

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I thank the gentlewoman for her fine remarks and leadership on this issue and the efforts of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) and especially to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), the ranking member, for crafting this important bipartisan legislation.

The creation of democracy in Russia must be counted as one of the great achievements of the past century. Yet for all of its accomplishments, that democracy is not yet firmly established. The civil society on which all democracies ultimately rest remains precariously weak. Much of the legacy inherited from Russia's authoritarian past is still to be overcome. The institutions of democracy remain fragile in many areas. The habits of freedom have not yet become universal.

Given these and other concerns, the government's stated goal of creating a guided democracy where the parameters of permitted dissent are significantly narrowed is very troubling indeed, as are the patterns of clear, gross and uncorrected human rights violations associated with the continuing conflict in Chechnya.

Mr. Speaker, you juxtapose these problems along with the trafficking problem, which remains a very significant problem where young Russian women are trafficked into forced prostitution and are abused in the United States and countries of the West as well as in Russia itself, we need to do more. This bill advances the ball and will be an aid to the democratic forces in Russia. It is a good bill and deserves the support of our colleagues.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2121, the Russia Democracy Act, and thank the co-sponsors of this bill for their support. In drafting this legislation, I sought to enhance United States democracy, good governance and anti-corruption efforts in order to strengthen civil society and independent media in Russia. Cultivating civil society in Russia and knitting together its patch-work democracy is not only a goal of U.S. policy—it is an imperative. Unless we redouble our efforts to strengthen democratic reform in Russia—as this bill seeks to do—our former adversary may yet return to authoritarian rule and challenge our national security.

The Russia Democracy Act expands upon U.S. initiatives that have proven successful in Russia. Among other things, it provides further support for local democratic governments through the Regional Initiative; expands training for Russian journalists in investigative techniques designed to ferret out corruption; and it broadens successful U.S.-Russia cultural exchanges, such as those sponsored by the Library of Congress.

As Russia becomes more democratic and our foreign policies become more closely aligned in the war against international terrorism, it is important that the U.S. seize upon the opportunity to facilitate Russia's integration

into the West. The Russia Democracy Act is designed to achieve this goal. This bill launches a number of initiatives to take advantage of new developments in Russian society over the past decade, and harnesses new information technologies to provide Internet access to Russian citizens, independent media and NGOs. And it engages the growing network of local, independent media outlets to spread democratic principles working in partnership with such stalwarts of democracy as Radio Liberty and Voice of America.

Deepening our engagement with Russia's civil society is critical to its survival. At the same time we must stand ready to defend against Moscow's attempts to undermine it. Following September 11th, President Putin made a courageous decision to make common cause with the Western democracies in defeating terrorism. But recent decisions by Putin to embrace Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and his continued attempt to intimidate free media in Russia, threatens to jeopardize our new partnership.

Just last week, President Putin revoked a decree issued by his predecessor that allowed Radio Liberty to establish a bureau in Russia and provided the broadcaster with certain privileges. Radio Liberty, which is supported in part by the U.S. government, may now be subject to Russia's restrictive media laws. The right of Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russia is no longer guaranteed. Although some in Russia argue that this was done to level the playing field for all broadcasters, the Putin Administration has been known to apply the law selectively, as the cases of NTV and Ekho Moskvy make clear. I condemn this decision, and urge my colleagues to join me in ensuring Radio Liberty does not suffer the fate of Russia's other independent news organizations.

Having lived under both fascist and communist rule, I am painfully aware of the importance of this legislation. As a teenager living in Hungary during the Second World War, I recall fondly the inspirational and liberating broadcasts of the Voice of America, and can testify personally to the dramatic effect these radio programs had in providing hope to a captive people. To keep Russia on track toward westward integration, surrogate broadcasting such as Radio Liberty is critical.

I am also pleased that the bill includes an important provision to provide for an endowment to preserve the Andrei Sakharov archives. Without Mr. Sakharov's contribution to peace, human rights, and democracy, the unprecedented change that took place in Russia in the last decade of the previous century would never have happened. These documents are important not only to study the transition from tyranny to democracy in Russia, but will also help activists and scholars from countries around the world understand how a society moves from bondage to freedom. Therefore, I welcome this provision, which authorizes a grant to Brandeis University for an endowment to support the archives and the related human rights center. I realize it is extraordinary for U.S. appropriated funds to be used to fund an endowment, where such funds can use interest earned from U.S. funds to support the program. However, because of the importance of these archives and this center, I believe it is appropriate in this case. Finally, because of the wide-ranging importance of these documents, I believe it would be appropriate for funds from the Foreign Assist-

ance Act to be used for this noble undertaking.

