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108th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     108-558
======================================================================
 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

                                _______
                                

 June 21, 2004.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 4548]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 4548) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2005 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose..........................................................    14
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee 
  Intent.........................................................    15
Scope of Committee Review........................................    16
Committee Findings and Recommendations...........................    16
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported..............    40
    Title I--Intelligence Activities.............................    40
        Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations.............    40
        Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations.......    40
        Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments...............    40
        Section 104--Community Management Account................    41
    Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
      Disability System..........................................    41
        Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations.............    41
    Title III--General Provisions................................    41
        Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and 
          Benefits Authorized by Law.............................    41
        Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence 
          Activities.............................................    41
        Section 303--Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
          For Information Management.............................    41
    Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................    42
        Section 401--Permanent Extension of Central Intelligence 
          Agency Voluntary Separation Incentive Program..........    42
    Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Activities.......    42
        Section 501--National Security Agency Emerging 
          Technologies Panel.....................................    42
    Title VI--Education..........................................    42
    Subtitle A--National Security Education Program..............    42
        Section 601--Provision for Annual Funding................    42
        Section 602--Modification of Obligated Service 
          Requirements Under the National Security Education 
          Program................................................    43
        Section 603--Improvements to the National Flagship 
          Language Initiative....................................    43
        Section 604--Establishment of Scholarship Program for 
          English Language Studies for Heritage Community 
          Citizens of the United States Within the National 
          Security Education Program.............................    43
    Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign 
      Language Skills............................................    43
        Section 611--Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
          for Language and Education.............................    43
        Section 612--Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency 
          for Advancement to Certain Senior Level Positions in 
          the Intelligence Community.............................    44
        Section 613--Advancement of Foreign Languages Critical to 
          the Intelligence Community.............................    44
        Section 614--Pilot Project for Civilian Linguist Reserve 
          Corps..................................................    44
        Section 615--Codification of Establishment of the 
          National Virtual Translation Center....................    44
        Section 616--Report on Recruitment and Retention of 
          Qualified Instructors of the Defense Language Institute    45
Committee Position...............................................    45
Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular 
  Provisions.....................................................    48
    Letter From Chairman Hunter to Chairman Goss.................    48
    Letter From Chairman Goss to Chairman Hunter.................    49
    Letter From Chairman Boehner to Chairman Goss................    49
    Letter From Chairman Goss to Chairman Boehner................    50
Oversight Findings and Recommendations...........................    50
Fiscal Year Cost Projections.....................................    51
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................    51
Committee Cost Estimates.........................................    54
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of 
  This Legislation...............................................    54
Changes to Existing Law..........................................    54
Minority Views...................................................    69
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information 
Management.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency voluntary 
separation incentive program.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.

                          TITLE VI--EDUCATION

            Subtitle A--National Security Education Program

Sec. 601. Provision for annual funding.
Sec. 602. Modification of obligated service requirements under the 
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 603. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 604. Establishment of scholarship program for English language 
studies for heritage community citizens of the United States within the 
National Security Education Program.

  Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language 
                                 Skills

Sec. 611. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education.
Sec. 612. Requirement for foreign language proficiency for advancement 
to certain senior level positions in the intelligence community.
Sec. 613. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 614. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 615. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual 
Translation Center.
Sec. 616. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors 
of the Defense Language Institute.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (2) The Department of Defense.
          (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (4) The National Security Agency.
          (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (6) The Department of State.
          (7) The Department of the Treasury.
          (8) The Department of Energy.
          (9) The Department of Justice.
          (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (13) The Coast Guard.
          (14) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, for the conduct of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed 
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4548 of the One 
Hundred Eighth Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the 
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the 
executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2005 under section 102 when 
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions.
  (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central 
Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the 
authority granted by this section.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 the sum of 
$318,395,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced 
research and development shall remain available until September 30, 
2006.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 
2005. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of 
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed 
from other elements of the United States Government.
  (c) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
        Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized 
        to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
        Account for fiscal year 2005 such additional amounts as are 
        specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred 
        to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and 
        development shall remain available until September 30, 2006.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
        Community Management Account as of September 30, 2005, there 
        are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements 
        as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
        Authorizations.
  (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2005 any 
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed 
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community 
Management Account from another element of the United States Government 
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis 
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
  (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
        in subsection (a), $29,811,000 shall be available for the 
        National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds 
        provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation 
        purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006, and 
        funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available 
        until September 30, 2007.
          (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
        shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the 
        National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The 
        Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the 
        activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
          (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
        Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
        provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
          (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
        operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2005 the sum of 
$239,400,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 303. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INFORMATION 
                    MANAGEMENT.

  (a) Establishment of Position Within the Office of the Director of 
Central Intelligence.--Subsection (e)(2) of section 102 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
          (1) by striking subparagraph (G); and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new 
        subparagraph (G):
          ``(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Information Management.''.
  (b) Duties.--Section 102 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (h); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
        subsection (h):
  ``(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information 
Management.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there 
shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information 
Management who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Information Management is the chief information 
officer of the intelligence community.
  ``(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Information Management shall--
          ``(A) manage activities relating to the information 
        technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture 
        requirements of the intelligence community;
          ``(B) have procurement approval authority over all 
        information technology items related to the enterprise 
        architectures of all intelligence community components;
          ``(C) direct and manage all information technology-related 
        procurement for the intelligence community; and
          ``(D) ensure that all expenditures for information technology 
        and research and development activities are consistent with the 
        intelligence community enterprise architecture and the strategy 
        of the Director of Central Intelligence for such architecture.
  ``(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant Director of 
Central Intelligence for Information Management may not, while so 
serving, serve as the chief information officer of any other agency or 
department, or component thereof, of the United States.''.
  (c) References.--Any reference to the Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Administration in any law, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Information Management.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY 
                    SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.

  (a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (f); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
        (f) and (g), respectively.
  (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of 
such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking 
subsection (i).
  (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act 
of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public 
Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES PANEL.

  The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
  ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency 
Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the 
National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall 
report directly to, the Director.
  ``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel shall 
study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the 
research, development, and application of existing and emerging science 
and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics.
  ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging 
Technologies Panel.''.

                          TITLE VI--EDUCATION

            Subtitle A--National Security Education Program

SEC. 601. PROVISION FOR ANNUAL FUNDING.

  (a) In General.--Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by 
section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037), is amended by adding at the 
end of section 810 the following new subsection:
  ``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for 
Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts 
that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal 
year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the 
Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 
2005, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant 
programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of 
section 802(a)(1).''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by 
inserting ``or from a transfer under section 810(c)'' after ``National 
Security Education Trust Fund''.

SEC. 602. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 
                    NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of title VIII of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 
102-183; 105 Stat. 1273), as amended by section 925(a) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 
Stat. 1578), is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B), and 
inserting the following:
                  ``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, as 
                soon as practicable but in no case later than three 
                years after the completion by the recipient of the 
                study for which scholarship assistance was provided 
                under the program, the recipient shall work for a 
                period of one year--
                          ``(i) in a national security position that 
                        the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use 
                        the unique language and region expertise 
                        acquired by the recipient pursuant to such 
                        study in the Department of Defense, in any 
                        element of the intelligence community, in the 
                        Department of Homeland Security, or in the 
                        Department of State; or
                          ``(ii) in such a position in any other 
                        Federal department or agency not referred to in 
                        clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the 
                        Secretary that no position is available in a 
                        Federal department or agency specified in 
                        clause (i); or
                  ``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, as 
                soon as practicable but in no case later than two years 
                after the completion by the recipient of the study for 
                which fellowship assistance was provided under the 
                program, the recipient shall work for a period equal to 
                the duration of assistance provided under the program, 
                but in no case less than one year--
                          ``(i) in a position described in subparagraph 
                        (A)(i) that the Secretary certifies is 
                        appropriate to use the unique language and 
                        region expertise acquired by the recipient 
                        pursuant to such study; or
                          ``(ii) in such a position in any other 
                        Federal department or agency not referred to in 
                        clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the 
                        Secretary that no position is available in a 
                        Federal department or agency specified in 
                        clause (i); and''.
  (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a). In 
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish standards 
that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance under the 
program under such section 802 are required to demonstrate to satisfy 
the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as required 
under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(2) of such section.
  (c) Applicability.--(1) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David 
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
  (2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not affect the force, 
validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under the 
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the date 
of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date.

SEC. 603. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.

  (a) Increase in Annual Funding.--Title VIII of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 
1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by 
section 333(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended by striking 
section 811 and inserting the following new section 811:

``SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.

  ``(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and 
2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the 
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with 
fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the 
National Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
  ``(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for 
Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts 
that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal 
year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the 
Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 
2005, $12,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the National 
Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
  ``(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made available 
under this section shall remain available until expended.''.
  (b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of the 
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 
1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student that 
participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the student 
shall enter into an agreement described in subsection (b), other than 
such a student who has entered into such an agreement pursuant to 
subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
  ``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of the 
Federal Government that participates in training in programs under 
paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in writing--
          ``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or department 
        of the Federal Government employing the employee for the period 
        of such training;
          ``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or 
        department employing the employee following completion of such 
        training for a period of two years for each year, or part of 
        the year, of such training;
          ``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of 
        such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) 
        provided to the employee if, before the completion by the 
        employee of the training, the employment of the employee by the 
        agency or department is terminated due to misconduct by the 
        employee or by the employee voluntarily; and
          ``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing 
        such training, the employment of the employee by the agency or 
        department is terminated either by the agency or department due 
        to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily, 
        before the completion by the employee of the period of service 
        required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the same ratio 
        to the total cost of the training (excluding the employee's pay 
        and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved 
        portion of such period of service bears to the total period of 
        service under clause (ii).
  ``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the 
United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all 
purposes a debt owing the United States.
  ``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to 
reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) 
when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the 
element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so 
require.''.
  (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training that 
begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
  (c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational 
Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as the 
Secretary determines will increase the number of qualified educational 
institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language 
Initiative to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to 
train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve 
advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the 
Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the 
national security of the United States.
  (d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
Educational institutions that receive grants under the National 
Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total 
immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that 
are critical to the national security of the United States.

SEC. 604. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
                    STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY CITIZENS OF THE 
                    UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
                    EDUCATION PROGRAM.

  (a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage 
Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of 
section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
          (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
          (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
          (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                  ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
                          ``(i) are United States citizens who--
                                  ``(I) are native speakers (commonly 
                                referred to as heritage community 
                                residents) of a foreign language that 
                                is identified as critical to the 
                                national security interests of the 
                                United States who should be actively 
                                recruited for employment by Federal 
                                security agencies with a need for 
                                linguists; and
                                  ``(II) are not proficient at a 
                                professional level in the English 
                                language with respect to reading, 
                                writing, and interpersonal skills 
                                required to carry out the national 
                                security interests of the United 
                                States, as determined by the Secretary,
                        to enable such students to pursue English 
                        language studies at an institution of higher 
                        education of the United States to attain 
                        proficiency in those skills; and
                          ``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a 
                        national security position or work in the field 
                        of education in the area of study for which the 
                        scholarship was awarded in a similar manner (as 
                        determined by the Secretary) as agreements 
                        entered into pursuant to subsection 
                        (b)(2)(A).''.
  (2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section is 
amended--
          (A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the 
        scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under 
        paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language Initiative 
        described in subsection (i)''; and
          (B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the 
        authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program 
        under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
  (3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(d)(4)(E)) is 
amended by inserting before the period the following: ``and section 
802(a)(1)(E) (relating to scholarship programs for advanced English 
language studies by heritage community residents)''.
  (b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:

``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE 
                    COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.

  ``(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account.--In 
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under 
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
transfer to the Secretary from amounts appropriated for the 
Intelligence Community Management Account for each fiscal year, 
beginning with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out the 
scholarship programs for English language studies by certain heritage 
community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).
  ``(b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under subsection 
(a) shall remain available until expended.''.

  Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language 
                                 Skills

SEC. 611. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR LANGUAGE AND 
                    EDUCATION.

  (a) In General.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403) is amended--
          (1) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there 
shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
  ``(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education shall carry out the following duties:
          ``(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign 
        language education and training of the intelligence community.
          ``(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating 
        to such requirements.
          ``(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the 
        capability of the intelligence community to carry out national 
        security activities of the United States.
          ``(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign 
        language education and training in order to ensure the 
        requirements of the intelligence community with respect to 
        foreign language proficiency are met.'';
          (2) in subsection (d)(2) by adding at the end the following:
          ``(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
        for Language and Education, ensuring the foreign language 
        education and training requirements of the intelligence 
        community are met.''; and
          (3) in subsection (e)(2)--
                  (A) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph 
                (I); and
                  (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following 
                new subparagraph (H):
          ``(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Education and Language.''.
  (b) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which the 
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education 
is first appointed under section 102(i) of the National Security Act of 
1947, as added by subsection (a), the Assistant Director shall submit 
to Congress the following reports:
          (1) A report that identifies--
                  (A) skills and processes involved in learning a 
                foreign language; and
                  (B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are 
                most effective in teaching foreign languages.
          (2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage 
        communities, particularly such communities that include 
        speakers of languages that are critical to the national 
        security of the United States.
          (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign 
        language heritage community'' means a community of residents or 
        citizens of the United States--
                  (i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency 
                in, a foreign language; and
                  (ii) who should be actively recruited for employment 
                by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists.
          (3) A report on--
                  (A) the estimated cost of establishing a program 
                under which the heads of elements of the intelligence 
                community agree to repay employees of the intelligence 
                community for any student loan taken out by that 
                employee for the study of foreign languages critical 
                for the national security of the United States; and
                  (B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting 
                and retaining highly qualified personnel in the 
                intelligence community.

SEC. 612. REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR ADVANCEMENT 
                    TO CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403-4) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
  ``(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior 
Level Positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) An individual 
may not be appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service 
in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of 
the Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director of Central 
Intelligence determines that the individual--
          ``(A) has been certified as having a professional speaking 
        and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency 
        being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable 
        Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level on such 
        other indicator of proficiency as the Director determines to be 
        appropriate; and
          ``(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities of 
        the United States and exercise influence in that foreign 
        language.
  ``(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through the 
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of section 102 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403), as added by section 
611(a), is amended in paragraph (2) by adding at the end the following 
new subparagraph:
          ``(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).''.
  (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply 
with respect to appointments made on or after the date that is one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (d) Report on Exceptions.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
submit to Congress a report that identifies positions within the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the 
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that 
should be exempt from the requirements of section 104(i) of the 
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), and that 
includes the rationale for the exemption of each such position 
identified by the Director.

SEC. 613. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. is amended--
          (1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the 
        following:

              ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology''; and

          (2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

     ``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the 
                         intelligence community
  ``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of Defense 
and the Director of Central Intelligence may jointly establish a 
program to advance foreign languages skills in languages that are 
critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out 
national security activities of the United States (hereinafter in this 
subtitle referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
  ``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry out the 
Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
Central Intelligence shall jointly determine actions required to 
improve the education of personnel in the intelligence community in 
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the 
intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the 
United States to meet the long-term intelligence needs of the United 
States.
                        ``education partnerships
  ``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign Languages 
Program, the head of an element of an intelligence community entity may 
enter into one or more education partnership agreements with 
educational institutions in the United States in order to encourage and 
enhance the study of foreign languages that are critical to the 
capability of the intelligence community to carry out national security 
activities of the United States in educational institutions.
  ``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership Agreements.--
Under an educational partnership agreement entered into with an 
educational institution pursuant to this section, the head of an 
element of an intelligence community entity may provide the following 
assistance to the educational institution:
          ``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of 
        the element of the intelligence community entity to the 
        educational institution for any purpose and duration that the 
        head determines to be appropriate.
          ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to 
        transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the educational 
        institution of any computer equipment, or other equipment, that 
        is--
                  ``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
                  ``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
                  ``(C) determined by the head of the element to be 
                appropriate for support of such agreement.
          ``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the educational 
        institution--
                  ``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are 
                critical to the capability of the intelligence 
                community to carry out national security activities of 
                the United States; or
                  ``(B) to assist in the development of such courses 
                and materials for the institution.
          ``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the 
        educational institution in research projects of the element of 
        the intelligence community entity.
          ``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in 
        developing a program under which students receive academic 
        credit at the educational institution for work on research 
        projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
          ``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and 
        assistance to students of the educational institution.
          ``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the 
        head of the element of the intelligence community entity 
        determines to be appropriate.
                          ``voluntary services
  ``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding 
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to subsection 
(b), the Foreign Languages Program under section 1011 shall include 
authority for the head of an element of an intelligence community 
entity to accept from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as 
defined in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the 
activities authorized by this subtitle.
  ``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary 
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of the 
element shall--
          ``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the head 
        of the element would supervise a compensated employee of that 
        element providing similar services; and
          ``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, has 
        appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or is 
        otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to 
        provide such services.
  ``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under 
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence community 
entity may not--
          ``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or 
        other position performing inherently government functions; or
          ``(B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate the 
        individual for the provision of such services.
  ``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing 
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community entity 
may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary services 
accepted under subsection (a).
  ``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to 
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted under 
subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection (c), an 
individual shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal 
Government only for purposes of the following provisions of law:
          ``(A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
        Code (relating to compensation for work-related injuries).
          ``(B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating 
        to maintenance of records on individuals).
          ``(C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating to 
        conflicts of interest).
  ``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under paragraph 
(1) provided by an individual that are within the scope of the services 
so accepted, the individual is deemed to be a volunteer of a 
governmental entity or nonprofit institution for purposes of the 
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
  ``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with 
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
  ``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall have 
no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security clearance.
  ``(e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes of 
determining the compensation for work-related injuries payable under 
chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to an individual providing 
voluntary services accepted under subsection (a), the monthly pay of 
the individual for such services is deemed to be equal to the amount 
determined by multiplying--
          ``(1) the average monthly number of hours that the individual 
        provided the services, by
          ``(2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with section 
        6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 
        206(a)(1)).
  ``(f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an 
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an 
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual in 
providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a). The head of 
an element of the intelligence community entity shall determine which 
expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this subsection.
  ``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated 
or nonappropriated funds.
  ``(g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an element of 
the intelligence community may install telephone lines and any 
necessary telecommunication equipment in the private residences of 
individuals who provide voluntary services accepted under subsection 
(a).
  ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may pay 
the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed under paragraph 
(1) for authorized purposes.
  ``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States Code, 
the head of an element of the intelligence community entity may use 
appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying 
out this subsection.
                             ``regulations
  ``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate regulations 
necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages Program authorized under 
this subtitle.
  ``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an 
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe regulations 
to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to that element 
including the following:
          ``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of 
        voluntary services under section 1013.
          ``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the 
        installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
                             ``definitions
  ``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
          ``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an 
        agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in subparagraphs 
        (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
          ``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
                  ``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is 
                defined in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and 
                Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
                  ``(B) an institution of higher education (as defined 
                in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
                U.S.C. 1002) other than institutions referred to in 
                subsection (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
                  ``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides 
                instruction of foreign languages in languages that are 
                critical to the capability of the intelligence 
                community to carry out national security activities of 
                the United States.
          ``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the 
        intelligence community and private citizens (including former 
        civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been 
        voluntarily separated, and members of the United States Armed 
        Forces who have been honorably discharged or generally 
        discharged under honorable circumstances, and rehired on a 
        voluntary basis specifically to perform the activities 
        authorized under this subtitle).

