[Pages H1241-H1260]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

{time} 1430
DEFENDING EDUCATION TRANSPARENCY AND ENDING ROGUE REGIMES ENGAGING IN
NEFARIOUS TRANSACTIONS ACT

General Leave

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1048.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 242 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill, H.R. 1048.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Harrigan)
to preside over the Committee of the Whole.

{time} 1430

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 1048) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to strengthen
disclosure requirements relating to foreign gifts and contracts, to
prohibit contracts between institutions of higher education and certain
foreign entities and countries of concern, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Harrigan in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed 1
hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority
member of the Committee on Education and Workforce or their respective
designees.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg) and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 1048.
Foreign nations, including our biggest adversaries like the Chinese
Communist Party, contribute billions of dollars to American
universities. The lack of transparency around foreign relationships
should concern every American as we see stolen research, anti-Semitic
propaganda, and academic censorship. None of these things belong inside
our borders let alone on our college campuses.
By establishing footholds in American schools, bad actors gain access
to valuable research and intellectual property that can be used to
bolster their own military and undermine our Nation's best interests.
Under the Higher Education Act, schools are required to report
foreign gifts and funding. Unfortunately, loose legislative language,
the Biden-Harris administration's inaction, and colleges' refusal to
adhere to the law have resulted in billions of foreign funds
infiltrating our country undetected. Last year, a congressional
investigation of two research universities uncovered nearly $40 million
in unreported research contracts with the Chinese Communist Party. That
is $40 million in unreported funds at just two universities.
Of course, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Without transparency,
we have no idea the true amount or impact of foreign funds at our
institutions.
This is why we need the DETERRENT Act. It closes these loopholes and
has more strict reporting requirements for foreign funding and
contracts. It also will hold institutions accountable by imposing
fines, such as the loss of student aid funding for schools that
continually fail to comply.
This bipartisan bill is a commonsense solution to an irrefutable
problem, which is why it passed last Congress with bipartisan support.
We should be loud and clear: No American university should be helping
the hidden agendas of the Chinese Communist Party or other nations
continue to threaten U.S. national security.
I thank Mr. Baumgartner for introducing this vital piece of
legislation. I would also like to highlight that the DETERRENT Act
includes bills from my committee colleagues Representative Harris,
Representative Owens, and Representative Messmer.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the DETERRENT Act. Doing
so will help defend against our adversaries while also holding our
institutions to a higher standard. Take foreign money first, ask
questions later is not the way to go.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1048, the DETERRENT Act.
Let's acknowledge, first of all, the elephant in the room. Just this
month, the Secretary of Education fired one-half of the Department's
staff, and last week, President Trump signed an executive order aimed
at dismantling the entire Department. This administration is actively
working to eliminate an agency that has long been the cornerstone of
ensuring that every child in America has access to a quality education.
Today, we are discussing a bill that would add even more
responsibility to the very Department that they are trying to destroy.
It is almost as if they are trying to dismantle the agency, but at the
same time, they recognize how critical its role is and are piling on
additional duties. This is not only nonsensical but also reckless.
Republicans can't argue that the Department of Education is unnecessary
and then hand it more work, expecting it to function without the staff,
resources, or the leadership that it needs.
This Congress has a responsibility to address the many pressing
issues that students face such as closing the achievement gaps,
improving college

[[Page H1242]]

affordability, and ending gun violence in schools. Instead, we find
ourselves considering bills that target vulnerable groups, and now this
bill, which risks isolating America from global partnerships in
research and education.

Instead of requiring institutions to report foreign gifts or
contracts large enough to exert any influence, the bill before us would
require institutions to report gifts of any value from people who are
not U.S. citizens if they are from a list of countries of concern, a
list that is difficult to find and will be very difficult to keep track
of because it is subject to change.
The Department of Education has already lost one-half of its staff,
and if this bill passes, it will have to process an exponentially
larger number of reports than it has to process already.
Now, how can we place these new responsibilities on an agency that is
being hollowed out, and how can we expect it to manage these complex
issues when the institution is being dismantled?
H.R. 1048 will also impose burdensome and unnecessary penalties on
institutions for working with international scholars and organizations.
Since faculty really don't know their colleagues' citizenship status,
it is reasonable to believe that discrimination will follow and
institutions will be disincentivized from hiring talented international
faculty.
Mr. Chair, present law already requires reporting of any gift large
enough to exert any influence over a university. This bill requires the
reporting of gifts of any value, whether it be a cup of coffee or a
doughnut, from people who are from so-called countries of concern and
requires the Department of Education to process all of those reports,
the same Department of Education that just lost one-half of its staff.
If the problem is millions of dollars in unreported gifts, then
requiring the reporting of free doughnuts cannot be the answer.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Baumgartner), who is the sponsor of this legislation.
Mr. BAUMGARTNER. Mr. Chair, it is an honor to be a Member of this
august body, and as the son of a university professor who cares deeply
about higher education and a former State Department officer who cares
deeply about American national security, I am excited and proud to
sponsor this bill.
Indeed, there are many wonderful things that happen on American
university campuses, but there are also some nefarious and concerning
issues on American campuses that deal with foreign adversaries.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the numbers do not lie. Foreign adversaries
have poured billions into American universities, and much of it remains
hidden from public view. In just two universities alone, congressional
investigators have uncovered nearly $40 million in unreported research
contracts tied to the Chinese Communist Party.
Nearly 30 percent of disclosed foreign funding lack even basic
details like contract dates or intended purpose. Current regulations
permit anonymous giving. These are not clerical errors. This is a
systemic failure, one that has left our institutions wide open to
foreign influence with real consequences for American society.
Let's be clear. Every dollar from an adversarial nation comes with
strings attached, expectations about what gets taught, which research
gets funded, and who gets hired or silenced.
We are already seeing the consequences. The committee report
accompanying the DETERRENT Act highlighted research from the Network
Contagion Research Institute, which analyzed foreign funding data
between 2024 and 2019 and found that universities receiving undisclosed
donations from Middle Eastern sources saw, on average, 300 percent more
anti-Semitic incidents than other institutions.
Correlation is not causation, but one thing is certain: Secrecy
allows these influences to operate unchecked and unexamined. The less
we know about where this money is coming from and what it is funding,
the easier it is for malign actors to push their agendas without
scrutiny.
The problem is far bigger than any one country. Sixty percent of all
foreign money in U.S. universities comes from just four sources,
including China and Qatar, nations that oftentimes have strategic and
ideological conflicts with U.S. interests. Despite this, 70 percent of
universities fail to comply with foreign funding reporting
requirements. Worse, universities can simply list foreign donors as
anonymous, further obscuring the source of gifts.
How can we claim to protect academic integrity when billions in
foreign influence remain hidden in the shadows?
This is why the DETERRENT Act is necessary. It closes reporting
loopholes; it requires universities to fully disclose the source,
purpose, and terms of all foreign gifts; and it imposes real
consequences for noncompliance, including fines and loss of Federal
funding. It also ensures transparency in private university endowments,
preventing foreign adversaries from quietly shaping campuses' culture
and academic research behind closed doors.

The American people want to know when foreign countries, including
our adversaries, are active on our college campuses. That is what this
bill is about. Universities have a choice to lead now with
accountability.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Chu).
Ms. CHU. Mr. Chairman, as chair emerita of the Congressional Asian
Pacific American Caucus, I rise in strong opposition to the DETERRENT
Act.
For now, the American university research system is the envy of the
world, but the DETERRENT Act would burden our higher education
institutions and Federal agencies with massive amounts of reporting of
a gift of any value from foreign countries and will cast a chilling
effect disproportionately on the Asian-American academic community.
From the incarceration of Japanese Americans in World War II to the
racial profiling of Chinese-American scientists under Trump's failed
first term China Initiative, countless Asian Americans have had their
lives destroyed because our government falsely accused them of being
spies.
Already, 72 percent of Asian-American academic researchers report
feeling unsafe. By publicizing the private, personal information of
certain faculty and staff on databases, this bill would make the
problem worse, making them much easier targets for xenophobic attacks.
Safeguarding national security can be done through commonsense
reforms Democrats have offered that don't come at the expense of U.S.
scientific innovation, global collaboration, and the Asian-American
community. As if we needed another reason to oppose this bill, it would
create enormous new responsibilities for the Department of Education at
the same time that Trump is attempting to illegally dismantle that very
Department.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''

{time} 1445

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I appreciate the concerns of my colleague,
but my committee has worked very closely with the Select Committee on
the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese
Communist Party to combat malign influence at our universities.
One type of malign influence is very different than what we are
talking about here. The influence is known as transnational repression,
which is efforts by the CCP to exert influence over dissidents,
dissidents that could be coming here to gain a great education at our
universities but are discouraged by the CCP. This legislation would
encourage students seeking an education here and be able to push back
against the malign influence of the CCP.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina
(Mr. Harris), a cosponsor of this bill with portions of his bill in
this bill, as well.
Mr. HARRIS of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, I thank Congressman
Baumgartner for his work on this bill.
Mr. Chair, each year adversarial nations like China, North Korea,
Iran, and Russia attempt to buy the ability to influence our next
generation through donations and contracts with American colleges and
universities.
The DETERRENT Act will shine light on these shady backroom deals

[[Page H1243]]

and get malign foreign influence out of our schools. The legislation
will strengthen the thresholds of reporting foreign gifts and
contracts.
According to The Wall Street Journal, in the last 12 years, U.S.
schools had nearly 3,000 contracts with China valued at no less than
$2.32 billion. That raises an important question: Why would a country
that certainly doesn't have the best interests of American students in
mind pay such enormous sums to American universities?
This bill will get to the bottom of it.
The DETERRENT Act includes language from my own legislation, the No
Contracts With Foreign Adversaries Act, which requires a college or
university to be transparent about the reason they might want to
contract with one of the four countries currently designated by our
government as a ``country of concern.''
It is true that there could be an academic purpose for a partnership
with a country like China, North Korea, Iran, or Russia, but these
partnerships cannot come at the expense of our national security,
research integrity, or our future generations.
Students, parents, and taxpayers have a right to know the financial
ties of these universities.
The DETERRENT Act strengthens current law by raising the reporting
standards and providing a real enforcement mechanism if schools try to
hide their dealings with foreign countries.
I urge all of my colleagues to stand and support the DETERRENT Act.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record a letter from the American Council
on Education on behalf of the American Association of Community
Colleges, American Association of State Colleges and Universities,
American Council on Education, Association of American Universities,
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, and the National
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, which says in
part: `` . . . as currently proposed, the DETERRENT Act would
significantly impede critical research activities; duplicate existing
interagency efforts; and put in place a problematic expansion of data
collection by the Department of Education without ensuring that actual
national security or foreign malign influence threats, including those
which espouse support for actions that run counter to American foreign
policy, are addressed.''

American Council on Education,

Washington, DC, March 25, 2025.
Hon. Mike Johnson,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Hakeem Jeffries,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: On
behalf of the American Council on Education and the
undersigned higher education associations, I write in
opposition to H.R. 1048, the ``Defending Education
Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious
Transactions (DETERRENT)'' Act. We appreciate and take very
seriously the concerns raised around research security and
foreign malign influence, at institutions of higher
education. However, as currently proposed, the DETERRENT Act
would significantly impede critical research activities;
duplicate existing interagency efforts; and put in place a
problematic expansion of data collection by the Department of
Education without ensuring that actual national security or
foreign malign influence threats, including those which
espouse support for actions that run counter to American
foreign policy, are addressed.
Over the past several years, we have worked with our
members to encourage full compliance with reporting
obligations in Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, as
well as working with the national security agencies, research
agencies, and the Department of Education to clarify and
improve foreign gift and contract reporting. As a result,
since issues with foreign gift reporting were raised by
Congress and policymakers in 2018, there has been a
substantial increase in Section 117 reporting. Our
associations and member institutions have continued to work
with the federal research agencies to implement a range of
new reporting requirements under NSPM-33, the CHIPS and
Science Act, and numerous National Defense Authorization Act
provisions. Since 2023, when the DETERRENT Act was first
marked up, federal research agencies have now fully
implemented common disclosure forms that require more details
on foreign affiliations, relationships, and financial
interests; started implementing requirements for institutions
to maintain research security programs; and created new
processes for assessing and mitigating risks prior to award.
Proponents of this bill have also asserted that it may be
helpful in deterring antisemitic activity linked to foreign
actors on colleges campuses. To be very clear, our
institutions take seriously the rise of antisemitic activity
across the country, and there is no question that more needs
to be done to address it. We continue to work with major
Jewish organizations and institutions with a shared
conviction that Jewish students, staff, and faculty deserve
to study and work without threat of harassment or
discrimination. However, the DETERRENT Act is unlikely to
solve the societal problem of antisemitism. Instead, it will
result in more duplicative reporting, confusion on campuses
and among faculty, and an increase in the overall costs of
compliance.
We appreciate that the DETERRENT Act would make Section 117
an annual report, rather than the current biannual
requirements, which would better align it with the National
Science Foundation (NSF) foreign gift reporting requirement.
We also appreciate that the legislation exempts tuition
payments and certain outgoing contracts from institutions
used to purchase goods from foreign companies. Exempting
tuition is especially important since the DETERRENT Act would
lower the reporting threshold from $250,000 to $50,000 for
some gifts and contracts and to $0 for certain countries of
concern and foreign entities of concern.
Additionally, we appreciate the alignment of definitions
(i.e. ``countries of concern'' and ``foreign entities of
concern'') with definitions already in use at Department of
Defense and NSF to help guide our institutions efforts to
address research security concerns. We also support the
language clarifying record retention and translations of gift
and contract agreements, which provides important guidance to
our institutions regarding retention of records.
However, we are concerned that the version of the bill
being considered on the floor includes significant changes
whose impact on institutions we have not had time to fully
understand. This includes the addition of ``intellectual
property'' to the definition of foreign gifts and contracts,
as well as adding organizations such as the United Nations,
to the definition of foreign sources. We remain concerned
regarding the expansion of Section 117 into areas where it is
unclear how additional and often burdensome reporting will
help to address national security concerns, beyond the new
requirements created and implemented over the past few years.
Additionally, the proposed expansion and creation of new
reports under Section 117 could increase national security
concerns by exposing information to malign foreign efforts.
The proposed bill includes several sections with
detrimental impacts, and we urge you to strike these
sections:
The new Section ll7a, ``Prohibition on Contracts with
Certain Foreign Entities and Countries,'' would require
institutions to receive a waiver from the Department of
Education before beginning or continuing a contract with a
country of concern or a foreign entity of concern. This
provision is particularly concerning because the definition
of a ``contract'' is incredibly broad and therefore will
likely capture not only all research agreements, but also
student exchange programs and other joint cultural and
education programs. This is especially concerning, given
the fact that the U.S. Department of State has paused
federal efforts around exchange programs, such as
Fulbright and Gilman Scholars, at a time when the United
States needs more students to study the Chinese language.
In addition, the Department of Education does not currently
have the expertise to carry out the review of contracts, many
of which will likely focus on scientific research not under
the jurisdiction of the Department. And given the recent
reduction in force actions, which greatly reduced staff
including at Federal Student Aid, it is unclear how this
additional work would be carried out in a timely manner by
the Department. Our institutions abide by the regulations and
requirements maintained by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Department
of State regarding U.S. partnerships, export controls, and
purchases from foreign entities. There are no indications
that expanded Department of Education reviews are necessary;
no other industry or government entity, including states,
localities, and other nonprofit organizations, must undertake
this type of review of an agreement before they can enter
into a contract with a country or foreign entity.
Section ll7b, ``Institutional Policy Regarding Foreign
Gifts and Contracts to Faculty and Staff,'' would require
institutions of higher education that receive more than $50
million in federal research and development funding or any
Title VI funding to develop a policy to compel research
faculty and staff, including those at ``affiliated entities''
to report any foreign gifts valued over $480 and contracts
over $5,000, as well as creating and maintaining a
searchable, public database with that information. This
requirement is unnecessary given other existing federal
statutory mandates that require researchers to disclose all
sources of foreign, domestic, current, and pending support
for their research to federal research agencies as they apply
for research awards and contracts.
While the bill attempts to make the names of the reporting
faculty and staff private, this provision raises both privacy
and security concerns regarding personal financial

