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## Senate

(Legislative day of Monday, July 10, 1995)

The Senate met at 8:30 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Today we have a guest chaplain, Dr. Gary Hollingsworth, of the First Baptist Church of Alexandria. He is a guest of Senator HELMS.

### PRAYER

The guest chaplain, Dr. Gary L. Hollingsworth, offered the following prayer:

Let us pray together:

Loving God, we thank You for the wonderful gift of a new day. You have said, "This is the day the Lord has made, let us rejoice and be glad in it."—Psalm 118:24.

May today be a day of gladness and rejoicing. We rejoice in Your mercy, Your patience, and Your justice. We are glad that You have provided everything we need for life now and life everlasting. We pray, dear God, for Your wisdom and Your will to be made known and done in this assembly today.

Your word tells us "righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people."—Proverbs 14:34. Help us this day be righteous people. In so doing, Your promise to our Nation is secure. Grant Your wisdom to these women and men of the U.S. Senate who serve at Your pleasure for Your people. I pray they might have courage to do what is right and that they feel Your strength and protection as they serve You by serving others.

I pray also for their families and friends who often must sacrifice time and treasure so they may serve. Wherever they are, and whatever they are doing, speak a word of peace to them at this moment. May the issues before this assembly today be discussed and decided with firm reliance upon Your providence and guidance. Amen.

DR. GARY L. HOLLINGSWORTH

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me begin by saying it is a source of great pride and pleasure to Dot Helms and me that Dr. Gary L. Hollingsworth has accepted the Senate's invitation to serve as guest chaplain today.

His eloquent prayer was typical of his great ministry—sincere, impressive, and deeply reverent.

The Nation very much needs to be remembered every day in the prayers of all of us, and we Senators need the prayerful support of all Americans that we will faithfully uphold the moral and spiritual principles set forth by our Founding Fathers.

Dr. Hollingsworth is pastor of First Baptist Church, Alexandria, which since its organization in 1803 has served the spiritual needs of countless citizens of the Nation's Capital and surrounding area. It is one of the truly historic churches of the area; its congregation numbers 2,850 members. The First Baptist annual budget has grown to \$2 million. In addition to the spiritual needs of its congregation, First Baptist, Alexandria, serves many other local, national, and international ministries—for example in the Dominican Republic, Tanzania, Ukraine, and others.

Now, first a word about Dr. Hollingsworth: He and Gwen Beaman were married a few days before Christmas in 1978. They have two fine sons, Jonathan Andrew and Ryan Thomas.

Gary's friends are excited about his being a part of the U.S. Senate today—but I suspect his wonderful parents, L.T. and Magoline Hollingsworth, are excited most of all. A number of staff members and members of First Baptist, Alexandria, are here today and of course the Senate welcomes all of them as well.

For the remainder of today's Senate session, Dr. Hollingsworth will have the privilege of the Senate floor. He can come and go—meaning that he can

meet the Senators, talk with them and maybe counsel some who need it most.

Thank you, Chaplain Hollingsworth, from the U.S. Senate, for this day, for being here today. Thank you, Mr. President.

I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, is there a unanimous consent stipulating what shall happen now? I assume the pending business is still the Bosnia resolution, is that correct?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Dole amendment No. 1801, in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair if the first speaker on this has been identified in the unanimous consent?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The first speaker was to be the Senator from Connecticut, Senator DODD.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAIG). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. HUTCHISON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the fact that more than 3 years after the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans we are debating the same issues that we did not resolve 3 years ago is surely proof of the failure of Western leaders to craft an effective policy against the expansionist brutality and ethnic cleansing that is going on in Bosnia, and it is surely proof it is a false hope to believe that aggression which is ignored will somehow stop on its own without the use of collective force.

There is no use in blaming NATO or blaming the United Nations. We have to blame the leading nations of NATO and the United Nations. Leading nations means the United States, the French, the British, and our other allies that have the responsibility to lead but that have collectively failed.

We have heard a lot about the failure of the United Nations and the failure of NATO, and, yes, there is plenty of failure there. But NATO and the United Nations are made up of countries, and those entities follow the decisions and the will of their members. So when the United Nations fails, it is because we or the British or the French or the Russians or other members of the Security Council and the General Assembly that make up the United Nations and will not allow it to do something have decided on that course of action.

The same thing is true with NATO. NATO has failed because we and the British and the French and the other members of NATO will not agree on a course of action in the Balkans. We have failed. Collectively we have failed.

There is no easy answer in Bosnia, but I am convinced that the least bad answer is to allow Bosnians to defend themselves. I have been convinced of that for a long time and nothing has changed my view. Quite the opposite. I am more convinced than ever that since we and Western Europe are not willing—no one is willing—to send in ground forces to defend the Bosnian Government and its people against aggression. The least we should do is allow them the right that every other government in the world has, and that is the right of self-defense. No other state recognized by the United Nations is being prevented from exercising this inherent right.

If lifting the embargo results in the United Nations leaving and if it results in the suspension of humanitarian relief, then at least the Bosnians will have been able to exercise their right to die fighting instead of having their hands tied by this embargo while they are being slaughtered.

I find it morally repugnant that we, the nations of the world, are denying Bosnia that right while being unwilling collectively to come to the defense of Bosnia. And it is particularly repug-

nant in light of the ethnic cleansing, the rape, the forced marches which the State Department has acknowledged are being carried out primarily by the Bosnian Serbs.

The United Nations estimates that the Bosnian Serbs have expelled, killed, or imprisoned over 90 percent of the 1,700,000 non-Serbs who before the war lived throughout the territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs. Now, it is not just in the name of decency that we must allow the Bosnians the right to fight back. In the hope of stopping Serb aggression before it spreads more widely, or before it involves neighboring countries and ultimately us in a wider, deeper conflict we must also allow the Bosnians the right to fight back.

At this point allowing the Bosnians to fight back seems to me to be the best hope of eventually stopping Serb expansionist drives. So it is not just that it is morally repugnant not to allow the Bosnians to defend themselves. As a practical matter I do not see any other way of stopping Serb expansionism unless someone tries physically to stop it. Who is going to try to stop it? Who is there fighting the Serbs in their expansionist goals? And they have them. Their goals for a greater Serbia which can spread into the Balkans and spread into Europe can once again be the source of a wider war which then drags in America as we have been dragged in twice in this century. So no one believes that allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves is going to Americanize the war more than doing nothing. Doing nothing will also result someday in America being dragged into a wider conflict. The only way to prevent a wider conflict is to allow someone who wants to fight against Serb expansionism to fight. That is what the Bosnians not only are willing to do, but they are pleading with us that they be allowed to do.

Bosnia has been littered by broken promises. None of us can be sanguine about the new threats of airstrikes that were made in the last few days. We look at the fine print of the London agreement and we see that us and our allies, NATO, and U.N. officials are still arguing about the dual-key approach, about who has the right to call in airstrikes and who has the right to veto them, and about whether or not the threats apply to Gorazde or whether or not they apply to all safe areas. We read in the morning newspaper that "U.N. officials are now given the right to veto airstrikes by NATO." We were told last weekend no, they were not. NATO and the United Nations are again in disarray within a few days after presumably there had been an agreement. And if there is any principle involved in the London conference, in the London agreement, it was that a credible threat of airstrikes against strategic Serb targets in Bosnia would have at least a reasonable prospect of stopping an attack on Gorazde.

Now, that is what the Secretary of Defense told us yesterday. That at least a credible threat would have the possible effect of deterring an attack on Gorazde. It is not guaranteed that threat of an airstrike even if it is addressed at targets in Bosnia held by the Serbs outside of the immediate area, that a threat, a credible threat of a strong air attack would deter the attack, but at least there was that possibility. That is what is at the heart of the London declaration. Though then the question comes, if it is possible that the threat of a credible airstrike would stop an attack on Gorazde, why would not that same threat stop the attack on Sarajevo? Why do we not apply the Gorazde rules to Sarajevo? What London did was give a green light for an attack on Sarajevo because what it said was the threat of a credible air attack is limited to Gorazde. And when I asked the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State yesterday, why do we not apply that same threat to stop this ongoing assault and siege of the capital of a nation that belongs to the United Nations, I was told we hope that same decision will be made relative to Sarajevo in the next few days.

Well, I hope it will be too. But I am not going to hold my breath. And I cannot honestly tell the people of Bosnia who have suffered for years that somehow or other these kinds of faltering steps, threat today, watered down tomorrow, threat today, not carried out tomorrow—that this can in any way protect them. There is only one thing that will protect the Bosnian people from the Bosnian Serb expansion, and that is if they are allowed to defend themselves. It has been proven year after year that this is their only defense. There is no other. Now, we are told that this would be a bad precedent, withdrawing from the U.N. resolution. But this would not be the first U.N. resolution which has been ignored in Bosnia and ignored by us. The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution last September which was an effort to punish the Serbs for rejecting the contact group's peace plan. Now, that resolution, just last September, declared that all states should "desist from any political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party as long as that party has not accepted the proposed settlement in full."

The U.N. resolution says, all states should "desist from any political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party as long as that party has not accepted the proposed settlement in full." Within 4 months we violated that resolution unilaterally. There was no change in that resolution. We and other European officials went to Pale for political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party. U.S. Special Envoy Charles Thomas went there despite the fact that the preconditions which had been set for that direct dialog had not been met. Now, that was a blatant disregard, unilaterally for an important U.N. resolution. Of course,

that one was dealing with the Serbs. So I guess that one is overlooked. That does not count. It was a resolution very specifically regulating diplomatic and political and military matters. And we ignored it, unilaterally we ignored it. The U.S. Ambassador at that time, Victor Jackovich, objected to the visit and was recalled to Washington as a result of his statement of objection.

This genocide in Bosnia has taken on Orwellian aspects. UNPROFOR is no longer a protection force. Safe havens are neither safe nor are they havens. The contact group of nations is not making any significant contact with the warring parties on a peace agreement. And peacekeepers are now hostages and human shields.

Whatever else, whatever else, the United States and our allies have not mustered the will to defend Bosnia. And we cannot in conscience both enforce an embargo and tell the Bosnians that we are not going to defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. We cannot in good conscience say both things at the same time. We are not going to defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. It is one or the other. Morally it is one or the other, and also it is one or the other for very practical reasons. That is, unless there is a counterweight to Serb expansionism in Bosnia, it will continue. Next it will be Kosovo. Next it will be Croatia. Next other countries will become involved in stopping that expansion.

Next, other countries will respond to the first countries getting involved. Next, a Balkan war spreads to Europe.

There is no easy answer in Bosnia, and anyone who thinks that there is a cure is making a terrible mistake.

Allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves has risks. The status quo has risks. And in judging which are the greater risks, nobody can be sure that their judgment is right. But year after year, I have felt that with all of the clash of pros and cons, there is one nugget of truth, and that is the right of self-defense, of that I am sure.

I am sure that the U.N. Charter, an international law, permits every nation the right of self-defense. I am sure that this country has stood for that for as long as we have been in existence. We have stopped standing for that in Bosnia.

Later on today, the Senate will reassert that fundamental belief that every nation has a right of self-defense, and if there is anyplace where that right is appropriate, it is in a place that has been the victim of a genocide.

I never thought we would hear the words "ethnic cleansing" again in this century. We not only heard them, we have watched them. We have watched ethnic cleansing operate. We saw a picture in the paper of Serbian troops separating men from women and children. The men going that way, probably to slaughter; the women and children going this way, probably to rape or to other horrors. That picture reminded

me of another picture that took place in a concentration camp about 50 years ago, where Gestapo agents, at the doors of the camp, separated families, some to their death, a few to survive.

It is time to let the Bosnians defend themselves. It has been long overdue and the Senate today is going to make a statement, which I hope is a powerful statement that is, if we cannot stop genocide, and if we are unwilling to stop it, we certainly must let the victims of the genocide try to protect themselves from that horror.

Madam President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I rise today in support of the resolution that is before the Senate, the resolution sponsored by Senator DOLE, Senator LIEBERMAN, and many others. I compliment them for this resolution. I also compliment many of my colleagues who spoke so eloquently on this issue yesterday.

