''(C) Namibia; and

''(D) Mauritius.''.

(b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by subsection (a) apply to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) REVIEW AND REPORTS.—

(1) ITC REVIEW AND REPORT.—

(A) REVIEW.—The United States International Trade Commission shall conduct a review to identify yarns, fabrics, and other textile and apparel inputs that through new or increased investment or other measures can be produced competitively in beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 7 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States International Trade Commission shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Comptroller General a report on the results of the review carried out under subparagraph (A).

(2) GAO REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the submission of the report under paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that, based on the results of the report submitted under paragraph (1)(B) and other available information, contains recommendations for changes to United States trade preference programs, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.) and the amendments made by that Act, to provide incentives to increase investment and other measures necessary to improve the competitiveness of beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries in the production of yarns, fabrics, and other textile and apparel inputs identified in the report submitted under paragraph (1)(B), including changes to requirements relating to rules of origin under such programs.

(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

(A) the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the term ''beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries'' has the meaning given the term in section 506A(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2466a(c)).

(d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—Section 6002(a)(2)(B) of Public Law 109–432 is amended by striking ''(B) by striking'' and inserting ''(B) in paragraph (3), by striking''.

SEC. 4. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES.

Section 505 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2465) is amended by striking ''December 31, 2008'' and inserting ''December 31, 2009''.

SEC. 5. CUSTOMS USER FEES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13031(j)(3) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c(j)(3)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''November 14, 2017'' and inserting ''February 21, 2018''; and

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ''October 7, 2017'' and inserting ''January 31, 2018''.

(b) REPEAL.—Section 15201 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–246) is amended by striking subsections (c) and (d).

SEC. 6. TIME FOR PAYMENT OF CORPORATE ESTIMATED TAXES.

The percentage under subparagraph (C) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act is increased by 2.25 percentage points.

SEC. 7. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

Section 15402 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–246) is amended—

(1) in subsections (a) and (b), by striking ''Carribean'' each place it appears and inserting ''Caribbean''; and

(2) in subsection (d), by striking ''231A(b)'' and inserting ''213A(b)''.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERMISSION TO CONSIDER AS ADOPTED MOTIONS TO SUSPEND THE RULES

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motions to suspend the rules relating to the following measures be considered as adopted in the form considered by the House on Saturday, September 27, 2008: House Resolution 1224, H.R. 4131, H.R. 6600, H.R. 6669, S. 3536, S. 3598, S. 3296, and S. 2304.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, respective motions to reconsider are laid on the table.

There was no objection.

THE DEFEAT OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008

(Ms. KAPTUR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. KAPTUR. Madam Speaker, this was an amazing day in the Congress of the United States. The American people were actually heard, and fear was put on the shelf as we stopped hasty action that Wall Street powerhouses had attempted to ram through this Congress. It was a sobering day. It was an exhausting day. Now we have to get to work to create a new moment: to draft legislation on a bipartisan basis that is responsible, that is rigorous and that meets the real needs.

This includes securities and exchange reform legislation to expand credit flows. The SEC and bank regulators must act immediately to suspend the fair value accounting rules; they must clamp down on abuses by short sellers, and they must withdraw the Basel II capital rules. These will go a long way to expanding credit flows at the local level.

We have to stabilize our housing markets on Main Street, and we have to reform the regulatory process and investigate the wrongdoers who brought America and the American people to this juncture.

We have to fund the FBI to go after those who have exhibited malfeasance, accounting fraud, who have used abusive practices, and who have made billions doing it.

I want to thank the American people and this Congress for doing what was right, not what was hasty.

REGULATING WALL STREET

(By William M. Isaac)

The Fed's decision to open the discount window to Wall Street firms, and to subsidize the takeover of Bear Stearns, requires that we rethink the regulation of Wall Street. How we resolve the issues will have profound effect on our financial markets for years to come.

Before attempting to come up with answers, we need to make sure we know and understand the questions. I will try to identify the important ones.

A. Who Gets Access to the Safety Net? Under What Circumstances? What Price Do They Pay? The federal safety net (i.e., the ability to borrow from the Fed and to offer insured deposits) was created to promote stability in the banking and thrift industries, and the cost is borne by banks and thrifts. The deposit insurance fund now exceeds $50 billion, and each year the Fed pays to the Treasury billions of dollars of profits earned in part from interest-free reserves maintained by banks.

If we expand the safety net, which firms should be included—investment banks, hedge funds, leveraged buyout firms, insurance companies, others? How will we draw the line—size of firm, inter-connections to other firms, harm a failure would cause to consumers or businesses, the potential impact of a failure on financial stability?

If non-banks are granted access to the safety net, will they be required to help pay cost? Would it be fair to banks and thrifts to have invested billions per year in the safety net for much of the past century to suddenly allow non-banks to obtain the benefits of the safety net? What would be the competitive effects on banks and thrifts?

B. Who Will Regulate Our New Universe of Safety Net Firms? Treasury argues that we need to revamp the regulation of financial firms in view of the new world of finance in which commercial banks, thrifts, investment banks, insurance companies, and others perform many of the same functions. It is suggested that we need to consolidate the regulators while designating a single ''market stability'' regulator.

I would argue that the genius of the American system of government is the diffusion of government power. We do not believe in centralized planning, and we rely heavily on checks and balances.

One of the clearest lessons of the S&L crisis of the 1980s is that we must have an independent deposit insurance agency armed with the full array of examination and enforcement powers. The former FSLIC, which insured deposits at S&Ls, was a toothless agency operating as a subsidiary of the primary regulator. The failure to provide that check on the S&L industry was an important contributing factor to a taxpayer loss of some $150 billion. Are we prepared to go down that path again in our pursuit of a tidy organizational chart?

We currently have at least four agencies heavily focused on maintaining stability in the financial markets—the Fed, the SEC, the FDIC, and Treasury. Do we really believe that having a single agency fretting about market stability will be an improvement? If so, which agency has been proven to have such all-knowing vision and wisdom?

The major problem confronting our financial system for the past year is the collapse in the residential real estate markets. Did the banking agencies and Treasury not notice that unregulated mortgage loan brokers were sprouting up everywhere, that securitizations were providing unprecedented liquidity to mortgage markets, that