safer because of the belief I had that people around the country would share my view on that.

Now the pictures are off the wall, the furniture is moved out, the day is closing for the end of my Senate service. I will acknowledge that it was more than skills and knowledge that brought me here. Some of that was the pure good fortune of the people of New Jersey electing me the first time I went out to run for office. They did not know me from anybody else, but they looked at the record my company had and how we built it from nothing to something important. They looked at my service as commissioner of the Port Authority of New Jersey and New York that controls the bridges, tunnels, terminals, and buildings in New York that was an appointed post. People looked at me and said: Well, we don't know this guy, but it looks like he has done some things correctly. They saw pictures of my family. They know how devoted I am to them. I also was chairman of one of the largest charities of the world for 3 years. They entrusted me with this seat, the New Jersey seat, that I occupied for 18 years. I always refrain from calling it ''my seat'' because it is not; I filled it for a while.

In closing, I thank the occupant of the chair for the opportunities we have had to share common goals and for his decency in reviewing those with me and having an open mind on many of the issues. I thank my friend from Nevada who stands as the guardsman of the floor in his assignment for the Democrats as the whip, and I note the respect I felt for him when I saw how arduously he worked to protect his State from becoming a nuclear dump, even when we struggled to find a place to put that material —and we do have to find a place. The fact of the matter is, if we defend the interests of our States in concert with the interests of our country, we will have done our jobs correctly.

I hope the legacy I leave will create a brighter future for the people who sent me here, for my eight wonderful grandchildren, and for all of those I took the oath to serve.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

REMINISCENCE AND FAREWELL

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, on this last day of the 106th Congress I would ask to be allowed a moment of reminiscence and farewell.

Come January 3—deo voluntus, as the Brothers used to teach us—I will have served four terms in the United States Senate, a near quarter century. In our long history only one other New Yorker, our beloved Jacob K. Javits, has served four terms. I had the fortune of joining the Finance Committee from the outset, and served for a period as chairman, the first New Yorker since before the Civil War. I was also, at one point, chair of Environment and Public Works. I have been on Rules and Administration for the longest while, and for a period was also on Foreign Relations. Senators will know that it would be most unusual for someone to serve on both Finance and Foreign Relations at the same time. An account of how this came about may be of interest.

The elections of 1986 returned a Democratic majority to the Senate and the Democratic Steering Committee, of which I was then a member, began its biannual task of filling Democratic vacancies in the various standing committees. There are four ''Super A'' committees as we term them. In order of creation they are Foreign Relations, Finance, Armed Services and Appropriations. With the rarest exceptions, under our caucus rules a Senator may only serve on one of these four.

There were three vacancies on Foreign Relations. In years past these would have been snapped up. Foreign Relations was a committee of great prestige and daunting tasks. Of a sudden however, no one seemed interested. The Senate was already experiencing what the eminent statesman James Schlesinger describes in the current issue of The National Interest as ''the loss of interest in foreign policy by the general public'' (p. 110). Two newly-elected Senators were more or less persuaded to take seats. At length the Steering Committee turned to me, as a former ambassador. I remained on Finance.

And so I served six years under the chairmanship of the incomparable Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. I treasure the experience—the signing and ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the final days of the Cold War. But I continue to be puzzled and troubled by our inattention to foreign affairs. To be sure, the clearest achievement of this Congress has been in the field of foreign trade, with major enactments regarding Africa, the Caribbean, and China. These, however, have been the province of the Finance Committee, and it was with great difficulty and at most partial success did Chairman BILL ROTH and I make the connection between world trade and world peace. This would have been self-evident at mid-century. I remark, and I believe there is a case, that any short list of events that led to the Second World War would include the aftermath of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. Indeed, in the course of the ceremony at which the President signed the measure naming possible permanent normal trade relations with China in connection with its admission to the World Trade Organization, I observed that the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which conceived the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and anticipated an international trade organization, opened on the day I joined the Navy. For certain there was no connection, but my point was simply that in the midst of war the Allies were looking to a lasting peace that might follow, and this very much included the absence of trade wars.

