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104th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE                                
  2d Session                                                    104-246
_______________________________________________________________________



 
CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START II
                                 TREATY

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
                          UNITED STATES SENATE






   March 27 (legislative day, March 26), 1996.--Ordered to be printed
                SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
           [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

   ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, 
             Chairman
 J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice 
             Chairman
JOHN GLENN, Ohio                     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada             RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BOB GRAHAM, Florida                  MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         JON KYL, Arizona
MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana       KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia            CONNIE MACK, Florida
                                     WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
   BOB DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, 
            Ex Officio
                                 ------                                
 Charles Battaglia, Staff Director
 Christopher C. Straub, Minority 
          Staff Director
  Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
104th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                     104-246
_______________________________________________________________________


CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START II 
                                 TREATY

                                _______


   March 27 (legislative day, March 26), 1996.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______


 Mr. Specter, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                               background

    The START II Treaty, which was signed in Moscow on January 
3, 1993, builds upon the reductions that are being implemented 
pursuant to the Treaty between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July 
31, 1991 (the START I Treaty). The START I Treaty requires a 
reduction of thirty to forty percent in the overall number of 
long-range nuclear warheads deployed by both Parties, with a 
fifty percent reduction in the most threatening systems. The 
START II Treaty will further substantially reduce those 
numbers. The START II Treaty's central limits require the 
Parties to reduce their strategic offensive arms so that 
specified limits are reached by the year 2003, with the 
possibility of those limits being reached by the end of the 
year 2000 if both Parties agree on a program of U.S. assistance 
within a year after entry into force.
    There are five Parties to the START I Treaty: the United 
States and, as START I Treaty successors to the Soviet Union, 
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, and 
Ukraine, as well as the Russian Federation. In contrast, the 
START II Treaty is bilateral: The United States and the Russian 
Federation are its only Parties since, in association with the 
Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the START I Treaty 
have pledged and are proceeding to eliminate strategic 
offensive arms located on their territories. Nevertheless, the 
START II Treaty draws upon the START I Treaty for definitions, 
counting, rules, prohibitions, and verification provisions and 
only modified those as necessary to meet unique requirements of 
the START II Treaty. The START II Treaty is therefore built 
upon the START I Treaty and could not enter into force without 
the prior entry into force of the START I Treaty.

                    scope of the committee's effort

    The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee has formal 
responsibility for reviewing all treaties before they are acted 
upon by the full U.S. Senate, in light of the full spectrum of 
policy concerns. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence has prepared this report, as well as a classified 
report of over 100 pages, to support the ratification process 
by providing the Senate its assessment of the arms control 
monitoring and counterintelligence issues raised by this 
Treaty.
    This report is the culmination of the Committee's work over 
the last thirteen years monitoring the progress of the START 
negotiations. The Committee has routinely reviewed START 
progress and addressed START monitoring capabilities in its 
annual Intelligence Authorization Acts. Committee members and 
staff have met numerous times with U.S. negotiators, in both 
Washington and Geneva. The Committee has expressed its views on 
verification issues to the negotiators and to other senior 
level officials both formally and informally.
    In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent to 
ratification of the START II Treaty, Committee staff held 
numerous staff briefings; reviewed hundreds of documents, 
including National Intelligence Estimates of U.S. capabilities 
to monitor compliance with START provisions and written 
statements from the Director and Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence; and asked numerous formal questions for the 
record. Committee staff also travelled to our intelligence 
operations to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge of how 
the Intelligence Community collects, and how its analysts use, 
information bearing upon other countries' compliance with arms 
control agreements signed by the United States.
    On May 12, 1993, the Committee held a closed hearing on the 
START II Treaty, its implementation and its counterintelligence 
and security implications. Testimony was taken at this hearing 
from the Honorable Linton Brooks, U.S. Negotiator for Strategic 
Offensive Arms; Major General Gary Curtin, USAF, Deputy 
Director for International Negotiations, J-5, the Joint Staff; 
and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for 
Strategic Programs.
    On March 1, 1995, the Committee held a closed hearing on 
U.S. monitoring capabilities and the risks and implications of 
violations by the other party to the Treaty. At this hearing, 
the Committee took testimony from Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy 
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; 
Ambassador Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. START Negotiator; and Dr. 
Amy Sands, Assistant Director, Bureau of Intelligence, 
Verification and Information Support, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
    The Committee has also received numerous responses to 
questions for the record that were submitted to the Executive 
branch after these hearings, and the results of these inquiries 
have been integrated into this report.
    Throughout the Committee's efforts, experts in the U.S. 
Intelligence Community have provided generously of their time 
and insight. They also produced a detailed and honest analysis 
of the strengths and limitations of U.S. monitoring 
capabilities, in 1993, and an update of this and a related 
analysis in 1995. The Committee has been especially pleased to 
find in these analyses a straightforward discussion of the 
differences between agencies on some major issues. The Report 
of the Committee draws heavily on the 1993 analysis and could 
not have been prepared without the Intelligence Community's 
assistance.

                   textual, legal and regional issues

The President's submission to the Senate

    The Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Arms (the START II Treaty) consists of the main 
Treaty text and three documents which are integral parts 
thereof:
          The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of 
        Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of 
        Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty 
        Between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and 
        Conversion Protocol);
          The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspection of Heavy 
        Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United 
        States of American and the Russian Federation on 
        Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
        Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
          The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead 
        Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the 
        Treaty Between the United States of American and the 
        Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on 
        Attribution).
    Also submitted to the Senate for its information were 
documents that are associated with, but not integral parts of, 
the START II Treaty. These included three exchanges of letters 
between the two sides, addressing SS-18 missiles on the 
territory of Kazakstan, heavy bomber armaments, and heavy ICBM 
silo conversion. Although not submitted for the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are 
relevant to the consideration of the START II Treaty by the 
Senate.