I was one that wanted to speak. I noticed the Presiding Officer made an excellent speech last night. Several other of my colleagues, Senator MCCAIN and others, spoke eloquently on the need for this resolution. I compliment them for it.

Madam President, my involvement in the former Yugoslavia probably started with a trip that I made with Senator DOLE to Yugoslavia in the summer of 1990. I learned a lot about the former Yugoslavia and some of the Republics at that time. I must say my eyes were opened. I was shocked by some of the things I had seen, by some of the discrimination, and I will say hatred, by some of the leaders in Serbia, particularly Mr. Milosevic.

I remember Senator DOLE and others on the trip, we wanted to go into Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic did not want us to go. I remember there were so-called elections in Serbia about that time. He stole the elections. But he did not want us to go into Kosovo because of all the problems. We wanted to go into Kosovo because we heard of human rights violations. They did not want us to find out about it.

The people of Kosovo wanted us to go, and we initially went. We went because of the leadership of Senator DOLE. Even the State Department said they did not know about this, but Senator DOLE said no, we are going to go, and we went after hours of haggling negotiations. We eventually went.

We saw thousands of people—Albanians. Kosovo is about 85 percent Albanian. They were really oppressed. They had been denied jobs. Their newspapers had been shut down. They were denied access to radios. They were expelled

from hospitals, from universities, and other institutions.

Frankly, the leaders in Serbia—and I hope you will note I am talking about the leaders, because not all Serbs are bad. Certainly, in my opinion, they have some very bad leadership. They distorted the whole thrust of our intentions. Our intentions were to listen to the people, and they tried to deny us that access.

We did listen to many of the people in Kosovo on both sides of the issue. We saw mass demonstrations, thousands of people. In many cases, the police tried to deny them access to us.

I will not forget that trip. I will not forget the leadership that Senator DOLE had in trying to make sure that we were able to see the people in Kosovo, and also I will not forget the way that Mr. Milosevic had distorted our trip, distorted the press afterward, and how he had suppressed some of the people in Kosovo.

It reminds me of the same trip where we were also in other countries, some of the Eastern European countries that were now experiencing democracy, and how excited they were; and then, to see this happening in the former Yugoslavia, and how sad that was.

Now we see some results later. I might mention as a result of that, we passed an amendment. I will mention that amendment. In the fall of 1990, that was opposed by the Bush administration, but the result of it was if we are going to give economic assistance to the republics in the former Yugoslavia, they must be showing some respect for human rights and democracy. Serbia did not qualify. Other Republics did qualify.

We had a heated debate on that. We had a conference on that one issue that lasted for hours. We passed that amendment—so-called Nickles-Dole amendment. It was one of the first legislative items we had dealing with the former Yugoslavia that said we want to support the forces that are trying to get human rights, freedom, and democracy. Again, I say, this is back in the fall of 1990, so this is not a new issue.

Mr. President, in thinking back a little more, and more recently, I remember an issue we had in the summer of 1993, where this Senator and others raised the prospect that we felt like this administration was trying to delegate too much authority to the United Nations. We had a vote on this floor. Actually, we had an amendment, and fought it for 2 days on the floor, saying we did not think U.S. military combatants should be placed under U.N. control.

We eventually lost that amendment. I think we made a point. Our point was that this administration was very intent on delegating U.S. military authority under the auspices of the United Nations. We stated then, 2 years ago, that would not work. I think the events in Bosnia, the events in the former Yugoslavia, have proven that to be the case. They have not worked.

The United Nations is not a military machine. It may be a diplomatic effort, but their efforts on the military front but certainly fail. They have failed.

We are witnessing a real tragedy, a real tragedy, and a lack of leadership from the United Nations, a lack of leadership from the United States. A lot of mistakes have been made. We continue to see war-torn Bosnia suffer as a result.

Mr. President, myself and others have met with the Prime Minister of Bosnia, and he said, "Let us defend ourselves. Lift the arms embargo. The arms embargo that was placed in 1991 was placed on the entire Yugoslavia. There is not a Yugoslavia today." The arms embargo was not placed on the State of Bosnia.

Maybe we made a mistake in recognizing the State of Bosnia. But we have done that. That may have been a mistake. But Bosnia is an independent nation. They have a right to defend themselves.

Under the auspice of the United Nations, we said, well, we will have a resolution, we will designate safe areas. Those safe areas are not safe. The Senator from Texas pointed out last night, they are not safe.

It is a real tragedy, a human rights tragedy, when we see today genocide taking place, when we see people either being slaughtered, raped, or separated from their families with men on one side, women on another, and there are other people transported out—ethnic cleansing, happening today, in 1995, in the so-called safe areas, where we have a U.N. resolution saying this will be a safe area, and it is not safe.

Certainly, we should accede to the request of the people of Bosnia who say, "At least let us protect ourselves." We should give them that opportunity. They have requested that opportunity. Some people say if we do that, think of the consequences. I think that is important. We should think of the consequences. What will happen? Who is in the best situation to make those determinations? I say the people of Bosnia.

The people of Bosnia are saying they are going to ask the U.N. so-called peacekeeping troops to leave. If they wish to do so, let us let them do so. If they want to have the ability to be able to protect themselves, certainly we should allow them to do that. Senator MCCAIN said on the floor last night that there are worse things than dying. Certainly if a family is being separated from their loved ones, they ought to at least have the opportunity to be able to fight for their families. We are not giving them that. We have given them a false umbrella called the U.N. safekeeping area, safe haven, and they have not proven to be safe. Surely we owe it to those individuals to allow them to be able to protect themselves. We have not done that under this administration.

As a candidate, President Clinton said he wanted to lift the embargo. They have made a couple of failed at-

tempts. To me, again, that shows real lack of leadership. They made an attempt through the United Nations early in 1993 to have a multilateral lifting of the embargo. But it was not successful.

What happened between this and the previous administration when we had a world crisis in the Persian Gulf with the Bush administration? They were able to pass U.N. resolutions and enforce those U.N. resolutions. They had teeth. They had respect, and we were successful in getting our allies in the United Nations—and some people who you would not consider our allies in the United Nations—to support those resolutions to expel Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis from Kuwait. We built up a worldwide effort and community to oppose his aggression, to finance the opposition to that aggression and militarily put the forces together to repel that aggression. We passed U.N. resolutions, and we enforced those resolutions.

This administration 2 years later is not able to convince our allies to lift the embargo and, instead, is leading us down a road to surely significant U.S. military involvement, which I know has not been stated as the intention of this administration. Now they say, "Well, if we lift the embargo, the U.N. troops are going to leave, and surely then it would be Americanization of the war." Why? Because this administration said we will supply 25,000 troops to get the U.N. troops out. So now we have U.S. ground troop involvement in Bosnia. Where did they come up with the 25,000 troops?

Madam President, 2 years ago when we had this debate on the floor and I was arguing against delegating U.S. authority to the United Nations, I was quoting administration sources that said they wanted to commit 25,000 troops to an international peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. I argued against that. Yet, that is what this administration is trying to do. They said, "Well, we have already made a commitment." Even when they made that public announcement of, "Yes, we will put U.S. forces in for the withdrawal," a few weeks ago for the relocation of U.N. peacekeeping forces, where did that come from? They said, "Well, we were continuing with the commitment of the Bush administration." That is not the case. That is not factual. The Bush administration never committed putting United States ground forces into the former Yugoslavia for any reason, not relocation of troops, not the extrication of the U.N. troops, not for any reason. They did say, "Yes, we might have some air support" for protection, or cover, or for whatever reason, but they did not say we would be putting in ground troops.

The Prime Minister of Bosnia has said, "Why do you need 25,000 troops?" Almost all of the U.N. troops are on the Bosnian Government's land, Moslem controlled, not Serb controlled area. I think they said 30 or 60 U.N. troops

might be under the control of the Serbs. Why do we need 25,000 troops to get them out?

So I want to make it perfectly clear, I support the resolution lifting the arms embargo. I do not support the 25,000 troops that President Clinton made without consulting with Congress, certainly in contradiction to the previous administration's commitment in Yugoslavia. I do not think you need 25,000 troops to get U.N. troops out. Those are troops. They can get out. They have the capability of getting out. Why make this kind of unilateral commitment, "Well, if they are going to get out, we have to make a commitment to help them get out?" The Bosnian Government said they are going to ask them to leave; they have not been a help; they have not been a positive factor concerning this.

I will read a couple of quotes by the Bosnian Foreign Minister:

I emphasize once again that we are not asking for foreign troops to come to Bosnia. I emphasize once again that we are only prepared to count on ourselves and no one else.

This is July 17 of this year.

He also said, and I quote this.

\*\*\* it's my assessment that you don't really need these NATO troops and certainly not these U.S. troops. The reason is that when these plans were drawn up, they were drawn up under worst case scenarios—number one, assuming a large number of U.N. and Serb controlled territory, and number two, assuming that Bosnian civilians would, somehow, prevent the U.N. troops from leaving.

Well, on the first point, there are almost no U.N. troops left on Serb-controlled territory. They have all withdrawn to government-controlled territory; effectively, now, it is government troops that are protecting them, and we are ready to let them leave. As for Bosnian civilians preventing the U.N. from leaving, they've seen what the U.N. has done for them in Srebrenica, what it's doing for them in Zepa, what it needs to do for them in Gorazde, and, frankly, what it needs to do for them in Sarajevo. It's not a heck of a lot. I think most of the Bosnian civilians—I think all, frankly—would be glad to see the U.N. forces leave.

That was made July 18, 1995.

So basically the Bosnian Foreign Minister has said they are going to be asking the U.N. forces to leave. They have not helped. The safe areas have not. They are not safe. We have seen what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. They are afraid of what is going to happen in Sarajevo. They are asking. And we have a letter on our desk that said:

Please. I am writing to you today to once again appeal to the American people and the government to lift the illegal and the immoral arms embargo on our people.

Today's vote is a vote for human life. It is a vote for right against wrong. It is not about politics. It is about doing the right thing.

He basically says, "Let us defend ourselves." So why have a commitment of 25,000 troops? He said, "We are going to let the troops out." The troops can get out. Do we have to get their equipment out? We are going to risk 25,000 troops to get out U.N. equipment? I do not think that equipment is worth it.

What happens when some forces happen to shoot down U.S. transport helicopters or destroy military equipment or personnel get locked in, or if they capture more pilots and they hold those captive and hostage? What are we going to do then? We are probably going to send in more troops to make sure we get them out.

In other words, the Bosnian people are not asking for United States forces. They are not asking that we send troops. Let us not do it. I think it would be a mistake. I think the administration made a mistake when they unilaterally said, oh, yes, we will commit 25,000 U.S. forces for the extrication of the U.N. forces. I think that is a mistake. And so I am going to be very clear that while I support the lifting of the arms embargo, I do not support U.S. ground forces to pull out the U.N. forces that were probably there by mistake in the first place.

Madam President, let us allow the Bosnians to defend themselves. Let us lift this embargo. This embargo was placed on the entire country of Yugoslavia, not on the nation of Bosnia. Bosnia has been recognized by the United Nations. It has been recognized by the United States. Maybe that was a mistake. But that was in 1991. Surely, they have a right to defend themselves as a sovereign country.

Madam President, further vacillations from this administration, which said in the past they are in favor of lifting the embargo but has been so ineffective in getting other countries to join us, is very regrettable. We need strong leadership in the United States, and we have not seen it. So it is with some regret I say that we are really refuting the President's policy, but it needs to be refuted.

I think we have serious mistakes that have been made in the former Yugoslavia, and as a result you see a real decline of United States leadership, United States prestige, United States influence, not only in Europe but I am afraid throughout the world. As to our ability in the United Nations, think of where we were under both the Reagan and Bush administrations when we had a great deal of influence in the United Nations where we were the leaders, where we were the leader, and now to see we do not have the capability to convince the allies to lift the embargo I think shows a real impotence by the United States, a real loss of prestige and influence on our allies. I regret that. I do not want that to happen. I do not care who is President.

This is a serious vote, one of the more serious votes we will have had in this body, and it is one that I do not relish—having congressional dictation of foreign policy. Many times that can be a mistake. But, Madam President, this administration's foreign policy has been a disaster. It has been a real disaster for the people of Bosnia. We need to change course. I think lifting the arms embargo is the first step.

