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104th Congress Report
1st Session 104-4
OVERSIGHT OVER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
January 18 (legislative day, January 10), 1995.--Ordered to be printed
Mr. Specter, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
R E P O R T
Prompted by the most devastating espionage case in our
nation's history, the Aldrich Ames case, the Committee
pioneered the most significant counterintelligence legislation
ever passed in the Congress. The legislation addressed a number
of problems identified in the Ames case, including the CIA's
failure to notify the FBI of a counterintelligence problem in a
timely manner. The legislation required agency heads to
immediately advise the FBI whenever it becomes apparent that
classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in
an unauthorized manner to a foreign government or agent of a
foreign government. The legislation also required the President
to issue, within 180 days, an Executive Order setting standards
for access to classified information; and made physical
searches conducted for intelligence purposes subject to the
same court-order procedures (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978) that have been used for electronic surveillance.
The establishment of a bipartisan presidential commission
to examine the roles and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community was a Senate initiative put forth by Vice Chairman
John Warner. The 17-member commission includes eight members
appointed by the Congressional leadership and nine private-
sector individuals appointed by the President. The Commission
is charged with reviewing the missions, budgets, organization,
and capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies; and with
providing a report of its findings and recommendations to the
Congress and the President by March 1, 1996.
In 1988, the Committee established its own Audit and
Investigations staff to conduct audits of special interest
areas for the Committee. One of the audit team's most
noteworthy projects during the 103rd Congress was it review of
the new National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters project.
The staff reviewed the construction project's cost, overall
requirements and management. The key conclusions of the staff's
review were that the full and comprehensive project costs were
not provided to the Committee by the NRO; the budget for this
project was not appropriately presented in the annual NRO
budget submissions to our Committee; and the new NRO
Headquarters facility significantly exceeded the NRO's space
requirements, which caused the project costs to be higher than
necessary. A Director of Central Intelligence and Department of
Defense joint review of the project, ordered as a result of the
Committee's findings, confirmed the Committee's assessment.
The Committee also played a central role in the March 10,
1994, decision by the Clinton Administration to permit the
commercial sale of medium resolution imagery and imaging
equipment. The Committee has long been concerned about the
intelligence industrial base and the growth of foreign
competition in the commercial remote sensing field. After
holding two hearings to examine how the entry of U.S. medium
resolution imaging technology into the commercial market would
affect U.S. national security interests and the U.S.
intelligence industrial base, the Committee strongly urged the
President to support the commercial sale of such imagery.
Over the past several years, Committee Members and staff
have visited with officials from a large number of foreign
governments to discuss the Congressional oversight process of
the U.S. Intelligence Community. In response to the growing
number of requests received from foreign governments for
information regarding the U.S. system of oversight, and at the
direction of Senator DeConcini, the Committee produced a
booklet entitled ``Legislative Oversight of Intelligence
Activities: The U.S. Experience.'' The booklet contains a
narrative which traces the evolution and accomplishments of the
congressional intelligence committees, and explains how the
committees are organized and function.
The Committee was instrumental in making more intelligence-
related information available to the public. The Committee
accomplished this by holding an unprecedented number of
hearings and briefings that were open to the public. In
addition, the Committee took the lead in a number of efforts to
declassify previously classified material by the Executive
Branch. In total, the Committee has worked with the Executive
Branch to declassify and make available to the public over
36,400 pages of material.
Under the leadership of its Chairman Dennis DeConcini and
Vice Chairman John Warner, the Committee placed an emphasis on
reducing the size of the Committee staff and its operating
budget. In answering the call of the American people for less
government, the Committee reduced its budget by 10 percent and
downsized its staff by 25 percent. Despite these reductions,
the Committee vigorously carried out its oversight
responsibility, while tackling unforeseen issues as they arose.
In conclusion, this report demonstrates the wide range of
issues the Committee dealt with during the 103rd Congress. The
Committee continued to carry out its responsibilities in the
same bipartisan manner that has characterized its work since
its inception, and, for the most part, received excellent
cooperation from the Intelligence Community. Rarely did the
Committee receive information that it had requested in less
than a timely and complete manner. Overall, the close working
relationship between the Committee and the Intelligence
Community, so essential to the conduct of legislative
oversight, has continued. While the future will hold new
challenges for both institutions, the experience during the
103rd Congress provides a good foundation for the years to
a. s. 647 cia voluntary separation incentive act
In March, 1993, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
requested legislation to assist in the drawdown of civilian
personnel at the CIA. On March 30, 1993, the Committee held a
closed hearing to receive testimony from the DCI and members of
his staff on the need for such legislation.
On May 5, 1993, the Committee reported S. 647, the CIA
Voluntary Separation Incentive Act, introduced by Senators
DeConcini and Warner, to allow the Central Intelligence Agency
to offer limited financial incentives to certain categories of
CIA employees, as determined by the DCI, to encourage such
employees to resign or retire. (See Senate Report 103-43.)
The purpose of the legislation was to assist the Director
of Central Intelligence in downsizing the CIA civilian work
force while minimizing the need for involuntary separations to
meet reduction goals. The legislation was modeled after similar
legislation enacted for the civilian and military personnel of
the Department of Defense.
A virtually identical companion bill (H.R. 1723) passed the
House of Representatives on May 24, 1993, and was agreed to by
voice vote in the Senate on May 26, 1993. The bill was signed
into law by the President on June 8, 1993 (see Public Law 103-
b. s. 1301 fy 1994 intelligence authorization act
The Committee reported S. 1301, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, authorizing
appropriations for U.S. intelligence activities for fiscal year
1994, on July 28, 1993.
In addition to the annual authorization of appropriations,
the bill made certain adjustments in the CIA Retirement and
Disability System, required an unclassified annual report on
the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, provided
funding authorization for the National Security Education
Program for the next three fiscal years, and provided a limited
exemption for the National Reconnaissance Office to withhold
from public disclosure information concerning its employees.
The bill passed the Senate on November 10, 1993, and the
conference report on the House counterpart bill (H.R. 2330) was
agreed to on November 20, 1993. The bill was signed into law on
December 3, 1993. (Public Law 103-178)
c. s. 1885 framework for classification and declassification
On March 2, 1994, Chairman DeConcini introduced S. 1885,
the Security Classification Act of 1994, providing a uniform
framework for the classification and declassification of
information in the interests of national security.
Among other things, the bill provided--
explicit criteria to govern the classification of
procedures for the identification and marking of
procedures to authorize persons to classify
information in the interests of national security;
time limits for the classification of information;
procedures to govern the establishment of special
procedures to govern the declassification of
classified information pursuant to a request from a
member of the public or with the expiration of time;
special procedures to govern the declassification of
information pertaining to topics of significant
historical interest; and
sanctions for persons who may violate the procedures
established by the bill or by the regulations issued
pursuant to the bill.
While the Committee sought comments concerning the bill
from the public and from witnesses who appeared before the
Committee, the bill was not reported due to the concurrent
efforts of the Executive branch to develop a new Executive
Order on classification to replace Executive Order 12356,
issued in 1983. Because the Administration had itself been
unable to resolve internally the issues posed by the bill
during its consideration of the new Executive order, the
Committee deferred consideration of S. 1885 until a later date.
d. counterintelligence legislation
In the wake of the arrest of CIA employee Aldrich H. Ames
and his wife for espionage on February 21, 1994, six bills
(designed to improve the counterintelligence and security
posture of the U.S. Government) were introduced in the Senate
and referred to the Committee: S. 1866 by Senator Metzenbaum;
S. 1869 by Senators Boren and Cohen; S. 1890 by Senator Heflin;
S. 1948 by Senators DeConcini and Warner; S. 2056 by Senators
DeConcini and Warner on request of the Administration; and S.
2063 by Senator Gorton.
