Waipio Little League baseball team for winning the 2008 Little League World Championship. These young men from Hawaii won the World Series on August 24, after defeating Team Mexico with an impressive score of 12–3.

As a member of the Hawaii Congressional Delegation and as an island resident I am delighted to distinguish these young men.

Waipio became only the second team in Little League World Series Championship game history to score in every inning. It was the second time in four years that a team from Oahu won the world title in what is arguably the biggest event in youth sports.

The Waipio Players have demonstrated skills in leadership, athleticism, and above all, team work. Through their example we can all recognize that with cooperation and hard work much can be achieved.

I join their family and friends in applauding them on this outstanding achievement. I would like to acknowledge all the coaches and players' families who make this program such a success. For the commitment, time, and expense it took to get the team from their home field in Waipio all the way to the World Series in Williamsport, PA.

As was evidenced by the hundreds of Hawaii residents that lined Kalakaua Avenue during the ''Parade of Champions'' earlier this month—Waipio Little League, you make Hawaii proud.

JOB CREATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF ACT OF 2008

SPEECH OF

HON. RUSH D. HOLT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 26, 2008

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7110, the Appropriations for Job Creation and Preservation, Infrastructure Investment, and Economic and Energy Assistance Act of 2008.

There is no denying that our country is in the midst of a financial crisis. While those in the media continue to focus on the crisis on Wall Street, they have forgotten that American families have been struggling for months. The unemployment rate has been steadily increasing, reaching 6.1 percent this month, the highest level since 1992. 84,000 Americans lost their jobs in August and 605,000 have lost their jobs this year. Employed Americans are continuing to struggle from increased energy and food costs, and decreasing wages. Many are at risk of losing their pensions due to bad decisions made by Wall Street. The legislation before us today would directly help those struggling on Main Street and I strongly encourage my colleagues to support it.

H.R. 7110 would provide immediate assistance to those who need it most. It would extend unemployment benefits by 7 weeks for workers who have exhausted regular unemployment compensation. It would help provide healthcare to the growing number low-income children and families by providing a temporary increase in the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid health costs. It would provide $2.6 billion for food stamps to address the rising food costs for seniors, people with disabilities and very poor families with children. It would also increase access to job training for youths and for workers who have lost their jobs to help them to find new employment.

This legislation would help to grow our economy by providing tens of thousands of jobs by making a significant investment in our nation's infrastructure. H.R. 7110 would provide $12.8 billion to improving our nation's aging highways and bridges. It would contribute $12.5 billion for investment in our nation's water resource infrastructure, $3 billion for repairing crumbling schools, $5.1 billion for expanding public transportation including Amtrak, and $1 billion for improving public housing.

H.R. 7110 would also provide for our long term energy needs. This legislation would provide $500 million to accelerate the development of renewable energy and energy efficient technologies. Additionally, it would invest $1 billion in advanced batteries.

This legislation would provide some much needed relief to America's families as they struggle through these tough economic times. However there is much more that needs to be done to keep our economy strong in the long term. I look forward to working with my colleagues to find real solutions which will help to keep America's economy strong.

UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT

SPEECH OF

HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 26, 2008

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill which will do unacceptable damage to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

I have worked for over three years in opposition to the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement because of its disastrous implications for nonproliferation. I've been called the ''Arch-Critic'' of the deal; but really I see myself as the ''Arch-Defender'' of nuclear nonproliferation. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons is not something over which the United States can afford to compromise; this issue is central to both international stability and our own security here at home. I'm not ''attacking'' India, I am defending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

My goal has been to get meaningful nonproliferation conditions included in the agreement at all levels, including at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). But the Bush administration fought this at every turn.

The legislation I introduced in 2005, H. Con. Res. 318 outlined the serious nonproliferation problems of the proposed India nuclear cooperation agreement.

I testified before the House International Relations Committee on May 11, 2006 and explained the incredible dangers of the President's proposal. I told them that the deal was ''ill-conceived, that it undermines U.S. national security interests, and that it sets a dangerous precedent that will be exploited by our adversaries and rivals.'' I continue to believe that this is the case.

