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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     111-63
======================================================================
 
 APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE 
                   FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

                                _______
                                

                 July 29, 2009.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Baucus, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                      [To accompany S.J. Res. 17]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 17) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
    I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee......................1
      A. Report of the Committee on Finance......................     1
      B. Background..............................................     2
          1. The Government of Burma.............................     2
          2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.......     2
          3. S.J. Res. 17 Is a ``Renewal Resolution'' for 
              Purposes of Extending Import Restrictions..........     4
          4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 17.............     4
          5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade 
              Sanctions Against Burma............................     4
          6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma....     8
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution..........................9
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......11

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................11

              I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE


                 A. Report of the Committee on Finance

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 17) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass.

                             B. Background


1. The Government of Burma

    Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), a military junta that took power in September 
1988. Since taking power, the junta has violently suppressed 
pro-democracy movements. International human rights 
organizations and the U.S. Department of State have reported a 
pattern of SPDC policies that include the suppression of 
political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners, 
widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians, 
conscription of civilians--including children--into military 
services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work 
on economic projects. Recent examples of these human rights 
abuses are provided below.
    On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred 
people assaulted the opposition National League for Democracy 
(NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near 
Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. The attackers were 
members of the United Solidarity Development Association 
(USDA), an organization affiliated with the SDPC. Some NLD 
supporters were killed, and others were taken into custody.
    In September 2007, the Burmese government engaged in a 
violent crackdown against Buddhist monks and other Burmese 
citizens who were demonstrating peacefully against the poor 
economic conditions in Burma and the repressive policies of the 
SPDC. And the government failed to provide adequate 
humanitarian assistance or allow speedy entry of international 
aid in response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.
    Most recently, in May 2009, the Burmese Government accused 
Suu Kyi of violating her house arrest by permitting the 
uninvited visit of an American man, John Yettaw. Suu Kyi's 
trial began in May and is currently underway. United Nations 
investigators allege that the Burmese Government has violated 
Suu Kyi's substantive and procedural rights during the course 
of her trial.

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

    On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003 (the BFDA) was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in 
response to the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30, 2003. 
A revised version of the legislation was introduced in the 
Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, 
passed the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a 
recorded vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an 
amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418-2, 1 
Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed version of 
H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded 
vote of 94-1. The legislation was presented to the President on 
July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 
2003 (Pub. L. 108-61).
    The BFDA bans the importation of any article that is a 
product of Burma. The BFDA allows the President to lift these 
import restrictions if he certifies to Congress that (1) the 
SPDC has made substantial progress to end human rights 
violations, including rapes, and no longer systematically 
violates workers' rights, including forced and child labor, and 
conscription of child soldiers; (2) the SPDC has made 
substantial progress toward implementing a democratic 
government, including by releasing political prisoners, by 
allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion, 
and by reaching agreement with the NLD for a democratically 
elected civilian government; and (3) Burma has not been 
designated as a country that has failed to abide by its 
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and 
to take other effective counternarcotics measures. In addition 
to the import ban, the BFDA also freezes the assets of the 
Burmese regime and its officials held by U.S. financial 
institutions, directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct 
the U.S. representatives to international financial 
institutions to oppose loans or other assistance to Burma, and 
authorizes the President to deny visas to the leaders of the 
Burmese regime.
    In July 2008, Congress amended the BFDA when it passed the 
Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) 
Act of 2008 (JADE Act). The JADE Act was introduced in the 
House on October 18, 2007, and passed by voice vote on December 
11, 2007. The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on 
December 19, 2007. After resolving the differences between the 
two bills, the revised legislation was passed by the House on 
July 15, 2008 by voice vote and by the Senate on July 22, 2008 
by Unanimous Consent. The President signed the legislation into 
law on July 29, 2008. The JADE Act amends the import 
restrictions of the BFDA by prohibiting the importation into 
the United States of jewelry from any country that contains 
jadeite or rubies mined in Burma. The JADE Act also imposes 
additional financial and visa sanctions on members of the SPDC 
or USDA and their immediate family members.
    Pursuant to section 9(b) of the BFDA, the import ban 
expires after 1 year unless a new joint resolution approving a 
1-year renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to 
the anniversary of the date of enactment of the BFDA. The 
current import ban remains in effect through July 28, 2009.
    As originally enacted, section 9(b)(3) also limited the 
imposition of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years from 
the date of enactment, or until 2006. In 2006, a joint 
resolution was introduced to extend this period to a maximum of 
6 years from the date of enactment, or until 2009. 
Specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in the House on May 
19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the Senate on May 
26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 11, 2006 by 
voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on 
July 26, 2006 and passed without amendment by voice vote. The 
President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 (Pub. 
L. 109-251).
    S.J. Res. 17 renews the import ban for another year, in 
accordance with section 9(b) of the BFDA. The resolution also 
extends the limitation on the import restrictions to a maximum 
of 9 years from the date of enactment, or until 2012. A similar 
resolution (H.J. Res. 56), which included budgetary offsets, 
was passed by the House on July 21, 2009, by voice vote. H.J. 
Res. 56 was received by the Senate on July 22, 2009, and passed 
by Unanimous Consent on July 23, 2009. The resolution was 
signed by the President on July 28, 2009.