I also note that the bill also contains a very important provision on Burma human rights that ensures that UNDP assistance to Burma is properly utilized, fully coordinated with the Burmese opposition and carried out only with NGOs.

I would also like to acknowledge the exceptional work of my staffer, Tanya Mazin, on this important legislation. Tanya's deep and personal knowledge of Russia and its people was critical to the success of Congressional consideration of the Russia Democracy Act.

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the U.S. Congress, I believe our interests and values demand that we cultivate civil society in Russia. It will not happen over night, but over time—with strong support from the United States and our democratic allies—I am confident it will. Passage of the Russia Democracy Act is a step in this direction, and a step I urge my colleagues to take.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PETRI). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, H.R. 2121.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate amendments were concurred in.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND NATO ENHANCEMENT RESOLUTION OF 2002

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 468) affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supporting continued United States participation in NATO, ensuring that the enlargement of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. RES. 468

*Resolved,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This resolution may be cited as the "Transatlantic Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002".

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The House of Representatives makes the following findings:

(1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played an essential role in guaranteeing the security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States and its partners in the Alliance.

(2) NATO, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, has proved to be an indispensable instrument for forging a trans-Atlantic community of nations working together to safeguard the freedom and common heritage of its peoples and promoting stability in the North Atlantic area.

(3) NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective

and approach to issues concerning the security of North America and Europe and remains the only multilateral security organization demonstrably capable of conducting effective military operations and preserving security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

(4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States remain linked to the security of the countries of Europe.

(5) NATO remains the most visible and significant embodiment of United States engagement in Europe and therefore membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

(6) NATO enhances the security of the United States by providing an integrated military structure and a framework for consultations on political and security concerns of members which could impact the Alliance.

(7) The security of NATO member countries is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe, and the consolidation and strengthening of democratic and free societies on the entire continent is of direct and material importance to the NATO Alliance and its partners.

(8) The sustained commitment of the member countries of NATO to a mutual defense has been a major contributing factor in the democratic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.

(9) Members of the Alliance can and should play a critical role in addressing the security challenges of the post-Cold War era and in creating the stable environment needed for Central and Eastern Europe to successfully complete political and economic transformation.

(10) NATO should remain the core security organization of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all countries enjoy the same freedom, cooperation, and security.

(11) NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its members, and should be capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members to defend common values and interests.

(12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold War risks emerging from outside the treaty area in the interests of preserving peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including—

(A) risks from rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery;

(B) transnational terrorism and disruption of the flow of vital resources; and

(C) conflicts outside the treaty area stemming from unresolved historical disputes and the actions of undemocratic governments and sub-state actors who reject the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(13) All NATO members should commit to improving their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project power decisively and sustain operations over distance and time.

(14) The requirements to provide collective defense, to project power, and to sustain operations dictate that European NATO members possess military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts.

(15) NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to improve the defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of Alliance forces, must continue to be pursued by all

members of the Alliance in order to develop balanced capabilities.

(16) With a few exceptions, European members of NATO have been deficient in maintaining required military capabilities and providing defense spending at levels adequate to meet these capability shortfalls. Failure of the European NATO members to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative could weaken support for the Alliance in the United States over the long term.

(17) Members of the Alliance must also recognize that the campaign against new and emerging threats to the security of the Alliance requires other non-military capabilities and efforts to be effective. Thus, the need to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally between Alliance members and partners and within the Alliance collectively, the facilitation of enhanced coordination among Alliance member's law enforcement agencies, and improved police and judicial cooperation and information exchanges are critical to the overall effort.

(18) NATO has embarked upon a historic mission to share its benefits and patterns of consultation and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-Atlantic area through both enlargement and active partnership.

(19) NATO has enlarged its membership on four different occasions since 1949.

(20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in the fall of 2002 in Prague will provide an historic opportunity to chart a course for NATO in the new millennium by reaffirming the importance of NATO to the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region, by addressing new threats, developing new capabilities, and by extending invitations to additional countries of Europe to become members of the Alliance.

