

analysis would be available. I have learned that you can get two different lists, and they might sometimes show a little different analysis or interpretation than what is in the bill.

Would the chairman of the committee like to respond?

Mr. CHAFEE. Well, we certainly have tables and charts that will show what Alaska got under ISTEA I, what Alaska gets under ISTEA II, what Alaska gets under ISTEA II with the added money in the so-called Chafee amendment, what those total dollars are, what the total dollars are in ISTEA II, as amended, compared to ISTEA I. The percentage of the total moneys that are given out, I think, are pretty elaborate—the figures that we have provided. It isn't anything new.

Mr. STEVENS. What I am disturbed about is this concept of 91 percent of the money paid into the Treasury on the gas tax will be returned to each State. How about 91 percent of the money paid into the Treasury from any oil-producing State? We send more money to the Treasury every day than any one of these donor States do. We are not getting it back and we are not getting any roads. I am really getting disturbed.

I must say, Leader, I asked to be notified so I could come and deal with the objection. I understand there is nothing to object to over the cloture vote. But somehow or other, we have to find some way to recognize the plight of States that do not have revenue going into the gas tax fund because they don't have roads. But we are sending more money to the Federal Treasury than any State in the Union with regard to resource production. How about some of that coming back to us? Let us build highways with part of our own tax revenues. Somehow, that has to be worked out. I don't want to be at cross purposes with the leader, but I shall have to vote against cloture once again.

I don't like to do that with the leadership, but it seems to me that there ought to be some way to work out this donor/donee business with relationship to how much money is the State paying into the Treasury from its activities.

These are State lands, Mr. President. We own the lands that the oil is produced from. We send 25 percent of the domestically produced oil to the United States. We could sell it in the world market for a lot more money. But it is getting to be a great problem to me to figure out how to deal with the future for my State. If we can't build roads, we are no longer going to be able to get subsidies for mail transportation, and we have many more of our communities becoming totally isolated now because of the Federal policies that forbid us from building roads across Federal lands in the first place.

Mr. LOTT. Let me say, Mr. President, if I could reclaim my time, I certainly understand what the Senator is saying. I am sympathetic to his con-

cerns. Certainly, he is not getting into cross purposes with me. I am trying to bring this to a conclusion. I understand why he will vote the way he will. By the way, if you want to keep more of that oil and gas revenue in Alaska, put me down, I will be with you. We need to find more ways to leave more money with the people in the States anyway.

Mr. STEVENS. The leader has always been with us. But I have to find a way out of this hole we are in right now, both on building ferries and building roads. I don't have that answer yet. I will be here again and again, Mr. President. Thank you very much.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Thursday, March 5, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,528,529,698,719.50 (Five trillion, five hundred twenty-eight billion, five hundred twenty-nine million, six hundred ninety-eight thousand, seven hundred nineteen dollars and fifty cents).

One year ago, March 5, 1997, the federal debt stood at \$5,359,515,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred fifty-nine billion, five hundred fifteen million).

Five years ago, March 5, 1993, the federal debt stood at \$4,211,535,000,000 (Four trillion, two hundred eleven billion, five hundred thirty-five million).

Twenty-five years ago, March 5, 1973, the federal debt stood at \$451,546,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-one billion, two hundred forty-six million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,077,283,698,719.50 (Five trillion, seventy-seven billion, two hundred eighty-three million, six hundred ninety-eight thousand, seven hundred nineteen dollars and fifty cents) during the past 25 years.

U.S. FOREIGN OIL CONSUMPTION FOR WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 27TH

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the American Petroleum Institute reports that for the week ending February 27, the U.S. imported 7,649,000 barrels of oil each day, 544,000 barrels more than the 7,105,000 imported each day during the same week a year ago.

Americans relied on foreign oil for 54.7 percent of their needs last week, and there are no signs that the upward spiral will abate. Before the Persian Gulf War, the United States obtained approximately 45 percent of its oil supply from foreign countries. During the Arab oil embargo in the 1970s, foreign oil accounted for only 35 percent of America's oil supply.

Anybody else interested in restoring domestic production of oil? By U.S. producers using American workers?

Politicians had better ponder the economic calamity sure to occur in America if and when foreign producers shut off our supply—or double the already enormous cost of imported oil flowing into the U.S.—now 7,649,000 barrels a day.

THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Mr. BIDEN. I rise today to condemn the murderous attacks carried out by Serbian paramilitary units against civilians in the province of Kosovo.

Mr. President, the immediate cause of the violence was an attack several days ago by units of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, which killed four Serbian police. The fundamental cause, however, is the Serbian government's brutal repression of the ethnic Albanians, who make up more than ninety percent of Kosovo's population.