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transactions of relatively small amounts, including for
example an inheritance from a foreign family member. This
could also provide our foreign adversaries with a roadmap for
targeting our top-notch U.S. researchers. Section 117b will
likely result in the collection of an ocean of data, much of
it trivial and inconsequential, and do little to address the
fundamental concerns regarding research security and foreign
influence.
Section 117c, ``Investment Disclosure Report,'' would
create new reports for certain institutions of higher
education (private institutions with endowments over $6
billion or with ``investments of concern'' above $250
million). These institutions would need to report those
investments with a country of concern or a foreign entity of
concern on an annual basis to the Department of Education,
which would then be made public on a searchable database.
Similar to our concerns with l17a and 117b, it is unclear
what national security or foreign malign influence threat
this provision is trying to address. Our institutions are in
compliance with Treasury rules regulating our investments,
regarding outbound investments in certain sensitive
technologies in countries of concern. It is unclear how this
will address additional issues of national security, beyond
existing federal requirements. It is also unclear why
endowments at certain private institutions of higher
education would be specifically called out as a national
security concern when investments made by other entities that
are not institutions of higher education, such as other
nonprofits, government grantees and private government
contractors are not made public.
Section 117d, ``Enforcement; Single Point of Contract;
Institutional Requirements,'' establishes new fines regarding
compliance with Section 117 reporting and the new subsections
of Section 117. The legislation would put into statute the
tie between Section 117 and an institution's program
participation agreement. By tying the new proposed fines to
Title IV, this would punish students for compliance issues at
institutions, specifically compliance with foreign gift
reporting, which is not likely impacting individual students.
In addition to these recommendations, we strongly encourage
the final bill to also include language that requires the
Department of Education to carry out negotiated rulemaking on
Section 117, in order to ensure that the Department engages
fully with the stakeholder community and clarifies important
questions around definitions to ensure the reports are
completed in the most useful way possible for policymakers,
interested public parties, and the national security
agencies.
We appreciate the efforts in the DETERRENT Act to clarify
Section 117 and codify compliance rules the Department of
Education has previously used sub-regulatory guidance to
explain. However, we urge you to consider the potentially
detrimental impacts of Sections 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d,
and strike those sections. This significant expansion of
Department authority and responsibility is especially
problematic given the recent reduction in force implemented
at the Department of Education, as well as the
Administration's efforts to dismantle the Department. We look
forward to working with you on this important legislation as
it moves forward in Congress. However, if the bill includes
those problematic provisions as it moves forward, we will
continue to oppose the legislation as drafted. There are
better approaches to address the concerns of policymakers and
we welcome the opportunity to work with lawmakers on the
right solutions.
Sincerely,
Ted Mitchell,
President.

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Messmer), an upstanding, proud member of this committee.
Mr. MESSMER. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the DETERRENT Act.
This important legislation will bring vital transparency and
accountability to gift reporting requirements for colleges and
universities.
For decades, the Chinese Communist Party, Iran, and Russia have
targeted America's college systems by pushing dangerous propaganda
aimed at influencing impressionable students.
As my colleagues have pointed out, many American universities have
been far too cozy with our international adversaries. They accept
generous investments masked as research projects and infrastructure
opportunities, which turn out to be funded by regimes that wish to do
us harm.
Not only did those corrupt arrangements create dangerous environments
for our students and faculty, they also put America's national security
at risk.
I am pleased that my bill, the INSTRUCT Act, is included as one of
the DETERRENT Act's main provisions. My legislation requires that
colleges and universities disclose to American intelligence agencies
any and all financial investment data so we can ensure they remain free
of the exploitation of hostile foreign influences.
I urge my colleagues to pass this bill, not just because it makes
sense, but because it will put our adversaries on notice that we are
watching them. Most importantly, it will protect our Nation's students
from foreign manipulation and provide them with the transparent and
safe learning environment that they deserve.
Again, I wish to thank Chairman Walberg for his leadership on this
issue.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Utah
(Mr. Owens), the vice chairman of the House Education and the Workforce
Committee as well as the chairman of the Higher Education and Workforce
Development Subcommittee.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chair, imagine our esteemed universities, pillars of
free thought and innovation, quietly channeling millions into
investments linked to the Chinese Communist Party, Russian oligarchs,
or the Iranian regime. While our students learn about democracy and
liberty, their tuition dollars may be funding governments that stand
against these very ideals.
This isn't hypothetical. This is happening. Since 2013, U.S. colleges
and universities have received over $1 billion from Chinese Communist
Party-affiliated sources. In return, we have seen professors silenced,
student groups threatened, and our intellectual property stolen.
At the same time, these institutions, many of which proudly divest
from fossil fuels and boycott Israel, are more than willing to accept
foreign funding from adversaries who seek to undermine our Nation.
The DETERRENT Act is our line in the sand. It demands transparency
and accountability from higher education. If universities are entangled
with foreign adversaries, the American people deserve to know. I am
proud that my Reporting on Investments in Foreign Adversaries, or RIFA,
Act is included in this legislation. The RIFA Act ensures private
colleges and universities disclose whether they are investing their
endowments in hostile nations like China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea. These financial partnerships should not be hidden from the
public.
For far too long, we have allowed educational institutions to become
conduits for foreign influence. Administrators on the taxpayers' dime
have given repressive regimes easy access to our students, turning
their backs on the very freedoms they claim to uphold. This betrayal
must stop, and I must make it clear that profit over patriotism, profit
over American values, and profit over American culture is traitorous
betrayal.
The DETERRENT Act takes critical steps to safeguard our institutions,
protect our students, and preserve American values. We must not allow
profit to overshadow patriotism. It is time to reclaim our universities
and secure our future. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this
legislation.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chair, we received a letter from the Association of Public and
Land-Grant Universities which says in part that Federal agencies since
2023 ``have significantly expanded research security efforts'' and
outlines those efforts and then says: ``Rather than advance
transparency and meaningfully contribute to the plethora of actions
taken by Congress and the Trump and Biden administrations over the last
10 years, the DETERRENT Act will impede important international
collaborations and be duplicative of other Federal research agencies'
efforts to appropriately strengthen research security and foreign
partnership reporting requirements.''
Then they outline some specific concerns by saying: ``The bill would
inappropriately create a new and highly unusual role for the U.S.
Department of Education in making determinations about the suitability
of international research, education, and cultural partnerships,
despite its lack of expertise in scientific research.''
It also says: ``The bill would require institutions to create new
public databases for the disclosure of international gifts to faculty
and staff members. This reporting would include the disclosure of non-
work-related gifts from any country that grantees receive

[[Page H1245]]

from family, for example, even when there are no connections to their
work. Records of such gifts would be required to be in a searchable
database maintained by institutions, and for public universities, such
reporting would potentially be subject to open records requests that
could allow foreign actors to identify leading researchers to target
for influence operations.''
Finally, it says: ``The bill would create duplicative disclosure
requirements for foreign gift disclosures as Federal research grant
applicants already must disclose all sources of support--whether
foreign or domestic--for the research activities.''
Mr. Chair, I include this letter in the Record.

Association of Public and Land-grant Universities,
Washington, DC, March 24, 2025.
Hon. Mike Johnson,
House of Representatives,
Washington DC.
Hon. Hakeem Jeffries,
House of Representatives,
Washington DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: As
president of the Association of Public and Land-grant
Universities (APLU), a membership association of more than
230 public research universities and systems in all 50
states, I write to share concerns on the DETERRENT Act, H.R.
1048. Regrettably, APLU must oppose this bill as currently
constructed as it would ultimately impede innovation that is
essential to U.S. competitiveness and add substantial costs
to institutions that drive growth in administrative
compliance and bureaucracy rather than support for students
and science. APLU strongly believes a better approach to
address policymaker concerns is possible and welcomes the
opportunity to work together to achieve common goals.
In recent years, the public university community has worked
with Congress and the intelligence and law enforcement
community to bolster research security to prevent undue
foreign influence. Congress has already passed numerous bills
that have significantly altered U.S. universities treatment
of international partnerships. In fact, since the DETERRENT
Act was last considered in 2023, federal agencies have
significantly expanded research security efforts including:
the Department of Defense issued a policy for risk-based
security reviews of fundamental research to prevent
partnerships with entities and countries of concern;
the Department of Energy established a new framework for
risk-based decisions and ensure transparency;
the National Science Foundation (NSF) launched a new
reporting system for institutions receiving funding,
requiring grantees to report all foreign gifts and contracts
over $50,000;
NSF launched a risk mitigation process to prevent potential
national security risks;
NSF launched a new center to share information and reports
on research security;
the National Institutes of Health created a decision matrix
to assess the potential for foreign interference; and
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
launched uniform guidelines about foreign talent programs.
While expansive, this is not even a comprehensive list of
new federal actions advancing research security just since
2023.
Rather than enhance transparency and meaningfully
contribute to the plethora of actions taken by Congress and
the Trump and Biden administrations over the last ten years,
the DETERRENT Act will impede important international
collaborations and be duplicative of other federal research
agencies' efforts to appropriately strengthen research
security and foreign partnership reporting requirements.
Below, I outline public research universities' most
significant concerns with the legislation as currently
formulated:
The bill would inappropriately create a new and highly
unusual role for the U.S. Department of Education in making
determinations about the suitability of international
research, education, and cultural partnerships, despite its
lack of expertise in scientific research. The Department is
ill-equipped to take on such work as it is well outside its
responsibility and expertise. Additionally, U.S.
universities' partnerships with foreign entities are already
regulated by the Departments of Commerce, State, and
Treasury, among others.
The bill would require institutions to create new public
databases for the disclosure of international gifts to
faculty and staff members. This reporting would include the
disclosure of non-work related gifts from any country that
grantees receive from family, for example, even when there
are no connections to their work. Records of such gifts would
be required to be in a searchable database maintained by
institutions, and for public universities, such reporting
would potentially be subject to open records requests that
could allow foreign actors to identify leading researchers to
target for influence operations.
The bill would create duplicative disclosure requirements
for foreign gift disclosures as federal research grant
applicants already must disclose all sources of support--
whether foreign or domestic--for the research activities.
Additionally, NSF established a new reporting portal in 2024
for all gifts or contracts from countries of concern. NSF's
newly-created reporting portal is more user friendly and does
not have the technical challenges of the Department of
Education's currently outdated reporting system. An
alternative approach to the DETERRENT Act could build upon
rather than duplicate the NSF system.
The bill contains several provisions that APLU supports
including unifying definitions across federal agencies,
codifying compliance rules the Department of Education has
previously used sub-regulatory guidance to explain, providing
clarity on the treatment of tuition payments, and requiring
the Department of Education to maintain a single point of
contact to respond to inquiries and provide technical
assistance to institutions. However, concerns about the role
and capacities of the Department of Education, which were
already significant, are further exacerbated given recent
administration announcements on the future mission and
staffing of the Department.
Public research universities remain committed to working
with policymakers to appropriately enhance research security.
APLU strongly believes this can be done without unnecessarily
burdening institutions with additional regulations that are
overly broad, misdirected, and would further bureaucracy both
of schools and the federal government. We welcome the
opportunity to work with lawmakers on better balanced
solutions.
Sincerely,
Mark Becker,
President, APLU.

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Kiley), the subcommittee chair of the Early Childhood,
Elementary, and Secondary Education Subcommittee.
Mr. KILEY. Mr. Chair, America's universities have long been the place
where for better or for worse cultural trends tend to begin and then
spread throughout the rest of the country. Unfortunately, in recent
years, it has been for worse.
An ethos of censorship took hold first in American universities
before spreading to tech companies throughout our broader culture and
into the government itself.
Of course we saw most vividly on university campuses the absolutely
appalling scenes of anti-Semitism that sadly also became part of our
broader problem for the rest of the country over the last few years and
even before that.
America's adversaries, noticing this phenomenon, have decided that
targeting our universities is a way to weaken the United States.
Infiltrating our universities is a way to influence our broader
institutions and to influence public opinion.
You see, for example, a congressional investigation found that there
were nearly $40 million in contracts with the CCP or CCP-linked
organizations. This is just what we know about.
Institutions have accepted billions in anonymous foreign funds
without any transparency or accountability. There was even a recent
study from the Institute for the Global Study of Anti-Semitism and
Policy showing how this has infiltrated K-12 classrooms as well as
funding from Qatar ended up at Brown University which developed anti-
Israel curricula that then went to 8,000 K-12 schools throughout the
entire country.
The DETERRENT Act is a much-needed, commonsense piece of legislation
that simply says if you are going to accept funding from foreign
countries, you need to disclose that. After all, universities are
massively funded in various forms by the Federal Government, so if
taxpayer dollars are going to support institutions that are taking
foreign money, we should know about that.
The requirements put in place by this bill simply say that if you
accept a gift of $50,000 or more, a foreign gift, then you need to
report that, and it is anything of any value if it is from an
adversarial nation.
The bill also closes reporting gaps, including faculty-level
disclosures and imposes real penalties for noncompliance, including
loss of title IV funds.
The good news, Mr. Chair, is that over the last year or so we have
seen a reckoning begin in higher education in this country, and we are
starting to see very positive changes. A number of university
presidents have lost their jobs, and universities are increasingly
committing themselves anew to protecting civil rights and promoting
academic freedom.
The DETERRENT Act will be an important part of that trend. I am proud
to be a cosponsor.

