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                                                      Calendar No. 494
115th Congress    }                                     {       Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session       }                                     {      115-298

======================================================================



 
 MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 
                             2018 AND 2019

                                _______
                                

                 July 11, 2018.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 3153]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 3153) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
years 2018 and 2019 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

               Classified Annexes to the Committee Report

    On June 12, 2017, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly 
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the 
National Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2018 was $57.7 
billion. On February 27, 2018, acting pursuant to Section 364 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
(Public Law 111-259), the DNI publicly disclosed that the 
President's aggregate request for the National Intelligence 
Program for Fiscal Year 2019 was $59.9 billion. Other than for 
limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared classified annexes to this report that contain 
classified Schedules of Authorizations; one for Fiscal Year 
2018, and one for Fiscal Year 2019. The classified annex and 
Schedule of Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2018 reflect 
negotiations with the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence for a joint explanatory statement and accompanying 
classified annex in anticipation of separate passage of an 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. The 
classified Schedules of Authorizations are incorporated by 
reference in the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 and have the 
legal status of public law. The classified annexes are made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives and to the President. They are 
also available for review by any Member of the Senate subject 
to Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (the ``Act'') 
that was reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal Year 2019. Section 
101 further clarifies that certain appropriated funds are 
authorized for purposes of Section 504 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094) and limits certain waivers for (1) 
activities authorized under Section 503 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093), and (2) major systems as 
defined in Section 506A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3097), unless the DNI notifies the congressional 
intelligence committees that the activities are urgent for 
national security purposes.

Section 102. Classified Schedules of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal 
Year 2019 are contained in classified Schedules of 
Authorizations and that the classified Schedules of 
Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and 
to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment 
of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2018 in excess of the 
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three 
percent of the total limit applicable to each Intelligence 
Community (IC) element under Section 102, and ten percent of 
the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule 
for the purposes of contractor conversions. The DNI may do so 
only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions. If the DNI exercises the provision allowing for 
contractor conversions, the DNI shall provide written 
justification to the congressional intelligence committees.
    Section 103 does not authorize personnel for Fiscal Year 
2019, given the congressional intelligence committees have 
committed to allowing the IC to manage by funding under its 
multisector workforce initiative, and no longer by positions.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2018 and Fiscal Year 2019. Section 104 authorizes personnel for 
Fiscal Year 2018, but consistent with Section 103, Section 104 
does not authorize personnel for Fiscal Year 2019, given the 
congressional intelligence committees have committed to 
allowing the IC to manage by funding under its multisector 
workforce initiative, and no longer by positions.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for 
each of Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

Section 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement 
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil 
Service Retirement System.

            TITLE III-GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
        technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition 
        of special pay authority for cyber positions

    Section 303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science, 
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee 
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions. 
Section 303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform 
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.

Section 304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer 
        of the Intelligence Community

    Section 304 changes the position of IC Chief Information 
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being 
subject to appointment by the DNI.

Section 305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of 
        positions within the intelligence community on the Executive 
        Schedule

    Section 305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the 
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion 
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for 
inclusion.

Section 306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
        Force

    Section 306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United 
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply 
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 306 further 
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and 
annual reports.

Section 307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and 
        cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with 
        foreign governments and entities

    Section 307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign 
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the pervasiveness 
of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, 
equipment, and services provided by United States adversaries 
or entities thereof.

Section 308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the 
        intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber 
        attack

    Section 308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection 
support for the personal technology devices and personal 
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly 
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection 
activities.

Section 309. Modification of authority relating to management of 
        supply-chain risk

    Section 309 extends certain IC procurement authorities to 
manage and protect against supply chain risks. Section 309 
further requires annual reporting on the IC's determinations 
and notifications made in executing these authorities.

Section 310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security 
        classifications

    Section 310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is nominated 
to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain 
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of 
interest regarding that nominee.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees 
        of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide 
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated 
immediate family members, if there is a national security 
threat that warrants such protection.

Section 402. Designation of the Program Manager-Information Sharing 
        Environment

    Section 402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to appointment by the 
DNI, not the President.

Section 403. Modification to the Executive Schedule

    Section 403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.

                       SUBTITLE B--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 411. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
        certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    Section 411 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with 
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).

Section 412. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of 
        the Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence 
        community

    Section 412 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to 
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security 
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of 
the IC as defined in paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 1, 2020. 
Section 412 further provides that the plan shall not address 
the DSS's personnel security functions.

Section 413. Notice not required for private entities

    Section 413 provides a Rule of Construction that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not 
required to provide notice to private entities before issuing 
directives on agency information security policies and 
practices.

                       TITLE V--ELECTION MATTERS

Section 501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
        United States election infrastructure

    Section 501 directs the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis (I&A) of DHS to submit a report on cyber attacks 
and attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United 
States election infrastructure, in connection with the 2016 
presidential election. Section 501 further requires this report 
to include identification of the States and localities affected 
and include efforts to attack voter registration databases, 
voting machines, voting-related computer networks, and the 
networks of Secretaries of State and other election officials.

