

need to go back and tell them that the money is already spent if we deregulate, and it has to be deregulated because we have to spend the money. That seems to happen a lot around here.

Then the emissions trading scheme, that one takes the cake. Each of the cost estimates I have seen include a range of credit trading scenarios. The assumption is the more credits we can buy, the cheaper it will be to meet our Kyoto commitments. That is the assumption: The more we buy, the cheaper it gets. That is like going to the mall and saving money by taking advantage of as many sales as you can. You still spend the money.

The Energy Information Administration says the credits will cost us \$70 to \$350 a term. In people terms, that is 15 cents to 70 cents a gallon of gas, up to an 80 percent increase in your electrical bill. And we thought deregulation would save us some money.

The range is as a result of not knowing how many countries will participate. If we have to buy all our credits only from Europe and Russia, they are going to be very expensive. That puts us in the \$350-per-ton range. If we get countries like China and India to sell us their emission credits, we can get that cost down to \$70. That is the assumption.

Do you know why they will sell us theirs for so low a price? They don't have any ceiling. Last year I went to Kyoto. I got to meet with the Chinese delegation. By the year 2012 they are going to be the biggest polluters in the whole world and they will not be a part of the treaty. Why not? They are a developing nation. They cannot be put under those constraints. I asked them when they would be done being a developing nation. They said, "Never." Good negotiating. They even developed a fine system so that if we pollute, we get fined, and the money goes to, guess who, the developing nations. They get the money that way.

Now there is another scheme—sell credits. We buy the right to pollute from China and the developing nations. They will sell it to us for just \$70 a ton because they have no limit. They are not really selling a quantity. They can sell as many units as they want. They are already polluting; they can continue to pollute. Good deal for us? That is what the White House says we can do. We will pay China so we can have the right to drive our cars and turn on our lights. We will pay China so we can drive when we want to and where we want to. Just pay China and you can turn on all your Christmas lights whenever you want. They will already have the jobs.

In theory, China will limit its own emissions at some future level. In the meantime, they will sell us permits, in theory. In theory the whole world would participate and we would reduce the growth of carbon emissions and save the Earth from certain devastation—in theory.

I got to meet with those nations that are island nations; if global warming happens, they will be inundated by water. They are not going to be a part of the treaty. If this were a real problem and your country was going to be inundated by water, wouldn't you sign the treaty? Wouldn't you push every nation in the world to sign the treaty? I can tell you, they are not, which tells you what they think about global warming.

It is a way to get jobs. It is a way to sell emission credits. The whole world is not participating and the Earth will not be saved because the treaty will not reduce carbon emissions. In fact, we cannot even get the developing world to abide by copyright treaties, what makes anybody think they will abide by an emissions treaty even if they sign it? Oh, no, the joke will be on us. It will be on the American people. We are planning to pay China for a piece of paper that says, "We reduced our emissions by 1 ton so you can increase yours by 1 ton." And we will pay them for that right. That is what it says.

What are we going to do if they just take the money and keep on polluting? And they have assured us they would. Are we going to send in troops and demand our money back? The Energy Information Administration has pointed out that this treaty would cost American families between \$350 and \$1,740 per year. That is what the private economists have been saying. And it will eliminate jobs.

I urge my colleagues to get a copy of this report and read it. In November the administration will go to Buenos Aires, Argentina, to continue negotiations on the Kyoto treaty. They plan to work out emissions trading enforcement provisions. These are two critical parts of how this treaty will hurt American families. People need to be mindful of this process. People need to protest this process. Now is the time, not during the negotiations, not after the President has signed and sent a treaty here that we have already said, 95 to 0, does not meet the requirements for the economy in the United States, that it is just selling our economy.

A study conducted by DRI-McGraw-Hill estimated Kyoto could cost us 1.5 million jobs. Charles River Associates put that figure as high as 3.1 million jobs by 2010.

Even the Argonne National Laboratory, pointed to job losses in a study on the impact of higher energy prices on energy-intensive industries. Argonne concluded that 200,000 American chemical workers could lose their jobs. All of the American aluminum plants could close, putting another 20,000 workers out of work. Cement companies would move another 6,000 jobs overseas. And nearly 100,000 U.S. steel workers would be out of work.