(21) The governments of NATO member countries have stated that enlargement of the Alliance is a further step toward the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.

(22) The enlargement process of NATO helps to avert conflict, because the very prospect of membership serves as an incentive for aspiring members to resolve disputes with their neighbors and to push ahead with reform and democratization.

(23) The Partnership for Peace, created in 1994 under United States leadership, has fostered cooperation between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to future membership in the Alliance.

(24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state and government issued a communique declaring "[we] pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area".

(25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership Action Plan designed to help interested Partnership for Peace countries prepare for membership by offering advice and assistance on programs and membership-related issues.

(26) The Membership Action Plan establishes certain political, economic, social, and military-related goals that aspiring candidate nations are expected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for democratic procedures and the rule of law, human rights, democratic control of the military and other military reforms, and a commitment to stability and well-being through economic liberty and social justice.

(27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine nations of Europe issued a statement (later

joined by a tenth) declaring that their countries will cooperate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the next round of NATO enlargement and since then have taken concrete steps to demonstrate this commitment, including their participation in Partnership for Peace activities and their commitment to the concept of the Membership Action Plan.

(28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President George W. Bush stated "[all] of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom—and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe".

(29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include as full and equal members additional democracies in Europe will serve to reinforce stability and security in Europe by fostering their integration into the structures which have created and sustained peace in Europe since 1945.

(30) As new members of NATO assume the responsibilities of Alliance membership, the costs of maintaining stability in Europe will be shared more widely. The concurrent assumption of greater responsibility and development of greater capabilities by new members of NATO will further reinforce burdensharing.

(31) The membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has strengthened NATO's ability to perform the full range of NATO missions by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO forces during Operation Allied Force in the Balkans, by their contributions of military forces to NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by their support for Operation Enduring Freedom.

(32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, due to their similar recent history, have bolstered NATO's capability to integrate former communist nations into a community of democracies and have served as mentors to other countries that aspire to join NATO.

(33) In supporting NATO enlargement all candidate countries must be fully aware of the costs and responsibilities of NATO membership, including the obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty that new members be able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and further to ensure that all countries admitted to NATO are capable of assuming those costs and responsibilities.

(34) For those candidate countries that receive an invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit, the process of joining NATO does not end with the invitation but rather with meeting the full responsibilities of a NATO member, including the completion of issues identified by the Membership Action Plan, which will continue beyond Prague.

(35) In considering the enlargement of NATO at Prague and in issuing invitations to the candidate countries who have made significant progress toward achieving their objectives in the Membership Action Plan established by NATO, there is a recognition that each country invited to join NATO should accede on a common date but before the date on which the next announced NATO summit is to take place.

(36) The countries that will be invited to begin accession negotiations with NATO at the NATO summit in Prague should not be the last such countries invited to join NATO and there should be a continuing process and progress toward the admission of additional democracies in Europe beyond 2002 depending on the degree to which those countries meet the criteria set forth in NATO's Membership Action Plan.

(37) The process of NATO enlargement entails the consensus agreement of the governments of all 19 NATO member countries and ratification in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

### SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

The House of Representatives makes the following findings:

(1) The admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of new members from countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will not threaten any other country.

(2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attached particular importance to the development of constructive and cooperative relations with the Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining vestiges of confrontation and competition in order to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation.

(3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at cooperation, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace Program, further enhancing the emerging NATO-Russian Federation dialogue.

(4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of strong commitment to work together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, the heads of state and government of NATO and the Russian Federation signed the ground-breaking "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation".

(5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federation formally established its mission to NATO and appointed a senior military representative to facilitate military and defense-related cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation.

(6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Federation have worked cooperatively with each other in the Balkans and elsewhere setting the stage for the ability of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooperative spirit embodied in the Founding Act.

(7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step toward the Alliance's long-standing goal of building a secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-Atlantic area, NATO took the decisive and substantial step of deepening the NATO-Russian Federation relationship by establishing the new NATO-Russia Council.

### SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

The House of Representatives declares the following to be the policy of the United States:

(1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should remain the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern.