3. S.J. Res. 17 Is a ``Renewal Resolution'' for Purposes of Extending 
        Import Restrictions

    As described above, the import restrictions in the BFDA may 
be renewed for a 1-year period if Congress approves a ``renewal 
resolution,'' which section 9(c)(1) defines as a joint 
resolution whose sole matter after the resolving clause is 
language to renew the import restrictions for 1 year. Section 
9(c)(2)(B) applies the expedited procedures set forth in 
section 152 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade Act of 
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), to Finance 
Committee and floor consideration of a renewal resolution.
    S.J. Res. 17 does not meet the definition of ``renewal 
resolution'' under section 9(c)(1) of the BFDA because the 
resolution both renews the import restrictions for 1 year 
(section 1) and extends the limitation on annual renewal 
resolutions from 6 years to 9 years (section 2(a)). Section 
2(b) of S.J. Res. 17, however, deems the resolution to be a 
``renewal resolution'' for purposes of section 9 of the BFDA. 
The effect of section 2(b) is to qualify S.J. Res. 17 as a 
renewal resolution for the purpose of extending the import 
restrictions for 1 year under section 9(b)(2) of the Act; 
however, section 2(b) does not trigger the application of the 
expedited procedures set forth in section 9(c)(2)(B) of the 
BFDA.
    S.J. Res. 17 was introduced in the Senate before receipt of 
H.J. Res. 56 from the House, and the House passed its 
resolution before the Committee reported the Senate measure. 
Thus, upon receipt of the House-passed measure, the House 
resolution was placed on the Senate calendar, and the Committee 
continued to report the Senate measure. After the Committee 
reported the Senate measure, the vote on passage in the Senate 
was on the House-passed measure.

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 17

    The Committee considered S.J. Res. 17 in open executive 
session on July 23, 2009.
    With a quorum present, the Committee approved S.J. Res. 17 
by voice vote. (Note: Senator Enzi asked for the record to 
reflect that he voted ``nay''.)
    The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July 
23, 2009.

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions 
        Against Burma

    On July 21, 2009, the U.S. Department of State submitted to 
Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, 
as required by section 8(b)(3) of the BFDA. At the request of 
the Chairman, that report was made a part of the record of the 
Committee's consideration of S.J. Res. 17. The State Department 
report is reprinted below:
                                  U.S. Department of State,
                                     Washington, DC, July 20, 2009.
Hon. Max Baucus,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The enclosed report reviews measures to 
promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the 
effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom 
and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) to improve conditions 
in Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also 
discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban 
contained in the Act.
    We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not 
hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance in 
this matter.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard R. Verma,
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosure:
          As stated.

            Report on U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Burma


                        INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

    Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003, P.L. 108-61 (the BFDA), and in view of 
the impending expiration of the import ban contained in the 
BFDA, this report reviews bilateral and multilateral measures 
to promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the 
effectiveness of the Act's trade provisions relative to the 
improvement of conditions in Bui Ina and the furtherance of 
U.S. policy objectives.
    During this reporting period (May 2008 to July 2009), the 
United States tightened economic sanctions, targeting 
additional leaders and affiliates of the Burmese regime, and 
added new sanctions pursuant to the Tom Lantos Block Burmese 
JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
286). These restrictions make it more difficult and costly for 
regime leaders and their affiliates to continue to profit from 
the repression of the Burmese people. Despite these measures, 
expanding trade with countries in the region and continued 
income from the exploitation of Burma's natural gas reserves 
provided the regime the economic means to maintain its military 
rule. In the absence of concrete progress toward respect for 
human rights, transition to democracy, and other key policy 
goals, the State Department supports a renewal resolution to 
maintain the import ban.