In response to the issues I and others raised regarding the threat to Congressional prerogatives from the administration's draft bill, the bill that was actually introduced removed many of the worst ''blank check'' provisions of the Administration bill. For instance, the administration bill would not have allowed the Congress to even see India's IAEA Safeguards Agreement or the Nuclear Suppliers' Group rule change before we voted on whether or not to give final approval.

The Motion to Recommit which I offered during floor debate on July 26, 2006 focused on India's dangerous relationship with Iran. My motion would have required India to help us halt Iran's nuclear program. It received 192 votes—the strongest vote that opponents of the deal were able to muster. Sadly, however, it was not included in the final bill.

But after the Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde Act of 2006, to allow in principle nuclear trade with India, the Bush Administration ignored many of the most important nonproliferation-related conditions and requirements which were contained in that legislation. President Bush has negotiated a deal with India which is universally recognized by nonproliferation experts as ripping an enormous hole in the nonproliferation regime by granting unprecedented concessions to India, a country that has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain for the RECORD, the problems inherent with this bill, and more generally with President Bush's now three-year campaign to carve out a massive loophole to the nonproliferation rules on behalf of India.

ADMINISTRATION ARGUMENTS FAIL THE REALITY TEST

In selling its proposal for the nuclear cooperation agreement with India, the Bush Administration relied on arguments which simply fail the realty test. Among the most glaringly false arguments on which the administration continues to rely to this day are that the nuclear deal will unlock India for American commerce, and that India will be a natural strategic partner with the United States,

The U.S.-India trade relationship

The Bush Administration has argued that the nuclear cooperation agreement will exponentially boost commerce with India. They also argued repeatedly that if the nuclear deal were not immediately approved by the Congress, the U.S. would lose the benefit of this trade.

But in reality, we already have strong and growing trade ties with India, and there is no reason to believe that this will be substantially altered by the nuclear cooperation agreement. Furthermore, I believe that the Bush Administration has sought to use this false economic argument to rush Congressional approval.

The truth is that since 2000, Indian exports to the United States have doubled, and U.S. exports to India have almost tripled. In the last 30 years, total bilateral trade has grown almost 8-fold, an enormous increase. In 2006, our total bilateral trade topped $31.9 billion, growing at a whopping 18.9% over the previous year. Even during the worst moments of the U.S.-India relationship, for instance after the 1974 and 1998 Indian nuclear tests, trade continued to grow at rapid rates.

The bottom line is that trade between the United States and India will continue to grow, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the nuclear cooperation agreement.

The U.S.-India strategic relationship

The Bush administration has repeatedly called the U.S.-Indian relationship a ''Strategic Partnership.'' I am a strong supporter of India, and I believe that the United States and India must, and will, continue to have a relationship marked by mutual cooperation and shared values. But I do not believe, as the Bush Administration has essentially argued, that India will become a subservient partner to the United States.

The reality is that India has always followed a fiercely independent foreign policy, and will certainly continue to do so. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told his Parliament in August of 2006 that, ''Our sole guiding principle in regard to our foreign policy, whether it is on Iran or any other country, will be dictated entirely by our national interest.''

The first major test of the U.S.-India strategic partnership is the question of how to deal with Iran's nuclear program. If India really were a steady strategic partner to the United States, New Delhi would be actively supporting the U.S. in halting the Iranian nuclear program. But instead of assisting the U.S. with Iran, India's longstanding strategic relationship with Iran has only grown stronger.

Let me list some of India's actions vis-à-vis Iran which have led me to conclude that India is not fully and actively supporting United States' efforts to sanction and isolate Iran for its ongoing nuclear program: India has repeatedly defended Iran's nuclear program; India has developed intelligence outposts in Iran near the Pakistani border; India and Iran have held two joint naval exercises, in March 2003 and March 2006; The 2003 Iranian-Indian New Delhi Declaration explicitly raised concerns about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq; Indian scientists have been sanctioned by the U.S. for WMD-related transfers to Iran, most recently in July 2006; India is pursuing an $8 billion gas pipeline from Iran. India has committed to help Iran build a Liquefied Natural Gas terminal; the two countries established the Indian-Iranian Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism in 2003; and India is developing a port in south-east Iran which analysts believe will be a naval base.

The other major test of the U.S.–India strategic partnership is how to address the rise of China. Some supporters of the nuclear deal will admit, in their more candid moments, that the real driver behind this enormous change is a desire on the part of the Bush Administration that India become the U.S. ''hedge'' to contain China's rise in Asia.