All of these bills were the subject of a public hearing on
May 3, 1994, where the Committee heard testimony from former
SSCI Chairman Boren and Vice Chairman Cohen; Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick; DCI R. James Woolsey; FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh; Robert Kohler, Vice President, TRW Aeronautics
and Space Surveillance Group; Kate Martin, Director for
National Security Studies, American Civil Liberties Union; and
David Whipple, Executive Director, Association for Former
On May 24, 1994, the Committee marked up S. 2056, the bill
requested by the Administration. S. 2056 was reported to the
Senate on June 30, 1994. (See Senate Report 103-296.)
When the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
1995 (S. 2082) came to the Senate floor on August 12, 1994,
Senators DeConcini and Warner offered (a slightly modified
version of the text of S. 2056) as an amendment to the bill.
The amendment passed by voice vote.
In conference on the FY 1995 authorization bill, the
provisions dealing with counterintelligence and security were
agreed to with certain amendments. Key provisions included:
a requirement that the President issue regulations
establishing uniform minimum standards for access to
a requirement that all persons who obtain security
clearances be asked to sign a written waiver, as a
condition of their security clearance, permitting an
authorized investigative agency to obtain access to
their financial and travel records consistent with the
criteria and approvals set forth in the statute;
a requirement that the President may require
financial reporting of federal employees who occupy
positions giving them access to extremely sensitive
new authority for authorized investigative agencies,
as defined by the bill, to obtain access to financial
and travel records of cleared federal employees,
subject to the conditions and approvals specified in
a requirement that departments and agency heads
advise the FBI immediately of cases where classified
information has been compromised to a foreign
government, and continue to advise the FBI of actions
taken with regard to such compromises;
an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 bringing physical searches done for
intelligence purposes under the same type of court
order procedures as have been used for electronic
surveillances since 1978;
new jurisdictional authority for U.S. courts to try
espionage cases where the conduct in question took
place outside the United States;
a new misdemeanor offense for removing classified
documents to an unauthorized location with the intent
to retain them at such location;
new authority for the Attorney General to pay rewards
in espionage cases; and
an expansion of the Government's existing authority
to subject the property of a defendant in an espionage
case to forfeiture when it can be demonstrated the
defendant has deliberately moved the proceeds of his
espionage activities beyond the reach of U.S. courts.
These counterintelligence provisions became law when the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was signed
by the President on October 14, 1994.
E. legislation creating a presidential commission on intelligence
On June 30, 1994, Senators Warner, Graham, DeConcini,
Metzenbaum, Chafee, and Cohen introduced S. 2258, a bill to
create a commission on the roles and capabilities of the U.S.
When the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
1995 came to the Senate floor on August 12, 1994, Senator
Warner offered a slightly modified version of the text of S.
2258 as an amendment to the intelligence authorization bill (S.
2082). It passed the Senate on a roll-call vote of 99-0.
In conference on the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization
Bill, the Senate provision was agreed to with minor
modifications. In general, the conference bill provided for a
17-member commission to be appointed, with the President
designating 9 members and the remaining 8 being designated by
the congressional leaders (two each by the Majority and
Minority Leaders of the Senate and two each by the Speaker and
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives).
The legislation provided a broad and comprehensive array of
topics for review by the commission, to include the missions
and functions of intelligence agencies, organizational
arrangements, legal authorities, budgets, etc. The commission
was also asked to compare the U.S. system with those of
comparable foreign governments.
The report of the Commission is to be submitted by March 1,
This provision became law on October 14, 1994, when the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was signed
into law by the President.
f. other provisions of the intelligence authorization act for fy 1995
In addition to the provisions discussed above, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 also
contained a number of other significant provisions:
The 1986 statutory limitation on intelligence
cooperation with the Government of South Africa was
The DCI was directed to provide a report regarding
the desirability and feasibility of instituting an ``up
or out'' policy similar to that in effect in the
The Secretary of Defense was authorized to provide
personnel management for employees of the Central
Imagery Office under the same authorities pertaining to
Defense Intelligence Agency employees;
The President was directed to promulgate an Executive
order on security classification, and money was
earmarked for document declassification pursuant to the
A funding ceiling was placed on expenditures
associated with a new office building complex of the
National Reconnaissance Office (see the discussion of
this building under ``Oversight Activities''); and
New reporting requirements were imposed on
intelligence agencies to advise the congressional
oversight committees when new construction projects or
improvements to existing facilities exceed the
thresholds established in the bill.
III. Arms Control
a. start ii
On January 3, 1993, Presidents George Bush of the United
States and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation signed the
Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, better known as START II. The Committee, which
has closely followed U.S. arms control monitoring capabilities
since the SALT II negotiations of the 1970s, commenced an
inquiry into the implications of START II not only for U.S.
monitoring of Russian compliance with that treaty, but also for
monitoring of Russian and Ukrainian compliance with the
original START treaty, which had yet to enter into force. After
examining the documentation and holding both informal and on-
the-record briefings for staff, the Committee held a closed
hearing on START II on May 12, 1993. During that hearing the
Committee heard testimony from the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Joint
Staff, and Department of Defense elements responsible for
handling security and implementation matters. The Committee
also received written answers to 19 questions for the record
that it submitted after that hearing.
START II cannot enter into force until START I does so, and
the Russian Federation conditioned its ratification of START I
upon Ukraine's adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
as a non-nuclear weapons state. Ukraine did not announce such
adherence until recently, and START I will not enter into force
until after the 103rd Congress adjourns. In addition, Russian
ratification of START II is not assured. There has been
substantial public debate in Russia over the wisdom of the
treaty from the standpoint of Russian military strategy. In
light of these multiple uncertainties, the Committee, like
other committees of the Senate, decided not to move beyond the
hearing stage in its consideration of the treaty during the
103rd Congress. The Committee expects to revisit this treaty
and to prepare classified and public reports to the Senate on
START II during the 104th Congress.
b. open skies treaty
The Open Skies Treaty was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on
March 24, 1992, and was submitted to the Senate on August 12,
1992, for its advice and consent to ratification. The
Committee, which had been following the Open Skies talks
closely since their inception in 1989, held a series of three
briefings for staff in late 1992. On March 4, 1993, the
Committee held a closed hearing on the Treaty during which it
took testimony from Ambassador John H. Hawes, chief U.S.
negotiator; Mr. Craig Chellis, Acting Chief of the DCI's Arms
Control Intelligence Staff; Mr. Leo Hazlewood, Director of the
National Photographic Interpretation Center; Major General
Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director, DoD On-Site Inspection
Agency; Mr. Ray W. Pollari, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense/Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures;
and Brigadier General Teddy E. Rinebarger, USAF, Assistant
Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Strategic Plans
and Policy, the Joint Staff.
The Committee sought and obtained from the intelligence
community an interagency assessment of the likely information
gains and losses resulting from the Treaty. The Committee also
obtained an interagency assessment of the Treaty's
counterintelligence and security countermeasures implications.
Finally, the Committee submitted and received answers to a
series of questions for the record. Based on these materials,
the Committee prepared both classified and public reports to
the Senate. The public report, ``Intelligence and Security
Implications of the Treaty on Open Skies,'' was published as S.
Rpt. 103-44 (May 19, 1993).
The Open Skies Treaty is not an arms control treaty in the
traditional sense. It does not require the destruction or limit
the capabilities of any weapons or other military equipment. It
does not require, therefore, the same sort of monitoring
through National Technical Means to determine other countries'
compliance that one finds, for example, in the START Treaty.
The observation flights envisioned in the Open Skies Treaty
were very similar, however, to cooperative measures for
verification that have grown out of arms control treaties.
Thus, the flights would be implemented by many of the same U.S.
Government agencies that implement arms control verification;
the information collected by these flights would have to be
analyzed by the U.S. intelligence community; and the issues of
counterintelligence and security protection for U.S. personnel
and for sensitive or proprietary information were similar to
those faced in various on-site inspections for arms control
These issues of implementation costs and benefits and of
security concerns and costs were the focus of the Committee's
report, which is organized around the following questions:
Does the Treaty contain ambiguities or present
monitoring difficulties that are likely to lead to
What information gains will the United States obtain
from this Treaty?
What sensitive or proprietary information might the
United States lose as a result of other countries'
observation of U.S. territory or overseas bases?
