

pass this plan, this country is going to go into a tailspin. Those are not his exact words, but it is exactly what he meant.

Of course, he was wrong. This country passed a new economic plan and gave the American people confidence about the future. Guess what happened. The largest deficits in history turned into the largest surpluses in history. We have had the longest economic expansion on record—welfare rolls are down, home ownership is up, inflation is down. Almost every basic index in this country is better.

Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. DORGAN. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. DURBIN. When the Senator from Texas—Governor Bush's home State—voted against the Clinton-Gore plan in 1993, he said: "This program is going to make the economy weaker, hundreds of thousands of people are going to lose their jobs as a result of this program."

Was the Senator from Texas correct as a result of the Clinton-Gore plan? Did hundreds of thousands of people lose their jobs?

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois asked a question about job creation. This administration, during these 8 years, has seen 22 million new jobs created in this country. In the 4 years prior under President George Bush, 2.5 million new jobs were created. You will see this is one of the most robust periods of economic expansion in this country's history. Is it an accident? No. This administration had a new economic plan that said let's move away from growing and choking deficits and give the American people some confidence about the future. The result of it was that confidence manifested a growing economy that created new jobs and new opportunities. Every single feature of this economy has become better in the last 8 years, every single one. Unemployment, inflation, welfare, home ownership—in every single instance, things are better in this country.

This morning, when I heard the Governor say, "Well, you have had your chance," I would say, yes, this administration had its chance and it inherited a weak and troubled economy and turned it into a strong, vibrant, growing economy, and good for them.

It did not happen because they took the easy road. This was not the easy thing to do. In 1993, when they had the vote on the new plan, it passed by only one vote in the House and the Senate. We did not get even one vote on the majority side. We took our licks for voting for it, but history shows that what we created was the strongest economy in this world, and I think Vice President GORE and President Clinton and those who voted for that new plan in this Congress can take some pride in what the result of that plan has been.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time allotted to the distinguished Senator has expired.

#### MAKING FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I understand the Senate has received the continuing resolution. I ask that the previous order now commence, and the clerk report the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the joint resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (H.J. Res. 119) making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2001, and other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been considered read the third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution pass?

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. ASHCROFT), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. BOND), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. BROWNBACk), the Senator from Montana (Mr. BURNS), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. CAMPBELL), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CRAPO), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. ENZI), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. FRIST), the Senator from Washington (Mr. GORTON), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. GRAMS), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. INHOFE), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. JEFFORDS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. LUGAR), the Senator from Florida (Mr. MACK), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. MURKOWSKI), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. THOMAS) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. THOMPSON), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) and the Senator from Montana (Mr. BURNS) would each vote "yea."

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. BOXER), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. CLELAND), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. CONRAD), the Senator from California (Mrs. FEINSTEIN), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. KOHL), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. LAUTENBERG), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN), and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. WELLSTONE) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 67, nays 1, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 292 Leg.]

YEAS—67

Abraham	Feingold	Murray
Akaka	Fitzgerald	Nickles
Allard	Graham	Reed
Baucus	Gramm	Reid
Bayh	Grassley	Robb
Bennett	Gregg	Roberts
Biden	Hagel	Rockefeller
Bingaman	Harkin	Santorum
Breaux	Hatch	Sarbanes
Bryan	Hutchinson	Schumer
Bunning	Hutchison	Sessions
Byrd	Inouye	Shelby
Chafee, L.	Johnson	Smith (NH)
Cochran	Kennedy	Smith (OR)
Collins	Kerrey	Snowe
Craig	Kerry	Specter
Daschle	Landrieu	Thurmond
DeWine	Levin	Torricelli
Dodd	Lincoln	Voinovich
Domenici	Lott	Warner
Dorgan	Mikulski	Wyden
Durbin	Miller	
Edwards	Moynihan	

NAYS—1

Stevens

NOT VOTING—32

Ashcroft	Frist	Lieberman
Bond	Gorton	Lugar
Boxer	Grams	Mack
BrownbacK	Helms	McCain
Burns	Hollings	McConnell
Campbell	Inhofe	Murkowski
Cleland	Jeffords	Roth
Conrad	Kohl	Thomas
Crapo	Kyl	Thompson
Enzi	Lautenberg	Wellstone
Feinstein	Leahy	

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 119) was passed.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

#### EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on October 10, 2000, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) hosted an important luncheon discussion on the European Union's evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The guest speakers at that luncheon were Ambassador Christopher Meyer of Great Britain, Ambassador Juergen Chrobog of Germany, and Ambassador Francois Bujon de l'Estang of France. Senator LEVIN and I were privileged to sponsor this luncheon on Capitol Hill, in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing room. Attendees at this luncheon included a prestigious group of former ambassadors and administration officials, representatives from industry, policy and research organizations, and senior congressional staff from both the House and Senate.