(2) The member states of NATO should reaffirm, at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002, the continued importance of NATO, renew their commitment to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity within NATO, maintain a vigorous capability to carry out collective defense, and harmonize security policies and strategies for transatlantic affairs.

(3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while maintaining collective defense as its core function, should as a fundamental Alliance task, continue to strengthen national and collective capacities to respond to new threats wherever such threats occur, including from abroad.

(4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic concept adopted by the Allies at the summit meeting held in Washington in 1999, must recognize the need to develop new capabilities, and agree to consider acting upon

the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism by intensifying consultations among political and military leaders, and by developing comprehensive capabilities to counter these threats to the international community.

(5) The Alliance should make clear commitments to remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics, strategic airlift, command and control, modern strike capabilities, adequate shared intelligence, and the other requirements identified by NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative necessary to provide the ability to carry out the full range of NATO's missions.

(6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable sharing of contributions to the NATO common budgets and to overall national defense expenditures and capability-building.

(7) The President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts, thus making such NATO allies more effective partners.

(8) The member states of NATO should commit to enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforcement, police, and judicial cooperation, and expanded information exchanges within and among Alliance members in order to meet the challenges of new and emerging threats.

### SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) while maintaining its essential and inherent right to make its own decisions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek to strengthen its relations with the Russian Federation as an essential partner in building long-term peace in Europe, and to that end, the new NATO-Russia Council, in which member states and the Russian Federation will work as equal partners on mutually-agreed matters, should be welcomed and supported;

(2) while retaining its primary commitment to collective defense, NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore to the Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including the Russian Federation; and

(3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO's defensive and security-enhancing intentions to the Russian Federation, it is essential that neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized.

### SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR NATO.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the fall of 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should extend invitations for accession negotiations to any appropriate candidate country that meets the objectives and targets for NATO membership as outlined in the Membership Action Plan process established by NATO in 1999, including—

(A) a commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the Washington Treaty;

(B) the capability to contribute to collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions; and

(C) a firm commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and to be willing and

able to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership;

(2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the significant progress such countries have made thus far in political and economic liberty and military reform necessary for meeting the objectives for prospective members of NATO as set out in their own Membership Action Plans;

(3) each candidate country, despite recognized Membership Action Plan deficiencies requiring further refinement, could in its own way contribute to stability, freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole, as many of such countries have done thus far in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and would make a positive contribution toward furthering the goals of NATO should it become a NATO member country;

(4) having made significant progress in reforming their societies and their military forces, and having developed reasonable, affordable, and sustainable plans to be able to work within the Alliance structure and to contribute positively to the collective defense of the Alliance and other NATO missions, the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have met in a satisfactory manner, the criteria established by NATO in the Membership Action Plan process, would likely make a positive contribution to NATO, and should be invited to begin the accession process to join the Alliance at the Prague summit;

(5) with respect to candidate countries invited to join NATO, such countries should accede on a common date before the next announced NATO summit is to take place;

(6) after the Prague summit those candidate countries invited to join the Alliance should continue to participate in the Membership Action Plan until accession, and the accession process should take into account work conducted under the Membership Action Plan; and

(7) the process of NATO enlargement should continue beyond the inclusion of such candidate countries invited to join NATO at Prague, to include those candidate countries not so invited at Prague as well as other democratic European countries which may express interest in joining the Alliance, and which agree to utilize the Membership Action Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGLY) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATSON) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGLY).

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, on November 21 and 22, the heads of state and government of the 19 members of the NATO alliance will gather in Prague in what will arguably be the most important meeting of the alliance in a decade.

At Prague, the future of the alliance will thoroughly be debated. That debate will include the critical issue of whether the alliance can agree on what threats the alliance is likely to face in the future and whether the alliance members will make a serious and credible commitment to the development of the military capabilities necessary to meet those threats.

In addition, the summit will affirm the new relationship with Russia and will make history by likely issuing invitations to the largest number of new members ever in the history of the alliance.

Last November, when the House voted on the Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act, we were entering the beginning of a debate within the Congress, the Bush administration, the media, and among our NATO partners over the future of the alliance and what kind of alliance we would be inviting new members to join.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, I felt it would take some time to address several of the questions being asked regarding the alliance. Some of those questions included: Was NATO still relevant to Euro-Atlantic security? Were the alliance's roles and missions in need of new definition? What was the ability of the alliance to carry out those missions? What was the rationale for adding new members, and what could those new members provide the alliance? Finally, what would the impact of an enlarged NATO on a West-leaning but still somewhat skeptical Russia be?

