[Pages H3628-H3634]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1700
                 RISK OF CONFLICT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  (Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2025, Mr. 
McGovern of Massachusetts was recognized for 60 minutes as the designee 
of the minority leader.)
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address one of the most 
serious issues of our time, the risk of conflict with nuclear weapons. 
It is a threat that challenges our conscience. It is a threat not just 
for Americans but for all humanity. It is a threat not just to humans, 
but to all species of life on our planet.
  We raise this issue in the context of a series of important 
anniversaries. One week ago, July 16 marked the 80th anniversary of the 
Trinity test, the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in New Mexico. 
We still live with the legacy of above-ground nuclear tests.
  Two years ago, the Defense Department awarded the Atomic Veterans 
Commemorative Service Medal to the still-surviving veterans of that era 
and their family members.
  We must also honor the downwinders, civilians whose health and land 
suffered from the effects of radiation from these tests. Many were in 
the State of Nevada. In addition, we cannot forget the Pacific 
Islanders who have not been able to return to their home islands or the 
Uyghurs and others whose homeland in Xinjiang was the location of 
China's nuclear tests. They, too, have suffered long-term health 
consequences.
  In 2 weeks, we will commemorate the first use of a nuclear weapon in 
a conflict--and that was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 
1945--and the second, the bombing of Nagasaki, on August 9. Let us pray 
that Nagasaki will be the last. Let us work to make sure that it is.
  Sadly, the threat from nuclear weapons is only increasing. There are 
estimated to be 13,400 nuclear weapons in the world today. Some 90 
percent of these are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. 
The rest belong to the U.K., France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea.
  Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and even 
against NATO nations. North Korea uses its nuclear weapons program to 
intimidate the United States, Japan, and Korea. China continues to 
build up its nuclear arsenal. It has some 600 warheads today and is 
expected to pass 1,000 by 2030, according to the Pentagon.
  The question of Iran's nuclear program has been at the top of our 
concerns. The military strikes by Israel and the United States were, as 
stated, designed to degrade or eliminate Iran's nuclear development 
capabilities. However, as The Washington Post reported last week, U.S. 
intelligence agencies assess that only one of Iran's three principal 
nuclear facilities was destroyed by the U.S. attacks. This tells us 
that military action is not a reliable way to counter nuclear threats. 
In 80 years of the nuclear era, the only proven, demonstrated way to 
reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to lessen the scale of its 
destruction is through diplomacy and negotiations.
  If not for past arms control agreements, Mr. Speaker, today's 
arsenals would be larger and more dangerous. If not for limitation on 
above-ground and atmospheric testing, many more people would suffer 
from radiation and contamination.
  However, our challenge is made harder by the fact that there is only 
one arms control agreement remaining in force between the United States 
and Russia. The New START Treaty limits the number of deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads for each party to 1,550. The treaty expires 
in February 2026. There are scant signs that either government is 
interested in extending it.
  President Donald Trump can and should take forward steps on nuclear 
arms control. He can follow in the footsteps of other Republican 
Presidents. President Eisenhower, in his ``Atoms for Peace'' speech, 
expressed the moral imperative to warn Americans and the

[[Page H3629]]

world of the destructiveness of atomic weapons.
  President Reagan in his second term negotiated the INF Treaty with 
the Soviets. He spoke privately with Gorbachev about the elimination of 
all nuclear weapons.
  Earlier this year, President Trump said from the Oval Office: ``There 
is no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons, we 
already have so many. You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 
times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they're 
building nuclear weapons.''
  He added: ``We're all spending a lot of money that we could be 
spending on other things that are actually, hopefully much more 
productive.''
  On this point, Mr. Speaker, President Trump is right. President Trump 
has the opportunity to make nuclear threat reduction a part of his 
legacy.
  As a smart first step, he and Putin can strike a deal to respect New 
START's central limits and set the stage for a more comprehensive 
nuclear arms control framework agreement.
  Next, President Trump can put nuclear weapons on the agenda when he 
meets with Xi Jinping. He expressed a willingness to do this in his 
Oval Office comments.
  Even talking about negotiations in itself can help reduce tensions. A 
deal requires a first step, and I encourage the President to take it 
and to take it soon.
  We, in Congress, can use our voice. Along with our colleague, the 
gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Tokuda), I am the proud sponsor of H. Res. 
317, a resolution that calls on the U.S. Government to return to the 
negotiating table on nuclear disarmament and to lead a global effort to 
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. It reaffirms our country's moral 
and strategic obligation to prevent nuclear war and pursue a world free 
of nuclear weapons as a national security imperative.
  This call is in the spirit of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan and 
Presidents Carter and Obama, and we hope President Trump. I am pleased 
to report that Senators Markey, Merkley, Sanders, Welch, and Van Hollen 
have all introduced a version of our resolution. I urge the foreign 
policy committees of both bodies to consider these resolutions 
promptly.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, activity in House committees is taking us 
in the wrong direction. Last week, the Appropriations Committee 
approved an energy and water bill that cuts the National Nuclear 
Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account by 
$412 million. That is 17 percent. These activities help the U.S. stop 
the spread of nuclear weapons, detect hidden nuclear activities, and 
support arms control efforts. Why would anybody think it is a good idea 
to cut that account?