But again, how to account for the falling-off of congressional involvement in foreign affairs. I offer the thought that the failure of our intelligence, in the large sense of term, to foresee—forsooth to conceive!—the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought forth a psychology of denial and avoidance. We would as soon not think too much about all, thank you very much.

I have recounted elsewhere the 1992 hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee on the START I Treaty. Our superb negotiators had mastered every mind-numbing detail of this epic agreement. With one exception. They had negotiated the treaty with a sovereign nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Now they brought to us a treaty signed with four quite different nations: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. When asked when this new set of signatories was agreed to, the Committee was informed that this had just recently taken place at a meeting in Lisbon. An observer might well have wondered if this was the scenario of a Humphrey Bogart movie. The negotiators were admirably frank. The Soviet Union had broken up in December 1991. Few, if any, at their ''end of the street'' had predicted the collapse. Let me correct the record: None had.

As to the record, I would cite the 1991 article in Foreign Affairs by the estimable Stansfield Turner. The Admiral had served as Director of Central Intelligence and knew the record. He was blunt, as an admiral ought. I cite a passage in Secrecy:

[Turner wrote,] ''We should not gloss over the enormity of this failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis. We know now that there were many Soviet academics, economists and political thinkers, other than those officially presented to us by the Soviet government, who understood long before 1980 that the Soviet economic system was broken and that it was only a matter of time before someone had to try and repair it, as had Khrushchev. Yet I never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing systemic economic problem.'' Turner acknowledged the ''revisionist rumblings'' claiming that the CIA had in fact seen the collapse coming, but he dismissed them: ''If some individual CIA analysts were more prescient than the corporate view, their ideas were filtered out in the bureaucratic process; and it is the corporate view that counts because that is what reaches the president and his advisors. On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile. Why were so many of us insensitive to the inevitable?

Just as striking is the experience of General George Lee Butler, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) from 1990 to 1994. Again to cite from Secrecy.

As the one responsible for drafting the overall U.S. strategy for nuclear

war, Butler had studied the Soviet Union with an intensity and level of detail matched by few others in the West. He had studied the footage of the military parades and the Kremlin, had scrutinized the deployments of Soviet missiles and other armaments: ''In all, he thought of the Soviet Union as a fearsome garrison state seeking global domination and preparing for certain conflict with the West. The only reasonable posture for the United States, he told colleagues, was to keep thousands of American nuclear weapons at the ready so that if war broke out, Washington could destroy as much of the Soviet nuclear arsenal as possible. It was the harrowing but hallowed logic of nuclear deterrence.'' But Butler began having doubts about this picture, upon which so much of U.S. foreign policy was based, by the time of his first visit to the Soviet Union, on December 4, 1988. When he landed at Sheremetyevo Airport, on the outskirts of Moscow, he thought at first that the uneven, pockmarked runway was an open field. The taxiways were still covered with snow from a storm two days earlier, and dozens of the runway lights were broken. Riding into downtown Moscow in an official motorcade, Butler noticed the roads were ragged, the massive government buildings crumbling. He was astonished when the gearshift in his car snapped off in his driver's hand. After pouring over thousands of satellite photos and thirty years' worth of classified reports, Butler had expected to find a modern, functional industrialized country; what he found instead was ''severe economic deprivation.'' Even more telling was ''the sense of defeat in the eyes of the people. . . . It all came crashing home to me that I really had been dealing with a caricature all those years.''

General Butler was right. More than he might have known. This fall former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski estimated that the economy of ''Russia is one-tenth the size of America and its industrial plant is about three times older than the OECD average.'' The population has dropped from 151 million in 1990 to 146 million in 1999. Infant mortality is devastating. Far from overwhelming the West, it is problematic as to whether Russia can maintain a presence east of the Ural Mountains. If you consider that the empire of the Czars once extended to San Francisco we can judge the calamity brought about by sixty-some years of Marxist-Leninism.