Americans have a right to know what is going on, even if the Office of White House Counsel does not think so. They should have a chance to see who is playing with their livelihoods.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JEFFORDS). Under a previous order, the Senator from Ohio is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, let me first congratulate my colleague from Wyoming for a very eloquent and very thoughtful statement about a very serious issue, a very serious problem.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago we introduced the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. This bipartisan legislation, which now has over one-third of the Senate as cosponsors, calls for an additional \$2.6 billion investment in international counter-narcotics efforts over the next 3 years. With the additional resources provided in this legislation, we can begin to restore a comprehensive eradication, interdiction, and crop substitution strategy. I say "restore." I say restore because we currently are not making the same kind of effort to keep drugs from entering the United States that we used to. Drugs are now easy to find and easy to buy. As a result, the amount of drugs sold on our streets and the number of people who use drugs, particularly our young people, is at an unprecedented high level. The facts demonstrate the sobering trends.

The August 1998 National Survey of Drug Abuse report by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration lists the following disturbing facts: One, in 1997, 13.9 million Americans age 12 and over cited themselves as "current users" of illicit drugs, a 7 percent increase over 1996's figure of 13 million Americans. That translates to nearly a million new users of drugs each year.

Second, from 1992 to 1997, the number of children age 12 to 17 who were using illegal drugs has more than doubled and has increased by 27 percent, just from 1996 to 1997 alone.

For children age 12 to 17, first-time heroin use—which as we all know can be fatal—surged an astounding 875 percent, from 1991 to 1996. The overall number of past-month heroin users increased 378 percent from 1993 to 1997.

We cannot in good conscience and with a straight face say that our drug control strategy is working. It is not. More children are using drugs. With an abundant supply, drug traffickers now are seeking to increase their sales by targeting children age 10, 11, 12. This is nothing less than an assault on the future of our children, on our families, and on the future of our country itself. This is nothing less than a threat to our national values and, yes, even our national security.

All of this, though, begs the question: What are we doing wrong? Clearly there is no one, simple answer. However, one thing is clear: our overall drug strategy is no longer balanced; it is imbalanced. To be effective, our national drug strategy must have a

strong commitment in the following three areas. One is demand reduction, which consists of prevention, treatment and education programs. These are, of course, administered by all levels of government: Federal level, State level, and the local community as well as nonprofit and other private organizations. The second component is domestic law enforcement which, again, has to be provided by all three levels of government. And finally, No. 3, international eradication and international interdiction efforts, which is the sole responsibility of the Federal Government, our sole responsibility.

These three components are really all interdependent—you need them all. A strong investment in each of them is necessary for each to work individually and to work collectively. For example, a strong effort to destroy or seize drugs at the source or outside the United States, both reduces the amount of drugs in the country and drives up the street price. As we all know, higher prices will in fact reduce consumption. This, in turn, helps our domestic law enforcement and demand reduction efforts.

As any football fan can tell us, a winning team is one that plays well at all three phases of the game—offense, defense, and special teams.

The same is true with our antidrug strategy. All three components have to be effective if our strategy is going to be a winning effort.

Mr. President, while I think the current administration has shown a clear commitment to demand reduction and domestic law enforcement programs, the same, sadly, cannot be said for the international eradication and interdiction components. This was not always the case. Let me turn to a chart.

In 1987, a \$4.79 billion Federal drug control budget was divided as follows: 29 percent for demand reduction programs; 38 percent for domestic law enforcement; and 33 percent, one-third, for international eradication and interdiction efforts. This balanced approach worked. It achieved real success. Limiting drug availability through interdiction drove up the street price of drugs, reduced drug purity levels and, consequently, reduced overall drug use.

From 1988 to 1991, total drug use declined by 13 percent, cocaine use dropped by 35 percent, and there was a 25-percent reduction in overall drug use by adolescent Americans.

This balanced approach, however, ended in 1993, and by 1995 the \$13.3 billion national drug control budget was divided as follows: 35 percent for demand reduction, 53 percent for law enforcement, but only—only—12 percent—only 12 percent for international interdiction efforts.