Section 502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect 
        against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the 
        Presidential election

    Section 502 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within one year of enactment of this 
Act, a report on the Director's review of the IC's posture to 
collect against and analyze Russian efforts to interfere with 
the 2016 United States presidential election. Section 502 
further requires the review to include assessments of IC 
resources, information sharing, and legal authorities.

Section 503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
        elections

    Section 503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC elements, to 
commence assessments of security vulnerabilities of State 
election systems one year before regularly scheduled Federal 
elections. Section 503 further requires the DNI to submit a 
report on such assessments 180 days before regularly scheduled 
Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before 
regularly scheduled Federal elections.

Section 504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
        States elections

    Section 504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the 
Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for 
countering Russian cyber threats against United States 
electoral systems and processes. Section 504 further requires 
this strategy to include input from solicited Secretaries of 
State and chief election officials.

Section 505. Information sharing with State election officials

    Section 505 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment 
of this Act, to support the Under Secretary for I&A at DHS, and 
any other appropriate designees of the Secretary of DHS in 
sponsoring a security clearance for each eligible chief 
election official of a State, territory, or the District of 
Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up to the top 
secret level. Section 505 also requires the DNI to assist the 
Under Secretary for I&A with sharing appropriate classified 
information about threats to election systems and to the 
integrity of the election process with chief election officials 
and their designees who possess the aforementioned security 
clearances.

Section 506. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead 
        election security matters

    Section 506 requires the DNI to designate a national 
counterintelligence officer within the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and 
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence 
matters, including certain risks from foreign power 
interference.

                     TITLE VI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

Section 601. Definitions

    Section 601 provides definitions for terminology used 
throughout this Title.

Section 602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and 
        background investigations

    Section 602 requires the interagency Performance 
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce the 
background investigation inventory and best align the 
investigation function between the Department of Defense and 
the National Background Investigation Bureau. Section 602 
further requires the Council to report on the future of the 
clearance process and requires the DNI to notify the 
appropriate committees upon determining requests to change 
clearance standards, and the status of those requests' 
disposition.

Section 603. Improving the process for security clearances

    Section 603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire 
for National Security positions (SF-86) and the Federal 
Investigative Standards to determine potential unnecessary 
information required and assess whether revisions are necessary 
to account for insider threats. Section 603 further requires 
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish 
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the 
clearance process for contract and government personnel.

Section 604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security 
        clearances

    Section 604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be 
able to process ninety percent of clearance requests at the 
Secret level in thirty days, and at the Top Secret level in 
ninety days. The plan shall also address how to recognize 
reciprocity in accepting clearances among agencies within two 
weeks, and to require that ninety percent of clearance holders 
not be subject to a time-based periodic investigation.

Section 605. Security Executive Agent

    Section 605 establishes the DNI as the government's 
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order 
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.

Section 606. Report on unified, simplified, government-wide standards 
        for positions of trust and security clearances

    Section 606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office 
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and 
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of trust 
and security clearances from five to three tiers.

Section 607. Report on clearance in person concept

    Section 607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a 
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for 
access to classified information for up to three years after 
access may lapse.

Section 608. Budget request documentation on funding for clearances

    Section 608 requires the President to submit to Congress 
with the Fiscal Year 2020 budget request exhibits that identify 
resources allocated by each agency for processing security 
clearances, identified by each respective tier.

Section 609. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of 
        departments and agencies

    Section 609 requires each federal agency to submit a report 
to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances that take 
more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and set forth the 
reason for any delays. Section 609 further requires the DNI to 
submit an annual report summarizing reciprocity.

Section 610. Intelligence community reports on security clearances

    Section 610 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC 
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal 
employees and contractor employees.

Section 611. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community 
        which can be conducted without access to classified 
        information, networks, or facilities

    Section 611 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on positions that can be 
conducted without access to classified information, networks, 
or facilities, or may require only a secret-level clearance.

Section 612. Information sharing program for positions of trust

    Section 612 requires the Security Executive Agent to 
establish a program to share information between and among 
government agencies and industry partners to inform decisions 
about positions of trust and security clearances.

Section 613. Report on protections for confidentiality of 
        whistleblower-related communications

    Section 613 requires the Security Executive Agent, in 
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, to submit a report detailing the IC's controls used 
to ensure continuous evaluation programs protect the 
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    SUBTITLE A--MATTERS RELATING TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FOREIGN POWERS

Section 701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of 
        cybersecurity unit with the Government of Russia

    Section 701 prohibits the Federal government from expending 
any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity unit or other 
cyber agreement that is jointly established or otherwise 
implemented by the United States Government and the Russian 
Government, unless the DNI submits a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the armed services 
committees at least 30 days prior to any such agreement. The 
report shall include the agreement's purpose, intended shared 
intelligence, value to national security, counterintelligence 
concerns, and any measures taken to mitigate such concerns.

Section 702. Report on returning Russian compounds

    Section 702 requires the IC to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of this 
Act, both classified and unclassified reports on the 
intelligence risks of returning the diplomatic compounds--in 
New York, Maryland, and California--taken from Russia as a 
reprisal for Russian meddling in the 2016 United States 
presidential election. Section 702 also establishes an ongoing 
requirement for producing similar assessments for future 
assignment of diplomatic compounds within the United States.

