School Social Work Association of America
Service Employees International Union
Shaken Baby Alliance
Sjogren's Syndrome Foundation
Society for Adolescent Medicine
Society for Pediatric Research
Society for Personality Assessment
Society for Public Health Education
Society for Research on Child Development
Society for Social Work Research
Society for Women's Health Research
Society of American Gastrointestinal Endoscopic Surgeons
Society of Medical Consultants to Armed Forces
Society of Professors of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Society of Thoracic Surgeons
South Carolina Medical Association
South Dakota State Medical Association
STOP IT NOW!
Suicide Awareness Voice of Education
Suicide Prevention Action Network USA
Tennessee Medical Association
Texas Medical Association
The Arc of the United States
Title II Community AIDS National Network
Tourette Syndrome Association
Treatment and Research Advancements Association of Personality Disorder
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
United Cerebral Palsy Association
United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministry
United Jewish Communities
United Methodist General Board of Church and Society
Utah Medical Association
Vermont Medical Society
Volunteers of America
Washington State Medical Association
Wellstone Action
West Virginia State Medical Association
Wisconsin Medical Society
Working Assets
Women of Reform Judaism
Wyoming Medical Society
Yellow Ribbon Suicide Prevention Program
Youth Law Center

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there now will be a period for the transaction of morning business until 10:40 a.m. with the first 22 minutes under the control of the Senator from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, or his designee; the following 22 minutes under the control of the Senator from Florida, Mr. GRAHAM, or his designee; the following 22 minutes under the control of the majority leader or his designee; and the final 22 minutes under the control of the Senator from California, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, or her designee. Under the unanimous consent agreement just entered, this time shall not be diminished by the minority leader having used his time.

The Senator from Kansas is recognized.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, Senator GRAHAM and I have conferred. He has a scheduling conflict. So I ask unanimous consent that he be recognized first. I think that is his intent.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senator from Florida is recognized for 22 minutes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague for his graciousness. I also commend him for the leadership he has been providing to this body, particularly as the chair of the Intelligence Committee. That is the subject of my remarks today.

THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM, PART III

Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, during this week, I have spoken—and this will be the third statement—about the need to reform our Nation's intelligence agencies. I have suggested that the horrific acts of September 11, 2001—acts which killed nearly 3,000 Americans in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania—could have been avoided if our intelligence agencies had been more organized and more focused in dealing with the threat of international terrorism. These conclusions were largely the result of the work of the House-Senate joint inquiry on September 11, 2001. This bicameral, bipartisan committee finished its investigation on December 20, 2002, and filed its report. In that report, it concluded there were a number of problems with our existing intelligence networks and it made 19 recommendations of how to fix those problems.

Repairing the flaws in our intelligence community is a matter of national security, a matter of the highest importance and urgency. As we are now learning in the context of the war with Iraq and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, policymakers cannot make wise decisions affecting the security of American people without timely, accurate, credible information, and tough-minded, independent analysis, and will use that information to shape the judgments of the President and other decisionmakers, not to validate previously held opinions. If we fail to accurately perceive future threats, we will be poorly prepared to respond to them. If we do not perceive current threats accurately, then our response may be either inadequate or excessive.

Whether restraining the development of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or interdicting terrorists, now, more than ever, intelligence matters. If there is another terrorist attack on American soil, the American people will demand to know what the Congress, what the President, what other governmental institutions learned from the September 11 attacks, and now the prewar intelligence in Iraq, and how that information was used to protect them. There will be no avoidance of accountability for the next attack, either for Congress or the President. We must take our responsibility seriously.

Further, we must recognize that every day needed intelligence reforms are delayed is a day of unnecessary risk for the American people. Unfortunately, with regard to the recommendations of the joint inquiry committee, very little has been accomplished to date. In my two previous statements, I discussed the status of these recommendations dealing with the intelligence community reform and specific responses to terrorism. I particularly commend Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN for her leading role in the area of reorganization of the intelligence community.

Today I will turn to two additional areas of particular concern: the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, which governs the use of electronic eavesdropping on foreign nationals in the United States. Here, I particularly recognize the contributions of Senators DEWINE, DURBIN, EDWARDS, and KYL to this section of our report.

We know now the FBI did not have or did not give adequate attention and resources to the problem of terrorism prior to September 11, 2001. For the FBI, terrorism was a lesser priority and its personnel did not understand the FISA and therefore did not use effectively its available investigative authority. Important information was not shared with other agencies, was not shared even within the various branches of the FBI itself. During the summer of 2001, separate parts of the FBI had information that could have been used to disrupt or destroy al-Qaida's hijacking plot, but that information was never collectively analyzed.

For example, what agents in Minnesota knew about Zacaria Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker who was taken into custody in August of that year, is he was studying to fly commercial airlines but was disinterested in either taking them off or landing them. Meanwhile, a Phoenix field agent of the FBI had become suspicious of radical Islamists who were also learning to fly airplanes. An agent in San Diego was working with an informant who knew at least two of the hijackers. The informant was aware that one of the future hijackers was moving to Arizona with a fellow terrorist—again to attend flight school.

If these agents had been aware of each other's activities or if the analysts at FBI headquarters had connected these geographically separate events, portions of the September 11 plot might well have been uncovered and disrupted. Unfortunately, the FBI lacked the sufficient number of analysts to process all the relevant information, and barriers to sharing information prevented agents from learning about each other's activities, even though both the Phoenix memo which expressed concern that bin Laden was sending young recruits to the United States for pilot training and the