  Also last week, the Armed Services Committee approved the National 
Defense Authorization Act. It authorizes $62 billion for the nuclear 
enterprise, which represents a 26 percent increase over President 
Biden's request last year. Unfortunately, the Committee rejected an 
amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Garamendi) to restrict 
funding to create a new land-based nuclear delivery system, the 
Sentinel missile, a $180 billion boondoggle he has called an endless 
money pit.
  The threat of nuclear war is an existential one. We have a moral 
imperative to address it and address it urgently. Debates over the 
utility and morality of nuclear weapons are as old as the nuclear age. 
Notably, many of the people who helped make atomic weapons turned out 
to be some of the most powerful voices against their use and for the 
reduction in their arsenals.
  Mr. Speaker, 2 years ago this week, the film ``Oppenheimer'' 
premiered. It told the story of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the theoretical 
physicist who helped create the atomic bomb but then pushed against the 
development of more powerful weapons. For that position of moral 
courage, he paid a political price.

                              {time}  1710

  Mr. Speaker, 2 months ago, Dr. Richard Garwin passed away at the age 
of 97. He is best known as the author of the first hydrogen bomb. Less 
widely known is that he spent decades working tirelessly in arms 
control and disarmament, as well as scientific panels, conferences, and 
government boards.
  In a 2018 interview, Dr. Garwin said: ``There is a myth, and you saw 
it operate many times in the past, that if there is a perceived 
security problem, well, no difficulty, we will just buy more nuclear 
weapons. But that doesn't improve our security. What we want is less 
nuclear weapons and less cause for using them on the other side.''
  When I was a staffer for the late Congressman Joe Moakley in the 
1980s, I recall going to hear Dr. Garwin and Dr. Carl Sagan give a talk 
on nuclear weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Dr. Sagan, of 
course, is the physicist who helped us understand the idea of a nuclear 
winter, which is the hemisphere-wide Dark Age caused by the radioactive 
ash sent into the atmosphere following multiple nuclear detonations. It 
would wipe out food supplies and cause untold deaths from starvation, 
even beyond the millions killed by the blasts.
  For us today, the dynamic Dr. Garwin identifies isn't in the past. It 
is in the present. Our inboxes are full of policymakers expressing 
fears about the growth of China's nuclear arsenal or Vladimir Putin's 
intentions or Iran's plans.
  Too often, policymakers have a reflexive response. They are building 
more. Then we should build more. Mr. Speaker, this is so shortsighted. 
It is a dangerous reaction. It is very, very dangerous. We know 
firsthand the harm that such devastating weapons can have.
  On the 80th anniversaries, people of many generations will gather at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Very few survivors of those atomic bombings 
remain with us, but their stories endure. The disturbing photos of the 
burns and the radiation sickness endure.
  In those cities, those gathered will recommit to preserving the 
memory of the destruction, and to plead with current and future 
generations to work to ensure that such horrors never ever, ever happen 
again.
  Mr. Speaker, I regret I cannot be with them in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. That is why I have organized this Special Order on the House 
floor today so that Members can share their message from the floor of 
the House.
  To our colleagues, to the President, and to the American people, this 
is a crucial moment in world history. We have a moral responsibility to 
speak out and to do more.
  When we return to Washington after the anniversaries and after the 
August break, let us commit to raising more awareness. Let us commit to 
more congressional hearings and more debate on the floor. Let us commit 
to more encouragement for scientists, civil society, and regular 
citizens to raise their voices. Let us commit to legislation to contain 
the growth of nuclear weapons. Let us commit ourselves to the 
elimination of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Foster).
  Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. McGovern) for holding this Special Hour to discuss the dangers of 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, when I first entered Congress, I was the third Ph.D. 
physicist elected to this body. We had at the time Vern Ehlers, a 
nuclear physicist and a conservative, religious Republican representing 
western Michigan.
  We had Rush Holt, a plasma fusion physicist, a progressive Democrat 
representing Princeton.
  We had me, a sort of garden-variety Democrat who spent the last 25 
years smashing protons and antiprotons together to make particles that 
have not been around since the big bang.
  Although our politics were quite different, we were united by a 
special responsibility to join the discussion about nuclear weapons and 
ask what we could do to strengthen global nuclear security and maintain 
U.S. leadership in trying to prevent nuclear war.
  One area where we were always in violent agreement was to stop 
wasting money on Star Wars, which was then rebranded as the SDI, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, and has now been rebranded Golden Dome.
  For more than 45 years, scientists have been patiently explaining to 
policymakers that this is never going to work. It is easy to overwhelm 
with a trivial response to it.