And again, I wish to congratulate Senator DOLE and Senator LIEBERMAN and others who have had the persistence to bring this forward, particularly Senator DOLE, because, as I mentioned earlier in my comments, I went to the former Yugoslavia with him and I saw his persistence in trying to stand up for what he felt was right in helping the people who are really oppressed—at the time the people in Kosovo. I compliment him for that tenacity. And looking back, since we have been involved in amendments in the Chamber since 1990, this is not just about Presidential politics, as some people have alluded. This is much more important than that.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

I yield the floor.

Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. DODD. Madam President, I thank the Chair.

Let me say at the outset that this is a most difficult issue. I have heard my colleagues over the last number of days talking about the Bosnian situation express I think during the remarks a degree of anguish. It is a policy that began to evolve prior to the arrival of this administration, with serious and difficult questions under the administration of President Bush, and this administration has obviously wrestled with them as well. I think in fact that my colleagues by and large during the expression of their remarks have also expressed a recognizable degree of uncertainty over which is the best course of action to follow.

And so with that in mind, let me begin by saying the obvious to all of us. Under our Constitution, the Senate plays a unique and important role in the conduct of foreign policy. In exercising our responsibilities, we bear an individual and collective obligation—to do that which is in the best interests of our country. We are Senators of the United States and no other nation. This is our most important priority.

That is not to say there may be other considerations, but they must always be secondary, always secondary, Madam President, to the interests of our country, the United States.

It is not uncommon obviously for Members of this body to arrive at entirely different conclusions regarding what those best interests may be. That is obviously the case with the conflict in Bosnia.

I respect deeply my colleagues who have concluded that the United Nations should leave Bosnia and the arms embargo be lifted, thus giving the beleaguered people of Bosnia the chance to defend themselves. I have nothing but the highest respect for them and the conclusions that they have drawn.

If, however, the only consideration were whether the victims, the Bosnian Moslems, should be able to fight back, then I believe the conclusion we would reach would be a simple one.

Unfortunately, the implications of removing U.N. forces and lifting the embargo could, could produce, Madam President, profound effects on the United States, on NATO, our most important strategic alliance, on other significant allies, on the nations and peoples neighboring Bosnia, and on the innocent people of Bosnia themselves, who have already suffered so much.

Just as the original decision, no matter how lamentable in hindsight, to impose the embargo and introduce U.N. forces triggered certain events, the tragic results of which we are witnessing today, so, too, could the decision to lift and leave create unwelcome results tomorrow. No matter how much we may wish to undo the mistakes of the past 3 years, let us not compound those mistakes by plunging into greater ones today.

The stakes, Madam President, are far too high and, in my view, the price far too dear. The obvious guilt that some people feel over the bloodstained land of Bosnia should not be equated with, in my view, the paralysis that afflicted Western leaders in the 1930's. Remember, six decades ago the world literally sat idly and watched the cruel advance of fascism. Whatever else may have been done wrong in Bosnia, we have not been mere observers to Serbian genocide.

Significant military, diplomatic, and political efforts have been tried to end the horror of Bosnia. It is totally wrong and profoundly dangerous, in my view, to our future interests to imply that Western leaders have once again been mere spectators to naked aggression.

It is a legitimate criticism, however, to suggest that more thought, far more thought should have been given to those earlier decisions and the likely Serbian reaction to them. But our failure to have been thoughtful once on Bosnia, in my view, is no justification for making the same mistakes again.

As we vie with one another to find new and more dramatic language to express our moral outrage over Serbian aggression, we have not even begun to exhaust our vocabulary. In my view, the worst is yet to come. For all that will be left in the pitiful land called Bosnia are two highly armed forces, locked in a death struggle with no regard for anyone who happens to be in their way, including, I fear, their own people.

I know my colleagues are impatient over this issue. It has gone on far too long. I know that my colleagues are horrified over the sickening atrocities. I know, Madam President, my colleagues are frustrated with the pathetic failure of the status quo policy. And I know my colleagues want to move on to other issues that we must try to resolve. My concern, Madam President, is that we are about to act out of passion at what we are witnessing in Bosnia, rather than acting after

careful analysis of what may be the unintended results of our legislative action.

Madam President, I pose the following six questions for my colleagues to consider before casting their vote on this vitally important resolution.

First, are we prepared to commit 20,000 to 25,000 United States ground forces to the Bosnian battlefield with the full knowledge, the full knowledge, that there are those who will seek to involve us in their cause?

Second, are we prepared to witness the collapse of multilateral embargoes we have engineered against Iraq, Libya, and Iran, not to mention the added difficulty we will have in leading and fashioning such future efforts?

Third, are we prepared to accept a deep and lasting fissure in the most vital and strategic alliance our Nation has anywhere in the world at the very hour, at the very hour that alliance faces uncertainty from Russia and the New Independent States which are staggering under the crippling economic, political, social, and military burdens?

Fourth, are we prepared to accept the likely broad-based political hostility from the people of our two oldest and most dependable allies in the world?

Fifth, do we accept the clear responsibility of our country if the lift-and-leave proposals in this resolution occur and the cancerous conflict of Bosnia spreads to the other Balkan States?

Sixth, and lastly, Madam President, what are we prepared to propose if the war in Bosnia escalates and today's mind-wrenching scenes are paled by comparison as thousands more innocent Bosnians are raped, murdered, cleansed, and left destitute?

Madam President, I do not argue that any or all of these questions can be answered with certainty if this resolution is adopted, but nor, Madam President, can those who propose this resolution argue that these results will never occur. The issue then must be which course poses the greater risk when the possible results are weighed against each other. The answer, I believe, is clear.

Gnashing our teeth over the current mess in Bosnia does not justify placing other vital interests of our country at risk not to mention the risk to the very people that this resolution seeks to deliver from harm's way.

Having concluded that this resolution should be rejected, Madam President, let me quickly add that I do not believe a continuation of the status quo is any more acceptable for many of the same reasons. The U.N. forces must be permitted in my view to fight back and fight back aggressively on the ground in the face of Serbian offensives. The role of these forces as nothing more than armed crossing guards is untenable. These troops are some of the best trained troops in the world. These troops have been trained to do one thing, Madam President. We ought to allow them to do it, that is, fight.

NATO's airstrikes are also critical in my view. Alone they will not complete the job, but in conjunction with an aggressive effort on the ground these targeted airstrikes on essential military targets could, I think, be decisive.

Madam President, President George Bush, to his everlasting credit, showed the world how future conflicts of this kind should be addressed; namely, by building international alliances and cooperation, no easy task indeed. President George Bush demonstrated in my view how effective the civilized world can be in handling these international thugs and simultaneously protecting our own vital interests.

This is not to say, Madam President, that every situation that threatens U.S. interests must only be addressed through international measures. That would be foolish. But where international burden sharing can be achieved, it should be sought.

What a great tragedy it would be if in the very first real test of the Bush doctrine it was the United States led by President Bush's own party that walked away and left our allies on their own. Can, Madam President, the United States, the only superpower on Earth, accept the burden and mantle of leadership the world anticipates from us? The answer to that question does not reside alone on 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Madam President, it resides in this Chamber on this day. It resides with each and every one of us who bear the obligation bestowed by our Constitution and constituents as U.S. Senators. That obligation, Mr. President, sometimes means casting a vote that is politically difficult but necessary to protect U.S. national interests. This is clearly in my view one of those moments. And I urge the rejection of the proposal.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator, Mr. President, remain for just a brief question or two?

Mr. DODD. Certainly.

Mr. WARNER. I listened very carefully to your rendition of the six questions. I am prepared to work on that. But I listened as you said them, and I think I got your words accurately with reference to the NATO forces. "They should fight back. They are the finest troops in the world."

I agree that they are the finest troops in the world. But, Mr. President, roughly speaking there are only 10,000 of the rapid reaction force that have been brought in. They are the ones and the first ones that have been equipped to engage in defensive operations and offense if the Senator's recommendation were to be adopted.

But my first question to you, there are roughly 10,000 French, British, and Dutch. My understanding is but a fourth or a third of those are actually in the region at this time. That is a relatively small force. Some have

moved into the Sarajevo area. The Senator suggests that suddenly this force can wheel into action and adequately deter the overwhelming forces of the Bosnian Serbs. I find that unrealistic.

Mr. DODD. Well, I presume that is a question.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. DODD. I will try and respond. Let me say I have great respect for my colleague from Virginia's knowledge in matters affecting NATO and military affairs.

I really point out, as I said, I think the status quo is unacceptable and that in my view a better alternative would be to give these forces who are well-trained, some of the best trained in the world, the opportunity to respond.

Last evening our colleague from Nebraska, Senator KERREY, spoke with eloquence, I believe, in describing a series of events where NATO forces, officers, with far fewer numbers than their Serbian aggressors handled the situations militarily in several instances that have not been widely reported but should be known by people because the assumption I think that is developing is that these soldiers that are there are cowards unwilling to fight. In fact when they have been placed in those situations, they have done a remarkably fine job.

Now whether or not the balance in the equation of forces is such that these troops could presently handle the extensive aggression by the Serbians is a legitimate question. But I think it begs the issue of whether or not it makes more sense to try and free up that force and let them do the job. I happen to believe, having read the U.N. resolutions, that there is enough flexibility in that language that these forces could be far more aggressive without going back to the Security Council and seeking broader authority for them to act. So if the issue is merely getting more troops in to do the job, then it seems to me that would be a better course of action to follow, I say to my colleague, than the issue of leaving to the Bosnians the unilateral decision to ask these troops to leave, lifting that embargo on weapons, under the assumption that during that period of time that there will not be even a broader, wider spread of aggression than we are presently seeing today.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from Connecticut refers to the U.N. resolutions which he, who is indeed a very experienced and knowledgeable Member of the Senate as it relates to the United Nations and other matters, the Senator thinks they lend themselves to interpretation.

Mr. President, I say why were not they written clearly in the first instance? That is one of the major problems we have here is the lack of clarity, the lack of understanding of who has the authority to use force.

The headlines in today's paper start out with: "NATO Gives U.N. Officials Veto on Airstrikes in Bosnia."

Is that the type of chain of command that the Senator from Connecticut is suggesting can resolve this conflict?

Mr. DODD. My colleague from Virginia, Mr. President, will have no argument with this Senator over whether or not there have been serious blunders made over the last few years. I do not think necessarily we advance our cause by engaging in the kind of 20/20 hindsight with which no one is going to argue.

I quickly state, and my colleague from Connecticut is here, who is one of the principal authors of this resolution, had this body and others followed the advice of my colleague from Connecticut several years ago, I suspect we would not be here today engaged in this debate. I am not debating that point at all.

The points I tried to raise and, again, I believe probably a few other Members appreciate and understand the one particular point I tried to raise, and that is NATO. I do not think there has been another Member of this body over the past quarter of a century who has stood more often and fought harder to maintain the vital concern of that alliance.

My fear is, and it is shared, that we may do damage to that alliance at the moment when it is critically important we do everything possible to shore up that alliance. I cannot say with certainty that will happen. I do not buy the rhetoric in every case of those who suggest this is an absolute certainty.

But when I balance and weigh the risks between jeopardizing that relationship and the situation as it presently exists, I come down on the side of caution rather than running the risk of looking back and regretting deeply, in the legitimate call of doing something different than we are doing, placing in harm's way that most strategic alliance.

That is not the only reason I argue, but it seems to me we have to be careful, no matter how disappointed and how angry and how legitimately upset people are over what we are watching night after night, day after day with the human tragedy unfolding in Bosnia.

As tragic as all of that is, my deep concern is that in our resolve to answer those mistakes, we will make additional ones, in fact, fall prey to the same thing that occurred several years ago when we should have thought—I think my colleague from Connecticut yesterday in an eloquent set of remarks pointed out the people are well intentioned. I do not think he was arguing they were motivated by malevolence, but honestly thought, I guess, if you impose an embargo on the Bosnian Moslems, somehow that was going to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table.

I do not think anybody had a corrupt intent with that in particular, except maybe the Serbians themselves, but it did not work. We did not think it through carefully.