Section 703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia

    Section 703 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 60 days of enactment of this Act, an 
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source 
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 703 
further requires the assessment to include global nodes and 
entry points for Russian money laundering; United States 
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals 
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government; 
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by 
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; and 
challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce 
sanctions and combat organized crime.

Section 704. Notification of an active measures campaign

    Section 704 requires the DNI to notify congressional 
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
Member of the congressional intelligence committees and the 
armed services committees, each time the DNI has determined 
there is credible information that a foreign power has 
attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to employ a covert 
influence or active measures campaign with regard to the 
modernization, employment, doctrine, or force posture of the 
nuclear deterrent or missile defense. Section 704 further 
requires that such notification must include information on any 
actions that the United States has taken to expose or halt such 
attempts.

Section 705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and 
        consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United 
        States

    Section 705 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that 
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two 
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such 
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of 
the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary 
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and 
address any noncompliance.

                          SUBTITLE B--REPORTS

Section 711. Technical correction to Inspector General study

    Section 711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by replacing 
the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors General with 
employees having classified material access, with a ``review'' 
requirement.

Section 712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer 
        of the Department of Homeland Security

    Section 712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy 
of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the Chief 
Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes 
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence 
activities.

Section 713. Report on cyber exchange program

    Section 713 directs the DNI to submit a report, within 90 
days of enactment of this Act, on the potential establishment 
of a voluntary cyber exchange program between the IC and 
private technology companies.

Section 714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
        respect to certain foreign investments

    Section 714 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's 
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the 
United States Government's evaluation of national security 
risks associated with potential foreign investments.

Section 715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against 
        United States telecommunications networks

    Section 715 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees, 
within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report on known 
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks to 
surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC has 
taken to protect United States Government agencies and 
personnel from such surveillance.

Section 716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks

    Section 716 requires the DNI to establish an IC working 
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report 
that includes an identification, analysis, and explanation of 
national security vulnerabilities, foreign investment trends, 
foreign countries' strategies to exploit vulnerabilities 
through the acquisition of either critical technologies 
(including components or items essential to national defense), 
critical materials (including physical materials essential to 
national security), or critical infrastructure (including 
physical or virtual systems and assets whose destruction or 
incapacity would have a debilitating impact on national 
security), and market distortions caused by foreign countries. 
Technologies, materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be 
``critical'' under this provision if their exploitation by a 
foreign government could cause severe harm to the national 
security of the United States.

Section 717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of 
        foreign diplomats

    Section 717 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of 
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain 
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular 
personnel of the Russian Federation.

Section 718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
        disclosures of classified information

    Section 718 requires the Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security at the Department of Justice, in consultation 
with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and judiciary committees a semiannual report on 
the status of IC referrals to the Department regarding 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Section 718 
also directs IC elements to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a semiannual report on the number of 
investigations opened and completed by each agency regarding an 
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information to the 
media, and the number of completed investigations referred to 
the Attorney General.

Section 719. Congressional notification of designation of covered 
        intelligence officer as persona non grata

    Section 719 requires, not later than 72 hours after a 
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non 
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
notification of that designation, to include the basis for the 
designation and justification for the expulsion.

Section 720. Inspectors General reports on classification

    Section 720 requires each designated IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the accuracy 
in the application of classification and handling markings on a 
representative sample of finished products, to include those 
with compartments. Section 720 also directs analyses of 
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the 
effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or 
historical importance that merit prioritization for 
declassification review.

Section 721. Reports on intelligence community participation in 
        vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government

    Section 721 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of 
enactment of this Act, to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities 
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element. 
Section 721 further requires each IC element to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a 
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP process 
and criteria. Section 721 also requires the DNI to submit an 
annual report to the congressional intelligence committees with 
specified information on certain VEP metrics.

Section 722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
        implications

    Section 722 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report every five years on the 
implications of global water insecurity on the United States' 
national security interests.

Section 723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between 
        elements of intelligence community and other entities of the 
        United States Government regarding significant operational 
        activities or policy

    Section 723 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring each 
IC element to submit an annual report to the congressional 
intelligence committees that lists each significant memorandum 
of understanding or other agreement entered into during the 
preceding fiscal year. Section 723 further requires each IC 
element to provide such documents if an intelligence committee 
so requests.

Section 724. Repeal of report requirement for inspectors general of 
        certain elements of intelligence community

    Section 724 repeals an annual reporting requirement for 
Inspectors General of the NSA, DIA, NRO, and NGA, while leaving 
intact ongoing substantive semiannual reporting requirements 
for those Inspectors General.

Section 725. Repeal of requirement for annual personnel level 
        assessments for the intelligence community

    Section 725 repeals the DNI's requirement to provide an 
annual personnel level assessment for each IC element.

