

COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 11,
2001

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from New York (Mr. HINCHEY) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, it has now been 30 months, 2½ years, since the attack of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Virginia, and the loss of the plane in Pennsylvania and the loss of all of those lives, more than 3,000 lives lost on that particular day, all the result of the attack of a group of organized criminals known as al Qaeda, the base, or the al Qaeda network.

It is a very important thing for us to examine that attack and to understand it in its full dimensions and implications. It is very important for at least two reasons. First of all, there are the families and the friends, associates of all of those Americans who were killed that day. They have a right to expect that we will provide them with every detail, that we will look into this event, this catastrophe, this disaster meticulously, and we will understand it in every aspect, and all of that will be done publicly and they will have access to all of that information. We owe them, the families of the victims, nothing less, not a scintilla less than that.

Secondly, it is important because the al Qaeda network still exists, and they have others that are operating with them, perhaps in many countries around the world, and some people suggest as many as 60. To the extent that is true, we can expect that they are contemplating additional attacks on our country. In fact, our intelligence agencies inform us that they believe that is the case; and they are working diligently to try to prevent that from happening.

But nevertheless, these plans are being laid and in order for our intelligence agencies and our government to prevent another attack from occurring, we need to know everything possible about the attack of September 11, 2001: precisely who was behind it, how they formulated it, why they did it, what were their motivations, what information and evidence did we have prior to the attack, when did we have it, who had the information, to whom was that information communicated, how was it communicated, under what circumstances, how was it not communicated, and what did we do as a government before, during, and immediately after that attack. All of that information is essential knowledge if we have any chance of preventing another attack from occurring in the future.

So the commission that has been set up to examine these questions is obviously crucially important, and we should be working with them in a fully cooperative way. We should be providing them with all of the resources

and all of the time they need to complete this very essential work. To the extent that we are not doing so, either this Congress or the administration, we are failing in our responsibilities to the American people and failing in a very serious way.

The commission is in existence now, but there was a question initially as to whether or not it would actually exist. After initially opposing the creation of an independent commission to investigate the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has consistently hampered the commission's investigation. They have done so by failing to fully cooperate and to share with the commission information that is necessary for it to be able to conduct its work. This is inexplicable. Why would the administration fail to cooperate with this commission? Why did the administration initially not want the commission to come into existence?

Should we infer from that that the administration had something to hide, has something to hide, does not want information to come out? It is hard to come to a different conclusion based upon the way in which the administration opposed the creation of the commission and the way in which the administration has hampered the work of the commission by failing to fully cooperate with it and to share with it necessary information. This has forced the commission, this failure to cooperate and to provide necessary information, has forced the commission to request an initial 2 months of time in order to fully complete the investigation that it is mandated to complete.

Now, while such a request would seem to be routine, President Bush and the Speaker of the House of Representatives opposed it. Both eventually relented, but they have not done so sincerely. The Speaker now refuses to allow the commission the original 60 days it was originally given after publishing its report to formally wrap up its work and communicate and work with the Congress on its recommendations. This extra time is crucial and should not be eliminated.

We are having the pretense of cooperation and the pretense of extending time but not the fact. The commission is given the same amount of time; it is just being told to do different things within the limited context of that time. The commission should have all the time it needs. Why does the administration and the leadership of this House not want to give it the time that it needs?

The Senate, on the other hand, has passed this legislation. Legislation passed in the Senate would extend the commission's report deadline and its eventual termination for an additional 2 months. The House must follow suit, and it must do so quickly or the commission will be forced to curtail its work and begin preparing its final report before the original deadline. This work is too important to rush. Why is the administration and the leadership

of this House forcing this commission to work under a very tight, restricted deadline when its work is complex and complicated and it should have all of the time it needs to complete it because the information that it is going to provide is so essential to the safety and security of every American citizen?

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Already the commission has produced findings. They have made great strides in uncovering the events that allowed the September 11 attack to occur. Let me give my colleagues just a few examples. The commission has exposed some of the immigration screening flaws that allowed the hijackers to enter the United States, including the dismal lack of cooperation among Federal agencies with security watch lists. In other words, our Federal agencies had watch lists, individuals that they were watching, that they were alerted to and watching for; but the information was not shared, and as a consequence, these people were able to slip through.

