

when the nexus between drug traffic and terrorist groups is becoming more acute, we need to make funding for our intelligence capabilities one of our highest priorities.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, the next vote will be on passage of the Defense appropriations bill. I congratulate the managers. It has been a job well done.

We are going to be on the port security bill tomorrow and on Monday. The managers are here, and they are ready to debate and take up amendments. We will not be voting tomorrow.

I remind my colleagues that we have scheduled an event on Monday at 6 o'clock to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. We invite all Members to participate.

There will be no more votes tonight. We will not be voting tomorrow. We want to have all opening statements tonight and tomorrow on the port security bill.

We will have announcements tomorrow morning as to whether we will be voting on Monday. The Democratic leader and I will make that announcement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read a third time.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The bill having been read for the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass? On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: The Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. CHAFEE).

Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) is necessarily absent.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 239 Leg.]

YEAS—98

Akaka	Clinton	Feingold
Alexander	Coburn	Feinstein
Allard	Cochran	Frist
Allen	Coleman	Graham
Baucus	Collins	Grassley
Bayh	Conrad	Gregg
Bennett	Cornyn	Hagel
Biden	Craig	Harkin
Bingaman	Crapo	Hatch
Bond	Dayton	Hutchinson
Boxer	DeMint	Inhofe
Brownback	DeWine	Inouye
Bunning	Dodd	Isakson
Burns	Dole	Jeffords
Burr	Domenici	Johnson
Byrd	Dorgan	Kennedy
Cantwell	Durbin	Kerry
Carper	Ensign	Kohl
Chambliss	Enzi	Kyl

Landrieu	Nelson (FL)	Smith
Lautenberg	Nelson (NE)	Snowe
Leahy	Obama	Specter
Levin	Pryor	Stabenow
Lincoln	Reed	Stevens
Lott	Reid	Sununu
Lugar	Roberts	Talent
Martinez	Rockefeller	Thomas
McCain	Salazar	Thune
McConnell	Santorum	Vitter
Menendez	Sarbanes	Voinovich
Mikulski	Schumer	Warner
Murkowski	Sessions	Wyden
Murray	Shelby	

NOT VOTING—2

Chafee Lieberman

The bill (H.R. 5631), as amended, was passed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate insists on its amendments, requests a conference with the House, and the Chair appoints the following conferees: Mr. STEVENS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. BOND, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. GREGG, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. BURNS, Mr. INOUE, Mr. BYRD, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. REID, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, and Ms. MIKULSKI.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to thank my staff for all their hard work on this bill, especially my clerk, Sid Ashworth. As always, she has done the work on this bill and a multitude of amendments, along with the staff. And Charlie Houy, on Senator INOUE's staff, has given good advice and leadership.

I also thank my colleague and partner, Senator INOUE. It is a nice birthday present to pass a bill of this size, I say to the Senator.

As I said, Charlie Houy, Betsy Schmid, Nicole Di Resta, and Kate Fitzpatrick for their support on this bill.

There is a large staff that works on this bill. We do not often name them all, but I will do it this time. This was a tough bill. I give credit to Kate Kaufer, Brian Wilson, Brian Potts, Alycia Farrell, Mark Haaland, Ellen Maldonado, Michael Pollock, Alison Garfield, Bridget Zarate, Jennifer Chartrand, and Janelle Treon. Miss Treon is not with us. She recently left the committee, but she was a vital partner in the creation of the bill. We wish her good luck in her new life in North Carolina. She can learn to dodge the hurricanes.

Thank you very much.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader is recognized.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, just for the purpose of our colleagues' schedules, we will not be voting Monday evening. Monday is September 11. As we said, there will be an event here at 6 o'clock, and I encourage all our colleagues to participate. But a number of our colleagues did ask whether we will

be voting Monday evening, and we will not. So there will be no rollcall votes on Monday.

We are going to turn to the port security bill, a bill that has been the subject of a whole lot of work by a number of our colleagues by both sides of the aisle. We have three committees that have parts of jurisdiction here. It is a very important bill. As we work to secure this country and secure the safety of the American people, we absolutely must address the issue of port security. So I am very pleased we are bringing that bill to the floor. We will address it tonight and tomorrow and Monday, and hopefully we can finish it shortly thereafter. I talked to the Democratic leader, and the managers on both sides of the aisle will be working to gather the amendments. We will be discussing and talking about those at the appropriate time.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to Calendar No. 432, H.R. 4954, the port security bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 4954) to improve maritime and cargo security through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 4919

(Purpose: To provide a complete substitute)

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment at the desk be considered and agreed to and further that it be considered as original text for the purpose of additional amendments and for debate only this evening.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 4919) was agreed to.

(The amendment is printed in today's RECORD under "Text of Amendments.")

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maine.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to present the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. This bill will help to close dangerous gaps in our ability to protect our shipping lanes and seaports from attack.

A number of our colleagues have worked very hard on this bill. This bill reflects not only bipartisan consultation and support but coordination among the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Commerce Committee, and the Finance Committee. I thank our leader, Senator FRIST, for encouraging and facilitating those discussions.

I particularly wish to thank my colleague, Senator MURRAY, who joined me in sponsoring the GreenLane cargo security bill in November of 2005, which

has served as the basis for the legislation we debate tonight. Senator MURRAY has been steadfast in her commitment to enhancing port security. She has been working on it since the attacks on our country 5 years ago. She has been a terrific partner.