The Treaty text

    As noted earlier, there is an integral relationship between 
the START I Treaty and the START II Treaty with respect to the 
formalities of the entry into force of the two Treaties, and 
this is true also with respect to every aspect of 
implementation of the START II Treaty. Indeed, paragraph 1 of 
Article V states that, except as otherwise specifically 
provided for, ``the provisions of the START I Treaty, including 
the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation 
of this Treaty.'' Thus, whenever a question arises, reference 
must be made to the START I Treaty. It is on this basis that 
the terms used throughout the START II Treaty have their 
meaning. This means that terms such as ``reduction and 
limitation'' and ``strategic offensive arms'' are to be 
understood in precisely the same manner as in the START I 
Treaty.
    Article 1, paragraph 1, obligates the United States and 
Russia each to reduce its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and 
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, along with ICBM and SLBM 
warheads and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that by seven 
years after entry into force of the START Treaty neither party 
has more than a total of 4250 warheads attributable to deployed 
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, as counted 
pursuant to Articles III and IV of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 1 sets forth sublimits within the overall 4250 limit 
that each party must observe: (a) 2160 for deployed SLBMs; (b) 
1200 for those types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is 
attributed; and (c) 650 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
    Paragraph 3 of Article 1 provides that once a party has 
fulfilled its obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall 
continue the reductions process so that by January 1, 2003, it 
does not have more than a total of 3500 warheads attributable 
to its deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy 
bombers. Paragraph 4 of Article 1 establishes the sublimits 
applicable to the aggregate of 3500 (or less if a party decides 
on a lower aggregate number for itself), as follows: (a) 1750 
for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs; (b) zero for 
warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more 
than one warhead is attributed; and (c) zero for warheads 
attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.
    The effect of these reductions is that by January 1, 2003, 
the aggregate number for deployed warheads must not exceed 3500 
(no more than 1750 of which can be attributed to deployed 
SLBMs) and neither party may have a deployed launcher of an 
ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed, a deployed 
launcher of heavy ICBMs, or any heavy ICBMs or heavy-ICBM 
launch canisters. Such language is redundant, as the only 
deployed heavy ICBM (the SS-18) is in fact a deployed ICBM of a 
type to which more than one warhead is attributed and, under 
the terms of both the START and the START II Treaties, the 
number of warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs may not be reduced 
through downloading. In light of the separate reference to 
heavy ICBMs that is maintained throughout the START Treaty and 
in the START II Treaty for other purposes, however, the 
separate treatment in subparagraph 4(c) of Article 1 is 
designed to leave no doubt that the complete elimination of 
heavy ICBMs is necessary.
    Under the rules for elimination, launchers may be either 
destroyed or converted and, in most cases, the missiles need 
not be destroyed. All heavy ICBM silo launchers must be 
destroyed (except for ninety that may be converted under 
stringent procedures) and all heavy ICBMs and their launch 
canisters must also be destroyed. There is no specific legal 
obligation in START II to reduce at a given rate; thus, Russia 
is not obligated to eliminate or convert a minimum of thirty-
five SS-18 silo launchers a year, although the START I 
commitment (in letters of July 30, 1991, signed by the U.S. and 
Soviet representatives) to eliminate twenty-two per year 
remains. Eliminating or converting substantially fewer that 
thirty-five per year over a sustained period, however, could 
cause concern with regard to compliance with the commitment, as 
the Executive branch has noted.
    Article II states the exception to the above requirement 
for launchers which are allowed under the START I Treaty at 
space launch facilities. ICBM launchers that have been 
converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be 
capable of launching an ICBM of a former type. (This does not 
include those silos for ICBMs which have been reduced in the 
number of warheads they can launch, which will remain capable 
of launching such missiles with more than the attributed number 
of warheads.) No more than ninety silo launchers of heavy ICBMs 
may be converted in this way; the remainder must be physically 
destroyed. Only SS-25-type ICBMs can be installed in the 
converted heavy launchers. Each party has the right to inspect 
the destruction of heavy ICBMs and their launcher canisters, as 
well as the conversion of silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Both 
parties agree not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient 
whatsoever. Neither party will produce, acquire, flight-test, 
or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed.
    Article II sets forth the rules for reducing the warhead 
attribution of (i.e., for downloading) existing types of ICBMs 
and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. Like the START I Treaty, 
START II bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of 
