

that is supporting and enhancing science, technology, and mathematics education, research, and public outreach programs. The network includes over 850 affiliates in academia, business, museums and science centers, as well as state and local agencies. The Space Grant program provides scholarship and fellowship opportunities to students in every state, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Space Grant is an established and demonstrably effective national mechanism for attracting and retaining students in science, technology, and mathematics. The conferees strongly support its continuation at robust levels within NASA's education program.

The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) provides States of modest research infrastructure with funding to develop a more competitive research base within their State and member academic institutions. A total of seven Federal agencies conduct EPSCoR programs which build infrastructure and broaden the participation of states in the Federal research enterprise. The conferees strongly support its continuation at robust levels within NASA's education program.

#### Sec. 703. NASA scholarships

Current law has two slightly different versions of law providing NASA with the authority to provide scholarships. Section 703 corrects this disparity.

#### ADDITIONAL CONCERNS

The conferees are aware of the issues surrounding NASA's use of its Mission Management aircraft. Therefore, the conferees request that NASA transmit a report to the authorizing committees by April 1, 2006, describing current policies concerning the use of NASA aircraft, the source of those policies, the extent of any adverse impact to the Agency and its ability to fulfill its mandates as prescribed in the Space Act, as amended, and any recommended changes to those policies that would assist NASA in carrying out its operations in fulfillment of those mandates.

From the Committee on Science, for consideration of the Senate bill and the House amendment, and modifications committed to conference:

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT,  
KEN CALVERT,  
RALPH M. HALL,  
LAMAR SMITH,  
BART GORDON,  
MARK UDALL,  
MICHAEL M. HONDA,

Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas is appointed in lieu of Mr. Honda for consideration of secs. 111 and 615 of the House amendment, and modifications committed to conference.

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

For consideration of the Senate bill and House amendment, and modifications committed to conference:

TOM DELAY,  
*Managers on the Part of the House.*

TED STEVENS,  
TRENT LOTT,  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,  
DANIEL K. INOUE,  
BILL NELSON,

*Managers on the Part of the Senate.*

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#### IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INSTRUCT ON DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

(Mr. SCHIFF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for the motion to instruct conferees on H.R. 1815, the DOD authorization bill that was offered earlier today by the distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. SKELTON).

Mr. Speaker, for over 3 years now, the Congress has failed to oversee the administration's policy regarding the detention of enemy combatants. We know very little about the criteria used to designate an American as an enemy combatant, even less about the due process afforded foreign nationals in Guantanamo and almost nothing about the reported existence of clandestine detention facilities operated by the U.S. Government.

The motion that passed the House overwhelmingly today instructs the conferees to insist on a Senate-passed provision that would require the DNI to submit to Congress a report on any clandestine prison or detention prison currently or formerly operated by the U.S. Government, regardless of location, where the detainees in the global war on terrorism are or were being held.

The conferees should retain this important provision in the Defense Authorization Bill.

#### REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF MOTIONS TO SUSPEND THE RULES

Mr. SESSIONS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 109-355) on the resolution (H. Res. 623) providing for consideration of motions to suspend the rules, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

#### REMOVAL OF CONFEREE AND APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREE ON S. 1932, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KIRK). Without objection and pursuant to clause 11 of rule I, the Chair removes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. UPTON) as a conferee on S. 1932 and appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BARTON) to fill the vacancy.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will notify the Senate of the change in conferees.

#### GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 109-76)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence and ordered to be printed:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The robust and effective sharing of terrorism information is vital to protecting Americans and the Homeland from terrorist attacks. To ensure that we succeed in this mission, my Administration is working to implement the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) called for by section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The ISE is intended to enable the Federal Government and our State, local, tribal, and private sector partners to share appropriate information relating to terrorists, their threats, plans, networks, supporters, and capabilities while, at the same time, respecting the information privacy and other legal rights of all Americans.