[[Page H1246]]

{time} 1500

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, we received a letter from the Association of American
Universities, which says, in part: `` . . . as currently proposed,
sections 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d in the bill are unhelpful to
advancing the national and research security interests of the United
States. Indeed, the new faculty and staff gift reporting requirement
for any and all countries is excessive, will prove counterproductive,
and divert important university resources away from more valuable and
focused efforts to address legitimate research security risks.
Additionally, the bill's contract waiver requirement will prevent U.S.
researchers and students from participating in important international
scientific collaborations and exchange programs, ultimately harming--
not helping--the U.S. maintain its global leadership position in
critical areas of scientific research.''
Mr. Chair, I include this letter in the Record, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Association of

American Universities,

Washington, DC, March 24, 2025.
Hon. Mike Johnson,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Hakeem Jeffries,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: I write
on behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU)
representing 69 leading U.S. research universities to urge
your opposition to H.R. 1048, the ``Defending Education
Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious
Transactions (DETERRENT)'' Act.
AAU supports some aspects of the bill to improve foreign
gift reporting by institutions of higher education as
required by Section 117 of the Higher Education Act,
including establishing a single (point of contact at the
department, exempting reporting for certain tuition payments,
aligning some definitions, and establishing annual reporting.
However, as currently proposed, section 117a, 117b, 117c, and
117d in the bill are unhelpful to advancing the national and
research security interests of the United States. Indeed, the
new faculty and staff gift reporting requirement for any and
all countries is excessive, will prove counterproductive, and
divert important university resources away from more valuable
and focused efforts to address legitimate research security
risks. Additionally, the bill's contract waiver requirement
will prevent U.S. researchers and students from participating
in important international scientific collaborations and
exchange programs, ultimately harming--not helping--the U.S.
maintain its global leadership position in critical areas of
scientific research.
We are also concerned: (1) the version of the bill now
being considered on the floor contains new language not
included in the bill marked up by the House Education and
Workforce Committee that raises additional concerns for which
the impacts are not yet fully understood; and (2) given
recent actions taken by the Trump administration to
significantly reduce the staff of and dismantle the U.S.
Department of Education, we do not believe it is sensible for
Congress to now assign that department with new U.S. national
and research security responsibilities. We also endorse
separate comments opposing the Act made by the American
Council on Education (ACE).
AAU's specific concerns are outlined in greater detail
below:

(1) Broad usage of waivers will restrict important international
research collaborations and exchange programs

Section 117a of the DETERRENT Act requires academic
institutions to apply for and obtain a waiver from the
Department of Education before entering a contract with a
country of concern or a foreign entity of concern. The waiver
requirement would slow down and require unprecedented
approval by the Department of Education for all contracted
academic research collaborations and all student academic
exchanges or joint cultural and education programs with
countries such as China, including collaborations, exchanges,
and programs that have minimal national security concern or
connection to critical technologies.
Additionally, we are concerned that the Department of
Education lacks the expertise necessary to assess national
security risks associated with scientific research and
related partnerships. These concerns are further heightened
by the recent reductions to the department's workforce which
raise questions about the department's ability to ever fully
implement this new oversight requirement. With new and
ongoing staffing constraints, we would expect waivers to go
unanswered--effectively halting all activities requiring
departmental approval and preventing any collaborations or
academic exchanges from occurring.
A waiver requirement at the Department of Education is also
unnecessary when universities are already working to ensure
appropriate risk evaluation processes are in place. Since
2018, universities have stepped up their efforts to
recognize, address, and mitigate research security concerns.
Institutions have developed risk criteria, established risk
management committees to review international engagements and
collaborations, and have started to utilize the new NSF-
funded SECURE Center to collaborate and inform their risk
mitigation efforts. At a time of intense global competition
for talent and knowledge, it would be unwise for the U.S. to
slow down or halt productive research activities and other
programs and therefore isolate and disadvantage U.S. faculty
and students.

(2) Requiring individual faculty and staff gift and contract
disclosures from any country is excessive and will not protect or
secure scientific research

Section 117b compels institutions of higher education
receiving more than $50 million in federal research and
development funding or any Title VI funding, to implement a
policy requiring all research faculty and staff to
individually report any foreign gift valued at over $480 and
contracts over $5,000 and post that information to a publicly
available and searchable database.
This provision represents extensive overreach by the U.S.
government and would be an unprecedented expansion of
oversight by the Department of Education under Section 117.
Of particular concern, Section 117b provides unlimited scope
and no exceptions so gifts from and contracts with all
foreign countries would need to be reported, including even
friendly and neighboring countries such as Canada, Mexico,
and the UK. For research faculty and staff, this would mean
that even personal gifts they receive from family members or
family inheritance in excess of $480 dollars would need to be
reported.
While Section 117b now includes language to protect some
private information, it still raises privacy concerns for
researchers who may be required to report personal, private
financial transactions that could be made public through the
Freedom of Information Act or other efforts. As a result of
this requirement, university researchers and staff would have
to report and university administrators would have to
collect, record, and publicly post inconsequential data that
does nothing to address legitimate research security risks or
foreign influence concerns. Some researchers may ultimately
decide participating in federal research programs carries too
much burden and familial scrutiny, which will only stand to
further weaken the talent pool for U.S. research.
AAU supports ironclad enforcement of university and agency
disclosure requirements which Congress provided in Section
223 of the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Both the previous Trump and Biden administrations have also
updated agency disclosure requirements as required by
National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33).
Common disclosure forms were finalized at the end of 2023 and
federal research agencies have now adopted or are in the
process of final adoption of the harmonized common disclosure
form, which requests more details on foreign affiliations,
relationships, and financial interests from researchers
applying for federal research funding.

(3) New requirements that duplicate existing requirements will be
counterproductive

AAU sees no need for Congress to impose additional
excessive and unnecessary disclosure requirements on
university faculty and staff included in the DETERRENT Act.
Since December 2023, when the Act was last considered on the
House floor, Congress and the federal agencies have taken
multiple actions to address research security concerns and
help mitigate risks. This includes Section 226 and Section
238 of the FY 2025 NDAA which require DOD to conduct periodic
examinations of research awards to ensure compliance with
current DOD research security policy and prohibits DOD
funding to institutions of higher education that conduct
fundamental research in collaboration with covered entities
on the Section 1286 list. Additionally, the National Science
Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Department
of Energy, and the Department of Defense all have announced
or already begun implementing new processes to consider risk
factors prior to awarding a grant. If a risk is identified,
mitigation measures are added to the conditions of the award.
The DETERRENT Act piles on additional requirements that are
likely to conflict, duplicate, and create confusion with
existing requirements.
In conclusion, AAU opposes the DETERRENT Act, as many of
the bill provisions will not effectively address U.S.
national and research security concerns. They will instead
needlessly divert important university resources away from
more effective methods of safeguarding and securing research
conducted on behalf of American taxpayers, protecting it from
undue foreign influence and other international threats.
We urge the House to vote ``no'' on the legislation unless
section 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d are all removed from the
bill. Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Barbara R. Snyder,
President.

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I
know my good friend and colleague's concern is sincere about faculty
involvement in reporting in institutions,

[[Page H1247]]

of course, that know how to keep records of sports donors, boosters,
and alumni who are contributing various things. I think this is even
more important.
My colleague argued that requiring researchers to disclose foreign
gifts and contracts would be invasive and unnecessary. I first remind
my colleague that this requirement applies to specific researchers
involved in government contracts who are at specific high research
institutions. These are faculty working in crucial and sensitive
research, areas our adversaries have targeted time and time again.
This is not just an abstract problem. Just in the last 2 years,
prominent research faculty at Harvard, Stanford, the University of
Maryland, and the University of Delaware were found to not have
disclosed foreign funding from Chinese sources, just to name a few
examples. Reporting in-kind support specifically for a researcher's
grant is critical, but deterrent provisions also cover other ways our
adversaries can influence faculty.
Democrats also continue to falsely claim that the DETERRENT Act would
require reporting for everyday activities like doughnuts or coffee. The
DETERRENT Act holds faculty to the same standard for monetary gifts as
Members of Congress. A gift of a $5,000 purse from a foreign source
rightfully needs to be scrutinized and publicized.
Regarding privacy concerns, I do want to point out that these
individuals are often happy to voluntarily publish their own names,
their email addresses, and their donors when it comes to their own
published works. Many universities have open directories on their
websites. However, the DETERRENT Act does have a commonsense privacy
protection included.
The American public deserves transparency, and I urge critics of the
bill to ask why relationships, including those with our worst enemies
and our adversaries, should continue to lie in the shadows.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 1048 as currently
drafted. The bill not only targets our Nation's educational
institutions but also undermines the very Department we rely on to
enforce these very complex policies.
Mr. Chair, you can't effectively dismantle an agency and then demand
more from it. You can't ignore the fact that half of the Department's
employees have been fired, and these cuts will make it even more
difficult for the Department to carry out these increased
responsibilities effectively. The contradiction is clear: How can you
demand more reporting and enforcement from an agency that has half of
its staff?
Furthermore, the bill does not really address any alleged problem.
Present law already requires reporting of gifts large enough to exert
any influence, and requiring the reporting of free doughnuts will not
do anything to add to national security.
What it will do is add to a feeling of problems with researchers from
other countries. The National Academy of Science did a survey of 1,300
Asian-American faculty and found that, although a majority, 89 percent,
of these faculty desired to contribute to the United States'
advancements in science and technology, many, 72 percent, feel unsafe
in conducting research in the United States.
Instead of adding unnecessary burdens and penalties to our
educational institutions and adding the feeling of ``unsafe'' and
discrimination against minorities, we need to focus on meaningful
reforms to protect the integrity of the education system and promote
collaboration around the world.
We also need to use the limited resources left to the Department of
Education to focus on things like academic achievement and achievement
gaps; violence in schools, especially gun violence; access to college;
and things like that. We need to safeguard the Department of Education,
not destroy it.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to reject this bill and support the
policies that strengthen, rather than dismantle, the systems that serve
our students and workforce.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Onder), a member of the Committee on Education and
Workforce.
Mr. ONDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 1048,
the DETERRENT Act.
Mr. Chair, this bill will end the influence and downright espionage
of the Chinese Communist Party on our American College campuses.
Last Congress, the Select Committee on the CCP issued a remarkable
report highlighting how UC Berkeley partnered with Tsinghua University
and the city of Shenzen to create the Tsinghua-Berkeley-Shenzen
Institute, which actively partnered with a Chinese research lab in
April 2023 to improve advanced chip technology.
Why in the world should the Chinese Communist Party, which controls
the city of Shenzen and Tsinghua University, have access to American
research on sensitive technology with military applications?
Likewise, Alfred University recently received a grant from the
Department of Defense to research hypersonic weapons. Unbelievably, the
China University of Geosciences in Wuhan then partnered with Alfred
University with this research.
China University of Geosciences also happened to be doing very
similar weapons research for the CCP. How do we know that our research
and development in our hypersonic weapons isn't going straight to the
CCP? The answer is: It probably is.
Additionally, according to the FBI, the CCP is the world's principal
infringer of intellectual property. We need to stop the Chinese
Communist Party, the number one threat to our security and the security
of the world, from taking advantage of American innovation and the
openness of our university campuses.

Mr. Chair, I proudly support the DETERRENT Act.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Mr. Chair, I thank my colleagues who have come to speak today on such
an important matter regarding not just higher education but national
security.
International collaboration is not inherently bad, but foreign
nations have been able to operate in the dark for far too long. When
foreign adversaries give to universities, it is not out of the goodness
of their hearts. It is because they want something in return. Sometimes
that is extremely negative.
Each dollar that is accepted comes with strings attached, and that
can influence student behavior or gain access to research. The
DETERRENT Act is a crucial step toward transparency and protecting
American education and students from malicious foreign influence. The
current system has allowed our Nation's students to become targets for
our adversaries, and that is unacceptable.
We must pass this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Crawford). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Committee on Education and Workforce, printed in the bill, an
amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules
Committee Print 119-1 shall be considered as adopted and the bill, as
amended, shall be considered as read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 1048

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Defending Education
Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious
Transactions Act'' or the ``DETERRENT Act''.

SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.

(a) In General.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of
1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.

``(a) Disclosure Reports.--
``(1) Aggregate gifts and contract disclosures.--An
institution shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with
subsection (b)(1), a disclosure report on July 31 of the
calendar year immediately following any calendar year in
which--

[[Page H1248]]

``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters into
a contract with, a foreign source (other than a foreign
country of concern or foreign entity of concern)--
``(i) the value of which is $50,000 or more, considered
alone or in combination with all other gifts from, or
contracts with, that foreign source within the calendar year;
or
``(ii) the value of which is indeterminate; or
``(B) the institution--
``(i) receives a gift from a foreign country of concern or
foreign entity of concern, without regard to the value of
such gift; or
``(ii) upon receiving a waiver under section 117A to enter
into a contract with such a country or entity, enters into
such contract, without regard to the value of such contract.
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of an institution
that is substantially controlled (as described in section
668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or
successor regulations)) by a foreign source, the institution
shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with subsection
(b)(2), a disclosure report on July 31 of each year.
``(3) Treatment of affiliated entities.--For purposes of
this section, any gift to, or contract with, an affiliated
entity of an institution shall be considered a gift to, or
contract with, respectively, such institution.
``(b) Contents of Report.--
``(1) Gifts and contracts.--Each report to the Secretary
required under subsection (a)(1) shall include the following:
``(A) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract
entered into with, any foreign source--
``(i) the name of the individual, department, or other
entity at the institution receiving the gift or carrying out
the contract on behalf of the institution;
``(ii) any intended purpose of the gift or contract
communicated to the institution by the foreign source, and,
as of the date of filing such report, the manner in which the
institution intends to use such gift or contract;
``(iii) in the case of a restricted or conditional gift or
contract, a description of each restriction or condition that
meets the definition of the term `restricted or conditional
gift or contract' in subsection (f);
``(iv) with respect to such a gift--

``(I) the total fair market dollar amount or dollar value
of the gift, as of the date of submission of such report; and
``(II) the date on which the institution received such
gift;

``(v) with respect to such a contract--

``(I) the total fair market dollar amount or dollar value
of the contract, as of the date of submission of such report;
``(II) the date on which the institution enters into such
contract;
``(III) the date on which such contract first takes effect;
``(IV) if the contract has a termination date, such
termination date; and
``(V) an assurance that the institution will--

``(aa) maintain an unredacted copy of the contract until
the latest of--
``(AA) the date that is 5 years after the date on which
such contract first takes effect;
``(BB) the date on which the contract terminates; or
``(CC) the last day of any period that applicable State law
requires a copy of such contract to be maintained; and
``(bb) upon request of the Secretary during an
investigation under section 117D(a)(1), produce such an
unredacted copy of the contract.
``(B) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract
entered into with, a foreign source that is a foreign
government (other than the government of a foreign country of
concern)--
``(i) the name of such foreign government;
``(ii) the department, agency, office, or division of such
foreign government that approved such gift or contract, as
applicable; and
``(iii) the physical mailing address of such department,
agency, office, or division.
``(C) With respect to a gift received from, or contract
entered into with, a foreign source other than a foreign
government subject to the requirements of subparagraph (B)--
``(i)(I) the legal name of the foreign source; or
``(II) in the case of a gift received from a foreign source
that awarded such gift to the institution as an agent
described in subsection (f)(4)(G) on behalf of another
foreign source--

``(aa) the legal name of the foreign source that awarded
such gift; and
``(bb) the legal name of the foreign source on whose behalf
the gift was awarded, or a statement certified by a
compliance officer in accordance with section 117D(c) that
the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such name;

