

I delay the vote on the Dole-Lieberman legislation until after the London meeting, which ended just a short while ago.

I agreed to the President's request. Unfortunately, the London meeting was a disappointment—another dazzling display of ducking the problem. Instead of clarity and decisiveness, once again we have ambiguity and a lowest common denominator approach.

Instead of dumping the dual key it has been modified. Instead of responding to the fall of Zepa and Srebrenica, these two eastern enclaves have been written off. Most egregiously, the London meeting reaffirmed the current failed U.N. operation.

In the wake of the fall of Zepa, it is hard for me to imagine that anyone still believes that the U.N. mission is viable in Bosnia—that what we are witnessing is anything but a colossal, collective catastrophe.

Yesterday, the Bosnian Presidency building was shelled while the European envoy, Carl Bildt, was meeting with the Bosnian President. If attacks on Sarajevo continue, what will be the West's response? Another meeting. According to Secretary Christopher, the focus of U.N. efforts will be to open access to the city for humanitarian aid. Yes; the Bosnian people need food. They also need protection.

The London meeting reportedly produced a decision to defend Gorazde through a substantial response—after a serious warning is given to the Serbs. Gorazde is already under attack. How much further do the Bosnian Serbs have to go before the warning is triggered?

The Serbs are becoming more aggressive and more defiant by the hour. The London meeting made it clear there would be no immediate or decisive response except more meetings.

In effect, what the Clinton administration and European leaders are doing is trying to manage the conflict—to limit the war's consequences without providing a solution. Or, as the Bosnian Prime Minister said, without dealing with the real problem—which is Belgrade-sponsored aggression.

Western leaders in London also called for a cease-fire and more negotiations. It has been 1 year since the Bosnian Government signed the so-called contact group's plan. Why should the Serbs sign now after yet another display of fecklessness?

It is crystal clear that the London meeting did not produce a solution. It did not result in a policy.

I believe that the Senate will not be fooled by administration spin doctors who will no doubt announce great results from the London meeting.

I believe that there is a substantial majority in favor of the Dole-Lieberman legislation and that the disappointing outcome of the London meeting will only serve to strengthen that support.

Once again, I want to emphasize that the Dole-Lieberman legislation lifts

the U.S. arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. It seems to me that this point is being deliberately ignored and intentionally obfuscated by those allied and administration officials who claim that the Dole-Lieberman legislation if passed will be responsible for a U.N. pull-out. This does not take effect until they are out, so we will not be responsible for a pull-out.

No doubt this is a political tactic designed to find excuses for what is the inevitable end of the U.N. mission in Bosnia. It may not be today, may not be tomorrow, but this will end as a consequence of its own failed policy. If only administration and allied officials would spend as much time designing a new policy as they do designing new excuses for their inability to develop an effective and principled policy. The bottom line is that passage of the Dole-Lieberman bill may be an excuse for U.N. withdrawal, but it will not be a cause.

The dire administration predictions of humanitarian disaster have come true—but not because of lifting the arms embargo, but because of a lack of American leadership and a willingness to go along with failure in the name of consensus. Despite the paternalistic assertions made by administration officials that they have the best interests of the Bosnians at heart, the present approach is not humanitarian, it is inhumane. First, the Bosnians were corralled into giant refugee camps, then disarmed, and then left unprotected.

With respect to the assertion that this legislation would give the Bosnian President the right to send 25,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia I would make three points: First, the commitment to send 25,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia for either a withdrawal or to police a settlement is a commitment that was made by President Clinton—and not pursuant to any request by the Bosnian Government or the result of any congressional action. Second, the days of colonialism are over. The Bosnian Government is a sovereign government and has the right to tell the British, French, Dutch, and other forces if and when it wants them to leave. Third, President Clinton has yet to make his case to the Congress that 25,000 troops are needed for such a withdrawal. Let us not forget that the Dutch troops in Srebrenica negotiated their departure with the Serbs—they were not rescued by U.S. marines.

Let me also indicate, as I was told by the foreign minister just a few days ago, he said there were about only 30 U.N. personnel in Serbian-held territory. Somebody said that figure is much higher, maybe 500, maybe 600; but, again, it would not take 25,000 American troops to rescue 30 or 500 or 1,000 U.N. personnel.

We have been assured by the Moslems that they would in no way interfere with the withdrawal.

Finally, I would like to say that a belated NATO response to the brutal Serb

onslaught in the Eastern enclaves is not a substitute for a policy. The U.N. operation is a failure. That is a fact. And no amount of reshuffling will change that fact.

Neither Band-aids, nor reconstructive surgery will save the U.N. operation in Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo and letting the Bosnians defend themselves is the only policy option which has any hope of saving them—and saving United States credibility.

I might point out, the New York Times—which has been struggling with this issue editorially, as many have on the floor, today, and maybe that will be referred to by my colleague from Connecticut—said rather flatly, it is time to lift the embargo. It is time to lift the arms embargo. If we do not want to Americanize what is happening there, and we want to give this independent nation a right to defend itself, then the course is clear. Lift the arms embargo after withdrawing the U.N. forces, and then we believe we can supply the Muslims with weapons. They can be trained in safe places with no hazard, by anybody in the United States or any United States force who might be involved in any weapons or training or whatever.

We believe this is not the best solution. There are not any good solutions. It gives an independent nation a right to defend itself and gives the people in that nation a right to defend themselves. In my view, sooner or later, it will happen.

Maybe not this week. Maybe not next week. Maybe not next month. But winter is coming very soon in that part of the world, and I believe before that happens, U.N. forces will be withdrawn or on the way out. Then, perhaps, the Bosnians will have an opportunity to do what they wanted to do for some time.

I do not mean to dismiss the humanitarian aid that has been provided. It has been helpful in some cases, but unintentionally, the U.N. protection forces have become a barrier, which unintentionally has been a help to the Serb aggressors, and not to the poor people who are trapped in the enclaves.

So far, one has fallen. Another is about to fall. Clearly, everyone is in danger.

ORDER FOR RECESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I just say, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order following the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator LIEBERMAN, and the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, Senator PRESSLER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Connecticut.