

Madam Speaker, Dr. Wilson believed anything was possible. He never gave up and fought to make every institution of higher learning at which he served the best it could be. His students received the educational tools they needed to become prominent and successful business people, professionals and elected officials.

Throughout his life, Dr. Wilson received countless honors, awards and recognitions, including the Henry B. Gonzalez Latino Leadership Award, named in honor of our colleague, the late Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez. This citation for meritorious service is presented to those who have worked selflessly, often without recognition, and made contributions both in the Hispanic community and the broader society as well.

Dr. Wilson was chosen to receive this award because he embodied a giving, sharing spirit and made a lasting contribution to our nation through education. Upon retiring from TSU in 1990, Dr. Wilson was honored by the Texas House of Representatives for his distinguished service in his community, business, government and academia.

Dr. Wilson is survived by his second wife, Imelda Pradia Wilson and three children: Rhea Ann Fairley, Zelda Jefferson Young, and Milton Wilson, Jr.; his sister, Jessie W. Wilson; and five grand-children: Gladys Zelda Fairley, Paul Milton Fairley, Milton Wilson III, Marcus James Wilson, and Wendell Mosley.

Dr. Milton Wilson was a true American pioneer. His efforts and his accomplishments will long be remembered.

I ask all Members of Congress to join me in commending the late Dr. Milton Wilson for his exceptional career and contributions to our Nation and in extending our sincere condolences to his family and friends.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. STUPAK) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. STUPAK addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HOEKSTRA) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, tonight I wish to spend a few minutes talking about a couple of issues; number one, the progress and the commitment and the hope that I have observed in Iraq in two different trips, two different opportunities I have had to travel to Iraq, once in August and going back in September; and then I want to talk a little bit about the statement today by Dr. David Kay on the interim progress of the Iraqi Survey Group. The Iraqi Survey Group is the group that is working in Iraq and doing the search and the delineation of exactly what the WMD, the weapons of mass destruction, program consisted of in Iraq before and during the Operation Iraqi Freedom.

First, let me talk about my trip to Iraq in August and in September. You fly into a city of 5.7 million people and then you fly over Baghdad for half an hour or 40 minutes to get kind of an observation as to exactly what is going on in Baghdad. Remember, I did this in the middle of August. The first observation was that this was not a country and that this was not a city that was destroyed by war and mired in turmoil. Sometimes that is the impression that we get from watching the nightly news.

Aside from a few small pockets of destruction in Baghdad, the city appeared to be functioning close to a normal city in the Middle East. There were cars, buses and trucks on the streets. There were people on the streets. The stores were open. Commerce was going on in Baghdad. There had been a lot of progress and a lot of activity going on in Baghdad.

We had the opportunity to talk with our troops and to hear about the rebuilding and the reconstruction that they had been involved with in Iraq over the last number of months. They talked about having what I call walking-around money, but it is very closely tracked by the military. The military, at any given time, can print out a list of all the projects that they have been working on.

The 101st Division, up in northern Iraq, gave us a list of roughly 1,800 projects that they had been involved with, that they had completed or were still working on in the middle of August. They had 1,800 projects, from repairing clinics, drilling wells, repairing schools, working in hospitals, agricultural projects, and a whole number of different kinds of things that clearly empowered them to go into the communities where they were stationed and where they were trying to provide security and to assist the Iraqis in rebuilding their community, not tomorrow but at that moment and on that day. As these funds were depleted, the troops would get more funds. These funds came from the dollars that were left over in the Iraqi treasury after Saddam Hussein was overthrown.

A second thing that kind of struck me. I was impressed by the troops. They are doing an absolutely awesome job there. The other thing that people have asked me, what were you surprised about when you went to Iraq? I was not surprised about the work of our troops in Iraq. I have seen our troops in action in Afghanistan. I have been on aircraft carriers. I have been in Bosnia and Kosovo and had the opportunity to interact. I am not surprised by the work of our troops. I am impressed but not surprised. I have come to expect that because they have demonstrated it over and over.