Since December 1999, when the European Union (EU) Heads of State announced at a summit meeting in Helsinki their "determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises," there has been a great deal of discussion and debate about the development of a common European defense identity. While I commend our European allies for their

willingness to do more militarily, I have been concerned about the impact of an ESDP on the NATO Alliance.

My views on the development of the European Security and Defense Policy start with the basic premise that NATO has been the most successful military alliance in history. NATO won the cold war; it is now plying an instrumental role in keeping the peace in Europe. Whatever is done in the context of an ESDP, it must not weaken NATO.

There are a number of questions concerning the content of an ESDP—questions I, Senator LEVIN, and others raised at the October 10 luncheon. For example, Europeans are discussing increasing their military capabilities at a time of declining defense budgets, in a number of NATO partners. How is an added military capability possible with less money? Will ESDP developments—particularly the establishment of EU military structures—take valuable and scarce resources away from NATO military capabilities? How will the EU military force interact with NATO? Will NATO have the right of first refusal—or veto power—over an EU-led military operation?

These are important questions that should be answered. During the meeting on October 10, the Ambassadors provided valuable insight into the development of an ESDP. I commend their participation in today's forum. I ask unanimous consent that the opening statements of the three Ambassadors be printed in the RECORD.

I will continue to monitor these developments and keep the Senate informed.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER MEYER  
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY  
(ESDP) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

In October 1998 Tony Blair launched an initiative on European defense in a speech at Pörschach.

He had been dismayed by the inadequacy of European diplomatic and military performance in the Balkans. It undermined the credibility of the EU's common foreign and security policy. It corroded the Atlantic alliance by giving comfort to those in the U.S. who argue that the Europeans refuse to assume their share of the burden.

He saw that the Europeans lack military transportation over long distances; logistical support to sustain fighting forces for long periods away from home; and enough capabilities such as airborne surveillance, precision-guided munitions and command, control and communications. The Kosovo campaign in particular showed up these deficiencies.

Blair's aim was, and remains, three-fold: To strengthen the AEU's capacity to act internationally in a more effective manner; to deliver a step-change in Europe's ability to manage crises; and to strengthen the European Contribution to the Atlantic alliance, in particular through more robust European military capabilities.

In the British view this is overwhelmingly in the interests of the U.S., the alliance and of Europe.

Since Blair's speech, he and president Chirac have been the main drivers of this ini-

tiative. The British-French St. Malo declaration was the first land-mark. But, of course, over the last two years, the full memberships of the EU and NATO have become increasingly involved, notably Germany.

My colleagues will speak to you about the implications of this initiative for the U.S. and NATO; about the current state of play; and about next steps.

I want to make only two observations.

The first is that the initiative has made extraordinary progress in less than 2 years:

Last December, at Helsinki, the EU set itself a headline goal: to be able by 2003 to deploy 60,000 troops at 60 days' notice for operations lasting at least a year. By the end of this year we should have identified who will need to do what to make this goal reality; and we ought to have in place key element of EU/NATO arrangements, as well as necessary internal EU structures. My colleagues will say more about this.

My second observation is that behind the official statements of welcome for this initiative, there has been chronic suspicion and skepticism on this side of the Atlantic, especially on Capitol Hill. Why?

First, there is a long-standing schizophrenia at work. For decades you have been telling the Europeans to get their act together: one emergency phone number, please. But whenever we show signs of doing what you ask, you become suspicious and anxious that we are doing things behind your back. European defense initiative has been much afflicted by this schizophrenia. Damned if we do, damned if we don't.