Though the overall antidrug budget increased almost threefold from 1987 to 1995, the percentage allocated for international eradication and interdiction efforts decreased dramatically. This disruption only recently has started to change. Unfortunately, the imbalance

is still there, and the figures still show that.

In the President's proposed \$17 billion drug control budget for 1999, 34 percent will be allocated for demand reduction, 52 percent for law enforcement, and 14 percent for international and interdiction efforts. Those are the numbers. But what really matters is what these numbers get you, what they buy, in terms of resources. The hard truth is that our drug interdiction presence—the ship, the air, and the manpower dedicated to keeping drugs from reaching our country—has eroded dramatically, and here are just a few examples.

One, the Department of Defense funding for counternarcotics decreased from \$504.6 million in 1992 down to \$214 million in 1995. That is a 57-percent decrease in only a period of 3 years. As a result, flight hours by our AWACS planes dropped from 38,100 hours in 1992 down to 17,713 hours by 1996, a 54-percent reduction.

Another example: At the beginning of the decade, the U.S. Customs Service operated counternarcotics activities around the clock. This made sense because drug trafficking is a 7-day, 24-hour enterprise. Today, the Customs Service does not have the resources to maintain these around-the-clock operations. In a recent hearing on our legislation, the original piece of legislation we introduced, a representative of the U.S. Customs Service testified that the Customs Service has 84 boats in the Caribbean in drug apprehension efforts, and that is down from 200 vessels in 1990—200 down to 84.

The Customs Service estimates that they expect to have only half of the current fleet of 84 vessels by the year 2000, if present trends and projections continue—half again.

These, I believe, are shocking statistics, and, perhaps more than the budget numbers themselves, these statistics demonstrate the imbalance in our overall drug strategy. We have to have a balanced strategy. All portions are needed.

I have witnessed the lack of our resources and commitment in the region firsthand. This past year, I traveled to the Caribbean several times to see our counternarcotics operations there. I met with the dedicated people on the front lines of our drug interdiction efforts. I witnessed our strategy in action and sat down with the experts, both military and civilian—our experts who are charged with carrying out the monitoring, the detection, and the interdiction of drugs.

On one of my recent trips, I saw, in particular, Haiti has become the attractive rest stop on the cocaine highway. You can tell, when looking at the map, why that would be. It is strategically located about halfway between the source country, Colombia, and the United States. As the poorest country in the hemisphere, it is extremely vulnerable to the kind of bribery and corruption that the drug trade needs in order to flourish.

Not surprisingly, the level of drugs moving through Haiti has dramatically increased. A U.S. Government inter-agency assessment on cocaine movement found that the total amount of cocaine coming from the United States through Haiti jumped from 5-percent in 1996 now up to 19 percent by the end of 1997.

In response to that, we initiated a U.S. law enforcement operation called Operation Frontier Lance. Operation Frontier Lance utilized Coast Guard cutters, speed boats, and helicopters to detect and capture drug dealers on a 24-hour-per-day basis. This operation was modeled after another successful interdiction effort that was first done off the coast of Puerto Rico, and that operation was called Operation Frontier Shield. Both these operations were done in two different time periods. Operation Frontier Shield utilized nearly 2 dozen ships and aircraft, and Operation Frontier Lance utilized more than a dozen ships and helicopters.

To make Operation Frontier Lance work ultimately required that we borrow a few ships and helicopters from operations elsewhere in the Caribbean. Because of our scarce resources, frankly, we had to rob Peter to pay Paul, as they say. But these operations produced amazing results. The 6-month operation in Puerto Rico resulted in the seizure of more than 32,000 pounds of cocaine and 120 arrests. The 3-month operation in Haiti resulted in 2,990 pounds of cocaine seized and 22 arrests.

Mr. President, these operations demonstrate we can make a big difference—a big difference—if we provide the right levels of material and the right levels of manpower to fight drug trafficking. They worked.

Having had this success, one would think that these operations would serve as a model for the entire region, that we would be able to duplicate them, replicate them. Instead of maintaining these operations, we ended them. This potential roadblock on the cocaine highway is no more. Now in Puerto Rico, we only have a combined total of six air and sea assets doing maintenance operations.