But one of the things that did surprise me is I had heard of the palaces of Saddam in Iraq. I have been to Versailles, I have been to Buckingham Palace, but nothing prepares you for Saddam's lavish spending on himself once you take a look at his palaces in Iraq.

The palace in Tikrit has over 100 buildings in it. It probably stretches an area from the Capitol here in Washington down to the White House, if not a larger area. It has a perimeter security system with walls and watchtowers and those types of things; three to four story high buildings, which in terms of their scale are closer in scale to the size of this building, the Capitol of the United States, than what they are of our White House. And again he has these all over the country.

We also had the opportunity to meet with Peter McPherson, who is the President of Michigan State University, who for a number of months served in Iraq. He is now back at Michigan State but served as their finance minister.

I asked him about one of the allegations that was made about the post-war planning. I said, Peter, there are folks that are saying there is very little planning that went on as to what we were going to do after the war. He kind of laughed and said, you know, a number of the things that typically happen after a war in a country did not happen here in Iraq.

Many times the currency will collapse. As a matter of fact, here in Iraq, we had a debate about whether we should keep the Iraqi dinar. Why the debate? Well, the debate was the Iraqi dinar has a picture of Saddam Hussein on it, and the last thing we really wanted to do was to provide to the people of Iraq a constant reminder of the Saddam regime and that Saddam was still out there. But he said, Pete, we went through this conscious decision to keep the Iraqi dinar in circulation so that commerce could continue and so that the economy would not collapse.

He also said that by keeping the dinar in circulation and by providing the security into the system, the banks did not collapse, that there was not a run on the banks right after the banks reopened. The banking and the financial institutions stayed in business. As a matter of fact, with the stability that we have there, there are now a number of international banks that are clamoring to get into Iraq. And in a couple of weeks we will be introducing a new currency into Iraq, one that gets rid of the picture of Saddam Hussein on the money.

Peter McPherson worked with the Iraqi Governing Council to put in place a tax structure, highest tax rate of 15 percent, to put in a tariff structure and also to come up with rules for international investment. Every industry will now be open for foreign investment, except the energy sector.

I also had the opportunity to meet with another individual from Michigan, Jim Haverman, who is serving as kind of the shadow finance minister, or health care minister in Iraq. What he is doing is rebuilding the structure. I asked him the same question. Jim, what about the plan or the lack of planning in the post-war period?

He came back and said, we do not get a lot of credit or we get no credit for the things that did not happen here. A lot of times after there has been a war, there will be an outbreak of epidemic diseases, things like cholera, malaria, and other diarrheal diseases. So you notice none of those things happened here in Iraq. We were able to keep the hospitals open, we were able to keep the clinics open, we were able to provide the basic health care necessary to prevent the outbreak of epidemic diseases, and now we have moved forward, that we have distributed 10,000 tons of pharmaceuticals.

It is not that many of those pharmaceuticals were not present prior to the war in Iraq. They were present in Iraq, but they were stored in warehouses, and they were there for the elite and not for the masses. But what Jim and the Iraqi health care service have done is they have been focusing on getting quality health care or improved health care out to much of the rest of the country. They have been successful in doing that, and they are now working at upgrading the health care system.

Remember, somebody like Saddam Hussein spent about 60 to 70 cents on health care for each and every Iraqi last year, in contrast to what he spent on his palaces. And the joke, though it is not very funny in Iraq, is what Saddam spent his money on. He spent his money on his palaces. He spent it on runways. You will fly over Iraq and you will see military runways all over Iraq, so he was building the military infrastructure. And then he also spent a significant amount of money on munitions. Later on, as I talk about Dr. Kay's report, Dr. Kay outlines that they estimate that they have munitions dumps that will hold over 600,000 tons of munitions.

The bottom line, from my perspective and those of the people who I traveled to Iraq with, is that we are making progress in Iraq. We are bringing stability and hope to the Iraqi people. It does not mean that on occasion, and maybe too frequently, we do not have spectacular setbacks, the death of American soldiers or a bombing where the folks that are opposed to us are going after American troops, coalition troops, Iraqis that are helping us, Iraqis that are stepping up and taking leading roles in their government, but we are making progress.