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

 ``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
  ``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence, 
acting through the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, 
may assign employees of such elements in analyst positions requiring 
foreign language expertise as students at accredited professional, 
technical, or other institutions of higher education for training at 
the graduate or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for 
the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
  ``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and Training.--
(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned under subsection 
(a) for the total cost of the training described in subsection (a), 
including costs of educational and supplementary reading materials.
  ``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to employees who 
are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
  ``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated 
or nonappropriated funds.
  ``(c) Relationship to Compensation As an Analyst.--Reimbursement 
under this section to an employee who is an analyst is in addition to 
any benefits, allowances, travels, or other compensation the employee 
is entitled to by reason of serving in such an analyst position.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National 
Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to 
section 1001 and inserting the following new items:

                  ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology

``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate 
degrees in science and technology.

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to 
the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language 
students.''.

SEC. 614. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.

  (a) Pilot Project.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps 
comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency 
in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the 
President to perform such service or duties with respect to such 
foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may 
specify.
  (b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and 
recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under 
subsection (a) the Director of Central Intelligence shall--
          (1) identify several foreign languages that are critical for 
        the national security of the United States;
          (2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of 
        proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available 
        to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection 
        (a); and
          (3) implement a call for the performance of such services and 
        duties.
  (c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a) 
shall be conducted for a three-year period.
  (d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Director of Central 
Intelligence may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or 
entities to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).
  (e) Reports.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit 
to Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project 
conducted under subsection (a).
  (2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain 
information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the 
pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a 
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the 
continuation or expansion of the pilot project.
  (3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months after 
the completion of the project.
  (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Director of Central Intelligence for each of fiscal 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to carry out the pilot project 
under subsection (a) such sums as are specified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to section 102.

SEC. 615. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL VIRTUAL 
                    TRANSLATION CENTER.

  (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
                 ``national virtual translation center
  ``Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the intelligence 
community known as the National Virtual Translation Center under the 
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
  ``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall 
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence 
for all other elements of the intelligence community.
  ``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to minimize the 
need for a central facility for the National Virtual Translation 
Center, the Center shall--
          ``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
          ``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the 
        intelligence community; and
          ``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
  ``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National Virtual 
Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center at any location 
that--
          ``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency or 
        department of the United States; and
          ``(2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines to be 
        appropriate for such purpose.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 118 the 
following new item:

``Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.''.

SEC. 616. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS 
                    OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

  (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on methods 
to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign language 
instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language 
Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in 
the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to 
expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status to 
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
  (b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted 
under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations 
for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary 
determines to be appropriate.
  (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the following:
          (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate.
          (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

                                Purpose

    The bill would:
          (1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for 
        (a) the intelligence and intelligence-related 
        activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community 
        Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence 
        Agency Retirement and Disability System;
          (2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 
        2005 for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
        activities of the U.S. Government and permit the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to authorize civilian 
        personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 2005 for any 
        intelligence element, with the approval of the Director 
        of the Office of Management and Budget;
          (3) Authorize $239.4 million for the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund 
        (CIARDS) in order to fully fund the accruing cost of 
        retirement benefits for individuals in the Civil 
        Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and other federal 
        retirement systems;
          (4) Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
        establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
        for Information Management to serve as the Chief 
        Information Officer of the intelligence community and 
        to manage the activities relating to the information 
        technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture 
        requirements of the intelligence community;
          (5) Amend the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
        Separation Pay Act by repealing the September 30, 2005, 
        termination date, thus providing the CIA with permanent 
        authority to offer incentives to encourage separation 
        restructuring;
          (6) Establish the National Security Agency Emerging 
        Technologies Panel to periodically advise the Director 
        of NSA on existing and emerging science and technology 
        advances and other topics;
          (7) Increase the effectiveness of the National 
        Security Education Program (NSEP) by authorizing 
        funding to support scholarships, fellowships and 
        grants, increasing repayment options for recipients of 
        scholarships and fellowships, expanding the National 
        Flagship Language Initiative, and by establishing a 
        English language scholarship program for members of 
        heritage communities in the United States; and
          (8) Improve the foreign language capabilities of the 
        intelligence community by establishing the position of 
        Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language 
        and Education, requiring that individuals appointed to 
        the Senior Intelligence Service possess a foreign 
        language proficiency, directing the establishment of 
        partnerships with educational institutions to advance 
        foreign language skills, and by authorizing a three-
        year pilot study on establishing a Civilian Language 
        Reserve Corps.

  Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this public report includes the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated 
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex 
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered 
by the Committee, which underlies the funding authorization 
found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in 
the classified annex to this report be conducted in accord with 
the guidance and limitations set forth as associate language 
therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated directly into 
this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The 
classified annex is available for review by all Members of the 
House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 
13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
and rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure for the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under 
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Tactical Intelligence and 
Related Activities (TIARA), and the Joint Military Intelligence 
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
    The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign 
intelligence, intelligence related, and/or counterintelligence 
programs conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; (2) the 
Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; 
(4) the National Reconnaissance Office; (5) the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (6) the Departments of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force; (7) the Department of State; (8) the 
Department of the Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10) 
the Department of Justice; (11) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; (12) the Department of Homeland Security; and 
(13) the U.S. Coast Guard. The Committee has exclusive 
legislative, authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these 
programs.
    The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of 
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a 
functional part of the basic military force structure and 
provide direct information support to military operations. 
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence 
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program 
that respond to the needs of military commanders for 
operational support information, as well as to national 
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Committee 
on Armed Services in the House of Representatives shares 
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs 
comprising TIARA with the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
    The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated 
program management of defense intelligence elements that 
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included 
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency 
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence 
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery 
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support, 
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included 
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the 
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense 
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself 
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program 
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP), 
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program 
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program 
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program 
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Committee on Armed Services 
in the House of Representatives shares oversight and 
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP 
with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

                 Committee Findings and Recommendations

    The Committee completed its review of the President's 
fiscal year 2005 budget request, carrying out its annual 
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close 
examination of intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. 
The Committee, and in some cases, its component subcommittees, 
held 14 budget-related hearings covering all major intelligence 
programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical 
Intelligence and Related Activities accounts, and also covering 
functional capabilities, such as human intelligence, analysis, 
counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
    As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary 
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings. 
The actions taken in this bill are the result of the 
Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes scores 
of Committee and subcommittee hearings on intelligence 
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges each year. In 
addition, the Committee Members and staff undertake hundreds of 
briefings and site visits annually.
    Deserving of particular note is the time and attention the 
Committee has devoted to the in-depth study of three broad 
topics in particular. Over the past year, the Committee has 
conducted exhaustive reviews of: Intelligence Community 
language capabilities, all facets of the performance of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community on Iraq prior to the successful 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the interrogation and treatment of 
detainees in Iraq and other locations of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).
    The Committee holds in highest regard the work accomplished 
by U.S. intelligence officers across the globe. Amid great 
sacrifice and intense conditions, the men and women of the 
Intelligence Community continue to perform their missions with 
great energy, and an enormous devotion to duty. The Committee 
commends these officers for their professionalism, integrity 
and perseverance, often in the most difficult of circumstances. 
The freedom and security of our great nation relies on their 
success.
    Intelligence has been, rightly, recognized as a critical 
weapon in the GWOT. Resources for--and demands on--the U.S. 
Intelligence Community have increased dramatically in the two 
and three-quarters years since the attacks of September 11, 
2001. This increase is even more dramatic when one takes into 
consideration the depth of the cutbacks, underinvestment, and 
the near fatal loss of political support for the IC in the last 
administration. Yet, looking at the Community as a whole, the 
Committee finds continuing gaps in capabilities and fundamental 
flaws in the management of resources and personnel. To the 
extent that these concerns may be outlined in an unclassified 
manner, the Committee has addressed them in the ``Areas of 
Special Interest'' section immediately following. A complete 
discussion of the Committee's oversight findings and 
recommendations is contained in the classified annex to this 
report.
    This legislation, along with its accompanying report and 
classified annex, contains the Committee's specific 
recommendations about where the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity 
should be heading, how it can posture itself for strategic superiority, 
and how the fiscal year 2005 intelligence budget should be invested. 
The classified schedule of authorizations includes the intelligence 
portion of the Contingent Emergency Reserve (CER), which the Committee 
views as an integral part of the fiscal year 2005 budget. Funds in the 
CER have been requested to address the high intelligence operations 
tempo in the GWOT--including Afghanistan and Iraq--and related areas.
    The Committee applauds the President for taking this major 
step towards ending the practice--begun in earlier 
administrations--of funding critical operational intelligence 
and military requirements via supplemental appropriations. 
Funding by supplemental is a practice the Committee has 
addressed in great detail in past reports. Suffice to say, the 
Committee believes it should end.
    In addition to a substantial enhancement for funding 
critical intelligence priorities related to the GWOT, H.R. 
4548:
           Increases investment in U.S. HUMINT (human 
        intelligence) capabilities;
           Improves Intelligence analysis, coverage and 
        depth;
           Strengthens Intelligence Community language 
        capabilities across the board though both improved 
        legislative authorities and additional investment;
           Improves the structure and management of the 
        disparate elements of the intelligence community's 
        information technology systems; and
           Bolsters U.S. counterintelligence resources 
        and capabilities.
    The Committee reported this legislation favorably. For the 
first time in at least ten years there were dissenting votes as 
the bill was reported from Committee. And, not just a few. 
Indeed, despite the positive expression of support for the bill 
in the classified version of the Minority Views, the eight 
Minority Members of the Committee who were present at the mark 
up voted against the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005.'' This was a bit startling given the 
thorough, bipartisan staff preparation for the mark up. In a 
marked departure from past practice, a number of the amendments 
offered by the Minority, however, were not shared on a 
bipartisan basis before the mark up. Taken as a group, the 
Minority amendments added nothing helpful to the bill or to the 
range of issues in which the HPSCI is already engaged.
    Apparently, the Minority may be unaware that the Senate 
version of this bill is close to the House version, though 
slightly less generous in its funding levels. That bill was 
supported unanimously by both Majority and Minority. That the 
HPSCI Minority voted to deny the legal authorization to carry 
out the intelligence work during wartime, while trying to say 
they support the work of the IC, appears to be excessively 
contorted. It is noted that the unclassified Minority Views 
reserves expression of support for the work of the men and 
women of the Intelligence Community until the penultimate 
sentence of their views.

                                MARK UP

Closed Session

    Notwithstanding the Minority's statements to the contrary, 
the specifics of the mark up discussion are sealed solely 
because there was substantial discussion of highly classified 
programs and intelligence information throughout the course of 
the proceeding. Indeed, discussion and debate on the 
legislative provisions alone, and amendments thereto, took 
approximately 3 hours. These included classified discussions 
related to the IC's national security need for improved 
language capabilities; how the IC is performing in the GWOT, 
particularly the IC's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 
the need to improve or increase the IC's HUMINT analysis, and 
technical collection capabilities. It is useful, however, to 
review the areas of dispute that arose during the Committee's 
consideration of this legislation. During the course of this 
consideration, Minority Members offered seven amendments.

                 MINORITY AMENDMENTS OFFERED AT MARK UP

The Global War on Terrorism

    Mr. Peterson, Mr. Boswell, and Mr. Cramer offered two 
amendments, the first to the statutory language and the second 
to the classified schedule of authorizations, which sought to 
double the total amount the Committee recommended for 
authorization in the Contingent Emergency Reserve (CER). Both 
of these amendments were defeated.
    The Committee has spoken repeatedly against the practice of 
funding important intelligence capabilities via supplemental 
appropriations, and has been wary of that practice.
    As stated above, the Committee believes that President Bush 
has taken a giant stride towards ending this practice through 
his CER request. Although some supplemental funds will probably 
be required before the end of fiscal year 2005, due to the 
uncertain requirements of war, requesting a significant portion 
of operations tempo funding up front through the CER is a vast 
improvement over past practice. The Committee has specifically 
authorized these funds in those areas the Committee believes 
are the most critical to win a global--emphasis on global--war 
on terror.
    It is important to understand that the CER level in this 
legislation has been fully coordinated with the House Armed 
Services Committee and the House Appropriations Committee. In 
other words, this is real money.
    Unfortunately, the funding level sought by the Peterson/
Boswell amendments was not real money. It had not been 
coordinated with the HASC. It does not have dollars in 
Appropriations to back it up. So, had either amendment been 
approved, the funding in it would have been hollow. In other 
words, the amendments were nothing more than empty gestures.
    ``Hollow'' funding is something the Committee makes every 
attempt to avoid. The Committee did not approve the Peterson/
Boswell/Cramer amendments because in the view of the majority 
of its Members they were likely do more harm than good to the 
Intelligence Community.
    Finally, the Committee notes that the same eight Minority 
Members who supported the two Peterson/Boswell/Cramer 
amendments unanimously opposed a later amendment offered by Mr. 
Gibbons to transfer a large sum of (real) money, in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, from a long-term research and 
development project to provide additional operations tempo 
reserves for the GWOT.
    It is relevant, also, to note that 5 Minority Members of 
the Committee voted in October 2003 against the $87 billion 
GWOT Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-106).

Document Request--Detainees in the GWOT

    Mr. Reyes offered an amendment to withhold or fence one-
quarter of all funds authorized in the bill for the Central 
Intelligence Agency Program, the General Defense Intelligence 
Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program until the 
Committee receives various documents relating to the detention 
and interrogation of detainees in the GWOT.
    The majority of the Committee Members believe that this 
amendment would have placed an absurdly high percentage of U.S. 
intelligence funding--dollars that all agree are absolutely 
critical to the GWOT--on hold pending a routine document 
request. It was the view of the Committee that this was a petty 
action masquerading as a grand gesture.
    Document requests are normally handled through routine 
Committee business--that is, through staff work and official 
requests from the Chairman. In fact, several categories of the 
documents sought through this amendment have in fact been 
recently requested through a letter from Chairman Goss and 
Ranking Minority Member Harman:

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, June 1, 2004.
Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Secretary Rumsfeld: On June 11, 2004, we will hear 
testimony from Administration officials regarding the critical 
need for interrogation in the Global War on Terrorism. This 
hearing, originally scheduled for June 10 (see attached), will 
provide the Administration an opportunity to explain the 
policies underlying interrogation activities, the legal 
framework within which those activities are permitted to take 
place, and the value to our national security as a result of 
such interrogation. In anticipation of this hearing, the 
Committee requests that the Department provide the following 
documents, for the benefit of the Members, no later that 48 
hours before the time of the hearing, which is scheduled to 
being at 9:00 on June 11.
         Any orders concerning interrogation and 
        counter-resistance policies for Iraq;
         Any orders relating to the control and 
        operating procedures of Abu Ghraib;
         Any orders concerning interrogation policies 
        and operating procedures for Guantanamo Bay;
         Any interrogation-derived reports from Abu 
        Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay from June 1, 2003 to present.
    Additionally, we have been advised that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does not permit sharing of 
its reports and their related documents to legislative bodies 
of any country. For this reason, we understand, Brigadier 
General Karpinski's response to the ICRC of December 24, 2003, 
has not yet been made available to the Committee. We would 
request that you consider Section 502 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 when considering your obligation to the ICRC. 
Please advise us of the status of this continuing request.
            Sincerely,
                                   Porter J. Goss,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Jane Harman,
                                           Ranking Democrat.