ICBMs and SLBMs. The parties can exceed the START I limit on 
total warhead downloading of 1250 and the 500-warhead limit on 
downloading ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III 
ICBM and the Russian SS-19 SLBM. This article allows the United 
States to maintain its sea-based leg of the Triad while meeting 
the limit of 1,750-SLBM warheads, and it allows the Russians to 
download 105 SS-19 ICBMs from six warheads to one, thus 
allowing them to retain the missiles after the January 1, 2003, 
deadline for the removal of MIRVed ICBMs. Reentry vehicle 
platform destruction is not required in this case, allowing the 
Russians to meet the lower limits in a more economical manner 
than that which will still be required for downloading to meet 
START I obligations (but perhaps making uploading--the 
restoration of downloaded warheads--a more feasible breakout 
scenario). The uploading of downloaded ICBMs or SLBMs is 
banned.
    Article IV establishes the constraints on heavy bombers. 
This specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed 
to a deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of 
nuclear weapons with which any bomber of that type or variant 
is actually equipped. This is a significant departure from the 
START I Treaty, under which 150 U.S. and 180 Soviet ALCM-
equipped heavy bombers were discounted up to fifty percent and 
only one warhead was attributed to heavy bombers equipped for 
nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For START 
II purposes, the United States successfully argued that each 
bomber should be counted as having the largest number of 
nuclear weapons for which any bomber of that type or variant 
would be actually deployed. Both sides agreed that the number 
of warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or 
variant of a type would be the number listed in the Memorandum 
on Attribution.
    The Memorandum requires a one-time exhibition of one heavy 
bomber of each type and variant for the purpose of 
demonstrating the number of nuclear weapons for which such 
bombers are actually equipped. These exhibitions are to be 
conducted no later than 180 days after entry into force. Each 
Party can increase or decrease the number of warheads for which 
a heavy bomber is actually equipped, but this requires another 
exhibition of the same sort as just described.
    Each party may reorient to a conventional role those heavy 
bombers that have never been accountable under the START I 
Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
The right to reorient bombers to a conventional role is in 
addition to the right under START I to convert, using specified 
procedures, no more than seventy-six heavy bombers to heavy 
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Heavy bombers which 
are reoriented to a conventional role are to be segregated as 
to basing and may not be used in nuclear missions or nuclear 
exercises, nor can their crews train or exercise for nuclear 
missions. Each party has the right to return heavy bombers to a 
nuclear role once, with ninety-days' notice. Reoriented bombers 
must be based at least one hundred kilometers away from storage 
areas for heavy-bomber nuclear armaments, and are subject to 
inspection. If only some bombers of a given type are 
reoriented, then those bombers must be distinguished from the 
nuclear types in a manner observable by National Technical 
Means.
    The Committee has found no aspects of the START II text 
that are likely to cause compliance issues because of the 
manner in which they are worded. Indeed, START II, by banning 
flight-tests and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after 2003, may 
lessen the likelihood of compliance issues regarding the number 
of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM is equipped or tested; 
it should generally be easier to determine the presence or 
absence of MIRVs than to determine (or agree upon) whether a 
numerical limit has been exceeded.
    One aspect of START II may increase the likelihood of 
compliance concerns related to START I. By banning MIRVed ICBMs 
after 2003, START II is likely to lead Russia to produce and 
deploy more SS-25-type mobile ICBMs. Increased reliance upon 
that system could cause Russia to approach the limit of 250 
non-deployed mobile ICBMs in Article IV, paragraph 1(a), of 
START I. Given U.S. uncertainties regarding total production 
numbers for Russian ICBMs, analysts may well, at some point, be 
unable to assure U.S. policy makers that Russia does not have 
enough undeclared mobile ICBMs to exceed this START I limit. 
Possession of undeclared missiles would be a START violation in 
any case, but concern that any such missiles would also violate 
a START I numerical limit might make the issue more salient.
    One aspect of START I, which is also relevant to START II, 
has already required diplomatic discussions and a new Joint 
Statement (issued by START I's Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission on September 28, 1995). This is the question of when 
a space launch vehicle (or SLV) shall also be considered an 
ICBM or SLBM. The Committee's 1992 report on START I monitoring 
capabilities (S. Rpt. 102-431) indicated a compliance issue 
could result from the fact that START did not specify how SLV 
stages must differ from the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs in 
order not to be subject to the Treaty's limits.\1\ The SLV 
issue is discussed in some detail later in the present report.
    \1\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Capability of the 
United States to Monitor Compliance with the START Treaty, S. Rpt. 102-
431 (September 29, 1992), p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

