to travel to parts of the atoll. Signs outside warned workers not to walk across the lagoon. One day, a friend did. That night, his friend died, Haoa recalled.

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Oct. 9, 1995]

FRANCE CLAIMS NO RADIATION INCREASE FROM TEST

PARIS.—France said today that its recent test of a nuclear warhead with the explosive force of just below 110,000 tons of TNT had not raised radiation levels at its Fangataufa atoll testing site in the South Pacific.

Measurements taken at the site in French Polynesia found the same low ''background'' level of radioactivity after the Oct. 1 test as before the blast, European Affairs Minister Michel Barnier wrote to EU Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard.

The level of radioactivity on the atoll corresponds to weak natural background levels, Barnier said in his letter to Bjerregaard, which was sent on Friday.

A copy of the letter has been released by the French Foreign Ministry.

Bjerregarrd has complained that France prevented European Commission experts from visiting Fangataufa and refused to turn over data on radioactivity in the water and marine life around the Mururoa atoll, where the first French nuclear test in the current series took place on Sept. 5.

Barnier, in his letter, dismissed her complaints, saying the commission experts were allowed to visit more sites than had initially been planned and were given all the data they sought.

[From the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, Washington, DC]

Source: Le Monde, August 2, 1995, n.p.

PARIS PUBLISHES FIRST LIST OF ITS NUCLEAR TESTS

François Mitterrand was the first French President to authorize a greater number. More than two hundred shots since 1960, three caused initial contamination.

France has just published for the first time a complete and detailed list of her nuclear tests since 1960, the date of the first test in the Sahara. This list, which contains the code name for each operation, the hour of the explosion, place and explosive power released has been published in a general survey (three volumes and a fourth in preparation) of nearly 670 pages published jointly by the Administration of Military Applications (DAM) for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the management of the Centers for Nuclear Experimentation (DIRCEN). It appears that in toto France has had 240 launches, of which 12 are classified. It was François Mitterrand who was the one of all the heads of state during the Fifth Republic to order the—by far—the greatest number of tests.

In the Sahara between February 1960 and February 1966, France initiated 17 launches in all (four atmospheric tests and 13 underground tests at the bottom of a mine in a mountain. In Polynesia, between July 1966 and July 1991, France undertook 175 tests (41 in the atmosphere and 78 underground ones in shafts dug in the crown of coral atolls and 56 underground ones in shafts sunk into the lagoon.) The Mururoa Atoll was used for the greatest number of shots (163). There were also 12 tests carried out on Fangataufa, about 40 kilometers away.

TWELVE ''SECURITY'' SHOTS

Of all the tests three were of the same kind: It concerned dropping a life-size weapon from a plane (a Mirage IV, a Mirage III–E, and a Jaguar) in July 1966, in August of 1973, and in July, 1974 several dozen kilometers away from Mururoa Atoll. These gravitational weapons were the NA-22 (60 kilotons) and the AN-52 (20 kilotons) then in use in the French Air Force. There were replaced by the ASMO missile, weighing 300 kilotons.

To the above total must be added 12 security experiments on Mururoa between July 1966 and November 1989. The security shots were intended to verify whether the weapon was safe, i.e., that it would not explode inopportunely when subjected to external pressures of shock, uncontrolled vibrations, or fire. Security bolts are thought to be able to stop the launching of the weapon. These bolts also have a more political purpose, as the head of the government is the one who in the last resort would be the one to start the nuclear conflagration—if need be—by raising the bolts by remote control.

Most of the tests, including the Sahara ones, were moderate- or low-energy ones. So, just to stay with Polynesia, 63 tests (18 atmospheric tests and 45 underground ones) developed a force of between 5 to 20 kilotons (the energy emitted at Hiroshima was about 18 kilotons). Likewise 56 tests (11 atmospheric and 45 underground) were between 20 and 200 kilotons. Finally 54 tests (10 atmospheric and 44 underground) emitted energy between 150 and 1000 kilotons. Only three atmospheric shots (the first in May of 1968 on Fangautafa, and the second in August of the same year on Mururoa) developed very high energy, higher than a megaton.

The tests, according to AEC engineers caused initial contamination. The first, named ''Ganymede'' was an atmospheric shot under a balloon on Mururoa in July 1966. The second, called ''Rigel'' was an atmospheric (the bomb was put on a barge) in September 1966 on Fangataufa. The third one, called ''Parthenope'' was an atmospheric shot under a ballon [sous ballon] in August 1973 on Mururoa. The areas had to be decontaminated, i.e., surface sediments freed from radioactivity.

The comparisons undertaken afterwards by French technicians with the news being broadcast at the time by the New Zealanders—at the time France issued no statements concerning the testing—show that the method of detection using seismic sensors at a distance from the explosion is not reliable.

THREE TIMES MORE THAN DE GAULLE

If the error in assessing energy is greater than 100 percent in 20 percent of cases, which means that the detection by New Zealand stations of the shock caused by the underground test overestimated by a factor of two the actual power of the bomb tested in Polynesia. This method of oversight is, at present, the only one available, if you exclude direct espionage on test sites themselves or in the laboratories which subsequently use the results obtained. Its non-reliability could prove to be disturbing in the long run during discussions on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Geneva, in dealing with countries likely to carry out clandestine low-energy tests in areas difficult to reach or prohibited from any one site control.

A final observation may be made from this information, published for the first time from an official French source. Between February of 1960 and August of 1968 (there were no tests in 1969), General De Gaulle authorized 30 shots: the 17 recorded in the Sahara and 13 more in Polynesia. Between July 1981 and July 1991 (the moratorium was declared in April 1992), Francois Mitterrand ordered 86 tests. During a period of time comparable enough for the two men, give or take a few months—Mitterrand undertook roughly three times the number of tests than did the founder of the Fifth Republic and theoretician of dissuasion.

However, despite this pronuclear zeal, history will no doubt remember that in 1992, Mitterrand decreed without prior consultation with the administration, chiefs of staff or AEC officials a unilateral suspension of French tests, which General de Gaulle defied the international community by deciding in 1960 to launch the first French tests in the Sahara, while the United States (and hence Great Britain, which tested on American territory) and the ex-Soviet Union were observing a joint moratorium.

MOTION TO ADJOURN

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WELDON of Florida). The Chair at this time before entertaining a motion to adjourn, will declare a recess.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12, rule I, the House will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 54 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. DREIER) at 1 o'clock a.m.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2491, 7-YEAR BALANCED BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1995

Mr. SOLOMON, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 104–292), on the resolution (H. Res. 245) providing for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2491) to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 105 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1996, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed out of order for 5 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DREIER). The Chair wishes to inform the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] that after midnight, it is not in order to proceed for 5 minutes under the special order arrangement, but the gentleman is recognized for 1 minute and the Chair would like to inform the gentleman that he will be very generous with the 1 minute.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the Speaker. Mr. Speaker, the rule that we have just filed is the enabling legislation to bring the so-called reconciliation bill to the floor, which will guarantee that this body is going to act fiscally responsible for the next 7 years and bring about a balanced budget.

Mr. Speaker, the Chair knows, and I know, that the single most serious problem facing this Nation today is the