Second, some of you don't actually believe we will ever put our money where our mouth is and increase European military effectiveness. But, Britain and, I'm sure, France and Germany are determined to make a reality of this initiative. Britain has just increased its military budget accordingly. The capabilities commitment conference will be held precisely to pin member-states down to concrete commitments. The UK has already made clear that it will offer a pool of land forces adding up to about 20,000, of whom a maximum of 12,000 would be deployed in any one scenario. The pool would allow deployment of one a group of armored, mechanized or air assault brigades, with probably two additional brigades in support (e.g. Artillery, air defense, attack helicopters, HA and signals).

The UK defense budget is rising in real terms. Procurement plans announced this year include four C-17 strategic lift aircraft with more to follow; maverick precision guided munitions and new air-to-air missiles for the Eurofighter; two new aircraft carriers and six new type-45 destroyers; new command, control and intelligence systems.

Third, you sometimes exaggerate the share of the burden the U.S. have to assume. Its true you flew most of the sorties in the Kosovo campaign. That is something we Europeans have to rectify. But don't forget that today in Kosovo, 85% of the NATO-led force comes from Europe. So does most of the civil aid. That's how it should be.

Fourth, the question is asked why it is necessary to introduce the EU into the equation, when there is already a security body called NATO, of which 13 out of 15 members are European. Isn't, the skeptics ask, the European defense initiative really about replacing NATO as the basis for collective European defense and cutting transatlantic security ties? This is perhaps the most deep-seated of U.S. concerns.

The answer to this last question is an emphatic "no", as my colleagues will confirm. NATO will remain the bedrock of our defense and that of European allies. This initiative is not about replacing NATO or undermining its role in collective defence and other de-

manding crisis management missions. No-one in Europe is suggesting an EU role in collective defence. European allies have made perfectly clear, in actions as well as in declarations, our preference to act alongside the U.S. wherever possible, particularly in high intensity operations.

Instead, this initiative is about other cases, where the U.S. does not want to be involved, "putting out fires in our backyard", as French defence minister Alain Richard has put it. With the U.S. where you want to be present, otherwise on our own. "Separable, but not separate".

Bear in mind that we are not writing on a blank piece of paper. Rather than creating a new security body, we are replacing an existing body that has not proven effective enough—the western European union—by one with far greater political, financial and organizational muscle—the European union. We are trading up for a more useful instrument. But our aims have not changed: a more effective European defence, organically linked to NATO and its structures.

Submerging Western European Union (WEU) functions into the European Union (EU), we simplify not multiply European security structures. We end an artificial separation between hard defence in NATO and WEU, from foreign and security policy in the EU. EU policies should become less declaratory, more hard-headed. That will be good for us all.

Finally, let me underline one point that Tony Blair has made clear, repeatedly, right back to his first speech in October 1998: this initiative should be judged, and we ourselves will measure its success, by whether there is a real improvement in military capabilities. We are under no illusions about the difficulty. But it has been and remains the central aim of the initiative.

SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR JURGEN CHROBOG  
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY  
(ESDP) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

Now that Sir Christopher has outlined how ESDP came into being and what it is all about, I would like to concentrate on the contribution ESDP will make to NATO and the transatlantic partnership. In doing so, I'll try to address some of the questions that have been raised in this country about ESDP. I'll certainly be happy to discuss them in more detail later on. Christopher Meyer's remarks have pointed out why ESDP is vital to further European integration. With ESDP, the European Union has committed itself to making essential progress towards a political union which is underpinned by credible political and military action. But ESDP is of equal importance to NATO, the U.S., and the transatlantic relationship—and not just because a strong Europe is very much in the interest of the United States.

To underpin this, I would like to make four brief points:

First: ESDP will enable Europeans to engage in crisis management, principally on the European continent. ESDP is an historic step towards strengthening the military capabilities of the Europe NATO partners. In this respect, it is a product of the lessons learned from Bosnia and Kosovo. ESDP enhances the ability of the EU to make decisions in crisis management. With ESDP, Europe will be able to perform a broad spectrum of missions ranging from civilian conflict prevention to military crisis management. These include humanitarian assistance, evacuation measures during crisis situations in third countries, and military peace-keeping and peace-enforcing—all of which we refer to as the "Petersberg Task." I would

like to mention here the efforts to enhance European capabilities predates the St. Malo agreement of 1998 by a few years. In June 1992, on German initiative, a WEU Ministerial meeting near Bonn first outlined the "Petersberg tasks" which later became the basis for ESDP objectives. Within the framework of ESDP, the EU will develop tools for civilian crisis management, including a task force of police officers ready to deploy on short notice. This will make the EU the only multilateral organization that can offer the full range of conflict management measures.