[[Page H3630]]

  We have spent over $200 billion on it. We have never tested it once 
against the kind of countermeasures that we know any competent opponent 
would deploy. Even if we succeed at stopping ballistic missiles, there 
are, unfortunately, many other ways to deliver nuclear weapons that we 
can never stop.
  This thing is deeply--I guess ``stupid'' is not too strong a word. We 
explain something to someone in a variety of terms again and again, and 
they don't want to hear it because they think it messages so well.
  Wouldn't it be great if we had this magic Golden Dome, or whatever we 
want to call it, to stop nuclear weapons? Yeah, it would be great.
  If it is an impossibility to do the fundamental physics of it, then 
we should stop talking about it, and we should certainly stop wasting 
money on it.
  Another place where we were always in strong agreement was how we 
should be strengthening the nonproliferation efforts at our national 
laboratories.
  Our national labs create an underlying foundation for all of our 
nuclear security efforts including the nonproliferation and national 
security priorities that we are talking about here today. In order to 
ensure that current and future arms control efforts are properly 
fulfilling their mission, we have to invest in our scientific workforce 
to maintain our leadership and verification efforts.
  It is certainly not well-known among Members of Congress, but when 
the IAEA sends inspectors into Iran and into countries of concern, 
those have been largely trained by the national labs in the United 
States. When we gut the nonproliferation capacities of our national 
labs or simply allow them to retire, as has been happening, we risk 
putting aside one of the most powerful tools we have to actually 
enforce any deal that we may get.

  The President is very fond of talking about this deal he is going to 
get on Iran nuclear. We listened to him talk about how he was going to 
get North Korea. I support efforts to try to do that.
  If we ever succeed in getting one of these deals, for sure we are 
going to need to have experts we trust that can go in there and make 
sure nobody is cheating. Unfortunately, what we are seeing is the 
gutting of those budgets in that capacity. I guess it doesn't satisfy 
the MAGA worldview.
  Over the years, I have focused my attention on a few specific areas 
to strengthen our nuclear security architecture. One of them is what is 
called nuclear--well, it has a number of names. If for some reason a 
nuclear weapon is detonated somewhere in the United States or anywhere 
around the world, the President will come under huge pressure to say: 
Who did that? Whose weapon was it?
  There is a lot of very detailed knowledge that we have had in the 
past in our national labs to be able to go in there and do what is 
called nuclear forensics and find out whether that was a bomb from X, 
Y, or Z. That capacity has been under duress for a long time. It seems 
like it is every single time the appropriations budgets come up, we end 
up having to try to defend that.
  That is something that is completely irrelevant until it is the most 
important question in the world. Who did that? Who let off this nuclear 
weapon? How do we make sure we don't retaliate against the wrong person 
or entity that did that?
  There are a number of other things I have been working on. First and 
foremost is H. Res. 100. It is a resolution I introduced in the House 
with 19 other Members. It supports arms control and condemns Russia's 
purported suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.
  The current extension of the New START Treaty is set to expire in 
under a year, and anyone who remembers previous arms control 
negotiations will know that there is almost no time left to negotiate a 
subsequent treaty.
  Additionally, any negotiations, whether with Russia, China, or any 
other country, will require partners who are willing to have 
discussions on arms control, which is something that is far easier said 
than done.
  This is not something where the two great men leading great nations 
can come together and strike a deal. The details matter. We have to 
have technical experts that we trust to go deep down into the weeds to 
have an agreement so they can come back and say this is a solid 
agreement we can trust.
  It is a time when traditional channels of dialogue on arms control 
and strategic stability have been closed or quiet, and we are going to 
rely more than ever on keeping alternative channels open and keeping 
the expertise in place. Then when the time comes for these agreements, 
we have people we trust who can carry them out.