How effectively will U.S. security precautions limit
the potential loss of such sensitive or proprietary
What costs will be incurred in order to implement the
Treaty, analyze the information that is obtained, and
protect U.S. security?
The Committee's report included the following
recommendations, which were also transmitted to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee:
Recommendation #1: After the first 1-2 years, the
United States should not use its full active
observation flight quota unless there is a clear
likelihood of obtaining significant information through
those flights. Unless an environmental sensing package
is adopted under Open Skies, only two aircraft should
be used for Open Skies flights after the transitional
Recommendation #2: The United States should make
every effort to use a U.S. observation aircraft and
sensors in its Open Skies observation flights.
Recommendation #3: The Senate should add a condition
to the resolution of ratification to the effect that
the United States shall not agree to Open Skies
Consultative Commission approval of any new Open Skies
sensor or of one with improved resolution until at
least thirty days after notifying interested Committees
of the Senate of its intention to do so; such
notification shall include an analysis of the legal and
security implications of the proposed change or
Recommendation #4: The Executive branch should
institute an outreach program to inform industry about
the likely impact of the Open Skies Treaty and to offer
appropriate assistance in safeguarding proprietary
information that may be put at risk. Such assistance
need not incur major costs to the government and could,
if necessary, be user-funded.
Recommendation #5: Congress should consider
legislation to create a new b(3) exemption to the
Freedom of Information Act that would permit the
Government to withhold information collected pursuant
to the treaty from public disclosure.
The condition proposed in Recommendation #3 was included in
the resolution of ratification passed by the Senate on August
6, 1993, as was a declaration based upon Recommendation #1. The
legislation suggested in Recommendation #5 was enacted as
Section 533 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236).
c. chemical weapons convention
On September 3, 1992, after some twenty-five years of
negotiations, members of the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva concluded the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction--more commonly known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC. This convention was
endorsed by the United Nations on November 30, 1992, and was
opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. On November
23, 1993, President Clinton endorsed the Convention (which had
been signed during the Bush Administration) and formally
submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to
In preparation for Senate consideration of the CWC,
Committee staff held two on-the-record staff briefings (and
several less formal sessions) and reviewed numerous documents,
including a National Intelligence Estimate on U.S. monitoring
capabilities, written statements from several Executive branch
agencies, and the Executive branch responses to over 130
questions for the record. Committee staff also visited U.S.
Government and industry facilities and attended conferences to
gain a more detailed knowledge of how information bearing upon
other countries' compliance with the CWC can be obtained,
especially through on-site inspections.
On May 17, 1994, the Committee held a closed hearing on the
CWC, focused on issues relating to monitoring and verification
of compliance, the implications of any successful evasion of
CWC provisions by States Parties, CWC implementation, and the
Convention's counterintelligence and security implications.
Testimony was taken at this hearing from the Honorable John D.
Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency; Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar, U.S. Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament; Major General David McIlvoy,
Deputy J-5 (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy) for
International Negotiations, the Joint Staff; Mr. John Lauder,
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Arms Control; Major General John Landry, USA, National
Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces; Dr. Theodore
M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic
Energy) (Chemical/Biological Matters); and the Honorable
William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration. A written statement was submitted by Brigadier
General Gregory G. Govan, USA, Director of the Department of
Defense On-Site Inspection Agency.
On September 30, 1994, the Committee issued both classified
and public reports to the Senate on ``U.S. Capability to
Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.'' The
public report, which the Committee also submitted to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, was published as S. Rpt. 103-
The Committee's public report includes numerous findings
and fourteen recommendations, several of which would require
language in the resolution of ratification by which the Senate
would give its advice and consent to ratification of the
Convention. The report's recommendations and major conclusions
regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention were summarized as
Implications of the CWC Text
The Committee pursued several issues of treaty
interpretation in its hearing and in questions for the record,
and the answers provided by the Executive branch were generally
reassuring. The lack of a definition of ``law enforcement
purposes'' could lead, however, to compliance disputes.
If the CWC is ratified, a new Executive order will be
needed to minimize the risk of American use of riot control
agents in ways that would raise compliance questions.
It is likely that some States Parties to the CWC will
assert that the Convention requires substantial changes in the
functioning of the Australia Group. The Committee trusts that
the United States and other Australia Group members will
prepare to counter such arguments both publicly and in
Recommendation #1.--The Senate should make its consent to
ratification of the CWC conditioned upon a binding obligation
upon the President that the United States be present at all
Amendment Conferences and cast its vote, either positive or
negative, on all proposed amendments made at such conferences,
thus ensuring the opportunity for the Senate to consider any
amendment approved by the Amendment Conference.
Monitoring and Verification
A single, all-encompassing judgment cannot be made
regarding the verifiability of the CWC or U.S. capability to
monitor compliance with the Convention. In some areas our
confidence will be significantly higher than others. Like the
Executive branch, however, the Committee largely accepts the
Intelligence Community's pessimistic assessment of U.S.
capability to detect and identify a sophisticated and
determined violation of the Convention, especially on a small
scale. The Committee also notes the Intelligence Community's
assessment that the CWC would give the U.S. Government access
to useful information, relevant to potential CW threats to the
United States, that would not otherwise be obtainable.
It is likely that some countries that ratify the CWC will
seek to retain an offensive chemical weapons capability. While
it is unlikely that they would do so by diverting declared CW
stocks, the covert stockpiling of undeclared agent or munitions
could well occur. Monitoring such illicit behavior will be the
single most challenging task for the CWC verification regime
and U.S. monitoring.
OPCW investigators, if not blocked from gaining needed
access to sites and affected persons, should be able to
determine whether chemical weapons have been used in a
Recommendation #2.--The Executive branch should work to
foster OPCW procedures that would permit on-site inspectors to
identify and record the presence of non-scheduled chemicals,
while taking extraordinary steps, if necessary, to protect any
confidential information thereby acquired.
If the international inspectorate is determined, well
trained, and well equipped, and if U.S. or other States Parties
provide accurate and timely leads to the OPCW, there may well
be some occasions in which on-site inspection will produce
evidence of CWC violations. It will be vital, however, that the
OPCW not lose sight of that objective.
In addition, U.S. and international monitoring will, at
times, be sufficient to raise well-founded questions. In order
to maintain the effectiveness of the Convention and to deter
potential violators, the United States and the OPCW must pursue
such questions vigorously, even to the point of seeking
international sanctions if a State Party does not adhere to the
principle set forth in paragraph 11 of Article IX of the CWC,
that ``the inspected State Party shall have the right and the
obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its
compliance with this Convention.'' U.S. verification policy and
investment in monitoring technologies should start from the
principle that monitoring can contribute to effective
international action even if it cannot conclusively demonstrate
a country's violation of the Convention.
Recommendation #3.--The Executive branch should adhere to
an arms control verification policy that does not require
agencies to prove a country's non-compliance before issues are
raised (either bilaterally or in such international fora as the
OPCW or the United Nations) and appropriate unilateral actions
The deterrent effect of the CWC is extremely difficult to
predict. A strong U.S. commitment to the enforcement of the CWC
will be essential to the effectiveness of the Convention. It
may in fact be possible to achieve a measure of both
enforcement and deterrence, but only if the United States is
prepared to make compliance with the CWC a major element of its
foreign policy stance toward each State Party to the
Improving U.S. Monitoring and Verification
Recommendation #4.--The Committee endorses the call by the
interagency committee under the Deputy Secretary of Defense for
increased funding of CW sensor technology and urges the
Executive branch to redirect FY 1995 funds for this purpose as
well. The Committee also recommends that Congress rescind its
restriction on DOE efforts to develop CW (and BW) sensors based
upon technologies it is developing in the nuclear field.
Funds invested in CW sensor technology may well be wasted,
however, unless the Executive branch institutes effective
oversight of the multitude of agency programs in this field.