Senator STEVENS, Senator INOUE, Senator GRASSLEY, Senator LIEBERMAN, Senator BAUCUS, Senator COLEMAN, and Senator ALLEN have also played critical roles on this important legislation. Their support and involvement have been invaluable in crafting a measure that I believe is going to make a real difference and that will improve our protection against terrorist threats without crippling the operations of our ports. This is very important. We need to strengthen security at our ports, but we need to do so in a way that does not cripple our system of trade, that does not place barriers in the way of moving legitimate goods.

This legislation will provide the structure and the resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through seaports that are both vulnerable points of entry and vital centers of economic activity.

Our legislation, our joint legislation, which is the product of so many weeks, months, and years of study and compromise, is a comprehensive approach that addresses all major aspects of maritime cargo security. It would require the Department of Homeland Security to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for all transportation modes by which cargo moves into, within, and out of American ports. It creates an Office of Cargo Security Policy to coordinate departmental activities and to be a central contact point for inter-agency, private sector, and international partners in cargo security. It requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop protocols for the resumption of trade at seaports after an incident. That is necessary to minimize economic losses. It authorizes risk-based grants, training, and exercises for port security. It improves and expands several security programs, such as the Container Security Initiative, known as CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, and establishes deadlines for DHS action on these programs. And it provides incentives for shippers and importers who meet the highest levels of cargo security standards.

Before commenting further on these provisions, let me offer a few facts that illustrate the importance of strengthening the security of our seaports.

America's 361 seaports are vital elements of our Nation's transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of overseas trade. In 2005 alone, U.S. ports logged 53,000 calls by foreign-flagged vessels, including 16,000 container ship calls that brought 11 million shipping containers to our shores.

The largest 22 ports, ranging from Los Angeles to Boston, handle 98 per-

cent of the container traffic. Nearly half of all container ship calls are made in just three States—California, New York, and Virginia—but traffic arrives at many ports, from Maine to Hawaii, including a port in my State, Portland, the largest port by tonnage in new England. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located.

In addition to our ports' economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security is obvious and the vulnerabilities of our ports worrisome. Shipping containers are a special source of concern. When we look at shipping containers, we know, in most cases, they contain useful consumer goods. But shipping containers could also be used to convey a squad of terrorists or a dirty bomb. In some sense, containers could be the 21st century "Trojan horse."

The vulnerabilities of containers are evident when one considers a recent incident that occurred in Seattle. In May, several Chinese nationalists illegally smuggled themselves within a shipping container that made its way to Seattle. Now, they were discovered, fortunately, but think if that container had, instead of including illegal Chinese immigrants seeking a better way of life, included individuals, terrorists, who were dedicated to destroying our way of life.

The container has also been called "the poor man's missile" because a low-budget terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the Pacific to a U.S. port for just a few thousands dollars. And the contents of a container do not have to be as complex as a nuclear or chemical or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner told the New York Times last year, a single container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and a detonation system could produce 10 times the blast that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on an American port could cause great loss of life, damage our energy supplies and infrastructure, cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on just-in-time inventory, prevent farmers from exporting their crops, and hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces.

Earlier this year, I visited the ports in L.A. and Long Beach and Seattle. At the invitation of Senator MURRAY, I examined the Seattle port. When one looks at the busy harbor in Seattle, one sees ferries bringing thousands of passengers—a large urban population—in sight of the port and two stadiums nearby. You realize immediately the depth and destruction that a ship carrying a container with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict at a single port.

Moreover, a successful port attack would likely trigger a security lockdown of all of our ports, just as the attacks 5 years ago grounded all commercial aircraft. So the economic damage would swiftly spread across the entire country. The Pacific Coast has already given us a glimpse of the economic damage that an attack on a port would cause. The west coast dock strike of 2002 was peaceful and anticipated, unlike any terror attack would be, but it cost an estimated \$1 billion a day in economic losses for each of the 10 days it lasted.

Of course, a port could also be a conduit for an attack as well as being a target itself. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded on a truck or a railcar or have its contents unpacked at a port and distributed to support an attack elsewhere—perhaps in the heartland of this country.

For these reasons, and many others, including the risks of container tampering or false documentation, the 9/11 Commission concluded that "Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation" as in commercial aviation.

Some actions have been taken to improve security at our seaports. The 9/11 terror attacks prompted some useful moves toward better security for vessel shipping lanes and the ports themselves. But, unfortunately, many of these initiatives have not proceeded under a comprehensive, strategic security plan. Some of them have lagged, and some of them have not been effectively implemented.

The Senate Homeland Security Committee has conducted five hearings on port security and the failures of DHS's cargo security programs. The first hearing we held back in March of 2003 when the committee heard testimony from several experts that cargo containers could well be the next target of terrorists. Three of these hearings have been conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator COLEMAN, and I thank him and Senator LEVIN for their efforts in this area. Indeed, several provisions in our bill address concerns that were identified through that joint investigative work.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine yield for just a brief comment or question or two?

Ms. COLLINS. I am happy to.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, let me just take a moment to thank Senator COLLINS for her leadership and the work of her committee in this area. I say to the Senator, I have been listening to her remarks. I think it is very important we outline the risks that are involved here and the importance of our ports to the economy of America.