                              {time}  1720

  Mr. Speaker, nongovernmental organizations, scientists, and research 
institutions have kept this dialogue open even during the worst parts 
of the Cold War, and we are going to need to rely on them to fulfill 
these roles again.
  Another crucial institution that we must continue to support in these 
times is the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have 
already seen the incredibly hard work that Director General Grossi and 
his staff are putting in to responding to the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine with its many nuclear reactors and the myriad of other crises 
on their doorstep.
  Mr. Speaker, that brings us to Iran. One of the proudest moments in 
my career was standing alongside Dr. Richard Garwin, who, as 
Representative McGovern mentioned, was often pointed to as the father 
of the hydrogen bomb and a strong advocate for nuclear 
nonproliferation. He stood by my side, along with Energy Secretary Dr. 
Ernest Moniz, as I announced my support for the Iran nuclear deal.
  One of the tragedies of the recent past has been this President's 
abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal, which has gotten us into a heck 
of a pickle, as predicted by the people who actually understood what 
our true options were in that negotiation.
  After the U.S. bombing of Iran, there has been an immense amount of 
debate about whether or not Iran's nuclear program was set back by a 
certain amount of time, whether it is years or whatever. The level of 
technical ignorance that has been displayed by this administration is, 
frankly, frightening. They have access to the best weapons designers in 
the world, and they are either not listening to them or not asking 
questions.
  When you hear Secretary Rubio, for example, saying not to worry about 
their 60 percent enriched uranium inventory because they are going to 
have to convert it to metal and that will take years, anyone with 
knowledge of the history of the Manhattan Project knows that is not a 
major activity. Iran has done it for a long time. They know how to do 
it.
  If you are only interested in converting from uranium hexafluoride to 
metal, a few tens of kilograms, which is what you need for your first 
set of weapons, this happens in a laboratory. It can happen in a 
congressional office. You don't need a big space for this.
  The conversion of the uranium hexafluoride to what is called green 
salt, and the green salt to metal, is something that happens in a small 
industrial building. It can happen anywhere in any city in Iran, and it 
will be really hard to tell. We have not prevented them from doing what 
they have to do.
  The enrichment level is another thing where we are seeing, frankly, 
technically ignorant statements made. We have three levels of uranium. 
Less than 20 percent is generally regarded as relatively safe and can 
be used in reactors without a lot of safeguards. When you get about 90 
percent enriched uranium, that is the good stuff for really high-
performance weapons.
  What about in between? They have 60 percent uranium. Guess what? That 
is not weapons-grade, but it is weapons-usable. For example, the 
Hiroshima bomb was made with a mixture of 50 percent enriched uranium 
and higher enriched uranium.
  The 60 percent enriched uranium that Iran has a significant inventory 
of is perfectly usable even for a simple Hiroshima-style gun-type 
device. Our leadership speaks in apparent ignorance of that fact, 
beating their chest and saying we set them back by decades, when that 
is not the case.
  Just to give a sense of the scale, the 400 kilograms of uranium 
hexafluoride that the IAEA watched them enrich to 60 percent is stored 
conventionally in the United States in about 25 scuba tank-sized 
pressurized containers. Any five of those containers have enough 
uranium to make a Hiroshima-style nuclear weapon.

[[Page H3631]]