In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, as part of his demagogic policy of whipping up Serb ultra-nationalism, abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo, granted by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.

Flooding the province with Yugoslav military units, special police forces, and nationalist militias, Milosevic set up a police state that has prevented the ethnic Albanians from exercising their basic political and cultural rights.

To their credit, Kosovo's Albanian leadership, led by Ibrahim Rugova, opted for a non-violent approach in their struggle for independence. They established alternative institutions, including a shadow parliament with various political parties, independent schools, and trade unions.

For eight years Mr. Rugova was able to keep the lid on a potentially explosive situation. Inevitably, however, the weight of Serbian repression had its effect, particularly on younger Kosovars, as the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo are called.

A so-called Kosovo Liberation Army was formed, and last year began an armed campaign against Serbian officials and ethnic Serb civilians. While this development is understandable, Mr. President, it is regrettable. Aside from causing casualties and deaths, the armed resistance has provided Milosevic the pretext for his brutal crack-down.

The violence in Kosovo could provide the spark to ignite the Balkan tinderbox into full-scale regional war, which, in the worst case, could bring in neighboring Albania, Macedonia—and perhaps even Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.

Immediate action is necessary. Already the Administration is consulting with our NATO allies about an appropriate response. One immediate step should be to extend the mandate of the NATO-led UNPREDEP, the U.N. preventive deployment force in neighboring Macedonia which includes several

hundred American troops, beyond its August 1998 termination date.

The Clinton Administration has already revoked several concessions granted to Milosevic as a reward for support of the new Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

The Bush Administration's Christmas 1992 warning of military action—which meant air strikes against targets across Serbia—unless violence against the Kosovar Albanians stopped, should be restated.

We should mobilize international pressure on Milosevic to restore the pre-1989 autonomy to Kosovo and to the ethnically heterogeneous Vojvodina (voi-voh-DEEN-uh) province in northern Serbia.

To coordinate our policy, President Clinton should name a high-profile Special Representative for dealing with the Kosovo Problem. Our current Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, is simply stretched too thin to devote adequate time to this explosive situation.

Mr. President, it is difficult to exaggerate the stakes in the current Kosovo violence. A continuation of the Serbian repression and Kosovar Albanian counter-violence could easily spin out of control and endanger the entire Balkan peninsula.

It could undo the recent progress we have made in Bosnia and endanger NATO solidarity.

We must act at once to prevent these developments.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following executive reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. HELMS, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Treaty Doc. 105-36 Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 On Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (Exec. Rept. 105-15).

TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION AS REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocols to the North At-

lantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (as defined in section 4(6)), subject to the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3.

SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following declarations:

(1) REAFFIRMATION THAT UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATO REMAINS A VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.—The Senate declares that—

(A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area against all external threats;

(B) through common action, the established democracies of North America and Europe that were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring the survival of democratic government in Europe and North America throughout the Cold War;

(C) NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;

(D) the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America can be more evenly shared through an alliance in which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members;

(E) the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO members; and

(F) United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

(2) STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT.—The Senate finds that—

(A) Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity, including—

(i) the potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe;

(ii) conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders;

(iii) the proliferation of technologies associated with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons as well as ballistic and cruise missile systems and other means of the delivery of those weapons; and

(iv) possible transnational threats that would adversely affect the core security interests of NATO members;

(B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests;

(C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, having established democratic governments and having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of membership, including those necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of all NATO members, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and

(D) extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

(3) SUPREMACY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN NATO DECISION-MAKING.—The Senate understands that—

(A) as the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions to review, challenge, or veto by any forum affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any non-member state participating in any such forum;

(B) the North Atlantic Council does not require the consent of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation, or stationing of forces; and

(C) the North Atlantic Council has direct responsibility for matters relating to the basic policies of NATO, including development of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in section 3(1)(E)), and a consensus position of the North Atlantic Council will precede any negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO members participating in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council.

(4) FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR NEW NATO MEMBERS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, will have all the rights, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members.

(B) POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.—The Senate endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which are not legally binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the security of NATO members.

(5) NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.—The Senate finds that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

(6) THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.—

(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(i) the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its members;

(ii) the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a primary institution for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, crisis prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation and, as such, is an essential forum for the discussion and resolution of political disputes among European members, Canada, and the United States; and

(iii) the European Union is an essential organization for the economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe.

(C) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.—The Policy of the United States is—

(i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and

(ii) to encourage actively the efforts of the European Union to expand its membership,