The commission has also highlighted the air security flaws that allowed the terrorists to board the planes and carry on with them makeshift weapons. The commission has uncovered evidence that United States intelligence agencies were given information that they did not use properly and information that they did not share with other elements of intelligence, other intelligence organizations within the context of our government. For example, they were given the first name and phone number of one of the hijackers. This information was provided by German intelligence. But no action was taken on it. The first name and the telephone number of one of the hijackers. Nothing was done about it. Why?

These questions must be answered, and the commission must be given enough time to develop the information which will enable these kinds of answers to be forthcoming. If given sufficient time, the commission will no doubt compile the most comprehensive and extensive report about the September 11 attack and provide Congress and the White House with concrete recommendations for improving the security of the American people. It is essential that we do that.

Throughout the commission's existence, cooperation from the administration has been grudging and delayed. The commission had to issue a subpoena to the Federal Aviation Administration in order to obtain detailed transcripts and other information about communications that took place on September 11. That subpoena had to be issued because the agency refused to cooperate. The Federal Aviation Administration would not give the 9/11 commission transcripts and information about communications that took place on the date of September 11, the date of the attack. It is just incomprehensible.

In October 2003, the commission had to threaten the White House with subpoena because the commission believed it was not being provided all the necessary materials for its investigation by the White House. While interviews have been scheduled with former President Clinton and Vice President Gore, similar cooperation has not been forthcoming either from President Bush or other members of his administration. President Bush and Vice President CHENEY refused to meet with the entire commission. Instead, they have decided that they will only agree to separate, limited meetings with the chairman and the vice chairman. They will meet separately for 1 hour and only 1 hour, and only with the chairman and the vice chairman of the commission. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice continues to refuse to testify publicly. The commission is now considering whether to issue her a subpoena. Obviously, because of this lack of cooperation, the commission needs more time and the deadline needs to be extended.

In addition to studying the causes of September 11, there are other things about this circumstance that the Congress ought to be looking into. Congress should be conducting a vigorous examination of the administration's actions in Iraq prior to, during, and currently with regard to the war. With the exception of limited inquiries by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House has failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities with respect to our operations in Iraq. The Constitution of the United States provides the responsibility to the House of Representatives to oversee the operations of the executive branch and to perform oversight functions and to carry out oversight responsibilities. What could be more important than the war in Iraq, which has now cost 550 American lives, American servicemen and -women killed, nearly 3,000 others seriously wounded, many of them lost limbs, wounds that they will carry for the rest of their lives, not to mention thousands of other lives that have been lost? What could be more important than that?

House committees should be thoroughly investigating, not just our intelligence community's massive failures but how the President and members of his administration used the intelligence that they were given to support their case for making war in Iraq. We should also examine all the other reasons that President Bush and other members of the administration cited to support his war. All of this should be examined carefully and in detail.

House committees should be thoroughly investigating the Pentagon's postwar plans. The guerilla war is continuing despite Saddam Hussein's capture. Civil strife is at an all-time high after today's synchronized bombings of Shiite religious gatherings despite the apparent adoption of an interim constitution. Why did the civilian leader-

ship in the Pentagon ignore Army recommendations for a more comprehensive occupation? Why? House committees should be thoroughly investigating how the administration secretly awarded billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to companies like Halliburton. It is only thanks to the work of Members of the Congress, like the gentleman from California (Mr. WAXMAN) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. DINGELL), that we have begun to uncover the scope of some of these massive contracts and that the U.S. taxpayer is actually being overcharged, in fact grossly overcharged, for much of the work that is going on in Iraq by these companies.

House committees should be thoroughly investigating the administration's plan to hand over power in Iraq. How was this hand-over date chosen? It seems conveniently selected to take the upcoming Presidential election into consideration. Why did it take months to get the United Nations involved?

And then there is the whole matter of the case for the war itself. How did we come to go to war in Iraq? How was it that this resolution was presented to the Congress and passed in a very controversial and divisive way? Now that several months of searching have passed without finding any weapons of mass destruction and there remains no evidence whatsoever of a connection between Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, and September 11, one thing is inarguably clear: President Bush and his surrogates intentionally misled the Congress, the American public, and the world about the evidence that such weapons existed in Iraq.