Second: By developing European capabilities in key military areas, ESDP will make a substantial contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing. These new capabilities include command and control, strategic intelligence, and strategic airlift—just to name the most important ones. These priorities will also play an important role in the reform of the German armed forces which has recently begun. This reform will triple the number of troops that Germany will be able to rapidly deploy from 50,000 to 150,000. This increase in the readiness forces will enable the Bundeswehr to participate in one major operation with up to 50,000 soldiers for a period of up to one year or two medium sized operations, each with up to 10,000 soldiers for several years, a significant improvement over current capabilities as demonstrated by the 7,500 men presently deployed in the Balkans. Germany will thus be in a better position to meet its responsibilities within NATO and the European framework. Germany's defense budget will increase by 3.2% in 2001. As you know, a German-French initiative is already underway on establishing a European air transport command—a way to combine financial resources to achieve the required capability quality and quantity. The modernization of European forces will be harmonized with NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative and thus simultaneously contribute to both the European and NATO force goals. Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska said it very plainly in his recent article for "Defense News" (3.7.2000), and I quote "Greater European military capabilities will make the alliance stronger, lift some of the burden the United States now carries in having to act in every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship a more equal one." End of quote. I could not agree more. A strong Europe is good for the United States. For this very good reason, not only Senator Hagel but also a whole generation of American politicians before him have been calling for exactly the same steps which we are now taking with ESDP.

Third: Within NATO, ESDP will strengthen the transatlantic link. The European Union will use its crisis management capability to complement and reinforce NATO. There may be occasions when the U.S. is not inclined or, for other reasons, is unable to dispatch American troops to deal with a conflict in Europe which needs to be addressed. This is precisely the type of scenario in which ESDP can play a role. Let me be clear: The EU is not competing with NATO. The Europeans will take care of business "where NATO as a whole is not engaged" (European Council Helsinki, Dec. 1998). There will be no separate European army. There will be no unnecessary duplication of assets or capabilities between NATO and the European Union. In fact, the EU might require NATO assets to conduct EU-led military operations. ESDP reflects the EU's willingness to shoulder more of the burden of safeguarding peace and democracy. As the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which was endorsed at NATO's Washington summit in April 1999, states: "The increase in the responsibilities and capacities of the European allies with respect to security and defense enhances the security environment of the alliance."

And finally, my forth point. The EU will include other European countries in ESDP. Procedures are being put in place to allow the six European NATO members which are not EU member states and possibly other contributing states to fully participate in European-led operations. That includes the Eastern and Southeastern countries that are candidates for EU membership. ESDP thus reinforces and broadens the security umbrella of NATO.

To sum up: EU and NATO have very different backgrounds, histories and structures. They will not detract from each other, but grow closer in values, convictions, and actions. For the European Union, and Germany in particular, the transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on the European continent. And one thing is absolutely certain: NATO remains responsible for the collective defense of Europe. NATO will not lose any of its importance, and ESDP will strengthen the European Union and NATO.

SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR FRANCOIS BUJON DE L'ESTANG

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

I would like to thank Dr. Hamre and Simon Serfaty for this excellent initiative taken by the CSIS.

From St. Malo to today, some apprehension has been expressed on Capitol Hill regarding European security and defense policy. This apprehension has been largely due, I believe, to misconceptions and lack of understanding of our intentions and our objectives. Perhaps terminology has not helped either, with the European predilection for ominous acronyms

After the excellent presentations of my British and German colleagues, there is little left to add. However, there is only one thing worse than a European conspiracy: a French-inspired European conspiracy. According to a rather popular theory in Washington, ESDP is a dark and dangerous plot organized by France to finally break up the Atlantic Alliance with the unknowing complicity of its blind European partners. Therefore, people are undoubtedly paying close attention to the current French Presidency of the EU. Let me spend a few minutes to shed some light on our plans until December 31, and briefly go over the goals—and achievements—of our current presidency in order to dispel and doubt that might still be lingering in your minds.