START II and the States of the former Soviet Union

    The Executive branch believes the likelihood is small that 
rising political tensions between the states of the former 
Soviet Union would adversely affect the drawdowns under the 
START treaties in the near term. Russia has agreements with 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan that are supposed to result in 
the elimination or the withdrawal of the strategic nuclear 
forces that were on their territory when the USSR dissolved.
            Kazakstan
    At START I entry into force (EIF), the Russians declared 
two ICBM bases in Kazakstan with a total of 104 SS-18 heavy 
ICBM silos and sixty-nine deployed SS-18 ICBMs; fifty-three at 
Derzhavinsk, with thirty-one deployed ICBMs; and fifty-two 
silos at Zhangiz Tobe, with thirty-eight deployed ICBMs. Since 
EIF, the fifty-two silos at Zhangiz Tobe have been eliminated; 
the United States has conducted a closeout inspection of this 
base.
    Roughly half of the original fifty-two declared silos at 
the Derzhavinsk base have been eliminated. In the September 5, 
1995, START I Notification of Annual Schedule for Conversion 
and Elimination applicable to the Republic of Kazakstan during 
Treaty Year Two, Russia indicated that the last twenty-four SS-
18 ICBM silos would be eliminated by July 2, 1996.
    At EIF, the Russians also declared two non-deployed SS-18 
ICBMs at the Leninsk Test Range, as well as ten SS-18 test 
silos. The two missiles were eliminated earlier this year and 
roughly half of the SS-18 test silos have been eliminated.
            Ukraine
    Pursuant to the terms of the January 1994 Russia-U.S.-
Ukraine agreement, Moscow is to provide Ukraine with nuclear 
fuel rods for the latter's power reactors as a form of 
compensation for the return of the warheads. Earlier this year, 
a suspension of warhead withdrawals was announced, due to 
compensation issues. Although the nuclear weapons remaining in 
Ukraine are scheduled to be returned to Russia by May/June 
1996, further compensation difficulties could cause additional 
delays. The compensation issue may have been somewhat defused 
by the recent Russian-Ukrainian agreement under which Russia 
will purchase from Ukraine some thirty-two SS-19s, nineteen Tu-
160 blackjack and twenty-five Tu-95 strategic bombers, and 
nearly 300 cruise missiles.
    Ukraine manufactured two of Russia's most modern MIRVed 
ICBMs, the SS-18 and the SS-24. At least to the extent that 
tensions persist between Ukraine and Russia, the feasibility of 
cheating scenarios involving covert production of those systems 
may be significantly diminished. The United States had the 
right under START I, to conduct perimeter and portal continuous 
monitoring (PPCM) at the SS-24 final assembly facility at 
Pavlohrad to count the number of ICBMs, if any, that exited 
that portal. Since SS-24 production ended, however, the U.S. 
right to conduct PPCM at Pavlohrad ceased as of May 31, 1995; 
PPCM can only be conducted there again if SS-24 production 
should resume.
            Belarus
    To date all but eighteen of the single-warhead SS-25 ICBMs 
and their warheads originally deployed in Belarus have been 
returned to Russia. Two regiments remain, one at Lida and the 
other at Mozyr.
    The withdrawals appeared to be proceeding on schedule until 
July 1995, when Belarusian President Lukashenko reportedly 
suspended nuclear weapons shipments to Russia, claiming that 
Belarus should be fairly compensated for economic and financial 
hardships stemming from the departure of Russian troops and 
environmental damage at former Russian missile sites. 
Belarusian officials have stated that all SS-25s will be 
withdrawn by the end of 1996, the date specified in their 
bilateral agreement ratified by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet 
in November 1993. However, in the Committee's view, President 
Lukashenko's recent tendencies to act in a more authoritarian 
and arbitrary manner suggest that the original withdrawal 
schedule is not guaranteed.
    The Intelligence Community has a general understanding of 
the various bilateral and multilateral agreements involving 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan for the return of 
nuclear weapons in the newly independent states. The 
Intelligence Community indicates that any suspension or 
cessation in the withdrawals can be detected with high 
confidence.
    START I does not ban production in the non-Russian states 
of items banned by START II. Ukraine was the producer of major 
START II-banned items (i.e., the SS-18 and SS-24). If START II 
should not be ratified, Russia might turn to Ukraine to replace 
those SS-18s and SS-24s that Russia decided to maintain under 
START I when they reached the end of their service life. In any 
event, Ukraine may attempt to maintain cooperation with Russia 
on future missile programs and to develop space launch 
vehicles; but Russia has not announced any plans to purchase 
such items.
    Missile proliferation, however, continues to be of concern. 
There has been proliferation activity in both Russia and 
elsewhere, as exemplified by the reported seizure of Russian 
``advanced guidance equipment, such as accelerometers and 
gyroscopes,'' in transit to Iraq.\2\ Some of this activity may 
well occur without official government knowledge, as designers 
or producers make their own deals. The Russian Government 
professes support of the goals of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR), and it would constitute a START Treaty 
violation to sell strategic systems.
    \2\ ``U.N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound 
Equipment,'' The Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p. A30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intelligence support

    The Intelligence Community, represented by the Special 
Assistant to the DCI for Arms Control, was deeply involved in 
the senior-level interagency process that led to the 
development of U.S. positions during the START II negotiations. 
The Community presented critical analysis of the implications 
of the breakup of the Soviet Union for that country's nuclear 
infrastructure, which provided insights into Russian 
negotiating behavior. Moreover, the Intelligence Community 
helped design specific provisions that were included in the 
Treaty to complement U.S. monitoring capabilities and to 
interact synergistically with national intelligence means to 
enhance those monitoring capabilities.

                      u.s. monitoring capabilities

    As is the case with START I monitoring, the United States 
will rely upon a combination of capabilities--including 
imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open-source 
information and the verification provisions of the START I and 
START II Treaties--to monitor compliance with the provisions of 
START II. Those verification provisions include on-site 
inspections, exhibitions of equipment for either on-site or 
satellite-based observation, perimeter and portal continuous 
monitoring (PPCM), notifications, unencrypted telemetry, and 
exchanges of data, including telemetry. Despite the strapped 
resources and systems and personnel reductions thus far in the 
post-Cold War era,\3\ the Intelligence Community assesses a 
high probability of detecting questionable activity that might 
be contrary to the Treaty.
    \3\ The Director of Central Intelligence summarized these 
difficulties in a public statement on January 10, 1995; see Worldwide 
Intelligence Review, Hearing before the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 104-15, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee agrees with the Intelligence Community that 
U.S. National Technical Means are generally sufficient to 
monitor compliance with both START Treaties. Congress has 
endeavored to maintain and enhance those capabilities in the 
intelligence budget for Fiscal Year 1996, as well as in past 
years. The Committee has concern, however, that U.S. 
capabilities could be insufficient if competition for scarce 
collection and analytic resources were intense and if Russian 
practices were to change in ways designed to impede U.S. 
monitoring. As noted below, the Committee recommends that the 
President be required to certify the sufficiency of U.S. 
monitoring capabilities regarding those START II provisions 
relating to ICBM and SLBM capabilities and to report to 
Congress on how such sufficiency will be assured. The Committee 
also urges the Executive branch to pursue a firm policy 
regarding Russian actions that may violate the terms of START I 
or START II, including the verification provisions of those 
Treaties.

Monitoring Russian missile tests

    The Intelligence Community's monitoring confidences reflect 
a vastly changed world from that of a decade ago. The end of 
the Cold War has brought a substantial refocusing of U.S. 
intelligence from the old Soviet Union to a much wider variety 
of threats to the national security. Indicative of this change 
is the fact that in the Fiscal Year 1996 budget process, the 
Department of Defense opposed funding the COBRA DANE radar in 
Shemya, Alaska. In order to protect that important arms control 
monitoring system, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) stepped in and took responsibility for its funding. The 
Congress instead restored full funding for the COBRA DANE 
platform in the FY 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act, an 
action that both Defense Appropriations Subcommittees have 
sustained.
    Some other systems that monitor Russian missile tests face 
uncertain funding futures or are increasingly diverted to other 
intelligence priorities, or even to non-intelligence functions. 
Although intelligence officials remain confident of overall 
U.S. monitoring capabilities, they have acknowledged that these 
actions affect those capabilities.
    The Committee finds it unacceptable that coverage by 
National Technical Means of Russian strategic missiles--still 
the systems with by far the greatest capability to effect the 
nuclear destruction of U.S. territory--should be available only 
at the expense of other important intelligence priorities. The 
Committee recommends that the resolution of advice and consent 
to ratification of the START II Treaty be conditioned on a 
requirement that the President certify and, within ninety days 
of depositing instruments of ratification, submit to the 
Congress a plan for ensuring, continued adequate monitoring of 
Russian ICBM and SLBM capabilities.