The recent formation of a Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Technology Working Group may provide an appropriate forum in
which to deconflict and narrow the focus of agency programs and
to fund the most promising avenues to ensure expeditious
completion. The Executive branch should ensure that the body
that makes such decisions is fully briefed on all relevant
intelligence and defense programs. Even highly sensitive
programs should not be immune from high-level interagency
consideration to determine whether they warrant increased or
Cooperation With the OPCW
The lack of U.S. access to raw data from on-site
inspections will impede the Intelligence Community's monitoring
of CWC compliance.
Progress is being made in The Hague on enabling the OPCW to
take advantage of the information resources of States Parties;
the Executive branch should give this matter high priority.
Recommendation #5.--Rather than waiting until the CWC
enters into force, the Executive branch should begin preparing
now to meet the likely need for U.S. support to OPCW
inspections, including information that would be needed for
challenge inspections of declared and undeclared sites pursuant
to Part X of the CWC Verification Annex.
The Committee cannot assure the Senate that the Preparatory
Commission's other recommendations will improve CWC
verification significantly, but it is encouraged by the
reported general direction of those talks.
The Question of Russian Compliance
The Committee views with great concern Russia's failure to
comply fully with the data declaration provisions of the
Wyoming MOU and its implementing procedures. In the absence of
full compliance with the Wyoming MOU, neither the Committee nor
the Senate can overlook the distinct possibility that Russia
intends to violate the CWC.
The failure to implement all the on-site inspections
originally agreed to in the Wyoming MOU is another cause for
serious concern. The inspections under Phase II of the MOU are
no longer likely to make a significant contribution to
compliance monitoring or verification. Rather, as pared down in
1993 and in the final implementing procedures, they will
continue the confidence-building process and help the two sides
prepare for later inspections under the BDA and/or the CWC.
Given Russia's refusal to permit a full suite of technical
inspection equipment, even after most inspections and all
challenge inspections of non-declared sites were eliminated,
the Senate must assume that Russia may have something to hide.
Recommendation #6.--The President should make full Russian
implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the BDA an issue of high
priority in U.S.-Russian relations and raise the matter
personally at the highest levels. The Committee recommends that
the Senate add a condition to the resolution of ratification of
the CWC requiring the President, 10 days after the CWC enters
into force or 10 days after the Russian Federation deposits
instruments of ratification of the CWC, whichever is later,
(a) to certify to the Senate that Russia has complied
fully with the data declaration requirements of the
Wyoming MOU; or
(b) to submit to the Senate a report on apparent
discrepancies in Russia's Wyoming MOU data and the
results of any bilateral discussions regarding those
The Committee further recommends that the Senate add a
declaration to the resolution of ratification of the CWC
expressing the sense of the Senate that if Russian data
discrepancies remain unresolved 180 days after the United
States receives information on Russia's initial CWC data
declarations from the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the United
States should request the Executive Council of the OPCW to
assist in clarifying those discrepancies pursuant to Article IX
of the Convention.
Given the passage of one-and-a-half years since Russia and
the United States reached ad referendum agreement on BDA
implementation, and given the fact that the BDA mandates
extensive on-site inspection by U.S. personnel, the Committee
believes there is a real risk that the BDA will never enter
into force, notwithstanding Russia's economic incentive to
accept bilateral verification. In the absence of agreement on
BDA implementation, the Committee advises the Senate that
verification of Russian compliance would likely be based upon a
smaller number of inspections than originally anticipated, that
the inspections of Russian sites would be conducted by the OPCW
inspectorate rather than by U.S. personnel, and that there
would be no guaranteed U.S. access to the detailed inspection
data. On the other hand, the OPCW is unlikely to exempt Russia
from the requirements set forth in the CWC's provisions.
Recommendation #7.--The Senate should add a condition to
the resolution of ratification of the CWC, barring the deposit
of instruments of ratification until the President certifies to
Congress either: (a) That U.S.-Russian agreement on BDA
implementation has been or will shortly be achieved, and that
the agreed verification procedures will meet or exceed those
mandated by the CWC; or (b) that the OPCW will be prepared,
when the CWC enters into force, to effectively monitor U.S. and
Russian facilities, as well as those of the other States
Parties. Relevant committees may also wish to consider whether
it would be effective to attach conditions to one or more
elements of U.S. economic assistance to Russia.
Recommendation #8.--The Executive branch and the committees
of Congress with responsibility for U.S. contributions to the
OPCW budget should pay close attention to the OPCW's changing
needs, so that additional funds can be made available in a
timely fashion if current planning assumptions prove too
Recommendation #9.--The Executive branch should ensure that
the effectiveness of the CWC, both in Russia and around the
world, is the primary objective of U.S.-Russian CW policy.
Protecting Classified and Proprietary Information
Although some loss of sensitive information will likely
occur as a result of CWC data declarations and on-site
inspections, the Executive branch is taking all reasonable
steps to protect classified information that may be at risk.
The Committee welcomes the recent increase in efforts to help
U.S. industry, but believes that still more can be done to
protect confidential business information held by private
Some loss of classified or proprietary information in
challenge inspections is likely, at least through perimeter
monitoring. It will be especially important, therefore, for the
OPCW to have effective regulations and procedures guarding
against disclosure of such information by OPCW personnel.
Recommendation #10.--The United States should exercise its
right to reject a proposed inspector or inspection assistant
when the facts indicate that this person is likely to seek
information to which the inspection team is not entitled or to
mishandle information that the team obtains.
Recommendation #11.--Congress should amend the CWC
implementing legislation (S. 2221) to give the DoD On-Site
Inspection Agency (OSIA) authority to escort inspectors on non-
DoD sites, when asked to do so by the owners or managers of
those sites, on a non-reimbursable basis to the extent that
funds are available.
Recommendation #12.--The Department of Commerce, with
assistance from the Department of Defense, should develop a
database similar to the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness
Program (DTIRP) database, to which interested firms could
voluntarily contribute information on security needs at their
facilities in the event of a CWC inspection.
Given industry's important role in data declarations, the
first of which must be submitted by the United States only 30
days after the CWC enters into force, the risk that industry
unpreparedness will lead to inaccurate U.S. declarations is a
cause for concern.
Recommendation #13.--The Commerce Department should
undertake a substantially-increased outreach program to inform
companies that do not yet understand their data declaration
obligations, in particular. Because U.S. ratification of the
CWC may well precede enactment of implementation legislation,
the Commerce Department should begin this effort now, rather
than waiting for formal designation as the lead agency for this
Recommendation #14.--The Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations should pay particular attention to whether section
302 of S. 2221 provides for sufficient disclosure of
information to Congress and, if necessary, to the public.
The resolution of ratification was not reported out of the
Foreign Relations Committee during the 103rd Congress, so there
has been no final disposition regarding either the Intelligence
Committee's recommendations or the larger issue of Senate
advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons
d. nuclear weapons proliferation in korea, russia, ukraine, and china
In the 103rd Congress, the Committee continued its on-going
review of the Intelligence Community's assessment of the threat
to U.S. national security interests and its effectiveness in
monitoring the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and their delivery systems. The Committee
has worked to enhance the resources devoted to this important
issue in an increasingly constrained budget environment.
In addition to the legislative provisions pertaining to
counterintelligence which were enacted in the 2nd session of
the 103rd Congress (see section II, above), the Committee
devoted a substantial part of its oversight efforts to
analyzing the Ames espionage case, which came to light on
February 21, 1994, with the arrest of CIA employee Aldrich H.
Ames and his wife, Rosario.
The Committee was first briefed on the case the day of
arrests and immediately requested the CIA Inspector General to
undertake an inquiry to determine what Ames had done and how he
had been able to carry on such activities for a period of nine
years without detection. In the meantime, the Committee
continued to receive periodic updates on the progress of the
criminal investigation and undertook an extensive inquiry into
the cooperation between the CIA and FBI where
counterintelligence matters were concerned.
