

It doesn't take much imagination to figure out what Iran will do with another \$100 billion, which is the windfall that they are about to receive based on this bad deal. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have both begrudgingly admitted, it is nearly certain that the Iranians will use this money to sow the seeds of even more death and destruction. Think about that. They are nearly certain that part of this \$100 billion will go there.

The Islamic Republic is not our friend, Mr. Speaker. It is a dangerous geopolitical foe. It is led by a cult of extremists that are hellbent on our annihilation. Yet President Obama will do nothing to stem the tide of the Ayatollah's ambitions.

When faced with an adversary whose theology and eschatology are fundamentally incompatible with peace and world order, the United States, under President Obama's leadership, chose a path of appeasement. I truly believe President Obama has made perhaps the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in our lifetime. We are now facing a newly emboldened, cash-rich, radical Islamic regime fully committed to weakening our Nation, terrorizing the West, and destroying our way of life.

Mr. Speaker, it is up to Congress to do everything in our power to keep as much of this money as possible out of the hands of Iran's terrorist proxies. The Congress must move swiftly to strengthen terrorism- and human rights-related sanctions against Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Congress must maintain strict oversight over Iran's nuclear program as its infrastructure remains intact.

Iran's hostility must be combated, Mr. Speaker, and this body should not abrogate that responsibility, even if our President already has.

#### SARACINI AVIATION SAFETY ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FITZPATRICK) for 5 minutes.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, in light of recent reports of ISIS entering Europe disguised as refugees and a terrorist having just tried to take down an aircraft, I think it is important to understand the threats we face, but also to learn from the past.

In the 9/11 Report, al Qaeda mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told al Qaeda terrorists to watch the cockpit doors at takeoff and landing to observe whether the captain went into the lavatory during the flight and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.

We all know what happened when these attackers stormed the flight deck and turned our airliners into weapons of war. But today, more than 14 years after the attacks of September 11, the FAA still admits the cockpit is vulnerable when the reinforced door has to be opened. That is unacceptable.

We know that terrorists study our vulnerabilities and make their plans accordingly. Yet, even after the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission emphasized the importance of "a layered security system," we have not taken the simple, cost-effective step to protect the skies above us with the installation of secondary barrier doors.

These lightweight, wire-mesh gates can be closed whenever the cockpit door is opened and effectively protect against a terrorist—or team of terrorists—rushing the cockpit by providing the pilot enough time to recognize the threat and reenter and lock the reinforced cockpit door. They are easy to deploy and stow, and provide the "layered protection" that experts agree is needed.

That is why I have introduced the Saracini Aviation Safety Act. This is a one-page bill named after my constituent, United Airlines pilot Victor J. Saracini, whose life was taken when his aircraft was hijacked and flown into the South Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11. It requires that these cost-effective secondary barriers be included on large passenger aircraft.

We promised to never forget those lost on 9/11 and the lessons learned by all of us on that tragic day; yet after many years and more than 40 hijacking attempts around the world, including five that were successful, we are still not taking this threat seriously.

Mr. Speaker, I will continue to advocate for the adoption of this common-sense policy, both as a stand-alone bill or as part of a larger piece of legislation like the FAA reauthorization, and I urge my colleagues to join me.

#### GTMO

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. PERRY) for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, one of the most oft-repeated campaign promises from President Obama's 2008 campaign was his determination to close the U.S. Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

Congress, a coequal branch of government representing each citizen and re-elected every 2 years, hasn't come to the same conclusion as President Obama about the status of GTMO moving forward. Because of this, we have blocked funding for its closure year after year after year.

We have strong reasons for concern. Last September, the Director of National Intelligence reported that 117 transferred detainees are confirmed to be reengaging in terrorist activities, with another 79 suspected to have done so. Disturbingly, this amounts to a full 30 percent of transferred detainees either confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities.

The Director's report clearly shows that the detainee transfer process is obviously deeply flawed and poses a significant unnecessary and unaccept-

able risk to the security of our Nation and, quite frankly, the world.

The high percentage of reengagement clearly exposes the fact that we have just simply failed to properly identify the threat posed by transferred detainees and provide necessary safeguards to protect our citizens—safeguards that should have been in place before one single transfer ever took place.

Given the dire national security implications posed by these detainee transfers, I, along with 23 of my colleagues in this House, sent a letter last week to President Obama requesting to see the terms of agreements made with countries where detainees have and will be transferred.

There are 55 countries, by the way, including the likes of Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Yemen, really? Libya is a failed state—which we may have had a great part in creating—and we are sending terrorists there to be detained? Think about it. What incentive would it take for you to bring a terrorist to your country? To your neighborhood? To your home?

In particular, I am interested in the agreements' provisions to mitigate the inherent danger posed by detainee transfers. Specifically, what were the provisions aimed at preventing reengagement? Were there any? How did we ensure accountability by the home countries? What did these nations do to prevent contact with known terrorists, especially in countries that are full of terrorists, like Yemen or Somalia? How did we ensure these countries offer no form of aid and assistance to terrorist organizations?

The President says detaining these people is a recruiting magnet. Well, I wonder if we shouldn't detain gang members in our country. It is a right of passage to go to prison if you are in a gang. Should we let them all out, too? According to that logic, incarcerating them creates more of them.

He also says that detaining them indefinitely, without a trial, violates America's principles. You know what? He is right. You ought to ask yourselves as taxpayers: Why did we pay millions of dollars for a state-of-the-art court facility for sensitive and top-secret information during a trial, and yet no one has been put on trial? It is right there next to the detention facility. I walked through it myself. Why can't the military tribunals take place so we can find out what the deal is with these people and have them incarcerated correctly or set them free? It doesn't happen at all.

President Obama declared to America in 2013 that his administration is "the most transparent administration in history." I will take some issue with that. Despite that fact, the President has clearly not lived up to this standard recently.

I sincerely hope that the President will give his promise of transparency higher priority than the priority given to unilaterally closing GTMO as part of a final-year, legacy-driven agenda. It is