Today, I issued a set of guidelines and requirements that represent a significant step in the establishment of the ISE. These guidelines and requirements, which are consistent with the provisions of section 1016(d) of IRTPA, are set forth in a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies. The guidelines and requirements also address collateral issues that are essential to any meaningful progress on information sharing. In sum, these guidelines will:

Clarify roles and authorities across executive departments and agencies;

Implement common standards and architectures to further facilitate timely and effective information sharing;

Improve the Federal Government's terrorism information sharing relationships with State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign allies;

Revamp antiquated classification and marking systems, as they relate to sensitive but unclassified information;

Ensure that information privacy and other legal rights of Americans are protected in the development and implementation of the ISE; and

Ensure that departments and agencies promote a culture of information sharing by assigning personnel and dedicating resources to terrorism information sharing.

The guidelines build on the strong commitment that my Administration and the Congress have already made to strengthening information sharing, as evidenced by Executive Orders 13311 of July 27, 2003, and 13388 of October 25, 2005, section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the USA PATRIOT Act, and sections 1011 and 1016 of the IRTPA. While much work has been done by executive departments and agencies, more is required to fully develop and implement the ISE.

To lead this national effort, I designated the Program Manager (PM) responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government, and directed that the PM and his office be part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and that the

DNI exercise authority, direction, and control over the PM and ensure that the PM carries out his responsibilities under section 1016 of IRTPA. I fully support the efforts of the PM and the Information Sharing Council to transform our current capabilities into the desired ISE, and I have directed all heads of executive departments and agencies to support the PM and the DNI to meet our stated objectives.

Creating the ISE is a difficult and complex task that will require a sustained effort and strong partnership with the Congress. I know that you share my commitment to achieve the goal of providing decision makers and the men and women on the front lines in the War on Terror with the best possible information to protect our Nation. I appreciate your support to date and look forward to working with you in the months ahead on this critical initiative.

GEORGE W. BUSH,

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 16, 2005.

### DISINTEGRATION OF IRAQ

(Mr. MCDERMOTT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, in the glow after the election, I come to the floor really to caution this House with the words of an old colleague of mine who says it is always too soon to congratulate yourself.

The New York Times on the 11th of December carried an editorial which is entitled Present at the Disintegration.

What he says, and he is an Iraqi, is that the government that has been established by the constitution and has now been elected is fatally flawed in three ways, and what we are going to get is continued civil war in that country because it is not possible to resolve the problems, given the people who have been elected.

The first is, we have created a parliament that can override the executive. We, secondly, created an executive that is divided between a president and a council of ministers, so there will be constant tension between the two factions that will control the government, the Shia and the Kurds. The Sunnis, everybody knows, are not going to be one of the controlling parties.

Finally, it encourages local governments to break off and become sovereign. What we are watching is the disintegration of Iraq.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 11, 2005]

PRESENT AT THE DISINTEGRATION

(By Kanan Makiya)

Washington and Baghdad will be tempted, with the adoption of a new Constitution and the election on Thursday for a four-year government, to declare victory in Iraq. In one sense, they are right to do so. The emerging Iraqi polity undoubtedly represents a radical break not only with the country's past but also with the whole Arab state system established by Britain and France after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

But in the larger sense, such optimism is misguided, for none of the problems associated with Iraq's monumental change have been sorted out. Worse, profound tensions and contradictions have been enshrined in the Constitution of the new Iraq, and they threaten the very existence of the state.

How did we get here? Much has been said about American failures in Iraq. And rightly so. But, as I've seen as a participant in political discussions both before and after the war, we Iraqis have also failed to lay the ground for a new order. For the new political elite cast into power by the elections last January has been unable even to begin to create a stable and strong Iraqi state to replace the one overthrown in April 2003. The increasing daily casualty rate for Iraqis, from 26 in early 2004 to an average of 64 in this fall, is only the most glaring sign that something has gone terribly wrong, and not for lack of any American effort to turn the situation around.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect the situation to change following Thursday's election. There is little chance that the winner will command the authority inside Parliament to reverse the decline, for a simple reason: the Constitution.

All signs suggest that this Constitution, if it is not radically amended, will further weaken the already failing central Iraqi state. In spite of all the rhetoric in that document about the unity of the "homeland of the apostles and prophets" and the "values and ideals of the heavenly messages and findings of science" that have played a role in "preserving for Iraq its free union," it is disunity, diminished sovereignty and years of future discord that lie in store for Iraq if the Constitution is not overhauled.

Any government that emerges from the coming elections will be fatally undermined in at least three ways.