                  BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

    During the reporting period, the United States intensified 
its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma 
through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in 
Southeast Asia and beyond, by supporting UN action on Burma, 
and by expanding targeted sanctions on the Burmese leadership 
and its financial supporters. The United States continued to 
push for international pressure on Burmese authorities to begin 
a dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority representatives 
on a transition to democracy. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon 
maintained regular contact with representatives of civil 
society and ethnic minority groups, and used every possible 
interaction with Burmese officials to advocate respect for 
human rights and encourage political reform.
    Senior U.S. officials encouraged their counterparts in the 
region and other like-minded states to press the regime to take 
concrete and credible actions towards national reconciliation 
and democratic transition. The European Union, Australia, and 
Canada each maintain financial and trade sanctions against the 
Burmese regime. All three continue to impose restrictions on 
Burmese imports (focusing on gems and timber) as well as 
targeted financial sanctions against senior Burmese government 
members and their inner circle of supporters.
    The United States has consistently pushed for the United 
Nations to keep pressure on the regime through the UN Security 
Council and more effective engagement by the UN Secretary 
General's Good Offices Mission. On May 2, 2008, the UN Security 
Council issued a Presidential Statement that called for the 
regime to hold a free and fair constitutional referendum 
including full participation of all political actors and 
respect for fundamental political freedoms. On May 22, 2009, 
the Security Council issued a press statement that expressed 
concern about the political impact of the trial of National 
League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It also 
reiterated the need for Burma to create the conditions 
necessary for dialogue in order to achieve national 
reconciliation, including the release of political prisoners. 
UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari also briefed the UN 
Security Council and the Group of Friends.
    On April 30, 2008, the President issued an Executive Order 
that expanded the scope of financial sanctions against the 
regime by permitting the targeting of entities owned or 
controlled by the Burmese government or its officials. On July 
29, 2008, the President signed the JADE Act, which imposed 
additional visa restrictions and financial sanctions and 
expanded a prohibition on the importation of Burmese jadeite 
and rubies to include jadeite and rubies, and articles of 
jewelry containing them. The prohibition on entry into the 
United States of such jadeite and rubies, and articles of 
jewelry containing them, is expected to hinder the ability of 
the Burmese regime to market rough jadeite and rubies to the 
international jewelry industry, which will no longer be able to 
export such items to the U.S. market. On the same day, the 
President also announced financial sanctions against 10 new 
businesses and individuals. On January 15, 2009, the United 
States imposed financial sanctions on an additional 25 
companies and individuals who provide support to the regime. 
The United States continues active efforts to identify regime 
officials and cronies. To date, the United States has 
sanctioned 17 financial supporters of the regime and their 
family members, and 41 of their companies.

               EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

    U.S. economic sanctions have made it more difficult and 
more costly for the Burmese regime and its financial supporters 
to continue profiting from their repressive policies. Senior 
Burmese regime officials, such as the Foreign Minister, have 
publicly complained about sanctions and called for them to be 
lifted. Influential businessmen in Rangoon with connections to 
the regime have increasingly complained about the detrimental 
effects sanctions have had on their business operations and 
personal lives. Between May 1, 2008, and July 10, 2009, 109 
transactions totaling approximately $5,133,000 and involving 
Burmese individuals or entities were reported to the Treasury 
Department as blocked. Despite these consequences, the Burmese 
regime has given no indication that it is open to meaningful 
democratization.
    During the reporting period, the Treasury Department issued 
63 licenses authorizing the release of blocked funds or 
otherwise prohibited transactions, for example, to allow NGOs 
to conduct non-humanitarian transactions, including 
agricultural development, microfinance, and education projects. 
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Burma in 
May 2008, the Department of the Treasury issued General License 
14, which, as subsequently amended, continues to provide a 
broad authorization for funds transfers in support of 
humanitarian and religious activities in Burma.
    While the United States and others continue to look at ways 
to target sanctions against the Burmese authorities, growing 
trade with countries in the region and increased income from 
the exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits has provided 
the regime the economic means to retain power. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Burma's GDP grew roughly 3.4 
percent in 2007, due primarily to rising prices for petroleum 
and agricultural exports. According to Burma's Ministry of 
Commerce, total trade reached $10.4 billion in 2008, with 
exports of $6.6 billion and imports of $3.8 billion. 
Nevertheless, foreign investment falls well below potential 
investment levels, as the Burmese business climate continues to 
worsen.
    The regime continued to commit gross human rights abuses 
during this reporting period. The military regime severely 
restricted and frequently violated freedom of assembly, 
expression, association, movement, and religion. Human rights 
abuses have included custodial abuses and deaths, 
disappearances, rape, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, 
and forced labor. The government continued to infiltrate and 
covertly and overtly monitor meetings and activities of 
virtually all non-governmental organizations, including 
religious organizations.
    In November and December 2008, the Burmese authorities 
sentenced more than 150 political prisoners to draconian prison 
terms, in effect life sentences. Many of those prisoners had 
been held for nearly a year without being charged and were 
convicted of offenses relating to their participation in the 
pro-democracy movement, including the August and September 2007 
protests (i.e., the ``Saffron Revolution''). Others, such as 
political activist and comedian Zarganar, were convicted of 
crimes after criticizing the Burmese government's failure to 
respond following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis. 
Although the authorities granted amnesty to nearly 10,000 
prisoners during the reporting period, fewer than 40 of those 
released were political prisoners. Burmese authorities continue 
to hold an estimated 2,100 political prisoners.
    On May 14, 2009, Burmese authorities charged democratic 
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on spurious counts of 
violating her house arrest and transferred her to Insein 
Prison, She was subsequently put on trial; as of the writing of 
this report, that trial is ongoing. The United States has 
joined with many other countries in condemning her arrest and 
the related judicial proceedings.

             EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

    Intensified sanctions targeting regime leaders and their 
financial supporters sent a clear signal to the regime and to 
the Burmese people of support for a transition to democracy. 
Many individuals in. the Burmese democracy movement support 
U.S. sanctions. However, some academics and exiled Burmese have 
questioned whether U.S. sanctions have any chance of success 
without the participation of Burma's major trading partners, 
including China, India, ASEAN members, and other countries in 
the region.
    The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented 
pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 
(BFDA) and Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448, and 13464 have 
had a limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations. 
Although some foreign businesses and their representative 
embassies have complained about the impact of sanctions, those 
investing in Burma since 2003 have done so recognizing the 
difficult operating environment and overall poor economic 
climate created by the regime.
    The restrictions contained in the JADE Act that amend the 
BFDA on the importation of jadeite and rubies into the United 
States have an impact on other countries that process jadeite 
and rubies. Thailand specifically has expressed strong concern 
over the negative impact the JADE Act provisions have had on 
its ruby-processing and jewelry manufacturing industry.

                               CONCLUSION

    Burma's generals continue to ignore the desire of the 
Burmese people for democracy and respect for human rights. 
Nonetheless, the Administration's support for Burma's democracy 
movement remains firm. The United States continues to work 
within the UN and with countries in Southeast Asia and beyond 
to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. Economic 
sanctions are one important tool for exerting pressure on the 
regime to respect the will of the Burmese people and to 
cooperate with the international community's efforts to 
facilitate a genuine dialogue with democratic and ethnic 
minority representatives on a transition to democracy. In the 
absence of concrete progress on the part of the Burmese 
authorities in key areas of democracy and human rights, failure 
to renew the import ban in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy 
Act as amended by the JADE Act, would send Burma's ruling 
generals the wrong message. The Department of State supports a 
resolution to extend the authorization period for the BFDA, 
which will otherwise expire this year, and to renew the BFDA 
sanctions for another year.

6. Additional international sanctions against Burma

    The international community has joined with the United 
States in protesting human rights conditions in Burma. The 
European Union, Australia, and Canada each maintain financial 
and trade sanctions against the Burmese regime. All three 
continue to impose restrictions on Burmese imports, focusing on 
gems and timber, as well as targeted financial sanctions 
against senior Burmese government members and their inner 
circle of supporters. In May 2008, the United Nations Security 
Council issued a Presidential Statement that called on the 
Burmese Government to hold a free and fair constitutional 
referendum, and to allow greater humanitarian aid to enter the 
country.