Now the situation is different than at that particular moment. There is a lot

more involved in the decisions we make than just the decision to go in or not. That is why I express that concern.

I will be honest with my two colleagues, this is really the first time I have spoken on this issue, because as I said to my colleague, this has been gnawing at me over what steps to take. I envy those who months ago, except those who have worked for years on this, came to a snappy conclusion on this. I think most of my constituents are deeply concerned and confused as to what is the best course to follow.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me speak for myself. I have not come to a quick, snappy decision. For 2 years plus I opposed the distinguished majority leader and my good friend from Connecticut steadfastly and have taken many of the positions that the senior Senator from Connecticut has taken.

Mr. DODD. No, I respect that.

Mr. WARNER. But I have changed my view because I think we can no longer, as a body, as the U.S. Senate, sit by idly. We have to take the initiative. The drafters of the resolution which is presently before us have radically changed from their earlier positions to where now they recognize there are a certain set of triggering mechanisms that should bring about the action sought; namely, the very basic right of people to defend themselves with such arms as they may require.

Here are today's dispatches:

Thousands of terrified Bosnian refugees poured out of the captured enclave of Zepa today.

A safe haven which we basically demilitarized, took away the arms, thinking that for some reason, the Bosnian Serbs would honor the U.N. declaration that this was a safe haven. These people relied—relied, Mr. President—on what had been represented to them by the United Nations.

Despite the efforts to try to get clarity of chain of command and control, here is today's New York Times, if I may just read a paragraph:

Four days after the United States, Britain, and France threatened the Bosnian Serbs with the heaviest airstrikes yet if they attacked the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, NATO officials said early this morning that they had agreed that no large-scale bombing could start unless United Nations civilian officials gave the go-ahead.

Clearly, again, the dual key. We just continue to go along indecisively as a partner to this decisionmaking between the United Nations and NATO. It is time, Mr. President, it is time some body politic in this world stood up and said, "This is the course of action we can take," and that option is now before the U.S. Senate this very morning. In a matter of 3 hours, we will cast a vote which I hope will be heard around the world as this is the policy that should be followed henceforth. I commend the distinguished majority leader and the junior Senator from Connecticut for taking this action.

Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the senior Senator. We have worked together. We have traveled together on many issues relating to foreign affairs. While I regret he cannot at this point in time join, I hope that in the future there will be other opportunities when we can work together once again. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to make a comment in regard to the story in the New York Times today referred to by my friend from Virginia, and to talk more broadly for a moment about some of the understandable and very sincere statements that my senior colleague from Connecticut made about the impact of our actions today on our NATO allies.

We have been in a historic alliance with the French and British, one of the great alliances of history, which successfully thwarted the advance of Soviet troops into Europe and beyond, and the cold war.

Part of what is being played out here—and I do not use that verb lightly—in the former Yugoslavia is the extent to which this great alliance, NATO, remains viable, the extent to which we have common interests or acknowledge that we have common interests, both in protecting stability in Europe and in having NATO be a force for stability in the world, which we continue to need.

Mr. President, the last two American administrations, the Bush administration, Republican, and the Clinton administration, Democratic, have either agreed with or gone along with our allies in Europe, particularly the British and the French, in their vision of what was happening in Yugoslavia and what they ought to do and ought not to do to try to stop it.

From the beginning, there has been a group of us in Congress on a bipartisan basis that has disagreed with the position of the administrations, the Bush and Clinton administrations, and our allies particularly in Britain and France. As I have said before, this is a Democratic administration, obviously, but Senator DOLE stood with me, and I with him and with many others of both parties during the Bush administration in criticizing that administration for standing by and letting this arms embargo continue to be imposed, particularly in response to the appeals of our allies of Britain and France.

President Clinton ran for office, as we have said, critical of the Bush administration for its weakness in Bosnia, urging the policy of lifting the arms embargo and then striking from the air. He came into office with that policy. A lot of Members had a high sense of hope. But as this debate has gone on, people say if you vote for this Dole-Lieberman proposal there will be more bloodshed, the war will be Americanized.

We have rebutted that and we will again. Do we not have a responsibility to listen to the people whose blood has been shed? What gives us the sense of presumptuousness, of moral paternalism, to say to these people who have lost 200,000 lives, that we are worried that what we are about to do, which they want us to do, give them the weapons to defend themselves, will shed more of their blood?

That is preposterous. It is outrageous. Think how we would feel if we were on the other side of this tragedy, attacked, having lost a substantial percentage of our population, watching our families separated, men in this direction, women in that direction, women raped, men slaughtered, refugees all around, torn from our homes because of our religion.

How would we feel in trying to fight back against these tanks and heavy artillery, with light weapons on our side, if the world not only stood by and watched this slaughter occurring, but it continued to impose an embargo that meant we could not make it a fair fight, that we could not stand up and fight for our families.

Mr. President, these excuses that have been given are really, to me, unacceptable. The Americanization of the war—we have responded to that as we have gone along, too; but what remains is the fact that as we look at this history, we continue to impose this illegal arms embargo.

Let me go back to the NATO allies. The allies talked Secretary Christopher out of the lift-and-strike position. The allies had a few months before, earlier in 1992, as a result of the first understanding of the atrocities being committed in Europe, the ITN British television crews going into the concentration camps—I cannot call them anything else. They called them "detention camps" at that time—emaciated bodies of men, clearly starving.

Yesterday, the International Tribunal in the Hague, authorized by the United Nations, indicted the President of the Bosnian Serbs, Mr. Karadzic and his chief of staff, General Mladic. Among the elements of the indictment is the operation of these detention camps and slaughtering of people.

Europeans at that point, very much on their own, felt pressure from world opinion. We, too, instead of responding with the basic and fundamental policy that at long last—this is 1992—give these victims, the Bosnians, the weapons with which to fight back. We did not do that. We maintained the embargo. And instead of using NATO air power to punish the Serbs for their aggression and genocide, what did we do? We sent in—we, at the urging of the Western European allies—sent in the United Nations on a peacekeeping mission where there was no peace, misusing the brave soldiers—British, French, Dutch, Bangladeshi, Jordanian, a whole host of countries that are there, Malaysian—sending them into combat without adequate weapons themselves,

making a mistake for which we will pay for a long time, bringing the United Nations down because of the outrageous mission. That was the decision that was supported and led by our allies in Europe.

Allies are just like members of the same family—you have disagreements. It is a test of the strength of the family and a test of the strength of this alliance as to whether we can transcend the disagreement and go on and be allies.

Understand how this happened—the British and French led the drive to send in the United Nations to assert their own ability to deal with this problem in Europe. It was dealt with in a way that was ambivalent.

"If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow into battle?" Remember the words of the Scripture. The sound of that trumpet was extremely uncertain. No one followed in the battle except the Serbs who saw the weakness and continued the aggression.

The policy has continued. The strength of rejection of the policy has grown on a bipartisan basis here in Congress. That is what, I think, will be expressed later today.

Now the latest excuse for not acting—at every step we were told, Senator DOLE and I, "Do not lift the arms embargo, they will seize hostages, U.N. personnel." The embargo has not been lifted, and hostages were seized. "Do not lift the embargo, they will attack the safe havens." We did not lift the embargo, they attacked the safe havens. The latest excuse is the London communique, an agreement, an expression of strength by the NATO allies to use the might of NATO air power, a warning to the Serbs: Attack Gorazde and you will pay the price. As I have said here before in the last 3 or 4 days, a threat, not a policy to end the war, and a limited threat at that. Only going to one of the four so-called safe areas is sending a clear signal to the Serbs that the other three are open season. In fact, in the last 3 or 4 days, that is exactly what they have done, attacked Sarajevo, Tuzla, and particularly, Bihac. OK, a limited threat, but at least a threat with regard to Gorazde.

At least the assertion coming out of the meetings that the dual-key approach was over, that we no longer had to go to the United Nations, that NATO had finally taken control, and this great alliance was working, together, to stop aggression, instability in Europe, and genocide, once again, in this century, against a people, because of their religion.

What do we find? Today is Wednesday, 5 days later. Exactly what my friend and colleague, Senator WARNER from Virginia, has said. Apparently, it was not as strong a message from London. Apparently, the dual-key approach, where soldiers on the ground have to go to the U.N. politicians to get approval, and over and over, they

have gone and been refused the right to strike back at those who are shooting at them.

I will read from the article in today's New York Times written from Brussels by Craig Whitney.

Far from doing away with the cumbersome "dual-key" arrangement that the United States says has hampered NATO's ability to protect United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, the NATO allies in effect have sided with the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has been saying nobody could take his key away from him.

The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a "strong recommendation" to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and elsewhere to decide when the time had come to start bombing the Serbs if they attacked.

Imagine this. We have gotten ourselves in a position where the strongest military alliance in the world today must make a plea to the Secretary General of the United Nations to allow this strong alliance to strike back at countries, at soldiers, that are not only attacking civilians in safe areas, but are attacking NATO soldiers.

Continuing:

But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has been extremely cautious about approving airstrikes in the past, what was meant to sound like a roar in London 4 days ago appeared likely to have been throttled down to something more like a growl by the time NATO ambassadors finished grappling with it in the small hours of Wednesday morning.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will look at that article, there is the paragraph that deserves to be noted. It says as follows:

The main pressure to preserve a decision-making role for Mr. Boutros-Ghali came from Britain and France. With nearly 15,000 soldiers on the ground in Bosnia who could suffer the consequences if bombing and Serb reactions to it spiral out of control, the countries pressed, in effect, for a series of political firewalls against precipitate American action from the air.

Then the next paragraph.

In particular, French officials deny [I repeat deny] that they ever agreed last Friday in London to launch automatically what the American Secretary of Defense William Perry called a "disproportionate response" to an attack on Gorazde.

The U.S. Senate was highly influenced by the comments of the Secretary of Defense. I think he is a very fine and able individual. I do not know what the background is to this. He, along with the Secretary of State, were present yesterday in the Halls of the Senate. I met with both briefly.

But I find it very disconcerting when our allies undercut what Secretary Perry thought was a decision reached last week, and he personally was present at that time.

So I think that again we come back to who is going to make a decision in this frightful situation? I say the responsibility comes now to this body politic as the sole one in the world

willing to step up at this time and speak decisively on this critical issue.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely right. Yesterday, I was in a meeting with the Democratic Senators which Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher addressed. I have the highest regard for both of them.

It is clear to me—I know they are acting with the best of intentions and sincerity here—that the policy they took and fought so hard for last week in London, and it appeared that they thought was adopted, was clearly not what the British and the French are willing to accept. The paragraph that the Senator from Virginia read is exactly where I was going, which is to say that our allies, presumably having accepted a policy in London on Friday, then at the NATO Ministers' meeting in Brussels yesterday have undercut it and set up Mr. Boutros-Ghali as their instrument to frustrate that.

I must say that I do not understand it because they do have troops on the ground. They are the ones who are most vulnerable if the NATO allies are not able to strike back against Serbian aggression. When will they understand that the Serbs will take the—who is smiling, who is laughing most at this story from Brussels? The Serbs are. The signals are clear. "Do what you want with the three of the four remaining areas, 'safe areas,' incredulously titled today. And as for Gorazde, don't worry too much about attacking that either eventually because the West does not have its act together." That was just a toothless tiger roaring, or growling, as the article in the Times today said, from London.

I want to make two points about this. The first is to my colleagues who are going to vote in a few hours, and it is an important vote. Please read this article. Then I simply do not know how any colleague in good conscience could say that the policy emanating from the London communique is a reason not to vote to lift the arms embargo. This sense that somehow the calvary was coming and, therefore, the victims do not need to defend themselves is not so. It is simply not so. That is not a reason to sustain this illegal, immoral arms embargo.

The second point is, and let us acknowledge it, that we continue to have a fundamental difference of opinion—that is, the bipartisan majority here in the Senate, bipartisan majority in the other body—with our allies in Britain and France. Let us acknowledge it. We acknowledge it.

I do not understand how our Western European allies, having gone through two world wars in Europe this century because aggression was not stopped early, can stand by and not see that they have an interest in stopping aggression here before it goes on to Kosovo, and then to Macedonia, which will bring in Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, and in the worst of all circumstances will create truly an-

other tragic wider war in the Balkans. But they have apparently not reached that conclusion.

