Nearly 20 years ago, Congress prohibited the importation of junk guns, but allowed their domestic manufacture to soar virtually unchecked. Today, 8 of the 10 firearms most frequently traced at crime scenes are junk guns that cannot legally be imported. My view is that if a gun represents such a threat to public safety that it should not be imported, its domestic manufacture should also be restricted. A firearm's point of origin should be irrelevant.

Since the introduction of my legislation, a strong grassroots movement has developed to help get these weapons off the streets. Thousands of volunteers have worked to educate local, State, and Federal elected officials about the issues. The emerging coalition against junk guns includes law enforcement officials, physicians, children's advocates, and religious organizations. More than two dozen California police chiefs, including those from California's largest cities, have endorsed my legislation.

The movement to get these junk guns off the streets is clearly gaining steam. Many of California's largest cities, such as San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose, have enacted local ordinances prohibiting the sale of junk guns. Two weeks ago, the mayors of more than a dozen cities from California's East Bay pledged to push for local junk gun prohibitions in each of their jurisdictions, creating the one of the largest junk-gun-free zones in the country.

I am dedicated to working hard on this issue in the 104th Congress and beyond. We will get these killer guns off our streets. When Senators return to their States over the August recess, I encourage them to discuss this issue with their constituents. I believe they will find that citizens do not support the current junk gun double standard, allowing poor quality weapons to be produced domestically, but not imported.●

JAPAN CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

● Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to speak about an item that is not in the news right now. But that could have significance for United States construction companies and for United States-Japan trade relations. It has come to my attention that the Japanese Government is building a new airport near Nagoya, Japan called the Chubu International Airport. This multibillion-dollar project will be that country's largest public works effort for the next decade. The first flights are planned for the year 2005.

As many of my colleagues are already aware, American construction companies must be included in any list of our most competitive international industries. These companies have particular expertise in building large airports, having constructed the international airports in Hong Kong and Seoul, Korea, among others. Curiously, only in Japan have they been unsuccessful.

This is not for lack of trying. American construction, architecture, and design engineering firms have been trying to participate in the Japanese market for over a decade, with limited success. I have taken to the Senate floor many times to complain about how United States companies were blocked from participating in any meaningful way in the construction of the Kansai International Airport, despite numerous promises from the Japanese Government to allow their participation.

But Mr. President, my purpose here is not to recount the sorry tale of closed construction markets in Japan. I will just note that we have gone through years of negotiations to try to open Japan's construction market and break their corrupt dango system. In 1994, in the face of United States sanctions under title VII, Japan agreed to adopt an action plan to eliminate the numerous barriers to foreign participation in their public works market.

And I must say, Mr. President, that the first two reviews of the action plan have been very disappointing. In fiscal year 1995, foreign firms won only one construction project, out of a total of 613 let out for bid, and one design project, out of 20. The dedicated commerce officials monitoring Japan's performance indicate that United States companies still face unsatisfactory restrictions on the size and scope of joint-venture consortia that can bid on major procurement projects and still face discriminatory prequalification criteria.

But you don't get anywhere crying over lost opportunities, so today I instead want to use my remarks to point out to the Japanese Government that the Chubu project presents an opportunity for the Government to demonstrate its openness to foreign participation. And, it gives Japan the opportunity to enjoy a world class international airport.

In order to make this happen, the procurement agency for Chubu should immediately move to adopt open and competitive bidding procedures as called for under the United States-Japan bilateral understandings.

Mr. President, I will be watching very closely and I fully expect United States firms to be given equal opportunity to participate, commensurate with their ability.

I understand that our Commerce Department officials will travel to Japan again in September for further consultations, and I hope that they will receive positive news on the Chubu project.●

BOSNIA POLICY

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the deployment to Bosnia of the International Force [IFOR] has passed its midway mark and I would like to review with my colleagues what I believe has been accomplished to date, the many questions yet unanswered by the Administration, as well as the dangerous pitfalls I see on the road ahead.

Mr. President, I was one of those who voted against the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, to take part in the NATO-led effort to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Accord. I was skeptical then, and remain so today, of Administration assertions that U.S. strategic interests in Central Europe or in the ''future of NATO'' justified this costly investment of troops and resources abroad. I took with a grain of salt Administration promises that U.S. troops would be out of Bosnia in a year's time and Administration assurances that it would work to level the military playing field between Serbs and Muslims.

I maintained then—I reiterate today—that it is the Congress—the Congress—which had to authorize the deployment, after thorough consultation with the Administration. From all reports coming out of Bosnia, we are now paying the piper for moving without the careful deliberation and consideration of pros and cons that a real policy debate would have engendered. If the Administration had truly consulted with the Congress—and not simply presented us with a fait accompli—we might have been able to anticipate many of the problems now facing IFOR and its parallel civilian institutions. I recognize that the issues and problems are complex and I do not mean to suggest that I or the Senate would have all or even some of the answers.