    The Committee has no reason to believe that this request 
will not be honored.
    Indeed, we have received good cooperation to date from the 
DOD and the CIA on information related to detainees and 
interrogation. The Committee has been aggressive in seeking 
this information, holding 5 full committee meetings so far (and 
a sixth hearing--the most substantial planned to date--was only 
postponed because the government was closed to observe the 
state funeral for President Ronald Reagan on that day). It has 
been rescheduled for July 13, 2004. In addition, we have held 
multiple high-level briefings for staff and individual 
Committee Members.
    Likewise, the Committee has already received thousands of 
pages of documents, including:
           The Miller Report
           The Ryder Report
           The Taguba Report--the full report with 
        annexes; and
           The official interrogation field manual.
    The Committee staff has been briefed extensively on the 
approved interrogation authorities, as well as the value of 
detainee interrogation in the GWOT. Terrorist plots have been 
disrupted as a result. Similarly, high value targets have been 
apprehended and detained through information gained by 
appropriate methods of interrogation.
    In fact, the bipartisan Committee staff was briefed within 
the last two weeks that many--if not all--of the prisoners in 
the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal were not even the subjects of 
intelligence interrogation. They were rapists, murderers, 
prison rioters, deviant individuals, and other hardened 
criminals. While that fact does not mitigate the abuses caused 
by a few, it does make it seem like less of an intelligence 
matter and more of a military police matter.
    For these reasons, the Committee rejected the Reyes 
Amendment.

Document Request--Ahmed Chalabi

    Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to withhold or fence all 
funds (100%) for the office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Intelligence (USDI) until the Committee receives a ``full 
accounting'' of the relationship between DOD and Mr. Ahmed 
Chalabi from January 2001 through May 2004, as well as specific 
intelligence documents and the names of intelligence sources.
    The Committee notes that DOD (including DIA) has been 
forthcoming in providing information on these matters. 
Documents continue to come into the Committee as requested. 
Members continue to receive briefings on the matter. In fact, 
the day just prior to mark-up Members had the opportunity to 
hear from executive branch officials on these and related 
matters. The detailed information provided at that briefing, in 
addition to all of DOD's other efforts to keep the Committee 
informed, provided a sufficient basis for the Majority to 
conclude that all of the information available on this subject 
has been made available to the Committee. All of this 
information is in addition to the more than twenty volumes of 
information and intelligence reporting the Committee has 
received in the course of its Iraq intelligence review.
    For these reasons, and because the majority of Committee 
Members viewed the amendment as heavy-handed and unnecessary, 
it was rejected by the Committee.

Intelligence Community Restructuring

    The Ranking Minority Member offered, as an amendment, her 
Intelligence Community restructuring legislation (H.R. 4104), 
which was introduced in the House on April 1st.
    The amendment would have created a Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) as a superstructure above the existing 
Intelligence Community. The Office of the DNI would have 
created an additional layer of bureaucracy. In addition, the 
amendment would have required nearly all senior management in 
the Office of the DNI to be Presidential appointees, subject to 
Senate confirmation. The Committee believes that this new 
bureaucratic super-structure would only widen the gap between 
analysts, operations officers and senior management; and create 
new inefficiencies in the flow of information. Additionally, 
the Committee is of the firm view that less political 
influence, not more, is needed in the Intelligence Community. 
Moreover, her amendment would serve to create confusing lines 
of authority and could be read as subjugating the Intelligence 
Community to the DOD. This is not a direction the Committee 
Majority wished to go.
    The Ranking Minority Member's amendment would not address 
the key issue of providing a logical source of budget authority 
for the Intelligence Community. In fact, the amendment avoids 
providing the DNI more budget authority than the Director of 
Central Intelligence currently enjoys. Similarly, it satisfies 
none of the Joint Intelligence Committee's recommendations 
except with respect to DNI.
    Although an argument has been advanced that her legislation 
would breakdown the information ``stovepipes'' in the 
Intelligence Community, the Committee does not assess that this 
is the case. The Committee believes just the opposite is true.
    Finally, the Committee notes that H.R. 4104, introduced on 
April 1, 2004, was introduced by the Minority Membership of the 
Committee, without any engagement of the Majority Membership 
prior to its introduction. The Committee has held no hearings 
on the legislation.
    The Chairman and ten other Members of the Committee 
introduced legislation asserting their vision to improve the 
management of the Intelligence Community (H.R. 4584), the 
Directing Community Integration Act.'' The Committee intends to 
take up the issue of Intelligence Community management and 
structure in the near future. H.R. 4584 is not incorporated in 
the bill reported by the Committee.
    The Committee rejected the Ranking Minority Member's 
amendment because it would create an additional layer of 
bureaucracy over the Intelligence Community, would fail to 
address critical needs such as improved budget authority for 
the head of the Intelligence Community, would not meet its 
stated goal of breaking down information stovepipes, and for a 
host of other issues that would most properly be addressed 
through Committee hearings and briefings.

Language Program

    Mr. Holt offered an amendment to amend Mr. Bereuter's 
amendment, which was offered to provide increased intelligence 
community language capabilities through several different types 
of programs. Mr. Bereuter had introduced his amendment as two 
separate bills in the House prior to mark-up (H.R. 4573 and 
H.R. 4574). Mr. Holt sought to expand Mr. Bereuter's proposals 
in a way that would have complicated the jurisdictional aspects 
of the legislation. Additionally, Mr. Holt's amendments took a 
different approach to that being advanced by the Committee on 
Education and the Workforce. Based on these grounds, the 
Majority rejected the amendment offered by Mr. Holt.

Classified Program

    Mr. Cramer offered an amendment to adjust the funding level 
for a classified program. The Majority disagreed with Mr. 
Cramer's arguments on the matter and rejected the amendment.

                       AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

    In the following several pages, the Committee highlights 
areas of concern that it believes must be addressed with a high 
priority by the Director of Central Intelligence, (DCI) as the 
leader of the Intelligence Community, if intelligence 
sufficient to protect our national security is to be obtained 
and provided to policy makers. The Committee places particular 
emphasis on issues that impact the Intelligence Community as a 
whole or that involve several various programs.

Global Human Intelligence Collection

    All is not well in the world of clandestine human 
intelligence collection (HUMINT). The DCI himself has stated 
that five more years will be needed to build a viable HUMINT 
capability. The Committee, in the strongest possible terms, 
asserts that the Directorate of Operations (DO) needs fixing. 
For too long the CIA has been ignoring its core mission 
activities. There is a dysfunctional denial of any need for 
corrective action. The CIA must collect against all types of 
targets needed to gain the insights into plans and intentions 
of our adversaries, be they terrorist, political, economic, 
military, in nature. Countering the threat from terrorism is, 
of course, and should be, at the top of CIA's list of 
collection priorities, but the Central Intelligence Agency must 
continue to be much more than just the ``Central 
Counterterrorism Agency'' if America is to be truly secure, 
prosperous, and free.
    The Committee has placed in the classified annex of this 
intelligence authorization its comprehensive analysis of what 
specifically is not right with the way the Directorate of 
Operations is being and has been managed. The Committee also 
assesses that the consequences of continued CIA mismanagement 
of the HUMINT mission are significant. Replete throughout this 
analysis, which includes specific recommendations for 
corrective action, are footnoted references to similar 
criticisms made by this Committee in the classified annexes of 
past intelligence authorization bills stretching back well 
before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. So, this is not new 
territory for the Committee. CIA has officially registered its 
strong objection to the Committee's exhaustively researched 
conclusions, which were reached over the course of years of 
close oversight and informed by hundreds of meetings and 
continuous dialogue with experienced CIA field operatives and 
Headquarters officials. That none of it could be made 
unclassified is unfortunate.
    The Committee respects the authority of the DCI to make 
classification decisions and will, of course, abide by his 
ruling in this matter. After years of trying to convince, 
suggest, urge, entice, cajole, and pressure CIA to make wide-
reaching changes to the way it conducts its HUMINT mission, 
however, CIA, in the Committee's view, continues down a road 
leading over a proverbial cliff. The damage to the HUMINT 
mission through its misallocation and redirection of resources, 
poor prioritization of objectives, micromanagement of field 
operations, and a continued political aversion to operational 
risk is, in the Committee's judgment, significant and could 
likely be long-lasting. Immediate and far-reaching changes can 
still reverse some of the worst factors eroding its 
capabilities, however. If the CIA continues to ignore the 
experience of many of its best, brightest, and most experienced 
officers, and continues to equate criticism from within and 
without--especially from its oversight committees--as 
commentary unworthy even of consideration, no matter how 
constructive, informed, and well-meaning that criticism may be, 
they do so at their peril. The DO will become nothing more than 
a stilted bureaucracy incapable of even the slightest bit of 
success. The nimble, flexible, core-mission oriented enterprise 
the DO once was, is becoming just a fleeting memory. With each 
passing day, it becomes harder to resurrect. The Committee 
highlights, with concern, the fact that it only took a year or 
two in the mid-1990's to decimate the capabilities of the CIA, 
that we are now in the 8th year of rebuild, and still we are 
more than 5 years away from being healthy. This is tragic. It 
should never happen again.
    The Committee believes that the DO's difficulties are 
manifest in the discussion on Iraq's WMD. The analysts have 
taken a significant amount of criticism on the issue. It is 
imperative to point out, however, that the analysts do not 
collect the information they analyze. They simply take what is 
available and reach educated assessments. It is incumbent on 
the DO and other areas of the IC collection community to gather 
the information that will present a more complete picture. 
There was an insufficiency of the right amount of information 
available on this topic for the analysts. The U.S. cannot 
afford to be in such a position.

The State of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI)

    In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, the CIA's Directorate of 
Intelligence has experienced dramatic personnel shifts and a 
rapid increase in the demand for both its analysts and work 
product. The DI, much like the CIA's clandestine arm, the 
Directorate of Operations, suffered from disinvestments 
resulting from the so-called ``peace dividend'' of the 1990's. 
It was not until the World Trade Center and Pentagon were 
struck that senior DI management began to realize just how 
desperate the need is for an expanded and experienced analytic 
cadre.
    DI analysts have earned a reputation in the Intelligence 
Community for being highly educated, well trained, motivated, 
and capable of handling demanding and fast moving assignments. 
As a result, with the expansion of the terrorist mission, DI 
analysts are in demand across the Intelligence Community, and 
in line with the CIA's ``can-do'' attitude has committed 
significant numbers of DI analysts to other organizations and 
posts. The CIA's analytic cadre, much like its covert 
counterpart in the DO, toil quietly, without significant 
praise, seldom ever to tell of success publicly, but sharply 
criticized for the least inaccuracy. The Committee notes the 
hard-working and dedicated rank-and-file professionals that 
provide the link between collection and truth and add value to 
raw data for policymakers.
    The Committee notes four developments that, if not 
adequately addressed in the near-term, will work together to 
seriously undermine and degrade the relevance of the DI and its 
critically important products at a time when they are needed 
most by consumers. The first factor--the unsustainable surges 
in DI personnel to cover crisis issues withoutadequate back-
filling--may be the easiest of the four problems to address. Aggressive 
new hiring is helping to mitigate this problem, but in the interim, 
overall DI expertise is declining, as new analysts need substantial 
training and on-the-job learning of their accounts. While there may be 
a strong temptation to surge these analysts to meet new crisis needs, 
it is important that this not be done prematurely or so haphazardly 
that it creates more problems than it seeks to solve. DI analysts must 
be allowed to develop true expertise. The DI must not be permitted to 
become an organization of generalists. Longer assignments on specific 
countries, regions, or issues--once discouraged by DI management 
concerned about analytic ``clientitis''--should be strongly encouraged. 
This is, in the Committee's view, a major way to reverse permanently 
the trend towards widening global analytic gaps. Analytic depth can be 
more about skills than about numbers of bodies.
    The second major DI problem area concerns the culture of 
analytic risk aversion, begun long before 9/11, but fostered 
through the continued perception on the part of the rank-and-
file that senior DI managers do not want risk taking--however 
calculated, caveated, and warranted--and that they will not 
stand by an analyst who has made the wrong prediction. With 
some exceptions, the DI has become more focused on coordinated 
judgments that are often so caveated that they are of little 
use to consumers who are searching for some form of clarity in 
the very gray world of finished intelligence reporting. While 
clarity will not always be possible, analysts should be 
encouraged to be more forward leaning and to push the analytic 
envelope whenever possible, lest consumers turn more and more--
as they have in recent years--to uncorroborated single-source 
HUMINT or SIGINT reports to inform their decisions. Creating an 
environment of some stability for analysts to develop adequate 
expertise will be an essential part of breaking the DI's risk 
averse culture, lest risk-taking become a reckless rather than 
calculated process.
    The Committee recognizes that the DI is suffering from the 
difficult combination of vastly increasing requirements and too 
few bodies to service them. Strong DI leadership, however, with 
a demonstrated commitment to calculated risk-taking and to the 
true expertise building that must come with it, would begin to 
bridge the gap between where DI personnel numbers are now and 
the time when adequate help arrives. With the CIA's analysis on 
Iraq being widely criticized, DI leaders simply cannot afford 
to sit on their heels. If analysts decided to give up on risk-
taking entirely, the national security interests of the country 
will suffer. This cannot be permitted to happen.
    The third major problem area was also clearly evident to 
the Committee as a problem in the years before 9/11 and 
appeared in the form of criticial classified report language in 
past intelligence authorizations. This is the continuing 
overemphasis by senior DI managers on current intelligence 
reporting instead of on the longer-term, predictive, strategic 
intelligence forecasting that was once the strength of the DI 
and the staple of the DI's avid consumer base. The explosion of 
all form of open-source reporting, combined with technology for 
transmitting news across the globe in near-real time makes it 
nearly impossible for DI analysts to keep up. Instead of 
``chasing CNN,'' as the Committee has observed in the past, the 
DI should be devoting much more of its resources to doing the 
kind of all-source, in-depth analysis that cannot, and is not, 
being done elsewhere in government or through media outlets. 
The DI will always have to leave some capability in place to 
make sure that its judgments about overnight developments in 
the world's hot spots are rapidly provided to consumers each 
day via tried and tested means, such as daily publications, 
spot reports, and briefings, for example. But, analysts have 
complained for years, and the Committee has heard the message 
loud and clear, that the preference of senior DI managers for 
current intelligence and opportunities to brief such product to 
high-level consumers far outstripped the DI's capacity to be 
useful. More importantly, such DI priorities damaged the DI's 
base of expertise by squandering scarce analytic resources that 
could be put to better use helping the more sophisticated line-
consumers understand better what was behind the facade of the 
daily or hourly news reports. The crisis atmosphere post-9/11 
has indeed generated more interest in rapid analytic judgments 
to address fast-moving situations, but the DI needs to play to 
its strengths and fill a badly needed function of giving the 
consumer a much higher degree of education than the ``sound-
bite'' analysis currently being emphasized. These are the types 
of priorities to be set by the DI's top manager. The Committee 
continues to disagree with the rationale for the continuing 
trend towards current intelligence at the expense of nearly 
every other form of the discipline.
    Finally, the Committee remains concerned that senior DI 
managers still do not have the ability to drive collection 
priorities, despite past Committee exhortations about the 
urgency of fixing this problem, and the CIA's own stated goals. 
A number of analytic judgments on Iraq have so far been found 
to be inconsistent with the facts on the ground. While 
intelligence analysis seldom, if ever, provides a 100 percent 
accurate picture, deficiencies were largely the result of years 
of inadequate or insufficient HUMINT collection, and extensive 
and ingrained denial and deception tactics that defeated 
technical collection efforts. Analysts had little actual ground 
truth with which to work. The Committee now finds the DO overly 
focused on a few priority targets, leaving analysts once again 
reliant on the media and other mostly open or insufficiently 
validated sources of information with which to make its key 
judgments. Given the recent performance on Iraq, the Committee 
believes that senior DI management should play a stronger role 
in determining collection priorities and advocating the need 
for global coverage.