Let us acknowledge here what we are saying. We disagree with our allies. Let us acknowledge also that that disagreement puts in doubt, sadly unsettlingly, the viability of this great alliance.

I think we have to figure out a way to disagree within the family and still remain strong. We have to figure out a way. Looking back in hindsight I wish that both the Bush and Clinton administrations had figured out a way to lead our NATO allies to a stronger policy, the policy of lifting the embargo and striking from the air. I truly believe that if we had implemented that policy in 1992, the war would be over today. A settlement would have been reached because the Serbs finally would have been given a reason to stop their aggression.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could the Senator forbear for a moment?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. We have but a few moments left.

The Senator from Connecticut raised a very clear point. In today's New York Times—and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain backup documents to this important colloquy.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE—PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GEN. JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, JULY 21, 1995

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Good evening. On behalf of the entire United States delegation, I want to thank Prime Minister Major for convening today's conference and Foreign Secretary Rifkind for his very skillful chairmanship.

None of us is under any illusion about today's meeting. By now we're all too aware that no conference, including this one, can end the war and suffering in the former Yugoslavia. What a conference of this kind can do is to focus our minds on how we can best contribute to alleviating suffering and achieving a negotiated settlement. This conference has served as a decision-forcing event. As I told my colleagues today, the entire world is watching us, waiting to see if the West will answer the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous aggression.

We face a very simple and stark choice: either the international community rapidly takes firm steps to fulfill its mission in Bosnia or its mission will collapse. Today we have agreed on several actions which, if vigorously implemented, offer a real opportunity to reassert the international community's role in Bosnia.

Let me stress the obvious: to have any chance of success the decisions made today must be translated, translated quickly into reality on the ground. President Clinton and the United States are determined to do so. The international community and the people of Bosnia simply cannot afford any more empty threats. Let me briefly review what the United States believes to be the central elements of today's agreement.

First, the unanimous reaffirmation that UNPROFOR will remain in Bosnia. In order

to do so, its ability to fulfill its mandate will be strengthened. We are all painfully aware of UNPROFOR's shortcomings. Nevertheless, we agree that UNPROFOR's collapse in the face of Bosnian Serb aggression can only lead to far greater humanitarian tragedy and strategic danger in the Balkans.

Second, and of most immediate concern. Gorazde will be defended. Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice that an attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive air power. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili can speak more fully on the military aspects of the plan, but let me make just a couple of points. Any air campaign in Gorazde will include significant attacks on significant targets. There'll be no more pin-prick strikes. Moreover, existing command and control arrangements for use of NATO air power will be significantly adjusted to ensure that responsiveness and unity, our purposes, are achieved. The new system is a much improved system.

Third, we will take steps to stabilize the situation in Sarajevo. Its people must be fed. French and British troops from the Rapid Reaction Force will take action to open and secure humanitarian access routes. At the same time, we agreed more broadly on the need to fulfill the United Nations other mandates, including that in the other safe areas. In this regard we are especially concerned about the escalating Bosnian Serb attacks in Bihac.

Fourth, we're agreed on the need to support on-going efforts to address Bosnia's deep humanitarian needs, which have certainly been exacerbated by the fighting in Srebrenica and Zepa. We intend and we are urging others to increase our contribution, especially in advance of the coming winter.

Fifth, we reaffirmed our belief that the conflict in Yugoslavia can only be resolved by a political settlement. Today we received an update from the European Union's representative Carl Bildt and we underscored our support for this work. Tonight the Contract Group ministers will be meeting with Mr. Bildt to review his political efforts. At the same time, during the conference, I made clear our belief that so long as the Bosnian Serb aggression continues, any political process is doomed to failure. Our first step must be to take action that can return an element of stability on the ground. At that point we agreed that a country wide ceasefire should be declared which can be used as a basis for a resumption of the negotiations.

Finally, today's participants are fully aware of the risks that will accompany any effort to implement UNPROFOR's mission more vigorously. The Bosnian Serbs have taken hostages before and they may do so again. As part of today's plan, we are urging the United Nations to take steps immediately to minimize the exposure of its personnel. At the same time, we're determined that the taking of hostages will no longer be allowed to prevent the implementation of our policies. We are also resolved to hold the Bosnian Serb leaders fully responsible for the safety and personnel of any UN personnel that they have detained.

Let me say again that President Clinton is committed to working with our partners, all of them—especially France and Britain—to see that the decisions we take today are translated into reality. We do not seek to make the international community a participant in the war in Bosnia, but we're determined to make another, perhaps final effort to fulfill the world's responsibilities in Bosnia. Today's meeting was a necessary first step toward that goal. Now we must act. Thank you.

I believe that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will not have opening remarks,

but I'm sure you'll have some questions for them as well as for me.

QUESTION. Secretary, could you clear up a couple of things? We had been told earlier by our Defense officials that this ultimatum would apply to an attack on Sarajevo as well. And according to Secretary Ritskind, that is not the case. It would only apply, according to the Chairman's statements, to an attack on Gorazde. So could you clear that up, and also could you clarify French claims that there is a commitment of American helicopter lift to bring in troops to Gorazde?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. With respect to the first question, the conference today focused on Gorazde because that seemed to be the area of greatest immediate threat. Having attacked and apparently overcome both the enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa, the next one evidently on the target list is Gorazde. So we focused our primary concern on that, but at the same time we were concerned about all the safe areas. Now with respect to Sarajevo, the focus there was on the use of Rapid Reaction Force to ensure that there will be opportunities for humanitarian aid to get through. But let me emphasize this: should the Bosnian Serbs launch the kind of shelling attack that they have had on Srebrenica and Zepa, should they launch that kind of attack on other safe areas, these procedures can be promptly applied to those other areas and we stand ready to take the necessary steps to do so. But today's meeting was focused, as the Chairman said, primarily on Gorazde.

With respect to the other question you asked, as the Chairman's statement indicated, there was an indication on the part of all the participants that the UNPROFOR troops were necessary, would be resupplied, given additional supplies, additional arms if necessary. If that becomes necessary, that can be considered. But there is no commitment on behalf of the United States, at the present time, for the use of helicopters; and I might say there is also no commitment by the United States with respect to ground troops. Our long-standing position on that remains intact.

QUESTION. I am sorry. You said that there would be no more pinprick attacks and there have been statements here about substantial attacks, I would like to ask Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, would these attacks go far beyond Gorazde? In other words do you intend as you said on the airplane to wipe out the Serbs' air defense system and give you freedom in the air over Bosnia and to attack perhaps fuel dumps, ammunition depots and other areas to teach them a lesson?

Secretary PERRY. I don't want to describe the details of the air campaign which we discussed in some detail with our colleagues. But what I will say is that, first of all, it is a phased plan ranging everywhere from close air support for a particular tactical unit on the ground that is being attacked, to a broader regional air campaign; that this would be agreed to in detail, to be drawn out in detail and agreed to between the air commander and the ground commander. In its latter phases it involves an area considerably broader than Gorazde. Would General Shalikashvili perhaps like to add to that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that you are right, that it is important to understand that these are not just responses against the initial provocation but an air campaign that consists of a wide range of targets throughout a broad zone of operations. That is a significant departure from the way air power was used before.

QUESTION. And was it agreed that, if hostages were held, that such a campaign would not be stopped by that?

Secretary PERRY. That was an issue that was discussed fully and completely at the

meeting. We all understood that the success of a sustained air campaign depended on its being sustained and therefore it could not be deterred and interrupted by hostage taking if that were to occur. We cannot let a policy be hostage to the taking of hostages.

QUESTION. Do you understand the meeting to have declined to approve, at this point, the use of air power in the case where some other action is taken other than an attack on Gorazde? Will there have to be another meeting if some other action is taken by the Bosnian Serbs in violation of UN mandates?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. David, let me say two things about that. First, the meeting didn't decline to do anything. The meeting was positive in character. Second, there are existing authorities, as you know, for the use of air power in particular circumstances. If additional authority was necessary because the Bosnian Serbs took some other action, we stand ready to do that; but there are broad existing authorities under the UN Security Council at the present time that are available to the NATO authorities. We focused on Gorazde and, as both the Secretary and the General have said, we made fairly specific and detailed plans for an air campaign should it become necessary in Gorazde. I think those procedures could be translated into other areas if that becomes necessary.

QUESTION. Bihac is under attack now, sir, and I wonder why that hasn't been responded to?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The situation in Bihac is as it has been before, not always entirely clear as to who's doing the attacking and what the circumstances are. We will be watching that very carefully. I think that today's meeting indicates a new level of concern about the situation in Bosnia as a whole. We addressed what we thought was the principal current threat; we will certainly be following Bihac. As I said in my statement, we are very concerned about the escalating attacks there, and we are following it with great care.

QUESTION. What is the new message to the Serbs?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The new message to the Serbs is that if you attack—First, the message to the Serbs is you should not attack Gorazde. We are issuing a very strong, stern warning to them which will be communicated in ways in addition to this particular press conference or Foreign Secretary Ritskind's press conference. But beyond that we are saying that if you do attack, you are going to pay an extremely heavy price.

QUESTION. What price?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I think that we will leave that to their consideration and imagination.

QUESTION. Do you think they are quaking in their boots, as somebody else put it earlier at another press conference?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. If they are well advised, they will not attack Gorazde because they will pay a very heavy price.

QUESTION. I have just been to the press conference by Mr. Kozyrev and the greatest expert on air strikes in the world at the moment, on civilian air strikes, namely General Grachev. They said that they don't agree with any of this and that they haven't been quoted properly, and they attack Mr. Ritskind for not quoting them. Do the Russians have the veto or not?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The Russians do not have a veto. There is no further action by the United Nations Security Council required for us to take the action that we are going to take today. We are prepared to go forward with the action if necessary. I must say that I did not hear the press conference, but Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the General were present in the meeting. They joined us I think in the importance of

UNPROFOR staying. They joined us in the significance of the Bosnian Serbs not taking further action—that they should not threaten Gorazde. I think that they realize UNPROFOR is at stake. If Gorazde were to be taken, as the Foreign Secretary said, UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia would be very seriously compromised.

But to answer your question directly, the action that we've taken today and the agreements that we've reached are not dependent upon Russian concurrence or any Russian vote.

QUESTION. You said earlier that how the countries with troops on the ground would respond if hostages were taken was fully discussed in the meeting. Do I understand you to mean that you understand clearly that these countries would not request interruption of bombings if this were to take place?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I can't forecast what any given country would do under some hypothetical situation. But the agreement of the importance of introducing a sustained air campaign was made with the understanding that it had to be sustained even in the face of hostage-taking. This was explicitly discussed and discussed in some detail.

QUESTION. Secretary Perry, again on your hostage remarks. Does that mean that the allies have to be prepared for the possibility of losing their personnel to a NATO air strike? Did the allies explicitly agree to that?

Secretary PERRY. Could you re-formulate the question? I did not understand the point.

QUESTION. Your comment on the necessity of sustaining an air campaign, even if hostages are taken: Could we interpret that to mean that the allies must be prepared for the possible loss of their hostages in the event air strikes are authorized? Was it discussed in such explicit detail, and did you get agreement on that point?

Secretary PERRY. First of all, we are not proposing to conduct an air campaign. We are proposing to threaten an air campaign to stop, to deter any action that the Bosnian Serbs might take to attack Gorazde. We hope that will be successful.

If it is not successful, we are prepared to conduct a sustained air campaign. We understand—everybody at the meeting understands—there would be substantial risks in doing that. The risks would be to the air crews conducting the campaign, the risk would involve UN forces on the ground, the risk would be even to civilians who are in the area of the targets. Those are inherent risks in air campaigns. We all agreed that that was an unattractive option, and the only reason we are going to proceed with that option is because the alternatives seem even more unattractive to us. The alternative of letting Gorazde fall, which would drive the UNPROFOR out of Bosnia, would result in a humanitarian catastrophe of great proportions. Therefore, balancing risks, we believe that these risks were far preferable to allowing Gorazde to fall.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Could I add to Secretary Perry's statement that we are urging the United Nations and we have urged the United Nations already to minimize the exposure of its personnel to limit the possibilities of hostage-taking if it comes to that.

