

Resolution 185, a resolution recognizing and commending the personnel of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for their participation and efforts in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Operation Allied Force in the Balkan Region.

SENATE RESOLUTION 196

At the request of Mr. WARNER, the names of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HAGEL), and the Senator from Maine (Ms. SNOWE) were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 196, a resolution commending the submarine force of the United States Navy on the 100th anniversary of the force.

SENATE RESOLUTION 204

At the request of Mr. HATCH, the names of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. JOHNSON) and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. TORRICELLI) were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 204, a resolution designating the week beginning November 21, 1999, and the week beginning on November 19, 2000, as "National Family Week," and for other purposes.

SENATE RESOLUTION 208—EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN LIGHT OF THE ALLIANCE'S APRIL 1999 WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S JUNE 1999 COLOGNE SUMMIT

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. KYL, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. LIEBERMAN, and Mr. HELMS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 208

Whereas NATO is the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership;

Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the security of North America and Europe;

Whereas NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its members, capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members to defend common values and interests;

Whereas these requirements dictate that European NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts;

Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted (1) the significant shortcomings of European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; combat aircraft; precision-guided munitions; airlift; deployability; and logistics; and (2) the overall imbalance between United States and European defense capabilities;

Whereas this imbalance in United States and European NATO defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;

Whereas NATO has undertaken great efforts to facilitate the emergence of a stronger European pillar within NATO through the European Security and Defense Identity, including the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by the Western European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; and the establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations;

Whereas in promulgating NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative Alliance members committed themselves to improving their respective forces in five areas: (1) effective engagement; (2) deployability and mobility; (3) sustainability and logistics; (4) survivability; and (5) command, control and communications.

Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western European Union, including its command structures and military forces, and established within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; and

Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne Summit indicate a new determination of its member states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity with strengthened defense capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved,

SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—The Senate—

(1) believes NATO should remain the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern;

(2) believes all NATO members should commit to improving their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project power decisively with equitable burden-sharing;

(3) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to improve the defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of these European forces;

(4) acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; and

(5) calls upon the member states of NATO and the European Union to promulgate together during their respective meetings, ministerials, and summits in the course of 1999 principles that will strengthen the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity within NATO, and harmonize their roles in transatlantic affairs.

(b) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is further the sense of the Senate that—

(1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action;

(2) improved European military capabilities, not new institutions outside of the Alliance, are the key to a vibrant and more influential European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;

(3) failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Ini-

tiative would weaken support for the Alliance in the United States;

(4) the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;

(5) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security interests;

(6) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(7) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and

(8) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective force commitments to the Alliance.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, with Senator ROTH, Senator LUGAR and other colleagues, a resolution that attempts to clarify the relationship between the European Union's new European Security and Defense Identity, popularly known by its acronym ESDI, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. President, as my colleagues will remember, ESDI has been gathering momentum since last December's meeting in St. Malo, France between French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair. It is part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, which the EU sees as essential to its development as "an ever closer union."

ESDI was discussed in the communique of the April 1999 NATO Washington Summit, and it was elaborated on in the communique of the June 1999 EU Cologne Summit.

Let me say up front that I believe that ESDI—if it is developed in proper coordination with NATO—can serve the national interest of the United States by becoming a valuable vehicle for strengthening the European military contribution to NATO. Put another way, ESDI, if handled correctly, can at long last create more equitable burden-sharing between our European NATO allies and the United States.

NATO must and will remain the pre-eminent organization to defend the territory of the North Atlantic area against all external threats, as envisioned in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 and restated

on April 30, 1998 by the United States Senate in its Resolution of Ratification of the enlargement of the Alliance to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members. These missions have become known as non-Article 5 missions and were also reaffirmed by the Senate in the April 30, 1998 Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement.

ESDI's field of action should be restricted to those non-Article 5 missions in which NATO as an organization does not wish to involve itself. In practice, Mr. President, this would mean that at some future date if the need for military action arose in non-NATO Europe and the United States did not wish to become involved, the European Union could undertake the effort, utilizing, in part, NATO assets.

Mr. President, I believe that such a situation with a rejuvenated European pillar of the alliance could free up forces of this country for possible action elsewhere.