Section 726. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United 
        States adversaries to the United States technology sector

    Section 726 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
appropriate committees on the IC's and the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise's (DIE's) outreach to United States non-government 
entities (including private businesses and academia), regarding 
the United States' adversaries' efforts to acquire critical 
United States infrastructure technology, intellectual property, 
and research and development information.

Section 727. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified 
        wireline and wireless telephone calls

    Section 727 requires the DNI to complete a study and report 
on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and 
wireless telephone calls between personnel in the IC.

Section 728. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring 
        and retention of minority employees

    Section 728 expands and clarifies current IC reporting 
requirements on diversity of IC personnel to include five prior 
fiscal years and to disaggregate data by IC element.

                       SUBTITLE C--OTHER MATTERS

Section 731. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy

    Section 731 provides technical corrections to certain 
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Section 732. Securing energy infrastructure

    Section 732 requires the Secretary of Energy (hereinafter 
in this section, ``Secretary''), within 180 days of enactment 
of this Act, to establish a two-year control systems 
implementation pilot program within the National Laboratories. 
This pilot program will partner with covered entities in the 
energy sector to identify new security vulnerabilities, and for 
purposes of researching, developing, testing, and implementing 
technology platforms and standards in partnership with such 
entities. Section 732 also requires the Secretary to establish 
a working group composed of identified private and public 
sector entities to evaluate the technology platforms and 
standards for the pilot program, and develop a national cyber-
informed engineering strategy to isolate and defend covered 
entities from security vulnerabilities. Section 732 requires 
the Secretary, within 180 days after the date on which funds 
are first disbursed, to submit to specified committees an 
interim report that describes the pilot program's results, 
provides a feasibility analysis, and describes the working 
group's evaluations. Section 732 further requires the 
Secretary, within two years of funding, to submit to the 
aforementioned committees a progress report on the pilot 
program and an analysis of the feasibility of the methods 
studied, and a description of the working group's evaluation 
results.

Section 733. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks

    Section 733 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and 
its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile intelligence 
service, often abetted by state actors, and should be treated 
as such.

Section 734. Bug bounty programs

    Section 734 directs the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a strategic plan to 
implement bug bounty programs at appropriate agencies and 
departments of the United States Government. Section 734 
further requires the plan to include an assessment of the 
``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and subsequent bug bounty 
programs. Section 734 also requires the plan to provide 
recommendations on the feasibility of initiating bug bounty 
programs across the United States Government.

Section 735. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities 
        when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign 
        individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the 
        United States

    Section 735 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to 
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and 
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including 
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by 
such individuals against the United States, or against foreign 
allies or partners of the United States. Section 735 further 
provides that the Secretary of State should consider an 
individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence 
officer for a foreign adversary.

Section 736. Extension of provisions relating to declassification of 
        information in the public interest

    Section 736 reauthorizes the Public Interest 
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives 
for a term of four years, expiring on December 31, 2022.

Section 737. Modification of authorities relating to the National 
        Intelligence University

    Section 737 provides the National Intelligence University 
with three authorities that certain other Department of Defense 
educational institutions have regarding hiring faculty, 
accepting research grants, and enrolling eligible private 
sector individuals.

                           Committee Comments


Management of intelligence community workforce

    The Committee repeats direction from the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements should 
build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately balanced 
among its civilian, military, and contractor workforce sectors 
to meet the missions assigned to it in law and by the 
president. Starting in fiscal year 2019, the Committee will no 
longer authorize position ceiling levels in the annual Schedule 
of Authorizations.
    The bill, in Section 103, again includes authority for IC 
elements to adjust personnel ceilings by three percent, and by 
ten percent if done for the purposes of contractor conversions. 
These flexibilities are temporary management tools to optimize 
the workforce this year that will cease in fiscal year 2020 
when the IC can benefit from full implementation of the multi-
sector workforce initiative.
    The Committee looks forward to working with the ODNI as it 
develops an implementation strategy and sets standards for 
workforce cost analysis tools.

Authorization of appropriated funds

    The Committee is committed to ensuring that section 504 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094) (``Section 
504''), first enacted in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1986, is consistently upheld. Section 504 assures 
the American public that the congressional intelligence 
committees have reviewed and authorized funding appropriated 
for intelligence and intelligence related activities. While 
specific, temporary waivers of Section 504 may be required in 
extraordinary exigent circumstances, such temporary waivers 
remain subject to subsequent review and permanent authorization 
by the committees that Congress created for the specific 
purpose of overseeing U.S. intelligence activities. Activities 
authorized pursuant to section 503 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093) are of particular Committee interest. 
Therefore, the Committee will continue to ensure that any 
appropriation that affects activities within the Committees' 
jurisdiction shall be reviewed and authorized in full 
accordance with Section 504.

Countering Russian propaganda

    The Committee supports the IC's role in countering Russian 
propaganda and other active measures. The Committee is 
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities, 
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these 
hostile acts. The Committee specifically finds that language 
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering 
Russia's hostile acts. The Committee encourages the IC to 
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering 
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting Russian 
language speakers, and training officers in Russian, in 
particular key technical language skills. This effort will 
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating 
officers through language training. The Committee expects to 
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.