To attempt to find those answers, I laid out a comprehensive plan to gather the necessary information to make an informed judgment to present to the House. The subcommittee held several hearings on the future of NATO and enlargement. I met with numerous foreign visitors, both alliance members and candidates alike. I traveled to three of the candidate states to review the commitments they are making to becoming responsible members of the alliance.

Subcommittee staff attended countless meetings, analyzed much of the information available on the alliance and the candidate countries, and twice traveled to NATO headquarters in Brussels. All this was designed to ensure that the subcommittee, and subsequently the whole House, would feel comfortable supporting the NATO alliance and endorsing new countries wishing to join the alliance.

H. Res. 468 is the work product of the Subcommittee on Europe's efforts to address the importance of the events which will take place in Prague. H. Res. 468 reaffirms the need for our commitment to the NATO alliance. This is also the view held by President Bush and Secretary Powell.

H. Res. 468 addresses the urgent need for upgrading NATO's military capabilities in order to meet today's changing threat environment. It agrees with

the need for a strong NATO-Russia cooperative partnership. Finally, it affirms that the further enlargement of the alliance will further the stability of Europe, add to the security of the alliance, and is appropriate and welcomed.

During consideration of H. Res. 468 in the subcommittee, I offered an amendment regarding enlargement which was unanimously adopted. That amendment endorsed the candidates of seven countries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This endorsement was determined after reviewing an extensive report prepared by our staff. The report addressed the progress the candidates had made in accordance with NATO's member action plan or MAP. The analysis focused on political, economic, and social development with each candidate. It looked at their ability to develop a military structure capable of providing for the overall security of the alliance, and it reviewed the commitment to provide the resources necessary to ensure that the reforms continued and that required military capability would be achieved.

The analysis was by no means exhaustive, but it was intended to provide the Members an overview of what issues are important to NATO in making an informed assessment of each candidate. Overall, all 10 candidates should be congratulated for the efforts they have made thus far to meet the criteria for becoming a member of NATO.

Progress in the candidate countries, ranging from political and military reform, resources commitment, to ensuring the support of the population, has been very impressive. Each has displayed a level of enthusiasm and commitment to the alliance as we saw demonstrated when the ambassadors of all 10 of the candidate countries testified before our subcommittee. Each has already displayed their willingness to be a fully participating member of the alliance through their actions and contributions in the Balkans and with respect to the campaign against terrorism. Each candidate brings with it its own individual strengths. Each is a viable democracy which shares a pro Euro-Atlantic view. Each is committed to market economies, all have embraced military reform, and each provides a unique geopolitical perspective or geostrategic location. These attributes make them all desirable members, either now or in the near future.

On the other hand, each candidate has its weaknesses. Not all have mature political systems or strong institutions. Some have weak economies with structural deficiencies needing attention. Not all have sufficiently addressed corruption. Some need further reform of their militaries and more modern equipment. Of course, all need to spend more money.

Nevertheless, it is our judgment that each of the seven countries listed in the amendment thus far meet the MAP criteria in a satisfactory way.

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And each has been judged to be a potential net contributor to the alliance security. Does this mean they have nothing left to do? Far from it, Mr. Speaker. Each has plenty more to be done, and that work must continue until Prague and beyond Prague, whether they receive an invitation to join or they do not.

To conclude, Mr. Speaker, given the continued importance of NATO to the United States and the importance of the upcoming Prague summit, I believe the House of Representatives should play an active role in expressing our views on NATO and its future. I believe we should also provide our input on which countries should be admitted to the alliance as guidance for the administration, which will play a key role in determining who ultimately will be invited; and we offer our advice to our colleagues in the other body who, as stipulated in the Constitution, will be called on to ratify those selections.

I believe H. Res. 468 provides a mechanism for such expression of the will of the House, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. WATSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I stand in strong support of this resolution. I would first like to commend my colleague from California (Mr. GALLEGLY) for introducing this important resolution and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) for allowing it to move quickly to the House floor.