Treaty provisions to enhance monitoring

    All START I provisions designed to enhance verification, 
including those that guarantee access to telemetry data from 
ballistic missile test flights, will continue to apply under 
START II. In addition, START II provides for supplementary on-
site inspections that will enhance the Intelligence Community's 
ability to monitor the Treaty's unique provisions. The value of 
these Treaty provisions for U.S. monitoring varies, depending 
on the task. In some cases, the United States can obtain the 
same information from other sources. In other cases, the 
information gained--particularly from on-site inspections--will 
be unique and will help to reduce many of the Intelligence 
Community's uncertainties over time.
    In addition to the START I Treaty's thirteen types of 
inspections, START II's new on-site inspection provisions will 
be as follows:
          The United States will have the right to observe the 
        elimination of all declared SS-18 missile airframes 
        that are not launched, as well as all launch canisters 
        from declared SS-18s.
          The United States will have the right to confirm by 
        direct measurement that five meters of concrete have 
        been poured into converted SS-18 silos, as well as to 
        observe the entire process of concrete pouring, and to 
        measure the inner diameter of the restrictive ring 
        installed in the upper portion of each silo.
          The United States will have the right to conduct four 
        additional RV inspections per year at converted SS-18 
        silos to confirm the single-RV load of the new SS-25-
        type missile, observe the upper portion of its canister 
        for identification purposes, and confirm the continued 
        presence of the restrictive ring.
          During special heavy bomber exhibitions and all 
        short-notice inspections of heavy bombers after the 
        START I baseline period (which has already ended), the 
        United States will have the right to inspect the 
        interiors of weapons bays and external weapons 
        attachment points.

Dealing with the ``Parallel Accounts'' issue

    The START I and START II Treaties account for some systems 
differently. In addition, START II requires the monitoring of 
several elements that are not monitored under START I. The 
major systems that could potentially be affected by these 
differences in accounting are heavy bombers and SS-18 and SS-19 
ICBMs.
    Under START I, the number of warheads attributed to each 
bomber type was a negotiated figure and was not the number of 
warheads which that type of heavy bomber was actually capable 
of carrying. START II provides that the number of warheads 
attributed to heavy bombers be the number of warheads declared 
to be carried by each bomber type. The chart below illustrates 
the differences in the warhead attribution for each of the 
Russian heavy bomber types:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    START I    START II 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLACKJACK.......................................           8          12
BEAR H16........................................           8          16
BEAR H6.........................................           8           6
BEAR G..........................................           1           2
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The START II Treaty right to ``reorient'' up to one hundred 
heavy bombers to being conventional heavy bombers creates 
another difference between the two Treaties' accounting rules. 
START I does not make any provisions for conventional bombers. 
Therefore, a group of bombers under START I could be counted as 
having eight warheads per bomber, while under START II they 
were considered ``reoriented'' conventional heavy bombers with 
zero warheads. While the United States may ``reorient'' some of 
its heavy bombers, Russia has indicated no intent to do so.
    The difference in attributing warheads for the SS-19 ICBM 
arises because of the different counting rules for downloaded 
missiles in the two Treaties. Under START I, ICBMs may not be 
counted as having been downloaded by more than four warheads. 
In START II, by contrast, Russia is permitted to download the 
six-warhead SS-19 ICBM to a single warhead. While START II 
permits up to 105 ICBMs to be downloaded in this manner and to 
count as single-warhead ICBMs, they would still count in START 
I as having either two or four warheads (depending on whether 
or not the Russians installed a new RV platform required in 
START I if a missile is to be credited as being downloaded by 
more than two warheads).
    The Executive branch reports that it has taken steps to 
preclude confusion between START I and START II accounting. 
Thus, when START II enters into force, U.S. inspection teams 
will be provided both START I and START II data to support 
their inspections. A single inspection will do double duty for 
both treaties, so a thorough knowledge of both treaties by team 
members (especially team chiefs) will be essential. The 
Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is 
planning specific training sessions for its inspectors and 
escorts highlighting the accounting difference between START I 
and START II. In addition, OSIA will revise its current START I 
inspection reports and coordinate with the other Parties to 
ensure that START I and START II accounting are properly 
accomplished and documented in the formal inspection reports on 
both sides.

                       start ii monitoring tasks

    The tasks and monitoring confidences associated with 
monitoring Russian compliance with START II will be similar to 
those for START I. The primary task under START II is to 
monitor reductions of Russian strategic offensive arms beyond 
those mandated by START I, in particular the elimination of all 
MIRVed ICBMs. Additional tasks include:
          Monitoring the ban on the production, flight-testing, 
        acquisition, and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after 
        January 1, 2003 (or perhaps earlier);
          Ascertaining that the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 
        silos, the elimination of all other SS-18 silos, and 
        the elimination of SS-18 missiles and canisters are 
        carried out according to the specified procedures;
          Monitoring downloaded SS-19s to confirm that each 
        carries only a single warhead;
          Monitoring new types of ICBMs to ascertain that they 
        do not have a MIRV capability;
          Monitoring the number of nuclear weapons with which 
        Russian heavy bombers are actually equipped; and
          Monitoring any heavy bombers reoriented for 
        conventional roles to ensure that they do not carry 
        nuclear weapons and that they or their crews are not 
        used in training for nuclear missions.
    START II provides for additional on-site inspections that 
will help the Intelligence Community accomplish some of these 
monitoring tasks. START I provisions calling for notifications 
of all movement of Treaty-limited items will also assist the 
united States in monitoring eliminations, conversions, and new 
deployments.