When both defendants pled guilty to charges stemming from
their espionage activities on April 28, 1994, the Committee was
no longer constrained in its inquiry by concerns of hampering
the criminal investigation and began to look more intently into
what Ames had done. Closed hearings were held on May 6, June
16, and June 28. On July 18, the staff held an all-day session
with representatives of the CIA and FBI to review the case from
start to finish. These proceedings were supplemented by an
interview of Ames, conducted by Senator DeConcini, on August 5,
On September 24, 1994, the Committee received the first
draft of the CIA Inspector General's report on the Ames case,
and on September 28th held a closed hearing where the CIA
Inspector General presented his report. The following day, the
Director of Central Intelligence testified with respect to the
disciplinary actions he had taken in response to the Inspector
On the basis of these proceedings and the report of the CIA
Inspector General, the Committee, by unanimous vote, issued its
own analysis of the Ames case on November 1, 1994. (See Senate
Report 103-90.) In addition to criticizing the leniency of the
disciplinary actions taken by the DCI, the Committee found
``numerous and egregious'' shortcomings in the way the Ames
case had been handled and proposed 23 separate recommendations
for change. Among the key findings, the Committee found:
The counterintelligence function at the CIA was weak
and inherently flawed, and, despite numerous reports
pointing out these flaws, CIA had failed to correct
The CIA had failed to document and address the
serious suitability problems demonstrated by Ames,
e.g., alcohol abuse, extramarital relationships with
foreign nationals, security violations, failure to
comply with agency administrative regulations;
The CIA had failed to adequately coordinate the
operational activities of Ames by allowing him to meet
alone with Soviet Embassy officials at a time when he
had access to extraordinarily sensitive information
pertaining to Soviet nationals working clandestinely
with the CIA;
The CIA had failed to aggressively investigate the
cases compromised by Ames with adequate resources until
mid-1991, six years after the compromises occurred;
The CIA had failed to adequately limit Ames's
assignments and access to classified information after
suspicions concerning him had been raised; and
The CIA had failed to advise the oversight committees
of the losses caused by Ames despite a statutory
requirement to advise of ``significant intelligence
The FBI had failed to devote sufficient resources to
the molehunt and delayed for too long in opening a
formal investigation of Ames.
The Committee directed the CIA Inspector General to conduct
a followup inquiry to determine the extent to which the
problems noted in the Ames case have been remedied (or still
exist), and provide a report to the Committee by September 1,
1995. The Committee promised continuing oversight of this area.
A. world trade center bombing and the cia employee shooting
The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City on
February 26, 1993 awakened Americans to the fact that
international terrorists are capable of acting within the
borders of the United States. Six Americans were killed in that
bombing. In September 1993, the case went to trial and four
suspects were convicted in March 1994. To date, the FBI has not
found evidence that a foreign government was responsible for
The capability of terrorists to strike within the United
States was accentuated by the killing of 2 CIA employees as
they prepared to enter the CIA compound in Langley, Virginia on
January 25, 1993. The prime suspect for these killings, Amir
Kansi, fled the country and is the object of a major manhunt.
During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held four hearings
to examine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to
monitor and deter the activities of international and domestic
terrorist organizations. The Committee has consistently
supported increased efforts by the Intelligence Community to
identify support to terrorist organizations and to counter such
VI. Oversight Activities
a. the national security threat
On January 25, 1994 the Committee held an open hearing on
the current and projected national security threats to the U.S.
Testifying before the Committee were Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) R. James Woolsey, and Lt. General James R.
Clapper, Jr., USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). The witnesses discussed the threats to the U.S. and its
interests from the former Soviet Union, China, and countries in
other regions of particular concern (including the Middle East,
North Korea, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia) and from transnational
concerns (including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, terrorism, and illegal
drugs). The Committee's hearing transcript, ``Current and
Projected National Security Threats to the United States and
its Interests Abroad,'' [S. Hrg. 103-630] which included
numerous unclassified responses to Committee questions-for-the-
record (QFRs), was printed and is available to the public.
b. commercial availability of imagery
The Committee played a central role in the Administration's
March 10, 1994, decision to permit the commercial sale of
medium resolution imagery and imaging equipment.
Long concerned about the intelligence industrial base and
the growth of foreign competition in the commercial remote
sensing field, the Committee held a closed hearing on June 10,
1993, to learn from government and private sector experts how
the entry of U.S. medium resolution imaging technology into the
commercial remote sensing market would affect U.S. national
security interests and the U.S. intelligence industrial base.
The Committee held a second open hearing on this topic on
November 17, 1993, for the purposes of acquainting the public
with the issue and learning the Administration's progress in
producing a government-wide policy on commercial remote
sensing. On December 9, 1993, Chairman DeConcini, Vice Chairman
Warner, and Senator Robert Kerrey wrote to President Clinton to
note that ``there are substantial commercial opportunities for
United States businesses to sell satellite imagery systems and
products without in any way placing U.S. intelligence
capabilities and methods at risk'' and urging the
Administration to more aggressively support such sales. On
March 10, 1994, the Department of Commerce announced that the
Administration would henceforth permit the foreign sale of
remote sensing technology, within the context of a licensing
regime that would protect U.S. national security interests.
c. economic intelligence
During the spring and summer of 1993, the Committee
undertook an extensive review of economic intelligence to
ascertain the nature and extent of the Intelligence Community's
efforts in this area. After a series of staff visits and
briefings, the Committee held two closed hearings on this
subject to hear testimony from representatives of the CIA, the
NSA, the FBI, and the Departments of State and Commerce. These
closed hearings were followed on August 5, 1993, with an open
hearing to receive testimony from private sector
representatives, to include John F. Hayden, Corporate Vice
President, the Boeing Company; Thomas Faught, Jr., Faught
Management Group, Boyden Associates; and Mark M. Lowenthal,
Senior Fellow, Congressional Research Service.
On the basis of this review, the Committee concluded that
while the area of economic intelligence continued to lack
overall direction and guidance at the national level, the
ongoing activities of intelligence agencies appeared to be
consistent with U.S. laws, policy, and objectives, and appeared
to be producing beneficial results, both from the standpoint of
U.S. policymakers and U.S. commercial interests.
This assessment was confirmed during a closed hearing held
by the Committee in July 1994, where representatives of the
Departments of State and Commerce testified with respect to
several cases where intelligence reporting in the economic area
had led to tangible benefits for U.S. commercial interests.
While the Committee noted the continued lack of overall policy
direction in this area, it was satisfied with the progress
being made in the absence of such direction.
No further action was taken on this subject during the
d. clipper chip/digital telephony
During the 103rd Congress, the Committee explored two
initiatives proposed by the Clinton Administration to deal with
problems posed by advancing technologies which threatened to
hamper or thwart the ability of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, acting pursuant to existing law and
policy, to intercept electronic communications for foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. While the concern
which motivated both initiatives was principally that the
government's ability to conduct wiretaps for law enforcement
purposes be preserved, both initiatives also affected foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence equities.
The first of these initiatives, and the one which received
the most attention from the Committee, was the so-called
``clipper chip'' proposal. This proposal was prompted by the
growing concern that the encryption of telecommunications was
becoming increasingly sophisticated and would in time become
increasingly widespread, and that law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, acting pursuant to applicable law and
policy, would be unable to decrypt such communications. The
Administration plan envisioned the Government henceforth
purchasing only secure telephones that used a special computer
chip, called a ``clipper chip,'' to encrypt conversations over
such telephones. While the clipper chip telephone would provide
excellent security, the Government would retain a special
``key'' that would allow it to decrypt conversations encrypted
with the clipper chip. This key would be in two parts, each
part to be held by a designated ``key escrow agent,'' who would
provide access to authorized law enforcement agencies when
presented with a court order or warrant. These ``key escrow
agents'' were to be designated by the Attorney General.
While the proposal did not require U.S. manufacturers of
encryption software to use the ``clipper chip'' in the
manufacture of such software for sale to the public, the
Administration assumed that, since the Government was by far
the largest user of secure telephones, manufacturers would, as
a matter of economic practicality, conform to the Government
The Administration's proposal envisioned that U.S.
companies would be able to secure export licenses to use
``clipper chip'' devices outside the United States to secure
their communications abroad, and left open the possibility of
sale of clipper chip telephones to foreign governments.