Like the Senator from Maine, I myself recently went around looking at large and small ports, from the gulf all the way to Seattle and Tacoma. I must

say, I was somewhat pleased with the amount of effort that has been put in place in those ports.

But it also dramatizes how much more we need to do. We do need the macro legislation to deal with this. One of the great concerns is, as the Senator outlined, what would happen if we did have an event in one of those West Coast ports? It would lock them all down. What would be the process to restart them? I am also very much impressed with the appearance of those ports and the volume of the training activities. It is a critical area.

While a lot of work has been done and money has gone to our ports, big and small, we need this legislation. There is a lot more to it than just the restart protocols. It hasn't been easy because we have three committees with interest and jurisdiction, including Commerce and Finance. The Senator worked with the leadership of our Commerce Committee and of the Finance Committee, and I thank the Senator for that.

I urge my colleagues in the Senate that we move expeditiously on this legislation and that we not play games with it in any way because this is serious business. I feel for the person who would oppose this kind of legislation, or delay it, if some incident occurs. We need to move on it. This is the time to do it. It has been a real yeoman's task to bring it to this point. I wanted to be on record early commending the Senator from Maine, and I hope I will have an opportunity to talk later about some of the substantive parts of this legislation, which is critical for our country. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the junior Senator from Mississippi for his kind comments. He has been so helpful as a member of the Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee in helping us weave our way through a very difficult maze. Without his advice and support, I doubt that we would be here tonight. I express my personal appreciation to Senator LOTT for his guidance and his assistance and for keeping us all focused on the goal. We could never let turf battles or jurisdictional disputes block us from accomplishing such a needed and important task. He helped us keep our eye on the ball. I thank the Senator very much for his comments.

Mr. President, I was talking about the hearings we were having. Our most recent hearing was in April on the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, which I mentioned Senator MURRAY and I had introduced. We heard also from the House leaders on port security, including Representative DAN LUNGREN and Representative JANE HARMAN, as well as other experts on our Nation's ports. The following month, that bill was reported out of the Homeland Security Committee.

The Port Security Improvement Act will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of Government agen-

cies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear and measurable goals for better security of commercial operations from the point of origin to the destination. It will also establish mandatory baseline security standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

Perhaps most importantly, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be required to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake of an attack. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Government still has not established adequate protocols for resuming port operations and setting cargo release priorities after an attack. I will tell you, when I talk to port authority directors, every single one of them brings this up as a major issue. If we don't have a plan for restarting our ports and for releasing cargo, then our ports will be closed far longer than they would need to be and economic losses would multiply.

This legislation would also establish priorities for critical DHS programs necessary to improve maritime cargo security and would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress on their development and expansion. Let me give another example of where DHS has languished in some areas. They have made progress in others but languished in some.

For example, the Department has been working on a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2 years but has yet to issue it. Under our bill, the Department would have 6 months to establish minimum standards for securing containers in transit to the United States. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry would have to meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established.

The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential improvements in the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal Monitor Program, the CSI and C-TPAT.

The Automated Targeting System, ATS, is a screening mechanism that the Federal Government uses to help it determine which of the 11 million containers entering this country should receive further scrutiny. The GAO has criticized ATS for utilizing inadequate information to accurately assess the risk of cargo, and our legislation will ensure that the DHS improves that program.

Another notable provision of the bill is the requirement that radiation scanning be applied to 100 percent of the containers entering the 22 largest U.S. ports by December 31, 2007. Now, the result of that is that 98 percent of all cargo containers coming into U.S. ports will be screened for radiation. That is in addition to the radiation scanning that is done at foreign ports through the CSI and the Megaports Programs.

The legislation also expands and enhances the C-TPAT program to ensue the security of cargo from point of ori-

gin to destination. It creates a GreenLane, a third tier of C-TPAT, offering additional benefits to participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of security standards. The cooperation of private industry is vital to securing supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active cooperation in supply chain security efforts.

Another security measure that has languished for years is the vital Transportation Workers Identification Card, or the TWIC Program. Again, we would require DHS to publish a final rule on the implementation of this program by the end of this year.

Finally, this comprehensive legislation would authorize the competitive, risk-based Port Security Grants Program. It would have stable, consistent funding set at \$400 million each year for the next 5 years. This is a significant commitment of resources, and it will allow our ports to plan and to undertake multiyear projects that require a sustained investment.

The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 will help us construct an effective, layered, coordinated system that extends from the point of origin to the point of destination. It will cover the people, the vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime commerce. And it addresses a major vulnerability identified time and again by terrorism experts.

Mr. President, I do hope that we can proceed with all due haste to enact this important legislation.

I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. It reflects a bipartisan compromise between the three committees that have jurisdiction over the security of our Nation's ports, international intermodal supply chain and the administration of the Department of Homeland Security.

This bill strikes the right balance between security and facilitating the trade that is so important to our economy.

Our national economy depends on port security, yet amazingly, the administration has not made it the priority that it needs to be. It has consistently submitted inadequate funding requests and has routinely missed critical security deadlines that were required by law. It was not until the Dubai Ports World controversy hit the front pages of local newspapers that many members of the Congress began to take port security seriously.

I hope that Members of this body will give this important piece of legislation the consideration it deserves. Lastly, we all know that you cannot have a successful security policy without adequate funding. Today is a good first step, but the administration and this Congress must take the next step after we pass this legislation and fund these initiatives as proposed here.