  These things are not hard to smuggle. We will have a hard time 
convincing ourselves, in fact, that the Iranians haven't already done 
it.
  Pretending like Iran does not have a credible threat and has no 
leverage is a dangerous and ignorant position for our government to be 
taking and one of the scariest things about the many threats that we 
face right now.
  Those who don't know should go look at the Wikipedia article on the 
Hiroshima Little Boy bomb and the references in it. It is, 
unfortunately, very well-documented over the years because it is not 
the best weapon you can make, by far. You can make much more complex 
and efficient weapons, but the Iranians don't have to do that.
  If they simply want to replicate what was done, they would get an old 
155-millimeter howitzer, replace the explosive shell with some 
enriched--60 percent enriched will work just fine--uranium, shoot it 
into the right-shaped target, and they have something that is as 
effective as the Hiroshima weapon.
  This is not a trivial risk. The only answer to this is negotiations, 
and we have to get very serious about that.
  It is not something that the Iranians even have to test. We did not 
test the Hiroshima weapon. It was obviously going to work. The physics 
hasn't changed in the 80 years since then, so we are at a very 
uncertain position on that, and we shouldn't pretend otherwise.
  We have also recently been hearing a lot of calls about the 
resumption of nuclear testing. This is particularly worrying because 
the move away from nuclear testing has been really one of the 
cornerstone successes of nonproliferation and nuclear security.
  Just think of all the attention Donald Trump could get by giving the 
order that he wants to blow up a nuclear weapon just to make sure it 
works, or whatever it is. Yes, he would get a lot of attention that 
way.
  Our country has a tremendous amount to lose if everyone begins 
nuclear testing again. The U.S., during the Cold War, conducted over 
1,000 nuclear tests, far more than any other country, and we had much 
better instrumentation, knowing exactly what happened in those 
explosions.
  The knowledge that we gained has allowed our Nation to maintain the 
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile without 
any further testing. If we were to resume testing, the rest of the 
world would resume testing. I am sure they all have bomb designers that 
are just champing at the bit to get more data on exactly what happens 
if they explode one of their untested weapons.
  If we do this, we would be giving away the most significant strategic 
advantage that our country has, which is this huge database of exactly 
what works and what does not work in detailed and very technologically 
aggressive designs for our nuclear weapons.
  If we open that Pandora's box, every country that is nuclear-capable 
will say this is their opportunity to become coequal with the United 
States in knowledge of nuclear weapons. That will be yet another 
disaster for the proliferation regime.
  The next few years are going to be crucial to making sure that the 
world we live in remains safe from the threat of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative McGovern for bringing us together 
to discuss this.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Foster) for his thoughtful remarks.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Tokuda).
  Ms. TOKUDA. Mr. Speaker, I rise to join my colleagues and reinforce 
their warning and urgent call to action.
  Mr. Speaker, today, we stand at a crossroads. The world is once again 
drifting toward a future where nuclear weapons are not just tools of 
deterrence but urgent threats hanging over every human life.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. Speaker, we cannot afford to look away, not when the lessons of 
the past are still very visible amongst us. Look to the people of the 
Marshall Islands. Many of them are living in my district, part of our 
Hawaii ohana, whose lands became sacrifice zones in the name of power. 
Entire communities were displaced, and generations were scarred by 
radiation. The Bikini Atoll, once a paradise, became a proving ground 
for devastation.
  These are not just theoretical consequences, lines on paper, 
assumptions, and equations. They were real, and they are very real 
still.
  The United States and its allies conducted 318 nuclear tests in the 
Pacific islands. The people who lived on the islands lost their 
ancestral homes, now uninhabitable, and the people who were exposed to 
fallout were immediately sickened with ongoing, long-term impacts for 
human health, including increased rates of birth defects, genetic 
disorders, and secondary cancers.
  The nuclear age taught us that while bombs may drop in seconds, their 
impact crosses centuries and generations, and now, instead of learning 
from history and learning from the mistakes of our past, we are poised 
to repeat it with greater risk, fewer safeguards, and far more at 
stake.
  Today, the United States, Russia, and China inched closer to an 
unrestrained three-way arms race as we collectively spend well over $1 
trillion on updated and new nuclear warheads and means of delivery. 
Just one of these programs, as was mentioned, the Sentinel 
intercontinental ballistic missile, will cost $141 billion according to 
the Department of Defense.
  Keep in mind, Mr. Speaker, that is not even the bottom line. Their 
cost estimates keep growing and growing. A new arms race is a race with 
no finish line. Let us be clear: There are no winners, only losers in 
this race.
  It doesn't have to be this way.
  We must urgently renew and expand nuclear arms control treaties with 
both Russia and with China. The path to security lies not in new 
warheads or Golden Domes but in dialogue, transparency, and mutual 
restraint. We must invest as much into diplomacy and prevention as we 
do into silos and interceptors.
  Let us be clear. All it takes is one bomb, one miscalculation, and 
one moment of madness, and everything--everything--will end.
  The clock is ticking, but the future is still ours to shape. Let us 
choose wisdom over fear, peace over peril, and life over annihilation.
  Mahalo to my colleague, Congressman McGovern, for organizing this 
Special Order hour.
  I ask on August 6 and August 9, let us take a moment to pause and 
remember we do have a choice.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her remarks.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. Omar).
  Ms. OMAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to, once again, call on the 
United States to join the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons 
and for all of the world's nuclear armed powers to adopt policies of 
mutual disarmament and abolition.
  In a few short weeks we will mark the 80th anniversary of the only 
time nuclear weapons have been used in combat by the United States in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The fact is in 80 years since, we have 
only avoided nuclear war by sheer luck. As long as countries possess 
massive arsenals of world-destroying weapons, the risk of 
miscalculation and the risk of escalation is eternal.
  In the last few years, we have seen multiple situations that remind 
us of the extent of this fragility and of the danger. Nuclear-armed 
India exchanged fire with nuclear-armed Pakistan just this year. Cooler 
heads prevailed, this time.
  Nuclear-armed Israel conducted unilateral strikes on facilities in 
Iran. That war didn't go nuclear this time.
  Nuclear-armed Russia continues its brutal war of conquest in Ukraine. 
We are avoiding escalations that increase the threats of nuclear war 
between Russia and the West so far.
  The truth is, the era of nuclear weapons will only end in one of two 
ways. Either we will abolish these horrific weapons from the face of 
the Earth, or we will use them and abolish humanity instead.
  The only sane position and the only legitimate position for anyone 
who values human life is abolition.
  In addition, more than one-half of the countries in the world have 
now formally agreed signing on to the TPNW. We should join them.
  That is because just as we have gotten terrifyingly close to nuclear 
war in