And yet we did not judge. To say again, the United States government had no sense of what was coming, not the least preparation for the implosion of 1991.

In 1919, John Reed, a Harvard graduate, and later a Soviet agent wrote Ten Days that Shook the World, his celebrated account of the Russian Revolution, as it would come to be known, in October 1917. In no time these events acquired mythic dimension for intellectuals and others the world over. At Harvard, Daniel Bell would patiently guide students through the facts that there were two Russian Revolutions; the first democratic, the second in effect totalitarian. But this was lost on all but a few.

It would appear that the Soviet collapse was so sudden, we were so unprepared for it, that we really have yet to absorb the magnitude of the event. It was, after all, the largest peaceful revolution in history. Not a drop of blood was shed as a five hundred year old empire broke up into some twelve nations, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, whilst formerly independent nations absorbed into the Soviet Bloc, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia et al., regained their independence. In the aftermath there has been no book, no movie, no posters, no legend.

To the contrary, weak Russia grows steadily weaker—possibly to the point of instability, as shown in the miserable events in Chechnya. We see a government of former agents of the intelligence services and the secret police. We see continued efforts at increasing armament. Witness the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk. We see the return of the red flag. We see little engagement with the West, much less the East where China looms with perhaps ten times the population and far more economic strength.

And the United States? Apart from a few perfunctory measures, and one serious, the Nunn-Lugar program, almost no response. To the contrary, at this moment we have, as we must assume, some 6,000 nuclear weapons targeted on Russia, a number disproportionate at the height of the Cold War, and near to lunacy in the aftermath. When, as Senator LUGAR estimates, the Russian defense budget has declined to $5 billion a year.

What is more, other than the highest echelon of the Pentagon, no doubt some elements of the intelligence community, possibly the Department of State, no American knows what the targeting plan is. In particular, Members of Congress, possibly with very few exceptions, do not know. Are they refused information? Just recently, our esteemed colleague, J. ROBERT KERREY of Nebraska, wrote the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, a former colleague of ours, to set forth the facts of this insane situation.

There are signs that an open debate concerning nuclear weapons may be afoot. In The Washington Post recently, we learn of the response to a proposal by Stephen M. Younger, associate director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and head of its nuclear weapons work, proposing a great reduction in the number of massive weapons now in our arsenal in favor of smaller devices intended to deal with much smaller engagements than those envisioned during the Cold War. The Post reports that we now have some 7,982 warheads linked to nine different delivery systems, ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. These are scheduled to decline to 3,500, half on Trident II submarines, under the Start II agreement. Younger argues that still fewer are needed. Any one of which would wipe out any large city on earth. It appears that other experts believe that a few dozen to several hundred of today's high-yield warheads would suffice to manage the standoff with Russia or China. There is, perhaps more urgently, the matter of nuclear weapons in what are for some reason still called Third World nations, a relic of Cold War usage. Nuclear standoff has settled into the South Asian subcontinent. The prospect that an ''Islamic Bomb'' will migrate westwards from Pakistan is real enough. It may be happening at this moment. The more then do we need open debate. The more urgent then is Senator KERREY's assertion that Congress be involved. His profound observation that ''Sometimes secrecy produces its opposite; less safety and security.''

I have remarked on how little notice has been taken of the Russian revolution of 1989–91. By contrast, the ''information revolution'' has become a fixture of our vocabulary and our pronouncements on the widest range of subjects, and at times would seem to dominate political discourse. It might do well to make a connection as Francis Fukuyama does in the current issue of Commentary. In his review of a new book by George Gilder with the suggestive title Telecom: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolutionize Our World, Fukuyama makes the connection.

Why, then, do those convinced that the revolution is already triumphant shake their heads so sadly at those of us who ''just don't get it?'' True, people want to feel good about themselves, and it helps to believe that one is contributing to some higher social purpose while pursuing self-enrichment. But it must also be conceded that the information-technology revolution really does have more going for it than previous advances in, say, steam or internal combustion (or, one suspects, than the coming revolution in biotechnology).