So this figure, Mr. President, represented by these helicopters and ships has been dramatically changed. That is what has happened. That has been the change—down to six in that region.

In Puerto Rico today, we only have a combined total of six air and sea assets doing maintenance operations.

In Haiti and the Dominican Republic—off the coast of Haiti and the Dominican Republic—we only have one ship and one helicopter devoted for the drug operation. That is what we are down to here—just one. So we can take all of these off at once.

We should keep in mind also that since refugees remain a major problem in this area, these very few vessels are not dedicated solely and exclusively to the antidrug effort. Amazingly, no sooner than we built an effective wall against drug traffickers we tore it down.

While in the region, I was surprised to learn in the eastern Pacific, off the coast of Mexico and Central America, the coast is literally clear for the drug lords to do their business. This is, without a doubt, unacceptable. That whole region—that whole region—is literally clear for the drug lords, the entire eastern Pacific.

Again, we have no presence there because we lack the resources. An interdiction plan does exist for the region which would involve the deployment of several ships and planes in the region. This operation, however, unfortunately, was canceled. It was canceled before it even got started because the resources were needed elsewhere. To date, the coastal waters in the eastern Pacific remain an open sea expressway for drug business.

Mr. President, through my visits to the region I have seen firsthand the dramatic decline in our eradication and interdiction capacity. The results of this decline have been a decline in cocaine seizures, a decline in the price of cocaine, and an increase in drug use. This has to stop. It is a clear and imminent danger to the very heart of our society. That is why this legislation is timely. We need to dedicate more resources for international efforts to help reverse this trend.

I want to make it very clear, as I think I have time and time again, that I strongly support our continued commitment in demand reduction and in law enforcement programs. In the end, I believe that reducing demand is the only real way to permanently end illegal drug use. However, this is not going to happen overnight. That is why we need a comprehensive counterdrug strategy that addresses all components of this problem.

There is another fundamental reason, why the Federal Government must do more to stop drugs, either at the source or in transit, as they are coming into the United States. If we do not, no one else will. Let me remind my colleagues that our antidrug efforts here at home are done in cooperation with State and local governments and scores of nonprofit and private organizations. However, only the Federal Government has the ability and the responsibility to keep drugs from crossing into this country. Only the Federal Government has the ability to help deal with the problem at the source level. Only the Federal Government has the ability to stop drugs in the transit routes. That is our responsibility, and the buck should stop here.

But, it is not just an issue of responsibility. I think it is an issue of leadership. The United States has to demonstrate leadership on an international level if we expect to get the full cooperation of source countries, where the drugs originate, countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, as well as countries in the transit zone, including Mexico and the Caribbean island governments. There is little incentive for these countries to invest their limited

resources and risk the lives of their law enforcement officers to stop drug trafficking unless we provide the leadership and the resources necessary to make a serious dent in the drug trade.

Our bill is designed to provide resources and to demonstrate to our friends in the Caribbean and in Central and South America that we intend to lead once again. With this legislation, we can once again make it difficult for drug lords to bring drugs to our country and make drugs far more costly to buy.

It is clear drug trafficking imposes a heavy toll on law-abiding citizens and communities across our great country. It is time we make it a dangerous and costly business once again for drug traffickers themselves. A renewed investment in international and interdiction programs will make a huge difference, both in the flow and the cost of illegal drugs. It worked before and we believe it can work again.

As I said at the beginning, my colleagues and I reintroduced this legislation a few weeks ago. Since we introduced our original bill in July, we have received a number of suggestions on ways to improve the legislation, including several provided in conversations I personally had with Gen. Barry McCaffrey, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 5 additional minutes to conclude my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DEWINE. I thank my colleagues and I thank the Chair.

Some of these suggestions we incorporated in the House bill first introduced by Congressman BILL MCCOLLUM of Florida and Congressman DENNIS HASTERT of Illinois. The House passed the McCollum-Hastert bill with overwhelming bipartisan support. The final vote was 384-39. Clearly, the overwhelming bipartisan show of support for the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act is a wake-up call—a wake-up call—for leadership. It is time the United States once again led the way in a comprehensive and balanced strategy to reduce drug use; and the time for leadership is now.