QUESTION. Yes, I would like to ask you if the results of this meeting and met your hopes and expectations before the meeting and do you think they will be sufficient to restore the credibility of the United Nations mission in Bosnia?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I found the meeting to be a successful meeting. It met my hopes and expectations, especially since it was called on short notice and there was the need to try to coalesce the views of many countries in a very short period of time. I

think our working together with the British and French in advance to the meeting, of contacting other countries in advance paved the way for a successful meeting. And incidentally, at the meeting today Foreign Minister Kozyrev also described it as a successful meeting. If the Serbs are wise, the situation in Bosnia will become stabilized and will provide the opportunity for us to try to seek a peaceful negotiated settlement of the matter. In a sense, the matter is in their hands. If they choose to attack Gorazde, as I said, they will suffer very gravely. But it would be a much wiser course for them to withhold those attacks and enter into a peaceful negotiation which is the only ultimate conclusion to this tragic conflict.

QUESTION: Has it been decided to invite Canada and Italy to join the contact group, both in recognition of their major contributions to peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia and also to put the contribution of one of the current five, post-Chechnya Russia in more proportionate perspective? And second, given the outspoken support of the World Jewish Congress for Bosnia's Muslims, will you seek technical assistance from the Israelis for an Entebbe-like operation to rescue Karadzic and his mates before they commit further war crimes?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. One thing about it when you get two questions, you can choose which one to answer. With respect to Italy and Canada, there was no discussion about the Contact Group today, but the point I would emphasize here is that both Italy and Canada were very well and openly represented today by the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister and the chief of their military forces. They participated very actively in the discussions today. They were deeply involved and they will be certainly fully consulted as we move through each one of these further procedures.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation in which General Rupert Smith didn't have a final decision on whether air strikes would be launched. Can you tell us how far up the UN chain of command approval would have to come and who talks to whom in order to approve an air strike?

Secretary PERRY. We discussed that in considerable detail today, and we had at the meeting all of the relevant people. I'd like to refer specifically to General Shalikashvili to give you a more detailed answer to that. I am satisfied that we've made substantial changes much for the better in how that coordination is done. John?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The procedures we did discuss, as Secretary Perry said, are a very qualitative step forward, and they parallel proper air-ground operations procedures. In such procedures, the appropriate ground commander, General Rupert Smith, and the air commander must continually coordinate to insure that air strikes are carried out safely, but at the same time also very promptly.

These procedures that we now have represent the second part of your question: how far up does this coordination go in the UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these coordinations stops with the military commanders.

Thank you very much.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the New York Times article clearly says that NATO officials said early this morning that they had agreed that no large-scale bombing could start unless the United Nations "civilian officials" gave the go ahead. Emphasis "civilian officials."

Now I read from a press conference last Friday, July 22, of Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. Referring to the last page:

QUESTION: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation in which General Rupert Smith . . .

That is the on-scene commander for the UNPROFOR and U.N. troops—

didn't have a final decision on whether air strikes would be launched. Can you tell us how far up the UN chain of command approval would have to come and who talks to whom in order to approve an air strike?

General Shalikashvili replied:

The procedures we did discuss, as Secretary Perry said, are a very qualitative step forward, and they parallel proper air-ground operations procedures. In such procedures, the appropriate ground commander, General Rupert SMITH, and the air commander must continually coordinate to insure that air strikes are carried out safely, but at the same time also very promptly.

These procedures that we now have represent the second part of your question: How far up does this coordination go in the UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these coordinations stops with the military commanders.

Let me repeat that.

The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these coordinations stops with the military commanders.

To me, Mr. President, I clearly get the impression that the on-scene military commanders, Gen. Rupert Smith and NATO Commander Admiral Smith, are the decisionmakers. That is in direct conflict with what is reported today.

The Senate of the United States is trying to work its way through this complex issue. To a certain degree many, including this Senator, want to rely on the representations of the three principal security officials of the United States, Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But their representation to the world in this press briefing to the U.S. Senate on July 22 is in direct conflict with the reports that we received today.

So I come back again and again. It is now the time, and the obligation of this body politic to make a decision.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely right.

Again, I say to my colleagues, to quote the Scriptures, "If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow in the battle?"

The sound of the trumpet that was sounded in London on Friday is extremely uncertain, and there is no reason to use that communique as an excuse for not voting to lift the arms embargo.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia continues to worsen. Every day brings additional news of Bosnian-Serb troop movement, resulting in more chaos, devastation and re-

ports of horrendous atrocities. As one so-called safe zone after another is overrun, and with refugees streaming out of them, it is obvious to most that the Bosnian policy constructed by the United Nations, NATO and the American administration has failed.

If the consequences of the U.N. failure were not so grave, many of the scenes we all have witnessed would have to be considered almost farcical. United Nations armored personnel carriers being used to ferry bicyclists across streets in order to avoid a handful of snipers who operate with near impunity—shooting not only at the U.N. personnel—but at women, children, elderly folks. It's an outrage. Then we witness the spectacle of United Nations equipment being taken by the Bosnian-Serbs as they overrun United Nations positions, and also by the Bosnian Moslems in desperate attempts to protect themselves against Serbian attacks.

We have all witnessed these events, Mr. President—and those who continue to argue that negotiators require just a little more time need to face up to the reality of the situation. There is a deep-seated American belief that reasonable individuals—with time and effort—can solve even the most intractable of problems. Well, perhaps too many of our well intentioned negotiators labored for too long under the false impression that we were dealing with reasonable individuals in Pale and in Belgrade. The cycle of retaliatory violence confirms the fact that there is nothing remotely reasonable about the Bosnian-Serb leaders or their counterparts in Belgrade.

Institutions that tried to prevent further escalation have failed to do so—plain and simple. This being the case, it is now time to pursue an alternate course of action that will not embroil United States ground forces in a conflict that the Bosnian Moslems can best settle on their own. The Serbs control 70 percent of Bosnian territory and will continue to advance unless the Bosnian Moslems affect a reversal of the balance of power through force of arms.

While the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo may have some shortcomings of its own, and could be a costly endeavor, we should no longer actively prevent the Bosnian Moslems from defending themselves by trying to keep them unarmed.

However, we should not assume that this decision will not have consequences. For example, depending on the sources of the weapons, we could be sowing seeds of future difficulties. If the Bosnian Government decides to access East European weapons inventories for instance, we do not know exactly how the Russians will react.

Apart from sending weapons directly to the Serbs, the Russians might also decide to stem the flow of weapons to the Bosnians by applying certain forms of pressure on the East Europeans.

Somehow, I have a difficult time imagining that Russia will just sit idly by as events unfold which are clearly detrimental to their Balkan allies. It is also not exactly clear what might happen in the event that the United States become a prime source of equipment, and gets involved in the training of Bosnian personnel.

Mr. President, my decision to support this resolution is not without some concern about the unintended consequences of lifting the embargo. However, I do not see that we have much choice.

For several years, the administration has been sending a stream of let's-wait-and-see signals regarding action on Bosnia. The President asked the majority leader to hold off on S. 21 until after the London conference. Well, the London conference is over and the situation continues to spin out of control. It should be abundantly clear to all that sooner or later, all of the safe-areas are threatened by the Bosnian-Serbs. We even have one of the top Bosnian-Serb commanders in a recent interview with a Belgrade newspaper stating his intention to take the remaining safe-areas within a few months. Coincidentally, this same Bosnian-Serb commander—who oversaw the trampling of Srebrenica—was indicted yesterday by a U.N. Criminal Tribunal for perpetrating war crimes.

This time, the waiting is over, for if the embargo is not lifted soon, there may be no Bosnian Moslems left to arm. Ronald Reagan once said that "America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win." By supporting this resolution today, the Senate will telegraph its support for those who seek to make it on their own. I urge my colleagues to support the Dole resolution.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the resolution offered by Senators DOLE and LIEBERMAN.

For months, the situation in Bosnia has deteriorated from bad to worse, as have our policy options. Disappointment has given way to disaster—no matter how deep our common concern, it pales in the face of the horror and chaos of Srebrenica.

As we witness this unfolding tragedy, it is important to keep in mind that it is more than the future of Bosnia that is at stake—American credibility and international influence are on the line. Tomorrow's adversaries are carefully watching Bosnia today. They are measuring the weight of American words—evaluating the strength of our resolve—assessing our leadership, credibility and determination.

And, there is little doubt over the conclusion any casual observer would reach—our Bosnian policy is scarred by retreat and reversal—and repetition of the same mistakes.

Once again, as the Senate takes up legislation to lift the embargo there is a last minute appeal from the White

House that the timing is all wrong. We are urged to give yet another policy alternative time to work.

But this alternative, like the last alternative, and the options before that are building on the failure of UNPROFOR.

Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke commented "To whatever extent Americans are involved in the air or in any other way in Bosnia, we will not be limited or constrained by the insane dual key system with the U.N. and NATO \* \* \*. We are not going to ask the United Nations' permission for Americans to do anything in Bosnia."

I was encouraged by this refreshingly frank assessment of what has compromised UNPROFOR's mission and shattered all hope for a resolution to the crisis. You do not usually hear senior officials call years of policy "insane." It is a rare event for anyone in this administration to forcefully assert unilateral American rights and interests.

Unfortunately, no one in London listened.

United Nations officials will still be involved in decisions about when and where to conduct air strikes and use force. Although Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher have offered public assurances that this time, this decision is different, U.N. officials are already undermining those claims and maintaining that all final decisions on the use of force will continue to involve the United Nations.

Bosnia policy is in mayhem—the effect of the meetings in London merely modified the mayhem. Once again, we failed to deal with the real problem—Serb aggression. As Prime Minister Silajdzic said, "Another half measure . . . another fig leaf."

Marginally modifying the chain of command as agreed in London cannot erase or correct the United Nations and UNPROFOR's failed course. And, this is a well travelled course.

Just a few short weeks ago, President Chirac visited the U.S. pleading for American support for the Rapid Reaction Force. He assured us that it would be an aggressive, combat ready unit prepared to intercede—to make a real difference. Field commanders would make the decisions, not U.N. bureaucrats hundreds of miles removed from the conflict.

Chirac talked of opening a road to Sarajevo, of vigorously defending all the safe havens; and, he was adamant that peacekeepers would no longer be the sorry victims of Serb hostage taking.

Sadly, within days, it became clear the U.N. had other ideas. Special Envoy Akashi immediately issued an apologetic letter, assuring the Serb military that the Rapid Reaction Force would only augment the existing UNPROFOR units. There would be no change in mission, no change in operational activities, no change in command. In soothing platitudes, Akashi

directly undermined the RRF's credibility and undercut whatever opportunity they might have had to demonstrate success.

Worse yet, no one from the administration challenged Akashi's interpretation.

Now, we are being promised a robust air campaign, but one that will only protect Gorazde. Once again we have abandoned a principle we asserted a few short months ago. Once again, we drew a line in the sand, or, more appropriately, we drew a line around six safe havens. And now, once again, we are deserting the Bosnians in five of the six safe havens.

How long before we are forced by circumstance to redefine, retreat, repackage the next alternative?

It is long past time to recognize that United Nations Protection Force has become an expensive oxymoron—it is neither a force to be dealt with nor does it offer any protection. In fact, some have grimly joked the only thing the U.N. has successfully occupied is office space.

Any doubt—any false hope—about their capability to protect civilians was obliterated in the savaging of Srebrenica.

The mission has failed and it is time—it is past time—for UNPROFOR to leave, for the embargo to be lifted, and for the Bosnians to be given the chance to defend themselves.

It is their right and our duty.

In 1775, a young Patrick Henry stood up and talked of indulging in the illusions of hope, served by entreaty and supplication.

In calling our Nation to arms, he said,

We have done everything we could to avert the storm which is now coming on. . . . Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned. . . . In vain, may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free . . . we must fight.

The United Nations role in Bosnia is replete with petitions, supplications, and remonstrances—all in vain.

Are we to deny the Bosnian Moslems the very right to self determination that defines the conscience of this Nation? Are we to refuse them freedom—repudiate their desire to secure liberty?