The mechanization of production in the 19th and early 20th centuries rewarded large-scale organization, routinization, uniformity, and centralization. Many of the great works of imagination that accompanied this process, from Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, depicted individuals subsumed by huge machines, often of a political nature. Not so the information revolution, which usually punishes excessively large scale, distributes information and hence power to much larger groups of people, and rewards intelligence, risk, creativity and education rather than obedience and regimentation. Although

one would not wish to push this too far, it is probably no accident that the Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes did not survive the transition into the information age.

Is it possible to hope that we might give some serious thought to the possible connection? And to ask ourselves just how we measure up in this regard?

That said, is it not extraordinary and worrying that of a sudden we find ourselves in a state of great agitation concerning security matters all across our government, from our nuclear laboratories at home to embassies abroad to the topmost reaches of government? The late Lars-Erik Nelson described it as ''spy panic.'' In the process the possibility emerges that our national security will be compromised to a degree unimaginable by mere espionage. The possibility is that we could grievously degrade the most important institutions of foreign and defense policy—our capacity for invention and innovation—through our own actions.

Take the matter of the loss, and evident return in clouded circumstances of two hard drives containing sensitive nuclear information from the Nuclear Energy Search Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This June, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked two of our wisest statesmen, the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr., and the Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, to enquire into the matter. Here are the Key Findings of their report of September 25th.

While it is unclear what happened to the missing hard drives at Los Alamos National Laboratory, it is clear that there was a security lapse and that the consequences of the loss of the data on the hard drives would be extremely damaging to the national security.

Among the known consequences of the hard-drive incident, the most worrisome is the devastating effect on the morale and productivity of LANL, which plays a critical national-security role for the Nation.

The current negative climate is incompatible with the performance of good science. A perfect security system at a national laboratory is of no use if the laboratory can no longer generate the cutting-edge technology that needs to be protected from improper disclosure.

It is critical to reverse the demoralization at LANL before it further undermines the ability of that institution both to continue to make its vital contributions to our national security, and to protect the sensitive national-security information that is critical to the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

Urgent action should be taken to ensure that Los Alamos National Laboratory gets back to work in a reformed security structure that will allow the work there to be successfully sustained over the long term.

Almost alone among commentators, Lars-Erik Nelson pursued the matter, describing the interviews Senator Baker and Representative Hamilton had with lab personnel.

They now report that ''the combined effects of the Wen Ho Lee affair, the recent fire at [Los Alamos] and the continuing swirl around the hard-drive episode have devastated morale and productivity at [Los Alamos].

The employees we met expressed fear and deep concern over the . . . yellow crime-scene tape in their workspace, the interrogation of their colleagues by . . . federal prosecutors before a grand jury and the resort of some of their colleagues to taking a second mortgage on their homes to pay for attorney fees.

There is no denying that Lee and whoever misplaced the computer drives committed serious breaches of security. But the resulting threat to our safety is only theoretical; the damage to morale, productivity and recruitment is real.

Employees were furious at being forced to take routine lie-detector tests, a requirement imposed on them by a panicky Secretary of Energy. . . .

Obviously, there is a need for security in government. A Los Alamos employee gave Baker and Hamilton an obvious, easy solution. Unfortunately, it will be the one most likely to be adopted: ''The safest and most secure way to do work is not to do any work at all.''

In the course of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (of which more later), a Commission member, then-Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch, revealed to the American people the extraordinary work of the VENONA project, an enterprise of the Army Security Agency during and after World War II. During the war the agency began to copy KGB traffic from and to the United States. On December 20, 1946, Meredith K. Gardner—I am happy to say still with us, buoyant and brilliant as ever—''broke'' the first. Dated 2 December 1944, it was a list of the principal nuclear scientists at Los Alamos. Bethe, Bohr, Fermi, Newman, Rossi, Kistiakowsky, Segre, Taylor, Penney, Compton, Lawrence and so on. The Soviets knew, and in time stole essentials of the early atom bomb. But what they could not do, was to slow down or deter the work of these great men, who would take us further into the age of the hydrogen bomb. Next, their successors to yet more mind-bending feats. The Soviets could not stop them. Would it not be the final triumph of the defunct Cold War if we stopped them ourselves?