``(ii) in the case of a foreign source that is a natural
person, each country of citizenship of such person, or, if no
such country is known, the principal country of residence of
such person;
``(iii) in the case of a foreign source that is a legal
entity, the country in which such entity is incorporated, or,
if such information is not available, the principal place of
business of such entity;
``(iv) the physical mailing address of such foreign source,
or, if such address is not available, a statement certified
by a compliance officer in accordance with section 117D(c)
that the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such
address; and
``(v) any affiliation of the foreign source to an
organization that is designated as a foreign terrorist
organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
``(D) With respect to a contract entered into with a
foreign source that is a foreign country of concern or a
foreign entity of concern--
``(i) a complete and unredacted copy of the original
contract, and if such original contract is not in English, a
translated copy in accordance with subsection (c);
``(ii) a copy of the waiver received under section 117A for
such contract; and
``(iii) the statement submitted by the institution for
purposes of receiving such a waiver under section 117A(b)(2).
``(E) With respect to a gift received from a foreign source
that is a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of
concern, an assurance that the institution will--
``(i) in a case in which the institution received
documentation relating to such gift, maintain such
documentation until the latest of--

``(I) the date that is 5 years after the date such gift was
received by the institution; or
``(II) the last day of any period that applicable State law
requires a copy of such documentation to be maintained; and

``(ii) upon request of the Secretary during an
investigation under section 117D(a)(1), produce such
documentation;
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control.--Each report to
the Secretary required under subsection (a)(2) shall
contain--
``(A) the information required under paragraph (1) of this
subsection;
``(B) the legal name and the mailing address of the foreign
source that substantially controls the institution as
described in such subsection;
``(C) the date on which the foreign source assumed such
substantial control; and
``(D) any changes in program or structure of the
institution of higher education resulting from such
substantial control.
``(c) Translation Requirements.--Any information required
to be disclosed under this section, or requested by the
Secretary pursuant to an investigation under section
117D(a)(1), with respect to a gift or contract that is not in
English shall be translated into English, for purposes of
such disclosure or such investigation, by a person that is
not--
``(1) a foreign source that awarded such gift or entered
into such contract; or
``(2) any other foreign source from an attributable country
of a foreign source referred to in paragraph (1).
``(d) Public Inspection.--
``(1) Database requirement.--Beginning not later than May
31 of the calendar year following the date of enactment of
the DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall--
``(A) establish and maintain a searchable database on a
website of the Department, under which all reports submitted
under this section (including, to the extent practicable, any
report submitted under this section before the date of
enactment of the DETERRENT Act)--
``(i) are made publicly available (in electronic and
downloadable format), including any information provided in
such reports (other than the information prohibited from
being publicly disclosed pursuant to paragraph (2));
``(ii) can be individually identified and compared; and
``(iii) to the extent practicable, are searchable and
sortable--

``(I) by the institution that filed such report;
``(II) by the date on which the institution filed such
report;
``(III) by the date on which the institution received the
gift which is the subject of the report;
``(IV) by the date on which the institution enters into the
contract which is the subject of the report;
``(V) by the date on which such contract first takes
effect;
``(VI) by the attributable country of such gift or
contract;
``(VII) by the name of the foreign source;
``(VIII) by the information described in subparagraph
(C)(i); and
``(IX) by the information described in subparagraph
(C)(ii);

``(B) not later than 30 days after receipt of a disclosure
report under this section, include such report in such
database;
``(C) indicate, as part of the public record of a report
included in such database, whether the report is with respect
to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with--
``(i) a foreign source that is a foreign government; or
``(ii) a foreign source that is not a foreign government;
and
``(D) with respect to a disclosure report that does not
include the name or address of a foreign source, indicate, as
part of the public record of such report included in such
database, that such report did not include such information.
``(2) Application of federal privacy law; protections for
natural persons.--
``(A) Application of federal privacy law.--Except as
provided in subparagraph (B), a disclosure report filed
pursuant to this section is not subject to Federal privacy
law (including any exemption from disclosure described in
section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code)).
``(B) Protections for natural persons.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), with
respect to a disclosure report filed under this section, the
name or address (other than the attributable country) of a
foreign source that is a natural person--

``(I) may not be publicly disclosed; and
``(II) is exempt from disclosure under subsection (b)(3) of
section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred
to as the Freedom of Information Act).

``(ii) Exceptions for contracts with a foreign country of
concern or foreign entity of concern.--Clause (i) shall not
apply to a disclosure report filed pursuant to this section
that contains information with respect to a contract
described in subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) entered into with a
foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern.
``(e) Interagency Information Sharing.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, not later than 30 days after
receiving a disclosure report from an institution in
compliance with

[[Page H1249]]

this section, the Secretary shall transmit an unredacted copy
of such report (including the name and address of a foreign
source disclosed in such report) to the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of
the National Science Foundation, and the Director of the
National Institutes of Health.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Affiliated entity.--The term `affiliated entity',
when used with respect to an institution, means an entity or
organization that operates primarily for the benefit of, or
under the auspices of, such institution, such as a foundation
of the institution, or an educational, cultural, or language
entity.
``(2) Attributable country.--The term `attributable
country' means--
``(A) the country of citizenship of a foreign source who is
a natural person, or, if such country is unknown, the
principal residence of such foreign source; or
``(B) the country of incorporation of a foreign source that
is a legal entity, or, if such country is unknown, the
principal place of business (as applicable) of such foreign
source.
``(3) Contract.--The term `contract'--
``(A) means--
``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease,
or barter of property (including intellectual property) or
services by the foreign source;
``(ii) except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii), any
agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter
of property (including intellectual property) or services
from a foreign source; and
``(iii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar transaction
with a foreign source that involves the use or exchange of an
institution's name, likeness, time, services, or resources;
and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) an agreement made between an institution and a
foreign source regarding any payment of one or more elements
of a student's cost of attendance (as such term is defined in
section 472), unless such an agreement is made for more than
15 students or is made under a restricted or conditional
contract;
``(ii) an arms-length agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter of property (including
intellectual property) or services from a foreign source that
is not a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of
concern; or
``(iii) any assignment or license of a granted intellectual
property right (including a patent, trademark, or copyright)
that is not associated with a category listed in the Commerce
Control List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations).
``(4) Foreign source.--The term `foreign source' means--
``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a
foreign government;
``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, created
under the laws of a foreign state or states;
``(C) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise,
substantially controlled (as described in section
668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or
successor regulations)) by a foreign source;
``(D) a natural person who is not a citizen or a national
of the United States or a trust territory or protectorate
thereof;
``(E) an international organization (as such term is
defined in the International Organizations Immunities Act (22
U.S.C. 288));
``(F) a person who is an agent of a foreign principal (as
such term is defined in section 1 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611)); and
``(G) an agent of any of the entities described in
subparagraphs (A) through (F), including--
``(i) a subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign legal entity,
acting on behalf of such an entity; and
``(ii) a person that operates primarily for the benefit of,
or under the auspices of, such an entity, such as a
foundation of such entity, or an educational, cultural, or
language entity.
``(5) Gift.--The term `gift'--
``(A) means any gift of money, property (including
intellectual property), resources, staff, or services; and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) any payment of one or more elements of a student's
cost of attendance (as such term is defined in section 472)
to an institution by, or scholarship from, a foreign source
who is a natural person, acting in their individual capacity
and not as an agent for, at the request or direction of, or
on behalf of, any person or entity (except the student), made
for not more than 15 students, and that is not made under a
restricted or conditional contract with such foreign source;
``(ii) any assignment or license of a granted intellectual
property right (including a patent, trademark, or copyright)
that is not associated with a category listed in the Commerce
Control List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations); or
``(iii) decorations (as such term is defined in section
7342(a) of title 5, United States Code).
``(6) Restricted or conditional gift or contract.--The term
`restricted or conditional gift or contract' means any
endowment, gift, grant, contract, award, present, or property
(including intellectual property) of any kind which includes
provisions regarding--
``(A) the employment, assignment, or termination of
faculty;
``(B) the establishment of, or the provision of funding
for, departments, centers, institutes, instructional
programs, research or lecture programs, or new faculty
positions;
``(C) the selection, admission, or education of students;
or
``(D) the award of grants, loans, scholarships,
fellowships, or other forms of financial aid restricted to
students of a specified country, religion, sex, ethnic
origin, or political opinion.''.
(b) Prohibition on Contracts With Certain Foreign Entities
and Countries.--Part B of title I of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after section 117 the following:

``SEC. 117A. PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTS WITH CERTAIN FOREIGN
ENTITIES AND COUNTRIES.

``(a) In General.--An institution shall not enter into a
contract with a foreign country of concern or a foreign
entity of concern.
``(b) Waivers.--
``(1) In general.--A waiver issued under this section to an
institution with respect to a contract shall only--
``(A) waive the prohibition under subsection (a) for a 1-
year period; and
``(B) apply to the terms and conditions of the proposed
contract submitted as part of the request for such waiver.
``(2) Submission.--
``(A) First waiver requests.--
``(i) In general.--An institution that desires to enter
into a contract with a foreign entity of concern or a foreign
country of concern may submit to the Secretary, not later
than 120 days before the institution enters into such a
contract, a request to waive the prohibition under subsection
(a) with respect to such contract.
``(ii) Contents of waiver request.--A waiver request
submitted by an institution under clause (i) shall include--

``(I) the complete and unredacted text of the proposed
contract for which the waiver is being requested, and if such
original contract is not in English, a translated copy of the
text into English (in a manner that complies with section
117(c)); and
``(II) a statement that--

``(aa) is certified by a compliance officer of the
institution designated in accordance with section 117D(c);
and
``(bb) includes information that demonstrates that such
contract--
``(AA) is for the benefit of the institution's mission and
students; and
``(BB) will promote the security, stability, and economic
vitality of the United States.
``(B) Renewal waiver requests.--
``(i) In general.--An institution that, pursuant to a
waiver issued under this section, has entered into a
contract, the term of which is longer than the 1-year waiver
period and the terms and conditions of which remain the same
as the proposed contract submitted as part of the request for
such waiver may submit, not later than 120 days before the
expiration of such waiver period, a request for a renewal of
such waiver for an additional 1-year period (which shall
include any information requested by the Secretary).
``(ii) Termination.--If the institution fails to submit a
request under clause (i) or is not granted a renewal under
such clause, such institution shall terminate such contract
on the last day of the original 1-year waiver period.
``(3) Waiver issuance.--The Secretary--
``(A) not later than 60 days before an institution enters
into a contract pursuant to a waiver request under paragraph
(2)(A), or before a contract described in paragraph (2)(B)(i)
is renewed pursuant to a renewal request under such
paragraph, shall notify the institution--
``(i) if the waiver or renewal will be issued by the
Secretary; and
``(ii) in a case in which the waiver or renewal will be
issued, the date on which the 1-year waiver period starts;
and
``(B) may only issue a waiver under this section to an
institution if the Secretary determines, in consultation with
each individual listed in section 117(e), that the contract
for which the waiver is being requested--
``(i) is for the benefit of the institution's mission and
students; and
``(ii) will promote the security, stability, and economic
vitality of the United States.
``(4) Disclosure.--Not less than 2 weeks prior to issuing a
waiver under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the
authorizing committees of the intent to issue the waiver,
including a justification for the waiver.
``(c) Designation During Contract Term.--In the case of an
institution that enters into a contract with a foreign source
that is not a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity
of concern but which, during the term of such contract, is
designated as a foreign country of concern or foreign entity
of concern, such institution shall terminate such contract
not later than 60 days after the Secretary notifies the
institution of such designation.
``(d) Contracts Prior to Date of Enactment.--
``(1) In general.--In the case of an institution that has
entered into a contract with a foreign country of concern or
foreign entity of concern prior to the date of enactment of
the DETERRENT Act--
``(A) the institution shall as soon as practicable, but not
later than 30 days after such date of enactment, submit to
the Secretary a waiver request in accordance with clause (ii)
of subsection (b)(2)(A); and
``(B) the Secretary shall, upon receipt of the request
submitted under such clause, issue a waiver to the
institution for a period beginning on the date on which the
waiver is issued and ending on the sooner of--
``(i) the date that is 1 year after the date of enactment
of the DETERRENT Act; or
``(ii) the date on which the contract terminates.

[[Page H1250]]

``(2) Renewal.--An institution that has entered into a
contract described in paragraph (1), the term of which is
longer than the waiver period described in subparagraph (B)
of such paragraph and the terms and conditions of which
remain the same as the contract submitted as part of the
request required under subparagraph (A) of such paragraph,
may submit a request for renewal of the waiver issued under
such paragraph in accordance with subsection (b)(2)(B).
``(e) Contract Defined.--The term `contract' has the
meaning given such term in section 117(f).''.
(c) Interagency Information Sharing.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Education shall
transmit to each individual listed in section 117(e) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended by this Act--
(1) an unredacted copy of each report (including the name
and address of a foreign source disclosed in such report)
received by the Department of Education under section 117 of
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) prior to
the date of enactment of this Act); and
(2) any report, document, or other record generated by the
Department of Education in the course of an investigation--
(A) of an institution with respect to the compliance of
such institution with such section; and
(B) initiated prior to the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. POLICY REGARDING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FROM FOREIGN
GIFTS AND CONTRACTS.

The Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.),
as amended by the preceding section, is further amended by
inserting after section 117A the following:

``SEC. 117B. INSTITUTIONAL POLICY REGARDING FOREIGN GIFTS AND
CONTRACTS TO FACULTY AND STAFF.