But India has no desire for conflict of any kind with China, and India will not act as an American proxy. To put it simply, it is not in India's interest to risk poor relations with China. China is India's second largest trading partner. India and China signed an energy agreement to prevent them from bidding for the same resources and driving up prices, in January 2006. Total bilateral India-China trade has grown at over 30% every year since 1999, even faster than India–U.S. trade has grown.

China is simply too valuable as a partner, and too potentially threatening as an enemy, for India to seek anything but positive relations. And all the armchair strategists who have been trying to sell the idea of India as an American proxy against China are absolutely foolish. It's not going to happen.

I am not arguing that India cannot or should not have an independent foreign policy. I'm arguing it inevitably will chart its own course, as any powerful nation would be expected to do. My colleagues should be realistic about what we can expect from India in terms of support for U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Bush Administration seems to think that by granting India international nuclear trade we are locking them into a permanent foreign policy alliance with the U.S. That is absolutely naive, and I believe that the Bush Administration's strategic calculation that they are getting a permanent ally in exchange for a wholesale change of international nonproliferation rules is simply wrong.

U.S. VIOLATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which the United States is a signatory, states that, ''Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.'' However, the U.S.–India nuclear agreement could put the United States in violation of this central obligation, since India's nuclear weapons program is likely to both indirectly and directly benefit from the terms of civilian nuclear trade, and since the United States could therefore be said to be ''encouraging'' India's manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The non-partisan Congressional Research Service analyzed at my request the question of whether the U.S.-India nuclear agreement could violate the United States' obligations under the NPT, and identified three ways in which this could occur. First, it analyzed the ''separation plan'' under which India's civilian and military nuclear facilities will be disentangled. Second, it investigated whether U.S. defacto recognition of India as a nuclear power could encourage India to continue its production of weapons. And third, it examines the most significant issue of U.S. assistance to India's weapons program: how imported nuclear fuel would free up India's domestic uranium for use in its weapons program.

Without a credible separation plan, the United States could wind up transferring technology directly into India's weapons program. The CRS analysis states:

> It should be noted that while IAEA safeguards ensure that nuclear material is not diverted, there are no procedures or measures in place to ensure that information, technology and know-how are not transferred from the civil sector to the military sector. This could become a key loophole, particularly because the separation plan places 8 indigenous power reactors under safeguards, while leaving at least 8 indigenous power reactors outside of safeguards. Without additional measures to prevent the transfer of personnel or knowledge from the safeguarded program to the unsafeguarded program, there would be little assurallce that assistance to the safeguarded program could not migrate to the military program.

By changing U.S. law to allow for nuclear trade with India, the United States will grant international legitimacy to India's nuclear arsenal. The CRS analysis states:

> The United States is not granting de jure recognition to India as a nuclear weapon state, because doing so would require amendment of the NPT, a prospect that is unattainable, according to most experts. Nonetheless, a successful U.S. effort to gain an exemption in U.S. nuclear cooperation law would place India in the company of only four other nations—the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia—all de jure nuclear weapon states. While this may not constitute formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state, many observers believe that it legitimizes India's nuclear weapons program, thus providing de facto recognition.

Critics of the President Bush's plan for the U.S.-India nuclear agreement long argued that allowing India to import uranium for its civilian reactors would free up its domestic fuel sources to concentrate exclusively on weapons production, giving India a vast new capacity for the manufacture of fissile material for weapons. The CRS analysis agreed with this argument, calling this indirect benefit to India's weapons program ''a clear consequence of such cooperation.'' The analysis continues:

> Secretary Rice seemed to be suggesting that having more uranium would not encourage or assist India's nuclear weapons program because it already had the fissile material it needed. If, as Secretary Rice suggests, the military requirements are dwarfed by civilian requirements, then finding international sources for civilian requirements could result in a windfall for the weapons program.

It is my strong belief that the NPT is the single most important international security agreement in existence. Furthermore the United States has a unique responsibility as the sole remaining superpower, as well as the driving force behind the drafting of the NPT in the middle of the last century, to exert constant vigilance on behalf of this extraordinarily significant treaty. If the United States does not strictly adhere to its NPT commitments then we are likely to see a dramatic and dangerous deterioration in the strength and stability ofthe Treaty.

INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE HYDE ACT AND THE ''123'' AGREEMENT

The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous requirements for the negotiation of the technical bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation, known as the ''123 Agreement'' in reference to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, the Bush Administration did not meet these requirements, and the 123 Agreement is therefore inconsistent with the law.

The most important inconsistencies between the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement are: nuclear testing and the termination of U.S. nuclear supply; assurances of nuclear supply to India in the case of supply ''disruption;'' and, the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material.

Nuclear Testing and the Termination of U.S. Nuclear Supply

The Atomic Energy Act requires, and the Hyde Act reinforces, that nuclear trade with any nation will terminate if that nation conducts a nuclear test. In addition, U.S. law provides that the United States may demand the return of all transferred nuclear materials and technology in case of a test.

Almost all other 123 Agreements state these requirements and rights explicitly. But the U.S.-India 123 Agreement doesn't. The India 123 Agreement provides no detail at all on the kinds of actions that will result in termination. Given the difficult disagreements in the past

with India on nuclear rights and responsibilities, this is not wise. In addition, the India 123 Agreement does not state that the United States has the right to demand the return of all transferred nuclear materials and technology if India conducts a test.

Because the 123 Agreement lacks these specific statements of the consequences of an Indian nuclear test, many in India argue that they not only have an unfettered right to test their nuclear weapons, but that no consequences will follow if they do. This is not what Congress intended with the Hyde Act, which specifically requires that cooperation end if India tests a nuclear bomb.

Assurances of Nuclear Supply to India in the Case of Supply ''Disruption''

The 123 Agreement contains two unprecedented clauses with respect to assuring India a supply of nuclear fuel under all scenarios, even if they test a bomb.

First, the 123 Agreement commits the United States to ''support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of the reactor.'' This means that the United States will assist India in stockpiling uranium from international suppliers. If supply was terminated for any reason, even if India failed to uphold its nonproliferation commitments, such as by testing a nuclear bomb, India could use this stockpile of fuel as a cushion against another supply cutoff. This clause flies in the face of the Hyde Act, which states that any fuel reserve should not exceed normal reactor operating requirements.

Second, if India should ever have a fuel supply disruption, the U.S. is to convene ''a group of friendly supplier countries . . . to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.'' Again, this would take place in the event of any disruption of supply, including due to India exploding a nuclear bomb.

This renders toothless the requirement in the Atomic Energy Act to stop nuclear exports to a country that tests a nuclear weapon. Will India care that U.S. cooperation is cut off if the U.S. itself is turning around and asking other countries to step in and provide the nuclear fuel to India? Would you think twice about illegally parking if you know your ticket will be paid for?

The Hyde Act specifically states that the United States is to seek to prevent other countries from providing India with nuclear material or technology if our own cooperation is cut off. The 123 Agreement should say the same thing, but it doesn't.

Reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear material

As a matter of policy, the United States doesn't transfer enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production equipment to any state because of the dangerous utility of those technologies for nuclear weapons programs. In fact, in February 2004, President Bush said that ''enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' And he had it right!

And reinforcing the point, the Hyde Act states that, ''Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water,'' the United States will work to further restrict the transfers of such technologies to India.

Yet, the U.S. has given India the right to reprocess our nuclear material, and promised cooperation in reprocessing technologies! How will the U.S. be able to stop other countries from transferring reprocessing technologies and other sensitive technologies if we are making such transfers ourselves?

The fact of the matter is that President Bush negotiated an agreement with India that does not meet the requirements of U.S. law, on testing, on assurances of supply, and on reprocessing.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous requirements relating to India's negotiations and declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While a number of these key requirements have not met, President Bush made a formal declaration that all of the Hyde Act requirements were fulfilled.

Separation plan

Section 104(b)(1) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine that India must provide to the United States and the IAEA ''a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs.'' However, the separation plan that India has provided is not credible from a nonproliferation perspective, since it will not prevent all materials from moving between the civilian and military spheres.

Under the separation plan, India will be allowed to use domestically produced heavy water to moderate its safeguarded civilian reactors. However, the domestically produced heavy water itself will not be safeguarded, and safeguards will be removed from old heavy water as it is removed from the reactor in exchange for new heavy water. This creates a serious problem within the separation plan, as the old heavy water will contain tritium, a nuclear byproduct material which is used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons.