Do not dismiss this thought. If you happen to know a professor of physics, enquire as to how many ''post-docs'' are interested in weapons research, given the present atmosphere. To work at one-third the salary available elsewhere, and take lie detector tests.

And then there is intelligence. Nelson quotes a ''former top intelligence official'' who told him, ''If you're not taking secrets home, you're not doing your job.'' And yet here we are harassing John M. Deutch, a scientist of the greatest achievement, a public servant of epic ability for—working at home after dinner. Would it be too far-fetched to ask when will the next Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology choose to leave the banks of the Charles River for the swamps of the Potomac?

Now I don't doubt that, as opposed to an intelligence official, there are ambassadors who don't take their work home at night. Over the years the United States has created a number of postings with just that attraction. But these are few. The great, overwhelming number of our ambassadors and their embassy associates are exceptional persons who have gone in harm's way to serve their country. I was ambassador to India at the time our ambassador to Sudan and an aide were abducted from a reception by Islamic terrorists, spirited away and murdered. Some days later the Egyptian envoy in New Delhi asked to see me. He had a message from then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to tell me that their intelligence sources reported I would be next. It is a not uncommon occurrence. But nothing so common as taking work home, or working in a—usually heavily armored—embassy limousine. Ask any former ambassador to Israel. Our embassy in Tel Aviv is an hour's drive from the capital in Jerusalem. The drive up and back is routinely used to dictate memoranda of conversation, type them on a laptop. Whatever. This fall, the superbly qualified, many would say indispensable ambassador to Israel, Martin S. Indyk, was stripped of his security clearances for just such actions. I cite Al Kamen's account in The Washington Post.

Just the other day, ambassador to Israel Martin S. Indyk was deep into the State Department doghouse for ''suspected violations'' of security regulations. His security clearance was suspended, so he couldn't handle classified materials. He needed an escort while in the State Department building. The department's diplomatic security folks wanted him to stay in this country until their investigation was completed.

At a White House briefing Monday, a reporter asked if Indyk could ''function as ambassador? Do we have a functioning ambassador?''

''Not at the moment,'' press secretary Jake Siewert said.

Allow me to cite a report by the redoubtable Jane Perlez, who was just recently reporting from Pyongyang on the psychotic security measures in the capital of North Korea. Eerily similar antics were to be encountered on September 30, Ms. Perlez reported:

STATE DEPT. UNFREEZES HUNDREDS OF PROMOTIONS AFTER DELAY FOR SECURITY REVIEW

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29.—A continuing security crackdown at the State Department led to the freezing of promotions for more than 200 senior officials, pending a review of their security records, department officials said today.

The director general of the Foreign Service, Marc Grossman, said he was assessing the promotion files for security violations

before sending the promotions to the White House, which then dispatches them to Congress for approval.

The release of the list was delayed after the suspension of the security clearance of one of the department's most senior officials, Martin S. Indyk, ambassador to Israel, and a sudden vigilance by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, who is under pressure from Congress on security problems.

This evening, the department said that ''under 10'' officials had been barred from promotions after Mr. Grossman's review of 400 candidates. The nearly 400 people included 200 midlevel officials, whose promotions were released today after a weeklong delay.

As word of the latest action spread through the department, an assistant secretary of state complained at a senior staff meeting this week that management faced ''rage'' in the building and increasingly demoralized employees, according to several accounts of the session.

Others, as well as diplomats abroad, complained of a poisonous atmosphere in the department created, in part, by security officials who grilled junior Foreign Service officers about their superiors. One senior official said the obsession with security had created a ''monster'' out of the bureau of diplomatic security, which Congress generously finances to the detriment of other areas of the department.

In a yet more eerie analogy, one department employee described the situation as a ''security jihad.''