CIA Compensation Reform Program

    The Committee remains unconvinced and increasingly 
skeptical that the Pay for Performance (PFP) compensation 
reform program currently proposed by Agency leadership is the 
best, most appropriate pay system for the men and women of the 
CIA. It should be noted that the Committee is supportive of the 
President's vision regarding the need to change our government-
wide pay system.
    The Committee supports the design, development, and 
implementation of a reformed compensation plan for employees of 
the CIA. The Committee continues to have serious reservations, 
however, about the business model and assumptions uponwhich the 
CIA's proposed PFP system is based. The CIA is a unique Federal entity 
with vastly different jobs, many of which are not, and cannot, be 
preformed in the private sector. The Committee believes that it is a 
mistake to assume that money is the most significant employee motivator 
in the intelligence ``business.'' While financial compensation plays an 
important role in employment, it is not the sole motivating factor for 
many employees at CIA, nor should it be. CIA attracts the country's 
best and brightest, not for financial reward, but rather for the 
espirit d'corps, mission, and tradecraft that are unique to CIA.
    The Committee, nonetheless, supports the notion of 
rewarding superior performers with increased pay. In addition 
to the issues noted above, the Committee remains concerned 
about the difficulty the Agency has had to date in projecting 
the actual costs of implementation and administration of the 
proposed program. These concerns were magnified by the results 
of the congressionally mandated compensation reform pilot 
program. The actual costs of the pilot program exceeded those 
projected by almost 20%, and the performance model did not 
produce the expected disparity between superior and mediocre 
performers. In fact, at the direction of senior Agency 
leadership, this 20 % overage was added to the program at its 
conclusion to enhance the delineation between higher and lower 
levels of performance. Inexplicably, notwithstanding these 
known deficiencies, the pilot program was touted by Agency 
management as a great success and a resounding affirmation of 
the proposed compensation reform system. The Committee notes 
with displeasure that Agency employees apparently were never 
told of the failures of the performance model and the resulting 
need for the infusion of these additional funds.
    The Committee believes that greater improvement in 
communication between Agency leadership, employees, and 
Congress must occur before the proposed compensation reform 
plan is further implemented. When CIA seniors were questioned 
about certain materials provided by CIA that did not contain 
any known negative references regarding PFP, they claimed 
providing such data was not their responsibility, but rather 
that of lower ranking Agency personnel, and that they did not 
know why the information was never relayed to employees or to 
the Committee. The Committee is disappointed with what could be 
perceived as a callous indifference on the part of some CIA 
seniors of the impact such fundamental changes in the CIA's pay 
structure will have on Agency personnel and the continued 
unwillingness of some CIA seniors to engage in meaningful 
dialogue on this issue.
    As noted above, and notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
Committee remains optimistic that an effective and well-managed 
effort to reform the compensation system at CIA is possible, 
although this will require significant modifications to the 
current plan, at a minimum. The Committee is encouraged by the 
willingness of the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) to 
assist Agency senior leadership in their efforts to manage this 
process and address the concerns of CIA employees. The 
Committee has been advised that OPM and CIA will execute a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that clearly delineates their 
respective responsibilities with respect to this effort, and 
the Committee expects CIA to ensure this MOU is executed in a 
timely fashion. The intent of the MOU is to provide a 
cooperative framework within which OPM and CIA can work, with 
all interested stakeholders, to design, develop, implement, and 
communicate to CIA employees a reformed compensation system, 
and the Committee expects CIA to work with OPM in a manner 
consistent with this stated intent. Moreover, the Committee 
expects that as part of the OPM-CIA partnership, the question 
of whether the current plan needs to be replaced by an entirely 
new and better constructed plan will be seriously and 
expeditiously addressed.
    The Committee directs that the DCI will regularly advise, 
in intervals of no less than every three months, the Committee 
of developments in the process of reviewing, revising, or 
replacing the current reform plan, and fences all non-personnel 
services funds associated with the implementation of the 
proposed PFP system, including employee conversions, 
information technologies, pay tool and compensation design, and 
related training, until the DCI certifies, in writing to the 
intelligence committees that CIA has complied with the 
following requirements:
    1. An MOU is executed by and between the OPM and CIA that 
ensures that CIA will:
           Work cooperatively with OPM to design and 
        implement all elements of a new compensation system at 
        CIA;
           Invite OPM to all briefings on compensation 
        reform for Members and Committees of Congress and 
        Staff;
           Allow OPM such access and lines of 
        communication as necessary for it to administer a 
        process for truly anonymous CIA employee comment on 
        elements of a new compensation system and the process 
        by which it will be adopted;
           Work with OPM to develop a compensation 
        reform process timeline that will ensure adequate 
        employee and stakeholder input and feedback on all 
        elements of compensation reform and allows for 
        incremental stages of reform;
           Work with OPM to extend the timeline where 
        appropriate to meet legitimate concerns of employees 
        and other stakeholders; and
           Work with OPM to monitor and address 
        employee concerns over system credibility.
    2. Another, more objective and completely ``blind'' survey 
of employee opinion on all of the key aspects of the PFP system 
is conducted through the auspices of or in conjunction with OPM 
as a replacement for the CIA's poorly designed and badly 
administered survey performed by a contractor firm that was a 
stakeholder in the initial reform plan. CIA's efforts, while in 
technical compliance with the letter of the Congress's 
corresponding CDA in the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004,'' certainly did not adhere to the spirit of 
that Congressional direction.
    3. The following reports, outlined below, are completed and 
delivered in writing, signed personally by the DCI, to the 
intelligence committees of the House and Senate not later than 
180 days after enactment of this provision:
    (i) Management of the PFP System. This report shall detail 
the management processes the DCI has instituted and plans to 
institute to manage the implementation and administration of a 
PFP system. Specifically, this report shall delineate the 
process by which the DCI plans to select, train, certify, and 
evaluate the performance of pay pool managers, as well as the 
processes by, and regularity, with which these managers will 
communicate with Agency employees regarding all aspects of the 
proposed PFP system.
    (ii) Cost of Implementation and Administration of 
Compensation Reform. This report shall detail all current and 
projected costs relating to the implementation and 
administration of the compensation reform program. 
Specifically, this report shall delineate all personal and non-
personal services funds expended in the implementation and 
administration of compensation reform to date, to include, but 
not limited to, the following activities: performance 
management program and compensation implementation; IT systems 
development and deployment; training program development and 
implementation; surveys and focus groups; and communications. 
Additionally, this report shall detail the projected costs of 
the implementation and administration of compensation reform 
Agency-wide from FY06 through FY10.
    (iii) Pilot Program Web Application. This report shall 
explain the process by which the Pilot Program web application 
was designed and developed. Additionally, this report shall 
include an assessment of the performance of the web application 
throughout the duration of the pilot program. This assessment 
shall be conducted in accordance with associated industry 
``best practices'' and the Carnegie Mellon Capability and 
Maturity Model guiding principles. The report shall also detail 
the technological specifications of the current application 
baseline, as well as any information collected during the 
development and testing phases of the current baseline. The 
report shall evaluate the full technological impact a web 
application of this magnitude will have on the Agency's 
technological infrastructure. This evaluation shall include, 
but is not limited to, the impact to the Agency's network 
backbone, common application environment, and systems 
engineering and application maintenance workforce. Finally, 
this report shall include a cost estimate for the follow-on PFP 
tool application testing, development and deployment.

National Reconnaissance Office

    The Committee is concerned about the amount of time and 
attention that the National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) 
Director is available to provide to the NRO and the viability 
of its budget to sustain the number of programs underway.
    A recent IG report described the various responsibilities 
that the NRO Director has in addition to those he has as 
Undersecretary of the Air Force and as Acquisition Executive. 
While the benefits that accrue to the national security space 
programs as a whole that result from combining these positions 
may be positive, the Committee is concerned that it comes at an 
expense to the NRO, which plays a significant role in our IC 
and national security apparatus. The Committee will seek to 
understand how the needs of the Air Force space programs can be 
met while ensuring a more balanced or appropriate amount of 
time and attention can be provided to the NRO.
    The Committee recommendation is to continue the strong 
support for the 2005 funding request, but it has concerns about 
the viability and affordability into the future. At a time when 
the organization has struggled to fund adequately its current 
programs, it is embarking on a number of ambitious new 
capabilities. The future years' budget does not appear to be 
capable of sustaining it all. Moreover, some programs are 
likely to need additional time that will further exacerbate the 
fiscal viability. The Committee believes that the space systems 
provided by the NRO are an essential part of a comprehensive 
intelligence architecture and that either the budget should be 
capable of sustaining its programs or it should not start new 
programs.

Intelligence Community Language Capabilities

    The core function of the Intelligence Community (IC) is the 
gathering of foreign intelligence vital to the national 
security of the United States. To perform effectively this 
mission, and to ensure that the information acquired is indeed 
accurate, our nation must have sufficient numbers of 
intelligence professionals who are proficient in foreign 
languages. Fluency in a foreign language must not be considered 
a highly specializedtechnical skill possessed only by the few. 
Rather, proficiency in language should be a core capability for 
virtually all intelligence officers. The Committee has long been 
concerned that the IC lacks a strategy to ensure that an adequate 
supply of skilled linguists will be available in the event of their 
need. This is particularly true of critical languages such as Arabic, 
Russian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Farsi/Persian, and Pashtu.
    The Committee held a series of hearings on the issue of 
language capabilities in the IC, visited language institutions 
utilized by the IC, and solicited the views of leading 
academicians in the field of language and linguistics.
    The Committee found that significant strides have been 
taken to improve the IC's language capabilities, particularly 
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Initial 
steps have been taken in areas such as strategic planning of 
language requirements, increasing basic and applied research 
into the teaching of language and culture, augmenting existing 
Federal training programs, and broadening reservoir of 
linguists from which the IC might draw. The Committee would 
note that many of these initiatives are in response to 
congressional action. Nonetheless, the efforts by the 
Administration are to be commended, and, when taken together go 
a long way toward addressing the nation's need for expertise in 
critical languages. As correctly noted by Dr. Richard Brecht, 
Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Study of 
Language, these initiatives ``represent some of the finest 
policy, planning, and program implementation on behalf of 
language in the history of the United States.''
    While the Executive branch has begun to address concerns 
about critical language capabilities, the Committee found that 
much remains to be done. In particular, the Committee noted the 
absence of a single individual in the IC responsible for 
languages. There is no single individual tasked with developing 
a comprehensive, collaborative, and cohesive solution to the 
IC's language problem. In the absence of a single voice for 
language within the IC, each component has the ability to 
develop their own standards and set their own funding 
priorities. The Committee concluded that an essential component 
of any solution would be the creation of an Assistant Director 
of Central Intelligence for Language and Education.
    The Committee strongly approves the policy that has been 
adopted by the Foreign Service, wherein foreign language 
capability is an integral component during consideration for 
promotion. Indeed, the Department of State's Employee 
Evaluation Report (EER) forms establish specific language 
criteria that must be met for promotion. For entry into the 
ranks of the Senior Foreign Service, individuals are expected 
to demonstrate full mastery of written communication in a 
foreign language, be able to effectively argue complex policy 
issues, and be able to adeptly discern the innermost meanings 
and nuances of messages that others convey. These are exactly 
the skills necessary for the collection of foreign 
intelligence. The Committee concludes that the most effective 
method of establishing the primacy of language skills is to 
require similar language skills for individuals being elevated 
into the ranks of the Senior Intelligence Service. One year 
after enactment of this Act, all individuals promoted to the 
Senior Intelligence Service shall be required to demonstrate 
proficiency in a foreign language at the 3/3 level or higher. 
The Committee understands that there are certain senior level 
positions, such as those requiring advanced scientific or 
computer expertise, which may not require language skills. If 
there is a SIS position that should be exempted because of the 
nature of the specific responsibilities of the position, the 
Director should advise the Committee and request an exemption 
for that specific position. The Committee intends to be 
judicious in the granting of such exemptions.
    The Committee grants the authority to establish a program 
dedicated to the advancement of foreign languages critical to 
the IC. Under this program, the Director is authorized to enter 
into partnerships with educational institutions and to assign 
dedicated personnel and enlist volunteers to advance such 
partnerships. The Committee recommends that Concordia Language 
Villages would serve as an appropriate partnership, as would 
the SCOLA, and the Monterey Institute.
    In the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003,'' the Committee tasked a report on the concept of a 
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps. The report recommended moving 
forward with a three-year pilot program to establish a viable 
Corps. The Committee authorizes funds to implement the 
recommendations of this report.
    The Committee concluded that the National Security 
Education Program (NSEP), which was created in the Boren 
Amendment to the ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal 
Year 1992,'' has been and remains one of the most effective 
tools to recruit highly qualified linguists for service in the 
field of national security. This program provides scholarships, 
grants, and fellowships for advance language and cultural 
training in return for service in a specified national security 
capacity. This program has operated on a trust fund, but the 
inclusion of additional expanded responsibilities has almost 
exhausted the fund. Provision of an annual authorization is the 
most effective method of ensuring continued funding. The 
Committee believes the Community Management Account of the DCI 
is the appropriate vehicle to provide such authorizations.

Assessing the Terrorist Target

    The terrorism target transcends both our foreign 
intelligence and judicial systems. The IC was established to 
collect, assess, and disseminate foreign intelligence, prior to 
any adverse action or event. The judicial system investigates 
and administers justice after the law is broken.
    The judicial and intelligence systems evolved almost 
independently over the last half-century. Terrorism challenges 
both systems and demands that the two work together.
    The IC in fiscal year 2005 has requested a significant 
increase in funds for analysis with a substantial portion of 
these funds focused on assessing the terrorist target. In 
addition, the Executive Branch has begun to realign previously 
stovepiped organizations and analytic bodies to improve 
communication and information sharing for homelandsecurity 
purposes. The Committee notes the significant role the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) has played in moving the IC to reduce 
barriers to communication and Department-specific cultures. However, 
the Committee notes that the proliferation of counterterrorism 
divisions, task forces, and other organizations may create additional 
stovepipes. This is counter to the need to move information in a timely 
and efficient manner to those who need it most.
    Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Government has 
realigned resources to create the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Specifically P.L. 107-296 directed DHS to 
develop analytic capabilities to assess terrorist threats to 
the homeland and to disseminate that information to State, 
local, and private sector officials. The Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC) has also been created within the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), to consolidate more than a dozen 
``watchlists'' and to provide one-stop shopping for authorities 
when individuals of concern are detained by police, boarding an 
aircraft, or entering the United States, among other actions 
that might provide an opportunity to learn more about that 
person. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), largely 
staffed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel, acts to 
fuse the IC's analytic capabilities on terrorism. The FBI has 
established 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country 
to better communicate with state and local law enforcement 
communities. The Committee believes that these efforts have 
produced positive results.
    The Committee notes the spirit of cooperation among all 
agencies and all levels of government. All share the common 
goal of thwarting terrorists. Taken as a whole, however, the 
resources available are not yet sufficient to claim victory. 
Significant cultural, technologic, legal, and mission barriers 
also remain in place preventing the ultimate level of synergy 
needed to swiftly assess terror threats, successfully defeat 
those threats, and ultimately win the war on terrorism.
    Mission requirements and responsibilities between the TTIC 
and the DCI's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), and specifically 
the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA), remain vague and must 
be further delineated. The FBI, while improving its analytic 
cadre, has yet to fully utilize this resource and completely 
shift the mentality of its agent corps from prosecution to 
prevention. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of 
Information Analysis (IA), while making outstanding progress in 
a complex and challenging environment, remains in its infancy, 
heavily dependent on contract support for its analytic 
capabilities and unable to fully assume the responsibilities 
expected of it. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established 
the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism to address 
the global force protection mission associated with the 
terrorist threat. It is not clear, however, how this entity 
will interact with the myriad ``CT'' elements already existing 
throughout the IC and the military.
    The Committee expects the IC to develop a professional 
terrorism analysis career track by providing a baseline level 
of training for intelligence analysts who will be responsible 
for assessing terrorist targets. This training should include 
courses on culture, language, politics, and an understanding of 
the ``religious'' extremist fundamentalism associated with 
Middle Eastern and Arab terrorist groups which can provide the 
appropriate texture for sophisticated analysis. Additional 
areas of training should focus on illicit financial, arms, and 
narcotics networks to understand terrorist logistics, as well 
as the psychology, motivation, and application of propaganda in 
motivating terrorist activity. Finally, rotations by terrorism 
analysts outside their home components or organizations should 
be encouraged and rewarded as necessary steps for developing 
greater expertise and understanding of both terrorism and other 
U.S. government departments assessing terrorism.
    The Committee encourages improved communication among IC 
analysts covering similar accounts with the frequent exchange 
of contact information, such as email and phone numbers, as 
well as the organization of events such as analytic roundtable 
discussions at the office level among analysts from the FBI, 
CIA, TTIC, DIA, and the Department of Homeland Security's IA. 
Such roundtable discussions could focus on such things as 
baseline assessments of specific terrorist groups' ability, 
targets, methods of operations and targeting. The Committee 
encourages the DCI, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to promote such informal discussions and 
outreach among analysts throughout the IC.

Information Sharing

    Among the most critical elements to the successful fusion 
of terrorism related intelligence is the rapid and seamless 
movement of terrorism data across multi-layered security 
enterprises. One of the top-level IC-wide dilemmas is to design 
and deploy a solution for access to multiple ``networks'' at a 
``one user workstation.'' The follow-on, and more complex 
challenge will be the systems engineering intricacies 
associated with designing an enterprise application framework 
to share data across domains within the IC. The Committee 
supports the current IT efforts underway in support of seeking 
solutions to this IC-wide issue, and encourages the IC CIOs to 
formulate a unified plan for creating a sound framework for 
sharing terrorism related data across all IC enterprises within 
this larger enterprise. In other words, the Committee expects 
the DCI to develop an IC-wide, Enterprise Architecture. For 
this reason, the Committee adopted a legislative provision to 
create the office of ADCI/Info management, who shall serve as 
the ICCIO.
    The Committee notes the distinct difference evolving 
between terrorist and terrorist threat related information and 
traditional foreign intelligence. Terrorism-related 
intelligence needs to be shared and distributed to far more 
individuals and entities than traditional foreign intelligence 
that relates to the internal plans and intentions of a 
sovereign nation. Publicly available information, or law 
enforcement information, is often disseminated through separate 
stovepipes. The Committee encourages the DCI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, to examine the classification 
methods and processes associated with terrorist and terrorist-
threat information. The Committee is interested in the 
viability of a system providing this information to those who 
need it to protect the Homeland. But, the Committee understands 
the need to do so in a manner that protects sources and 
methods. Additionally, it is important that such a system 
include a mechanism that immediatelydenotes that the 
information was in fact distributed within the IC, as well as law 
enforcement communities, including at the State and local levels, and 
to appropriate sector authorities.
    The Committee directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
provide quarterly briefings to the Committee on these various 
challenges and the status of all policies associated with the 
integration and coordination of intelligence and law 
enforcement personnel, selected analytic products, procedures, 
and policies. Specifically, these briefings should address the 
country's efforts to effectively and efficiently organize its 
counterterrorism resources and the division of responsibility 
among these resources, as well as actions and policies to share 
sensitive information throughout the analytic community.
    The Committee directs the DCI to provide to the 
intelligence committees a report on the IC's evaluation and 
decisions to implement the recommendations produced by the 
Congressional Commission investigating the terrorist attacks in 
the United States on September 11, 2001. This report is due 
within 180 days after the Commission's recommendations are 
released.