The resolution before the House today endorses the expansion of NATO and specifically supports the NATO candidacy of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The resolution also reaffirms that NATO is the primary institution through which Europe and North American allies address security issues and calls on NATO to strengthen national and collective capacities to respond to new threats.

Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Congress has consistently led the way in supporting NATO enlargement and a strong and robust role for NATO in Europe. NATO is the longest surviving alliance of our time, and it has endured because it is an alliance of free democratic nations.

There can be no better endorsement of NATO's success and continuing importance than the desire of the newly emerging Central and East European democracies to join this alliance. Whether all seven of these aspiring NATO members are invited to join the alliance at the Prague summit next month or not, there must be opportunities in the future for all European states who accept the conditions of membership to join NATO.

Mr. Speaker, the post-September 11 era has brought us new realities, and one of them is the crucial role that NATO can play in the fight against terrorism. The countries which have applied to NATO have already joined the

United States by participating directly in the war on terrorism and by other means such as sharing intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing. While the record of accomplishments and contributions by the aspirant countries, working with their membership action plans, is impressive, none can afford to become complacent now. The process of reforming the NATO aspirant nations will not and cannot end with Prague.

The process of reform must continue after membership, including dealing with the problem of corruption, the treatment of minorities, relations between the governments and opposition, and Holocaust-era issues.

I would also like to emphasize the need for continued strong cooperation with the Russian Federation under the new NATO-Russia Council. I welcome President Putin's new attitude towards NATO enlargement. This represents an important change in the Russian perceptions of the NATO alliance and is a sentiment that we should continue to strongly encourage. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues in urging adoption of House Resolution 468, which expresses the support of the House for the enlargement of NATO that is planned for the Prague Summit later this fall. Millions of Americans of Central and East European descent share that view, as they demonstrated since the NATO expansion of 1999, when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. They—and most other Americans—recognize that a vital U.S. foreign policy interest will be served by continuing to expand the zone of democracy and stability in Europe.

I have been and remain a strong proponent of NATO enlargement to include those countries that have demonstrated their commitment to democratic reforms, including full protection of minority rights of the diverse ethnic communities that live in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Speaker, I want to mention a particular interest and concern regarding minority rights of two large historic Hungarian communities—the 1.5 million Hungarians in Romania and the 520,000 in Slovakia. The major unresolved issue affecting the minority communities of both countries is the continued postponement of the implementation of laws for restitution and/or compensation for communal property confiscated from Hungarian religious and educational institutions. Although both Romania and Slovakia have taken important steps to address this critical question of property restitution, progress has been both slow and disappointingly limited.

Mr. Speaker, I urge both countries to pursue restitution more vigorously in the coming months, until fair and complete restitution is implemented according to the rule of law. Only by the safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms will the NATO zone of stability be extended to nations that share a demonstrated commitment to democracy and a true community of values. I urge the governments of Romania and Slovakia to work to resolve these important issues, and I urge all of the countries who seek admission to the North

Atlantic Alliance to remember that we in the United States consider treatment of ethnic minorities as an important measure of a democratic society.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member would like to express his very strong support for H. Res. 468, the Transatlantic Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution, which is an important and historic resolution before the House today. Additionally, this Member would like to express his appreciation to the Chairman of the International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGLY) for his efforts as we worked together to draft this resolution, consider this resolution in the Europe Subcommittee, and bring this resolution to the Floor. Furthermore, this Member would like to thank the Chairman of the International Relations Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE); and the Ranking Member of the International Relations Committee, the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) for agreeing to waive the full Committee's jurisdiction over H. Res. 468 so that the House can debate and vote on this measure before Congress adjourns.

Indeed, as an original co-sponsor of this resolution and as a strong supporter of NATO and NATO enlargement, this Member is pleased that H. Res. 468 enjoys bipartisan co-sponsorship, including support from the House Leadership and from the full International Relations Committee.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, with dramatic changes in Russia, have necessitated the evolution of NATO as an organization—a process of change that is accelerating. Among three of the most notable changes are—Alliance enlargement, a new focus on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council.

The first post-Cold War legislation endorsing NATO enlargement was the NATO Participation Act of 1994, which the House of Representatives approved on October 7, 1994. The Senate, which has responsibility for ratifying the necessary changes to the NATO Treaty, shortly followed suit. At the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997, the Alliance began the process of expanding its membership from the lineup of eager former Warsaw Pact nations. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became full members in March of 1999. Overall this expansion has been very positive for NATO and for these three countries.