There are more than 360 ports in our Nation that serve as a gatekeeper for our Nation's trade and commerce, bringing into the country most of the merchandise and raw materials our businesses rely upon. If an incident forced the shutdown of ports across the Nation, the impact on our national economy would be devastating and have long-term consequences.

The Coast Guard, through the National Maritime Transportation Act, has taken important steps to create a plan to guarantee trade resumes quickly after an attack. However, more needs to be done to enhance the Coast Guard's plan and ensure effective implementation. Our economic health depends on it.

Given the role our ports play in the economy, we cannot underestimate the importance of ensuring that the containerized cargo that comes into our country is safe and that the ships entering our borders do not carry enemies of our Nation. Yet less than 6 percent of the cargo coming into this country is inspected, a level that is unacceptable if we are to take security seriously.

Making the current situation worse is the fact that current State inspection and radiation scanning technologies are woefully inadequate.

The measure before us today addresses the shortfalls of the past 5 years. First, it enhances the examination of cargo domestically and before it reaches our shores. Second, the bill improves interagency cooperation. Third, it improves the sharing of intelligence information with the creation of interagency port security command centers. Fourth, it provides an additional director within to improve communication and cooperation between the public and private sectors to quickly resume trade should an incident occur. And fifth, the bill offers assistance and technical training to our partners in the war on terror. These are all simple fixes but fixes that have significant consequence in our efforts to protect our ports.

As we consider this piece of legislation, we must not forget the security needs of our other transportation systems. Amendments will be offered to this bill that relate to securing other modes of transportation and it is my intent to support those amendments as well so that we have a comprehensive approach to securing our infrastructure.

I am hopeful that the Senate will pass this bill as soon as possible. Our approach has broad bipartisan support. The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee has focused on the issues of transportation security long before the events of September 11, 2001.

We have dedicated substantial time and resources to oversee and investigate the security and safety of our Nation's systems of transportation and this bill will mark the fourth landmark transportation security related bill that has been brought before the Sen-

ate. The time is right to pass these needed security improvements, and I am hopeful that we can make it happen.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, it has been 5 years since September 11, and our country is still dangerously vulnerable. We have huge loopholes at our ports and in our cargo container system, and none of us should sleep well at night until we close those security holes and protect our country.

That is why I am on the Senate floor once again pushing for us to pass the bipartisan GreenLane bill. I am excited that after working for a number of years, we are now on the verge of making our country more secure.

The full House of Representatives passed our bill. The Senate Homeland Security Committee passed our bill. We have worked with the Commerce and Finance Committees to address the issues in the bill they have raised. Now it is up to us, the full Senate, to finally pass this bill.

Today I wish to explain why our ports are so vulnerable, how an attack would affect our people and our economy, and finally, how this bill will make us more secure and keep trade flowing.

To understand why our ports are so vulnerable, one just has to look at something that happened in my home State of Washington 3 weeks ago.

On August 16, there was a big scare at the Port of Seattle. Two containers that originated in Pakistan were offloaded at terminal 18. They were targeted for inspection. They were first scanned by a gamma-imaging machine, which is essentially a giant x-ray machine for cargo containers. The initial images suggested what was supposed to be in the container was different than what that x-ray scan showed. Next, the port officials brought in two security dogs, and both dogs detected what they thought were explosives in that cargo container at terminal 18.

To understand why that is such a scary incident in Seattle, one just has to look at the Port of Seattle and what surrounds it.

This photograph shows the Port of Seattle. We can see the port very clearly in the foreground. That is Seattle in the background. My colleague, Senator COLLINS, was out there and remarked, tonight and while she was out there, about the incredible closeness to where our containers are brought into the Port of Seattle, to where our downtown area is, where there are two sports stadiums that can have thousands and thousands of people at one time sitting in them, and I-5 is over here. That is the main highway that goes through the State of Washington, right through downtown Seattle. As one can see, these cargo containers sitting on these docks are within feet and yards of mass people, infrastructure, our community, our railroads, our transportation system, sports stadiums, and where people live and work.

During the scare I just mentioned, officials had to close the terminal and establish a 500-yard safety zone surrounding the terminal, and they had to create a 300-yard safety zone around the entire Seattle waterfront. Fortunately, that day, after having the port closed down for some time, further testing showed that what was in that container was just a false alarm.

I wish to take a second to commend everyone on the ground for doing an excellent job of immediately responding to a possibly very dangerous incident.

Here is the problem: We did not know what was in that container. We did not know. It could have posed a problem, and it was sitting right on the dock, right within our sports stadiums, within all of downtown Seattle, within our transportation systems, and where people live and work.

That is why we are presenting this bill tonight. The main idea of this bill is to push our country's borders out, to do the screening and testing for these cargo containers overseas so that the container never gets close to our shores if we think it is dangerous. But today, too often we wait until that container is sitting on American soil, dangerously close to our cities, before we find out whether it could pose a danger.

Fortunately, that Seattle incident ended well, but that very same week, we got a very stark warning about how it could have ended differently.

In August around the same time, the RAND Center for Terrorism and Risk Management Policy issued a very troubling report that showed what could happen if there is a nuclear device in a cargo container.