1. To quote Lord Robertson, ESDP is about three things: capabilities, capabilities and capabilities. I wholeheartedly subscribe to this assertion, for at least two reasons: first of all, France has always prided itself, on a national level, with a strong commitment to robust defense capabilities, and our present forces are there to show it—it is only natural that we attempt to pursue our European endeavor with the same priority. Second, because capabilities are the key to the success of ESDP, in terms of political credibility of course but also in terms of our military objectives.

Let me tell you what our projects are in terms of capabilities:

As you all know by now, at Helsinki, last December, the fifteen heads of State or Government set themselves two series of targets in terms of military capabilities.

On the one hand, the quantitative so called "head-line goals" (60,000 troops rapidly deployable, self-sufficient for a whole year with the necessary air and naval support);

On the other hand, qualitative targets regarding collective capabilities in areas such

as command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. What we are doing today is to transform these political objectives into concrete goals, in a very detailed manner. In political objectives into concrete goals, in a very detailed manner. In other words, the dozen or so lines in the Helsinki conclusions on capabilities have, thanks to an alchemy performed by EU military planners with input from their NATO colleagues, turned into some 50 pages of specific requirements.

This allows us to match up what we need to what we currently have, and of course measure the gaps, which we will aim to close at the Capabilities Commitment Conference, to be held in Brussels next November 20 by Defense Ministers of the 15. This event will allow each member State to make pledges toward meeting these requirements. We also aim to decide, before the end of our Presidency, on a European review mechanism that will allow us to continue narrowing the gap until 2003, and more generally to review the nature and composition of European military forces.

Just to give you a flavor of this work, which suddenly makes all of these debates very real: the Defense Ministers of the 15 agreed, two weeks ago, that in order to fulfill the Helsinki objectives the EU needed: 80,000 troops in order to allow for a simultaneous contingency and still be able to project 60,000 as agreed (allowing for rotations, this means of course 200,000 to 230,000 troops); 300 to 350 fighter planes; some 80 combat ships . . . these are just some of the elements in this catalogue of forces that have been agreed. I could also mention strategic lift, UAVs, amphibious landing ships . . .

I would like to mention in passing that, as you can see, we are not just aiming at operations on the low end of the peace-keeping spectrum as I have sometimes heard. Does this mean that we would be able, in 2003, to carry out an operation such as "Allied Force" entirely by ourselves? Of course not—and it would be dangerous to create such expectations. But the imbalance between U.S. and European forces which we witnessed last year would be substantially reduced—and 2003 will be an important stepping stone on the path to such a capability, which we need to keep as a longer-term goal in order to be prepared for all non-article 5 contingencies.

3. I often hear people complaining about the fact that the EU is not working to improve its capabilities, but just creating new institutions. This is inaccurate on both counts: as I have just pointed out, we are actively working on reinforcing our capabilities. As for institutions, I would agree with Sir Christopher that we are re-organizing, not multiplying European institutions. As we have reiterated at the last European Councils, our goal is to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". The capacity to take decisions and to conduct EU-led military operations requires the adequate political-military decision-making structures, procedures and expertise. During our Presidency, we are working hard in order to allow these new EU structures (the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff) to get up and running in their permanent configuration, taking over from their interim one. These bodies are analogous to those that existed in the past in the WEU, and which will be disbanded.

I might add that those new institutions that are being created are those which fulfill the objective of allowing consultation and cooperation with NATO and with non-EU

countries, two goals that I know are very dear to many of those here today, as they are indeed to us. Under our Presidency, we have already held a joint meeting between the North Atlantic Council and the Interim Political and Security Committee (and there will be more to come), as well as several meetings of the newly set up joint working groups between the EU and NATO. These are needed to address, in a pragmatic and solution-oriented way, the issues that the two organizations need to work out together (access to NATO assets, information security, etc.) and to work out the elements of the long-term EU-NATO relationship. We have also set up an inclusive forum for the 15 European non-EU partners and, within this forum, for the 6 non-EU NATO allies. Several meetings have also already been held in the two months that have gone by since we took up our presidency. These countries will, of course, be closely associated to the November Capabilities Commitment Conference.

One final word: after having gone into such detail into our current projects, just to give you a taste of how complex this whole endeavor is and how seriously we are taking our task, I wouldn't want the trees to hide the forest.

