

Niger not a debunking of the British intelligence that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, but he did include things that suggested that it was even more likely.

Why did he go off on such a tangent? In an interview with the committee staff, Joe Wilson was asked how he knew some of the things he was stating publicly with such confidence. On at least two occasions, according to the committee staff report, he admitted he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims, and that he was drawing on either unrelated past experience or no information at all.

For example, when he was asked how he knew that the intelligence community had rejected the possibility of a Niger uranium deal, as he wrote in his book, he told committee staff that his assertion may have involved "a little literary flair."

"A little literary flair," when you charge the Vice President of lying based on information you had that was insufficient, inaccurate, and did not relate to the basic underlying information the British Government intelligence service provided? I think "a little literary flair" is not accurate. It is a fraud and a hoax. His statements were fraud. They were a hoax.

I have talked before about the people who owe some apologies for the assertions they have made about the President and Vice President. Let me add Joe Wilson as one who owes the Vice President a public apology—a public apology—for the unfounded, unbased accusations he made with just "a little literary flair." I think he owes the Vice President one, but I guess I will not hold my breath waiting until he provides it.

Unfortunately, that has been the practice. We have seen too often in too many places grand charges made and covered in the news media, and the committee goes back and we search and we search and we search to find what were the actual facts.

Democratic friends said the administration pressured analysts to change it or they influenced the views of the analysts. Chairman ROBERTS pursued every angle, invited everybody, pursued everyone, over 200, I think 240 interviews, and we came up with some conclusions.

Conclusion No. 83—and this is unanimously agreed to by Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee:

The committee did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Conclusion 84:

The committee found no evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments.

I read an op-ed piece by one of my colleagues saying the administration

did not do a good enough job of checking up on the analysis by the intelligence agencies. And in another breath, another one of my colleagues said they asked too many questions.

Madam President, let me tell you something I have learned as one new to the workings of the intelligence field. A good intelligence analyst puts forth his best or her best judgment on what to conclude from the often sketchy, incomplete facts they have before them and the reports that have to be evaluated, and they expect to be questioned. They want to know that the policy-makers who are using that information have the best sense of what they know. And the Vice President, who was diligent—he was doing due diligence—went over and questioned them time and time again. Did he tell them to change their analysis? Did he tell them what judgment they wanted? No. What he told them was what the intelligence community knew they had to do, and that was to do their very best job to get it right.

There has been a lot of criticism of how the intelligence agency analyzed it. But we have lots of good people who work very hard. There are structures in place that have kept them from sharing. They did not have the information they needed. But to the best of their ability, they gave the Vice President what they thought was the best analysis.

The report also found in conclusion No. 1—most important:

The committee found no evidence that the IC's—

Intelligence community's—mischaracterizations or exaggeration of the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities was the result of political pressure.

Conclusion No. 11:

No analyst questioned by the committee stated that the questions were unreasonable, or that they were encouraged by the questioning to alter their conclusions regarding Iraq's link to al-Qaida.

That is, the link to terrorism.

As I said before, all of the charges, all of the outline of the Democrats' secret memo of November 2003 on how they were going to use the Intelligence Committee to attack the President, to influence the election have been debunked.

A lot of apologies are owed for the baseless charges that have been made against the President, the Vice President, the Department of Defense, and particularly Douglas Feith, who is attempting to serve the Secretary of Defense by asking questions and trying to get the best he could out of the intelligence community for the decision-making in the Department of Defense.

I hope, I trust—maybe I am gullible, but I trust now we can move beyond this and recognize that the intelligence that the administration had, the same intelligence that this body had when we approved going into Iraq, the same intelligence the world had when they said that Saddam Hussein was a bad

guy and U.N. Resolution 1441 said that we need him to disarm, that was the best information we had at the time.

When we look back on it, we were absolutely dead right to go into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein. As David Kay said after he finished, Iraq was a far more dangerous place than we knew. It had the capability, it had the equipment, it had the scientists ready to turn out weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological, to turn over to terrorist groups. Let us hope and pray they were not able to turn over any.

The world is safer, the Iraqi people are safer, and the United States is safer because of the bold leadership of President Bush and Vice President CHENEY and our magnificent men and women in the military who are putting their lives at risk in Afghanistan and Iraq. We remember them and thank them in our prayers, and we also offer our best wishes and support for the Iraqi people to regain a decent country out of the mess that Saddam Hussein left.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. DEWINE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENSIGN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT—MOTION TO PROCEED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motion to proceed to S.J. Res. 40 is withdrawn.

Under the previous order, the majority leader or his designee is recognized for the purposing of making a motion.

AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, pursuant to the order entered last night, I move to proceed to H.R. 4520.

Mr. REID. No objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion is agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 4520) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove impediments in such Code and make our manufacturing, service, and high-technology businesses and workers more competitive and productive both at home and abroad.

AMENDMENT NO. 3562

(Purpose: To provide a substitute for the bill)