Counternarcotics/HUMINT Operations

    Illicit drug use results in approximately 17,000 drug-
related deaths of Americans annually. Drugs are estimated to 
cost the U.S. economy $160 billion annually in health care, 
social, and criminal costs, among other assorted costs. Illicit 
narcotics continue to constitute a clear and present danger to 
U.S. national security, and the Committee remains convinced 
that the IC should not lose its focus on the counternarcotics 
mission despite its many counterterrorism (CT) and 
counterproliferation (CP) requirements. In fact, the CT and CP 
missions can and should better leverage resources currently 
used for counternarcotics activities to help identify common 
smuggling routes and illegal enterprises that could be used as 
easily for smuggling WMD or terrorist infiltration, as for the 
narcotics trade.
    Further, the Committee encourages the DCI to allocate an 
appropriate portion of resources being added in the fiscal year 
2005 intelligence authorization to the CIA's Directorate of 
Operations for non-Tier 0/1 unilateral operational activities 
to further the CIA's counternarcotics mission in Latin America, 
from where the greatest illicit narcotics threat to U.S. 
interests originates.

Enterprise Architecture

    Enterprise Architecture (EA) is the bonding element in 
relation to Information Technology (IT) investment and strategy 
initiatives. In fact, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
Council in the executive branch subscribes to the fundamental 
practice of fusing IT investment and strategy to an EA. The IC 
CIO sits at the Federal CIO table and in that role should be 
striving to adhere to, and influence, the EA government-wide 
initiatives in this regard. The Committee understands that the 
creation and implementation of an EA is not easy and certainly 
will necessitate full support at all levels of the Intelligence 
Community (IC) management structure.
    Upon review, the Committee has determined that the process 
for linking IT investment to a formal EA is lacking, if non-
existent at all layers of the IC. The Committee notes that in a 
December 25, 2003 letter from the Executive Director for 
Community Management to the HPSCI, it was noted that, 
``Implementing the IC EA in accordance with OMB's Federal 
Enterprise Architecture criteria is a significant challenge for 
the IC primarily because of its federated nature. Through 
ICSIS, we have been able to develop strong Community agreement 
on the technical dimensions of the information-sharing portion 
of the IC EA, and with that, growing consensus around the 
business issues associated with a total IC Enterprise 
Architecture.'' While consensus is a good first step, the 
process for creating an executable and successful Enterprise 
Architecture relies on a consistently managed and calculated 
effort, with support and buy-in from the DCI and all IC agency 
directors. While ICSIS is a valid design concept for IC-wide 
Information Management, the Committee does not accept it as a 
formal EA. Attempts to make correlations between it and a 
formal EA will not produce the intended result as set forth by 
OMB.
    It is worth noting that a few of the IC agencies have made 
attempts to produce detailed pictures of the ``as-is'' status 
of their networks, applications, and IT processes. Some have 
even gone as far as mapping the future state and strategy for 
these components. These efforts have fallen short of adhering 
to the documented processes set forth by the federal EA model; 
however, by following a formal EA process, the Committee 
believes that the IC could reap the benefits such an exercise 
typically elicits. The Committee is fully aware that the IT 
elements within the IC are difficult to document. We believe, 
however, that implementation of an IC-wide EA would assist 
measurably in joining the technical elements of the IC into a 
more cohesive fabric.
    Several components typically formalized as a ``future 
state'' by an EA are currently being sought by the IC. All of 
these separate programs, however, constitute items that would 
typically be driven holistically from both agency-level EA's, 
as well as one IC-wide EA. So long as the strategy of these 
programs continues to be managed at the agency CIO level and 
not coordinated at the IC CIO level, there will be a continued 
lack of IC IT ``fusion'' in strategy. The Committee notes that 
many of these longstanding efforts address the ``unique'' 
challenges at the agency level, and not the global IC level. 
Without prescribing any one architecture, be it ``network-
centric,'' ``data-centric,'' or ``knowledge-centric,'' or any 
other methodology, the Committee believes that there are 
certain globally accepted linkages throughout the IC, and that 
these should be the driving force behind devising an IC-wide 
EA. As the Committee has stated in previous Authorization 
bills, these ``linkages'' are often expressed in the form of 
processes, data, and security.
    The Committee believes that the IC would benefit greatly by 
undertaking a formal IC-wide EA effort, as this process would 
take these ``linkages'' and fuse them togetheracross the 
community in the form of standard business, performance, data and 
information, service component, and technical models. For this and 
other reasons, in the legislative provisions, the Committee adopted 
section 303, which creates an IC CIO separate from the CIA CIO. 
Therefore, the Committee directs each agency CIO to provide a report to 
the intelligence committees no later than 01 March, 2005, which 
outlines the agency level plan for implementing EA before the end of 
fiscal year 2006. In addition, the Committee directs the IC CIO, in 
conjunction with each agency CIO, to draft the implementation plan for 
an IC-wide EA, which will conform the agencies' EAs to the broader IC 
strategy, within the same deadline. Standard COTS (Commercial-Off-the-
Shelf) software should be used in devising these preliminary documents.

                               JMIP/TIARA

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

    The Committee has been aggressive in funding for 
exploration in the Measurements and Signatures Intelligence 
(MASINT) sciences and applied research.
    There are initiatives found throughout the IC and within 
this bill that support such measures in basic and applied 
science, research and development, and the technologies that 
use MASINT concepts. It is the Committee's intent that the raw 
scientific intelligence gained from these activities be 
integrated into systems and programs, and into the more classic 
intelligence disciplines for use operationally.
    The committee is concerned, however, with the leadership 
and direction of the MASINT community, and has again, put 
fiscal attention toward a more collaborative effort for MASINT 
through the MASINT Consortium. The MASINT Consortium, led by 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), began in FY03 by 
congressional directive to assemble the various entities across 
all communities to explore basic and applied science research 
as it relates to intelligence and the DOD. The Committee 
believes that this is an IC required effort, and encourages the 
advancement of basic and applied systems research within the 
MASINT discipline.
    The Committee recognizes that there are other efforts that 
exist within the IC that are also attempting to consolidate and 
lead MASINT activities and direction. The Committee strongly 
encourages the DIA to include and embrace these efforts, assert 
a strong community-wide leadership role, and apply the 
culmination of all efforts community-wide.

Global Hawk SOUTHCOM Demonstration

    The budget request contained $336.2 million in PE 35220F 
for the Air Force Global Hawk high altitude endurance, unmanned 
aerial vehicle (HAE/UAV) program. The committee notes that 
section 221 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 
(Public Law 106-398) directed the Secretary of Defense to 
require and coordinate a concept demonstration of the Global 
Hawk HAE/UAV. The purpose of the demonstration was to quickly 
and efficiently demonstrate the capability of the Global Hawk 
to operate in an airborne, air-surveillance mode, using 
available, non-developmental technology in a counter-drug 
surveillance scenario designed to replicate actual conditions 
typically encountered in the performance of the counter-drug 
surveillance mission of the U.S. Southern Command.
    The Committee believes the Department has not met the 
requirements of this Congressionally Directed Action.
    The Committee has received the Air Force January 28, 2004 
memorandum that states the directive will be met by utilizing 
the HAE/UAV's existing ground target moving indicator (GMTI) 
with surface search modes. The Committee notes that the 
specific intent of section 221 is to provide an airborne air 
surveillance alternative for U.S. Southern Command through a 
concept demonstration performed under actual conditions in the 
performance of counter-drug airborne surveillance missions. 
Additionally, the Committee notes that the authorized funds 
were to also pursue the initiation of concurrent development of 
improved surveillance radar modes such as an airborne moving 
target indicator (AMTI) capability, for this purpose.
    The Global Hawk program office has briefed the Committee on 
the present plan and condition to meet congressional intent of 
the program. The Committee recognizes that although the Global 
Hawk contract agreement and the Global Hawk Demo amendment to 
agreement are separated, advances to the program cannot be. 
Furthermore, the committee sees disparity in the contractor 
obligated fees and government expenses, and does not view the 
Air Force program office as economical or responsible in its 
planning or execution of the amended contract. Specifically, 
the Committee notes that with no demo performed, the Air Force 
has expended 61% of the funds provided, and has obligated the 
remaining budget. The committee finds this inefficient and 
remiss, and can only conclude that $18.0 million worth of 
progress in the Global Hawk program has been met through the 
use of these funds, and has reduced the request accordingly.
    The Committee directs, once again, that the Secretary of 
Defense conduct a long endurance air-to-air radar surveillance 
mission concept demonstration of the Global Hawk HAE/UAV that 
meets the intent of section 221 of Public Law 106-945.
    The Committee recommends $318.2 million in PE 35220F, a 
reduction of $18.0 million based on the failure of the 
Department to fulfill the CDA.

Distributed Common Ground System

    The budget request contained a total of $734.5 million for 
the DOD's Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) program. DCGS 
is a multi-service and agency program to enable existing 
intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination systems 
to operate seamlessly across national and DOD architectures and 
standards.
    The Committee supports the recent decision of the military 
service acquisition executives to integrate the common DCGS 
integrated backbone (DIB), version 10.2 into each service 
program as a common integrated DCGS architecture. The Committee 
commends the services in coming together to work the challenges 
of intelligence sharing, and views this as a leap towards 
seamless information sharing.
    The Committee is concerned, however, that the present DCGS 
architecture within each of the military services is unique and 
may not be able to properly network and provide critical, 
timely information to the tactical users in the battle space.
    The Committee believes the services must have an 
overarching architecture that is well defined so DCGS may 
operate across multiple domains to include ships at sea, Army 
and Marine battalions on the move, and fixed sites for the Air 
Force.
    The committee also believes that the multiple systems that 
run the DCGS were devised by organizational tradition, and not 
to modern standards. The Committee is further concerned that 
while the services perform analogous operations on each DCGS 
system, they have not devised a coordinated strategy to merge 
requirements, functionalities, and applications to support a 
joint environment for users. The Committee recommends that the 
Department coordinate service-centric requirements, use 
commercial best practices to implement a systems' architecture, 
maintain cost controls, leverage purchasing power, and 
streamline development for the program.
    The Committee believes the services must have a single, 
converged architecture that is well defined to allow DCGS to 
operate across multiple domains; including ships at sea; Army 
and Marine battalions on the move; and fixed sites for the Air 
Force.
    In addition, the Committee notes that the Defense 
intelligence community has an interest in the DOD's Global 
Information Grid. Since DCGS is required to operate in both the 
IC and DOD domains, the Committee believes there must be a 
common approach for managing intelligence data over both 
enterprise networks. Therefore, the committee encourages the IC 
and the Department to work together to create and implement a 
systems architecture that will allow users from both 
communities to access information in a timely, accurate manner.
    Additionally, the Committee is concerned that the DCGS is 
unable to receive data from either the E8C Joint STARS radar 
system or the RC-135 RIVET JOINT signals intelligence system, 
and is unable to directly task the RQ-4 Global Hawk high-
altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (HAE/UAV) for 
imagery. The committee is concerned that the DCGS will not be 
able to achieve its goals without this ability.
    Accordingly, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence to report to the congressional defense 
committees and intelligence committees detailing the 
Department's DCGS integration plan to include tasking and 
imagery downlinks for the E8C Joint STARS, RC-135 RIVET JOINT, 
and RQ-4 Global Hawk systems by 01 March 2005.
    Furthermore, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Networking Information and Integration to report 
to the congressional defense committees and intelligence 
committees no later than 01 March 2005, as to how the two 
communities plan to operate a network-centric, not service-
centric, DCGS across both the IC domain and the larger DOD IT 
domain in the future.
    Therefore, the Committee recommends the following for the 
DCGS military service programs: $8.2 million for the Army, a 
decrease of $1.4 million; $45.2 million for the Navy, a 
decrease of $8.0 million, and $291.8 million for the Air Force, 
a decrease of $28.5 million.

Information Dominance Center (IDC)

    The budget request contained no funds for operations and 
maintenance or research and development for the Army's 
information dominance center (IDC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
    The IDC, a Headquarters' Department of the Army operations 
support activity assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence and 
Security Command (INSCOM), provides multi-disciplinary 
Information Operations (IO) support to the U.S. Army's 
component and major commands. The IDC dedicates analysis and 
technical support to deployed teams and the commands they 
serve. These tailored analytical products are generated 
frequently on a quick-response basis to meet a deployed team's 
immediate needs. The IDC also monitors potential trouble spots 
worldwide, preparing to support contingency operations with IO-
related products should the need arise. The IDC is a successful 
model of operational horizontal integration, using high-
capacity communications links to access selected information 
from a number of databases maintained by a number of other 
commands, agencies, and organizations.
    The Committee acknowledges that the IDC is one of the Army 
Chief of Staff's unfunded priorities intelligence objectives. 
The Committee supports the transformation efforts of the IDC 
and the future plan to incorporate functions of the IDC into 
the Army's Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS).
    Therefore, the Committee has recommended additional funds 
for this important program within the Army's Tactical 
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts, and 
within the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). 
Furthermore, the Committee expects to see the IDC fully funded 
within the President's Budget Request for Army in fiscal year 
2006.

Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC)

    The budget request contained no funds for the Defense 
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC) for 
research and development.
    The committee notes the ``National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004'' (Public Law 108-46) recommended that 
the Secretary of the Army establish a research and development 
line, specifically focused on the latest technologies and 
instructional methods in language and language learning that 
are required by the DLI/FLC. The Committee is disappointed and 
surprised that a budget request was not included in the fiscal 
year 2005 budget request.
    The Committee is very aware of the amplified demands within 
DOD for increased student throughput and expanded off-campus 
and distant learning sites. These current endeavors necessitate 
innovative approaches in the instruction of foreign languages 
and the educational processes to administer them. The Committee 
applauds the progress of DLI/FLC's innovative practices in 
meeting this challenge and supports the efforts in seeking new 
methods in the teaching of foreign languages and language 
learning technologies to meet the goals of DOD and the National 
Security Agency (NSA).
    Therefore the committee directs the Secretary of the Army 
to establish a new research and development program in fiscal 
year 2005 for the DLI/FLC, entitled, ``Defense Language 
Institute, Foreign Language Center'' and recommends $5.0 
million for this purpose.

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2005.
    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel 
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2005 are 
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.
    Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2005 to authorize 
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel 
ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence 
Community under section 102. The DCI may exercise this 
authority only if necessary to the performance of important 
intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be 
reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress.
    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Community 
Management Account (CMA) of the DCI and sets the personnel end-
strength for the Intelligence Community Management Staff for 
fiscal year 2005.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $318,395,000 
for fiscal year 2005 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI. 
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced 
research and development to remain available for two years.
    Subsection (b) authorizes 310 full-time personnel for 
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2005 and provides that 
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or 
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
    Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and 
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule 
of Authorizations and permits additional funding amounts for 
research and development to remain available through September 
30, 2006.
    Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in section 
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from 
another element of the United States Government be detailed to 
an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary 
situations of less than one year on a non-reimbursable basis.
    Subsection (e) authorizes $29,811,000 of the amount 
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the 
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e) 
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of 
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of 
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the 
National Security Act.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


                    AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$239,400,000 for fiscal year 2005 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.
    Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Information Management who would serve as the Chief Information 
Officer of the intelligence community. The Assistant Director 
would be responsible for managing activities relating to the 
information technology infrastructure and enterprise 
architecture requirements of the intelligence community, 
including information technology procurement and research and 
development.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Section 401 amends the Central Intelligence Agency 
Voluntary Separation Pay Act (VSPA) by repealing the otherwise 
applicable September 30, 2005 termination date for the Central 
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) authority under that statute. The 
CIA has used its Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP) 
authority over the past five years to restructure its workforce 
in support of the DCI's overall strategic direction. This 
section provides the CIA with permanent authority to offer 
incentives to targeted groups of employees to encourage 
separation from employment. Security considerations alsosupport 
vesting the CIA with permanent authority to administer a CIA-specific 
VSIP for all CIA officers and employees, whether in CIARDS, Civil 
Service, or FERS. Section 401 also eliminates the 15 percent fee 
previously required to be paid by the CIA pursuant to section 2(i) of 
the VSPA. Section 401 also amends the Federal Workforce Restructuring 
Act (FWRA) of 1994 by deleting payments made under VSPA from the 
definition of voluntary separation incentive payments in the FWRA.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

    Section 501 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959 
to establish the National Security Agency's Emerging 
Technologies Panel and grants it an exemption from the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The topics considered by the 
panel are almost exclusively classified and, accordingly, its 
meetings are exempt from the general FACA requirement that 
advisory board meetings be open to the public. In addition, the 
panel's published minutes contain classified information and 
are, therefore, not publicly available. The application of FACA 
to an advisory panel that considers almost exclusively 
classified information serves no significant purpose but 
generates unnecessary administrative burdens, including 
completing FACA procedures for closing each meeting. For this 
reason, Congress has previously provided an exemption from FACA 
for the advisory committees of the CIA and the science and 
technology advisory panel of the FBI. Difficulties have arisen 
in conducting joint activities among NSA, CIA, and FBI advisory 
bodies because the CIA and FBI bodies are reluctant to engage 
in meetings or other joint activities with the NSA panel when 
it is obligated to follow administratively burdensome FACA 
procedures prior to closing every meeting. Conversely, the NSA 
panel has not found it necessary to meet or engage in other 
joint activities with advisory bodies that are subject to FACA. 
Exempting the NSA advisory panel from FACA procedures would 
significantly facilitate its efficient and effective operation.