               principal strengths in start ii monitoring

    The Intelligence Community judges that it can monitor with 
virtual certainty the elimination or conversion of declared 
items and the number of deployed silo-based ICBMs, SLBMs and 
heavy bombers that remain in the force. Treaty provisions 
designed to enhance verification play important roles in 
augmenting U.S. National Technical Means in this regard. The 
ten annual RV inspections permitted under START I will help 
assure, over time, that those silos are not being used for 
MIRVed missiles, and the four extra RV inspections at converted 
SS-18 silos that are provided for in START II will add 
assurance regarding heavy ICBMs.
    One particularly important aspect of START II verification 
would be the on-site inspection of SS-18 heavy ICBM silo 
conversions, to guard against a break-out scenario involving 
speedy reconversion of SS-18 silos. In accordance with Section 
II paragraph 6, of the Protocol on Procedures Governing 
Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing 
Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, U.S. inspectors 
could either physically witness the pouring of the five meters 
of concrete in the bottom of the silo or measure silo depth 
before and after the concrete was poured. In order to guard 
against improper implementation of the conversion procedures, 
the Committee urges the Executive branch to exercise its START 
II Treaty ``right to observe the entire process of pouring 
concrete into each [SS-18] silo . . . that is to be converted, 
and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.''
    The Intelligence Community generally expects to be able to 
monitor the ban on flight-testing of MIRVed ICBMs after 2003, 
assuming it receives the good telemetry data mandated by START 
I. The Committee notes the importance of the START I provisions 
regarding the transmission and provision of missile flight test 
telemetry and interpretive data, and urges the Executive branch 
to adopt the firmest practicable policy regarding Russian 
compliance with those provisions.

             most serious start ii monitoring uncertainties

    Monitoring missile production and storage and, 
consequently, the number of non-deployed missiles is inherently 
difficult. At facilities where the United States conducts 
continuous perimeter and portal monitoring, the Intelligence 
Community's uncertainties are low. Uncertainties are higher, 
however, in estimates of missile production at facilities not 
subject to continuous monitoring or on-site inspection. As the 
Director of Central Intelligence stated in the START I context, 
``it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been stored 
at unidentified facilities.'' \4\
    \4\ The START Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 102-607, Pt. 2 (June 23, 25, 
26 and 30, 1992), p. 160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in 1992, when the Committee reported on U.S. 
capabilities to monitor compliance with the START I Treaty, a 
cheating scenario involving covert production and deployment of 
mobile ICBMs--and especially of MIRVed ICBMs--and their 
launchers would be particularly worrisome.\5\ The Committee 
continues to believe that the possible existence of covert, 
non-deployed mobile missiles must remain an important U.S. 
intelligence target.
    \5\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Capability of the 
United States . . ., p.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Uncertainties in the estimates of numbers of non-deployed 
missiles will make it difficult for the Intelligence Community 
to determine whether all SS-18 airframes have been declared and 
eliminated as required by START II. On the other hand, SS-18 
missiles and canisters are not mobile, are the largest 
ballistic missile system in the Russian force, and require 
substantial equipment for handling and transport. Storing and 
maintaining a covert force of any significant size would be a 
major undertaking and would increase the risk of detection. As 
SS-18 silos are destroyed or converted, moreover, the military 
utility of any undeclared missiles should steadily diminish. 
The Intelligence Community is quite confident of its ability to 
monitor the essentially irreversible conversion of SS-18 silos.
    Because heavy bomber weapon loadings can easily be changed, 
the Intelligence Community will find it difficult to determine 
whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the 
number of nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. As noted 
earlier, however, at least START II attributes more nuclear 
weapons to these bombers than does START I. When the Committee 
considered this matter in the START I context, the Executive 
branch emphasized that ``heavy bombers are inherently 
stabilizing, and . . . they play a more important role in the 
U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian. . . .'' 
General Curtin noted at the time that cheating scenarios ``that 
involve heavy bombers and ALCMs . . . generally pose little 
risk of militarily significant violations. Heavy bombers and 
ALCMs are slow flyers which offer little potential for a 
surprise attack.'' \6\
    \6\ Ibid., p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               monitoring the number of rvs on a missile

    As the Committee noted in its 1992 report, U.S. 
intelligence alone cannot reliably monitor the number of re-
entry vehicles actually on a deployed missile. But on-site 
inspections of randomly-selected missiles can lead to a 
statistical confidence, over time, that the Russians have not 
deployed illegal missiles at declared locations.\7\ START II 
would not change the feasibility of cheating scenarios that 
might involve the ``uploading'' of downloaded missiles, 
although its provisions permitting more downloading than under 
START I, its ban on MIRVed ICBMs after 2003 and its lower 
limits on total nuclear warheads could increase the perceived 
benefit of a successful cheating scenario.
    \7\ Ibid. While the likelihood of finding a given illegal missile 
might be small, one can conclude from elementary sampling theory that 
the probability of detecting at least one such missile would be 
substantial if illegal missiles were deployed in a large number of 
silos subject to inspection. The Intelligence Community is confident 
that with the fourteen RV inspections permitted annually under START I 
and START II, consistent findings of compliance would produce, within a 
few years, a very high level of confidence that no significant number 
of illegal missiles was deployed at declared sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Downloading always carries the risk, moreover, that Russia 
would engage in a breakout option. That is, while it might not 
be practicable for the Russians to covertly upload their 
downloaded missiles, they could more-or-less-overtly upload the 
missiles in the event of a serious crisis.
    The Join Staff representative at the Committee's May 12, 
1993, hearing testified that, in the Joint Staff's view, no 
potential cheating scenario posed a sufficient threat that 
would be judge militarily significant by the United States. 
Specifically addressing the risk of a Russian breakout through 
missile uploading, he added that the U.S. side's ability to 
restore its own forces to higher levels would be more than 
equal to the challenge.