After a series of staff-level meetings with Administration
officials and representatives of the private sector, the
Committee held a closed hearing on the clipper chip proposal on
June 17, 1993, receiving testimony from representatives of the
government agencies principally involved in developing the
proposal. This was followed by a series of written questions to
the agencies involved to explore various issues raised at the
hearing. The Committee took no legislative or budgetary action
with respect to the ``clipper chip'' proposal. Congress,
however, enacted new legislation in November, 1993, which
called for a comprehensive review of national cryptography
policy by the National Research Council, the principal
operating element of the National Academy of Science (see
Public Law 103-160). The Administration announced that it would
defer further implementation of the ``clipper chip'' initiative
pending the outcome of this review.
The second initiative reviewed by the Committee was the
Administration's proposed legislation to address the problem
posed by ``digital telephony.'' The problem arises as telephone
companies switch to digital communications to transmit voice
patterns more efficiently over telephone lines. If lines
carrying such digital signals are wiretapped, the conversations
transmitted by such signals are unintelligible unless the
digital signals carrying the conversations are processed
through software that makes the conversations intelligible. The
Administration's proposed legislation would require the
providers of telephone services to make such software
conversion possible so that targeted conversations could be
isolated and made intelligible to authorized federal agencies,
acting pursuant to lawful authority.
The legislation drafted by the Administration was
considered by the Committees on Judiciary of the House and the
Senate. While this Committee held no hearings on the
legislation and took no official position with regard to the
proposal, Chairman DeConcini, acting in his personal capacity,
did provide testimony to the Judiciary Committees in support of
the need for legislation, albeit with certain reservations
concerning the Administration's proposal. In October, 1994, the
Judiciary Committees agreed to a modified version of the
legislation proposed by the Administration, which was
ultimately enacted into law. (See Public Law 103-414)
E. SSCI AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS
The audit staff was created in 1988 by the Committee to
provide ``a credible independent arm for Committee review of
covert action programs and other specific Intelligence
Community functions and issues.'' The Audit and Investigations
staff has brought a new dimension to the oversight capability
of the Committee by the depth and quality of the program
reviews it has provided. During the 103rd Congress the staff
conducted seven individual program reviews and assisted on a
number of other critical Committee activities.
One of the most noteworthy projects undertaken by the Audit
and Investigations staff was the review of the new NRO
Headquarters project. The staff reviewed the construction
project's cost and schedule estimates, and overall requirements
and management. The key conclusions of the staff's review were
that the full and comprehensive project costs were not provided
to the Committee by the NRO; the budget for this project was
not appropriately presented in the annual NRO budget
submissions to our Committee; and the new NRO Headquarters
facility significantly exceeded the NRO's space requirements,
which caused the project costs to be higher than necessary.
As a result of the Members' concerns about the new NRO
Headquarters facility, the President advised the DCI and
Secretary of Defense to make public the existence of the new
NRO Headquarters facility. This was done on August 8, 1994. On
August 10, 1994 the Committee held a public hearing to express
their concerns to NRO and Intelligence Community officials. At
that hearing, witnesses acknowledged NRO failures. For example,
DCI Woolsey stated, ``If this [construction project] were begun
today, * * * there's no question it would be done
differently.'' The NRO project director added, ``We have been
negligent, clearly negligent, for not showing the budget
breakout for this project.''
The DCI and Secretary of Defense also committed to further
review of the NRO headquarters project to consider if there
were failures in the process, and identify potential cost
savings, if any. That review upheld the Committee's concerns.
The DCI/Secretary of Defense Review Team concluded, among other
things, that the NRO failed to follow appropriate budget
guidelines for communicating the costs of the new headquarters
project to the Congress and that there had been an insufficient
review of the project's space requirements, which resulted in
an oversized facility which could house as many as 1,000
As a result of the Audit and Investigations Team efforts,
the Committee took several actions which are designed to
strengthen oversight of intelligence facilities. For example,
Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1995 placed certain limitations upon the funding
authorized for the NRO, including:
suspending $50 million in funding until further
examination of the project was done,
allowing no further construction of NRO facilities
unless Department of Defense policies and procedures
for new construction are adhered to, and
placing a cap on the new NRO headquarters
Section 602 of the conference report established procedures
for congressional notification and approval of certain
intelligence community construction and improvement projects.
f. release of jfk documents
Public Law 102-526, the ``President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,'' mandated the
expeditious disclosure of records relevant to the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy.
In the spring of 1993, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence identified 175 archived boxes of material as
having possible relevance to the assassination. A page by page
review by Committee staff was completed by August 1993 and
resulted in the identification of over 34,000 pages of relevant
Coincident with the document identification and cataloging
process, agencies with equities in these documents were invited
by the Committee to conduct a security review of the 34,000
pages. Ninety-nine percent of the documents were declassified.
The Committee transmitted all declassified and redacted
documents directly to the National Archives. Classified
documents are being held by the Committee pending disposition
by the President's Board of Review.
The process of identification, cataloguing, security review
and transmittal to the Archives for public release was
completed in August of 1994.
g. north american free trade agreement (nafta)
Committee members held a November 4, 1993, open hearing to
explore NAFTA's potential impact on U.S.-Mexico relations,
hemispheric ties, the pace of Mexican economic reform and
narcotics trafficking. The CIA's National Intelligence Officer
for Economics testified that NAFTA's implementation would
likely facilitate greater openness and competitiveness in
Mexico's political system, stimulate greater economic change
and growth in Mexico and enhance efforts by the United States
to promote export-oriented growth policies and internal reform
programs throughout the Hemisphere. Representatives of the U.S.
private sector and academe presented testimony emphasizing the
far-reaching economic implications of NAFTA.
h. covert action
Covert action funding represents a small and shrinking
fraction of the intelligence budget. However, mindful of the
need to ensure that covert activities serve an agreed foreign
policy objective and are conducted in accordance with American
law and values, the Committee devoted a substantial amount of
oversight to this topic. In addition to regular periodic
reviews, the Committee convened special sessions to consider
new activities initiated by the President. The Committee also
acted in the FY 1995 budget process to ensure that the Central
Intelligence Agency's covert action capability remained
sufficient to respond to short-notice requirements.
i. russian/eastern european organized crime
A serious problem since the end of the Cold Car has been
the apparent growth of Russian organized crime. Within Russia,
crime has become the most serious public issue, with some
treating the growth of organized crime as a real threat to the
future of democratic and free market reforms in Russia. The
international reach of Russian organized crime has raised
concerns in Europe because of the reported involvement of
Russian organized crime elements in everything from stolen car
rings to drug smuggling and nuclear proliferation. Russian
organized crime activity has also reached America, involving
major criminal activities in New York and Los Angeles and other
areas as well.
The Committee and its staff have engaged in a series of
oversight activities intended to focus high level attention on
the Russian/Eastern European organized crime problem and ensure
that our intelligence response to this problem is timely,
adequately supported, and fully coordinated with our law
enforcement efforts. The Committee notes with regret that the
issuance of a formal executive branch policy delineating the
foreign intelligence/law enforcement interface in this area is
now more than a year overdue, despite vigorous attempts by the
Committee to urge the policymaking process to completion. The
subject, and the intelligence/law enforcement interface policy,
will remain special subjects of Committee interest in the 104th
j. environmental task force hearing
The Committee has been working with the Intelligence
Community on efforts to use intelligence assets and data to
assist environmental scientists and federal agencies with an
environmental mission. Since its inception, the Environmental
Program has taken numerous steps to determine the role
classified systems and data can play in environmental science.
In 1993, the Committee initiated a study of the potential
use of classified systems in support of the environmental
missions of appropriate federal agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), and the Departments of Interior
(including USGS), Transportation, Commerce (including NOAA),
Agriculture, Defense, and Energy.
The study was completed in May 1994, and affirmed the
significant potential benefits of this effort in providing
unique environmental information to federal agencies. The
Committee directed the Environmental Program to shift its focus
to this effort, and has emphasized the importance of closer
coordination between the Intelligence Community and federal
agencies with environmental data needs.