The Alliance is headed for a second enlargement round, with accession decisions expected at the Prague Summit in November. There are formally ten aspirant countries: all of the remaining Warsaw Pact satellite partners of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia. (Because it did not begin the formal accession process until May 2002, Croatia will not be eligible to receive an invitation to join NATO this year.) America's European and Canadian allies acknowledge that in the upcoming Summit the U.S. assessments of the readiness of the aspirant countries will be crucial. The consensus emerging in the Alliance is that seven new members will be invited to formally begin the accession process in Prague.

On November 7, 2001, the House passed the Gerald B.J. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act, which this Member introduced and was named for our esteemed, departed col-

league, a committed and active supporter of NATO. The Act, which had strong bipartisan support from House leadership, expressed congressional support for a robust second expansion round at Prague. It also authorized U.S. foreign military financing for seven aspirant countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. After an appeal from President Bush, the other body's limited but influential opposition to a second expansion round relented, and the other body approved the House bill by a vote of 85–6 on May 17, 2002.

On June 27, 2002, Chairman GALLEGLY and this Member introduced H. Res. 468, with the initial original co-sponsorship of the Ranking Member of the International Relations Committee, the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS); and the Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. COX). As introduced, the resolution was intentionally silent on which countries the House would recommend for accession invitations at the Prague Summit. Like leaders in our Executive Branch, the Subcommittee wanted to keep the pressure on the leading aspirant countries to address remaining deficiencies in their individual Membership Action Plans (MAPs) and in meeting the commitments that are important for NATO membership.

On September 25, 2002, during the Subcommittee mark-up, and with this Member's full support and consultation, the Chairman of the Europe Subcommittee offered an amendment which expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the seven most qualified countries be offered invitations to join NATO. The Subcommittee approved the amendment by voice vote and favorably reported the resolution, as amended. The resolution's passage will signal to the world U.S. House support and membership recommendations for the enlargement decisions at the Prague Summit. It also will demonstrate to the American electorate House support for members of the other body as they assume their treaty ratification responsibilities to implement the Prague enlargement decisions during the next Congress.

Why the interest in enlarging NATO membership? Why does NATO remain relevant and even crucial? What are the benefits of and concerns about enlargement? Why should Congress, the American people, and the NATO member nations support a robust NATO expansion round countries at the Prague Summit?

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union and positive changes in Russia, a resilient and vital NATO is needed (1) to perform its core function as a mutual defense pact against the possibility of direct aggression against NATO or a member state, (2) to provide a forum to facilitate a greater degree of consultation, cohesion and cooperation among NATO members, and (3) to serve as a source of integrated military strength to address conventional or unconventional threats or demands for out-of-area peacekeeping activities vital to NATO's interests.

NATO is the only multilateral security organization in place, potentially to be augmented by non-NATO participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), which is capable of conducting effective military operations and preserving the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

An expanded NATO provides the stable environment needed by its new member nations and aspirant countries in Central and Eastern Europe to successfully complete the political and economic transformation for integration into Europe and the community of Western democracies. Already, NATO membership requirements have been absolutely crucial in moving aspirant nations to civilian control of their militaries, transparency in military budgeting, interoperability of their military forces with NATO, resolution of internal ethics conflicts and territorial disputes, greater respect for human rights, reduced governmental and business corruption, judicial reform, market-oriented economies, and functioning parliamentary democracies.

The Alliance's military force structure, with its enhanced levels of interoperability, joint defense planning, command/control/communication/intelligence systems, and common force goals and doctrine, provides the crucial basis for forming ad hoc coalitions of willing NATO countries to take on combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief missions—supplemented by PIP participants, as in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

NATO membership motivates member states generally to sustain their commitment to collective defense and, in particular, to meet the goals of NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Thus, our allies improve their militarily capabilities and are less dependent on American forces.

The Alliance has accepted a new role in the war against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems among rogue states and non-state actors. Success will require more than the capability for a rapid and effective military response. It also will require: an enhanced level of intelligence-sharing; coordination among NATO members' law enforcement agencies; improved police, judicial and financial agency cooperation; and information exchanges.