We have paid a high price for failure in Bosnia—over \$2 billion in taxpayers' dollars have supported UNPROFOR. What we have paid in treasure, Bosnians have paid in lives and liberty.

Lifting the embargo will not guarantee Bosnians their freedom, but the United States will no longer hold the key to their shackles—the ball and chain that UNPROFOR has become.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the majority leader's resolution to lift the arms embargo. I do not make this decision lightly, and I have no illusions that our vote today will do anything to stop this

conflict. In fact, we can be sure that lifting the arms embargo will intensify the fighting and lead to more pain and suffering. I do not see what other choice we have, though. The U.N. peacekeeping force has failed to defend the misnamed "safe havens" or to protect Bosnians from Serb aggression, and the most honorable thing we can do is allow the Bosnians to defend themselves.

I will be the first to admit, Mr. President, that I did not expect Bosnia to become such a difficult and divisive issue for our country. When communism collapsed and the walls fell in 1989, I was as excited as anyone over the end of the cold war and the prospect of a world finally at peace. I expected that old ethnic and national tensions would flare up, but I figured that European and U.N. diplomacy and a few peacekeepers could handle the job, with limited U.S. involvement. The United States had just won a 40-year-long cold war, and we deserved to rest on our laurels. So when this conflict first started in 1991 after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, like most Americans, I barely took notice of it. I supported the creation of the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in February 1992, and I did not argue with UNPROFOR's extension to Bosnia in June 1992, putting my faith in efforts to cobble together a political settlement.

But this wound refuses to heal. Instead it festers, fed by historical conflicts and prejudices reaching back 500 years. I worry that this gangrenous conflict threatens to contaminate all of Europe.

As this conflict continued to worsen and Bosnians continued to suffer, I still held out hope for reason to prevail over aggression and imperialism. Last July, I voted against this very same resolution to lift the arms embargo. I wanted to give the administration more time to pursue a multilateral agreement on the arms embargo, and negotiators more time to find an agreement the Serbs would accept.

In the past year, the situation only got worse. This civil war cost the lives of several U.N. peacekeepers, and almost killed a brave American pilot. The Serbs continue to press their attacks, to ethnically cleanse by driving Bosnians out of their homes, and to kill civilians by shelling Bosnian safe areas. The only honorable thing to do is to admit that without unrestrained military commitments, U.N. peacekeepers cannot stop the Serbs, and let the Bosnians begin to fight Serbs on equal terms.

Regardless of the final wording of this legislation, I hope we all accept our commitment to helping U.N. peacekeepers withdraw from Bosnia, if necessary, with the massive involvement of United States ground troops. Senator DOLE set forth a set of reasonable guidelines on the use of U.S. forces in a withdrawal, designed to reduce risks, which I support. But despite the risks,

it is our responsibility as a member of NATO to help our allies save their people stuck in Bosnia.

Mr. President, this is not a political or partisan issue for me. I think our Defense Secretary, Secretary Perry, called this legislation the "lift-and-pray" option, and that is as good a description as any. This difficult situation has no easy solutions, and highlights our own difficulties in coming to grips with the realities of a post-cold-war world. It seems like the new world order looks a lot like old world disorder. As much as anybody, I want peace in Bosnia—but not a peace bought with the wholesale slaughter of Bosnians by Serbs.

It is time to admit that we do not have the answers here, and to do the only honorable thing—let the Bosnians get weapons they need to fight for their homes and their lives.

Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise in support of this resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

For several years, the United States and the United Nations have relied on a system of safe havens. These were protected towns: Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa in eastern Bosnia; Sarajevo, the capital; and Bihac in the west. U.N. peacekeepers were to provide security for the people in these towns, while an overall arms embargo covered all participants in the war.

#### FAILURE OF PRESENT POLICY

Where do we now stand today?

The Bosnian Serbs have ignored repeated efforts on the part of Americans, Europeans, and Russians to achieve peace. Instead, they have attacked all the safe havens.

Srebrenica has been captured, and its women and children expelled. Nobody knows what has become of the men of the town. The Western countries had given all these people a guarantee of safety.

Zepa fell yesterday.

Bihac is under attack.

Sarajevo is being bombed as heavily as ever.

And the U.N. peacekeepers have been shot at, shelled, and taken hostage.

Clearly, this policy has failed. The U.N. force has proven unable to prevent Bosnian Serb offensives, to protect civilians, or even to protect its own members. The time has come to admit it and move to something new.

#### THREE CHOICES

No choice is a good one. But I believe we have essentially three options, and one is superior.

First and foremost, we should not become involved as a combatant in the war. That would confront the American armed services with an impossible task—to impose a permanent political settlement. We would be likely to lose many men and women; we would certainly lose some; and ultimately it would be futile.

Second, the strategy some propose of American air attacks against Bosnian Serb positions, is irredeemably flawed. It does not command the full support

of our allies, and in any case history shows that air attacks without a coordinated ground campaign do not succeed.

The only remaining choice is the third: to lift the arms embargo and let the Bosnian Government fight in defense of its country. This may not solve the problems of the former Yugoslavia—and I do not believe an outside power can solve those problems—but it has the virtue of justice.

A country attacked by an outside aggressor, or by a rebellion against a legitimate government, has the right to defend itself as best it can. And its people, who have seen the West break its promise to keep them safe, should at least be able to fight for themselves.

That is why I support this resolution. And I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, for many months I have resisted legislative initiatives to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. But today I intend to vote differently.

I have felt that our country should not depart from the joint 1991 decision made with our NATO allies through the United Nations in enforcing an international arms embargo against what was then Yugoslavia. The international community took this action to prevent the fighting from escalating after Slovenia and Croatia withdrew from the Yugoslav federation.

As we all know, the fighting has escalated nevertheless. The U.N. and NATO have ever since struggled to balance the safety of Bosnia civilians with the desire to prevent the war from spiraling or spreading.

But events have taken a dramatic and tragic turn in recent weeks. That is why I now intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill to lift the arms embargo after the United Nations protection forces have left.

I recognize that United Nations forces have helped to reduce civilian casualties to a fraction of their prior levels. These forces have also carried out humanitarian operations that have saved thousands of lives.

However, it is now evident that the U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot be expected to keep the peace where there is no peace. The U.N. forces, I believe, were sent to the region to try to provide safe havens to protect civilians, to open routes to supply food, medicine and essential supplies to the Bosnian people, and to try to keep the peace.

But it is now clear that the Bosnian Serbs are advancing in areas that the Bosnian Moslems thought were safe. The Bosnian Serbs have marched into Srebrenica, a city that the United Nations had guaranteed as a safe haven for civilians. Today we here the further news that another so-called safe haven—Zepa—has fallen before the Bosnian Serbs' advance.

Again, Bosnian civilians have been left unprotected because the U.N. forces are not deployed for or capable

of resisting the Serbs' aggression. The fate of Srebrenica and the fall of Zepa make a mockery of the United Nations humanitarian mission.

We can now see that the embargo has had the practical effect of leaving the Bosnian Moslems virtually defenseless in the face of Serbian aggression.

I have not supported and do not support sending American ground troops to Bosnia to take sides in this conflict. I do not expect that we or our allies are prepared to send troops to the region in sufficient numbers to put an end to the war.

If that is the case—and I believe it is—then I think we must end the arms embargo against the Bosnian Moslems, so that they can defend themselves.

It is a departure for me to support ending an arms embargo anywhere, because I believe we ought to promote policies that slow the spread of arms around the world.

However, I cannot stand by and watch the atrocities that are occurring in Bosnia without believing that it is somehow immoral for us to deny the Bosnian Moslems the ability to defend themselves, their families and their territory. An independent nation has the right of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That is why lifting this embargo is not analogous to lifting the arms ban against Iraq or against any other aggressor.

Let me also point out that the Dole-Lieberman bill we are debating is a new version. It now says that United Nations Protection Forces should first leave Bosnia before the embargo is lifted. This will help to prevent the U.N. forces from getting caught in an escalating crossfire. As an additional insurance against that possibility, the United States must be prepared to honor the President's commitment to our NATO allies to send United States forces to assist in evacuating NATO forces from Bosnia.

Even as we take these steps, I support a renewed effort on the part of the United States to seek NATO's support for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. That would be a preferable approach. But in the final analysis, the United States must help the Bosnian Moslems get the arms to defend themselves.

For these reasons, I intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill. I pray that in some way a new set of policies might force the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a real truce and move that region closer to a permanent end to its conflict.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke at length about the situation in Bosnia. I spoke about the damage this debacle has caused to NATO, which has acted like a frightened child in the face of genocide on its borders. I said that the status quo is totally unacceptable. I also said that I believe our first responsibility is to NATO, and that NATO should be given an opportunity to redeem itself and act forcefully to protect the remaining safe havens in Bosnia.

I was encouraged by the statements of the NATO leaders after last Friday's meeting in London, when they said that NATO would respond with substantial and decisive air strikes if the Serbs attack Goradze. Then Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher suggested that there would be a similar response to attacks against the other remaining safe havens, which I support. They also indicated that the dual-key approach, that has been such a disaster, would end. In the future, NATO commanders would decide when to strike, not U.N. bureaucrats. These assurances were major factors in my decision yesterday to oppose unilaterally lifting the embargo.

Yesterday, I said I expected to see NATO display the kind of unity and power that it should have displayed from the very beginning of this conflict. I feared that by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, we would be undercutting our NATO allies and saying that we do not support a forceful NATO response. I believe such a decision could lead to wider war, greater suffering, and potentially endanger thousands of Americans. I believe that decisive NATO air strikes could not only turn the tide in favor of the Bosnian Moslems, it could also demonstrate the continued viability and strength of the NATO alliance.

I was therefore very concerned by the article in today's New York Times, titled "NATO Gives UN Officials Veto on Air Strikes in Bosnia." That article suggests that the fatally flawed status quo regarding the dual-key policy has not changed.

Mr. President, if that article were accurate I would have had no choice but to reconsider my position on this issue. As I said yesterday, I cannot support the status quo. I needed to be convinced that the failed dual-key policy was no longer in effect, and that NATO is now fully authorized to use decisive force to deter further Serb atrocities.

Because of the questions raised by that article, I prepared to telephone U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali earlier today. I wanted his assurance that future decisions about the use of NATO air power would be made by military commanders, not U.N. bureaucrats. Shortly before I was to make that call, I was informed by our mission to the United Nations in New York that the Secretary General had issued a statement which eliminated any ambiguity about dual-key. His statement goes even further, to address the issue of NATO action to protect Bihac and Sarajevo, as well as Goradze.

It is for that reason that I ask unanimous consent that the statement by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali be printed in the RECORD. His statement makes clear that the status quo is no longer in effect. Dual-key is over. A rapid, decisive response is now NATO policy.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PRESS STATEMENT

(Attributable to a Spokesman for the Secretary-General)

The Secretary-General and his advisers have concluded their study of the letter from NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes about the North Atlantic Council's decisions last night relating to the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks on Goradze.

As indicated in my earlier statement today, the Secretary-General welcomes the commitment of the North Atlantic Alliance to support the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and looks forward to working with NATO toward that end. He fully supports the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council, as conveyed in Secretary-General Claes' letter, and agrees with its conclusion that an attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Goradze should be met by a firm and decisive response, including through air strikes.

On the question of the "dual key", the relevant Security Council resolutions call for close co-ordination between the United Nations and NATO on the use of NATO air power and this is reflected in the NATO decision. In order to streamline decision taking within the United Nations chain of command when the use of air power is deemed to be necessary, the Secretary-General has decided to delegate the necessary authority in this respect to his military commanders in the field. He has accordingly delegated authority in respect of air strikes, which he has hitherto retained himself, to General Bernard Janvier, the Commander of United Nations Peace Forces, with immediate effect. As regards close air support, which is the use of air power to defend United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, after consulting the Secretary-General, has today delegated the necessary authority to General Janvier, who is authorized to delegate it further to the UNPROFOR Force Commander when operational circumstances so require.