The crucial element to bear in mind is that we are at a turning point in the history of the European Union, of the Atlantic Alliance and of transatlantic relations. There is much at stake, both for the future of the EU's foreign and security policy, and therefore for our ability as Europeans to play our role on the world stage, and for the transatlantic link as well. We have taken the full measure of what is at stake and are pleased to see that quarreling and suspicion have given largely given way, on this side of the Atlantic, to a better understanding of our common interests and our shared objective.

#### BRIAN BENCZKOWSKI

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, at the end of this session of the 106th Congress Brian Benczkowski will be leaving my staff. Brian has worked on the Hill since his third year in law school. He started as an intern while still in law school, served as the senior analyst for judiciary issues for the Senate Budget Committee, and worked closely with my general counsel to develop, and enact, over the President's veto, the Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Brian was my counsel for the second round of Whitewater hearings and was part of the team for the historic impeachment trial of President Clinton. Brian worked on Juvenile Justice legislation, and helped me take on the Mexican drug lords.

He learned the highway, airport and other infrastructure needs of New Mexico as well as any Highway and Transportation Secretary in any Governor's cabinet. He was knowledgeable on immigration issues and helped my case-workers with the really tough, but worthy immigration problems that are a daily fact of life in a border state. Just to prove that Brian had a soft side, he was my staff person for Character Counts during the 106th Congress.

Brian was instrumental in drafting the claims process legislation for the victims of the Cerro Grande fire. From the date that the fire first started to the day that the President signed the bill, complete with the \$640 million to pay the claims, was fifty days. It is a good legislative product, and it proved that the delegation and the Congress could be bipartisan and act expeditiously in an emergency.

Brian is a talented lawyer, a caring and hard working member of my staff.

For a young man raised in Virginia, taught the law in Missouri with parents now living in Connecticut, he has made many New Mexico friends, developed a taste for green chile and amassed an understanding of the border. At one point I remarked that his Spanish was as good as any other staff member in my office.

So what is it that such a talented young man would choose to do when leaving Capitol Hill?

Banking legislative assistants and counsels with backgrounds in securities often end up at the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission or at one of the Wall Street firms. However, the typical career path wouldn't do for this untypically talented young lawyer. He is going to New York to work for the first, real sports stock market.

This new sports stock market will list the baseball and other trading cards of today's marquee athletes and major league sports rising stars. Just like any major stock exchange, the exchange is a market maker. Just like E-trade or Ameritrade people will have sports brokerage accounts.

Brian is a baseball fan, former baseball player and a font of knowledge when it comes to sports. As a former minor league baseball player myself, I know baseball and am a fan of most other sports. ESPN was a great invention that adds to most men's enjoyment of life, sports and the pursuit of happiness. Hopefully, this new sports stock exchange will add another dimension to the way we all follow sports.

Many of us share a passion for sports, but very few of us get to take that passion, and merge it with the law, get an impressive title like assistant general counsel, receive a pay check and stock options. However, Brian is going to do just that at thePit.com. I wish him and his new company every success.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

At 7:30 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Kellaher, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following joint resolution, in which

it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.J. Res. 119. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2001, and for other purposes.

#### ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Kellaher, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled joint resolution:

H.J. Res. 119. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2001, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bill was signed subsequently by the President pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND).

#### ORDERS FOR MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2000

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority leader of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it recess until the hour of 5 p.m. on Monday, October 30, 2000. I further ask consent that on Monday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then proceed to a period of morning business until 7 p.m., with Senators speaking for up to 10 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator REID, or his designee, from 5 to 6 p.m.; Senator DOMENICI, or his designee, from 6 to 7 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROGRAM

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, the Senate will convene tomorrow at 5 p.m., with up to 2 hours for morning business, with Senators REID and DOMENICI in control of the time.

Under the previous order, there will be a vote on a continuing resolution at 7 p.m. That will be the first vote of the day. However, other votes may be necessary during tomorrow evening's session. Good-faith negotiations are ongoing, and it is hoped that an agreement can be finalized this week.

#### RECESS UNTIL 5 P.M. TOMORROW

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 7:58 p.m., recessed until Monday, October 30, 2000, at 5 p.m.