But I did pose a number of questions to the Administration during last year's all-too-brief hearings on the deployment and in the subsequent cursory debate on the Senate floor, in an attempt to focus priorities and anticipate problems. But as you know, the decision had already been made to move forward and the Congress sidelined, a sad fact I blamed as much on our timidity as the Administration's circumvention of constitutional process.

I recognize, Mr. President, that the Dayton Accord and the IFOR deployment to enforce its provision has not been without some real benefit. We can all be grateful that people are no longer dying en masse in Bosnia; U.S. and other IFOR troops are to be applauded for having largely succeeded in enforcing the military aspects of the agreement.

The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lt.Gen. Patrick Hughes, testified earlier this year that he expected that the parties would continue generally to comply with the military aspects of the Dayton Accord and with IFOR directives. Hughes ''did not expect'' U.S. or allied forces to face organized military resistance; any ''modest'' threat remained limited to mines and sporadic low-level violence, such as terrorism. NATO commander Joulwan recently confirmed that many of the peacekeeping tasks delegated to IFOR have been completed, including overseeing the transfer of territory, the demobilization of troops and the storage of heavy weapons.

But there are disturbing signs, Mr. President, that the progress is transitory and perhaps even an illusion.

Compliance is begrudging; ''the spirit of Dayton'' encouraged at the point of NATO arms.

In an October 19, 1995 letter to Secretary Perry, I asked just how durable an IFOR-enforced peace would be. Specifically, I asked for some assurance that the Serbs had abandoned their quest for a ''Greater Serbia'' and that the territorial integrity of Bosnia would be protected.

The facts on the ground provide the disturbing answer. General Hughes, for one, was troubled by the ''fundamentally'' unchanged strategic political goals of the former warring factions; that is, eventual permanent partition. Upon IFOR's withdrawal, Hughes foresaw: Bosnian Serbs seeking political confederation with Yugoslavia; Bosnian Croats with Zagreb; resistance by Serbs and Croats to efforts of the Muslim-led government to assert its authority; collapse of the ''Federation'' of Croats and Muslims, intended as a counterweight to the Serbian entity created by Dayton, under the mutual hostility of Muslim and Croat; and delay or stymie of civil affairs, such as elections.

In short, Mr. President, there is the real possibility that after a nearly $2.8 billion investment just for the deployment of our troops to Bosnia, we will be back at square one: hostile, ethnically-divided factions facing off at tenuous borders under unstable military, economic and social conditions.

In my letter to Secretary Perry and during floor debate, I also raised the question of cost, especially in light of how this expensive deployment would undermine efforts to balance the budget. In December, the Congress was told the cost would be roughly $2.0 billion. I predicted then that the bill would be a lot more. Now, because of unexpected costs and delay associated with a winter deployment, intelligence gathering and engineering efforts, the most recent DoD estimate of which I am aware is for $2.8 billion. Just how reliable is this estimate, or will there be more unexpected costs? I suspect it is hardly prophetic if I venture that the tab presented to the American taxpayer—just for the military side of this adventure—will top $3 billion, if not more.

I asked the Administration back in October if the U.S. would withdraw regardless of whether the mission was a success. I asked because I had my doubts that the stated goal—ending the fighting and raising an infrastructure capable of supporting a durable peace—was doable in twelve months time. I foresaw a danger that conditions would remain so unsettled that it would then be argued that it would be folly—and waste—to withdraw on schedule.

It should be no surprise then, Mr. President, that European diplomats are questioning whether IFOR should exit on schedule—claiming success—if the ''fundamental'' nation-building task of elections has not been completed. We know from press reports that the Europeans are pressuring the U.S. to stay on as well, in an undefined role and for an uncertain period of time.

While I welcomed Vice President GORE's declaration that our troops would be withdrawn on schedule, I also note that only yesterday Secretary of State Christopher testified before the SFRC that ''final decisions'' on withdrawal would have to await the results of the September elections and then qualified that by stating the military mission would be completed ''roughly'' by the 1-year deadline. In short, the very spectre I envisioned 7 months ago may be coming to haunt us.

Speculation that IFOR (and U.S. troops) will extend beyond one year is worrisome, given the assurances we heard last December that this deployment was limited in time. Even the weak resolution passed by the Senate accepting the deployment did not envision an open-ended affair. I urge the Administration to heed the sage observation of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili, who has reiterated that U.S. troops will be out of Bosnia by December. He said that if the factions wanted peace, then a one year IFOR deployment was enough; an extended mission would not alter the intentions of the parties.