The RAND Corporation looked at the following scenario: terrorists put a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb inside a cargo container and detonated it at the port of Long Beach, CA. The researchers chose that scenario because, as they put it, "analysts consider it feasible, it is highly likely to have a catastrophic effect, and the target is both a key part of the U.S. economic structure and a critical global shipping center."

Here is what they said would have happened: Up to 60,000 people would be killed instantly from the blast or from radiation poisoning; 150,000 people would be injured by radiation exposure; up to 6 million people would flee Los Angeles; 2 to 3 million people would need to be relocated because their land would be contaminated by radiation. And finally, the economic loss simply would be about \$1 trillion. That is 10 times worse than September 11. Those costs would include medical care, insurance claims, workers' compensation, evacuation, construction. Imagine that—the economic damage would be 10 times worse than what happened on September 11.

How many more reports such as that is it going to take? How many port evacuations and scares is it going to take before we get serious about port

security? Time is not on our side. Each year, 6 million cargo containers enter our U.S. seaports, and that number is expected to quadruple in the next 20 years. These cargo containers carry the building blocks of our economy, but without adequate security, they can also provide an opportunity for terrorists to deliver a deadly one-two punch to our country. The first punch would create untold number of American casualties. The second punch would bring our economy to a halt. Today we are not doing enough to keep America safe.

Standing in this Chamber, it can feel as if the dangers at our ports are a distant concern, but given that our ports are connected to our Nation's transportation system and are close to our major population centers, the threat is never far away.

I want to share a very disturbing photo that shows us what a terrorist attack could look like. On March 21, a container ship called the Hyundai Fortune was traveling off the coast of Yemen when an explosion occurred in the rear of the ship. This is a photo of what happened. This is a container ship close to Yemen with an explosion at the rear of the ship. Remember the picture I just showed of the port of Seattle and where we are and imagine this happening in the Port of Seattle.

What happened when this ship exploded was that 90 containers were blown off the side of this ship and it created a debris field 5 miles long. Thankfully, amazingly, there were no fatalities and the crew was rescued.

This incident, by the way, did not appear to be terrorist related, but it gives us an idea of what it would look like if a terrorist incident occurred on a container ship in one of our seaports.

I want my colleagues to imagine the same burning ship sitting just a few feet off our shores in New York Harbor or Puget Sound, off the coast of Los Angeles or Charleston, Miami, Portland, Hampton Roads, the Delaware Bay, or the Gulf of Mexico. Now imagine we are not dealing with just a conventional explosion; we are dealing with a dirty bomb. I want to walk through what would happen next.

Of course, there would be the immediate horrible loss of life. Many of our ports, as I said, are located near major cities. If this were a chemical weapon exploding in Seattle, the chemical plume could contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, SeaTac Airport, not to mention, as I showed my colleagues, the downtown business and residential areas. At the port, there would immediately be tremendous confusion. People would try to contain the fire, but it is unclear today who would be in charge. Then when word spread and chaos ensued, panic would set in and there would be chaos as our first responders tried to react and people who lived nearby would try to flee.

Next, what would happen is our Government would shut down every single port in America to make sure there were no other bombs on any other con-

tainers in any other city. That shut-down would be the equivalent of driving our economy into a brick wall and, in fact, it could spark a global recession. Day by day, we would feel the painful economic impact of the attack. American factories in the middle of our country would not be able to get the supplies they need. They would have to shut their doors and lay off workers. Stores around our country would not be able to get the products they need to put on their shelves. Prices would spike, demand would outweigh supply, and consumers would not be able to afford the simple items they rely on every single day.

In 2002, we saw what the closure of just a few ports on the west coast could do. It cost our economy \$1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all of our ports. One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for just 9 days, it would cost our economy \$58 billion.

The RAND report I mentioned earlier found the economic damage could easily top more than \$1 trillion. Of course, we would soon realize we have no plan for resuming trade after an attack. We have no plan today for how we would resume trade, no protocol for what would be searched. We wouldn't know what would be allowed in or even who was in charge, and there would be a mass scramble to create a new system in a crisis atmosphere. Eventually, we would begin the slow process of manually inspecting all the cargo waiting to enter the United States. One report found it could take as long as 4 months to get all the cargo inspected and moving again.

Finally, we would have to set up a new regime for port security. You can bet that any kind of rushed plan we put together in this kind of scenario would not balance strong security with efficient trade.

This is a realistic portrayal of events that could happen tomorrow. Five years after September 11, we have not closed a major loophole that threatens our lives and our economy. Time is not on our side. We have to act, and we need to act now.

I approach this as someone who really understands the importance of both improving our security and maintaining the flow of commerce. My home State of Washington is the most trade-dependent State in the entire country. We know what is at stake if there is an incident at one of our ports. That is why I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce to help us find where we are vulnerable and to evaluate the best security practices. It is why I worked hard to boost funding for the Coast Guard, and I fought to keep the Port Security Grant Program from being eliminated year after year.

Right after September 11, 5 years ago, I started talking with security and trade experts to find out what we needed to be doing to both improve security and keep our commerce going. Last year, I sought out Senator COLLINS as a

partner in this effort. I approached Senator COLLINS because I knew she cared about this issue. I knew she had done a lot of work on it already, and I knew she was someone who could get things done. Since that day, she and I have worked hand in hand to develop this bill and to move it forward.