It doesn't stop. It accelerates! Just this month The Washington Post reported the resignation of senior diplomats, the suspension of another, the firing of a further two over security matters.

J. Stapleton Roy, one of the nation's two most senior foreign service officers and a three-time U.S. ambassador, has resigned in protest after Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright suspended his deputy without pay and fired two other long-time State Department officials over a missing top-secret laptop computer. . . .

The departure of Roy and the reassignment of [Donald] Keyser will rob the department of two of its top China experts. The son of a missionary, Roy grew up in China, returned to the United States to go to Princeton University, then joined the foreign service. He later served as ambassador to China, Indonesia and Singapore. Keyser had served in Beijing three times, had been the State Department's director of Chinese and Mongolian affairs, and most recently held the rank of ambassador as a special negotiator for conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and former Soviet republics.

''That's a lot of brainpower suddenly removed from the State Department,'' said William C. McCahill, a recently retired foreign service officer who served as the deputy chief of mission in Beijing. ''Keyser is a brilliant analyst and a person of great intellectual honesty and rigor. Stape is the kind of person you want in INR, someone who can think beyond today and tomorrow, who can think beyond established policy.''—The Washington Post, December 5, 2000.

With some hesitation I would call to mind the purge of the ''China hands'' from the Department of State during the McCarthy era. As our Commission established with finality, there was indeed a Soviet attack on American diplomacy and nuclear development during and after World War II. There were early and major successes. The design of the first atom bomb. But not much else, and for not much longer. The real damage—the parallels are eerie—to American security came from the disinclination of the intelligence community—then largely in the Army—to share information with ''civilians.'' Specifically, documents obtained from the F.B.I. indicate that President Truman was never told of the Army Signals Security Agency's decryptions of Soviet cables during and after the war. He thought the whole business of Communist spying was a ''red herring.'' In 1953 he termed Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley ''a crook and a louse.'' American diplomacy and the Department of State in particular were for years haunted by charges they could readily have dealt with had they but known what their own government knew. And who issued the instruction that the President was not to be told? General Omar N. Bradley whom the President had made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Admittedly it is hard to prove a negative.) But I was reassured by an article in the Summer edition of the ''Bulletin'' of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. In it, Deputy CIA historian Michael Warner votes with the judgment I offered earlier in my book ''Secrecy.''

What might it be that Secretary Albright needs to know today but has not been told? A generation hence we might learn. If, that is, the current secrecy regime goes unaltered.

For the moment, however, I have further distressing news for Ambassador Stapleton if he should have occasion to return to the Department of State main building for one or another reason. I have just received a copy of a letter sent to David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Another recently retired Ambassador, a statesman of large achievement and impeccable reputation recently called at Main State, to use their term. He was frisked at the entrance. He was allowed into the building, but assigned an ''escort,'' who accompanied wherever he went. Including, the ambassador writes, ''the men's room.''

It is difficult not to agree with the Ambassador's assessment that ''the 'escort' policy is insulting and totally out of proportion to any desired enhancement of security.'' But then so is so much of security policy as it has evolved over the past sixty years.

What is to be done? Surely we must search for a pattern in all this. Our Commission proposed a simple, direct formation. Secrecy is a form of regulation.

In the previous Congress, legislation was prepared to embody the essentials of the Commission recommendations. All classified materials would bear the name and position of the person assigning the classification and the date, subject to review, that the classification would expire. It is not generally realized, but apart from atomic matters, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and a few other areas there is no law stipulating what is to be classified Confidential, Secret, Top Secret—and there are numerous higher designations. It is simply a matter of judgement for anyone who has a rubber stamp handy. Our bill was unanimously reported from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, under the fine chairmanship of Senator FRED THOMPSON, with the full support of the then-ranking Committee member, our revered John Glenn. But nothing came of it. The assorted government agencies, covertly if you like, simply smothered it. The bureaucracy triumphed once more. Thomas Jefferson's dictum that ''An informed citizenry is vital to the functioning of a democratic society'' gave way before the self-perpetuating interests of bureaucracy.