In any event, the Pentagon has also apparently modified the President's promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. Another option I have heard mentioned is having a reduced IFOR force—principally British and French troops—remain in Bosnia after December, under U.S. air cover.

Let me say now, Mr. President, that I am opposed to the continued deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia after December 1996. I do not think they should be there now and I expect the Pentagon to brief us on its plans for a timely exit.

That said, I am not necessarily opposed to a limited U.S. support role. I remain deeply concerned that Dayton produced a Muslim geographic entity essentially DOA. If ethnic partition is inevitable, the Muslim rump state likely to emerge will have no coastline, be an economic basketcase for the foreseeable future, and remain surrounded by hostile neighbors.

Our political, moral, financial and strategic investment in Dayton and in IFOR requires that we not allow the Muslim entity to wither on the vine. The dividends—stability in Europe, enhanced credibility in the Muslim world, undermining Iranian inroads, economic opportunities for U.S. business—outweigh the costs.

Which brings me, Mr. President, to the next question I raised in October: what provision had the Administration made for the arming and training of Bosnia's Muslims? I have argued almost from the moment I first entered the Senate that we should arm and train the Muslims, permitting them to adequately defend themselves. If we had done so three years ago, we would likely not have found ourselves in a position of enforcing a peace that the factions may not want.

I am pleased to note President Clinton's July announcement that the military assistance program for the Bosnian-Muslim federation is finally scheduled to begin. A contingent of Bosnian soldiers—all Muslims—reportedly arrived in Turkey in June for training and $98.4 million in U.S. arms are scheduled to be shipped to the Bosnian army, including M60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons in the next several weeks. Turkey has reportedly matched the U.S. pledge and U.S private contractors will assist the Turks in improving command-and-control and other military procedures. I hope that this marks the genesis of a Muslim force capable of defending itself against the better-armed Serbs, should the peace collapse, a not unforeseeable possibility.

But I wonder, Mr. President, where are our European allies? Even with the U.S. and Turkish pledges, there remains a $600 million shortfall on the amount needed to adequately equip and train the Muslims. The Europeans—especially the French and British—have contributed nothing and their support for Dayton Accord provisions calling for adequate arming and training of the Muslims, are lukewarm, at best. Yet while they continue to view sending Western arms to Bosnia as destabilizing, they do not seem to object to having Iran—an otherwise hostile state with which they wish to trade—arm the Muslims.

I had thought that we had received assurances from the Europeans that they would support the arm and train provisions of Dayton. Have we been bamboozled? What is the Administration doing to press the issue?

Yet another question I asked of Secretary Perry last year regarded U.S. treatment of indicted war criminals, such as General Mladic and Mr. Karadzjic. The issue of dealing with persons today government officials responsible for effecting Dayton's provisions, but who yesterday were mass murderers, is not an easy one. All the factions in Bosnia harbor such men and each of the ethnic communities—especially the Muslims—suffered grievously at their hands.

Some argue that the process of reconciliation would be better served by putting the past behind us. I disagree wholeheartedly. The international community has made a judgment that those involved in genocide must be brought before a court of justice. Certainly in investigating these cases and prosecuting these men we risk exacerbating old wounds. But I believe the healing process is better served by bringing these crimes out into the light of day and punishing those responsible. Otherwise, the victims families will allow the resentments to fester and the cycle of violence inevitably erupt anew.

I understand the view of the IFOR military commanders, who are reluctant to involve themselves and their troops in this sort of distasteful civilian task and in the dangers of ''mission creep.'' In a cauldron such as Bosnia, the last thing the peace enforcers want is to be perceived as taking sides.

But I believe that the higher moral and practical obligation involved requires that IFOR troops vigorously protect those seeking to uncover evidence of these crimes. The presence of a protective cordon of IFOR troops at Srebrenica, where the first solid evidence of mass murder and atrocities on an appaling scale is now being exhumed, is a welcome development. I note, however, that the two most prominent war criminals, Karadzic and Mladic, continue to flout their disdain for such pronouncements. Karadzic, for example, dismissed the moderate Serbian prime minister, Rajko Kasagic, in mid-May.

That act seems to me to be an act of real political power and certainly not in keeping with State Department assessments that the man is being ''sidelined.'' Karadzic's June 30 transfer of power to a political flunky was merely another transparent attempt to avoid punishing economic sanctions. And despite Ambassador Holbrooke's efforts last month to strip Karadzic of political influence, I think we all understand that Karadzic continues to call the shots, which are aimed at the underpinnings of Dayton.

There are other problems, of course. Carl Bildt, the High Representative for implementation of Dayton has noted that while the formal structures of civilian implementation are in place, the political will to make Dayton work is clearly missing. Conditions are nowhere near settled enough to conduct ''free and fair'' elections; absent are freedom of movement, freedom of association, a balanced media, and the right to vote in secret near one's home.