The reason we worked so hard on this bill is because we know how vulnerable we are. Terrorists have a lot of opportunities to introduce deadly cargo into a container. It can be tampered with at any time from when it leaves a foreign factory overseas to when it arrives at a consolidation warehouse and moves to a foreign port. It could even be tampered with while it is en route to the United States. There are several dangers. I outlined what would happen if terrorists exploded a container, but they could just as easily use cargo containers to transport weapons or personnel into the United States to launch an attack anywhere on American soil. In fact, in April, 22 Chinese stowaways were found at the Port of Seattle. They reached the United States inside a cargo container. In that case, they were stowaways, but they could easily have been terrorists sneaking into this country.

The programs we have in place today are totally inadequate. Last year, thanks to the insistence of Senator COLLINS and Senator COLEMAN, the Government Accountability Office found its C-TPAT was not even checking to see if companies were doing what they promised they would in their security plans. Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find something suspicious today at a foreign port, they can't force a container to be inspected. So we have a clear and deadly threat, and we know that current programs are inadequate. So what are we going to do about it? We could manually inspect every container coming into our ports, but that would cripple our economy.

The real challenge we face is how to make our trade more secure without slowing it to a crawl. That is why the Homeland Security, Commerce, and Finance Committees, through the leadership of Senators COLLINS and LIEBERMAN, Senators STEVENS and INOUE, and Senators GRASSLEY and BAUCUS and I, have worked with stakeholders and experts to strike the right balance. The result is the bill that we are now considering. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for how we improve security while keeping our trade efficient. At its heart, this challenge is about keeping the good things about trade—speed and efficiency—without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade, which is the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.

The GreenLane bill does five things. First of all, it creates tough new standards for all cargo. Today, we don't have any standards for cargo security.

Second, it creates a GreenLane option which provides for an even higher level of security. Companies have the

option to follow the higher standards of the GreenLane. Their cargo will be tracked and monitored from the moment it leaves the factory floor overseas until it reaches the United States. We will know everywhere their cargo has been. We will know every person who has touched it, and we will know whether it has been tampered with. The GreenLane pushes our borders out by conducting inspections overseas before cargo is even loaded into a ship bound for the United States, and we will provide incentives for the companies that use this highest standard of GreenLane.

Third, our bill sets up a plan to resume trade quickly and safely, to minimize the impact of a terrorist attack on our economy.

Fourth, our bill will secure our ports here at home by authorizing and funding port security grants. This funding will help our ports and port operators to develop and implement security plans. They could use this funding to strengthen their perimeter security, which would help prevent a number of security lapses that were highlighted in a recent Seattle Times article in which a reporter was able to enter a port and walk around the containers without anybody stopping him.

Finally, our bill will hold DHS accountable for improving cargo security. DHS is long overdue in establishing cargo security standards and transportation worker credentials. We need to hold DHS accountable, and our bill provides the infrastructure to ensure accountability and coordination.

Let me take a few minutes to share a few ways that our bill does make America safer. First of all, we close the loopholes that leave us vulnerable today. Senator COLLINS and I have studied the 9/11 Commission Report and the various GAO reports and we worked very hard to put their recommendations into this bill. The 9/11 Commission examined what went wrong 5 years ago and how we can prevent another terrorist attack. We listened to the 9/11 Commission and we worked very hard to incorporate their recommendations and to close the loopholes that the Commission identified. The 9/11 Commission said we needed a layered security system. Our bill adopts that layered approach.

Here is what we envision as the Secretary of Homeland Security implements this bill. Each step in the GreenLane system will have multiple and redundant security layers. Cargo would be monitored and secured starting at a foreign factory overseas. In addition, containers will be sealed with high-tech container security devices, such as e-seals, to protect against their being tampered with or compromised. Then, before that container is ever loaded onto a ship, its manifest is reviewed and the container is inspected for radiation, seal tampering, and x-rayed. Finally, the cargo will be secured with access controls, ensuring anyone with access to GreenLane cargo

has undergone a background check and possesses verifiable identification. Those multiple layers provide the type of layered security that the 9/11 Commission called for.

Now, the 9/11 Commission also said we have to centralize authority and responsibility so that there is finally someone accountable in our Government. Our bill does that. It centralizes authority by establishing the Office of Cargo Security Policy within the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate Federal cargo security programs and to advance security research and development.

The 9/11 Commission also said we need to do a better job sharing information throughout our Government. Our bill promotes coordination by establishing regional interagency operational centers to enhance cooperation between our Federal agencies. So our bill is responsive to the problems and the loopholes that the 9/11 Commission identified.

Our bill gives us new tools so we can approach cargo security in new ways. It gives U.S. officials in foreign ports the authority to inspect suspicious containers before they are loaded for departure into the United States. Our bill makes the haystack of containers smaller. It allows the Government to focus on suspicious cargo that enters our ports, and it ensures that we are inspecting and stopping cargo that poses a threat. And it cuts down on the smuggling of weapons, people, drugs, and other illegal cargo.

This bill will also protect America's economy in the event of a terror attack, and that is because it provides a secure, organized way to quickly resume cargo operations after any emergency shutdown because any shutdown of our ports has the potential to cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars a day. Our bill would minimize the economic impact of a terrorist attack.