Protection of the supply chain in intelligence community acquisition 
        decisions

    The Committee continues to have significant concerns about 
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to 
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 directed the DNI to review and consider changes to 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to 
reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD 731 (``Supply Chain Risk 
Management'') and issues associated with cybersecurity. It 
specifically recommended the review examine whether to: expand 
risk management criteria in the acquisition process to include 
cyber and supply chain threats; require counterintelligence and 
security assessments as part of the acquisition and procurement 
process; propose and adopt new education requirements for 
acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain threats; 
and factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain security. This 
review was due in November 2017, with a report on the process 
for updating ICD 801 in December 2017. The report was completed 
on June 18, 2018.
    As a follow-on to this review, the Committee directs three 
other considerations to be addressed: changes in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes 
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security 
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and 
operational phases of acquisition. The Committee further 
directs the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes 
within 60 days of completion of this review.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP 
        Authorities

    The Committee encourages the use by the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early 
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Program (VSIP) offers to meet its future goals of building a 
workforce more attuned to automation of data production, 
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of 
development and operations (``DevOps''') software development 
processes.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees, within 120 days of 
enactment of this Act, on its use to date of VERA and VSIP 
incentives, to include how they have been used to develop an 
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps''' software development 
processes, as well as a plan for further use of these 
incentives. The report should specify metrics for retooling its 
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and 
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of 
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.

Report on engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with university 
        community

    The Committee recognizes that the survivability and 
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important 
to the United States intelligence and defense communities. 
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the 
university community in support of basic research and 
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new 
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more 
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to report, within 
120 days of enactment of this Act, on NRO's current efforts and 
future strategies to engage with university partners that are 
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and 
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus 
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should 
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university 
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research 
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also 
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a 
University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) in this domain.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Facilities

    Consistent with Section 2401 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, the Committee 
authorizes the President's request for $381 million in Fiscal 
Year 2018 for phase one construction activities. The Committee 
recommends $447.8 million in Fiscal Year 2019 for phase two 
construction activities of the Next National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) West (N2W) facility in St. Louis, 
Missouri. The Committee is pleased that the second phase of 
this $837.2 million project is included in the Fiscal Year 2019 
President's budget.

Clarification of oversight responsibilities

    The Committee reinforces the requirement for all IC 
agencies funded by the National Intelligence Program to respond 
in a full, complete, and timely manner to any request for 
information made by a member of the congressional intelligence 
committees. In addition, the Committee directs the DNI to issue 
guidelines, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, to ensure 
that the intent of Section 501 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091) is carried out.

Clarification on cooperation with investigation on Russian influence in 
        the 2016 election

    The Committee continues to reinforce the obligation for all 
IC agencies to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner 
with the Committee's ongoing investigation into Russian 
meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and cooperation with 
the declassification process.

Supervisory feedback as part of continuous evaluation program

    The Committee directs the DNI to review the results of 
ongoing pilots regarding the use of supervisory feedback as 
part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous evaluation 
process and report, within 180 days of enactment of this Act, 
on the establishment of a policy for its use across the IC.

National security threats to critical infrastructure

    The Committee is aware of significant threats to our 
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by 
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information 
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital 
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committee 
has grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to 
analyzing and countering these threats are neither sufficient 
nor closely coordinated. The Committee includes provisions 
within this legislation to address these concerns.

Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection Doctrine

    The Committee directs the ODNI, in coordination with 
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework that 
could support the eventual creation and execution of a 
government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection 
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may 
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 180 days of enactment of this Act.
    This framework shall include:
          1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber 
        threats to the protection of the United States' 
        national security systems and critical infrastructure;
          2. Intelligence Community definitions of key 
        cybersecurity concepts, to include cyberespionage, 
        cyber theft, cyber acts of aggression, and cyber 
        deterrence;
          3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure 
        identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national 
        security interests, and to inform policy responses to 
        cyber attacks and computer network operations directed 
        against the United States;
          4. The Intelligence Community's methodology for 
        assessing the impacts of cyber attacks and computer 
        network operations incidents directed against the 
        United States, taking into account differing levels of 
        severity of incidents;
          5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response 
        to cyber attacks and computer network operations 
        incidents, taking into account differing levels of 
        severity of incidents;
          6. A policy and architecture for sharing 
        cybersecurity-related intelligence with government, 
        private sector, and international partners, including 
        existing statutory and other authorities which may be 
        exercised in pursuit of that goal; and
          7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities, 
        governance, technology, resources, and policy to 
        provide more capable and agile cybersecurity.

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and 
        Responsibilities

    The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) 
was codified by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010 to ``conduct independent reviews investigations, 
inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities 
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence'' and to lead the IC's IG community in 
its activities. The Committee is concerned that this intent is 
not fully exercised by the IC IG and reiterates the Congress's 
intent that the IC IG's role be over all IC-wide activities in 
addition to the ODNI. To support this intent, the Committee has 
directed a number of requirements to strengthen the IC IG's 
role and expects full cooperation from all Offices of Inspector 
General across the IC.
    The Committee also remains concerned about the level of 
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the 
level of insight congressional committees have into their 
disclosures. It is the Committee's expectation that all Offices 
of IG across the IC will fully cooperate with the direction 
provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the DNI and the 
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the 
disclosures made to any IG about any National Intelligence 
Program funded activity.