``(a) Requirement to Maintain Policy and Database.--
Beginning not later than 90 days after the date of enactment
of the DETERRENT Act, each institution described in
subsection (b) shall maintain--
``(1) a policy requiring covered individuals at the
institution and covered individuals at affiliated entities of
the institution to disclose in a report to such institution
by July 31 of each calendar year that begins after the year
in which such enactment date occurs--
``(A) any gift received from a foreign source in the
previous calendar year, the value of which is greater than
the minimal value (as such term is defined in section 7342(a)
of title 5, United States Code) or is of indeterminate value,
and including the date on which the gift was received;
``(B) any contract with a foreign source (other than a
foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern)
entered into or in effect during the previous calendar year,
the value of which is $5,000 or more, considered alone or in
combination with all other contracts with that foreign source
within the calendar year, and including the date on which
such contract is entered into, the date on which the contract
first takes effect, and, as applicable, the date on which
such contract terminates;
``(C) any contract with a foreign source (other than a
foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern)
entered into or in effect during the previous calendar year
that has an indeterminate monetary value, and including the
date on which such contract is entered into, the date on
which the contract first takes effect, and, as applicable,
the date on which such contract terminates; and
``(D) any contract entered into or in effect with a foreign
country of concern or foreign entity of concern during the
previous calendar year, the value of which is $0 or more or
which has an indeterminate monetary value, and including--
``(i) the date on which such contract is entered into;
``(ii) the date on which the contract first takes effect;
``(iii) if the contract has a termination date, such
termination date; and
``(iv) the full text of such contract and any addenda;
``(2) a publicly available and searchable database (in
electronic and downloadable format), on a website of the
institution, of the information required to be disclosed
under paragraph (1) (other than the information prohibited
from public disclosure pursuant to subsection (c)) that--
``(A) makes available the information disclosed under
paragraph (1) (other than the information prohibited from
public disclosure pursuant to subsection (c)) beginning on
the date that is 30 days after receipt of the report under
such paragraph containing such information and until the
latest of--
``(i) the date that is 5 years after the date on which--

``(I) a gift referred to in paragraph (1)(A) is received;
or
``(II) a contract referred to in subparagraph (B), (C) or
(D) of paragraph (1) first takes effect;

``(ii) the date on which a contract referred to in
subparagraph (B), (C) or (D) of paragraph (1) terminates; or
``(iii) the last day of any period that applicable State
law requires a copy of such contract to be maintained; and
``(B) is searchable and sortable--
``(i) if the subject of the disclosure is a gift, by the
date on which the gift is received;
``(ii) if the subject of the disclosure is a contract--

``(I) by the date on which such contract is entered into;
and
``(II) by the date on which such contract first takes
effect;

``(iii) by the attributable country with respect to which
information is being disclosed;
``(iv)(I) if the covered individual at an institution is
making the disclosure, by the most specific division of the
institution (such as the department, school, or college) that
the covered individual is at; and
``(II) if the covered individual at the affiliated entity
of the institution is making the disclosure, by the name of
such affiliated entity;
``(v) by the name of the foreign source; and
``(3) an effective plan to identify and manage potential
information gathering by foreign sources through espionage
targeting covered individuals that may arise from gifts
received from, or contracts entered into with, a foreign
source, including through the use of--
``(A) periodic communications;
``(B) accurate reporting under paragraph (2) of the
information required to be disclosed under paragraph (1); and
``(C) enforcement of the policy described in paragraph (1);
and
``(4) for purposes of investigations under section
117D(a)(1), a record of the name of each individual who makes
a disclosure under paragraph (1) and each report disclosed
under such paragraph.
``(b) Institutions.--An institution shall be subject to the
requirements of this section if such institution--
``(1) received more than $50,000,000 in Federal funds in
any of the previous five calendar years to support (in whole
or in part) research and development (as determined by the
institution and measured by the Higher Education Research and
Development Survey of the National Center for Science and
Engineering Statistics); or
``(2) receives funds under title VI.
``(c) Application of Federal Privacy Law; Protections for
Natural Persons.--
``(1) Application of federal privacy law.--Except as
provided in paragraph (2), a disclosure made pursuant to this
section is not subject to Federal privacy law.
``(2) Protections for natural persons.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
with respect to a disclosure made pursuant to this section,
the following may not be publicly disclosed:
``(i) The name or address (other than the attributable
country) of a foreign source that is a natural person.
``(ii) The name or any other personally identifiable
information of a covered individual making such disclosure.
``(B) Exceptions for contracts with a foreign country of
concern or foreign entity of concern.--Subparagraph (A) shall
not apply to a disclosure made pursuant to this section that
contains information with respect to a contract entered into
with a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of
concern.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the terms `affiliated entity', `attributable
country', `foreign source', and `gift' have the meanings
given such terms in section 117(f);
``(2) the term `contract'--
``(A) means--
``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease,
or barter of property (including intellectual property) or
services by the foreign source;
``(ii) except as provided in subparagraph (B), any
agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter
of property (including intellectual property) or services
from a foreign source; and
``(iii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar transaction
with a foreign source that involves the use or exchange of a
covered individual's name, likeness, time, services, or
resources; and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) an arms-length agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter of property (including
intellectual property) or services from a foreign source that
is not a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of
concern; and
``(ii) any assignment or license of a granted intellectual
property right (including a patent, trademark, or copyright)
that is not associated with a category listed in the Commerce
Control List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations); and
``(3) the term `covered individual'--
``(A) has the meaning given such term in section 223(d) of
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (42 U.S.C. 6605); and
``(B) shall be interpreted in accordance with the Guidance
for Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33
(NSPM-33) on National Security Strategy for United States
Government-Supported Research and Development published by
the Subcommittee on Research Security and the Joint Committee
on the Research Environment in January 2022 (or any successor
guidance).''.

SEC. 4. INVESTMENT DISCLOSURE REPORT.

The Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.),
as amended by this Act, is further amended by inserting after
section 117B the following:

``SEC. 117C. INVESTMENT DISCLOSURE REPORT.

``(a) Investment Disclosure Report.--A specified
institution shall file a disclosure report in accordance with
subsection (b) with the Secretary on each July 31 immediately
following any calendar year in which the specified
institution purchases, sells, or holds (directly or
indirectly through any chain of ownership) one or more
investments of concern.
``(b) Contents of Report.--Each report to the Secretary
required by subsection (a) shall contain, with respect to the
calendar year preceding the calendar year in which such
report is filed, the following information:
``(1) A list of the investments of concern purchased, sold,
or held during such calendar year.

[[Page H1251]]

``(2) The aggregate fair market value of all investments of
concern held as of the close of such calendar year.
``(3) The combined value of all investments of concern sold
over the course of such calendar year, as measured by the
fair market value of such investments at the time of the
sale.
``(4) The combined value of all capital gains from such
sales of investments of concern.
``(c) Treatment of Certain Pooled Investments.--
``(1) Pooled investment classification.--
``(A) In general.--For purposes of this section, except as
provided in subparagraph (B), a specified interest acquired
by a specified institution in a regulated investment company,
exchange traded fund, or any other pooled investment that
holds an investment of concern shall be treated as an
investment of concern and shall be reported pursuant to
paragraph (2)(A).
``(B) Certification of pooled investment.--Notwithstanding
subparagraph (A), such specified interest shall not be
subject to subparagraph (A) if the Secretary certifies,
pursuant to paragraph (2)(B), that such pooled investment is
not holding an investment of concern.
``(2) Procedures.--The Secretary, after consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, shall establish procedures under which a pooled
investment described in paragraph (1)--
``(A) shall be reported in accordance with the requirements
of subsection (b); and
``(B) may be certified under paragraph (1)(B) as not
holding an investment of concern.
``(d) Treatment of Related Organizations.--For purposes of
this section, assets held by any related organization (as
defined in section 4968(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986) with respect to a specified institution shall be
treated as held by such specified institution, except that--
``(1) such assets shall not be taken into account with
respect to more than 1 specified institution; and
``(2) unless such organization is controlled by such
institution or is described in section 509(a)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to such
institution, assets which are not intended or available for
the use or benefit of such specified institution shall not be
taken into account.
``(e) Valuation of Debt.--For purposes of this section, the
fair market value of any debt shall be the outstanding
principal amount of such debt.
``(f) Regulations.--The Secretary, after consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, may issue such regulations or other guidance as
may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this section, including regulations or other guidance
providing for the proper application of this section with
respect to certain regulated investment companies, exchange
traded funds, and pooled investments.
``(g) Database Requirement.--Beginning not later than May
31 of the calendar year following the date of enactment of
the DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall--
``(1) establish and maintain a searchable database on a
website of the Department, under which all reports submitted
under this section--
``(A) are made publicly available (in electronic and
downloadable format), including any information provided in
such reports;
``(B) can be individually identified and compared; and
``(C) are searchable and sortable; and
``(2) not later than 30 days after receipt of a disclosure
report under this section, include such report in such
database.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Investment of concern.--
``(A) In general.--The term `investment of concern' means
any specified interest with respect to any of the following:
``(i) A foreign country of concern.
``(ii) A foreign entity of concern.
``(B) Specified interest.--The term `specified interest'
means, with respect to any entity--
``(i) stock or any other equity or profits interest of such
entity;
``(ii) debt issued by such entity; and
``(iii) any contract or derivative with respect to any
property described in clause (i) or (ii).
``(2) Specified institution.--
``(A) In general.--The term `specified institution', as
determined with respect to any calendar year, means an
institution that--
``(i) is not a public institution; and
``(ii) at the close of such calendar year, holds--

``(I) assets (other than those assets which are used
directly in carrying out the institution's exempt purpose)
the aggregate fair market value of which is in excess of
$6,000,000,000; and
``(II) investments of concern the aggregate fair market
value of which is in excess of $250,000,000.

``(B) References to certain terms.--For the purpose of
applying the definition under subparagraph (A), the terms
`aggregate fair market value' and `assets which are used
directly in carrying out the institution's exempt purpose'
shall be applied in the same manner as such terms are applied
for the purposes of section 4968(b)(1)(D) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.''.

SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS.

(a) Enforcement and Other General Provisions.--The Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), as amended by
this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 117C
the following:

``SEC. 117D. ENFORCEMENT; SINGLE POINT-OF-CONTACT;
INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

``(a) Enforcement.--
``(1) Investigation.--The Secretary (acting through the
General Counsel of the Department) shall conduct
investigations of possible violations of sections 117, 117A,
117B, 117C, and subsection (c) of this section by
institutions and, whenever it appears that an institution has
knowingly or willfully failed to comply with a requirement of
any of such provisions (including any rule or regulation
promulgated under any such provision), shall request that the
Attorney General bring a civil action in accordance with
paragraph (2).
``(2) Civil action.--Whenever it appears that an
institution has knowingly or willfully failed to comply with
a requirement of any of the provisions listed in paragraph
(1) (including any rule or regulation promulgated under any
such provision) based on an investigation under such
paragraph, a civil action shall be brought by the Attorney
General, at the request of the Secretary, in an appropriate
district court of the United States, or the appropriate
United States court of any territory or other place subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, to request such
court to compel compliance with the requirement of the
provision that has been violated.
``(3) Costs and other fines.--An institution that is
compelled to comply with a requirement of a provision listed
in paragraph (1) pursuant to paragraph (2) shall--
``(A) pay to the Treasury of the United States the full
costs to the United States of obtaining compliance with the
requirement of such provision, including all associated costs
of investigation and enforcement; and
``(B) if applicable, be subject to the applicable fines
described in paragraph (4).
``(4) Fines for violations.--The Secretary shall impose a
fine on an institution that is compelled to comply with a
requirement of a section listed in paragraph (1) pursuant to
paragraph (2) as follows:
``(A) Section 117.--
``(i) First-time violations.--In the case of an institution
that is compelled to comply with a requirement of section 117
pursuant to a civil action described in paragraph (2), and
that has not previously been compelled to comply with any
such requirement pursuant to such a civil action, the
Secretary shall impose a fine on the institution for such
violation as follows:

``(I) In the case of an institution that knowingly or
willfully fails to comply with a reporting requirement under
subsection (a)(1) of section 117, such fine shall be in an
amount that is--

``(aa) for each gift or contract with determinable value
that is the subject of such a failure to comply, the greater
of--
``(AA) $50,000; or
``(BB) the monetary value of such gift or contract; or
``(bb) for each gift or contract of no value or of
indeterminable value, not less than 1 percent and not more
than 10 percent of the total amount of Federal funds received
by the institution under this Act for the most recent fiscal
year.

``(II) In the case of an institution that knowingly or
willfully fails to comply with the reporting requirement
under subsection (a)(2) of section 117, such fine shall be in
an amount that is not less than 10 percent of the total
amount of Federal funds received by the institution under
this Act for the most recent fiscal year.

``(ii) Subsequent violations.--In the case of an
institution that has previously been compelled to comply with
a requirement of section 117 pursuant to a civil action
described in paragraph (2), and is subsequently compelled to
comply with such a requirement pursuant to a subsequent civil
action described in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall impose
a fine on the institution as follows:

``(I) In the case of an institution that knowingly or
willfully fails to comply with a reporting requirement under
subsection (a)(1) of section 117, such fine shall be in an
amount that is--

``(aa) for each gift or contract with determinable value
that is the subject of such a failure to comply, the greater
of--
``(AA) $100,000; or
``(BB) twice the monetary value of such gift or contract;
or
``(bb) for each gift or contract of no value or of
indeterminable value, not less than 5 percent and not more
than 10 percent of the total amount of Federal funds received
by the institution under this Act for the most recent fiscal
year.

``(II) In the case of an institution that knowingly or
willfully fails to comply with a reporting requirement under
subsection (a)(2) of section 117, such fine shall be in an
amount that is not less than 20 percent of the total amount
of Federal funds received by the institution under this Act
for the most recent fiscal year.

``(B) Section 117a.--
``(i) First-time violations.--In the case of an institution
that is compelled to comply with a requirement of section
117A pursuant to a civil action described in paragraph (2),
and that has not previously been compelled to comply with any
such requirement pursuant to such a civil action, the
Secretary shall impose a fine on the institution in an amount
that is not less than 5 percent and not more than 10 percent
of the total amount of Federal funds received by the
institution under this Act for the most recent fiscal year.
``(ii) Subsequent violations.--In the case of an
institution that has previously been compelled to comply with
a requirement of section 117A pursuant to a civil action
described in paragraph (2), and is subsequently compelled to
comply with such a requirement pursuant to a subsequent civil
action described in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall impose
a fine on the institution in an amount that is not less than
20 percent of the total amount of Federal funds received by
the institution under this Act for the most recent fiscal
year.

[[Page H1252]]

``(C) Section 117b.--
``(i) First-time violations.--In the case of an institution
that is compelled to comply with a requirement of section
117B pursuant to a civil action described in paragraph (2),
and that has not previously been compelled to comply with any
such requirement pursuant to such a civil action, the
Secretary shall impose a fine on the institution for such
violation in an amount that is the greater of--

``(I) $250,000; or
``(II) the total amount of gifts or contracts that the
institution is compelled to report pursuant to such civil
action.

``(ii) Subsequent violations.--In the case of an
institution that has previously been compelled to comply with
a requirement of section 117B pursuant to a civil action
described in paragraph (2), and is subsequently compelled to
comply with such a requirement pursuant to a subsequent civil
action described in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall impose
a fine on the institution in an amount that is the greater
of--

``(I) $500,000; or
``(II) twice the total amount of gifts or contracts that
the institution is compelled to report pursuant to such civil
action.

``(D) Section 117c.--
``(i) First-time violations.--In the case of an institution
that is compelled to comply with a requirement of section
117C pursuant to a civil action described in paragraph (2),
and that has not previously been compelled to comply with any
such requirement pursuant to such a civil action, the
Secretary shall impose a fine on the institution in an amount
that is not less than 50 percent and not more than 100
percent of the sum of--

``(I) the aggregate fair market value of all investments of
concern held by such institution as of the close of the final
calendar year for which the institution is compelled to
comply with such requirement pursuant to such civil action;
and
``(II) the combined value of all investments of concern
sold over the course of all the calendar years for which the
institution is compelled to comply with such requirement
pursuant to such civil action, as measured by the fair market
value of such investments at the time of the sale.

``(ii) Subsequent violations.--In the case of an
institution that has previously been compelled to comply with
a requirement of section 117C pursuant to a civil action
described in paragraph (2), and is subsequently compelled to
comply with such a requirement pursuant to a subsequent civil
action described in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall impose
a fine on the institution in an amount that is not less than
100 percent and not more than 200 percent of the sum of--

``(I) the aggregate fair market value of all investments of
concern held by such institution as of the close of the final
calendar year for which the institution is compelled to
comply with such requirement pursuant to such subsequent
civil action; and
``(II) the combined value of all investments of concern
over the course of all the calendar years for which the
institution is compelled to comply with such requirement
pursuant to such subsequent civil action, as measured by the
fair market value of such investments at the time of the
sale.

