

recognizes the vitality of tribal life throughout the world. This vitality is clearly evident in my State of Wisconsin, which is home to eleven federally recognized tribal governments: the Brad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, the Forest County Potawatomi Indian Community, the Ho-Chunk Nation of Wisconsin, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, the Sokaogan Chippewa (Mole Lake) Community of Wisconsin, the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, and the Stockbridge Munsee Community of Wisconsin.

I am proud to represent the members of Wisconsin's tribes, many of whom are gathering here to support and participate in this important occasion. The influence of the Native Americans who have lived in Wisconsin for so many years is evident in the names of our cities and towns, lakes and rivers, and counties and parks. Wisconsin's native peoples' traditions are part of who we are and these vibrant communities make vast contributions to Wisconsin's culture.

Congress authorized the Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian on November 28, 1989 with passage of the National Museum of the American Indian Act. I congratulate my colleagues, the senior Senator from Colorado, Mr. CAMPBELL, who championed the creation of this museum as a member of the other body, and the senior Senator from Hawaii, Mr. INOUE, for their vision in writing the legislation that made this museum a reality.

The Museum opens today with a celebration that is expected to draw as many as 20,000 Native Americans to Washington. Many are calling the grand opening today the largest tribal gathering in history.

I commend the Congress and the Nation for finally recognizing our Native people and their past, present, and future contributions to America's culture, history, and tradition.

PEACE IN SUDAN

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I submit an amendment in the form of a substitute to S. 2781. I want to thank the majority leader for his support of our efforts to authorize assistance for the Darfur crisis and a final peace in Sudan. I also want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Senator BIDEN for his cooperation in introducing the bill, as well as in refining its language.

Our Committee recently held a historic hearing on Sudan. In that hearing Secretary Powell declared Sudan and the Janjaweed responsible for genocide. This important event reinforced congressional concern for African affairs and pursuing peace in Sudan.

Senator BIDEN and I have improved S. 2781 in the pending amendment by clarifying several elements. These improvements include an update to language that directly reflects the comments of Secretary Powell in his declaration of genocide in the Sudan. Further, the amendment clarifies that neither of the regions administered by the Government of Sudan nor the SPLM will be authorized to receive assistance unless the President certifies that they are complying with specific requirements.

Finally, upon receipt of the testimony and reports from Secretary Powell and the State Department, as well as the recent eyewitness account of the USAID Administrator Natsios, we want to redouble our commitment to support the African Union Mission in Sudan. The value of the reports from the small African Union Observer Force now in Darfur is evident and the international community must recognize its own responsibility in enabling the African Union to continue in this assertive and positive role. In my view the bill states that the United States should provide, to the extent practicable, all assistance necessary to ensure the African Union Mission in Sudan is capable of carrying out its mandate.

I urge my colleagues to support this important legislative initiative.

REMARKS TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week, at the invitation of the Council on Foreign Relations and the family of the late Paul Warnke, I gave the second annual Paul Warnke Lecture on International Security here in Washington. I spoke to the council about the ongoing efforts here in the Congress to address the issue of the reform of the intelligence community as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and others.

I told the council that to my mind, at least as important as the structural reforms of our intelligence community, and arguably even more so, is the need to protect the independence, objectivity and integrity of intelligence analyses. Too many times in our past, including most recently in the Iraq war, intelligence has been manipulated and politicized to support a specific policy.

I am willing to support the creation of a more powerful National Intelligence Director with greater authority over intelligence budgets and personnel, but only if this increased power is used to help ensure the accuracy, independence, objectivity and integrity of intelligence analyses, and not used to promote policy. I don't want a National Intelligence Director to be a more powerful "yes man" for the administration in power.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on September 13, 2004, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN AT THE PAUL WARNKE LECTURE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Thank you, Alton [Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Council on Foreign Relations]. Your connection with the Council since 1972 makes you a more enduring figure in Washington than just about anybody besides Senator BYRD.

It is a pleasure to be back at the Council, and an honor to be giving the second annual Paul Warnke Lecture on International Security. Paul was a great public servant and a tireless advocate for a wise and balanced approach to international security. I know there are some members of the Warnke family here, and I want to start by acknowledging their presence and thanking them for joining in the invitation to me.

Tonight I want to share some thoughts with you on the reform of our Intelligence Community, which is topic number one in the Senate right now. My remarks are subtitled "No more slam-dunks please, where nuance is needed."

With the end of the Cold War the greatest threats we face are from terrorists. We are less likely to be attacked by nations and armies with tanks and missiles, and more likely to be attacked by terrorists with bombs in trucks or strapped to their bodies.

Since terrorists are not deterred by the threat of their own destruction, and because terrorist networks are so diffuse, accurate intelligence is absolutely essential to preventing terrorist attacks.

The release of the 9/11 Commission's Report fueled a debate about how our intelligence community should be reformed to better respond to the terrorist threat. This is a debate we need to have. But in taking on structural reform involving stove-pipes and budget authority, we should not lose sight of the fundamental problem that was dramatically demonstrated not by the pre-9/11 intelligence failures but by the pre-Iraq War intelligence failures.

The intelligence failures before 9/11 related to intelligence agencies not using information they had and not sharing that information with others. The Report of the 9/11 Commission retold the story of people in the CIA and FBI, for instance, who failed to do their jobs in sharing information. And that Report noted the failure to hold anyone accountable. But there is no evidence in the more than 500-page 9/11 Commission Report that those failures were caused by inadequate budget power in the Director of Central Intelligence or his lack of authority to hire and fire intelligence personnel in other agencies than the CIA.

The failures to use and share intelligence have begun to be corrected with the formation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Coordination and sharing might be further enhanced by creation of a National Intelligence Director.

The massive intelligence failures before the Iraq War were of a totally different kind. To a significant degree, they were the result of the CIA shaping and manipulating intelligence to support Administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one direction, invariably making the Iraqi threat clearer and sharper and more imminent, thereby promoting the Administration's determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Nuances were dropped; a slam-dunk was the assessment.

The CIA was saying to the Administration and to the American people what it thought the Administration wanted to hear.