        the issue of space launch vehicles (slvs) based on icbms

    Both START I and START II permit the elimination of ICBMs 
and SLBMs ``by using such missiles for delivering objects into 
the upper atmosphere or space,'' i.e., by use as a space launch 
vehicle (or SLV), although that term is not used in the 
treaties. Russia has tested and advertised at least two SLVs 
based upon ICBMs: the ``Rokot'' SLV, based on the SS-19; and 
the ``Start'' SLV, based on the SS-25. (The ``Start'' SLV uses 
the Russian-language word for ``start,'' which is unrelated to 
the Treaty acronym.) No telemetry or START Treaty-required 
notifications were provided for the tests of these vehicles, 
and Russia asserted in 1994 and early 1995 that so long as the 
whole SLV was clearly different from an ICBM or SLBM, it was 
not (or should not be) covered by the START Treaty. The United 
States objected to those statements and actions at the time.
    In March of 1995, a ``Start'' SLV exited the Votkinsk 
Machine Building Plant in two sections, which triggered a START 
Treaty provision (the Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement) that 
could force reclassification of the SS-25 ICBM as a missile 
that is transported in stages. U.S. insistence upon 
implementation of that START Treaty provision had the potential 
to make Russian compliance with the Treaty impossible, because 
U.S. inspectors would have gained the right to inspect the 
insides of each SS-25 missile canister--in the field, as well 
as at the Votkinsk exit portal--to ensure that it did not 
contain two SS-25 first stages.
    Faced with both this embarrassing dilemma and high-level 
U.S. concern (which included discussions between Vice President 
Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin), Russia at length 
agreed to the U.S. interpretation of the START Treaty and, on 
September 28, 1995, initialed Joint Statement Number 21 on 
Space Launch Vehicles that Incorporate First Stages or ICBMs or 
SLBMs. The first paragraph of the Joint Statement states that 
all the Parties to START I: . . . confirm that the first stage 
of an ICBM or SLBM . . . that is incorporated into a space 
launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and 
that, for the purposes of the Treaty, such a space launch 
vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty relating to 
ICBMs or SLBMs as an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
    This provision has several implications, which are spelled 
out in later paragraphs of the Joint Statement. First, it makes 
clear that merely adding new features to an old first stage 
does not remove that first stage from START (or, by 
implication, from START II if that treaty should enter into 
force). Secondly, the whole SLV that incorporates a Treaty-
limited first stage--and not just the first stage of that SLV--
is covered by START. Hence, pursuant to the Thirty-first Agreed 
Statement to START I, telemetry from launches of such an SLV 
must include telemetry from the later stages until ``such 
objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.'' 
Finally, an SLV using the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a 
given type will count as an ICBM or SLBM of that type, rather 
than as a new type of ICBM or SLBM.
    The second paragraph of the Joint Statement makes clear 
that the Parties can agree, on a case-by-case basis, not to 
require that an ICBM stored in a canister be reclassified as 
one stored in stages, just because an SLV based on it is stored 
in stages. The third paragraph specifies that the SS-25 will 
not be reclassified as a result of the ``Start'' SLV, 
``provided that the sections of the launch canister of the 
`Start' space launch vehicle are maintained, stored, and 
transported together, solely in this configuration, until the 
`Start' space launch vehicle is prepared at a space launch 
facility or test range for launch.''
    The eighth paragraph of the Joint Statement confirms that a 
space launch facility may be located outside the territory of a 
Party to START. It also confirms, however, that the Party 
``shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs or SLBMs, 
including such space launch vehicles, as well as their 
launchers and support equipment.'' Thus, a space launch vehicle 
that uses the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM may not be 
exported, but it may be launched from a declared foreign site. 
An SLV that only uses one or more upper stages from an ICBM or 
SLBM, however, would not be subject to such START I or START II 
limitations.

                 russian start ii compliance incentives

    Russian critics of START II argue that the Treaty benefits 
the United States because it does little to restrict heavy 
bombers and SLBMs, which are considered U.S. strengths, while 
it bans MIRVed ICBMs. They also argue that Russia cannot afford 
the new single-RV ICBMs that START II compliance will require 
it to field. The Executive branch has assured the Committee, 
however, that, on balance, there is little incentive for Russia 
to cheat on either START I or START II.
    The disincentives for Russia to cheat are substantial. Many 
cheating scenarios, such as the reconversion of converted SS-18 
silos, would risk U.S. detection. The most feasible cheating 
scenarios would yield only small gains; thus, covertly 
reMIRVing all the 105 single-RV SS-19s allowed under START II 
would increase the number of Russian RVs by only about fifteen 
percent. And such scenarios as the covert production of large 
numbers of ICBMs and their launchers would require a 
considerable investment of scarce resources.
    Despite these disincentives, however, the Committee urges 
the Intelligence Community to base its collection and analysis 
priorities upon a more cautious appreciation of the record of 
Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements. 
Thus, it is hard to see how a purely rational analysis would 
have led the Soviet Union to build a large phased array radar 
near Krasnoyarsk. In the future, outmoded Russian doctrine 
could persist because of individual or collective inertia in 
adjusting to a changed world; or bureaucratic rivalries could 
lead a portion of the Russian military to resist central 
decisions to comply with START provisions.