Space launch facilities

    The Committee continues to believe it is critical to 
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
national security space missions, and encourages planned 
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program 
(OSP)-3 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO-111) mission, to be 
launched in 2018 on a Minotaur 1 from the Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Spaceport at Wallops Flight Facility. In the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Committee directed 
a brief from the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Air Force,on their plans to utilize state-
owned and operated spaceports, which leverage non-federal 
public and private investments to bolster United States launch 
capabilities and provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high 
inclination orbits for national security missions.
    The Committee directs that the ODNI supplement this brief 
with how state investments in these spaceports may support 
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and 
launch capabilities, for national security launches.

Project MAVEN

    Project MAVEN provides important capabilities for the 
acceleration of ongoing efforts to integrate big data, 
artificial intelligence, and machine learning, and ensure our 
warfighters maintain an advantage over our adversaries. 
Ensuring coordinated investment between the Department of 
Defense and the Intelligence Community is specifically critical 
for improving object detection, identification, and tracking of 
targets.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, 
in coordination with relevant IC elements, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees, within 90 
days of enactment of this Act, on the following aspects of 
Project MAVEN: a strategy for coordinating and validating 
requirements; a methodology for cataloging data; development 
and deployment of algorithms; a technology investment plan; and 
a plan for fielding Project MAVEN capabilities.

Acquisition Research Center postings

    The Committee supports a flexible National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO) acquisition process that allows the NRO to choose 
the most appropriate contracting mechanism, whether for small 
research and development efforts or large acquisitions. The 
NRO's Acquisition Research Center (ARC), a classified 
contracting and solicitation marketplace that NRO and other 
agencies use, enables this flexible acquisition process for 
classified efforts.
    The Committee directs the NRO, within 60 days of enactment 
of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and 
defense committees on options for modifying ARC posting 
procedures to ensure fair and open competition. Those options 
should include ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations are 
posted on the unclassified FEDBIZOPS site, and identifying ways 
to better utilize the ARC to encourage contract opportunities 
for a more diverse industrial base that includes smaller and 
non-traditional companies.

Ensuring strong strategic analytical tradecraft

    The DHS's Office of I&A has taken steps to improve the 
quality of its analysis, to identify its core customers, and to 
tailor its production to meet customer needs. The Committee 
concurs with I&A's implementation of analytic standards and 
review mechanisms that have improved the tradecraft behind I&A 
productions. The bedrock of these efforts has been the 
development of a yearly program of analysis (POA) and key 
intelligence questions, which are essential tools for providing 
a roadmap and boundaries for the office's production efforts.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Office of I&A to 
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic 
intelligence capabilities and production, including the annual 
development of a POA. Within 90 days of enactment of the Act, 
and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A shall 
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the 
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should 
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been 
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against 
the POA.

Cyber/Counterintelligence analysis

    DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center 
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by 
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC intelligence 
production. Advanced technologies are increasingly ubiquitous 
and necessary to the function of modern society. Consequently, 
the scope of the threats from countries intent on using these 
technologies as a vector for collecting intelligence from 
within the United States will continue to expand. The Office of 
I&A is well positioned to conduct a niche analysis critical to 
national security that combines foreign intelligence with 
domestic threat information.
    The committee strongly supports I&A's Counterintelligence 
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the 
increased resources the Fiscal Year 2019 dedicated to this 
analysis. Therefore, the Committee directs the Office of I&A, 
in coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days 
of enactment of this Act on its recent analytic production 
related to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign 
technology companies, including a review of the countries and 
companies that present the greatest risks in this regard.

Intelligence support to the export control process

    The Committee has significant concerns that China poses a 
growing threat to United States national security, due in part 
to its relentless efforts to acquire United States technology. 
China purposely blurs the distinction between its military and 
civilian activities through its policy of ``military-civilian 
fusion,'' which compounds the risks of diversion of United 
States technology to the Chinese military.
    The Committee concludes that the United States Government 
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed to 
address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in existing 
U.S. mechanisms that are aimed at preventing dangerous 
technology transfers, including the U.S. export control system, 
which is run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS). The Committee has specific 
concerns about the lack of adequate and effective IC support to 
BIS's export license application review process and believes 
more robust IC support could have prevented many of the ill-
advised technology transfers that have occurred in recent 
years.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to submit a plan, 
within 120 days of enactment of this Act, to describe how the 
IC will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely 
analysis of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any 
proposed export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled 
technology. The plan shall include detailed information on the 
appropriate organizational structure, including how many IC 
personnel would be required, where they would be located 
(including whether they would be embedded at BIS to coordinate 
IC support), and the amounts of necessary funding. In 
formulating the plan, the DNI should study the ``National 
Security Threat Assessment'' process that the National 
Intelligence Council uses to inform the actions of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The DNI 
shall submit the plan to the congressional intelligence 
committees in classified form.