Some may say that this is a premature accusation because it remains possible that some weapons of mass destruction will be found. But such a discovery would not change the indisputable fact that the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, particularly the Secretary of Defense, and other White House advisers were not truthful about the certainty of that evidence. The President would like us to believe that the discrepancies between what the White House said before the war and what we now know to be the truth resulted from failures in our intelligence. He has disingenuously appointed another commission to supposedly study these failures, but he has carefully bounded the commission's scope to prevent scrutiny of his own actions as well as those close to him who were involved in this decision-making process.

Gaps in our intelligence-gathering represent a gravely serious matter that needs to be examined fully. But it is even more important that we scrutinize the discrepancies between what the intelligence agencies told the White House and what the White House told the Congress and the world. If we cannot trust the President to tell us the truth about the need to send our troops into harm's way, then we have

lost an essential component of our system of government. Whatever power our leaders have derives from the informed consent of the governed. This President failed to properly inform those we govern.

There are numerous documented examples of the White House's deception in this matter. Part of the administration's method of operation was to take the intelligence community's assessment that a threat may exist and transform that possibility into a certainty in its public statements. For example, United Nations inspectors found that Iraq had failed to account for a quantity of bacterial-growth media. Had this been used, the United Nations inspectors reported, it, and I quote, "could have produced about three times as much" anthrax as Iraq admitted to having.

This report was fed into the White House propaganda machine and came out somewhat differently in President Bush's October 7 address. It came out in the following form, and I quote: "The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced already two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for and is capable of killing millions." The added rhetoric there did not come about by accident. Those words, used the way they are in that sentence, are designed to frighten people. And people who are frightened are more likely to bend to your will, even if your will is warped and taking them in the wrong direction. If you frighten people, they are more likely to follow you. That was the intention of those words and the misleading elements that are inherent in them.

A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described this particular act of trickery this way: "In two sentences, possibility becomes likelihood, likelihood then subtly becomes fact, and a huge stockpile is created. Finally, biological agent is transformed into weapons, and not just any weapons but extremely sophisticated delivery systems, the only way such weapons could kill 'millions.' Small changes like these can easily transform a threat from minor to dire."

The Carnegie report has identified 40 distinct caveats or conditions included in the October 2002 national intelligence estimate that White House officials usually left out of their public statements. The Bush administration regularly omitted terms like "probably" or "we suspect" or "we cannot exclude" when telling the world what our intelligence agencies had reported. Sometimes the White House was less subtle. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations, and I quote, "Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid evidence." That is the end of Mr. Powell's quote. We now

know that what the Bush administration gave us was indeed nothing more than speculation, speculation presented as if it were fact.

Another trick the administration and its advisers employed was the lumping of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons under the single rubric "weapons of mass destruction." In so doing, the White House could combine the likelihood that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons, a relatively minor threat, with the potentially catastrophic scenario of an Iraqi nuclear program for which there was never any evidence whatsoever.

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The administration further inflated the threat to the United States by insisting, with absolutely no supporting evidence, that Saddam would give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that this was unlikely. It was unlikely, said our National Intelligence Estimate, except under imminent threat of United States attack. Establishing this nightmare scenario was essential to securing public as well as congressional support for war. Only through terrorists did Saddam pose a threat on American soil. Without that threat, enthusiasm for an attack on Iraq would have been, no doubt, greatly diminished.

Using those methods, the White House presented us with the image of a "mushroom cloud," without which they could not wage the war they had been wanting to wage for years.

Today's synchronized bombing of Shiite Muslim religious ceremonies in Baghdad and in Karbala are tragic reminders that Iraq remains an extremely dangerous place. At least 143 people were killed and thousands more were likely injured just today.

These bombings are just the latest in a series of attacks against Iraqi civilians and against United States soldiers. Five hundred and fifty United States soldiers have died in Iraq, and over 2,700 have been wounded, seriously injured. While there is no accurate figure available for Iraqi casualties, it is reasonable to assume that that number is in the thousands. The vast majority of these deaths occurred after the end of major combat, after the end of those major combat operations was announced by President Bush on May 1 of last year.