First, the Constitution establishes a supremely powerful Parliament, which can ride roughshod over the executive. While that Parliament, as it is designed in the Constitution, looks like a democratic institution, it doesn't work like one. Rather, it is an artificially constructed collection of ethnic and sectarian voting blocs. If the experience of the interim government is any guide, the few people who control those blocs are the ones who will wield real power, and they will do so largely through handpicked committees and backroom wheeling and dealing. Because this cabal of powerbrokers also chooses the president and the prime minister and can dismiss them with a simple majority, there will be no check on the tyranny of majorities operating under the aegis of the legislature.

Second, executive power is divided between the president and the council of ministers, guaranteeing that major decisions will be met with the same tension and paralysis that have plagued the present government. Both the president and the prime minister (it is assumed, though not explicitly stated, that these two posts will be apportioned out to a Kurd and a Shiite Arab, as they are at present) can separately present bills to Parliament—a sure recipe for conflict. And both the president and the prime minister can be fired after a no-confidence motion endorsed by a parliamentary majority. At a time of civil war and pervasive violence, in other words, no one person or institution can be said to be in charge of the executive branch of the federal government.

Third, the Constitution encourages the transformation of governorates and local administrations into powerful, nearly sovereign regions that, with the exception of Kurdistan, have no underlying basis for unity. And while the articles dealing with the functioning of the federal government are poorly worded and intended to dissipate

executive power, the 10 articles of Section 5, on the powers and manner of formation of new regions, are a model of clarity and have been drafted with the sole purpose of encouraging new regions to be created at the expense of the federal union.

This guarantees that the more Iraqi provinces opt for regional status, and get it, the more the federal state will shrivel up and die. Moreover, with the exception of those who reside in provinces without oil (or in Baghdad, which cannot join a region), it is in the interest of every populist demagogue to press for regional status, because it is at that level that the lawmaking that truly affects day-to-day life will take place.

The powers of the new regions will be enormous. Not even the Iraqi Army can travel through one without the permission of the regional Parliament. And should there be any doubt about where the whip hand will lie on any issue not explicitly addressed in the Constitution, Article 122 states: "Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away from the power of the regions . . . except by the consent of the legislative authority of the concerned region and the approval of the majority of its citizens."

An Iraqi wit known only as Shalash al-Iraqi has lampooned this devolution of power in an imaginary constitution, called "The Federalism of the city of Thawra and its Environs," posted on the Internet. Its preamble reads:

Congruent with the wave of federalisms that is sweeping Iraq, the city of Thawra and its surrounding neighborhoods have decided to constitute themselves as a federal region . . . For this purpose a Constituent Assembly of the representatives of the most important and influential tribes in the City has been established . . . [and it] has noted that the City of Thawra [is well suited to become a region because it] floats on a lake of oil, and possesses a huge labor force along with an independent army and police force . . . In addition the city is bounded by a canal, which is its water link to the cities of the adjoining sisterly Republic of Iraq . . .

"We, people of the valley east of the canal, . . . have of our own volition and free will decided to separate from the people of Baghdad and all the other irritating governorates like Ramadi, Diwaniya, Tikrit, Darbandikhan, Samawa and all the rest . . . The adoption of this, our constitution, will free us from all the headaches and problems of Iraq."

There is nothing wrong with having strong regions within a federal union. Unfortunately the new Iraqi Constitution fails to inject the glue that would hold such a union together: the federal government. It sets up a regional system with big short-term winners (Shiite Arabs and Kurds) and big short-term losers (Sunni Arabs). It even allocates extra oil and gas revenues to the regions that generate them, on the implicit assumption that because of the political inequities of the past, the state owes the Sunnis of the resource-poor western provinces less than it does the Shiites and Kurds. But these provinces are not significantly better off than other parts of Iraq.

Iraq's Sunni Arabs voted solidly against the Constitution not because they are Saddam Hussein loyalists, nor because they hate the Kurds and Shiites (as some of the insurgents do); they voted against it because by doing away with the central state, which they had championed during the previous 80 years, and penalizing them for living in regions without oil, the Constitution became a punitive document—one that began to seem as if it was written to punish them for the sins of the Baath.

What is wrong with pursuing the Constitution to its logical conclusion: the breakup of