□ 1745

It is our hope that once the people of Iraq experience freedom, economic opportunity and a representative democratic government, the hope and expectation is that they will embrace this new way of life and will not foresee ever returning to tyrannical rule by a despotic government that exerts control through fear and oppression.

Today in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we had an opportunity to listen to testimony from Dr. David Kay talking about the progress, the 3-month progress report

from the Iraqi survey group. This statement was released by Dr. Kay to the public at 5 p.m. This is a nonsecret version of the testimony that he provided to both the House and the Senate intelligence committees today. It contains a portion of what we heard today, but not everything. Let me just go through some of the materials that Dr. Kay wanted us to fully understand. This was my fourth opportunity to meet with Dr. Kay. I met with him on three different occasions in Iraq and then in front of the committee today.

He begins by saying that he cannot strongly enough emphasize that the interim progress report is a snapshot in the context of an ongoing investigation of where we are after our first 3 months of work. It is not a completed report. It only covers the first 3 months. He says that they are still very much in the collection analysis mode, seeking the information and evidence that will allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual objectives, scope, and dimensions of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq's WMD program spanned more than 2 decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and was elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

He goes to say that the result talks about the period from 1991 to 2003 where much of what we expected to find in Iraq was based on very, very limited information. He talked extensively about what they have found and what we have not found. He said, "What we have not found are stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone."

Mr. Speaker, why are they having such difficulty? Here are some reasons. All of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror. It is hard to find out what was going on in Iraq. Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation relating to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans- to post-conflict. They destroyed the evidence and the information that would have clearly and quickly outlined for us exactly the programs they had in place. "Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable materials and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program."

The report covers in detail the significant elements of this looting that were carried out with a clear aim of concealing pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom activities of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pretrans-conflict period, and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them.

Another reason we are having some difficulties, any actual WMD weapons or materials are likely to be small in relationship to the total conventional armaments footprints and difficult-to-near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for and the quantities we would expect to find can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two-car garage.

But what have they found? This is not only about why it is difficult. What he is telling us is why we maybe did not just walk into Baghdad or Iraq and say here is the warehouse, and here is all of the information. He is telling us why it is difficult, and he says they have found dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.

Continuing on, he gives a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later. They include a clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses that contained equipment subject to U.N. monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research; a prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of biological agents; referenced strains of biological organisms concealed in scientists' homes, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons; new research on biological weapons applicable agents, documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation; a line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 kilometers, 350 kilometers beyond the permissible limit; continued covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles; plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers, well beyond the 150-kilometer range limit imposed by the U.N.; clandestine attempts between 1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 kilometer-range ballistic missiles.

They faced systematic destruction of documents. With regard to biological warfare activities, he stated that Iraqi survey group teams are uncovering significant information, including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi intelligence service, and possible biological weapon activities and deliberate concealment activities.

All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of biological weapons agents. Debriefings of IIS, Iraqi Intelligence Service, officials and site visits have

begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the U.N. and was previously unknown. They are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror agents; but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW facilities, and continuing R&D, all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.

The Iraqi intelligence service also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences. No big deal, except, the quote continues, according to Iraqi scientists and Iraqi intelligence service sources providing an important avenue for furthering BW applicable research. Interestingly enough, this was the only area of graduate work where the Iraqi intelligence service appeared to sponsor students.

Another quote, in a similar vein, two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq, under the guise of legitimate activity, developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved simplified fermentation and spray-drying capabilities for the simulant BT that would have been directly applicable to anthrax. One scientist confirmed that the production line for BT could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

Another area that needs investigation, another quote out of the report, additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities. Let me repeat that: reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substance, progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

I have only got a couple of minutes left; and the report that Dr. Kay has issued is an interim report, and I think that this report is now going to be available, or this portion, the declassified portion is going to be available to the American people.