It is now conventional wisdom that the President and his administration failed abysmally to plan for the conditions in postwar Iraq. Vice President CHENEY's predictions of a rosy welcome were shattered long ago. Our troops remain engaged in a guerilla war, and Iraq's civilian population lives under constant threat by the same adversary.

Why is the House, this House, ignoring this reality? The CIA, the State Department, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Army War College, and various nongovernmental organizations have produced thousands of pages of rec-

ommendations that were ignored. These predictions have proved extremely accurate after the fall of Baghdad. Outside experts are saying that the ongoing financial, diplomatic and human costs of the Iraq occupation are far worse than expected because the administration did not take its own agencies' suggestions.

This is an extremely serious charge, yet no House committee is currently investigating what went wrong with our postwar plans. We are in this House ignoring our responsibilities to oversee the operations of the administration on matters of great and grave seriousness.

Tonight is an opportunity to outline some of the advice that has been ignored by the administration, first with regard to U.S. military recommendations. War games run by the Army and the Pentagon's Joint Staff in preparation for war with Iraq led to very high troop levels. The Army's recommendation for an invasion force was 400,000 troops. Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned the force level of 75,000.

The Army's recommendation took into account the invasion and subsequent occupation. It argued a larger force would actually be more useful after Baghdad fell as opposed to the initial invasion. A large force would allow the Army to restore order quickly and perhaps allow for a much smaller occupation force 6 months or so later.

In Bosnia the Army stationed 200,000 troops to watch over 5 million people. In Iraq, with a population of 25 million, the Army dispatched fewer than 200,000 troops for postwar action. The heart of the Army's argument was that the U.S. would win the war and do so quickly but could be trapped in an untenable occupation if there were too few soldiers.

Marine General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM Commander, agreed with the Army's recommendation for higher troop levels. The Army had also worked out cost projections prior to the war, despite claims by Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz that it was impossible to produce such numbers.

The State Department's Future of Iraq Project is also important for us to look at. Starting in late 2001, the State Department began contemplating postwar plans and created the Future of Iraq Project. It brought in outside experts and teams of exiles and created 17 working groups designed to systematically cover what would be needed to rebuild Iraq's political and economic infrastructure. Congress authorized \$5 million to fund the project's studies in May of 2002. The final report consisted of 13 volumes of recommendations on specific topics. Among the list of recommendations were these:

First, restore electricity and water supplies as soon as possible after regime change by employing Iraqis, thereby creating jobs and engendering goodwill toward the coalition by the indigenous population.

Secondly, they recommended do not disband the entire Iraqi army. The project suggested purging the Iraqi army of its Baathist elements but retaining most members to help restore public order and provide for the country's defense when the U.S. departs. It also stressed, however, that "all combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system." The report later detailed steps on how this could be accomplished.

The project went on to stress how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation, despite Vice President CHENEY's rosy predictions. The report predicted the power vacuum and the crime and looting that followed Saddam's removal would be extensive, and, of course, they were entirely accurate.

The report also suggested that despite the need for a long United States postwar commitment, instituting a long-term military government would alienate the Iraqi people.

The report also warned against the ill will that would result from Iraqis being seen as working for foreign contractors instead of having foreign contractors be seen as assisting the Iraqi people. We have seen all of that come to pass because the recommendations of that report were ignored.

There were other suggestions that came from the Central Intelligence Agency that were forwarded to the administration. The common theme among all CIA predictions was that disorder would follow the fall of Baghdad. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep that quick transfer of sovereignty would invite chaos. The CIA began running war games to plan for the postwar Iraq. These included representatives from the Defense Department. But when the Secretary of Defense's office heard of this kind of cooperation between Defense and the CIA in the early summer of 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense reprimanded the Department of Defense employees who participated and ordered them to stop cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency. It is astonishing.

These war games were intended to make cost predictions and simulate potential problems. Because of that they were seen as weakening the case for launching this "war of choice."

There were also numerous recommendations from nongovernment organizations and the relationship of NGOs and USAID. In the fall of 2002, USAID began planning for postwar Iraq. Since it was the natural contact for nongovernmental organizations, these NGOs were concerned with relief operations in Iraq. At the time most high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were comparing the eventual fall of Iraq to the fall of Germany and Japan. The NGOs strongly disagreed with this assumption and made those views known to USAID.

