

hundred American troops, beyond its August 1998 termination date.

The Clinton Administration has already revoked several concessions granted to Milosevic as a reward for support of the new Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

The Bush Administration's Christmas 1992 warning of military action—which meant air strikes against targets across Serbia—unless violence against the Kosovar Albanians stopped, should be restated.

We should mobilize international pressure on Milosevic to restore the pre-1989 autonomy to Kosovo and to the ethnically heterogeneous Vojvodina (voi-voh-DEEN-uh) province in northern Serbia.

To coordinate our policy, President Clinton should name a high-profile Special Representative for dealing with the Kosovo Problem. Our current Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, is simply stretched too thin to devote adequate time to this explosive situation.

Mr. President, it is difficult to exaggerate the stakes in the current Kosovo violence. A continuation of the Serbian repression and Kosovar Albanian counter-violence could easily spin out of control and endanger the entire Balkan peninsula.

It could undo the recent progress we have made in Bosnia and endanger NATO solidarity.

We must act at once to prevent these developments.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following executive reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. HELMS, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Treaty Doc. 105-36 Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 On Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (Exec. Rept. 105-15).

TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION AS REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocols to the North At-

lantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (as defined in section 4(6)), subject to the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3.

SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following declarations:

(1) REAFFIRMATION THAT UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATO REMAINS A VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.—The Senate declares that—

(A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area against all external threats;

(B) through common action, the established democracies of North America and Europe that were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring the survival of democratic government in Europe and North America throughout the Cold War;

(C) NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;

(D) the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America can be more evenly shared through an alliance in which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members;

(E) the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO members; and

(F) United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

(2) STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT.—The Senate finds that—

(A) Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity, including—

(i) the potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe;

(ii) conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders;

(iii) the proliferation of technologies associated with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons as well as ballistic and cruise missile systems and other means of the delivery of those weapons; and

(iv) possible transnational threats that would adversely affect the core security interests of NATO members;

(B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests;

(C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, having established democratic governments and having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of membership, including those necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of all NATO members, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and

(D) extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

(3) SUPREMACY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN NATO DECISION-MAKING.—The Senate understands that—

(A) as the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions to review, challenge, or veto by any forum affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any non-member state participating in any such forum;

(B) the North Atlantic Council does not require the consent of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation, or stationing of forces; and

(C) the North Atlantic Council has direct responsibility for matters relating to the basic policies of NATO, including development of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in section 3(1)(E)), and a consensus position of the North Atlantic Council will precede any negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO members participating in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council.

(4) FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR NEW NATO MEMBERS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, will have all the rights, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members.

(B) POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.—The Senate endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which are not legally binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the security of NATO members.

(5) NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.—The Senate finds that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

(6) THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.—

(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(i) the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its members;

(ii) the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a primary institution for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, crisis prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation and, as such, is an essential forum for the discussion and resolution of political disputes among European members, Canada, and the United States; and

(iii) the European Union is an essential organization for the economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe.

(C) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.—The Policy of the United States is—

(i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and

(ii) to encourage actively the efforts of the European Union to expand its membership,