``(E) Ineligibility for waiver.--In the case of an
institution that is fined pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii),
(B)(ii), (C)(ii), or (D)(ii), the Secretary shall prohibit
the institution from obtaining a waiver, or a renewal of a
waiver, under section 117A.
``(b) Single Point-of-contact at the Department.--The
Secretary shall maintain a single point-of-contact at the
Department to--
``(1) receive and respond to inquiries and requests for
technical assistance from institutions regarding compliance
with the requirements of sections 117, 117A, 117B, 117C, and
subsection (c) of this section;
``(2) coordinate and implement technical improvements to
the database described in section 117(d)(1), including--
``(A) improving upload functionality by allowing for batch
reporting, including by allowing institutions to upload one
file with all required information into the database;
``(B) publishing and maintaining a database users guide,
which shall be reviewed and updated as practicable but not
less than annually, including information on how to edit an
entry and how to report errors;
``(C) creating a standing user group (to which chapter 10
of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply) to discuss
possible database improvements, which group shall--
``(i) include at least--

``(I) 3 members representing public institutions with high
or very high levels of research activity (as defined by the
National Center for Education Statistics);
``(II) 2 members representing private, nonprofit
institutions with high or very high levels of research
activity (as so defined);
``(III) 2 members representing proprietary institutions of
higher education (as defined in section 102(b)); and
``(IV) 2 members representing area career and technical
education schools (as defined in subparagraph (C) or (D) of
section 3(3) of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical
Education Act of 2006 (20 U.S.C. 2302(3))); and

``(ii) meet at least twice a year with officials from the
Department to discuss possible database improvements;
``(D) publishing, on a publicly available website,
recommended database improvements following each meeting
described in subparagraph (C)(ii); and
``(E) responding, on a publicly available website, to each
recommendation published under subparagraph (D) as to whether
or not the Department will implement the recommendation,
including the rationale for either approving or rejecting the
recommendation;
``(3) provide, every 90 days after the date of enactment of
the DETERRENT Act, status updates on any pending or completed
investigations and civil actions under subsection (a)(1) to--
``(A) the authorizing committees; and
``(B) any institution that is the subject of such
investigation or action;
``(4) maintain, on a publicly accessible website--
``(A) a full comprehensive list of all foreign countries of
concern and foreign entities of concern; and
``(B) the date on which the last update was made to such
list; and
``(5) not later than 7 days after making an update to the
list maintained under paragraph (4)(A), notify each
institution required to comply with the sections listed in
paragraph (1) of such update.
``(c) Institutional Requirements for Compliance Officers
and Institutional Policy Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--An institution that is required to file
a report under section 117 or 117C, that is seeking a waiver
under section 117A, or that is subject to the requirements of
section 117B, shall, not later than the earlier of the date
on which the institution files the first report under section
117 or 117C, requests the institution's first waiver under
section 117A, or first fulfills the requirements of section
117B--
``(A) establish an institutional policy that the
institution shall follow in meeting the requirements of
sections 117, 117A, 117B, and 117C; and
``(B) designate and maintain at least one, but not more
than three, current employees or legally authorized agents of
such institution to serve as compliance officers to carry out
the requirements listed in paragraph (2).
``(2) Duties of compliance officers.--A compliance officer
designated by an institution under paragraph (1)(B) shall
certify--
``(A) whenever the institution is required to file a report
under section 117 or 117C--
``(i) the institution's accurate compliance with the
reporting requirements under such section;
``(ii) that the institution, in filing such report under
section 117 or 117C--

``(I) followed the institutional policy established under
paragraph (1)(A) applicable to such section; and
``(II) conducted good faith efforts and reasonable due
diligence to ensure that accurate information is provided in
such report, including with respect to the valuations of any
assets that are disclosed in a report submitted under section
117C; and

``(iii) in the case of a report under section 117, any
statements by the institution required to be certified by
such an officer under clause (i) or (iv) of section
117(b)(1)(C); and
``(B) whenever the institution requests a waiver under
section 117A--
``(i) that the institution--

``(I) is in compliance with the requirements of such
section; and
``(II) followed the institutional policy established under
paragraph (1)(A) applicable to such section; and

``(ii) the statement by the institution required to be
certified by such an officer under section
117A(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II); and
``(C) whenever the institution is subject to the
requirements of section 117B, that the institution--
``(i) is in compliance with the requirements of such
section; and
``(ii) followed the institutional policy established under
paragraph (1)(A) applicable to such section.
``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of sections 117, 117A,
117B, 117C, and this section:
``(1) Foreign country of concern.--The term `foreign
country of concern' means the following:
``(A) Any covered nation defined in section 4872 of title
10, United States Code.
``(B) Any country the Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
Director of National Intelligence, determines, for purposes
of sections 117, 117A, 117B, 117C, or this section, to be
engaged in conduct that is detrimental to the national
security or foreign policy of the United States.
``(2) Foreign entity of concern.--The term `foreign entity
of concern' has the meaning given such term in section
10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and
Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19221(a)) and includes a foreign
entity that is identified on the list published under section
1286(c)(8)(A) of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 22 4001
note; Public Law 115-232).
``(3) Institution.--The term `institution' means an
institution of higher education (as such term is defined in
section 102, other than an institution described in
subsection (a)(1)(C) of such section) with a program
participation agreement under section 487.''.
(b) Program Participation Agreement.--Section 487(a) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1094) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(30)(A) An institution will comply with the requirements
of sections 117, 117A, 117B, 117C, and 117D(c).
``(B) In the case of an institution described in
subparagraph (C), the institution will--
``(i) be ineligible to participate in the programs
authorized by this title for a period of not less than 2
institutional fiscal years; and
``(ii) in order to regain eligibility to participate in
such programs, demonstrate compliance with all requirements
of each such section for not less than 2 institutional fiscal
years after the institutional fiscal year in which such
institution became ineligible.
``(C) An institution described in this subparagraph is an
institution--

[[Page H1253]]

``(i) against which judgment has been granted in 3 separate
civil actions described in section 117D(a)(2) that have each
resulted in the institution being compelled to comply with
one or more requirements of section 117, 117A, 117B, 117C, or
117D(c); and
``(ii) that pursuant to section 117D(a)(4)(E), is
prohibited from obtaining a waiver, or a renewal of a waiver,
under section 117A.''.
(c) GAO Study and Report.--
(1) Study.--Not later than January 31 of the second
calendar year that begins after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
initiate a study to identify ways to improve
intergovernmental agency coordination regarding
implementation and enforcement of sections 117, 117A, 117B,
117C, and 117D(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1011f), as amended or added by this Act, including
increasing information sharing, increasing compliance rates,
and establishing processes for enforcement.
(2) Report.--Not later than 3 years after the date of the
initiation of the study under paragraph (1), the Comptroller
General of the United States shall submit to Congress, and
make public, a report containing the results of the study
described in paragraph (1).

The Acting CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, shall
be in order except those printed in House Report 119-38.
Each such further amendment may be offered only in the order printed
in the report, by the Member designated in the report, shall be
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the
report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent,
shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand
for division of the question.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Ogles

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 119-38.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 57, line 10, insert the following before the period:
``, including any special administrative region within such a
covered nation or any other territory that the United States
recognizes as being under the control of such a covered
nation on or after the date of the enactment of this
subsection''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentleman
from Tennessee (Mr. Ogles) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, America's enemies will stop at nothing to
destroy us, and they don't care how they do it. These enemies would
stoop so low as to target our young people. For years, countries like
the People's Republic of China have used our own universities to
advance agendas that hurt American security.
Aside from the state of Qatar, there is probably no other country in
the world that finances U.S. colleges and universities more than the
People's Republic of China. They use this all-access pass to steal our
intellectual property, abuse our student visa programs, and prop up
Communist-inspired Confucius Institutes.
This places the Chinese authorities in a real position of influence
among our young people, all the more so because our own government
doesn't try to hold our colleges and universities accountable to the
basic disclosure standards.
A 2019 Senate report found that up to 70 percent of all institutions
failed to comply with what are called section 117 disclosure
requirements. Those that do not comply with section 117 substantially
underreport their foreign donations and contracts.
Under current law, if gifts and contracts, either individual or
combined, from an originating country meet or exceed $250,000, these
donations must be reported to the Department of Education twice a year.
By failing to enforce our laws, we are signaling to our enemies,
especially China, that we don't care if they use and abuse the American
higher education system. As a result, we really don't have a clear idea
of the extent of China's influence campaign against the youth of
America.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, parliamentary inquiry.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia will state his inquiry.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, what is the amendment that we are
considering? Could the Chair give the page and line number?
The Acting CHAIR. It is amendment No. 1 and printed in House Report
119-38, page 57, line 10.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, the intent of this amendment, as
I understand it, is to ensure that special administrative regions, such
as Hong Kong, are listed as a foreign country of concern if they are
within a country of concern.
As I have discussed already, we don't need to fuel xenophobia by
targeting citizens in foreign countries. This amendment goes further by
singling out residents of certain special administrative regions and
requires people to know what that means so they will know who they can
accept doughnuts from.
This amendment does nothing to thoughtfully protect our national
security, and, therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chairman, when mom and dad send their kids to college,
they expect them to get a good education and a return on investment,
not to be indoctrinated by our enemies.
The DETERRENT Act does a very valuable service by requiring proper
reporting and ensuring that four countries, Iran, Russia, North Korea,
and China, who actively seek to undermine our sovereignty, are
designated as ``foreign countries of concern.'' Think about that list.
This designation means that, for these countries, the foreign gift
reporting threshold is zero.

{time} 1515

Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge that if we know we have an adversary, we
should have access to all of their influence peddling in our country
that is targeting our youth so we have the full scale and scope of what
they are doing.
There is no country better than China at money laundering. If we
ensure that their reporting threshold is zero for the People's Republic
of China, that only solves one part of the equation. What happens when
the leaders of the PRC attempt to continue their malign influence
through Hong Kong or Macau? It could really marginalize the admirable
intent of this legislation and could only temporarily, potentially,
derail the PRC when we know they are going to try to get around it. We
know they are going to launder money through other means.
We have to clear this up, shore this up, and further clarify.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, as I read the amendment, it says: ``insert the
following before the period: `[comma] including any special
administrative region within such a covered nation or any other
territory that the United States recognizes as being under the control
of such a covered nation on or after the date of the enactment of this
subsection,' '' as to who is going to be a nation of concern.
Like I said, this is a question of whether or not you have to figure
out what that means so you will know whether or not you can accept a
doughnut from somebody from whatever that language means they come
from. I don't know how that has anything to do with national security.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I emphasize that we are talking about countries like Iran,
Russia, North Korea, and China. Whether it is a bag of doughnuts or a
bag of money, we know they are over here. We know they are doing it. It
is not being fully reported. Mistakes are being made. They are trying
to influence and brainwash our future leaders of this country.
We need to be proactive. We need to send a message that enough is
enough. The reference to doughnuts, so be it. Whether it is a bag of
doughnuts or a bag of money, if they are over here with malign intent,
the American people have the right to know about it.

[[Page H1254]]

Those universities should be put on notice. If you are in bed with
the enemy, you should be put on notice. If you are allowing subversion
of our country on your campus, the American people should know it.
I don't see why anybody would have a problem with this. It is clear.
We are talking about national security at a time when our adversaries
are on the move.
I will note my sincere gratitude to both the chairman of the
Education and Workforce Committee as well as the committee staff for
working with my team on these amendments. This amendment ensures that
special administrative regions of China, including Hong Kong and Macau,
are covered under the definition of a ``foreign country of concern'' in
this bill. Again, we know they are going to launder money through those
areas.
It is a commonsense edit that secures American colleges and
universities against the number one existential threat to our way of
life: the Communist Party of China.
Mr. Chair, again, this is a no-nonsense amendment. This makes sure
that we cover our flank, that we identify those areas where we know
that other countries can launder money through to influence our
campuses. We saw it in the spring. We saw it over this past year, the
bad behavior on college campuses. We have to make sure that this money
isn't getting through dark channels, back channels, and influencing our
universities and our youth.
Mr. Chair, I urge adoption of my amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Chair, just to say that everyone from a foreign country, even a
foreign country of concern, is not here for malign purposes. Some are
here to do research. The idea that people are here with malign purposes
that are going to use coffee and doughnuts to advance that agenda I
think is not necessary for our national defense.
Mr. Chair, I hope we defeat the amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Ogles).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Ogles

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in House Report 119-38.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Strike page 57, line 19 and all that follows through page
58, line 2, and insert the following:
``(2) Foreign entity of concern.--The term `foreign entity
of concern' has the meaning given such term in section
10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and
Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19221(a)) and includes--
``(A) a foreign entity that is identified on the list
published under section 1286(c)(9)(A) of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10
U.S.C. 4001 note; Public Law 115-232); and
``(B) a Chinese military company that is identified on the
list required by section 1260H of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentleman
from Tennessee (Mr. Ogles) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, this amendment ensures that Chinese military
companies are included as foreign entities of concern for the purposes
of this bill, which would subject such companies to a strict zero-
dollar threshold for gifts and contracts.
The section 1260H list was established in the FY 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act and has since been used as a blacklist for
Chinese military companies that are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or beneficially owned by the People's Liberation Army or
the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.
Needless to say, these companies aren't here to be our friends. They
hate us, and they want to harm us. They are here to steal our
technology and advance China's military modernization efforts. Even so,
there are going to be colleges in this country that get so captivated
by a dollar figure that they would salivate at the chance to work with
our enemies.
Some of America's most sensitive property is housed or developed at
our universities, and if there is a whiff of partnership between the
institution of higher education and a Chinese military company, the
American people deserve to know the details of every last gift and
contract.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. OGLES. Mr. Chair, the definition of a ``foreign entity of
concern'' in this bill would include any company subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a government like China's. While
constructive, there is still nothing in the underlying text of this
bill and nothing within the definition of a ``foreign entity of
concern'' that would automatically refer to the section 1260H list of
Chinese military companies.
Since the section 1260H list is something that the Secretary of
Defense is instructed to update, it is possible that there is a natural
delay as to when Chinese military companies are designated as foreign
entities of concern for the purposes of this act.
This amendment provides clarity and ensures that any U.S. college or
university entering into a contract with or receiving a donation from a
section 1260H list company is required to first receive a section 117A
waiver from the Department of Education.
Again, the reporting threshold for foreign entities of concern is
zero, meaning that a gift or contract of any size or scope has to be
reported.
Mr. Chair, this is about accountability. We know that they are here
to steal our secrets. We know that they want to undermine us. As we go
into the next phase of warfare that is not just on the battlefield but
is cyber war and its capabilities therein, we know that China is
aggressive in these spaces. They are in our universities. They are on
our campuses. They want to steal this information. We have to have a
mechanism of accountability and reporting so that we know who is doing
what and where.
It is that simple. It will require universities to pick their
partners carefully and make sure they are safeguarding the very
technologies that they are being entrusted to house on behalf of the
U.S. Government and the U.S. people.
We don't need to enable the Chinese military through modernization,
weaponization, or their attack on us, our Constitution, or our way of
life. All this does is require reporting. This isn't calling every
Chinese individual a bad actor but is acknowledging the fact that they
are our enemy and not our friend, and they want to supplant us as the
sole world power.
Mr. Chair, I urge adoption of my amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would add Chinese military companies to
the definition of ``foreign entity of concern.'' It seems to me that if
it is a Chinese military company, it would already be considered under
the definition of an ``entity of concern'' because they are subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of China, which is a foreign country of
concern.
I don't know if this adds anything. I think it would be duplicative
language. Therefore, I would recommend a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Ogles).
The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. SCOTT OF VIRGINIA

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 119-38.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

[[Page H1255]]

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 1, strike line 1 and all that follows through page 60,
line 6 and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``DETERRENT Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND CONTRACTS.

Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1011f) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND CONTRACTS.

``(a) Disclosure Reports.--
``(1) Aggregate gift and contract disclosures.--An
institution shall file a disclosure report described in
subsection (b) with the Secretary not later than July 31 of
the calendar year immediately following any calendar year in
which--
``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters into
a contract with, a foreign source, the value of which is
$100,000 or more, considered alone or in combination with all
other gifts from, or contracts with, that foreign source
within the calendar year; or
``(B) the institution receives a gift from, or enters into
a contract with, a foreign source, the value of which totals
$250,000 or more, considered alone or in combination with all
other gifts from, or contracts with, that foreign source over
the previous 3 calendar years.
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.--In
the case of an institution that is substantially owned or
controlled (as described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title
34, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations))
by a foreign source, the institution shall file a disclosure
report described in subsection (b) with the Secretary not
later than July 31 of every year.
``(b) Contents of Report.--Each report to the Secretary
required under subsection (a) shall contain the following:
``(1)(A) In the case of gifts or contracts described in
subsection (a)(1)--
``(i) for gifts received from, or contracts entered into
with, a foreign government, the aggregate amount of such
gifts and contracts received from or entered into with such
foreign government;
``(ii) for gifts received from, or contracts entered into
with, a foreign source other than a foreign government, the
aggregate dollar amount of such gifts and contracts
attributable to a particular country and the legal or formal
name of the foreign source; and
``(iii) the intended purpose of such gift or contract, as
provided to the institution by such foreign source, or if no
such purpose is provided by such purpose is provided by such
source, the intended use of such gift or contract, as
provided by the institution.
``(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the country to which
a gift is attributable is--
``(i) the country of citizenship or, if unknown, the
principal residence, for a foreign source who is a natural
person; or
``(ii) the country of incorporation or, if unknown, the
principal place of business, for a foreign source that is a
legal entity.
``(2) In the case of an institution required to file a
report under subsection (a)(2)--
``(A) for gifts received from, or contracts entered into
with, a foreign source, without regard to the value of such
gift or contract, the information described in paragraph
(1)(A);
``(B) the identity of the foreign source that owns or
controls the institution;
``(C) the date on which the foreign source assumed
ownership or control; and
``(D) any changes in program or structure resulting from
such ownership or control.
``(3) An assurance that the institution will maintain a
true copy of each gift or contract agreement subject to the
disclosure requirements under this section, until the latest
of--
``(A) the date that is 4 years after the date of the
agreement;
``(B) the date on which the agreement terminates; or
``(C) the last day of any period of which applicable State
public record law requires a true copy of such agreement to
be maintained.
``(4) An assurance that the institution will--
``(A) produce true copies of gift and contract agreements
subject to the disclosure requirements under this section
upon request of the Secretary during a compliance audit or
other institutional investigation; and
``(B) ensure that all contracts from the foreign source are
translated into English, as applicable.
``(c) Additional Disclosures for Restricted and Conditional
Gifts and Contracts.--Notwithstanding subsection (b),
whenever any institution receives a restricted or conditional
gift or contract from a foreign source, the institution shall
disclose the following to the Secretary, translated into
English:
``(1) For such gifts received from, or contracts entered
into with, a foreign source other than a foreign government,
the amount, the date, and a description of such conditions or
restrictions. The report shall also disclose the country of
citizenship, or if unknown, the principal residence for a
foreign source which is a natural person, and the country of
incorporation, or if unknown, the principal place of business
for a foreign source which is a legal entity.
``(2) For gifts received from, or contracts entered into
with, a foreign government, the amount, the date, a
description of such conditions or restrictions, and the name
of the foreign government.
``(d) Database Requirement.--Beginning not later than 30
days before the July 31 immediately following the date of
enactment of the DETERRENT Act of 2025, the Secretary shall--
``(1) establish and maintain a searchable database on a
website of the Department, under which each report submitted
under this section--
``(A) is, not later than 60 days after the date of the
submission of such report, made publicly available (in
electronic and downloadable format);
``(B) can be identified and compared to other such reports;
and
``(C) is searchable and sortable by--
``(i) the date the institution filed such report;
``(ii) the date on which the institution received the gift,
or entered into the contract, which is the subject of the
report; and
``(iii) the attributable country of such gift or contract
as described in subsection (b)(1)(B); and
``(2) indicate, as part of the public record of a report
included in such database, whether the report was submitted
by the institution with respect to a gift received from, or a
contract entered into with--
``(A) a foreign source that is a foreign government; or
``(B) a foreign source that is not a foreign government.
``(e) Relation to Other Reporting Requirements.--
``(1) State requirements.--If an institution that is
required to file a disclosure report under subsection (a) is
in a State that has enacted requirements for public
disclosure of gifts from. or contracts with, a foreign source
that includes all information required under this section for
the same or an equivalent time period, the institution may
file with the Secretary a copy of the disclosure report filed
with the State in lieu of the report required under such
subsection. The State in which the institution is located
shall provide the Secretary such assurances as the Secretary
may require to establish that the institution has met the
requirements for public disclosure under State law if the
State report is filed.
``(2) Use of other federal reports.--If an institution
receives a gift from, or enters into a contract with, a
foreign source, where any other department, agency, or bureau
of the executive branch requires a report containing all the
information required under this section for the same or an
equivalent time period, a copy of the report may be filed
with the Secretary in lieu of a report required under
subsection (a).
``(f) Modification of Reports.--The Secretary shall
incorporate a process permitting institutions to revise and
update previously filed disclosure reports under this section
to ensure accuracy, compliance, and ability to cure.
``(g) Sanctions for Noncompliance.--
``(1) In general.--As a sanction for noncompliance with the
requirements under this section, the Secretary may impose a
fine on an institution that in any year knowingly or
willfully violates this section, that is--
``(A) in the case of a failure to disclose a gift or
contract with a foreign source as required under this
section, or to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of subsection (b)(4) pursuant to the assurances
made under such subsection, in an amount that is not less
than $250 but not more than 50 percent of the amount of the
gift or contract with the foreign source; or
``(B) in the case of any violation of the requirements of
subsection (a)(2), in an amount that is not more than 25
percent of the total amount of funding received by the
institution under this Act (other than funds received under
title IV of this Act).
``(2) Repeated failures.--
``(A) Knowing and willful failures.--In addition to a fine
for a violation in any year under paragraph (1), the
Secretary may impose a fine on an institution that knowingly
or willfully violates this section for 3 consecutive years,
that is--
``(i) in the case of a failure to disclose a gift or
contract with a foreign source as required under this section
or to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of subsection (b)(4) pursuant to the assurances made
under such subsection, in an amount that is not less than
$100,000 but not more than the amount of the gift or contract
with the foreign source; or
``(ii) in the case of any violation of the requirements of
subsection (a)(2), in an amount that is not more than 25
percent of the total amount of funding received by the
institution under this Act (other than funds received under
title IV of this Act).
``(B) Administrative failures.--The Secretary may impose a
fine on an institution that fails to comply with the
requirements of this section due to administrative errors for
3 consecutive years, in an amount that is not less than $250
but not more than 50 percent of the amount of the gift or
contract with the foreign source.
``(C) Compliance plan requirement.--If an institution fails
to file a disclosure report for a receipt of a gift from or
contract with a foreign source for 2 consecutive years, the
Secretary may require the institution to submit a compliance
plan.
``(h) Compliance Officer.--Any institution that is required
to report a gift or contract

[[Page H1256]]

under this section shall designate and maintain a compliance
officer who--
``(1) shall be a current employee (including such an
employee with another job title or duties other than the
duties described in paragraph (2)) or legally authorized
agent of such institution; and
``(2) shall be responsible, on behalf of the institution,
for compliance with the foreign gift reporting requirement
under this section.
``(i) Single Point of Contact.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall appoint and maintain
a single point of contact to--
``(A) receive and respond to inquiries and requests for
technical assistance from institutions of higher education
regarding compliance with the requirements of this section;
and
``(B) coordinate and implement technical improvements to
the database described in subsection (d), including--
``(i) improving upload functionality by allowing for batch
reporting, including by allowing institutions to upload to
the database one file with all required information;
``(ii) publishing and maintaining, on an annual basis, a
database user guide that includes information on how to edit
an entry and how to report errors;
``(iii) creating a user group (to which chapter 10 of title
5, United States Code, shall not apply) to discuss possible
database improvements, which shall--

``(I) include at least--

``(aa) 3 members representing public institutions with high
or very high levels of research activity (as defined by the
National Center for Education Statistics);
``(bb) 2 members representing private, nonprofit
institutions with high or very high levels of research
activity (as so defined);
``(cc) 2 members representing proprietary institutions of
higher education (as defined in section 102(b)); and
``(dd) 2 members representing area career and technical
education schools (as defined in subparagraph (C) or (D) of
section 3(3) of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical
Education Act of 2006 (20 U.S.C. 2302(3)); and

``(II) meet at least twice a year with officials from the
Department to discuss possible database improvements; and

``(iv) publishing, on a publicly available website--

``(I) following each meeting described in clause (iii)(II),
recommended database improvements; and
``(II) with respect to each recommended improvement
described in subclause (I)--

``(aa) the decision of the Department as to whether such
recommended improvement will be implemented; and
``(bb) the rationale for such decision.
``(2) Prohibition.--An outside person may not serve as the
single point-of-contact required under paragraph (1).
``(3) Conflicts of interest.--The Secretary shall establish
a policy to ensure that any person serving as the single
point-of-contact under paragraph (1) is free from conflicts
of interest.
``(j) Treatment of Certain Payments and Gifts.--
``(1) Exclusions.--The following shall not be considered a
gift from, or contract with, a foreign source under this
section:
``(A) Any payment of one or more elements of a student's
cost of attendance (as defined in section 472) to an
institution by, or scholarship from, a foreign source who is
a natural person, acting in their individual capacity and not
as an agent for, at the request or direction of, or on behalf
of, any person or entity (except the student), made on behalf
of students that is not made under contract with such foreign
source, except for the agreement between the institution and
such student covering one or more elements of such student's
cost of attendance.
``(B) Assignment or license of registered industrial and
intellectual property rights, such as patents, utility
models, trademarks, or copy-rights, or technical assistance,
that are not identified as being associated with a national
security risk or concern.
``(C) Any payment from a foreign source that is solely for
the purpose of conducting one or more clinical trials.
``(2) Inclusions.--Any gift to, or contract with, an entity
or organization, such as a research foundation, that operates
substantially for the benefit or under the auspices of an
institution shall be considered a gift to, or contract with,
such institution.
``(k) Restrictions on Data Access.--None of the information
submitted to or maintained by the Department of Education
pursuant to this section may be made available to an outside
person unless--
``(1) the sharing of such information with such person is
specifically authorized or required by this section; or
``(2) such information is required to be made publicly
available under this section.
``(l) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `clinical trial' means a research study in
which one or more human subjects are prospectively assigned
to one or more interventions to evaluate the effects of those
interventions on health-related biomedical or behavioral
outcomes;
``(2) the term `contract'--
``(A) means any--
``(i) agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or
barter of property or services by the foreign source, for the
direct benefit or use of either of the parties, except as
provided in subparagraph (B); or
``(ii) affiliation, agreement, or similar transaction with
a foreign source that is based on the use or exchange of an
institution's name, likeness, time, services, or resources,
except as provided in subparagraph (B); and
``(B) does not include any agreement made by an institution
located in the United States for the acquisition, by
purchase, lease, or barter, of property or services from a
foreign source;
``(3) the term `foreign source' means--
``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a
foreign government;
``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, created
under the laws of a foreign state or states;
``(C) an individual who is not a citizen or a national of
the United States or a trust territory or protectorate
thereof; and
``(D) an agent, including a subsidiary or affiliate of a
foreign legal entity, acting on behalf of a foreign source;
``(4) the term `gift'--
``(A) means any gift of money, property, resources, staff,
or services; and
``(B) does not include anything described in section
487(e)(2)(B)(ii);
``(5) the term `institution' means an institution of higher
education, as defined in section 102, or, if a multicampus
institution, any single campus of such institution, in any
State;
``(6) the term `outside person'--
``(A) means any person who is not a direct employee of the
Department of Education; and
``(B) includes any person who is a political appointee,
special government employee, or employee detailed from any
agency outside the Department of Education; and
``(7) the term `restricted or conditional gift or contract'
means any endowment, gift, grant, contract, award, present,
or property of any kind that includes provisions regarding--
``(A) the employment, assignment, or termination of
faculty;
``(B) the establishment of departments, centers,
institutes, instructional programs, research or lecture
programs, or faculty positions;
``(C) the selection or admission of students; or
``(D) the award of grants, loans, scholarships,
fellowships, or other forms of financial aid restricted to
students of a specified country, religion, sex, ethnic
origin, or political opinion.''.

SEC. 3. REGULATIONS.

(a) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Education shall begin
the negotiated rulemaking process under section 492 of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1098a) to carry out
the amendment made by section 2.
(b) Issues.--Regulations issued pursuant to subsection (a)
to carry out the amendment made by section 2 shall, at a
minimum, address the following issues:
(1) Instructions on reporting structured gifts and
contracts.
(2) The inclusion in institutional reports of gifts
received from, and contracts entered into with, foreign
sources by entities and organizations, such as research
foundations, that operate substantially for the benefit or
under the auspices of the institution.
(3) Procedures to protect confidential or proprietary
information included in gifts and contracts.
(4) The alignment of such regulations with the reporting
and disclosure of foreign gifts or contracts required by
Federal agencies other than the Department of Education,
including with respect to--
(A) the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Division A of Public Law 117-
167; 15 U.S.C. 4651 note);
(B) the Research and Development, Competition, and
Innovation Act (Division B of Public Law 117-167; 42 U.S.C.
18901 note); and
(C) any guidance released by the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy, including the Guidance for
Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33
(NSPM-33) on National Security Strategy for United States
Government-supported Research and Development published by
the Subcommittee on Research Security and the Joint Committee
on the Research Environment in January 2022.
(5) The treatment of foreign gifts or contracts involving
research or technologies identified as being associated with
a national security risk or concern.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by section 2 shall
take effect on the date on which the regulations issued under
subsection (a) take effect.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Scott) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I am pleased to offer the Democrat
amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1048.
As I have mentioned, universities collaborate with various
international entities to advance complex research inquiries that
contribute to the advancement of our knowledge of many issues. These
international partnerships allow for a diverse range of perspectives
and resources that help our Nation make significant strides in health,
science, and technology.