Russian civilian leadership is gradually recognizing that NATO is not a threat but rather a forum where Russia can most effectively communicate with her western neighbors. Additionally, Russian civilian leadership in the NATO-Russia Council and the confidence-building and cooperative steps that follow from the new council can lead to the economic prosperity and security of the community of Euro-Atlantic democracies.

At a time when overt threats from Russia to its neighbors immediately to the west have declined or disappear, and when intense opposition to NATO expansion by the civilian Russian leadership has noticeably declined, there should be less reticence among NATO members to accept Baltic nation members and to willingly bear the mutual defense costs and concerns related to these prospective NATO members.

With the careful redirection of some of NATO's focus away from meeting a massive Soviet/Russia strike against NATO Europe, and toward new tasks of peacekeeping, responding rapidly to out-of-area military or terrorist actions, and fighting the war on terrorism in NATO countries, the aspirant countries, with fewer resources and generally, smaller populations than most NATO members, can bring specialized military capabilities to the table for use in these new NATO missions.

Mr. Speaker, Congress must recognize that NATO is adapting to meet the threats to its

member nations and to its collective interest. With the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for the assemblage of effective coalitions of the willing, NATO now has far more flexibility to address a range of new and very different threats. When the United States must defend its interests out of area, it is more likely to have some friends from NATO at its side who can effectively operate with it, despite a very troubling U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap.

Finally, and in conclusion, bringing in new qualified nations to NATO is not, on balance, a burden. Aspirant countries' vigorous interest in membership and their commitments to democracy, peace and stability will make NATO a more vital organization in an eastern European neighborhood. These countries have been striving to meet NATO membership qualifications and to finally join the ranks of the prosperous, peaceful, democratic nations of the Euro-Atlantic region. How, morally, can we deny them this tremendous step toward these worthy goals—some 57 years after the end of World War II?

Mr. Speaker, this Member urges his colleagues to vote "aye" on this resolution.

Ms. WATSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GALLEGGLY. Mr. Speaker, I have no other speakers, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PETRI). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGGLY) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 468, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

Mr. GALLEGGLY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

#### RECOMMENDING INTEGRATION OF LITHUANIA, LATVIA, AND ESTONIA INTO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Mr. GALLEGGLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 116) recommending the integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Clerk read as follows:

H. CON. RES. 116

Whereas the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are undergoing a historic process of democratic and free market transformation after emerging from decades of brutal Soviet occupation;

Whereas each of these Baltic countries has conducted peaceful transfers of political power—in Lithuania since 1990 and in Latvia and Estonia since 1991;

Whereas each of these Baltic countries has been exemplary and consistent in its respect for human rights and civil liberties;

Whereas the governments of these Baltic countries have made consistent progress toward establishing civilian control of their militaries through active participation in the Partnership for Peace program and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peace support operations;

Whereas Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are participating in the NATO-led multinational military force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

Whereas Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are consistently increasing their defense budget allocations and have adopted laws providing that such allocations for defense will be at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) by 2002 for Lithuania and Estonia and by 2003 for Latvia;

Whereas each of these Baltic countries has clearly demonstrated its ability to operate with the military forces of NATO nations and under NATO standards;

Whereas former Secretary of Defense Perry stipulated five generalized standards for entrance into NATO: support for democracy, including toleration of ethnic diversity and respect for human rights; building a free market economy; civilian control of the military; promotion of good neighborly relations; and development of military interoperability with NATO;

Whereas each of these Baltic countries has satisfied these standards for entrance into NATO; and

Whereas NATO will consider at its 2002 summit meeting in Prague the further enlargement of its alliance: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that—*

(1) Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are to be commended for their progress toward political and economic liberty and meeting the guidelines for prospective members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set out in chapter 5 of the September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement;

(2) Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would make an outstanding contribution toward furthering the goals of NATO should they become members;

(3) extension of full NATO membership to these Baltic countries would contribute to stability, freedom, and peace in the Baltic region and Europe as a whole; and

(4) with complete satisfaction of NATO guidelines and criteria for membership, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia should be invited in 2002 to become full members of NATO.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGGLY) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATSON) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GALLEGGLY).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GALLEGGLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the concurrent resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. GALLEGGLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH).

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding me this time.