The NGOs believed Iraq would likely fall into chaos following regime change and requested that sanction restrictions be lifted from them so that they could prepare for postwar Iraq. The NGOs should be allowed to go there and make the arrangements so that postwar Iraq could be organized and people would see that there were organizations that they could relate to and that chaos would not ensue. This request was denied. The NGOs continued to stress the disorder that would follow war, but all they received back from USAID representatives were broad assurances that everything was taken care of.

There was a report from the War College. In January, 2003, the Army War College produced a report that addressed Iraq reconstruction challenges. It predicted long-term gratitude towards the United States was unlikely and that if the United States had to supply the bulk of the occupation force this would lead to many more problems in postwar Iraq. The Army War College report strongly recommended that a large international force would be ideal for postwar occupation. It also provided a 135-item checklist of what tasks would have to be done right after the war and by whom those tasks would have to be accomplished.

According to those involved with this report, the Pentagon paid little attention to any of its postwar recommendations.

There were, of course, unrealistic assumptions. Exaggerations during the buildup for war were not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Administration officials often made widely ridiculed assumptions about postwar Iraq. Here are just a few: Both President Bush and Vice President CHENEY claimed we would be greeted as liberators. USAID Administrator Natsios claimed rebuilding would cost U.S. taxpayers \$1.7 billion. Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz repeatedly claimed it was impossible to guess any costs for the war. Secretary Rumsfeld called former Economic Adviser Lawrence Lindsey's claim that the war would cost \$200 billion way off. He thought that was a gross exaggeration. Wolfowitz claimed reconstruction would cost U.S. taxpayers very little. What is the record? To date, the United States Government has spent approximately \$150 billion in Iraq, and we know that the President has an additional bill of at least \$50 billion which he will present to the Congress sometime after the November election. Lawrence Lindsey's recommendation seems quite good now based upon the experience. It is too bad he was not listened to at the time.

The House of Representatives must investigate. These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. There are literally thousands of pages of postwar planning that were prepared and then ignored.

Why was the Defense Department and not the State Department initially

put in charge of postwar Iraq? Why were we not more prepared? Why did the administration not take its own recommendations? Why were we told there were no cost estimates when of course there were?

Postwar plans were available and they were ignored. The House of Representatives must investigate this to ensure that legislative remedies are examined and to put in place mechanisms that will prevent another failure of this magnitude.

Just for a moment let us take a look at the no bid contracts. Halliburton and Bechtel already have contracts in Iraq worth \$3.14 billion. Those contracts result from the conflict in Iraq and the reconstruction efforts. Yet the gentleman from California (Mr. WAXMAN) and his staff at the Committee on Government Reform have found that the cost of many of the reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90 percent if the projects were awarded to local Iraqi companies rather than contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel. The American people, in other words, could be saving 90 cents on the dollar if this reconstruction activity were done in a way that is not designed to benefit the people who benefit the administration.

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There is ample evidence of overcharging. We have learned that Kellogg Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary, is overcharging the United States for fuel delivered to Baghdad from Kuwait. They are charging as much as three times the amount for gasoline that can be purchased there on the market, inflating the price three times.

We have also learned that Kellogg Brown & Root employees received kickbacks from a Kuwaiti subcontractor in exchange for awarding that subcontractor a reconstruction contract. But that is all. How much of a kickback was there? Who were these people who received the kickback? Who at Halliburton knew about it? Who at the Defense Department may have known about it? Who else in the administration may have known about it? There is an awful lot of information we do not have, and that is why this investigation needs to go forward.

Members of Congress were informed of these sole-source noncompetitive contracts by media reports, by investigative reporters in the media. Despite repeated requests by Members to Federal agencies, the administration has been slow to respond, or simply has declined to provide details about why these large private contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis.

Here are two brief examples. USAID awarded several contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to a few companies it hand-picked to compete against each other, yet repeated inquiries from the minority on the Committee on Government Reform to USAID have been brushed aside, and now USAID has refused to provide cop-

ies of the contracts or information on how it chose which companies would bid on these initial contracts.

This is the taxpayers' money. We are spending enormous amounts of money, and it is being spent secretly, and the Congress is not being allowed to look at the contracts or examine how this bidding process went forward.