On August 4, 1994, the Committee held a hearing to provide
Committee members with detailed information relating to the
efforts of the Environmental Program. CIA's Deputy Director for
Science and Technology testified.
During 1994, the Committee did express specific concerns
regarding the focus and budget of the Environmental Program,
and took steps to resolve these concerns.
k. nsa support to law enforcement/sigint policy
The Committee, while in agreement with the National
Security Agency's need to protect intelligence sources and
methods and the constitutional imperative prohibiting practices
that infringe upon individual rights, is nonetheless of the
view that the National Security Agency can and should do more
than it has done in the past in foreign intelligence collection
to support U.S. law enforcement. The Committee believes that
the threat to domestic tranquility posed by international
organized crime of all kinds, but especially international
illegal drug trafficking, is so great that NSA's past
conservative approach to this problem does not meet the
American people's expectation that their government will fully
exert its resources and capabilities in their defense.
Accordingly, in section 810, ``Counternarcotics Targets
Funding,'' of Public Law 103-359, the Committee increased
funding directed against the narcotics target by $5 million and
directed that ``* * * a detailed operations plan with special
emphasis on the United States/Mexico border and including the
participation of the National Security Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
and the United States Customs Service * * * '' be completed and
provided to the Committee by November 15, 1994. The Committee
is gratified by NSA's initial response to the Committee's
directions and views and expects that the Agency, in close
coordination with the Department of Justice, will make the
maximum effort permitted under the law, with full respect for
the constitutional protections afforded all U.S. persons. This
is another area where the executive branch's formal policy on
the foreign intelligence/law enforcement interface, which is
more than a year overdue, can make a positive difference.
l. airborne reconnaissance
The Committee undertook three significant actions affecting
airborne reconnaissance programs and activities in the 103rd
Congress: (1) The placing of additional safeguard conditions on
the tactical UAV program to ensure that the warfighter gets a
tactical UAV that works; (2) the reversal of the proposed
transfer of the U-2 airborne reconnaissance program to the
Tactical Intelligence and Related activities (TIARA)
aggregation; and (3) the consolidation of governmental efforts
into a new organization responsible for the development and
acquisition of all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
The Committee strongly supported the HUNTER UAV system
which is designed for short-range reconnaissance in direct
support of tactical commanders. However, the Committee noted
early on that the HUNTER UAV system had experienced several
fundamental problems during its development and early
procurement efforts. The Committee feared that past concerns
were not resolved, and that as of April 1994, the HUNTER
program included an insufficient and unrealistic testing
schedule, extremely poor logistics support, engine design
problems, and questionable program management. Five UAV
crashes/mishaps between June and October of 1994 attested to
the significance of the HUNTER problems. While DOD restructured
the HUNTER program in the middle of the Congressional budget
cycle, the SSCI was instrumental in an amendment that
established additional safeguards.
In 1994, the Administration proposed transferring the U-2
program to TIARA on the basis of consolidating management of
certain functional areas such as airborne reconnaissance,
rather than according to the current statutory framework
governing intelligence programs and activities, specifically,
the distinction between national and ``solely'' tactical
intelligence. At the insistence of the SSCI, funding and
oversight responsibility for the U-2 airborne reconnaissance
capability was retained in the DCI's National Foreign
Intelligence Program. The Committee included in its public
report accompanying the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act
language requiring prior Congressional notification of any
further proposed transfers of programs out of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program.
In response to Congressional concerns, the Secretary of
Defense established the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
(DARO) in November of 1993. Its Director was given
responsibility for managing the development and acquisition of
all joint Service and Defense-wide manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance capabilities including vehicles, sensors, data
links and data relays. In support of DARO's stated goal ``to
bring management attention, order, and efficiency to tactical
airborne reconnaissance development and acquisition,'' the
Committee negated the President's request to allow a
duplicative UAV developmental effort by a non-DoD agency. The
Committee noted that such a bifurcation of responsibilities
would clearly have duplicated DARO's charter and capability to
develop and acquire UAVs. The Committee did not understand the
Administration's need for, or the practicality of, authorizing
two U.S. Government activities to develop separate UAV
m. publication of booklet on congressional oversight
Principally in response to the growing number of requests
received from foreign governments for information regarding the
U.S. system of oversight, the Committee approved the
publication of a new booklet in the fall of 1994 entitled
``Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S.
Experience.'' (Senate Report 103-88)
The booklet contains a narrative which traces the evolution
and accomplishments of the congressional intelligence
committees, and explains how the committees are organized and
function. The appendix to the booklet contains the pertinent
statutes, congressional rules, and executive branch policy
documents regarding the congressional oversight process, as
well as several recent commentaries on the subject.
VII. Foreign Intelligence
The Committee held six closed hearings and briefings
exclusively on Haiti and discussed the evolving Haitian
situation during several additional closed hearings in a 13-
month period beginning September 1993. Members focused on the
controversy surrounding the CIA's psychological profile of
President Jean- Bertrand Aristide, the impact of the embargo,
the political situation in Haiti and military plans surrounding
the September 19, 1994 U.S. intervention in that country.
The conflict in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was an
area of intensive focus for the Committee throughout the 103rd
Congress. The Committee held numerous closed briefings and
hearings on the situation in Bosnia and the adequacy of
intelligence support to U.S. Government efforts in Bosnia.
These briefings and hearings provided the Committee with
intelligence assessments of the military situation in Bosnia;
the likely impact of potential U.S. military actions; the
potential for achieving a negotiated settlement; and the
effectiveness of sanctions enforcement efforts. In addition,
the Committee examined the intelligence community's role in the
international community's efforts to investigate war crimes in
During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held a number of
closed briefings on the U.S. involvement in the United Nations
military effort in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Committee also
addressed this issue in open session during the January 25,
1994 open hearing on ``Current and Project National Security
Threats.'' In their testimony and responses for the record,
both DCI Woolsey and DIA Director General Clapper expressed
their pessimistic views of the United Nations' ability to reach
a peaceful, long-term settlement of the clan warfare in Somalia
after the March 31, 1994, withdraw of U.S. forces.
The Committee held an open hearing on July 29, 1993, to
assess U.S. policy toward Cuba and the prospects for political
and economic change in that country. The National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America testified that without profound
economic reforms the Castro government will be increasingly at
risk if it cannot bring significant relief to the population.
Other witnesses told the Committee that a peaceful transition
to democracy in Cuba is a vital U.S. interest. Witnesses from
the private sector differed in their assessments of U.S.
policy, with some arguing that the U.S. embargo against Cuba
has failed in promoting a democratic transition and others
suggesting that with economic pressure on Castro increasing,
now is not the time to relieve that pressure by lifting the
e. u.n. intelligence sharing
With the expansion of the United Nations role in
multilateral peacekeeping and inspection regimes, the Committee
heard testimony from U.S. officials on U.S. policy and
practices in providing intelligence support to the United
Nations for these efforts.
The Committee expressed several concerns in this area,
particularly concerning the security implications for
intelligence sources and methods where intelligence information
is provided to the U.N. The Committee will continue to examine
this issue in the 104th Congress.
f. north korea
In view of the crisis generated by the North Korean's
military activities and nuclear weapons program, North Korea
was the focus of considerable Committee time and energy during
the past two years. The Committee conducted six hearings
dedicated to intelligence analysis and capabilities on North
Korea's vast military build-up, its unstable political regime,
its fragile economy, its development of a nuclear weapons
program, and its development and proliferation of missiles.
Two specific issues of particular focus for the Committee
were the death of President Kim II Sung in July 1994, which
raised many questions about the succession of his son Kim
Chong-il and his command and control of the country. And the
October 21, 1994, nuclear agreement between the United States
and North Korea. In December 1994, the Committee held a hearing
on this nuclear agreement to address the capability of the
United States intelligence community to monitor North Korea's
a. dci r. james woolsey
On February 2, 1993, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central
Intelligence. A partner in the Washington law firm of Shea &
Garnder, Mr. Woolsey had previously served as Ambassador and
U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed
Forces (CFE) and as a Delegate to the START talks from 1983-
1986. He had also served as Under Secretary of the Navy during
the Carter Administration.
