

I ask the chairman to work, as this bill moves forward, to ensure that the bill does not degrade the NEPA process. I also hope that the chairman will work with me to provide the Corps the authority to perform ecosystem restoration work on lands owned by other Federal agencies, which is needed to complete important projects such as the South San Francisco Bay Salt Pond Restoration Project. I tried to offer a simple amendment to the Water Resources Reform and Development Act today, but the Rules Committee did not make my amendment in order.

Currently, the Army Corps of Engineers has the authority to use construction funds to perform flood protection work on lands owned by other Federal agencies, but the Corps does not have the legal authority to use construction funds to perform ecosystem restoration work on lands owned by other Federal agencies. In 2013, we all believe that good flood protection projects must incorporate ecosystem restoration, and the Corps has the ability to do integrated projects like this everywhere else except on lands owned by another Federal agency. This poses a significant hurdle in the case of the South San Francisco Bay Salt Pond Restoration Project, which seeks to return the San Francisco Bay to its natural state and provide flood protection and wetlands restoration.

In this case, the State of California and the United States Government, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, own the land on which the project will be performed even though most of the funding to buy the land came from the State and non-Federal interests. The Corps has told the local partners that it does not have the legal authority to perform the ecosystem restoration aspects of this work on lands owned by the Fish and Wildlife Service and that it needs Congress to provide that authority. My amendment simply sought to fix this situation by granting the Corps that authority so it could pursue this joint flood protection and ecosystem restoration project.

I ask Chairmen SHUSTER and GIBBS and Ranking Members RAHALL and BISHOP to work with me as this bill goes to conference with the Senate in order to provide the Corps with the authority it needs to carry out this project and projects for which it has already been authorized to perform feasibility studies.

#### A TRIBUTE TO A TEXAS LEGEND, BUM PHILLIPS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. OLSON) for 5 minutes.

Mr. OLSON. Mr. Speaker, my hometown of Houston, Texas, lost an icon last week, Bum Phillips.

Bum coached the Houston Oilers in their heyday, 1975 through 1980.

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Twice during that tenure, they came within one game of going to the Super Bowl.

Bum was loved because he was more than a football coach. He was a true Texan who happened to be a football coach—a Houston, Texas, football coach.

Bum understood the rivalry between Dallas, Texas, and Houston, Texas. He said:

The Dallas Cowboys may be America's team, but the Houston Oilers are Texas' team.

He knew football was just a game.

As he said:

Winning is only half of it. Having fun is the other half.

And he had fun.

In 1977, the Oilers drafted a star running back from Texas, Earl Campbell, a Heisman Trophy winner, a University of Texas graduate, a Longhorn from Tyler, Texas. In their first practice, Earl finished dead last in the mile run of the whole team. A reporter asked Bum if he was worried about Earl, could he perform in the NFL. Bum dead-panned:

When it's first and a mile, I won't give it to him.

He loved his players, nobody more so than Earl Campbell. Bum showed his love for Earl by saying:

I don't know if Earl is in a class by himself, but I do know that when that class gets together, it sure don't take long to call the roll.

Love ya, Blue; love ya, Bum. Thanks for the memories. God has a small class waiting for you in Heaven, and, yes, it won't take long to take the roll.

God bless Bum Phillips.

#### SUSTAINING THE ARAB SPRING

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, when a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire nearly 3 years ago to protest his lack of economic opportunity and maltreatment at the hands of local police, his desperate act touched off a political revolution that has convulsed the Arab world from the Maghreb to the Gulf.

First in Tunisia and then in Egypt, popular protests toppled long-serving autocrats while Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi was ousted by NATO-backed rebels. Elsewhere, from Bahrain to Syria, regimes have proven more resilient and, in several cases, willing to use extreme levels of violence to maintain their survival.

So, in the waning months of the third year of what has been dubbed the "Arab Spring," the future of a large swath of the global community remains uncertain. With Egypt under military control and Syria ablaze, it is not surprising that many here in the United States and elsewhere in the West view each new development with concern that an already volatile region could spiral completely out of control.

The situation in Syria is undoubtedly grim and Egypt faces a prolonged period of instability, but the news is not uniformly bad. In Tunisia, the Islamist government, headed by the Ennahda Party, has acceded to opposition demands that it hand over power to a caretaker government and schedule new elections.

Tiny Tunisia could again show its larger neighbors that a democratic transition—even an extended one of several intermediate steps—is possible in a region buffeted by the crosscurrents of religion, tribalism, and authoritarianism, and fueled by a huge demographic bulge of young people who are better educated and more connected to the world than their parents but who lack jobs and hope.

But even if Tunisia's next government is more reflective of the desires of the Tunisian people and is able to attack the problems that have retarded the country's progress, the pace of change will be slower than many Tunisians will desire. Entrenched interests and institutions connected to the ancien regime, what Egyptians have dubbed the "deep state," will conspire to stand in the way of a brighter future for Tunisia's people and slow the pace of change throughout the region.

Around the world, but especially here in Washington, the regional developments have fostered unease as events on the ground have proven less than amenable to external "management." The power of entrenched interests was more than offset by the early strength of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, giving rise to the fear of secular autocracies being supplanted by theocratically-oriented governments that would embrace the principle of "one man, one vote, one time."

This fear of an Islamist takeover has had two main effects in the first years of the Arab transition. The first is that it served to inhibit the American response for fear of strengthening the Islamists' hold or provoking a popular backlash. The other has been to drive a wedge between the United States and the Gulf Arab monarchs, who have been the most resistant to change and accommodation and understand fully the implications for their rule.

But change will be hard to resist. The same forces that swept aside Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's Ben Ali are at work throughout the region. The United States needs to craft policies that acknowledge the centrality of that fact, as well as the reality that this is a process that will play itself out over a generation and perhaps longer. We need to build mechanisms capable of supporting a transition in the Arab world in three dimensions: political, economic, and civil society.

Next week, I will discuss how the U.S. can help foster these three pillars of democratic development in a way that can be sustained without requiring an outsized share of our limited resources. In the weeks to come, I will be sharing a few more detailed thoughts