The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by current attacks on Sarajevo and on the Bihac pocket and notes that the North Atlantic Council has asked the NATO Military Authorities, in consultation with the United Nations Peace Forces, to formulate proposals on the possible use of air power in these situations also.

The Secretary-General is informing the Security Council of the measures that he is taking. He again expresses his appreciation for the continuing close co-operation which he enjoys with the Secretary-General of NATO. In furtherance of co-operation between the United Nations and NATO, he has today instructed the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Force Commander, Gen. Janvier, to travel to Brussels for consultations with NATO on the operational modalities for implementing last night's decision of the North Atlantic Council.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, the moral and practical consequences of our actions in Bosnia are on a collision course.

Every moral instinct I have tells me to lift the arms embargo of Bosnia. I share the anger, frustration and pain that inspired this amendment.

We must finally recognize that the U.N. peacekeeping mission has failed. They cannot keep the peace in a land where there is no peace. Despite their bravery, despite their good intentions

—they are not able to protect Bosnian civilians—they are not even able to protect themselves.

As a Polish-American, I see what is happening in Bosnia, and I think of what happened to Poland in the Second World War. Polish patriots on horseback, armed only with swords, faced German tanks and German howitzers. The world watched but did nothing.

And as Hitler exterminated the Jews, most of the world stood by. This passivity amounted to acquiescence.

We are showing the acquiescence today with our meaningless U.N. resolutions and our empty threats.

What is the result of our failure?

It is mothers and children running for their lives from so called safe havens.

It is the young woman who took her own life after being forced from her home and separated from her family.

It is the food and medicine convoys prevented from getting to those in need.

It is the Serb gunfire that is continually targeted toward civilians.

And it is the rape and torture that has been going on for 3 years. This barbarism is a crime against humanity.

It is very painful to be reminded of the inhumanity that man is capable of. It is a shame on all of us.

What history does not teach us, our principles should. And there is no more fundamental principle than the right to self-defense. We never should have imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia.

So my heart tells me to lift the embargo. I want the Serbs to pay for their barbarism. If we cannot or will not defend the Bosnian people—let us stop pretending—let us lift the embargo, let us let them defend themselves.

But, Mr. President, I cannot vote to take this course unless I also consider the consequences that we and the Bosnian people will face down the road.

What happens after we lift the embargo? Most people think that the Bosnian people will then be able to defend themselves—and that Americans would stay out of the war.

But both of these points are wrong.

Just allowing the Bosnians to arm will not make it happen. According to our military leaders, it will take months to sufficiently arm and train the Bosnian army. In the meantime, the Bosnian people will be defenseless.

The Serbs will not wait. The moment we lift the embargo, the Serbs will make a land grab—not just into the eastern enclaves, but also into central Bosnia. Their brutality could spread across all of Bosnia. So by lifting the embargo, we could make things a great deal worse for the people we so want to help.

In addition, lifting the arms embargo will guarantee that United States troops will be on the ground in Bosnia. They would be in rough terrain, surrounded by hostile forces. Not defending the Bosnian people—but defending the U.N. peacekeepers as they make their retreat. There could be American

casualties and there could be American POW's. And we will have done nothing to protect the Bosnian people.

While most people in this body support lifting the embargo—how many support sending U.S. troops? And how many of us are willing to take responsibility for the carnage that could occur if we lift the embargo and leave the unarmed Bosnians to fend for themselves? We need to consider the moral consequences of our action.

In any military action abroad, I believe that must always have clear criteria and objectives that answer three important questions:

Why are we there?

What keeps us there?

And what gets us out?

Without answers to these questions, we cannot send U.S. troops into battle. And we have no such answers in Bosnia.

I am not saying that we should stick with the status quo. That has brought the Bosnians nothing but misery.

I had hoped that in the London meetings last weekend that the allies would reach consensus on clear, decisive and immediate action. We did not go as far as we should have. We did not end, once and for all, the dual key policy that puts U.N. bureaucrats in control of military decisions.

But NATO policy does seem to be shifting. We are at least preparing for more robust and meaningful retaliation for Serb aggression and for substantial and decisive use of NATO air power. I believe that we must give this new policy a chance to succeed.

So I will oppose the Dole resolution.

This is a heart-wrenching decision for me. As I have said, every instinct I have tells me to lift the embargo. But I believe that we should not go it alone unless we are willing to act alone—unless we are willing to send in our troops to save Bosnia from the carnage that could occur. We must look at the moral and practical consequences of our action.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we all agree that the crisis in Bosnia is a massive human tragedy. But I oppose this legislation calling for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, and I do so for five reasons.

First, lifting the embargo may theoretically give the Bosnian Moslems a more effective means to defend themselves. But in fact, lifting the embargo is far more likely to put them in an even worse position—unless the United States and other nations are able and willing to provide extensive amounts of arms and military training over a lengthy period of time, and unless these nations are also prepared to take whatever military action is necessary—including the use of ground troops—to keep the Bosnian Serbs from over-running the Moslems during that period.

Second, if the U.N. forces withdraw, as seems inevitable when the arms embargo is lifted, the plight of innocent civilians will get much worse as the

bloodshed escalates and the vital U.N. humanitarian lifeline is severed. In 1992, before the U.N. peacekeepers arrived, there were 130,000 civilian casualties. Last year, there were fewer than three thousand.

In addition, over 1.3 million refugees and much of the civilian population of Sarajevo and central Bosnia—a total of 2.7 million people—are dependent upon the relief work of the United Nations. The U.N. may not have kept the peace as well as we had hoped, but it has saved hundreds of thousands of Bosnian lives. This lifesaving capability—and the maintenance of vital humanitarian supply lines—will all be lost if we unilaterally lift the arms embargo and force the United Nations out of Bosnia. Without the U.N.'s humanitarian efforts, we will see more starvation, more loss of life and a new flood of refugees. The almost \$500 million in food, medicine, shelter, and other relief supplies which U.N. agencies plan to deliver this year could well be denied to the innocent people of Bosnia.

Third, the wider war that is the most likely result if this legislation is enacted is in no one's interest and could have catastrophic consequences. The last thing the people of Europe and America need is a wider war in the Balkans.

Fourth, if the embargo is to be lifted, it should be done in cooperation with our allies, not unilaterally. Unilateral action by the United States will seriously undermine both the United Nations and NATO and will serve as a dangerous precedent for other nations to ignore other international mandates.

Fifth, this legislation would make a negotiated solution even more difficult than it is now. Yet a negotiated solution is the only realistic hope for ending this tragic war instead of expanding it.

There are no good answers on Bosnia. But the answer proposed in this legislation is worse than the alternative of working closely with our allies, as President Clinton is doing. He deserves the bipartisan support of Congress at this very important and very difficult time.

Mr. CONRAD, Mr. President, I intend to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act as modified by the Nunn and Cohen amendments.

The war in Bosnia is tragic and horrible. No one can hear accounts of the rape, torture, and other crimes the Serbs have committed as they overran the so-called safe areas in Srebrenica and Zepa without being profoundly saddened—and outraged.

I share with my colleagues a deep sense of frustration that the U.N. forces in Bosnia have been unable to put an end to these atrocities. I wish the many attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had been accepted by the Serbs. I wish our allies in Europe had been more willing to take the lead in countering Serbian aggression.

But the reality is, they have not. No one is effectively defending the

Bosnians, and they do not have the capacity to defend themselves because of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.

In the past, I have opposed resolutions calling for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. I have long believed the United States should not get involved on the ground in Bosnia, and that it will be much easier to get into Bosnia that it will be to pull American forces out later. I have been very concerned that unilateral actions could lead to greater American responsibility for that outcome and greater U.S. involvement.

But the amended resolution we will vote on today is different. Taken together, the Nunn and Cohen amendments require the United States before unilaterally lifting the embargo, to force a U.N. Security Council and, if necessary, U.N. General Assembly vote on lifting the embargo multilaterally. Only if both these avenues have been exhausted would the United States, as a last resort, act unilaterally.

The events of the past few weeks have made it clear that we cannot wait indefinitely for multilateral agreement to lift the arms embargo. The current approach in Bosnia is not working. Under these circumstances, we must force the United Nations to re-evaluate the arms embargo. It is my strong hope that the United Nations will decide to lift the arms embargo multilaterally. It is immoral to continue to block the Bosnians from obtaining the arms they need to defend themselves against Serbian aggression when it is abundantly clear that only the Bosnians are willing to defend Bosnia against Serbian aggression, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. The events of the past few weeks demonstrate that no one else—not the United Nations, not the United States, and not the Europeans—will adequately defend the Bosnians.

This was not an easy decision, Mr. President. There are no cheap or easy answers in Bosnia, and this approach involves some risks. But it is time to take the least risky approach: to lift the arms embargo—multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary—so the Bosnians can defend themselves.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

AMENDMENT NO. 1848 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1801

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk, and I call that amendment up.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN], for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. ROBB, proposes an amendment numbered 1848 to amendment No. 1801.

On page 2, after line 18, insert the following:

“(4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact Group’s proposal for Bosnia

And Herzegovina, a decision in the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable.”

On page 5, after line 12, insert the following and reletter subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g) respectively:

“(e) INTERNATIONAL POLICY.—If the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina submits a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or the countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (a), the President (or his representative) shall immediately introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to terminate the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States shall insist on a vote on the resolution by Security Council. The resolution shall, at a minimum, provide for the termination of the applicability of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will speak more to this resolution in my overall thoughts on the subject of the Dole-Lieberman amendment later this morning or shortly after noon after we meet with the President of South Korea.

But this amendment, as indicated by the reading of the clerk, basically does two things. This amendment says, which is a fact, that the contact group composed of Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Russia in 1994 made a statement that if the Bosnian Serbs did not agree to the contact group proposal, that the last resort would be the unavoidable lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security Council.

The second part of this amendment makes it clear that, without interfering with the Dole-Lieberman amendment’s timetable, which does not require the lifting of the embargo until after the U.N. forces are removed from Bosnia, without altering that timetable on what would be the unilateral lift, this amendment sets up another effort. It sets up one final effort by the United States, having the President of the United States go to the Security Council and asking the Security Council to multilaterally, in accordance with the United Nations’ and the Security Council’s previous resolution, lift the embargo.

I think this amendment is important. All of us know that the Security Council may not do that but in a month or two the situation may change. Some minds may change. And I would remind those countries, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, as well as the United States, that as part of the contact group, and those that are also on the Security Council, including Britain, France, and Russia, that this action, this multilateral lift that we will be seeking, if the U.N. forces withdraw, is in complete accord and consistent with statements that they signed on to as a

part of the contact group in 1994. So it would be my hope that there would be some minds changed if the U.N. forces withdraw.

Mr. President, I will make further remarks about both this amendment and my overall view of the Dole-Lieberman proposal before us and the administration policy sometime later in this debate.

I would say, though, that I concur in what I heard my friend from Virginia and my friend from Connecticut just state about the reports in the paper this morning which indicate that there remains a dual key, that the United Nations is maintaining jurisdiction and that our allies in Great Britain and France, according to the New York Times report, notwithstanding the London meeting, have been proponents of retaining that dual key.

That is contrary to what this Senator understood in reports from our administration’s representatives when they returned from London. It is contrary to the initial reports that came out of NATO from London. And it points to the continuing inability of NATO to get its act together and of the United Nations to be able to delegate authority for military action, and the United Nations by all accounts is incapable of making those decisions.

It also calls into question the crucial point about whether a bombing campaign envisions the possibility of hostage taking and whether the participants in the bombing campaign in response to an attack on Gorazde are willing to continue the required military action even if hostages are taken.

Mr. President, it is absolutely essential that the NATO alliance not begin a strike campaign unless they are willing to hit meaningful targets and unless they are willing to continue that in the face of almost certain adversity, that is, hostage taking and perhaps even the killing of United Nations personnel.

Mr. President, these remarks I will continue at a later point, but I did want to go on record that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Connecticut are correct, in my view, that this report this morning I think greatly undercuts the position we hoped had come out of the London conference, which was to abolish the dual key at least as far as Gorazde is concerned.

I yield the floor.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES—ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY KIM YONG-SAM, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now stand in recess until the hour of 12 noon and proceed to the Hall of the House of Representatives for the joint meeting.