When you read through here and you take a look at the concealment of these different programs from the U.N., the systematic effort to hide and destroy relevant information, and then the things that we have found already, the different labs, the discussion about human testing, the different efforts that they had that were under way, the work that they had going on in a number of different areas, it becomes clear quickly that we need to do two or three things, the first of which is we need to let Dr. Kay finish his report and to finish his work. As he states at the front end, it is too early to draw any conclusions as to exactly what was going on, what was available, and where Saddam Hussein was going. We need to let Dr.

Kay finish his work so that we will have a clear understanding of what was and what was not available in Iraq, and that is going to be a very difficult task given the destruction of materials and the environment that we have in Iraq today.

The second thing that we need to do is we need to make sure that we give Dr. Kay the resources to get the job done.

The third thing we know is there was a lot of stuff going on in Iraq, and the approach that Dr. Kay is taking is exactly the kind of approach that we need to take. Dr. Kay really has three criteria that he talks about before he will reach conclusions on exactly what Iraq has. He wants to find physical evidence, the materials or the equipment that demonstrate that certain programs or activities were under way. He wants to find the documentation that says here is the equipment, here is the documentation that outlines what this equipment was intended to do, and then the third piece that he wants to put with this is these are the Iraqis that were working the plan and working the equipment so that he has put all of the pieces together. That is exactly the kind of approach that we need to take, rather than asking Dr. Kay or others to jump to conclusions based on the piecemeal information that we have today.

In this report, Dr. Kay talks about the mobile labs. They have found mobile labs. So they have a piece of the puzzle. They have found mobile labs, but rather than reaching a conclusion and saying what they were or were not used for, since they only found the mobile labs and they have not found the documentation and they have not found the Iraqi personnel that might have been operating these labs, we are at this point in time speculating what they may have been used for and capable of; and Dr. Kay has simply in this report said we are not reaching a conclusion or making a decision as to what we believe that equipment was being used for. We are going to wait until we find the Iraqis; we are going to wait until we have an opportunity to uncover the documents that will outline exactly what these bio labs or what these laboratories, mobile labs, were going to be used for.

The professionalism of Dr. Kay and the process that he is going through are exactly what we need to have in place at this point.

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I think that the report today that was issued, the portions of the report that were made public, the portions of the report that are still classified, should give us the highest degree of confidence that Dr. Kay is going through this in exactly the right way that it needs to be done and that there are a number of very, very serious issues that need to be pursued and that we need to get to the bottom of. It will help us to better determine the accu-

racy and the effectiveness of our intel before the war, but also it will give us a better understanding as to how far chemical and biological weapons had progressed in Iraq, and we need to know that so that we will also have an idea as to what at some point in time may have been transferred to others who may want to do us harm.

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan). The balance of the majority leader's hour is reallocated to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH).

Mr. LEACH. Madam Speaker, I rise today to discuss the troubling situation in Iraq and the difficult legitimacy challenges posed by the U.S.-led coalition victory. In particular, I am convinced that the best way to develop international support for reconstruction efforts and reduce violence in the country is for the U.S. to maintain pre-eminent military leadership but grant the United Nations explicit authority for managing Iraq's political transition.

As my colleagues are aware, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, testified before several House committees last week regarding the administration's supplemental appropriations request for Iraq. In explaining administration policy, he outlined a number of constructive measures aimed at creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional and prosperous Iraq. These included bolstering the security situation in the country and advancing bold economic reforms designed to refashion the Soviet-style command economy bequeathed by Saddam into a vibrant free enterprise model for the region.

Ambassador Bremer also laid out a seven-step political transformation process. According to the Ambassador, three of the steps leading to sovereignty have been completed: In July, an Iraqi Governing Council was appointed; in August, the Governing Council named a Preparatory Committee to recommend a mechanism for writing Iraq's new, permanent constitution; and in September, the Governing Council appointed ministers to run the day-to-day affairs of state.

Additional steps include developing a process by which the Iraqis write their own constitution, and here Secretary Powell has expressed the hope that this could be completed in the next 6 months, although others have expressed doubts about the time frame; ratifying the constitution by popular vote of the entire adult population; holding elections for a new Iraqi government; and, finally, following elections, formally transferring sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the new government in Baghdad.