[[Page H3632]]

these past 80 years, we have gotten close to disarmament. It is not a 
pipe dream. Reagan and Gorbachev also did it. South Africa unilaterally 
dismantled their arsenal. Other countries have stopped developing 
nuclear weapons before they got the bomb.
  It is possible to disarm, and it is possible to abolish nuclear 
weapons. We only need the political will, and we need the urgency.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, you will note that I said the bombs dropped in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only nuclear weapons used in combat, 
but they were not--we must be absolutely clear--the only times nuclear 
weapons have been used.
  In fact, nuclear weapons have been used thousands of times, and their 
primary targets have been Americans. We also mark this month the 80th 
anniversary of the Trinity test in New Mexico. So we should remember 
that entire communities have been poisoned by these weapons right here 
in the United States. Entire generations have seen their families, 
their friends, and their classmates die of rare cancers caused by 
radiation exposure. They have been forced to drink poisoned water and 
breathe poisoned air.
  The effects on the communities known as the downwinders have been 
catastrophic, and their suffering is still, sadly, mostly unknown in 
this country. We have made some small steps toward providing overdue 
compensation to these Americans, the first and the most consistent 
victims of our nuclear weapons program, but we still are a long way 
from justice.

  Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. McGovern for hosting this Special Order hour 
tonight and for his years of principled leadership on this issue.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her remarks. 
We are living in a time when there is great polarization in our 
politics, but the issue that we are talking about here today is how to 
bring Democrats and Republicans together, because as Democrats and 
Republicans and liberals and conservatives we do have a mutual interest 
in survival. If nuclear weapons are ever used in this current day, then 
nobody wins.
  What we are talking about is the salvation or the destruction of our 
civilization from nuclear death. The stakes could not be higher, and 
yet what is shocking to many of us is the lack of urgency and the lack 
of attention to this subject.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. Tlaib).
  Ms. TLAIB. That is right, Mr. Speaker. There is a lack of urgency, 
and we need to move with urgency because a nuclear war cannot be won 
and would have catastrophic human consequences.
  One warhead--one--has the power to wipe out an entire city. A full-
scale nuclear war would devastate life as we know it.
  Mr. Speaker, 80 years ago, the horrific U.S. bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki caused unimaginable death and immense human suffering, and 
survivors to this day face long-term health issues and radiation 
poisoning.
  So 80 years after these atrocities, we must, as a Chamber, recommit 
our efforts to finally achieving the complete and total abolition of 
nuclear weapons worldwide. We must ensure these war crimes are never 
repeated anywhere.
  Nuclear weapons are tools of death and destruction. They cannot be 
used without disastrous consequences that violate international law and 
our shared humanity.
  The White House and Congress need to immediately work to negotiate 
new constraints to cap and reduce nuclear arsenals, especially with 
Russia and China. We must do everything in our power to prevent an 
unrestrained nuclear arms race.
  It is absolutely terrifying that in the United States the President 
has the power to unilaterally decide to launch a nuclear weapon.
  Think about that for one moment, Mr. Speaker. The use of just a 
fraction of the nuclear weapons we possess, most of which are ready to 
launch within minutes of an order from any President, including the 
current one, would lead to mass destruction of unprecedented global 
scale.
  Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle should back 
commonsense efforts to prioritize nuclear disarmament and adopt 
measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
  We must continue to work toward international agreements, Mr. 
Speaker, with all nine countries that possess nuclear weapons through 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaties, as well as the treaty on 
prohibiting a nuclear weapon.
  Again, we must come together. I cannot say this enough: The 
devastation and the consequences of any nuclear launch could be, again, 
life-changing around the world. We must continue to strive for a world 
free from the threat of nuclear war.
  I cannot thank enough my colleague, Mr. McGovern, as he commits to 
banning nuclear weapons and, again, tries to save us from any kind of 
life-changing devastation to our world.