India will be able to use tritium generated in its ''safeguarded'' reactors to boost the yield of its nuclear weapons, making the civilian-military separation plan utterly meaningless from a nonproliferation perspective. Yet, on September 10, 2008, President Bush made a formal declaration that ''India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs.''

India's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency

Section 104(b)(1) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine that:

India has ''filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.''

However, India has not filed such a declaration with the IAEA, and has stated that it will not do so until after the 123 Agreement has been approved.

Yet, on September 10, 2008, President Bush made a formal declaration that, India . . . has ''filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.''

India's progress towards concluding an Additional Protocol

Section 104(b)(3) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine that:

India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program.

The ''substantial progress'' required by the Hyde Act has simply not occurred. India and the IAEA have met just one time to discuss negotiations of an Additional Protocol, and one concept paper has been exchanged. No one knows what the final Additional Protocol will look like, if indeed one is ever successfully negotiated.

Yet, September 10, 2008, President Bush made a formal declaration that, ''India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program.''

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP WAIVER

The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous statements of United States policy relating to the negotiation of a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) guidelines for international nuclear trade with India. However, the Bush Administration ignored many of these statements of policy, and in at least one instance aggressively pursued a policy which was directly contradicted by the Hyde Act.

Termination of NSG supply in response to violations

Section 103(a)(4) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the United States to:

Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

However, the United States did not seek to establish strengthen the NSG guidelines to require a termination of NSG supply to a recipient states in the event of a violation of supplier and recipient understandings. In fact, many NSG member states sought to strengthen the NSG guidelines in this manner but could not because opposition by the Bush Administration. In this case the Bush Administration actively worked to thwart the policy of the United States as set by Congress in the Hyde Act.

Enrichment and reprocessing restriction

Section 103(a)(5) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the United States to:

Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.

However, the United States did not seek to strengthen NSG guidelines to restrict the transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, despite having sought such a restriction for four years. In 2004, President Bush declared in a major speech on nonproliferation that achieving a historic international restriction on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing was one of his administration's highest priorities. For the next four years, the Bush Administration sought to achieve such a restriction at the NSG, yet abandoned this issue during the negotiations regarding India.

Universalizing U.S. termination triggers

Section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the United States to:

> Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.

However, the United States did not seek to amend NSG guidelines to ensure that all international nuclear supply to India would be terminated if U.S. law required U.S. nuclear trade to be terminated. Such a rule would not only have significantly strengthened international nonproliferation policy, but it would have protected American firms from the possibility of being the only firms in the world barred from trade with India.

Madam Speaker, this bill, and the nuclear cooperation agreement with India which it approves, will do great damage to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Can we afford to undermine the nonproliferation rules at the very moment when Iran is speeding toward a viable nuclear capability, when North Korea is redoubling its intransigence and throwing out IAEA observers, and when Venezuela is requesting nuclear cooperation from Russia? No, we cannot. I urge my colleagues to think carefully about the implications of this bill for international stability and U.S. security, and vote against H.R. 7081.

H.R. 6460, THE GREAT LAKES LEGACY REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Mr. DINGELL. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6460, the Great Lakes Legacy Reauthorization Act. Today, we will vote to reauthorize the Great Lakes Legacy Act program for the next 2 years at its current level of $50 million per year rather than the $150 million per year for the next 5 years the House approved last week. I am supporting this Senate-amended version not because I believe the Great Lakes deserve substantially less money than we afforded them in the House, but because this very important cleanup program must be reauthorized before it expires next week.

The Great Lakes Legacy Act has been an incredibly successful program. In fact, the first success story from the Legacy Act is in Trenton, Michigan. Black Lagoon, as it had been named in the 1980s because of the oil and grease that had accumulated between the 1940s and the 1970s, was renamed Ellias Cove just 1 year ago after the area was remediated. Without the Great Lakes Legacy Act, the $9.3 million cleanup would not have been possible.

Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in voting ''yes'' on H.R. 6460 to reauthorize this program that will continue to clean up our national treasure. However, I look forward to a time, hopefully after the next election, when a single senator, who is not even from the Great Lakes region, cannot stand in the way of greater progress for our Great Lakes.