I am pleased to report that this year's Intelligence Authorization bill, which is now at the White House awaiting President Clinton's signature, includes the Public Interest Declassification Act. The measure establishes a nine-member ''Public Interest Declassification Board'' of ''nationally recognized experts'' who will advise the President and pertinent executive branch agencies on which national security documents should be declassified first. Five members of the Board will be appointed by the President and four members will be appointed by the Senate and the House.

The Board's main purpose will be to help determine declassification priorities. This is especially important during a time of Congress' continual slashing of the declassification budgets. In addition to the routine systematic work required by President Clinton's Executive Order 12958, the intelligence community is also required to process Freedom of Information Act requests, Privacy Act requests, and special searches levied primarily by members of Congress and the administration.

There is a need to bring order to this increasingly chaotic process. This Board may just provide the necessary guidance and will help determine how our finite declassification resources can best be allocated among all these competing demands.

My hope is that the Board will be a voice within the executive branch urging restraint in matters of secrecy. I have tried to lay out the organizational dynamics which produce ever larger and more intrusive secrecy regimes. I have sought to suggest how damaging this can be to true national security interests. But this is a modest achievement given the great hopes with which our Commission concluded its work. I fear that rationality is but a weak foil to the irrational. In the end we shall need character as well as conviction. We need public persons the stature of George P. Shultz, who when in 1986 learned of plans to begin giving lie detector tests for State Department employees, calmly announced that the day that program began would be the day he submitted his resignation as Secretary of State. And so of course it

did not begin. And yet with him gone, the bureaucratic imperative reappears.

And so Mr. President, I conclude my remarks, thanking all my fellow Senators present and past for untold courtesies over these many years.

RETIREMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it saddens me to note that the Senate will soon lose one of its most visionary and accomplished members, a great American, Senator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN.

It boggles the mind just to think of all of the important positions that PAT MOYNIHAN has held, including cabinet or subcabinet posts under four presidents: John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford. He served as Ambassador to India in the 1970's and then as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He came to the United States Senate in 1977 already a scholar, author and public official of great distinction and renown. In the 24 years he has spend here, he has only greatly expanded his enormous reputation and body of work. PAT MOYNIHAN is a Senator's Senator. Over the years, he has earned the respect of every member of the Senate.

PAT MOYNIHAN is a person who has shown tremendous vision throughout his life. He has shown foresight about the importance of a strong family and about the importance of strong communities in America. He raised the critical important of these basic values and concerns about the deterioration of these family values, long before others. He has shown great foresight about our Constitution. One of the highlights for me in my service in the Senate was joining Senator MOYNIHAN and Senator ROBERT BYRD in fighting against the line item veto as a violation of our Constitution. And, he has shown great foresight about the world and the role of the United States in international affairs. His work at the United Nations and in the Senate, as a former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and as Chairman of the Finance Committee have been marked by his perceptive, analytical, and worldly view on trade, foreign policy, and intelligence matters. Long before others, Senator MOYNIHAN was speaking of the economic and ultimately military weaknesses of the Soviet Union and predicting its collapse.

It is virtually impossible to list all of PAT MOYNIHAN's accomplishments in the U.S. Senate. Among the most lasting, however, will be his efforts on behalf of architectural excellence in the nation's capital. He was a crucial force behind the return to greatness of the Pennsylvania Avenue corridor between the U.S. Capital and the White House, the restoration of Washington's beautiful, elegant, and historic Union Station, and the construction of the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary Building here on Capitol Hill.

The author or editor of eighteen books, Senator MOYNIHAN has been at the forefront of the national debate on issues ranging from welfare reform, to tax policy to international relations. His most recent book, written in 1998, ''Secrecy: The American Experience'' expands on the report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy of which he was the Chairman. This is a fascinating and provocative review of the history of the development of secrecy in the government since World War I and argument for an ''era of openness''.