                              {time}  1740

  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Congresswoman Tlaib and all of my 
colleagues who have been here today because this is the most important 
issue, quite frankly, facing our planet.
  Mr. Speaker, we can never ignore the fact that behind the conference 
room discussions about the utility of nuclear weapons, behind the 
corporate lobbying for nuclear modernization spending, this is a story 
of human suffering.
  The Nobel Committee awarded the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to the 
organization Nihon Hidankyo for its efforts to achieve a world free of 
nuclear weapons and for demonstrating through witness testimony that 
nuclear weapons must never be used again.
  Nihon Hidankyo is a grassroots movement of atomic bomb survivors form 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 2 weeks, members of this organization along 
with activists and citizens from Japan and around the world will gather 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 80th anniversary of the atomic 
bombings. They will amplify this clear and existential message: that 
nuclear weapons must never ever be used again.
  This organization keeps alive the testimony of the ``survivors''; 
``Hibakusha'' of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They are the witnesses to the 
indescribable, the unthinkable, the incomprehensible pain and suffering 
caused by nuclear weapons.
  Nihon Hidankyo highlights the nuclear taboo, the concept that nuclear 
weapons should never be used, an idea that is under threat from the 
growth in nuclear arsenals around the world.
  Among the organization's aims is an international treaty for nuclear 
disarmament. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or TPNW, 
was adopted on July 7, 2017, and entered into force on January 22, 
2021. It is the first legally binding international agreement to 
comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal being 
their total elimination. Mr. Speaker, 73 nations are party to the 
treaty. The United States is not. Neither are the other eight nuclear 
powers.
  We won't get there overnight, but we should not abandon the goal. My 
resolution, coauthored with the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Tokuda), 
H. Res. 317, calls for good faith negotiations with the other eight 
nuclear arms states to halt any further buildup of nuclear arsenals and 
to aggressively pursue a verifiable and irreversible agreement or 
agreements to verifiably reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals 
according to a negotiated timetable. I encourage my colleagues to 
support this resolution and join us in our efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. Takano).
  Mr. TAKANO. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the ranking member of 
the Rules Committee, Mr. McGovern, for yielding. I thank him and the 
CPC for organizing this very important Special Order hour.
  Next month marks 80 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. These were the only times nuclear weapons have ever been used 
in war.
  I have to say that this memorial, this memory, this 80th anniversary 
milestone is not just historical, it is somewhat personal and 
unexpectedly so, say, beginning in 2001, 2002 when at the age of 40, 41 
I made my first visit to Japan.
  I grew up as an American, a Japanese American. One of my 
grandparents, my only grandparent, my grandfather, Isao Takano, 
immigrated to the United States around 1916. He was born in 1898 in 
Japan, and he came from the environs of Hiroshima.

[[Page H3633]]

  Growing up, we would go to his niece, my second cousin or I don't 
know how to kind of appropriate the right sort of familial designation 
of who is a cousin, a second cousin, but Kikue Takagi was my 
grandfather's niece who married an American and lived in Anaheim and 
worked at Disneyland.
  We knew some facts, but we never in our times when we would get 
together for our family gatherings would we ever discuss what happened 
in Hiroshima. It wasn't until I was well into my adulthood on my first 
trip to Japan visiting Hiroshima and visiting Kikue, who was there 
taking care of her mother, that I learned that she was a ``survivor''; 
``Hibakusha,'' that is the Japanese word for survivor, of the atom 
bomb.
  She lived in the outskirts of Hiroshima. If you have been there, it 
is mountainous. It is a place, a delta, with five different rivers 
converging, and she lived in the outskirts. She was a middle school 
student. On the day that the bomb dropped, she was still ill, so much 
so that her mother said she didn't need to go into the city center to 
do her public service work. The middle schoolchildren were needed to 
clean up the debris of the area around the downtown of Hiroshima. They 
were doing an urban renewal project to widen the streets.
  They knew, the people of Hiroshima, the political class knew that 
Hiroshima was a target because it was an industrial city. But little 
did they know that the teachers, the middle schoolteachers and the 13-
year-olds who were there at the city center doing this public service 
work were all going to perish that day. My cousin survived because she 
stayed home at the behest of her mother.
  She had not visited any of the memorials until I had arrived in the 
early 2000s. And I felt a tinge of guilt for asking her to do this 
because she had never really sort of delved into this history by 
visiting the memorial museum.
  Riding over the bridge of one of the rivers to the museum the day 
that Kikue and I decided to go, she told me about how the river was not 
visible during the day that the bomb was dropped and the days afterward 
because of the number of bodies that just covered the surface of that 
water.
  When you arrive at the memorial location, you can see bottles of 
water that many people who attend these memorials will leave for the 
thirsty souls of those who perished and those who were thirsty from the 
August heat.
  I feel a deep obligation and responsibility to carry this memory 
forward. I remember as I crossed the bridge thinking to myself how I 
was personally connected by family to this historical event, that it 
was not something abstract. It was a moment that who I was, my 
identity, somewhat shifted and changed.

  More than 200,000 people were killed, most of them civilians. Some 
died instantly. Others suffered for months or years from burns, 
radiation, and grief.
  Mr. Speaker, 80 years after the erasure of two cities we have still 
not learned the lessons of these terrible bombings.
  There are an estimated 13,400 nuclear warheads on Earth today. The 
United States and Russia hold more than 90 percent of them. Together, 
we control more than 12,000 warheads, and that is more than enough to 
end human civilization. While the United States and Russia maintain the 
largest stockpiles, China is rapidly building.
  According to the Department of Defense, China's arsenal already has 
500 operational warheads, and if current trends continue, it could 
surpass 1,000 by the year 2030.
  This growth adds to global instability and makes the case for urgent 
diplomacy and arms control even stronger. Yet, the most important arms 
control treaty still in force between the United States and Russia is 
set to expire in less than 200 days.
  If we let the New START Treaty expire, we will be left with no legal 
limits on the size of the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. At 
the same time, we are seeing headlines about strikes on Iran's nuclear 
facilities.
  These actions revive a dangerous question: Can we stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons through military force? I believe the answer is no. We 
cannot destroy knowledge with a bomb. We cannot erase a nuclear program 
by targeting one facility.
  Strikes might delay a program, but they almost always provoke 
retaliation and harden resolve. They do nothing to build the kind of 
long-term trust and transparency that actually reduces nuclear risk.