So I am very proud of this bill, and I thank all of our partners and all of our supporters. I especially thank Senator COLLINS for her tremendous leadership and work on this very complex issue, and I commend her for the job she has done. I thank Senator COLEMAN for his work as chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I thank Senator LIEBERMAN and all of our cosponsors, and I thank the Commerce and Finance Committees, especially Senator STEVENS and Senator INOUE, Senator GRASSLEY and Senator BAUCUS.

We have also seen tremendous progress on the House side with the Safe Port Act, and I want to thank Representatives DAN LUNDGREN and JANE HARMAN for their leadership. Finally, I especially tonight thank the numerous Federal, State and local officials and all of the industry representatives for their tremendous assistance in helping us craft this legislation. They truly are at the front lines of securing our Nation's ports, and I have been very proud to work with all of

them and to get to know them and see their dedication and commitment to making our country more secure.

Today, we have a choice in how we deal with the cargo security challenges that face us, but if we wait for a disaster, our choices are going to be pretty stark. So I think we have to make the changes now, on our terms, before there is a deadly incident. Let's protect America before an image like this appears on our television screens. Let's not wait until a terrorist incident strikes again to protect our people and to protect our economy.

Earlier this year, the American people woke up, and they spoke out when they heard that a foreign government-owned company could be running our ports. That sparked a very critical debate. Now we need to set up a security regime that will actually make us safer. Until we do so, none of us should sleep well at night. A terrible image like this of a burning container ship with a dirty bomb in one of America's harbors could be on our TV screens tomorrow. So this Congress needs to act today. We only have a few days to get this right, and I hope that all of our colleagues will work with all of us to move this bill quickly and expeditiously and pass a GreenLane bill before it is too late.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I again thank the Senator for her excellent statement, for her leadership, and for getting us to where we are today. It has been a long journey, but with her leadership we were able to craft this bill, work out the many compromises, and come to the floor. I hope we can do this bill relatively quickly. It has been the subject of an awful lot of discussion and review, and it would be terrific if we can show the American people that we can act in a bipartisan way on an issue that really matters to their security.

It is appropriate that the Presiding Officer tonight is the Senator from Virginia, Senator ALLEN. I know that port security has been a major priority of his. Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that California, New York, and Virginia are the three States that receive the greatest number of containers, although actually I would think that Washington State has to be in there, too, given the size of Seattle and Tacoma's ports as well. So I know they should be in there as well. But Virginia is a major player in port security, and I want to commend the Senator from Virginia for his leadership on this issue. I know that this has been of great concern to him. He has talked to me as this bill has been making its way through the process, and I publicly thank him for caring about this issue and making it a priority as well.

Mr. President, I am not aware of further Members who are seeking to speak on my side, and I see no indication of further Members on the other side. I am going to, very briefly, put in a quorum call so that we can check, but

I believe we are very close to concluding our business for tonight.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

ARMY FIRST SERGEANT AARON JAGGER

Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to the men and women in uniform serving the United States around the world, and observe a somber milestone in Michigan's contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In August, the 100th member of the U.S. Armed Forces from Michigan made the ultimate sacrifice while serving in Iraq. U.S. Army 1SG Aaron Jagger of Hillsdale died when a roadside bomb detonated near his vehicle in Ramadi, Iraq. Sergeant Jagger was serving his second tour in Iraq. I offer my heartfelt condolences to Sergeant Jagger's family.

As of the first week of September, 104 members of the U.S. Armed forces with ties to Michigan have lost their lives while serving in Iraq. I will ask that a list of their names be printed in the RECORD at the end of my statement.

No words can express our country's gratitude for the dedicated service and ultimate sacrifice of Sergeant Jagger or the other Americans who have lost their lives. I am also thankful for the sacrifice all the men and women in the U.S. military have made for their country while serving in Iraq. They are selfless patriots that give their time and too often their lives to preserve the freedoms we hold so dear.

I know that condolences offered to these brave families and words spoken on the floor of the Senate cannot possibly make up for their loss. But it is important that they know we remember them and that our prayers and thoughts are with those that have lost loved ones, and those that still have family and friends serving in harm's way.

I will remain committed to honoring their memory and ensuring that their families and their comrades who return from battle receive the support and respect they deserve.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the list to which I referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Major Kevin Nave, Union Lake; Private Brandon Sloan, Fraser; Sergeant Todd Robbins, Pentwater; Sergeant Michael Pedersen, Flint; Private First Class Juan Garza, Jr., Temperance; Private First Class Jason Meyer, Howell; Staff Sergeant Scott Sather, Clio; Specialist Richard Goward, Midland; Sergeant Sean Reynolds, East Lansing; Master Sergeant William Payne, Otsego; Staff Sergeant Brett Petriken, Flint; Specialist Corey Hubbell, Holly; Captain Paul Cassidy, Laingsburg; Sergeant Trevor Blumberg, Canton; Specialist Donald Wheeler, Concord; Specialist Artimus Brassfield, Flint; Staff Sergeant Paul Johnson, Calumet; Staff Sergeant Mark Vasquez, Port Huron; Staff Sergeant Paul Neff, II, West Branch; Private First Class Damian Bushart, Waterford.