Ambassador Frowick, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission head in Bosnia, even went so far as to admit July 29 that, at best, the elections could be expected to be ''reasonably democratic,'' adding that ''free and fair is a stretch.'' Frankly, I'm puzzled as to how elections neither free nor fair can ever be reasonably democratic.

Yet, the OSCE certified June 25 that such elections can be held by September 14. The chief of staff of the OSCE, William Steubner, resigned in June, reportedly over a disagreement as to whether Bosnia is anywhere near being ready for an election. The continued influence of thugs such as Karadzic, the reports that Serbian goons are preventing Serbs from voting in the their former home districts—one Serb official reportedly dismissed objections by stating: ''Who cares where they want to vote; they'll vote where we say.'' It was only in June that another 100 Muslims were forced out of their homes in Bosnian Serb territory. In the suburbs of Sarajevo and in countless villages across the former Yugoslavia the triumph of ethnic cleansing is apparent. All prisoners of war have not been released, as required by Dayton. Foreign forces remain in Bosnia long after the deadline for their departure; indeed, despite the Administration's certification that these people have left, the Washington Post reported July 8 that some Islamic fighters are burrowing in, creating mischief and posing a potential threat to IFOR troops. If true, how will this affect the Administration's pledge that the arm and train program will not come up to speed until those forces are gone?

These political problems—which certainly threaten the long term health of Dayton—are compounded by economic difficulties. A question I did not ask in October, but which looms now over the process, is that of paying for the reconstruction of Bosnia? How realistic is the expectation that the international community will pony up the estimated $5.1 billion necessary over three years to put Bosnia back on the road to recovery? In April, in Brussels, World Bank and EU officials requested $1.8 billion in reconstruction aid for 1996. Donors have pledged barely one-third of that amount and the World Bank has received only one-half (or $300 million) of that in actual commitments. Is it any wonder that the Sarejevo government may look again to Tehran, which recently offered $50 million in assistance?

Which leads me Mr. President, in a roundabout way back to the first and most important question I put to Secretary Perry back in October, and which I discussed at length during the December floor debate: why would the Administration not seek Congressional approval and support for the deployment to Bosnia? As I said then, it is through the authorization process—a procedure mandated by the Constitution—that a deployment is explained and refined; that questions are answered; fears alleviated; and the American people given an opportunity to air their views on what the mission is worth to them.

This first and last question, Mr. President, has never been answered. The result has been uncertainty and more questions. To date, we have been fortunate that the results have not been more tragic, the sad circumstances surrounding Secretary Brown's mission notwithstanding.

I remain unconvinced that the IFOR-imposed ceasefire masks anything more than an inevitable slide towards permanent partition; if that is the case—and I hope I am wrong—then I and the American people want to know how this costly deployment furthered the national interest. Mr. President, I hope we will have public hearings soon on the status of the deployment and that the Administration will answer the questions I put forward in October and repeated here today. I acknowledge again the Congress' own culpability in not forcing the issue and asserting its constitutional authority and responsibility on the deployment. I hope that the lessons learned here will lead to more backbone in the future.●

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 50th ANNIVERSARY

● Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, this summer, the eyes of the world are turned toward Atlanta, the host of the centennial Olympic games. But a careful look reveals another anniversary taking place in Atlanta—an anniversary that we should herald as well. On July 1, 1996, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] reached a milestone: The agency turned 50 years old. What began during World War II as a program to stop the spread of malaria among U.S. military personnel has become a world-renowned scientific agency the mission of which is to prevent and control disease, disability, and injury. With time-tested expertise in communicable disease control, the agency has led efforts in developing a strategy to address the newly emerging infectious diseases of today. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, which I am honored to chair, has held hearings on this major global public health issue and the role which the United States plays in fighting the spread of communicable diseases, and I am personally committed to this battle. Recently, President Clinton, recognizing the threat that infectious diseases present, issued a Presidential Decision Directive on Emerging Infectious Diseases. In recognition of CDC's golden anniversary, I would like to summarize the problem, along with the prevention strategy that CDC has developed.

ADDRESSING EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS: A PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Two to three decades ago, many scientists believed that infectious diseases could and would be eliminated as a public health problem in their lifetimes. Today, those very same diseases remain the leading cause of death worldwide, and a major cause of illness, death, and escalating medical costs in the United States.

More and more Americans recognize the threat that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases pose to domestic and global health. Accordingly, they understand the need to improve surveillance and response capacity inside and outside our borders—infectious microbes know no borders and disregard immigration laws.

Several dramatic changes in our behavior and environment have contributed to the resurgence of infectious diseases. Across the globe, explosive population growth has led to unprecedented migration of people across borders. These population shifts are aggravated by rapidly changing technology and increasing international travel.