              II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 23, 2009.
Hon. Max Baucus,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 17, a joint 
resolution approving the renewal of import restrictions 
contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, and 
for other purposes.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Zachary 
Epstein, who can be reached at 226-2680.
            Sincerely,
                                         Robert A. Sunshine
                                        (For Douglas W. Elmendorf).
    Enclosure.

S.J. Res. 17--A joint resolution approving the renewal of import 
        restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
        of 2003, and for other purposes

    Summary--S.J. Res. 17 would renew for one year the ban on 
all imports from Burma, including a ban on imports of certain 
gemstones originating from Burma. The ban was originally 
enacted as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 
(Public Law 108-61) and was set to expire on July 28, 2004. The 
ban has subsequently been renewed five times, most recently in 
Public Law 110-287, through its current expiration date of July 
28, 2009. Previous legislation limited renewals of the ban to a 
total of six years. This joint resolution would increase that 
limit to nine years, thereby allowing three additional one-year 
bans.
    CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from 
Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 
2009 and by about $2 million in 2010, with no effect 
thereafter. CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would not 
affect federal spending.
    Under S.J. Res. 17, the President could lift the import 
restrictions if the State Peace and Development Council, the 
military regime of Burma, has made substantial and measurable 
progress to end violations of human rights, implemented a 
democratic government, and met its obligations under 
international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also 
would have the authority to terminate the restrictions upon the 
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or 
waive them in the national interest.
    By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17 
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). Based on information from the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC), CBO estimates that the 
aggregate direct cost of the mandates would fall below the 
annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in 
UMRA ($139 million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation). 
S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
impact of S.J. Res. 17 is shown in the following table. The 
costs of this legislation fall within budget function 750 
(administration of justice).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   2015   2016   2017   2018   2019  2009-2014  2009-2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                   CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues...................................      *     -2      0      0      0      0      0      0      0      0      0       -2         -2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * = Revenue loss less than $500,000.

    Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 17, the President would 
have the authority to lift or waive the ban imposed by the 
resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President 
would not exercise this authority before the termination of the 
one-year ban.
    Based on data from the USITC on past U.S. imports from 
Burma and CBO's most recent forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO 
estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would reduce federal 
revenues by less than $500,000 in 2009 and by about $2 million 
in 2010, net of income and payroll tax offsets.
    In years just before the import ban first went into effect, 
over half of all U.S. imports from Burma were knitted or 
crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports 
included apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain types 
of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious 
and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and 
tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties 
collected on these imports came from knitted and crocheted 
articles, CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be 
replaced with imports from other countries.
    The President could remove the ban on imports upon the 
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if 
he were to determine and notify the Congress that to do so is 
in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. 
companies would be allowed to resume importation of goods 
produced, manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. If such 
an action were taken during the 2009-2010 period, the impact on 
federal revenues would be reduced accordingly.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: By renewing 
for one year the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17 
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The 
cost of the mandate would be the net value of forgone profits 
from banned Burmese products. According to information from the 
USITC, the value of imports from Burma was approximately $356 
million in 2002 and $276 million in 2003. Based on trade data 
from the USITC, CBO concludes that importers have been able to 
substitute goods from other countries, mostly within the 
region, to compensate for a large portion of the trade loss 
with Burma. Based on that information, CBO estimates that the 
cost of the mandate would likely fall below the annual 
threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA ($139 
million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation). CBO has 
determined that S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental 
mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, 
local, or tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Zachary Epstein; 
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Burke Doherty; 
Impact on the Private Sector: Marin Randall.
    Estimate approved by: Frank Sammartino, Acting Assistant 
Director for Tax Analysis.

    III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states 
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any 
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy 
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional 
paperwork.
    The following information is provided in accordance with 
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
(Pub. L. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of 
S.J. Res. 17 as approved by the Committee on July 23, 2009. In 
accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. 104-04, the 
Committee has determined that the bill contains no 
intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not 
affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

                      IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
the resolution, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 9. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.

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          (3) Limitation.--The import restrictions contained in 
        section 3(a)(1) may be renewed for a maximum of [six 
        years] nine years from the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.

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