Since House passage of the bill, I have reached out once again to the drug czar and to my friends on the Democrat side of the aisle to try to determine how we can work together to strengthen our drug interdiction efforts and our overall antidrug strategy. Again, we have received very constructive suggestions, and I am hopeful this dialogue will yield positive results in the future.

Mr. President, the resources we would provide in our legislation should be of no surprise to anyone involved in our drug control policies. The vast majority of the items in this bill are the very items which the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard and Customs Service have been requesting for quite some time. Many of

these items are detailed, practically item per item and dollar amount, in the United States Interdiction Coordinator report, known as USIC, which was originally requested by the drug czar.

The new drug bill that we have introduced represents a good-faith effort by the sponsors of this legislation to get something done this year. It includes almost all of the changes made in the House-passed bill and incorporates virtually every suggestion made by the drug czar. Of central concern to the general, as he expressed in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was the need for greater flexibility. And I agree and I understand.

Our new bill provides flexibility for the agencies to determine and acquire the assets best needed for their respective drug interdiction missions. It also provides more flexibility for the administration in providing needed resources to Latin American countries.

Mr. President, thanks to the suggestions we have received, the bill is a better bill. It has far more bipartisan support than the first version. Again, the growing support for this legislation is not surprising. This is not a partisan issue. We need to do more to fight drugs outside our borders.

But let's be frank. In this antidrug effort, Congress is the antidrug funder but the agencies represented here—the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, Coast Guard, State and Defense Departments, and the Drug Czar's Office—they are the antidrug fighters. They are the ones who are doing the job. The dedicated men and women of these agencies are working to keep drugs out of the hands of our children. And all we are trying to do is to give them the additional resources they requested to make that work result in a real reduction in drug use. This bill is just the first step in our efforts to work with the agencies represented here. I expect to do more in the future.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to make it clear that while this bill is an authorization measure, I have already started the process to request the money needed for this bill over 3 years. Even though we introduced the bill for the first time in late July, we have already secured \$143 million through the Senate passed fy 1999 appropriation measures. Senators COVERDELL, GRAHAM of Florida, GRASSLEY, BOND, FAIRCLOTH, and myself requested these funds through the various appropriation measures.

Given that it will take some time to dedicate some of our larger assets, such as boats, airplanes, and helicopters, we need to start investing in these resources as soon as possible.

I recognize that even as we finally are beginning to balance our budget, we still have to exercise fiscal responsibility. I believe effective drug interdiction is not only good social policy, it is sound fiscal policy as well. It is important to note that seizing or destroying a ton of cocaine in source or

transit areas is more cost-effective than trying to seize the same quantity of drugs at the point of sale. But more important, are the short and long term costs if we do not act to reverse the tragic rise in drug use by our children.

Let me remind my colleagues that there are more than twice the number of children aged 12 to 17 using drugs today than there were 5 years ago. With more kids using drugs, we have more of the problems associated with youth drug use—violence, criminal activity, and delinquency. Children are dying—either from drug use or drug-related violence. We will have more of the same unless we take action now to restore a balanced drug control strategy. We have to have all the components of our drug strategy working effectively again.

We did it before and we succeeded.

If we pass the Western Hemisphere drug elimination bill we can take the first step toward success. We can provide the resources, and most importantly, the leadership to reduce drugs at the source or in transit.

In the end, Mr. President, that is what this bill is about—it is about leadership—effective leadership. We have an opportunity with this legislation to show and exercise leadership. I hope we can seize this opportunity to stop drug trafficking, and more important, to save lives.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). Under the previous order, the senior Senator from West Virginia is recognized for up to 5 minutes.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. There was no previous order that I be recognized, but I still thank the Chair, and I hope I am recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Delaware, Mr. BIDEN, actually was here before I was, which does not mean anything under the Senate rules, but we have to live and let live here, and he has to catch a train at 2 p.m. So I ask unanimous consent that I may retain the floor, but that in the meantime the Senator from Delaware, Mr. BIDEN, be recognized for not to exceed—

Mr. BIDEN. Twenty.