           u.s. readiness to implement start ii verification

    The Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) 
would be ready to implement START II as soon as it was ratified 
and entered into force. START I baseline operations began on 
March 1, 1995, so that treaty's 120-day intensive period will 
not overlap with START II operations. From a logistical 
standpoint, START II inspections and eliminations would closely 
resemble those conducted under INF and START I. Team 
composition would be as in INF and START I, with the same 
mixture of weapons specialists, linguist(s), and team 
leadership. And START II does not make any additional U.S. 
facilities subject to inspection (although an additional 
portion of Whiteman AFB, the area where the B-2 is deployed, 
will become subject to inspection under START II).
    OSIA notes that an accelerated schedule of inspections may 
be required if the schedule for Phase II reductions under START 
II should be accelerated. Such an acceleration could 
necessitate formation of additional teams to ensure OSIA 
capability to perform inspection and escort functions under 
both regimes simultaneously while continuing to perform INF 
Treaty inspections until 2001. This is to be done out of 
currently planned START/INF resources.
    The FY 1996-1997 President's Budget submission for OSIA 
contains $8.9 million for START II implementation during FY 
1994-1997. OSIA estimates an additional cost of $23.7 million 
for it to meet its Treaty-related requirements during the 
period FY 1998-2003. The major part of the budget consists of 
travel, airlift, and logistical support costs for U.S. 
inspections of Russian eliminations of SS-18s and S-24s, SS-18 
silo conversions, and re-entry vehicle on-site inspections, 
with very small amounts dedicated to U.S. escort of Russian 
inspectors, equipment, training, and other minor costs. There 
is no continuous monitoring regime under START II, and 
therefore no continuous monitoring cost.
    OSIA's figures are somewhat higher than earlier estimates 
by DoD; they take into account the likely need for two 
inspections of each SS-18 heavy ICBM silo conversion. As much 
as two-thirds of total verification costs would be for on-site 
inspection of the SS-18 silo conversions. As noted earlier, the 
Committee considers those inspections to be especially 
important and urges the Executive branch to exercise its full 
rights to observe the pouring of the concrete plugs.
    Budget estimates assume that the United States will 
exercise all of its START II on-site inspection rights, 
including those for the elimination of all SS-18 missiles and 
their launch canisters, the conversion of ninety SS-18 silos 
and the four additional reentry vehicle on-site inspections 
allowed annually at converted SS-18 silos, and heavy bomber 
inspection and protection. The estimates do not include 
expenses related to National Technical Means, but the great 
majority of such expenses would have to be borne anyway in 
order to satisfy policy makers' needs for information on 
Russian strategic systems.

               counterintelligence and security concerns

    The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (ASDC3I) is responsible for 
providing security policy guidance to the DoD components. The 
Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) will 
provide the same support for START II as that provided for 
START I. The program assists new sites to determine their 
vulnerabilities and develop appropriate treaty compliant and 
cost efficient security countermeasures. As an integral part of 
the OSIA site preparation program, DTIRP arms control security 
specialists have provided support to START II facilities such 
as Whiteman Air Force Base and systems such as the B-2 Bomber, 
participated in START I Special Right of Access exercises, and 
provided continued support during mock inspections.
    Two sets of provisions in the START II Treaty, both related 
to bomber inspections, highlight the issue of safeguarding 
sensitive information. In general, the most important aspect of 
the bomber issue is that under START II, Russia will be able to 
inspect the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber. The U.S. Air Force is 
developing an inspection implementation plan that will ensure 
protection of sensitive information during inspections or 
exhibitions, but will also ensure that U.S. treaty obligations 
are met, and the Executive branch has assured the Committee 
that these inspections can readily be managed to avoid the 
compromise of classified information.
    For purposes of complying with START II, all deployed heavy 
bombers would be counted as carrying the actual number of 
nuclear weapons for which the bomber is equipped. A modified 
verification regime requires each Party to exhibit one heavy 
bomber of each type to demonstrate the number of nuclear 
weapons for which the bomber is actually equipped. The 
inspecting Party is entitled to ``visually inspect'' those 
portions of the exterior of the bomber that are equipped for 
weapons, as well as the weapons bay of the bombers, ``but not 
to inspect other portions of the exterior or the interior.'' 
The Party whose bomber is being inspected has the right to 
shroud the portions of the bomber not being inspected.
    START II also provides that up to 100 heavy bombers (except 
cruise missile carriers) can be reoriented to non-nuclear roles 
instead of being destroyed in order to meet the Treaty's bomber 
weapons ceiling. The Treaty further provides that such bombers 
can later be ``returned'' to a nuclear role. Bombers that have 
been reoriented to conventional roles must have differences 
observable by national technical means of verification and 
visible during inspection in order to distinguish them from 
nuclear-armed bombers with nuclear roles. During inspections, 
the inspecting Party is entitle to ``visually inspect'' those 
portions of the exterior of the bomber that have the 
``observable differences,'' but not to inspect other portions 
of the exterior or the interior. Again, shrouding is permitted 
as to the portions of the bombers not subject to inspection.
    Whenever Russian on-site inspectors visit the United States 
or American inspectors visit Russia, there is a risk that 
Russian personnel will take the opportunity to pursue espionage 
objectives. The FBI is responsible for protecting against this 
threat at home, and OSIA is the lead agency for responding to 
the threat overseas. The Committee believes that the 
counterintelligence challenges inherent in START II will be no 
greater than those of past treaties, and that U.S. agencies are 
capable of handling these challenges.