

be incurred if current law remains in place and the annual fee declines, the total cost to the private sector of extending this mandate would be close to \$300 million annually, beginning in fiscal year 2006. Measured that way, the cost of the mandate would exceed the annual threshold for the private sector as defined in UMRA. By contrast, measured against the fees paid for fiscal year 2005, the mandate would impose no additional costs on the private sector because the fees under the bill would not differ much from those currently in effect. In any case, CBO estimates that the total costs to State, local, and tribal governments would be small relative to the threshold for intergovernmental mandates.

Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Lisa Cash Driskill and Jimin Chung; Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Lisa Ramirez-Branun; Impact on the Private Sector: Selena Calera.

Estimate Approved By: Peter Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

#### DEATH OF MO MOWLAM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last month, sadly, Mo Mowlam, Great Britain's former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, died after a long and courageous battle with cancer. Mo will long be remembered for her leadership at a critical moment in the history of Northern Ireland. I first met her when she was a member of the Labour Party and her party was in opposition in Parliament. I was delighted when Prime Minister Blair came to power and named her Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. She was a breath of fresh air and quickly won over nearly every Irish American she met. She was exceedingly effective and was the right person for the job at the right time in Northern Ireland. With her remarkable abilities, she created the conditions that led to the historic Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Mo was fair, intelligent, and willing to take risks for peace.

On a personal note, my wife, Vicki, and I will always warmly recall our visit with Mo, and her husband, Jon Norton, at Hillsborough in Northern Ireland in January 1998.

Irish Senator Martin Mansergh, himself a key player in the Northern Ireland peace process, recently wrote a well-deserved tribute to Mo in the Irish Times, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Irish Times, Aug. 27, 2005]

MO WAS WILLING TO DIRTY HER HANDS FOR PEACE

(By Martin Mansergh)

A first memory of Mo Mowlam is of a young, newly elected MP accompanying, as deputy, the British Labour Party's Northern Ireland spokesman Kevin McNamara to an Anglo-Irish conference in Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire.

The British have an inexhaustible belief in country house diplomacy to solve problems like Northern Ireland in an atmosphere cut off from the modern world. Its efficacy was not evident on that occasion.

When John Smith died tragically in 1994, Mo Mowlam, a fellow north of England MP, was a principal lieutenant of Tony Blair in his leadership campaign. Her reward in being appointed Northern Ireland spokeswoman marked a shift away from the moderate pro-nationalist stance of McNamara and Labour's formal policy through the 1980s of Irish unity by consent.

Whether Labour would ever have been active persuaders for unity is doubtful. That policy was devised as a means of containing pressure from the Labour left for "troops out" and British withdrawal. By 1994, after the Downing Street Declaration, Labour adjusted its position to broad bipartisanship with the John Major government, both on constitutional principles and tactics.

Mo Mowlam did her homework while in opposition, studying the issues, attending conferences, meeting different parties, and acting as conduit to Tony Blair. Unwilling to open any flank for attack that might endanger election victory, Labour refrained from criticising the Tory mishandling of the peace process which contributed to, even if it was not responsible for, the breakdown of the first ceasefire. Labour kept its powder dry, and by the 1997 general election had become almost as acceptable to unionism as the outgoing Conservative administration.

Mo Mowlam became Northern Ireland Secretary of State, and held office during the crucial 12-month period that began with restoration of the IRA ceasefire in July 1997. With Irish help, Labour worked round the demand for immediate decommissioning that was a roadblock to progress at that stage.

She kept her cool in the conference room in July 1997 and gave nothing away when Conor Cruise O'Brien, sitting alongside Robert McCartney on the UKUP delegation, sought formal repudiation of more radical views she had once held on Ireland. Further negotiations at Stormont created conditions of engagement from late September in multi-party talks chaired by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell that included Ulster Unionists, loyalists and Sinn Féin, as well as the SDLP, Alliance and Women's Coalition.

As incoming Secretary of State, she made every attempt to be even-handed, and was prepared to be as sympathetic and receptive to unionist as to nationalist and republican views. Her eventual decision to let the Drumcree parade through in 1997 (for the last time) was evidence of that.

Much of the comment about her focuses more on style than substance. Her casual manner and outspoken language were something that not all British civil servants, used to the traditional patrician style exemplified by Sir Patrick Mayhew, appreciated. The Irish delegation had few problems on that front, though occasionally she made even Ray Burke look fastidious.

She was a culture shock to the Ulster Unionist Party, as to some extent was Liz O'Donnell. If Mo Mowlam ended up closer to nationalists, it was because unionists left her little choice, by increasingly refusing to deal substantively with her.

They bypassed her with impunity, by constant recourse to No 10 Downing Street—if not Tony Blair himself, his diplomatic adviser John Holmes, who provided reassuring continuity for them from John Major's time.

Nevertheless, with the help of minister of state Paul Murphy, and partnered on the Irish side by David Andrews, she kept the talks on the road over a difficult eight-month period, even if many strategic negotiations also took place between Downing Street, the NIO, the Taoiseach's Office, Foreign Affairs and Justice. Mo Mowlam made an important and courageous decision to go into the Maze to see loyalist prisoners, when

their ceasefire appeared to be collapsing in January 1998, following several murders.

Not only did she hold the ring, albeit with difficulty, but it was the moment the British system realised that agreement would only happen if it involved a radical programme to release paramilitary prisoners, however awful their convictions. She well understood that to obtain peace one had to be prepared to get one's hands dirty.

In the last hours of the Good Friday negotiations, she sat with the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (and this columnist) listening interminably to some 77 unsatisfied demands by Sinn Féin, all requiring answers, not least to satisfy large backroom teams.

While the Government had always striven for agreement bringing everyone present on board, the point had been reached, where, if necessary, continued Government credibility would have required agreement without Sinn Féin (already geared to campaign against changes to Articles 2 and 3).

Mo Mowlam, like the Taoiseach, favoured retaining a special electoral system, which would, most likely, have secured a place in the Assembly for both the Women's Coalition and the loyalists. The loyalist parties mistakenly believed they did not need such arrangements to stay out of the cold, creating problems to this day.

The Good Friday agreement is Britain's finest achievement so far in relation to Ireland. Mo Mowlam is entitled to full credit for her part in that, as the following Labour Party conference affirmed with thunderous applause. It is almost always a mistake for a minister to challenge the prime minister, and she was easily undermined by those who coveted her post for Peter Mandelson. His main positive contribution, in late 1999, was to persuade Ulster Unionists to let the institutions start, however temporarily.

Apart from her deserved place in British Labour Party folklore, Mo Mowlam's courage and down-to-earth approach will ensure that she long retains a warm place in the memory of most Irish people.

#### COMMEMORATION OF 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the Great Lakes Commission. The Great Lakes Commission is a bi-national agency working to improve the Great Lakes and the region. The Commission promotes the orderly and comprehensive development, use and conservation of the Great Lakes basin, its tributaries and the St. Lawrence River. Its members include the eight Great Lakes States, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, with associate member status for the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario.

Since its establishment in 1955, the Great Lakes Commission has been a pioneer in applying principles of sustainability to the natural resources of the Great Lakes basin and St. Lawrence River. The Commission promotes the paired goals of environmental protection and economic improvement and has built its reputation on an integrated and objective approach to public policy issues and opportunities.

When the Great Lakes Commission was founded in 1955, the Great Lakes region was about to gain greater regional and economic importance; St.