Social media

    The Committee encourages the IC, notably the FBI, to both 
continue and enhance its efforts to assist in detecting, 
understanding, and warning about foreign influence operations 
using social media tools to target the United States. 
Additionally, within the scope of the IC's authorities, and 
with all necessary protections for U.S. person information, the 
Committee encourages the IC to augment and prioritize these 
ongoing efforts.

Trade-based money laundering

    Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money 
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committee directs the 
DNI, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees on these 
threats, including an assessment of the severity of the threats 
posed to the United States' national security by trade-based 
money laundering conducted inside and outside the United 
States; an assessment of the scope of the financial threats to 
the U.S. economy and financial systems posed by trade-based 
money laundering; a description of how terrorist financing and 
drug trafficking organizations are advancing their illicit 
activities through the use of licit trade channels; an 
assessment of the adequacy of the systems and tools available 
to the Federal Government for combating trade-based money 
laundering; and a description and assessment of the current 
structure and coordination between Federal agencies, as well as 
with foreign governments, to combat trade-based money 
laundering. The report shall be submitted in classified form 
with an unclassified summary for public availability.

                            Committee Action

    On June 26, 2018, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report and the classified 
        annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annexes for 
Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, the base text for purposes of 
amendment.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to amending the 
bill's title to be the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc nine 
amendments to the classified annex, as sponsored by: (1) 
Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner; (2) Senator Rubio, and 
cosponsored by Senator Cornyn and Senator Manchin; (3) Senator 
Rubio, and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich; (4) Senator King, 
and cosponsored by Senator Cornyn; (5) Senator Cotton, and 
cosponsored by Senator Rubio, Senator Cornyn, and Senator 
Manchin; (6) Senator Manchin; (7) Senator Harris, and 
cosponsored by Senator Heinrich; (8) Senator Harris; and (9) 
Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, as to overall funding 
adjustments.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc seven 
amendments to the bill: (1) an amendment by Vice Chairman 
Warner regarding information sharing for positions of trust; 
(2) an amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator 
Rubio, Senator Heinrich, and Senator Harris, regarding state 
election officials' clearance eligibility; (3) an amendment by 
Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, regarding 
cyber protection for certain IC personnel; (4) an amendment by 
Senator Wyden regarding protections for confidentiality of 
whistleblower-related communications; (5) an amendment by 
Senator Wyden regarding a study and report on the feasibility 
of encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless telephone 
calls; (6) an amendment by Senator Heinrich regarding the IC's 
procurement authority to protect against supply chain risks; 
and (7) an amendment by Senator Harris to expand and clarify IC 
reporting on diversity.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree 
amendment by Chairman Burr to an amendment by Senator Cotton to 
the classified annex.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted the amendment by 
Senator Cotton to the classified annex, as modified by the 
second-degree amendment by Chairman Burr.
    By a vote of 6 ayes to 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Senator Rubio, and cosponsored by Senator 
Feinstein and Senator Cornyn, regarding creditable service for 
federal retirement for certain individuals. The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--
aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--
no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--
aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator 
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--no.
    By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by 
Senator Lankford, regarding the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.
    By a vote of 14 ayes to 1 no, the Committee adopted a 
second-degree amendment by Senator King to an amendment by 
Senator Wyden that prohibits IC officers nominated to Senate-
confirmed positions from making certain classification 
determinations, and would have required advisory opinions from 
the Public Interest Declassification Board. The second-degree 
amendment struck the Public Interest Declassified Board 
requirement. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; 
Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Lankford--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice Chairman 
Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator 
Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Manchin--aye; and 
Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of 14 ayes to 1 no, the Committee adopted the 
amendment by Senator Wyden that prohibits IC officers nominated 
to Senate-confirmed positions from making certain 
classification determinations, as modified by the second-degree 
amendment by Senator King. The votes in person or by proxy were 
as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator 
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator 
Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of 6 ayes to 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator 
Feinstein, Senator Heinrich, and Senator Harris, regarding IC 
reporting on IC resources used for certain travel and vetting 
initiatives. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Rubio--no; 
Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; Senator Lankford--no; 
Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Vice Chairman Warner--
aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator 
Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Manchin--no; and 
Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of 7 ayes to 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Senator Heinrich, regarding limitations on 
intelligence sharing with the Republic of Korea and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The votes in person or 
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; 
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; 
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; 
Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
    Senator Feinstein filed two amendments regarding the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act that she did not offer.
    Senator Wyden filed three amendments regarding the 
appointment of an Executive Director for IC whistleblowing and 
source protection, striking the Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks, 
and modifying unauthorized disclosures reporting, respectively, 
that he did not offer.