Mr. BYRD. Not to exceed 20 minutes, and that I then be recognized for not to exceed 25 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. The distinguished Senator from Oregon is also here. I wonder—and the reason I am asking is I have been asked by a Senator on the other side, Mr. GRAMM, to try to get 30 minutes locked in for him. May I ask the distinguished Senator from Oregon how much time he would require?

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I would, at the appropriate time, ask

unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes. I certainly understand there were Senators here before me, and I am happy to wait until after the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from Delaware are finished.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the completion of my remarks, the distinguished Senator from Oregon be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, and that he be followed by the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mr. GRAMM, for not to exceed 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I may have to object at this point. It is my understanding that there are speakers coming over on our side. Maybe we can work an arrangement out to alternate back and forth.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I didn't object to the Senator asking for his time.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, if I could make a suggestion that we have the three Senators who are on the floor now, lock that time in, but with the understanding that, beyond that, we would then begin to go back and forth.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator knows of a Senator who wishes to speak, that is one thing. I know Senator GRAMM wants to speak for 30 minutes. He inquired through a staff person as to whether or not I would make the request for him. I hope the Senator will not object to Mr. GRAMM following the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I will not object.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for allowing me to go first. Mr. President, the reason I didn't say anything initially is because I hoped to be able to still make my commitment in Delaware and hear the Senator from West Virginia. I mean that sincerely. It is rare for the Senator from West Virginia ever to take the floor if he does not have a serious piece of business to conduct. He is going to speak on the same subject I am speaking to. I will not get to hear his speech, but I am sure I will read it in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I had originally intended today to introduce a resolution authorizing United States airstrikes against Yugoslavia in connection with the Kosovo crisis because I believe our Constitution requires the President to come to us for that authority. I have decided, however, not to offer the resolution because of recent developments, not on the constitutional front, but recent developments on the ground. The reality is that we are about to go out of session, and my ability to get a vote on this issue is problematic, at best.

Instead, I rise to discuss the implications for U.S. policy regarding the

agreement on Kosovo worked out 2 days ago by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, after more than a week of intensive negotiations.

I might note that it seems at every important point in our history we have diplomats and elected officials who rise to the occasion to meet the needs of the Nation. I would like to suggest that Richard Holbrooke is the right man, at the right time, at the right spot. I compliment him. We are fortunate to have his diplomatic skills available to this Nation at this moment.

On Monday, NATO's 16 member nations voted unanimously for what they call an ACTORD. That is military terminology for an activation order, which allowed the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. General Wesley Clark, to order airstrikes, which reportedly would begin with cruise missiles and escalate to a phased bombing campaign that would move beyond Kosovo.

Because this action order was taken, I believe, and only because of this, our negotiator, Mr. Holbrooke, was able to get an agreement from Mr. Milosevic, the criminal President of the Republic of Yugoslavia, to agree to certain of NATO's demands. In response, the alliance has postponed launching the airstrikes, which have been authorized for 4 days, in order to assess whether or not he, Mr. Milosevic, will comply. I assure you that he will not comply if he believes we are not serious about using significant force. The cruise missiles are now on immediate standby; B-52s stand ready on the runway equipped with cruise missiles to move if Milosevic fails to meet his commitments. The cruise missiles are now in immediate standby until Friday evening, U.S. eastern daylight time.

In addition, more than 400 allied aircraft, the majority of them American, remain available for a phased air campaign, should that later become necessary.

Mr. President, let me give my assessment right up front. As I said, I believe that Ambassador Holbrooke has done a good job. The agreement he negotiated in Belgrade is a good one, as long as we can be sure that if Milosevic does not keep his word, NATO air power will be used against the Yugoslav military and security forces.

I must tell you, as the senior member in the minority on the Foreign Relations Committee, I have mixed emotions about Milosevic's having agreed. I believe he only understands force. I believe that he is the problem. I believe that, ultimately, force will have to be used. And, quite frankly, I wish we had just used this force.

Mr. President, this agreement has, at least temporarily, averted NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia, which, as I indicated, I strongly support. I support them recognizing that they would have endangered the lives of American military personnel, which I do not take