                              {time}  1750

  That is why we need a strategy based on diplomacy, prevention, and 
protection. We know that this strategy can work because it did in the 
past. Iran's nuclear weapons program development ground to a halt under 
the Iran nuclear deal. It was only after President Trump ripped up the 
accord that Iran set itself on the pathway that it is on today.
  The recent strikes reinforce the military theocracy's paranoia that 
the only pathway to secure the regime's long-term survival is through 
the development of a nuclear program. Like I said before, if a nation 
has enough willpower and know-how, they will develop a nuclear weapon. 
That means that the United States' national security cannot solely rest 
on deterrence. We should lead by example.
  That means modernizing verification tools, supporting the 
international inspectors, and investing in the diplomatic capacity to 
negotiate real agreements. It also means rethinking how we can make 
decisions about the use of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress has a role to play. We cannot stay silent while 
the risks grow and the guardrails fall away. The American people 
deserve transparency about how nuclear launch decisions are made and 
who is involved in making them. This is not just a matter of policy. It 
is a matter of survival.
  Mr. Speaker, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not mere tragedies. They 
were warnings. The people who died there cannot speak for themselves, 
but we can speak for the future they were denied. We can choose a path 
that avoids repeating the worst mistake in human history.
  Let us honor the lives lost not only with remembrance but with 
responsibility. Let's choose diplomacy over destruction, prevention 
over provocation, and peace over peril.
  Let me return back to that scene of riding over that bridge over the 
river with my cousin Kikue and the thought that I had that every world 
leader who has some control over a nuclear arsenal should make a 
commitment to visit Hiroshima, to walk the grounds and understand what 
happened there and in Nagasaki. I think that is the only way that one 
has the moral stature and authority to be a leader of a country that 
has a nuclear arsenal.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his eloquent 
remarks. There is so much more that needs to be said, yet our time is 
coming to a close.
  Let me end by saying that when I was in college in the late 1970s, I 
interned for Senator George McGovern, no relation, but a leader on arms 
control issues. I was able to accompany him to a debate with William F. 
Buckley at Yale University titled ``Resolved: That the SALT Talks Are 
in the Interests of U.S. National Security.'' Of course, the SALT talks 
were the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
  George McGovern closed the debate--and I remember this like it was 
yesterday--I thought very powerfully. He said that he recalls that when 
he was a young Senator in 1963, they were debating the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, and Senator Everett Dirksen, who was the Republican 
Senate minority leader at the time, ``took to the floor to close the 
debate. He said that he had just reread John Hersey's `Hiroshima,' the 
description of what happened to that great city, the morning after--the 
scene of one family sitting charred around the breakfast table; out in 
the yard, bits and pieces of children's clothing; the broken arm of a 
doll; toys and debris scattered over the landscape. And he said: `I 
thought about that scene, and I said that someday Everett Dirksen will 
be buried in Illinois, and when that happens, I don't want them to put 
on my gravestone: `He knew about this, and he didn't care.' ''
  Mr. Speaker, we all know the realities of nuclear weapons and their 
devastation, and the fact that if they were ever used, it would result 
in the total annihilation of our planet.
  The question for all of us is: Are we going to do anything about it?

[[Page H3634]]

  I said earlier that one of the most troubling factors in this whole 
topic is the lack of urgency here in Congress. We don't talk about 
this. We are not pushing for arms control. We are not setting goals for 
the total abolition of nuclear weapons. Instead, we are, just out of 
habit, voting in favor of military budgets that contribute to the 
problem.
  I think, at this moment, as we approach the 80th anniversaries of 
these horrible events, this is a time for us to step up and to do 
something before it is too late.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to commemorate and have moments of 
silence to remind their constituencies of the anniversaries of the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I urge them to join with us in a 
bipartisan way in doing something about it.
  George McGovern ended his debate with William Buckley at Yale by 
saying this: ``Many years ago, in ancient wisdom, it was said: I have 
set before thee two choices, life or death. Therefore, choose life that 
thee and thy seed may live.''
  Mr. Speaker, that is the choice I want the United States to make at 
this moment. I hope that we are up to the task, and I hope that we 
don't just continue to ignore the perils of nuclear warfare.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________