

snare, that this report was able to be produced. I could not be happier that we made it public while Senator ROCKEFELLER remains a Member of this body and has the chance to participate in this.

I join Chairman FEINSTEIN in recognizing the exceptional work of the Intelligence Committee staff: David, Dan, Alissa—who is not with us any longer. I thank you for mentioning Andrew Grotto, who was my staff member, who worked on this report. I feel we have done a very good thing here. I appreciate very much in particular Senator MCCAIN coming forward. He brings a unique moral perspective and force to this conversation. He has wielded that moral perspective and force with great courage.

I yield the floor.

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#### RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 2 p.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 1:11 p.m., recessed until 2 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Ms. BALDWIN).

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#### MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

If no one yields time, time will be equally charged to both sides.

The Senator from Georgia.

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#### SSCI STUDY OF THE CIA'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today as the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to respond to the public release of the declassified version of the executive summary and findings and conclusions from the committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program.

This is not a pleasant duty for me. During my 4 years as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have enjoyed an excellent relationship with our chairman, Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN. We have worked closely to conduct strong bipartisan oversight of the U.S. intelligence community, including the passage and enactment of significant national security legislation. However, this particular study has been one of the very, very few areas where we have never been able to see eye-to-eye.

Putting this report out today is going to have significant consequences. In addition to reopening a number of old wounds both domestically and internationally, it could be used to incite unrest and even attacks against our servicemembers, other personnel overseas, and our international partners. This report could also stoke additional mistreatment or death for

American or other Western captives overseas. It will endanger CIA personnel, sources, and future intelligence operations. This report will damage our relationship with several significant international counterterrorism partners at a time when we can least afford it. Even worse, despite the fact that the administration and many in the majority are aware of these consequences, they have chosen to release the report today.

The United States today is faced with a wide array of security challenges across the globe, including in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, north Africa, Somalia, Ukraine, and the list goes on. Instead of focusing on the problems right in front of us, the majority side of the Intelligence Committee has spent the last 5 years and over \$40 million focused on a program that effectively ended over 8 years ago, while the world around us burns.

In March 2009, when the committee first undertook the study, I was the only member of the Intelligence Committee who voted against moving forward with it. I believed then, as I still do today, that vital committee and intelligence community resources would be squandered over a debate that Congress, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court had already settled. This issue has been investigated or reviewed extensively by the executive branch, including criminal investigations by the Department of Justice, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as other entities.

Congress has passed two separate acts directly related to detention and interrogation issues—specifically, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The executive branch terminated the CIA program and directed that future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation. Also, the Supreme Court decided *Rasul v. Bush* in 2004, *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* in 2004, *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* in 2006, as well as *Boumediene v. Bush* in 2008, all of which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus review and identified certain deficiencies in both the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act.

By the time I became the vice chairman, the minority had already withdrawn from active participation in the study as a result of Attorney General Holder's decision to reopen the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the CIA's detention program. This unfortunate decision deprived the committee of the ability to interview key witnesses who participated in the CIA program and essentially limited the committee's study to the review of a cold documentary record. Now, how can any credible investigation take place without interviewing witnesses? This is a 6,000-page report, and not one single witness was

ever interviewed in this study being done. This is a poor excuse for the type of oversight the Congress should be conducting.

There is no doubt that the CIA's detention and interrogation program—which was hastily executed in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in our Nation's history—had flaws. The CIA has admitted as much in its June 27, 2013, response to the study. There is also no doubt that there were instances in which CIA interrogators exceeded their authorities and certain detainees may have suffered as a result. However, the executive summary and findings and conclusions released today contain a disturbing number of factual and analytical errors. These factual and analytical shortfalls ultimately led to an unacceptable number of incorrect claims and invalid conclusions that I cannot endorse.

The study essentially refuses to admit that CIA detainees—especially CIA detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques—provided intelligence information which helped the U.S. Government and its allies to neutralize numerous terrorist threats. On its face, this refusal does not make sense given the vast amount of information gained from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional terrorists, and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning.

Instead of acknowledging these realities, the study adopts an analytical approach designed to obscure the value of the intelligence obtained from the program. For example, the study falsely claims that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played “no role” in the identification of Jose Padilla because Abu Zubaydah, a senior member of Al Qaeda with direct ties to Osama bin Laden, provided the information about Padilla during an interrogation by FBI agents who were “exclusively” using what is called “rapport-building” techniques against him more than 3 months prior to the CIA's “use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques.” What the study ignores, however, is the fact that Abu Zubaydah's earlier interrogation in April of 2002 actually did involve the use of interrogation techniques that were later included in the list of enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, the facts demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to “around the clock” interrogation that included more than 4 days of dietary manipulation, nudity, and more than 126 hours—which is about 5 days—of sleep deprivation during a 136-hour period by the time the FBI finished up the 8.5-hour interrogation shift in which Abu Zubaydah finally yielded the identification of Jose Padilla. So during a 5-day time period, Abu Zubaydah got less than 10 hours of sleep, yet the majority does not acknowledge that this was an enhanced interrogation. In light of these facts,