RECOGNIZING THE 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DOWNINGTOWN LIONS CLUB

HON. JIM GERLACH

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Mr. GERLACH. Madam Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the Downingtown Lions Club on its 80th Anniversary and to honor the service organization for its commitment to serving the community.

Founded in 1928, the Downingtown Lions Club is part of the largest service organization in the world, with approximately 1.3 million members in 202 nations.

National Lions Club founder and Chicago businessman Melvin Jones said in 1917 that the organization was created to allow their service clubs to give something back to their communities. And the Downingtown Lions Club has certainly carried out that mission admirably.

Thanks to the dedication and work of its members and volunteers, the Club built the Kerr Park Pavilion and installed a drinking fountain along the Struble Trail. Hundreds of people in the community have benefited from the Club's distribution of free eyeglasses and funding raised for sight and hearing programs, including the Leader Dog Program.

The Club will celebrate its 80th Anniversary on Saturday, October 4th during a dinner at the Thorndale Inn.

Madam Speaker, I ask that my colleagues join me today in recognizing the Downingtown Lions Club for reaching this special milestone and in commending the efforts of Club members, both past and present, for their tireless dedication and service to the Downingtown area community.

CONGRATULATING THE REV. GREGORY F. LUCEY ON THE OCCASION OF HIS RETIREMENT AS PRESIDENT OF SPRING HILL COLLEGE

HON. JO BONNER

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Mr. BONNER. Madam Speaker, it is with great pride and pleasure that I rise to honor the long and distinguished career of the Rev. Gregory F. Lucey on the occasion of his retirement as president of Spring Hill College in Mobile.

For the past 10 years, Father Lucey has been an integral part of the Mobile community. As Mobile's Press-Register wrote in a tribute, ''His remarkable accomplishments will set the standard for leadership at [Spring Hill College] for years to come.''

Father Lucey was a student at Campion Jesuit High School, a boarding school in Wisconsin, when he chose to follow in his brother's footsteps and become a Jesuit priest. Ordained in 1964, Father Lucey has said he knew then that God had a plan for his life. He went on to earn a master's degree in education as well as undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy from St. Louis University. He earned a master's degree in liturgy from the University of Notre Dame, and later, he earned a Ph.D. in educational administration from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Following his educational pursuits, Father Lucey served as a teacher at his former high school before being named the school's principal a short time later. Just one year later, he was named president of Campion Jesuit High School.

From there, Father Lucey went on to Seattle University where he served as vice president for development. In 1988, Father Lucey returned to a spiritual role, serving as rector of the Jesuit community at Marquette University. He then went on to become president and chairman of the board of the National Jesuit Conference in Washington, D.C.

In 1997, Father Lucey was named president of Spring Hill College, and over the past 11 years, he has earned an admirable record of accomplishment. Enrollment has increased by over 15 percent during his tenure, and he has helped grow the college's endowment by almost $20 million. The campus has also experienced tremendous growth—the construction of six new buildings and the renovation of eight others. Spring Hill College also consistently receives high marks in U.S. News & World Report's college rankings.

Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in recognizing a dedicated spiritual and community leader as well as friend to many throughout south Alabama. I know his friends and colleagues join me in extending thanks for his service over the years. On behalf of a grateful community, I wish him the best in all his future endeavors.

RECOGNIZING THE HONORABLE BUD CRAMER AND THE HONORABLE TERRY EVERETT ON THEIR RETIREMENT FROM CONGRESS

SPEECH OF

HON. NICK J. RAHALL II

OF WEST VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, September 25, 2008

Mr. RAHALL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize two of my fellow colleagues from the great state of Alabama, Congressman BUD CRAMER and Congressman TERRY EVERETT, who are set to retire at the end of the 110th Congress. Both of these Members have a passion for and deep respect for serving the American people that led them to serve the constituents of the 5th and the 2nd Congressional Districts, respectively.

BUD CRAMER has served the people of the 5th District of Alabama in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1991, where he faithfully served on the House Appropriations Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. TERRY EVERETT came to the House of Representatives 16 years ago and ever since he has spent his time helping the people of the 2nd Congressional District and serving on the Agriculture Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and as Ranking Member on the House Armed Services Committee.

As military veterans, they have both answered the call to serve their country time and again, and I know that as they start this new