Let me emphasize, however, that in order for ESDI to accomplish both the goals of the European Union and of NATO, it must be clearly designed in a way that gives NATO the "right of first refusal" on non-Article 5 missions. To repeat—if NATO would not wish to become involved, then the European Union would have the option of leading the mission.

In addition, Mr. President, we must be sure that ESDI does not duplicate resources or discriminate against non-EU European NATO members (Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary).

Mr. President, in my opinion the biggest danger is that ESDI could be constructed as an alternative to NATO for non-Article 5 missions. If this would happen, it could lead to an estrangement of the United States from its European allies.

Unfortunately, the June 1999 Cologne EU Summit communique subtly modified the language of the April 1999 Washington NATO Summit communique in the direction of ESDI as an autonomous EU military organ, using NATO assets, without giving NATO this necessary "right of first refusal" for non-Article 5 missions.

The European Union is currently involved in internal negotiations on a further elaboration of ESDI at the December EU Summit in Helsinki. The Sense of the Senate resolution that we are introducing serves as a clear message to our friends in the European Union that while we recognize their aspirations for a European Security and Defense Identity, it must complement NATO, not be in competition with, or duplicative of it.

With that in mind, our Resolution traces the development of ESDI, citing

both the Washington NATO Summit and the Cologne EU Summit. It stresses that the Yugoslav air campaign demonstrated the military shortcomings of the European allies and the imbalance with the United States, both of which the allies have pledged to address through the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative.

The Resolution then expresses several items that are the Sense of the Senate.

NATO should remain the primary institution for security issues of trans-Atlantic concern;

All NATO members should commit to improving their defense capabilities so that the Alliance can project power decisively with equitable burden-sharing;

The Defense Capabilities Initiative adopted at the Washington NATO Summit is specifically endorsed;

The resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged is acknowledged;

The member states of NATO and the EU should promulgate principles that will strengthen the trans-Atlantic partnership and reinforce unity within NATO.

Then, Mr. President, cutting directly to the heart of preventing ESDI's becoming an alternative to NATO for non-Article 5 missions, the Resolution offers the Further Sense of the Senate that "on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action."

Further, and directly relevant to the issue of more equitable burden-sharing, the Resolution states the Sense of the Senate that "failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative would weaken support for the Alliance in the United States."

Addressing the issue of non-discrimination by the EU against non-EU NATO members, the Resolution states the Sense of the Senate that "the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure that non-EU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security interests."

Finally, the Resolution expresses the Sense of the Senate that the EU's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on trans-Atlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by NATO and should not pro-

mote unnecessary duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO.

Mr. President, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the cornerstone of our engagement with Europe. The resolution we have introduced makes clear to our partners that we support the European Union's European Security and Defense Identity as long as it is developed in a manner to strengthen NATO, not weaken it.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT

BINGAMAN AMENDMENT NO. 2345

(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. BINGAMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H.R. 434) to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

SEC. __. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report to Congress regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of Federal and State coordination of unemployment and retraining activities associated with the following programs and legislation:

(1) trade adjustment assistance (including NAFTA trade adjustment assistance) provided for under title II of the Trade Act of 1974;

(2) the Job Training Partnership Act;

(3) the Workforce Investment Act; and

(4) unemployment insurance.

(b) PERIOD COVERED.—The report shall cover the activities involved in the programs and legislation listed in subsection (a) from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1999.

(c) DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—The report shall at a minimum include specific data and recommendations regarding—

(1) the compatibility of program requirements related to the employment and retraining of dislocated workers in the United States, with particular emphasis on the trade adjustment assistance programs provided for under title II of the Trade Act of 1974;

(2) the compatibility of application procedures related to the employment and retraining of dislocated workers in the United States;

(3) the capacity of these programs to assist workers negatively impacted by foreign trade and the transfer of production to other countries, measured in terms of employment and wages;

(4) the capacity of these programs to assist secondary workers negatively impacted by foreign trade and the transfer of production to other countries, measured in terms of employment and wages;

(5) how the impact of foreign trade and the transfer of production to other countries would have changed the number of beneficiaries covered under the trade adjustment assistance program if the trade adjustment assistance program covered secondary workers in the United States; and

(6) the effectiveness of the programs described in subsection (a) in achieving reemployment of United States workers and