Private First Class Jason Wright, Luzerne; Staff Sergeant Thomas Christensen, Atlantic Mine; Staff Sergeant Stephen Hattamer, Gwinn; Private First Class Holly J. McGeogh, Taylor; Specialist Richard Trevithick, Gaines; Sergeant First Class Bradley Fox, Adrian; Private First Class Richard Rosas, St. Louis; Sergeant Aaron Elandt, Lowell; Sergeant David Hartman, Fairgrove; Specialist Craig Frank, Lincoln Park; Private First Class Nicholas Blodgett, Wyoming; Specialist Dana Wilson, Hudsonville; Specialist Donald McCune, Ypsilanti; Staff Sergeant Donald Davis, Saginaw; Sergeant Carl Thomas, Inkster; Private First Class Mark Barbret, Shelby Twp.; Specialist Don Clary, Flint; Private First Class Dennis Miller, Jr., La Salle; Lance Corporal Justin Reppuhn, Hemlock; Lance Corporal Justin Ellsworth, Mt. Pleasant.

Lance Corporal Michael Hanks, Gregory; Corporal Gentian Marku, Sterling Heights; Corporal In Kim, Warren; Staff Sergeant Jason Lehto, Warren; Lance Corporal Allan Klein, Clinton Township; Lieutenant Commander Edward Jack, Detroit; First Lieutenant Adam Malson, Rochester Hills; Captain Sean Grimes, Southfield; Staff Sergeant Ricky Kieffer, Ovid; Corporal Michael Lindemuth, Pellston; Specialist Randy Stevens, Swartz Creek; Captain Stephen Frank, Farmington Hills; Captain Ralph Harting, III, West Bloomfield; Sergeant Brad Wentz, Gladwin; Specialist Joshua Brazee, Sand Creek; Sergeant Charles Drier, Unionville; Specialist Eric Burri, Wyoming; Corporal Andrew Kilpela, Fowlerville; Specialist Adrian Butler, Detroit; Specialist Brian Derks, White Cloud.

Staff Sergeant Brian Morris, Centreville; Major Gregory Fester, Ada; Captain Lowell Miller, II, Flint; Sergeant First Class Casey Howe, Kimball; Corporal Nicholas Cherava, Ontonagon; Private First Class Nicholas Greer, Monroe; Staff Sergeant Vincent Summers, Bangor; Staff Sergeant Lewis Gentry, Detroit; Sergeant First Class Michael Hodshire, North Adams; Major Gerald Bloomfield, II, Ypsilanti; Specialist Timothy Brown, Cedar Springs; First Lieutenant Justin Smith, Lansing; Master Sergeant Anthony Yost, Millington; Private First Class John Dearing, Hazel Park; Lance Corporal Craig Watson, Union City; Lance Corporal David Huhn, Portland; Sergeant Spencer Akers, Traverse City; Specialist Anthony Cardinal, Muskegon; Specialist Dane Carver,

Freeport; Lance Corporal Jason Little, Climax; Specialist Walter Howard, II, Rochester; Corporal Ross Smith, Wyoming.

Sergeant Curtis Howard, II, Ann Arbor; Private First Class Allan Morr, Byron; Sergeant Joshua Youmans, Flushing; Private Joshua Powers, Kentwood; Corporal Nyle Yates, III, Eagle; Specialist Andrew Waits, Waterford; Sergeant First Class Richard Herrema, Hudsonville; Sergeant Matthew Webber, Stanwood; Corporal Alexander Kolasa, White Lake Twp; Corporal Brock Bucklin, Caledonia; Lance Corporal Brandon Webb, Swartz Creek; Staff Sergeant Raymond Plouhar, Lake Orion; Specialist Joseph Micks, Rapid River; Sergeant Duane Dreasky, Novi; Sergeant Al'Kalla Floyd, Grand Rapids; Staff Sergeant Michael Dickinson, II, Battle Creek; Specialist Dennis Smason, Jr., Hesperia; First Sergeant Aaron Jagger, Hillsdale; Sergeant Gabriel DeRoo, Paw Paw; Chief Petty Officer Paul J. Darga, Alpena; Staff Sergeant Eugene Alex, Bay City; Sergeant Ralph Porras, Merrill.

FAMILY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, next week marks the fifth anniversary of the attacks of September 11. On this solemn occasion, we reflect upon the lives of those who were lost and the families they left behind. Images of the planes hitting the two massive towers filled with innocent Americans are emblazoned in our minds and stir our conscience. Heroic tales of firefighters, police officers and first responders falling in the line of duty evoke deep pangs of sadness yet fill our hearts with great pride for our country.

It is important that during this time we remember the families of these victims of terror. They have suffered greatly, and we continue to mourn for their loved ones and honor their memories. But there are some families whose grief is also mixed with fear. The victims for whom they grieve were immigrants working in the World Trade Center, and the families that are left behind face potential deportation. Thus, in addition to the already incalculable loss inflicted upon them by the terrorists, these relatives face yet another hardship.

It is in the context of this situation that I wish to recognize the work of Debra Brown Steinberg. For the past 5 years, Ms. Steinberg has tirelessly sought to undo this injustice and allow these relatives to grieve alongside the thousands of other victims' families without fear of arrest and removal. Ms. Steinberg has dedicated her time—pro bono—to this cause and has been recognized time and again for her efforts.

My colleagues and I introduced legislation, known as the September 11 Family Humanitarian Relief and Patriotism Act, which would provide the necessary relief for these families. Now that a year has passed since the bill's introduction, and as we approach the fifth anniversary of 9/11, it is time to bring closure for the sake of the families and for the sake of honoring the memories of those killed.

Our tradition teaches us to have compassion for the widow, the orphan,