                          TITLE VI--EDUCATION


            Subtitle A--National Security Education Program

    Section 601 amends the David L. Boren National Security 
Education Act of 1991 (Title VIII of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1992) to authorize an appropriation to the 
Intelligence Community Management Account to support the 
scholarship, fellowship and grant programs under the National 
Security Education Program (NSEP). The Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1992 created the NSEP, along with the 
National Security Education Trust Fund as a means of funding 
the NSEP. That trust fund has been nearly depleted and an 
appropriation of $8,000,000 is authorized for fiscal year 2005 
to maintain the important education opportunities afforded by 
the NSEP.
    Section 602 amends the David L. Boren National Security 
Education Act of 1991 to modify the service obligations for 
recipients of NSEP scholarships and fellowships. The section 
shortens the amount of time a recipient of an NSEP scholarship 
or fellowship has to find federal employment as part of the 
service agreement made in exchange for educational assistance. 
Recipients of scholarships would be required to find federal 
employment within three years after completion of their 
studies, while recipients of fellowships would be required to 
find federal employment within two years after completion of 
their studies. Recipients of scholarships would be required to 
serve in the federal government for a period of one year, while 
recipients of fellowships would be required to serve in the 
federal government for a period of time equal to the duration 
of the assistance provided, but in no case less than one year. 
The section also expands the number of federal agencies in 
which a recipient may serve to include, in addition the 
Department of Defense, any element of the intelligence 
community, the Department of State, and the Department of 
Homeland Security.
    Section 603 amends the David L. Boren National Security 
Education Act of 1991 to authorize an appropriation of 
$12,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 to the Intelligence Community 
Management Account for the expansion of the grant program for 
institutions of higher education under the National Flagship 
Language Initiative (NFLI). The section details certain service 
obligations required for undergraduate and graduate students 
and federal employees who receive training in programs under 
the NFLI. The provision also seeks to increase the number of 
qualified institutions that receive grants under the NFLI.
    Section 604 amends the David L. Boren National Security 
Education Act of 1991 to establish a scholarship program within 
NSEP for English language studies for heritage community 
citizens of the United States. The scholarship program is 
designed to enable native speakers of languages that are 
considered critical to the national security interests of the 
United States to attain English language proficiency. The 
ultimate goal is to increase the scholarship recipient's 
English language proficiency to the level where a valuable 
contribution can be made to the intelligence community. The 
section establishes certain service obligations for work in a 
national security position or in the field of education. The 
section authorizes an appropriation of $4,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2005 to the Intelligence Community Management Account to 
establish the scholarship.

  Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language 
                                 Skills

    Section 611 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Language and Education to oversee and coordinate the 
requirements for foreign language education and training of the 
intelligence community. The Assistant Director is charged with 
identifying those languages that are critical to the ability of 
the intelligence community to carry out national security 
mission, as well as monitoring the allocation of resources for 
foreign language education and training. The section also 
requires the Assistant Director submit to Congress a number of 
reports relating to the enhancement of the intelligence 
community's language capabilities.
    Section 612 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
establish a language proficiency requirement for those 
individuals appointed to Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) 
positions within the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) and 
Directorate of Intelligence (DI). In order to be eligible for 
promotion to SIS positions within the DO or DI, individuals 
must be certified as having professional speaking and reading 
proficiency of at least level 3 on the Interagency Language 
Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency 
indicator. The Director of Central Intelligence is tasked with 
providing to Congress a report explaining which positions, if 
any, should be exempt from this requirement.
    Section 613 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
authorize the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense to establish a program to advance foreign 
language skills in languages that are critical to the national 
security interests of the United States. The section allows the 
intelligence community to enter into educational partnership 
agreements with educational institutions to encourage and 
enhance the study of foreign languages. These partnership 
agreements would allow the intelligence community to provide 
educational institutions with loaned and surplus equipment, 
personnel to teach courses and develop curriculum, academic and 
career advice, and cash awards. The section also provides the 
intelligence community with the authority to accept the 
volunteer services of employees of the intelligence community 
and private citizens in support of the partnership activities. 
The section provides the intelligence community with the 
authority to assign employees in analytical positions requiring 
foreign language expertise to accredited institutions of higher 
education for training in foreign languages.
    Section 614 requires the Director of Central Intelligence 
to conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist 
Reserve Corps (CLRC) comprised of United States citizens with 
advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages. These 
individuals would be available to be called up to perform 
federal service in areas relating to their language expertise. 
The section authorizes an appropriation for the pilot project, 
which will be conducted for a three-year period. In conducting 
the pilot project, the Director of Central Intelligence is to 
take into account the findings and recommendations contained in 
the CLRC feasibility report, required by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
    Section 615 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
require the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) to 
minimize the need for a central translation facility. NVTC will 
do this by utilizing state-of-the-art communications 
technology, using remote-connection capabilities, and 
integrating the existing translation capabilities of the 
intelligence community. The personnel of NVTC will be allowed 
to perform their translation function from any U.S. Government-
certified secure facility that the Director of Central 
Intelligence determines to be appropriate for such purpose.
    Section 616 requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a 
study on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of 
qualified language instructors at the Foreign Language Center 
at the Defense Language Institute. In preparing this report, 
the Secretary is to consider, as a means of recruitment and 
retention, providing permanent resident alien status to those 
qualified language instructors who are in the United States in 
a temporary status.

              Committee Position and Recorded Votes Taken


Motion To Close

    On June 16, 2004, in open session, a quorum being present, 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded 
vote of 9 ayes to 8 noes voted to close the Markup pursuant to 
Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules of 
House of Representatives, because national security would be 
endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. 
        Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. 
        LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye; 
        Mr. Everett--aye; Mr. Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no; 
        Mr. Reyes--no; Mr. Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr. 
        Cramer--no; Ms. Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr. 
        Ruppersberger--no.

Closed Session

    Chairman Goss offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 4548, as introduced. The Committee adopted 
the Goss amendment by a voice vote.
    An amendment was offered by Mr. Bereuter, to which Mr. Holt 
offered a second degree amendment that would have expanded the 
authorities of certain programs contained in the Bereuter 
amendment. The Committee rejected the Holt amendment by a vote 
of 8 ayes to 11 noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. 
        LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. 
        Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. 
        Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. 
        Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. 
        Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mr. Bereuter's amendment to revise the funding mechanism 
for scholarships, fellowships, and grants to institutions under 
the National Security Education Program, and to improve the 
foreign language capabilities of the Intelligence Community, 
the Committee voted to adopt the amendment by voice vote.
    On Mr. Peterson's amendment to Section 102 of the Goss 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, previously adopted, to 
increase funding levels contained in the schedule of 
authorizations incorporated by reference therein, the Committee 
rejected the amendment by a recorded vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr. 
        Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr. 
        Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs. 
        Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. 
        Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr. 
        Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mr. Reyes' amendment to withhold 25% of authorized funds 
for various intelligence programs until such time as the 
Committee received certain documents relating to interrogation 
practices, the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 
ayes to 11 noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. 
        LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. 
        Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. 
        Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. 
        Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. 
        Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Ms. Eshoo's amendment to withhold 100% of funds 
authorized for certain intelligence related activities of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until such time as 
the Committee receives a report and documents relating to the 
funding and activities of Ahmed Chalabi, the Committee rejected 
the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr. 
        Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr. 
        Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs. 
        Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. 
        Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr. 
        Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mrs. Harman's amendment to attach H.R. 4104 to the Goss 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, previously adopted, 
the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10 
noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr. 
        Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr. 
        Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs. 
        Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. 
        Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr. 
        Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mr. Peterson's amendment to increase certain funding 
levels in the classified schedule of authorizations, the 
Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10 
noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr. 
        Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr. 
        Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs. 
        Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. 
        Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr. 
        Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mr. Cramer's amendment to modify the funding level for a 
classified program in the classified schedule of 
authorizations, the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote 
of 9 ayes to 10 noes.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. 
        Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. 
        LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. 
        Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. 
        Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. 
        Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. 
        Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.

    On Mr. Gibbons' amendment to reduce funding for a research 
and development program and transfer those funds to provide 
additional resources to the DCI for sustained operations tempo 
for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, the Committee 
rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes, 9 noes and 2 pass.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. 
        Bereuter--pass; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; 
        Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--
        aye; Mr. Burr--pass; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--
        aye; Mr. Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no; Mr. Reyes--no; 
        Mr. Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr. Cramer--no; Ms. 
        Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr. Ruppersberger--no.

Open Session

    On June 16, 2004, in open session, a quorum being present, 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded 
vote of 11 ayes to 8 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4548, as 
amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. By 
that vote, the Committee ordered the bill reported favorably to 
the House.

          On that vote, the Members present recorded their 
        votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. 
        Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. 
        LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye; 
        Mr. Burr--aye; Mr. Everett--aye; Mr. Gallegly--aye; Mr. 
        Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no; Mr. Reyes--no; Mr. 
        Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr. Cramer--no; Ms. 
        Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr. Ruppersberger--no.

  Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions


                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, June 18, 2004.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the 
jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Armed Services in 
matters being considered in H.R. 4548, a bill to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for 
other purposes.
    Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 4548 and 
the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, 
while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over a number of 
provisions of the bill, I do not intend to request a sequential 
referral. This, of course, is conditional on our mutual 
understanding that nothing in this legislation or my decision 
to forego a sequential referral waives, reduces or otherwise 
affects the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services.
    The Committee on Armed Services also asks that you support 
our request to be conferees on the provisions over which we 
have jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference.
    With best wishes.
            Sincerely,
                                             Duncan Hunter,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                     Washington, DC, June 18, 2004.
Hon. Duncan Hunter,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Hunter: Thank you for your letter of June 18, 
2004, regarding H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2005. As you noted, elements of the bill as 
reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee 
on Armed Services. I will continue to work with you on these 
sections and will support the Committee on Armed Services' 
request to the Speaker for conferees on these provisions.
    I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the 
bill and not request a sequential referral in the interests of 
expediting consideration of the bill.
    I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive consideration of 
the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive its 
jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under your 
jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and this 
response in our Committee's report on H.R. 4548 and the 
Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on 
the House floor.
    Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
            Sincerely,
                                            Porter J. Goss,
                                                          Chairman.

                COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE

          Committee on Education and the Workforce,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Capitol, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to confirm our mutual 
understanding with respect to consideration of H.R. 4548, 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ordered reported on 
June 16, 2004. While this bill was referred solely to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, your Committee 
adopted provisions within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, specifically those programs for 
national security education now contained in the new Title VI, 
Education.
    Within Title VI, the Committee also included provisions 
changing the application of the Federal Employees Compensation 
Act (FECA) to contain volunteers, which the Congressional 
Budget Office has indicated will increase mandatory spending 
FECA. I thank you for working with me and for agreeing to offer 
an amendment to the bill for the rule during the Committee on 
Rules consideration of H.R. 4548. Since this amendment will 
correct a mandatory spending problem, I will support your 
request that this amendment be adopted as a self-executed 
amendment to the rule for H.R. 4548.
    With this understanding, I do not intend to delay 
consideration of H.R. 4548, nor will I object to the scheduling 
of this bill for consideration in the House of Representatives. 
However, I do so only with the understanding that this 
procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the 
Committee on Education and the Workforce's jurisdictional 
interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other 
similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for 
consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my 
Committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar 
provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I 
would expect Members of the Committee on Education and the 
Workforce be appointed to the conference committee on those 
provisions.
    Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our 
exchange of letters on this matter in your report to accompany 
this bill. If you have questions regarding this matter, please 
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                           John A. Boehner,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                     Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. John A. Boehner,
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce,
Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Boehner: Thank you for your letter of June 
21, 2004, regarding H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005. As you noted, provisions of the bill 
as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Education and Workforce. I will continue to work 
with you on these sections. I understand that the bill includes 
a provision changing the application of the Federal Employees 
Compensation Act (FECA) to certain volunteers, and that the 
Congressional Budget Office has indicated that this provision 
would increase mandatory spending in FECA. I agree to offer an 
amendment to the bill for the rule during the Committee on the 
Rules consideration of H.R. 4548.
    I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the 
bill and not request a sequential referral in the interests of 
expediting consideration of the bill. I acknowledge that by 
agreeing to waive consideration of the bill, the Committee on 
Education and Workforce does not waive its jurisdiction over 
the bill or any of the matters under your jurisdiction. In 
addition, I will support the Committee on Education and 
Workforce's request to the Speaker to name conferees to the 
conference committee on these provisions.
    I will include a copy of your letter and this response in 
our Committee's report on H.R. 4548 and the Congressional 
Record during consideration of the legislation on the House 
floor.
    Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
            Sincerely,
                                            Porter J. Goss,
                                                          Chairman.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held 14 hearings 
and briefings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 
4548. Testimony was taken from senior officials of the Central 
Intelligence Agency; the DCI's Community Management Staff; the 
Department of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the 
National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; 
the National GeoSpatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the 
Department of Treasury; the Department of Energy; the 
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 
Department of Homeland Security; and the U.S. Coast Guard. Such 
testimony related to the activities and plans of the 
Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and 
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.'' The 
bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions 
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.

                      Fiscal Year Cost Projections

    The Committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to 
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2005 and 
the five years following, if the amounts authorized are 
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified 
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.

                 Congressional Budget Office Estimates

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4548, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Schmit.
            Sincerely,
                                      Elizabeth M. Robinson
                               (For Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 4548--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

    Summary: H.R. 4548 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2005 for intelligence activities of the U.S. 
Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System (CIARDS).
    This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $344 
million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming appropriation of 
the necessary funds. H.R. 4548 would affect direct spending, 
but CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed 
to prepare such an estimate are classified.
    H.R. 4548 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 
Some private or public educational institutions would benefit 
from grant programs and appropriations authorized in this bill; 
any costs incurred by those schools would be incurred 
voluntarily.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 4548 is 
shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary 
information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because 
some parts are classified at a level above clearances held by 
CBO employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that 
the bill will be enacted by October 1, 2004, and that the 
necessary amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2005. 
Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 
(national defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                    --------------------------------------------
                                                                       2005     2006     2007     2008     2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\
 Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level............................................      318        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      193       98       20        5        0
Foreign Language Initiatives:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        4        4        4        4        4
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        2        4        4        4        4
Emerging Technologies Panel:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        2        2        2        2        2
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        2        2        2        2        2
Total Changes:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................      324        6        6        6        6
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      197      104       26       11        6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriation, H.R. 4548 would affect direct spending.
  However, CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed to prepare an estimate are classified.

Basis of estimate

            Spending subject to appropriation
    H.R. 4548 would authorize the appropriation of $318 million 
for the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds 
the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management 
of the intelligence agencies. That account received an 
appropriation of $178 million for 2004. The bill would earmark 
$30 million for the National Drug Intelligence Center and $24 
million for education initiatives from the funds authorized for 
the Intelligence Community Management Account. In addition to 
the costs covered by the specified authorization, the bill 
contains several new provisions, dealing with foreign language 
training and an advisory panel, that CBO estimates would 
require additional appropriations of $30 million over the 2005-
2009 period to implement. CBO estimates that implementing these 
provisions would cost $344 million over the 2005-2009 period, 
assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts.
    Foreign Language Initiatives. Section 613 would enhance the 
authorities of the intelligence community to provide foreign 
language training to its employees by allowing the Secretary of 
Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to create a joint 
Foreign Languages Program. Under this program, the intelligence 
community would be allowed to enter into cooperative agreements 
with educational institutions to develop and administer 
instruction in foreign languages critical to national security 
activities. The provision also would allow the Director of 
Central Intelligence to reimburse employees for the cost of 
foreign language materials and instruction at institutions of 
higher education. The cost of both programs would depend on how 
the agencies chose to implement each program and the number of 
individuals involved. Absent information from the intelligence 
community on how these programs would be implemented, CBO based 
its estimate on the cost of programs within the Foreign Service 
Institute and the Defense Foreign Language Institute that focus 
on languages critical to the current Global War on Terrorism. 
CBO estimates the cost of implementing both new programs would 
be about $4 million a year over the 2005-2009 period.
    Emerging Technologies Panel. Section 501 would establish 
the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel to 
advise the director of that agency on technological advances on 
encryption and other topics. Based on the budgets of other 
standing committees and advisory panels, CBO estimates the 
administrative cost to operate this panel would total about $2 
million a year over the 2005-2009 period.
            Direct spending and revenues
    Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $239 
million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to 
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The 
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the 
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in 
the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any 
additional cost to that provision.
    Section 401 would extend indefinitely the authority of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments 
to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. Under current 
law, this authority would expire on September 30, 2005. This 
section also would eliminate the requirement that the CIA make 
deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund 
equal to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who accepts 
an incentive payment. Extending authority to offer incentive 
payments to these employees could increase outlays from the 
civil service retirement system in the near term, although 
those amounts would be offset by reduced retirement payments in 
later years. CBO cannot provide an estimate of the direct 
spending effects because the data needed for such an estimate 
are classified.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: This bill 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA. The bill would authorize $8 million in fiscal 
year 2005 for the National Security Education Program. Under 
current law, colleges and universities receive one-third of 
those funds to increase foreign language and regional programs. 
The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $22 million 
in fiscal year 2005 for the National Flagship Language 
Initiative and encourage the participation of more schools in 
the program. Finally, the bill would authorize loans and 
transfers of equipment, instructional material, and cash awards 
to schools through the Foreign Languages Program. Some private 
or public schools would benefit from those programs; any costs 
incurred by those schools would be incurred voluntarily.
    Previous CBO estimate: On May 21, 2004, CBO transmitted a 
cost estimate for the unclassified portion of S. 2386, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, as 
reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 
5, 2004. The differences in the estimated costs reflect 
differences in the bills. In particular, S. 2386 would 
authorize $343 million for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, while H.R. 4548 would authorize $318 
million for that account. H.R. 4548 also would authorize new 
programs for foreign language training and an advisory panel, 
which CBO estimates would require additional appropriations of 
about $30 million over the 2005-2009 period.
    Estimates prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Schmit. 
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa 
Merrell. Impact on the Private Sector: David Arthur.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                        Committee Cost Estimates

    The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office.

 Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This 
                              Legislation

    The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States government are carried out to support the 
national security interests of the United States, to support 
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to 
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of 
the United States.
    Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress shall have 
power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defence 
and general welfare of the United States; * * *''; ``to raise 
and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; * 
* *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
    Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is 
empowered to enact this legislation.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

Sec. 101. National Security Council.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.
     * * * * * * *

         TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

[Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees 
          in science and technology.]

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees 
          in science and technology.

                  Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the 
          intelligence community.
Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
Sec. 1014. Regulations.
Sec. 1015. Definitions.

               Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language 
          students.
     * * * * * * *

TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 102. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Duties of Deputy Directors.--(1)(A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (2) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community 
Management shall, subject to the direction of the Director of 
Central Intelligence, be responsible for the following:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (E) Through the Assistant Director of Central 
        Intelligence for Language and Education, ensuring the 
        foreign language education and training requirements of 
        the intelligence community are met.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) * * 
*
  (2) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is 
composed of the following:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
        for Administration.]
          (G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
        for Information Management.
          (H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
        for Education and Language.
          [(H)] (I) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the Director of Central 
        Intelligence may establish or designate in the Office.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Administration.--(1) To assist the Director of Central 
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities 
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Administration who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  [(2) The Assistant Director for Administration shall manage 
such activities relating to the administration of the 
intelligence community as the Director of Central Intelligence 
shall require.]
  (h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Information Management.--(1) To assist the Director of Central 
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities 
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Information Management who shall be appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Information Management is the chief information officer of the 
intelligence community.
  (2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
for Information Management shall--
          (A) manage activities relating to the information 
        technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture 
        requirements of the intelligence community;
          (B) have procurement approval authority over all 
        information technology items related to the enterprise 
        architectures of all intelligence community components;
          (C) direct and manage all information technology-
        related procurement for the intelligence community; and
          (D) ensure that all expenditures for information 
        technology and research and development activities are 
        consistent with the intelligence community enterprise 
        architecture and the strategy of the Director of 
        Central Intelligence for such architecture.
  (3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant 
Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management may 
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer 
of any other agency or department, or component thereof, of the 
United States.
  (i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language 
and Education.--(1) To assist the Director of Central 
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities 
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Language and Education who shall be appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
  (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Language and Education shall carry out the following duties:
          (A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for 
        foreign language education and training of the 
        intelligence community.
          (B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities 
        relating to such requirements.
          (C) Identifying languages that are critical to the 
        capability of the intelligence community to carry out 
        national security activities of the United States.
          (D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for 
        foreign language education and training in order to 
        ensure the requirements of the intelligence community 
        with respect to foreign language proficiency are met.
          (E) Making determinations under section 104(i).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 104. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain 
Senior Level Positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) 
An individual may not be appointed to a position in the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the 
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency 
unless the Director of Central Intelligence determines that the 
individual--
          (A) has been certified as having a professional 
        speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, 
        such proficiency being at least level 3 on the 
        Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level 
        or commensurate proficiency level on such other 
        indicator of proficiency as the Director determines to 
        be appropriate; and
          (B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities 
        of the United States and exercise influence in that 
        foreign language.
  (2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through the 
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
Education.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  NATIONAL VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER

  Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the 
intelligence community known as the National Virtual 
Translation Center under the direction of the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
  (b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall 
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign 
intelligence for all other elements of the intelligence 
community.
  (c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to 
minimize the need for a central facility for the National 
Virtual Translation Center, the Center shall--
          (1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
          (2) integrate existing translation capabilities in 
        the intelligence community; and
          (3) use remote-connection capacities.
  (d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National 
Virtual Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center 
at any location that--
          (1) has been certified as a secure facility by an 
        agency or department of the United States; and
          (2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines 
        to be appropriate for such purpose.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Subtitle A--Science and Technology

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

      PROGRAM ON ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE 
                         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may jointly 
establish a program to advance foreign languages skills in 
languages that are critical to the capability of the 
intelligence community to carry out national security 
activities of the United States (hereinafter in this subtitle 
referred to as the ``Foreign Languages Program'').
  (b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry 
out the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and 
the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly determine 
actions required to improve the education of personnel in the 
intelligence community in foreign languages that are critical 
to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out 
national security activities of the United States to meet the 
long-term intelligence needs of the United States.

                         EDUCATION PARTNERSHIPS

  Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign 
Languages Program, the head of an element of an intelligence 
community entity may enter into one or more education 
partnership agreements with educational institutions in the 
United States in order to encourage and enhance the study of 
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the 
intelligence community to carry out national security 
activities of the United States in educational institutions.
  (b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership 
Agreements.--Under an educational partnership agreement entered 
into with an educational institution pursuant to this section, 
the head of an element of an intelligence community entity may 
provide the following assistance to the educational 
institution:
          (1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials 
        of the element of the intelligence community entity to 
        the educational institution for any purpose and 
        duration that the head determines to be appropriate.
          (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
        relating to transfers of surplus property, the transfer 
        to the educational institution of any computer 
        equipment, or other equipment, that is--
                  (A) commonly used by educational 
                institutions;
                  (B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
                  (C) determined by the head of the element to 
                be appropriate for support of such agreement.
          (3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the 
        educational institution--
                  (A) to teach courses in foreign languages 
                that are critical to the capability of the 
                intelligence community to carry out national 
                security activities of the United States; or
                  (B) to assist in the development of such 
                courses and materials for the institution.
          (4) The involvement of faculty and students of the 
        educational institution in research projects of the 
        element of the intelligence community entity.
          (5) Cooperation with the educational institution in 
        developing a program under which students receive 
        academic credit at the educational institution for work 
        on research projects of the element of the intelligence 
        community entity.
          (6) The provision of academic and career advice and 
        assistance to students of the educational institution.
          (7) The provision of cash awards and other items that 
        the head of the element of the intelligence community 
        entity determines to be appropriate.

                           VOLUNTARY SERVICES

  Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding 
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to 
subsection (b), the Foreign Languages Program under section 
1011 shall include authority for the head of an element of an 
intelligence community entity to accept from any individual who 
is dedicated personnel (as defined in section 1016(3)) 
voluntary services in support of the activities authorized by 
this subtitle.
  (b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary 
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of 
the element shall--
          (A) supervise the individual to the same extent as 
        the head of the element would supervise a compensated 
        employee of that element providing similar services; 
        and
          (B) ensure that the individual is licensed, 
        privileged, has appropriate educational or experiential 
        credentials, or is otherwise qualified under applicable 
        law or regulations to provide such services.
  (2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under 
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence 
community entity may not--
          (A) place the individual in a policymaking position, 
        or other position performing inherently government 
        functions; or
          (B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate 
        the individual for the provision of such services.
  (c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing 
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community 
entity may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary 
services accepted under subsection (a).
  (d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to 
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted 
under subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection 
(c), an individual shall be considered to be an employee of the 
Federal Government only for purposes of the following 
provisions of law:
          (A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United 
        States Code (relating to compensation for work-related 
        injuries).
          (B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code 
        (relating to maintenance of records on individuals).
          (C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code 
        (relating to conflicts of interest).
  (2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under 
paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the 
scope of the services so accepted, the individual is deemed to 
be a volunteer of a governmental entity or nonprofit 
institution for purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act of 
1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
  (B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with 
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such 
Act (42 U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
  (3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall 
have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security 
clearance.
  (e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes of 
determining the compensation for work-related injuries payable 
under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to an 
individual providing voluntary services accepted under 
subsection (a), the monthly pay of the individual for such 
services is deemed to be equal to the amount determined by 
multiplying--
          (1) the average monthly number of hours that the 
        individual provided the services, by
          (2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
        (29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)).
  (f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an 
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an 
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual 
in providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a). 
The head of an element of the intelligence community entity 
shall determine which expenses are eligible for reimbursement 
under this subsection.
  (2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
  (g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an 
element of the intelligence community may install telephone 
lines and any necessary telecommunication equipment in the 
private residences of individuals who provide voluntary 
services accepted under subsection (a).
  (2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
pay the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed 
under paragraph (1) for authorized purposes.
  (3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States 
Code, the head of an element of the intelligence community 
entity may use appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of 
the element in carrying out this subsection.

                              REGULATIONS

  Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate 
regulations necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages 
Program authorized under this subtitle.
  (b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an 
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe 
regulations to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to 
that element including the following:
          (1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of 
        voluntary services under section 1013.
          (2) Procedures and requirements relating to the 
        installation of equipment under section 1013(g).

                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
          (1) The term ``intelligence community entity'' means 
        an agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in 
        subparagraphs (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
          (2) The term ``educational institution'' means--
                  (A) a local educational agency (as that term 
                is defined in section 9101(26) of the 
                Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
                (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
                  (B) an institution of higher education (as 
                defined in section 102 of the Higher Education 
                Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002) other than 
                institutions referred to in subsection 
                (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
                  (C) any other nonprofit institution that 
                provides instruction of foreign languages in 
                languages that are critical to the capability 
                of the intelligence community to carry out 
                national security activities of the United 
                States.
          (3) The term ``dedicated personnel'' means employees 
        of the intelligence community and private citizens 
        (including former civilian employees of the Federal 
        Government who have been voluntarily separated, and 
        members of the United States Armed Forces who have been 
        honorably discharged or generally discharged under 
        honorable circumstances, and rehired on a voluntary 
        basis specifically to perform the activities authorized 
        under this subtitle).

              Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

  ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL AS LANGUAGE STUDENTS

  Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central 
Intelligence, acting through the heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community, may assign employees of such elements 
in analyst positions requiring foreign language expertise as 
students at accredited professional, technical, or other 
institutions of higher education for training at the graduate 
or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for the 
conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
  (b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and 
Training.--(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned 
under subsection (a) for the total cost of the training 
described in subsection (a), including costs of educational and 
supplementary reading materials.
  (2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to 
employees who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
  (3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
  (c) Relationship to Compensation As an Analyst.--
Reimbursement under this section to an employee who is an 
analyst is in addition to any benefits, allowances, travels, or 
other compensation the employee is entitled to by reason of 
serving in such an analyst position.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


 SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY 
                                  ACT

SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this 
section based on any separation occurring after September 30, 
2005.]
  [(g)] (f) Regulations.--The Director shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
  [(h)] (g) Reporting Requirements.--
          (1) Offering notification.--The Director may not make 
        an offering of voluntary separation pay pursuant to 
        this section until 30 days after submitting to the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
        of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate a report describing the 
        occupational groups or geographic locations, or other 
        similar limitations or conditions, required by the 
        Director under subsection (d).
          (2) Annual report.--At the end of each of the fiscal 
        years 1993 through 1997, the Director shall submit to 
        the President and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report 
        on the effectiveness and costs of carrying out this 
        section.
  [(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the 
Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of 
the United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement 
and Disability Fund (in addition to any other payments which 
the Director is required to make under subchapter III of 
chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, United 
States Code), an amount equal to 15 percent of the final basic 
pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005, retires voluntarily under 
section 8336, 8412, or 8414 of such title or resigns and to 
whom a voluntary separation incentive payment has been or is to 
be paid under this section. The remittance required by this 
subsection shall be in lieu of any remittance required by 
section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 
(5 U.S.C. 8331 note).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


      SECTION 4 OF THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1994

SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RETIREMENT FUND.

  (a) Relating to Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Definitions.--For the purpose of this 
        subsection--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the term ``voluntary separation incentive 
                payment'' means--
                          (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                          (ii) any separation pay under section 
                        5597 of title 5, United States Code[, 
                        or section 2 of the Central 
                        Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
                        Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 
                        107 Stat. 104)].

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security 
Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing 
panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be 
appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director.
  (b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel 
shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director 
on, the research, development, and application of existing and 
emerging science and technology advances, advances on 
encryption, and other topics.
  (c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall 
not apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging 
Technologies Panel.
                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE VIII--NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS

SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSES.

  (a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``David L. 
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 802. SCHOLARSHIP, FELLOWSHIP, AND GRANT PROGRAM.

  (a) Program Required.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry 
        out a program for--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (C) awarding grants to institutions of higher 
                education to enable such institutions to 
                establish, operate, or improve programs in 
                foreign languages, area studies, 
                counterproliferation studies, and other 
                international fields that are critical areas of 
                those disciplines (as determined under section 
                803(d)(4)(C)); [and]
                  (D) awarding grants to institutions of higher 
                education to carry out activities under the 
                National Flagship Language Initiative 
                (described in subsection (i))[.]; and
                  (E) awarding scholarships to students who--
                          (i) are United States citizens who--
                                  (I) are native speakers 
                                (commonly referred to as 
                                heritage community residents) 
                                of a foreign language that is 
                                identified as critical to the 
                                national security interests of 
                                the United States who should be 
                                actively recruited for 
                                employment by Federal security 
                                agencies with a need for 
                                linguists; and
                                  (II) are not proficient at a 
                                professional level in the 
                                English language with respect 
                                to reading, writing, and 
                                interpersonal skills required 
                                to carry out the national 
                                security interests of the 
                                United States, as determined by 
                                the Secretary,
                        to enable such students to pursue 
                        English language studies at an 
                        institution of higher education of the 
                        United States to attain proficiency in 
                        those skills; and
                          (ii) enter into an agreement to work 
                        in a national security position or work 
                        in the field of education in the area 
                        of study for which the scholarship was 
                        awarded in a similar manner (as 
                        determined by the Secretary) as 
                        agreements entered into pursuant to 
                        subsection (b)(2)(A).
          (2) Funding Allocations.--Of the amount available for 
        obligation out of the National Security Education Trust 
        Fund or from a transfer under section 810(c) for any 
        fiscal year for the purposes stated in paragraph (1), 
        the Secretary shall have a goal of allocating--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not 
        apply to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National 
        Flagship Language Initiative described in subsection 
        (i) or for the scholarship program under paragraph 
        (1)(E). For the authorization of appropriations for the 
        National Flagship Language Initiative, see section 811. 
        For the authorization of appropriations for the 
        scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E), see section 
        812.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (b) Service Agreement.--In awarding a scholarship or 
fellowship under the program, the Secretary or contract 
organization referred to in subsection (a)(4), as the case may 
be, shall require a recipient of any fellowship, or any 
scholarship to enter into an agreement that, in return for such 
assistance, the recipient--
          (1) * * *
          (2) will--
                  [(A) in the case of a recipient of a 
                scholarship, after the recipient's completion 
                of the study for which scholarship assistance 
                was provided under the program, work in a 
                position in the Department of Defense or other 
                element of the intelligence community that is 
                certified by the Secretary as appropriate to 
                utilize the unique language and region 
                expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to 
                such study for a period specified by the 
                Secretary, which period shall include one year 
                of service for each year, or portion thereof, 
                for which such scholarship assistance was 
                provided; or
                  [(B) in the case of a recipient of a 
                fellowship, after the recipient's completion of 
                the study for which the fellowship assistance 
                was provided under the program, work in a 
                position described in subparagraph (A) that is 
                certified by the Secretary as appropriate to 
                utilize the unique language and region 
                expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to 
                such study for a period specified by the 
                Secretary, which period shall (at the 
                discretion of the Secretary) include not less 
                than one nor more than three years for each 
                year, or portion thereof, for which such 
                fellowship assistance was provided; and]
                  (A) in the case of a recipient of a 
                scholarship, as soon as practicable but in no 
                case later than three years after the 
                completion by the recipient of the study for 
                which scholarship assistance was provided under 
                the program, the recipient shall work for a 
                period of one year--
                          (i) in a national security position 
                        that the Secretary certifies is 
                        appropriate to use the unique language 
                        and region expertise acquired by the 
                        recipient pursuant to such study in the 
                        Department of Defense, in any element 
                        of the intelligence community, in the 
                        Department of Homeland Security, or in 
                        the Department of State; or
                          (ii) in such a position in any other 
                        Federal department or agency not 
                        referred to in clause (i) if the 
                        recipient demonstrates to the Secretary 
                        that no position is available in a 
                        Federal department or agency specified 
                        in clause (i); or
                  (B) in the case of a recipient of a 
                fellowship, as soon as practicable but in no 
                case later than two years after the completion 
                by the recipient of the study for which 
                fellowship assistance was provided under the 
                program, the recipient shall work for a period 
                equal to the duration of assistance provided 
                under the program, but in no case less than one 
                year--
                          (i) in a position described in 
                        subparagraph (A)(i) that the Secretary 
                        certifies is appropriate to use the 
                        unique language and region expertise 
                        acquired by the recipient pursuant to 
                        such study; or
                          (ii) in such a position in any other 
                        Federal department or agency not 
                        referred to in clause (i) if the 
                        recipient demonstrates to the Secretary 
                        that no position is available in a 
                        Federal department or agency specified 
                        in clause (i); and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student 
that participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), 
the student shall enter into an agreement described in 
subsection (b), other than such a student who has entered into 
such an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) 
of section 802(a)(1).
  (B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of 
the Federal Government that participates in training in 
programs under paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in 
writing--
          (i) to continue in the service of the agency or 
        department of the Federal Government employing the 
        employee for the period of such training;
          (ii) to continue in the service of such agency or 
        department employing the employee following completion 
        of such training for a period of two years for each 
        year, or part of the year, of such training;
          (iii) to reimburse the United States for the total 
        cost of such training (excluding the employee's pay and 
        allowances) provided to the employee if, before the 
        completion by the employee of the training, the 
        employment of the employee by the agency or department 
        is terminated due to misconduct by the employee or by 
        the employee voluntarily; and
          (iv) to reimburse the United States if, after 
        completing such training, the employment of the 
        employee by the agency or department is terminated 
        either by the agency or department due to misconduct by 
        the employee or by the employee voluntarily, before the 
        completion by the employee of the period of service 
        required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the 
        same ratio to the total cost of the training (excluding 
        the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the 
        employee as the unserved portion of such period of 
        service bears to the total period of service under 
        clause (ii).
  (C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse 
the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is 
for all purposes a debt owing the United States.
  (D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation 
to reimburse the United States under an agreement under 
subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of the 
element, the head of the element determines that equity or the 
interests of the United States so require.