The administration has also failed to disclose information about its sole-source oil field contract with Halliburton's Kellogg Brown & Root. Kellogg Brown & Root was awarded a no-bid contract on March 8, 2003, but the Defense Department did not disclose until April 8 that this contract has a potential value of \$7 billion. Today, despite a recommendation by the Army Corps of Engineers to open this contract to public scrutiny, the Defense Department continues to keep its content classified for allegedly national security reasons. Whose security is at stake, we have cause to wonder.

House committees must investigate. It is clear that Members of Congress are receiving grudging and delayed cooperation, if they receive any cooperation at all, from the administration regarding reconstruction contracts. Only a formal committee investigation will be able to answer the serious questions and allegations that have arisen from these no-bid contracts and this no-bid process.

Ambassador Bremer has set the deadline for transferring power back to the Iraqi people as June 30, 2004. This date falls conveniently close to the beginning of the summer Presidential campaign. The date was set solely by the United States, despite recent events indicating that Iraq will not be able to make a peaceful transition without the United Nations leading negotiations. This begs the question, Was this date set for political purposes?

The House should be asking these questions and demanding clear proof of the reasoning behind this date. Part of the original reasoning was that elections in Iraq would be held shortly after the transition deadline to ensure the legitimacy of the new government. But that is no longer the case. The United States plan for such an election was roundly rejected, and it was the United Nations that had to step in and negotiate a solution to the election question.

Does this administration still believe the United Nations is a "worthless debating society"? I wonder.

Under the United Nations plan, national elections will take place in the late fall of 2004. Should this new development not affect the transfer date? The Congress and the American people deserve answers to these questions that at this late date still remain unanswered.

So, Mr. Speaker, we have two issues. One is the 9/11 commission and why that commission is not being allowed the time it needs to complete its work comprehensively and completely and provide answers to questions that beg

answers, answers that we need as Representatives and which the administration should have also, if it does not have them already.

The 9/11 commission should be given more time to carry out its work, and the 2-month extension is not too much to ask. Why are we rushing the completion of the work of that commission? That question ought to be on the mind of every Member of this House, and every Member of this House ought to demand an answer. The extension ought to be granted, and it ought to be granted sincerely and accurately so that they have the full time that they need to complete their work.

There, of course, remains all of the questions that I raised, and many, many more. I have just begun to scratch the surface of the questions that remain with regard to what happened prior to our going into Iraq in that war, what has happened during it, and what is continuing to happen and what we will do subsequently with regard to that country. Many questions remain unanswered.

The responsibility to develop those answers lies with this House of Representatives. The leadership of this House should appoint appropriate bipartisan committees to look into these matters. We are derelict in our duty. We are not fulfilling our responsibilities to the American people on an issue that is of paramount importance, an issue that involves thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars in American treasure and the future safety and security of the American people. Those answers should be forthcoming, and there should be no delay in setting up the mechanisms which will allow them to come forward.

POLL SHOWS ENTHUSIASM FOR FREE TRADE FADES

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KLINE). Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I wish to place in the RECORD this evening a poll done by the University of Maryland that shows that even high-income Americans, those earning over \$100,000 a year, now have lost their enthusiasm for free trade and the loss of jobs in this country as they perceive their jobs are now threatened by white collar workers in China, in India and other countries, and rising anxiety exists across all income bands in our country relative to free trade.

So it is as much of a curiosity as anything that the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Mr. Greg Mankiw, caused an uproar recently when he said the practice of shipping out our jobs, outsourcing U.S. jobs, is good for our country.

How can shipping out our jobs be a good thing? Not surprisingly, Mr. Mankiw was forced to backtrack and profess his sympathy for anyone who

had lost a job. My goodness, that is the least he could have done. Predictably, Mr. Mankiw was defended by free trade fundamentalists like The Washington Post and some of his fellow economists. But something has changed profoundly in America over the past 10 years, and I would say it is reality. Reality has set in coast to coast.

NAFTA is celebrating its 10th anniversary, and we are seeing the impact of failed NAFTA-style trade policy throughout our country and continent.