Mr. Woolsey testified on his own behalf at the confirmation
hearing. There were no other witnesses.
On February 3, 1993, the Committee reported Mr. Woolsey's
nomination to the Senate by a vote of 15-0. The nomination was
confirmed by the Senate by voice vote later that same day.
A. Declassification of Intelligence Documents
During the 103rd Congress, the Committee took the lead in a
number of efforts to declassify previously classified material
by the Executive Branch. In total, the Committee has
coordinated with the Executive Branch over 36,400 pages of
material that has been declassified and made available to the
public. The following is a compilation of the declassification
efforts pursued by the Committee:
Subject Page count Status
Intelligence Information Reports re: POW/ 20 Pending.
MIA's (SSCI# 93-0308).
Salvadoran Human Rights (SSCI# 94-0712).. 1762 Complete.
SSCI Transcript, Testimony of Elliott 116 Complete.
Abrams on December 8, 1986 (SSCI# 92-
SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the North 50 Denied in full.
American Free Trade Agreement on
September 22, 1993 (SSCI# 93-4125).
Senate Iran/Contra Committee Transcript 2 Complete.
Excerpt re: Discussions with Iranian
Representatives regarding U.S. Hostages
CIA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding 4 Complete.
regarding Activities of Present or
Former CIA Officers or Employees That
Are of Counterintelligence Concern
SSCI Transcript, Hearing of ``ISA'' on 40 Pending.
September 25, 1987 (SSCI# 94-2156).
SSCI Transcript, Hearing on Honduran 43 Complete.
Interrogation Manual, June 16, 1988
Honduras and the Honduran Death Squads 43 Pending.
CIA Memorandum regarding Aldrich Ames, 2 Complete.
December 5, 1990 (SSCI# 94-2831.
SSCI Transcript re: Interview with 108 Complete.
Aldrich Ames, August 5, 1994 (SSCI# 94-
2922 Sanitized Version).
NRO Material regarding the SSCI's hearing 46 Complete.
on August 10, 1994.
JFK documents released................... 34,392 Complete.
The total number of pages of previously classified JFK
related documents totaled 34,392 (3089 total documents) all of
which were released to the National Archives and Records
Administration for public dissemination.
B. Review of White House Security Procedures
In May 1994, the Committee received a request from the
Executive Officer of the President to review the White House
procedures for the issuance of White House passes and other
security-related functions that provide access to sensitive
classified information in the Executive Office of the
President, and make any recommendations to enhance those
Committee staff met with White House officials in May 1994
to review the existing procedures and to inform the Chairman of
the findings. After many hours of discussions with executives
within the Executive Office of the President the review was
completed and the Chairman forwarded his recommendations to the
The following four recommendations were made to the
1. The White House Office of Administration should be
assigned a Secret Service Agent or other appropriate
government official in a full-time position to function
as the Director of Security. Such a person should be
non-partisan, and responsible for overseeing all
security-related functions within the Office of
Administration. The person filling this position should
be a security professional to provide the White House
with broad security-related specialties, to include but
not limited to: knowledge of investigative and
adjudicative procedures; classified document handling
procedures; communication security procedures; and a
law enforcement background. This person would be
directly involved in the decisionmaking process for
final adjudication of White House access passes and Top
Secret security clearances.
2. A single office within the White House should
coordinate all background investigations. Currently the
Executive Office of the President has two separate
offices that initiate, track, control, and process
background investigations. One office processes
political appointees and another processes career
employees. In addition to these arrangements, the White
House Counsel's Office processes the background
investigations of Presidential Appointees who require
Senate confirmation. This practice gives the appearance
of an enormous amount of redundancy and lack of
centralized control. These offices should be combined
and headed by a senior security official (preferably
the Director of Security identified in item #1) in the
3. All security clearance/background investigation
paperwork should be completed and turned in on or
before the first day of employment with the White House
rather than the current procedure of 30 days. This
would alleviate any delay in initiating a security
background investigation and thus reduce the amount of
time, now approximately 120 days, that it takes to
process a new employee for a sensitive White House
4. Currently, new employees are required to undergo
an FBI full-field background investigation for
employment at the White House, regardless of whether or
not they have been the subject of a recent full-field
investigation from another government agency. New
employees who have undergone an FBI background
investigation within 5 years should not have to undergo
another full-field background investigation. The same
background investigation that is currently accepted
throughout the government should satisfy White House
requirements as well.
C. CIA's Office of Training and Education Training Course
On November 30, 1993, Committee staff worked with
representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency's Office
of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Office of Training and
Education to shoot a training video of a mock Congressional
briefing in the Committee's hearing room. The video has been
incorporated as a key element of the OCA-administered course
``Briefing Congress.'' The video was shot ``on location'' to
provide viewers with an atmosphere of authenticity to assist in
educating Agency and Community employees with some of the
essential aspects of an effective oversight process.
D. SECURITY AUTOMATION EFFORTS
The Committee expanded its use of technology during the
103rd Congress to facilitate the day-to-day mechanics of its
oversight responsibilities, pioneering a security clearance
management database. The system centralizes and tracks
Committee staff access to numerous special access programs,
provides timely alerts for updates of background
investigations, and generates the required material for passing
of clearances from Committee records to relevant agencies.
Complimentary software enables staff to efficiently create,
maintain, and update the personal information required for
background investigations. Together these systems further
bolster the integrity of the Committee's handling of
information classified at all levels.
A P P E N D I X
I. Summary of Committee Activities
A. number of meetings
During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held a total of
103 on-the-record meetings and hearings. There were seventy
(70) oversight hearings and seven (7) business meetings. Twelve
(12) hearings were held on the budget including the Conference
sessions with the House. Hearings on specific legislation
totaled nine (9) and nomination hearings totaled one (1).
Additionally, the Committee staff held four (4) on-the-
record briefings with over two hundred (200) off-the-record
B. bills and resolutions originated by the committee
S. Res. 43--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence. Referred to the
Committee on Rules and Administration.
S. 647--Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation
S. 1301--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994.
Enacted under bill number H.R. 2330. Public Law 103-178.
S. 2082--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1995.
Enacted under H.R. 4299. Public Law 103-359.
C. bills referred to the committee
S. 1578--Intelligence Authorization Process Adjustment Act.
S. 1869--Counterintelligence Improvements Act of 1994.
S. 1885--Security Classification Act of 1994.
S. 1886--Personnel Security Act of 1994.
S. 1890--A bill to require certain disclosures of financial
information to expose espionage activities by foreign agents in
the United States
S. 1948--Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act
S. 2056--Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act
S. 2258--A bill to create a commission on the roles and
capabilities of the United States intelligence community and
for the other purposes.
Senate Report 103-20--Special Report--Committee Activities
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 3,
1989-October 28, 1990.
Senate Report 103-23--Special Report--Committee Activities
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 3,
1991-October 8, 1992.
Senate Print 103-29--Legislative Calendar for the 102nd
Senate Report 103-43--Report to accompany S. 647, the
Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Incentive Act.
Senate Report 103-44--Intelligence and Security
Implications of the Treaty on Open Skies.
Senate Report 103-155--Intelligence Authorization for
Fiscal Year 1994.
Senate Hearing 103-296--Nomination of R. James Woolsey to
be Director of Central Intelligence.
Senate Report 103-256--Intelligence Authorization for
Fiscal Year 1995.
Senate Report 103-296--Report to accompany S. 2056, the
Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994.
Senate Hearing 103-565--Hearing before the SSCI on the
Prospects for Democracy in Cuba.
Senate Hearing 103-630--Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad.
Senate Hearing 103-650--Hearing on Economic Intelligence.
Senate Report 103-390--U.S. Capability to Monitor
Compliance With the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Senate Print 103-88--Legislative Oversight of Intelligence
Activities: The U.S. Experience.
Senate Report 103-90--SSCI Report on the Aldrich Ames