At home in New York, in a state which is known for its rough and tumble politics, he has shown leadership again and again, demonstrating the power of intellect and the ability to rise above the fray. That has been a wonderful contribution not just to New York but to all of America.

As they leave the Senate family, which will never forget their huge contribution, we salute PAT and Elizabeth MOYNIHAN.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the 211-year history of the United States Senate, the State of New York has one of the richest and most storied legacies.

Since 1789, New York has sent to the Senate 63 Senators. I have had the distinct privilege of serving with four of them, most memorably, Senator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN.

When the people of New York elected PAT MOYNIHAN to represent them nearly 25 years ago, they sent to Washington a uniquely gifted and talented man. Those are the reasons, Senator MOYNIHAN is one of only two, out of 63 Senators from New York, to have been elected to four consecutive terms in the United States Senate.

Senator MOYNIHAN began his service to this nation more than 50 years ago when he served in the United States Navy from 1944–1947—and he never stopped being ''Mr. Public Servant.'' He served one governor, New York's Averell Harriman, and four United States Presidents: two Democrats, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and two Republicans, Presidents Nixon and Ford.

What a record. PAT MOYNIHAN has given more than three quarters of his life to his nation and his state. This country, the United States Senate, and New York are joyously thankful.

He has been a leader in so many areas that it challenges one to list them all. But his impact on public architecture, monuments for future generations, are the hallmarks which this quiet gentleman reveres.

For over fifteen years now, I have had the privilege of serving with PAT on the Senate's Environment and Public Works Committee. I have been fortunate to work closely with him and observe his tireless effort and commitment to maintaining the architectural integrity of our great public institutions.

Some 40 years ago, the Kennedy Administration made the decision to revive Pennsylvania Avenue and restore the Federal Triangle. It was an extraordinary stroke of fortune that PAT MOYNIHAN, a deputy to Labor Secretary Goldberg who played a primary role in the effort, had the responsibility to draft a report that contained core ideas for redevelopment. The Federal Triangle, including the Ronald Reagan Building, and the Judiciary Building—to mention just a few—are dramatic evidence of his contributions that will live for years to come in the foundation of these magnificent buildings.

I cannot resist the temptation to recall that Senator MOYNIHAN was fond of noting that it was Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon who initially championed the idea of reviving the Federal Triangle and establishing it as an international trade and cultural center. It took a man of PAT MOYNIHAN's talent, character and foresight to pick up and finish that vision, started in the early 1930s, in such a grand manner.

I would be remiss were I not to take a minute to thank Senator MOYNIHAN for his leadership and the personal courtesies he extended to me, as he took the initiative to name the departmental auditorium at the Commerce Department building, the Andrew Mellon Auditorium. It truly is a remarkable structure and aptly named.

Over 200 years ago, Pierre L'Enfant, as he laid plans for the new United States capital, could only hope that a man like Senator MOYNIHAN would one day work with such compassion and perseverance to keep alive the true spirit and design envisioned in the original blueprints of George Washington's federal city.

One of the most rewarding assignments in my own career in public service, has been the opportunity to serve with Senator MOYNIHAN as a member of the Smithsonian's Board of Regents. The talented men and women who have served on the Board are unquestionably committed to the arts and preserving this nation's cultural heritage. And I am certain, that all of them who have served with him would agree that PAT MOYNIHAN's leadership and guiding wisdom have been indispensable.

Beyond the physical monuments to his achievements, I will always remember PAT MOYNIHAN for his humor, his intellect, his grace, his eloquence, and his humility.

All of us here, before we cast the first vote, before we discharge the first responsibility, take the oath of office. We solemnly commit ''to support and defend the constitution. . . .'' ''Against all enemies. . . .'' we commit ''to bear true faith and allegiance'' and we undertake ''to faithfully discharge'' our duty. Senator MOYNIHAN was a man of his word and here in the Senate he has always been true to his principles and true to his oath.

PAT MOYNIHAN has been a giant in the Senate for some time. I only hope that the years ahead give him the time he has always wanted to do those things he has never quite had the time to do.