It is no longer just in Ohio and Michigan, although the Great Lakes States are undoubtedly the epicenter of the job-loss earthquake. It is not just the Carolinas or Massachusetts, where the job losses have been so staggering. And it is not just vehicles, cars and trucks and the massive auto parts industry. It is not just machining businesses, and it is not just machinery in general.

In fact, the damage to our economy from outsourcing and the doctrine of free trade is no longer confined to just the manufacturing sector.

Something has changed in America, and it will undermine and eventually destroy public support for NAFTA-style trade agreements. Suddenly, it is not only manufacturing jobs that are being outsourced to Mexico, to China and other low-wage platforms. Now outsourcing is beginning to bite into whole new sectors of our economy, where the promise of future job growth once lay. Indeed, the loss of jobs in manufacturing has been dramatic over the past several years.

Look at these sectors: apparel, 37 percent of the jobs lost; textile mills, 34 percent; primary metals, down 25 percent; machinery, down 22 percent.

But the decline in what has been called knowledge-based industries has been dramatic too: computer and peripheral equipment, down 28 percent; communications equipment, down 39 percent; semiconductors and electronic components, down 37 percent; electrical equipment and appliances, down 23 percent; telecommunications, down 19 percent; data processing, down 23 percent.

During the NAFTA debate, the free trade fundamentalists promised that high-wage, high-benefit jobs would be replaced by high-wage jobs in the computer sector. In other words, automotive industry jobs would be replaced by computer jobs.

Wrong. As economist Paul Craig Roberts wrote recently in the Washington Times, "For years, as U.S. multinationals moved manufacturing offshore, Americans were told their future was in 'knowledge jobs.' Today, knowledge jobs are being moved offshore more rapidly than even manufacturing jobs were moved away."

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers said last week that in 2003, the U.S. jobless rate for computer scientists and systems analysts has reached an all-time high of 5.3 percent. That is roughly in line with the

national unemployment rate of 5.6 percent. In Ohio, the unemployment rate is 6.2 percent, in my region of Ohio, over 8.4 percent, and in some counties of Ohio as high as 18.5 percent.

But the burden of proof is now in the proponents of NAFTA-style trade agreements. If outsourcing is sending the jobs of highly trained computer scientists, computer programmers and medical diagnosticians overseas, then where are the new jobs supposed to come from?

It is hard to believe, but Vice President CHENEY said, "If the Democratic policies had been pursued over the last 2 or 3 years, the kind of tax increases that both Messrs. KERRY and EDWARDS have talked about, we would not have had the kind of job growth we have had."

I would just ask the Vice President, where is the job growth? I do not see any job growth. And that is what the average real American is asking too, where are the good new jobs going to come from? Where?

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the poll I referred to earlier.

[From USA Today, Feb. 24, 2004]

POLL: ENTHUSIASM FOR FREE TRADE FADES; DIP SHARPEST FOR \$100K SET; LOSS OF JOBS CITED

(By Peronet Despeignes)

High-income Americans have lost much of their enthusiasm for free trade as they perceive their own jobs threatened by white-collar workers in China, India and other countries, according to data from a survey of views on trade.

The survey by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) is one of the most comprehensive U.S. polls on trade issues. It found that support for free trade fell in most income groups from 1999 to 2004 but dropped most rapidly among high-income respondents—the group that has registered the strongest support for free trade. "Free trade" means the removal of barriers such as tariffs that restrict international trade.

The poll shows that among Americans making more than \$100,000 a year, support for actively promoting more free trade collapsed from 57 percent to less than half that, 28 percent. There were smaller drops, averaging less than 7 percentage points, in income brackets below \$70,000, where support for free trade was already weaker.

The same poll found that the share of Americans making more than \$100,000 who want the push toward free trade slowed or stopped altogether nearly doubled from 17 percent to 33 percent.

Rising anxiety about free trade and shipping out of U.S. jobs could intensify an already fierce political battle this election year.

In the fight for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C., has gained ground on front-runner Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., by hitting Kerry's support for free-trade agreements that critics say have cost American jobs. The two have bitterly accused each other of supporting past agreements.

Whoever the Democratic nominee, he is expected to use the trade issue against President Bush, whose administration has generally been supportive of free trade.

The poll was released last month, but breakdowns by income level were performed at the request of USA TODAY. The results