SEC. 803. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Functions.--The Board shall perform the following 
functions:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) After taking into account the annual analyses of 
        trends in language, international, area, and 
        counterproliferation studies under section 806(b)(1), 
        make recommendations to the Secretary regarding--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) which foreign languages are critical to 
                the national security interests of the United 
                States for purposes of section 802(a)(1)(D) 
                (relating to grants for the National Flagship 
                Language Initiative) and section 802(a)(1)(E) 
                (relating to scholarship programs for advanced 
                English language studies by heritage community 
                residents).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 810. FUNDING.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account 
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition 
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under 
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central 
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account 
for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, 
$8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant 
programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, 
of section 802(a)(1).

[SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  [(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made 
available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, 
there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for 
each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, 
to carry out the grant program for the National Flagship 
Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
  [(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
under subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.]

SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and 
2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the 
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized 
to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, 
beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the 
grant program for the National Flagship Language Initiative 
under section 802(a)(1)(D).
  (b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account 
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition 
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under 
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central 
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account 
for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, 
$12,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the National 
Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
  (c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made 
available under this section shall remain available until 
expended.

SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE 
                    COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.

  (a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account.--
In addition to amounts that may be made available to the 
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of 
Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from 
amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, 
$4,000,000, to carry out the scholarship programs for English 
language studies by certain heritage community residents under 
section 802(a)(1)(E).
  (b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under 
subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

    Our unanimous vote against favorably reporting this 
authorization bill is intended to send an unmistakable message 
that this bill needs to be stronger--we need stronger 
intelligence and stronger oversight.
    This was a difficult vote. For many of us, it was the first 
time we had ever voted against an Intelligence Authorization 
bill. We were compelled to this unprecedented decision by our 
conviction that we simply cannot afford to shortchange 
counterterrorism intelligence, fail to fix clearly identified 
problems with intelligence, and ignore the trend toward less 
and less effective oversight. Despite our best efforts, this 
bill fails to address these critical issues.
    We hope the Committee will work to include measures to 
address these concerns and that we will be able to support a 
stronger bipartisan bill on the house floor.

                        FULLY FUND INTELLIGENCE

    The nation needs an intelligence authorization bill that 
fully funds the Intelligence Community's requirements to fight 
the war on terrorism.
    The President's budget request covered just a fraction of 
the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism requirements. For 
example, it provided just 20% of the CIA's Counterterrorism 
Center funding requirements.
    After repeated bipartisan complaints from this Committee 
about the lack of adequate funding, the Administration sent 
down a request for supplemental funds to get through the first 
quarter of the fiscal year. They say the rest of the funds will 
be requested only after the November election.
    Supplemental funding requests are not new. But what is 
unprecedented is the degree to which the intelligence agencies 
have been forced, particularly since September 11, to rely on 
supplemental funding for core requirements. CIA's 
Counterterrorism Center--the pointy end of the spear in the 
Global War on Terrorism--has had to rely on late-in-the-year 
supplemental requests for 80% of its funding needs.
    Members on both sides of the aisle have roundly criticized 
this growing practice of funding the Intelligence Community in 
bits and pieces, rather than for a full fiscal year, the way 
Congress is supposed to do it. Senior intelligence officials 
have told the Committee that this practice makes it impossible 
to plan, forcing them to ``rob Peter to pay Paul'' until the 
additional funds arrive--potentially jeopardizing key 
counterterrorism operations.
    The nation's intelligence agencies have indicated with some 
precision the additional amounts they will need this year to 
fully fund counterterrorism efforts. It is likely that the 
Intelligence Community will not receive the additional funds 
until well into next year. So the bridge funds in the 
Chairman's mark are a bridge too short.
    Administration officials are on TV every week warning the 
American public about another attack this summer. We simply 
could not, in good conscience, go with ``business as usual'' 
and vote for a bill that provides less than one-third of what 
the intelligence community needs to try to stop the next 
attack.
    The amendment offered by Representatives Peterson, Boswell, 
and Cramer would have funded the counterterrorism needs of the 
Intelligence Community at the full amount that is needed to 
fight the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, our amendment was 
rejected on a party-line vote.

                          STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT

    The American public expects this Committee not only to make 
sure the Intelligence Community has the resources it needs to 
safeguard our nation, but also to conduct rigorous oversight to 
ensure that the activities the Intelligence Community 
undertakes on behalf of all Americans are effective and 
consistent with our national security interests and the rule of 
law. Unfortunately, just as this bill fails to meet the 
resource needs, it also fails to address serious oversight 
problems.
    Two oversight issues of particular importance are 
determining what went wrong with regard to the abuse of 
detainees and what was the true nature of the U.S. government's 
relationship with Ahmed Chalabi.
Detainee Abuse
    The pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which 
were unknown to this committee until their public revelation on 
60 Minutes, shocked all Americans. These despicable acts dealt 
a stunning blow to our military effort in Iraq and to the 
United States' image abroad, exposed U.S. soldiers and citizens 
to retribution, and undermined our nation's moral authority 
around the world. They also opened the door to a growing series 
of revelations--almost entirely in the public media--about 
broader issues related to detainee and interrogation policy. 
These are issues that this Committee must address.
    Interrogations are critical to gathering intelligence. They 
are one way of generating dots that might lead the Intelligence 
Community to the next terrorist plot. But adhering to the rule 
of law and the principles that make our country a model to 
which the Iraqi's and others should aspire are not only 
essential to winning the battle against terrorism but they are 
also essential to protecting our own soldiers should they fall 
into enemy hands.
    The abuses of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib were 
reprehensible. Equally stunning was the executive branch's 
failure to inform this Committee of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 
Members of this Committee were in Baghdad in mid-February, just 
when Major General Taguba was undertaking his investigation. 
There was no mention of any problems.
    There are numerous other examples of incidents and problems 
that should have been brought forward to this Committee but 
never were--until they were revealed in the media. 
Witnesseshave been asked pointed questions. Members on both sides of 
the aisle have urged them to be forthcoming. Yet, still we find a 
shocking lack of candor.
    Nor has the Committee received documents from the 
Administration that are essential to understanding where 
interrogations may have gone off track, including documents 
that Defense Department representatives said they would 
provide.
    Representative Reyes offered an amendment that would have 
fenced 25% of the funds authorized and appropriated for the 
Central Intelligence Agency Program, the General Defense 
Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, 
and the Army Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
Program until the Committee receives all documents related to 
the handling and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere.
    The funds this amendment would have fenced were substantial 
but they would have been fully available to the agencies once 
they provided the requested documents--all of which are in 
their possession. It was intended to send a strong signal that 
this Committee will follow the facts wherever they may lead and 
that we are tired of being misled.
    It is unfortunate that our effort to strengthen oversight 
was defeated on a party-line vote.

USG Relationship With Ahmed Chalabi

    In the case of Ahmed Chalabi, the Committee must find out 
why the executive branch invested so much political and 
financial capital in a man with such a checkered past.
    The CIA terminated its relationship with him years ago 
because it found him unreliable. The State Department couldn't 
account for how he was spending the money it was giving him. 
The Department of Defense felt compelled to go to extreme 
lengths to ensure he and the Iraqi National Congress didn't 
misspend the money it was giving him.
    Mr. Chalabi has undermined U.S. national security in a 
number of ways. For example, there are indications that he and 
his associates led the Administration to believe the Iraqi 
people would welcome U.S. soldiers as liberators. There are 
also strong indications that he or his organization provided 
false information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs prior to the war.
    Members of this Committee have pushed hard for answers to 
the many questions regarding this man's relationship with our 
government. Last month, we learned that the government had 
finally terminated its intelligence relationship with Chalabi's 
Iraqi National Congress. However, we have yet to receive 
satisfactory answers to all of our questions. This committee 
must go to the bottom of this story.
    Representative Eshoo offered an amendment that would have 
prevented the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence from expending any funds until the Secretary of 
Defense provided a full accounting of all contacts Department 
of Defense (DoD) personnel and its contractors had with Ahmed 
Chalabi and Chalabi's associates from January 2001 to May 2004, 
as well as the information, sources and documents he and his 
associates provided to DoD.
    It is intended as a strong signal of his Committee's 
determination to address counterintelligence concerns 
aggressively. It is unfortunate that our effort to strengthen 
oversight was defeated on a party-line vote.

                              TRANSPARENCY

    In addition to strengthening oversight, we need to do a 
better job of informing the American public about the oversight 
that we conduct. Precisely because so much of our work, and 
that of the Intelligence Community itself, must be cloaked in 
secrecy, we should work hard to find ways to open up the 
process whenever we can do so without jeopardizing classified 
information. We can begin by marking up the legislative portion 
of our bill, as this Committee did prior to the mid-90s, in 
open session.
    We do not have secret laws in this country. The legislative 
provisions in our bill are a matter of public record. They are 
openly debated on the floor of the House, and there is no 
legitimate reason for debating and voting on them in a secret 
session during Committee markup.
    This is why we objected to the motion to close the 
proceedings that was offered at the outset of the markup. 
Instead, the Ranking Member urged that the Committee not move 
into closed session until it had completed debate on the public 
law provisions and turned to the classified portion of the 
bill. Unfortunately, our effort to keep consideration of the 
public part of the bill open was defeated along party lines.
    In the coming year, we hope that this Committee will work 
harder to communicate to the public about the work we do here. 
For example, we should hold more open hearings. The few open 
hearings held over the past year, on issues such as pre-war 
intelligence on Iraq, civil liberties, diversity, and language 
needs, were extremely useful and should be expanded in the 
coming year.

                           LANGUAGE TRAINING

    We are very pleased that the bill contains legislation 
improving the support to foreign language programs assisting 
the Intelligence Committee in its missions. An amendment was 
offered by Representative Holt that we believe would have 
strengthened this legislation by providing funding for language 
training for intelligence officers with scientific, 
engineering, and technical specialties. We believe this to be 
particularly important given testimony by the former head of 
the Iraq Survey Group, Dr. David Kay, that this was a 
noticeable deficiency in his team. The amendment was defeated 
on a party-line vote.

                  TRANSFORM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

    Unfortunately, this bill is silent on another critical 
issue, as well: the need to transform intelligence from its 
Cold War structure and mentality to meet today's challenges. 
Our oversight activities examining the structure and 
performance by the Intelligence Community since 9/11, including 
the extensive investigation of the Joint House-Senate 9/11 
Inquiry and reviews of the Intelligence Community's pre-war 
intelligence on Iraq, have led the Minority to conclude that 
amajor effort to improve the organization and effectiveness of the 
Intelligence Community is urgently needed.
    The stars are aligned for intelligence reform as never 
before. Both sides of the aisle on this Committee and on the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) voted in favor 
of crating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after 
investigating the intelligence failures leading up to 9/11. The 
SSCI is also likely to urge reform when it issues its report on 
the intelligence failures on Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) is likely 
to make far-reaching reform recommendations about intelligence 
reform. The President, too, has stated that intelligence reform 
needs to be considered.
    This authorization bill should not be silent on the urgent 
need for intelligence transformation. Reform is coming, and 
this Committee ought to weigh in now and shape the outcome 
rather than react to events. That is why Representative Harman 
offered an amendment to make the Intelligence Transformation 
Act (H.R. 4104), introduced on April 1, 2004, by all nine 
Democratic members of this Committee, part of this bill.
    Members on both sides of the aisle know the problems that 
must be addressed in the Intelligence Community. The Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI) has not been an effective manage 
of the Community. His time and attention is dominated by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Today's Community is not a 
``community'' but a collection of 15 different agencies each 
operating independently. These agencies are still not networked 
together, and cannot collaborate or share data electronically. 
They work in stovepipes: We have at least three separate 
strategies for every intelligence problem--one for human 
intelligence, one for imagery, and one for signals 
intelligence.
    These are the same problems that plagued the military 20 
years ago, when it was fighting an Army war, a Navy war, and an 
Air Force war. In 1986, pushed by Congress in legislation known 
as ``Goldwater-Nichols'', the military made a revolutionary 
change and fixed their stovepipe problem. We need Goldwater-
Nichols for the Intelligence Community--integrated teams from 
all disciplines, under unified command.
    An essential cornerstone of successful reform is separating 
the DCI from CIA--giving the intelligence leader the time, the 
responsibility, and the accountability for managing the whole 
community. A DCI tied to the CIA, even with a bigger 
bureaucracy to run the Community, will still spend too much 
time running the Directorate of Operations and will never be 
viewed by the rest of the community as an honest broker--thus 
the Director is doomed to fail. We need a separate head of the 
Intelligence Community and we need to give that Intelligence 
Community leader the structure and authorities the Director 
needs--without creating a big new bureaucracy or a war with 
DoD.
    H.R. 4104 gives the DNI the authority to tell the 
intelligence troops what they are going to do each day--just 
like Central Command (CENTCOM) directs the operation of 
military troops rather than the service chiefs. And this 
tasking authority should be backed up by several measures that 
strengthen the DCT's ability to move money around during the 
fiscal year to enforce his directions.
    H.R. 4104 also adopts the Goldwater-Nichols formula for 
requiring joint assignments to break down cultural barriers and 
improve the quality of the Community staff.
    On information sharing, we borrow heavily from the 
bipartisan Markle Foundation and many other studies that have 
charted a path for us to network the Community--allowing a 
virtual reorganization, rather than moving organizations 
around--and new ways of doing business, as US business has 
proven.
    We remove other barriers to information sharing--currently 
no agency accepts the clearances of any others, each agency 
thinks it owns the data it holds, individual agency heads deny 
access to ``outsiders'' to protect U.S. persons' privacy.
    We give the DCI powerful new tools to manage the DoD 
agencies by working jointly with Secretary of Defense--
eliminating the agencies' ability to play one against the other 
to escape all control.
    H.R. 4104 is a solid basis for beginning serious debate in 
Congress and with the executive branch about intelligence 
reform, and that is why it was extremely regrettable that our 
amendment was defeated on a party-line vote.
    Given the national security threats that continue to face 
the United States, we hope the Committee is resolved to 
undertaking thorough, rigorous and comprehensive consideration 
on an urgent basis.
    We look forward to assessing the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission in this regard, and also to working with the 
other committees of jurisdiction to address their points of 
view regarding intelligence reorganization. We believe that, 
barring unforeseen circumstances, we should be able to agree on 
a reform package and include it in the conference report. 
Certainly, the national security of the United States demands 
our best efforts to do so, and indications are growing that the 
Congress is unlikely to look favorably upon a well-informed, 
broadly supported proposal for reform.

                               CONCLUSION

    These minority views, along with additional minority views 
in the classified annex related to classified programs, were 
written based on the bill and report language presented to the 
Members at the time of the Committee markup, since there was no 
opportunity to review and respond to any changes made after 
markup but before filing. However, we want to emphasize our 
strong support for all of the programs and activities funded in 
this bill that are so essential to effective intelligence 
collection and analysis. We would be extremely disappointed to 
see these programs undermined in any way.
                                   Jane Harman.
                                   Alcee L. Hastings.
                                   Silvestre Reyes.
                                   Leonard L. Boswell.
                                   Collin C. Peterson.
                                   Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.
                                   Anna G. Eshoo.
                                   Rush D. Holt.
                                   C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.