Vote to report the committee bill

    The Committee voted to report the bill unanimously, as 
amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and zero noes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator 
Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator 
Cornyn--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; 
Senator Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes, following the completion 
of the mark-up.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 28, 
2018, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

        ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN, HEINRICH, AND HARRIS

    We have sought information from the DNI on whether and to 
what extent Intelligence Community resources are intended to 
support the implementation of travel and vetting-related 
Executive Orders, ICE's ``Extreme Vetting Initiative,'' and any 
expansion of vetting of DACA recipients, people granted 
temporary protected status, or the general undocumented 
immigrant population. We are working with Committee leadership 
in obtaining this information in a timely manner.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Fiscal Year 2019 Intelligence Authorization bill 
includes eight important amendments I offered, three of which 
carried over from the Fiscal Year 2018 bill.
    The first amendment requires reporting from the Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Department of 
the Treasury, on the threat to the United States from Russian 
money laundering. It has become apparent that following the 
trail of illicit Russian money is a central component of any 
counterintelligence investigation related to Russia. Russian 
money laundering also threatens the U.S. financial system as 
well as efforts to enforce sanctions and fight organized crime. 
This reporting will bring together the resources of the 
Intelligence Community and elements of the Treasury Department 
under the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, such 
as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), so that 
the government and the Congress can understand the complex and 
hidden networks of shell companies and other money laundering 
instruments overseas and here in the United States.
    The second amendment prohibits the U.S.-Russia cyber 
security unit announced by the President on July 9, 2017, or 
any other U.S.-Russia cyber agreement, unless Congress has full 
information about what the administration intends. The 
President's statement that this unit will ensure that 
``election hacking, & many other negative things, will be 
guarded and safe''' raises numerous counterintelligence 
concerns, given Russia's hacking in connection with the 2016 
U.S. election. My amendment requires the DNI, at least 30 days 
prior to any such agreement, to report on what intelligence 
will be shared with Russia, the counterintelligence concerns 
associated with any such agreement, and what will be done to 
mitigate those concerns.
    The third amendment carried over from the Fiscal Year 2018 
bill requires a report on the threat that cyber security 
vulnerabilities in telecommunications networks, including 
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7), could result in foreign 
government surveillance of Americans, including U.S. government 
personnel. A Department of Homeland Security report from April 
2017 highlighted the risks of SS7 vulnerabilities. My amendment 
will require the whole of the Intelligence Community to report 
on whether foreign government surveillance is occurring as a 
result of this known vulnerability, and what the IC is doing 
about it.
    The Fiscal Year 2019 bill includes five new amendments I 
offered. The first requires a report from the DNI, in 
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, on the protection of whistleblower-related 
communications in the context of ``continuous evaluation'' of 
persons with security clearances. ``Continuous evaluation,'' in 
particular monitoring of communications, risks violating the 
confidentiality of whistleblowers and chilling whistleblower 
activities. Such a result would not only deprive the government 
of knowledge of waste, fraud and abuse, but could lead to more 
unauthorized disclosures, the very problem the continuous 
evaluation policy is intended to address.
    I offered two amendments that will help protect the 
unclassified communications of Intelligence Community 
personnel. The first, co-sponsored by Senator Heinrich, permits 
the DNI to provide cyber protection support for the personal 
devices and accounts of Intelligence Community personnel who 
are especially vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile 
collection activities. The second amendment requires the DNI to 
conduct a study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified 
communications among Intelligence Community personnel. 
Intelligence Community personnel should never communicate 
classified information through unclassified channels and should 
limit business to official devices and accounts. Nonetheless, 
these amendments recognize the reality that unclassified and 
personal communications may be of significant interest to our 
adversaries and should thus be secured to the greatest extent 
possible.
    The bill includes an amendment I offered with Senators 
Rubio, Heinrich, and Harris that removed the underlying bill's 
limits on the number of state election officials granted 
security clearances. As states and localities work to combat 
the evolving cyber threat to our election infrastructure, they 
will need additional assistance from the federal government, 
including the provision of classified threat information. It is 
thus critical that the Department of Homeland Security and the 
states have flexibility in ensuring that the people who need 
the information to safeguard our elections receive it.
    Finally, the bill includes an amendment I offered with 
Senators King, Heinrich, and Harris that prohibits Intelligence 
Community officers who are nominated to Senate-confirmed 
positions from making classification decisions about 
themselves. The amendment addresses a clear conflict of 
interest problem in which the officer could engage in selective 
classification and declassification in a manner that helps him 
or her get confirmed. The amendment gives the decision to the 
DNI, or the Principal Deputy DNI should the nominated officer 
be the DNI him or herself. It also requires a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on the reasons for the 
decision. The amendment originally required an advisory opinion 
from the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB), which 
would have added an independent perspective to the process. 
While I am disappointed that this requirement was removed, the 
amendment is nonetheless an important step forward.
    I remain concerned with a provision in the bill, carried 
over from Fiscal Year 2018, stating that it is the Sense of 
Congress ``that WikiLeaks and the senior leadership of 
WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile intelligence service 
often abetted by state actors and should be treated as such a 
service by the United States.'' My concern with this language 
does not relate to the actions of WikiLeaks, which, as I have 
stressed in the past, was part of a direct attack on our 
democracy. My concern is that the use of the novel phrase 
``non-state hostile intelligence service'' may have legal, 
constitutional, and policy implications, particularly should it 
be applied to journalists inquiring about secrets.
                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

                                  [all]