[[Page H1257]]

As I have mentioned before, my Democratic colleagues and I remain
committed to ensuring that universities and colleges have the resources
to safeguard their work from undue foreign influence. However, I
appreciate the majority's interest in addressing this important issue,
but I will emphasize, again, that their proposal is far too extreme and
would not promote compliance but rather deter universities from
conducting collaborative research.
Specifically, with such harsh fines and limited opportunities for
universities to receive guidance from the Department of Education, I am
concerned that these changes to section 117 of the Higher Education Act
would discourage universities from collaborating with international
entities, including our strong allies, that are essential in solving
important global issues.
At a time when President Trump is already illegally halting vital
research across the country through disruptions to USAID and NIH
funding, this international collaboration is now more essential than
ever.
I am concerned that we still see language that targets individual
faculty members for their collaborations with foreign entities,
including their own colleagues on campus. This kind of targeting easily
leads to hurtful consequences rooted in xenophobia for innocent
scholars and students. We have a responsibility to strike a balance
between enforcing the law and fostering safe campuses for students,
scholars, and faculty.
Unlike the DETERRENT Act, our Democratic substitute takes a
thoughtful approach to section 117 compliance to support universities
as they evaluate and implement their research integrity and foreign
influence policies.
In addition to requiring the filing of annual reports for gifts and
contracts from foreign entities, our amendment would create a robust
database at the Department of Education to hold these reports. It
establishes commonsense sanctions for noncompliance and allows for room
to help universities that need support scaling up their compliance
efforts rather than punishing them by pursuing civil penalties. It
establishes a single point of contact at the Department, who can't be
some unverified DOGE staffer, to coordinate section 117 compliance.
The substitute also builds on the robust work done through
implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act and the subsequent
interagency work of the Biden administration to protect federally
funded research and development from foreign influence. Our amendment
would align reporting requirements to those of other Federal agencies
and require the Secretary of Education to go through negotiated
rulemaking to address key implementation aspects of section 117 with
relevant higher education and national security stakeholders.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the Democratic substitute,
rather than the underlying bill, to enhance the ability of our Nation's
universities to protect against undue foreign influence while
supporting international partnerships that enhance groundbreaking
scientific research, build relationships across cultures, and increase
our national competitiveness.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

{time} 1530

The Acting CHAIR. Members are reminded to refrain from engaging in
personalities toward the President.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chairman, this is essentially the same amendment
that my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Scott, offered last
Congress on the floor as well as this Congress during committee markup.
Sadly, the same serious problems remain, I believe. Instead of taking
the threats of foreign influence seriously, this amendment is
insufficient to protect our students and institutions from our worst
adversaries.
The amendment, first, makes it easier for foreign sources to be
undetected, doubling the threshold for contracts to $100,000 and
allowing gifts under $250,000 over a 3-year span to be unreported. Bad
actors will seek any possible way to avoid transparency about their
attempts to harm America through their influence over American
postsecondary education. A strict threshold is essential to stop that
from happening.
The annual thresholds in the DETERRENT Act are simple and align with
other requirements in existing law such as in the CHIPS Act and the
Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research
and Development National Security Policy.
Shockingly, this amendment includes no differences for America's
biggest enemies, countries of concern and entities of concern. In my
Democratic colleagues' minds, it appears that gifts from Russia, China,
and Iran are the exact same gifts as those from England.
I remind everyone here that the DETERRENT Act uses a tailored list of
countries and individuals pulled from existing law that have a proven
track record of being security threats and actively working against the
United States.
The Democratic ANS also has terrible carve-outs that provide gaping
loopholes for cunning adversaries. The amendment allows gifts and
contracts to be rendered anonymous, with no foreign source
identification, and also exempts all clinical trials. These loopholes
will make it easier for foreign sources to conceal their relationships,
rendering disclosures all but useless. Simple transparency is the best
way to ensure partnerships are as good as institutions claim.
Finally, the Democratic proposal ensures schools have no financial
risk for failing to disclose foreign funds. Under this proposal, years
of flouting section 117 simply allow schools to go right back to their
same financial state before accepting the gift in the first place.
It is time to take foreign influence seriously. I stand against this
amendment. It is time we hold institutions accountable for accepting
foreign donations and keeping them from the public. The bipartisan
support we have for this bill shows the seriousness of this problem.
This amendment shows that some Democrats are still willing to turn a
blind eye to attempts by hostile regimes to influence students and
faculty on our college campuses.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and support the
underlying bill. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I think the gentleman from Michigan
had the right to close, so I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Amodei). The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Self

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 119-38.
Mr. SELF. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 2, line 5, strike ``$50,000'' and insert ``$1''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Self) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. SELF. Mr. Chair, I rise to support my amendment. I am outraged
that our universities and institutions are receiving gifts or entering
into contracts with foreign countries that seek to destroy or harm the
United States.
H.R. 1048, the DETERRENT Act, would strengthen disclosure
requirements by reducing the threshold from $250,000 to $50,000, but
those provisions are not strong enough. The American people deserve to
know about every

[[Page H1258]]

single dollar coming from adversary foreign sources, no matter how
small.
That is why I am introducing an amendment to slash the reporting
threshold from $50,000 all the way down to $1; total transparency of
every cent. Any foreign gift, no matter how small, can influence our
democracy, and we must close any loophole that lets foreign actors
purchase access or sway our institutions.
This is not about research. This is about human intelligence
collection and business espionage. Having spent time in the
intelligence community while I was in the military, this is a serious
matter.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and ensure full
transparency. Our constituents demand transparency today, and I say
let's give them transparency. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment and yield myself such time as I may consume.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman has
yielded back?
The Acting CHAIR. That is correct.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, by lowering the reporting
threshold to $1, universities would be required to report every single
gift from any country if the person is not a citizen of the United
States. That would mean every cup of coffee, every doughnut, every ride
home would have to be reported. This would create an unworkable
increase in reporting requirements for universities and individual
faculty members, which would undoubtedly lead to a significant backlog
at the Department of Education when trying to review the reports and
adhering to tight disclosure guidelines and timetables.
This doesn't have anything to do with national security. I think it
is just an administrative nightmare, and therefore I would ask for a
``no'' vote.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Self).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will
be postponed.

amendment no. 5 offered by ms. tlaib

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in House Report 119-38.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 57, after line 18, insert the following:
``(C) Any country that is defending against a case before
the International Court of Justice relating to an alleged
violation by such country of--
``(i) any of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or their
Additional Protocols; or
``(ii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.
``(D) Any country the government of which includes
officials that have outstanding arrest warrants issued by the
International Criminal Court.''

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentlewoman
from Michigan (Ms. Tlaib) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, this bill is yet another Republican attack
aimed at dismantling higher education in our Nation.
Last week, we know that President Trump ordered the illegal
elimination of the Department of Education, threatening the future of
millions of children across every district in our country. He is using
the threat of cutting off Federal funding as a negative approach, very
much taking a tool right here to pressure the universities and
administrations to submit to his will in violation of freedom of speech
for their students.
Mr. Chair, instead of addressing any of these crises threatening our
students in our education system, we are here voting today on a bill
that goes after foreign scapegoats instead.
We know that President Trump is the biggest threat to our education
system in America right now, not someone in North Korea or China.
Please, give me a break.
I fully support financial transparency in our universities. No one is
against that. No one. That is why I am introducing amendments to this
bill to ensure that transparency around our universities and the
relationships with so-called countries of concern include countries
whose leaders have active arrest warrants issued against them by the
International Criminal Court, to include countries actively on trial
with the International Court of Justice for violating the Genocide
Convention and the Geneva Conventions.
I am calling for transparency, Mr. Chair, around university
investments in companies profiting from violations of international
law, but my colleagues are not interested, of course, when it comes to
that sort of transparency. My colleagues are not interested in holding
countries with human rights abuses accountable. They are not interested
in voting to uphold international law, Mr. Chair. They are only
interested in voting to protect governments like the Israeli
Government's apartheid regime.
In fact, many of my colleagues have cheered on expulsion, arrest, and
deportation of university students calling for the exact type of
transparency and exercising their First Amendment right, Mr. Chair,
their constitutional right. You don't have to agree with them, Mr.
Chair, no one does, but it is their right. It is their right to again
express their disagreement with policy and decisions by a foreign
government.
In fact, many of my colleagues again continue to say there is
transparency for some countries in relationships with universities but
not certain other countries, even if they have an investigation
actively with the international court system.
This is not about transparency, as is claimed. It is truly about
destroying freedom of speech and the most important American value in
our country, the right to dissent.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The DETERRENT Act conforms section 117 with other existing
regulations, which is why the bill's definitions of countries of
concern come from existing law. The four countries on the countries of
concern list are rightfully in statute as unique threats to the United
States. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran represent countries that
are actively hostile to the U.S. and are serious security threats. The
DETERRENT Act ensures that any relationship with these countries is
extremely cautious and proactively transparent.
In contrast, this amendment attempts to use the illegitimate
International Criminal Court to determine what countries are threats to
the United States. The people of the United States in majority do not
support that. As President Trump has stated, the ICC has baselessly
asserted jurisdiction over the United States--and our citizens agree--
and its allies like Israel and further abused its power by issuing
frivolous arrest warrants.
There is no reason to use the ICC to define what countries are
actively seeking to harm the United States. We can do that. I oppose
this amendment that targets Israel and hurts American interests, and I
reserve the balance of my time.

{time} 1545

Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I think ``countries of concern'' is perfectly
explained in my amendment. That is to say, again, I know for a fact
that some of these countries killed American citizens. Some of them are
literally openly killing American citizens, and the countries of
concern, to explain--this is so important--that the International Court
of Justice, if there is any violation, these are violations to the
Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention.
If we are specifically talking about making sure that universities
are not engaging in whatever they are calling

[[Page H1259]]

so-called threats our country, why is it that certain countries, again,
who are under investigation for violating international law, many of
which are under investigation for war crimes like bombing hospitals and
schools and everything, are using it in the way that is also violating
people's freedom of speech? They are using some of the resources they
have in silencing many university students, especially those speaking
out against genocide that is happening in Gaza.
I think it is important that if we are for transparency, let's talk
about all violations of international law and human rights in all
countries, again, countries of interest to include all of those folks
that have active cases and arrest warrants for the people running their
country.
We can go back and forth about whether or not we think the ICC is
legitimate, but it exists. It exists to prevent what is actually
happening right now. I think it is important that if we are going to be
consistent about whether or not we are protecting American interests,
what about Americans that are being killed by countries of interest
that I am trying to include here? What about them? What about the folks
whose rights continue to be violated when they travel to those
countries?
I think it is really important and critical that if we are going to
say this to universities and that we are targeting higher education,
that we are consistent in what we say is a violation of international
law and human rights.
I think, Mr. Chair, it is so important that we continue to protect
the American interests. Right now it is very clear that this is an
attack. The opposition to this is because it is an attack on the fact
that many folks want the right to speak out against certain countries
that are violating international law.
It is critical that we protect the right to dissent in our country.
So many of my colleagues, even when I don't agree with them, I protect
their right to speak up and say whatever they want, even if I disagree.
I know what this is about. This is about silencing people. If my
colleagues are going to do it, they better include the folks committing
genocide. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, again, this amendment is designed, I believe,
to target Israel at a time when it is desperately seeking to defend its
citizens against terrorists.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. Tlaib).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Tlaib

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 119-38.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 39, after line 21, insert the following new clause:
(iii) any entity the Secretary of State determines
consistently, knowingly, and directly facilitates and enables
state violence and repression, war and occupation, or severe
violations of international law and human rights, including
as a result of doing business with or providing services to
any country--

(I) that is defending against a case before the
International Court of Justice relating to an alleged
violation by such country of any of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 or their Additional Protocols or the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; or
(II) the current government of which includes officials
that have outstanding arrest warrants issued by the
International Criminal Court.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 242, the gentlewoman
from Michigan (Ms. Tlaib) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, this amendment is to discuss whether or not,
again, our body, the United States House of Representatives, is
standing and making sure that we don't undermine international law and
the institutions that work to uphold it, especially the International
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
I think it is incredibly harmful to allow many of my colleagues to
take great lengths right here to protect war criminals, apartheid
regimes, folks that continue to commit war crimes in targeting
civilians including tent communities, schools, and hospitals. This bill
undermines the international legal system for seeking to hold various
officials, again, countries that are violating crimes against humanity.
Again, it is really important. My amendment basically allows us to
include countries that are currently under investigation or their
leaders have been convicted or have an arrest warrant out for the fact
that they have committed violation of international human rights laws.
I know when it comes to Russia or China, my colleagues like to talk
about rule-based international order. When it comes to governments like
the government of Israel, my colleagues are willing to throw
international law in the shredder. Their actions consistently undermine
the principle of equal justice under law when they protect perpetrators
of the most horrific crimes against humanity.
I wish my colleagues would see what is happening. I wish they would
see that, no matter their ethnicity, we should be saving the lives of
the children. We shouldn't allow it to be enabled or emboldened. Their
actions consistently undermine the principle of equal justice.
Of course, it is up to world leaders everywhere to affirm our
commitment to international law, but let's be consistent about it. No
matter who is committing it, it still is a violation of international
human rights laws.
It is important to support the International Court of Justice and
International Criminal Court. They were created so we can prevent
genocide and so we can stop what is happening in Gaza.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, the DETERRENT Act ensures section 117 is
aligned with existing statute. The four countries on the countries of
concern list are rightfully in statute as unique threats to the United
States. That is our concern. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran
represent countries that are actively hostile to the U.S. and are
serious security threats.
Endowment investments in companies controlled by our adversaries
could result in dangerous support for our enemies. This is why the
DETERRENT Act requires institutions to disclose any such investments of
concern. It is important for our wealthiest institutions to be
transparent with the public about this danger.
In contrast, this amendment attempts to use the illegitimate
International Criminal Court to determine what countries are threats to
the United States and targets endowment investments into those threats.
The ICC has baselessly asserted jurisdiction over the United States
and its allies like Israel and further abused its power by issuing
frivolous arrest warrants. There is no reason to use the ICC to define
what countries are actively seeking to harm the United States and what
endowment investments should be transparent.
Mr. Chair, I oppose this amendment that targets Israel and hurts
American interests.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I think it is really important to understand
the International Criminal Court right now is investigating right now
an active case against what is happening in Sudan. Are we saying we are
not caring?
I completely agree. Any country--Iran, China, Russia--any country
that has an active investigation or has arrest warrants for their
leadership in the International Criminal Court system and these
international systems that are in place was to prevent and, again,
protect the interests of the American people.

[[Page H1260]]

All of us support upholding international law because it protects our
country, but it protects the rule of law in making sure that war crimes
are not being committed.
Mr. Chair, I really urge my colleagues to understand we need to be
consistent here. If you are going to say we are going to go after
universities--because I know what this is really about. Is this really
about China and Russia and protecting our interests, or is this really
about trying to not protect certain people for speaking up in regard to
what is happening in Gaza?
The attack on higher education right now and freedom of speech is
incredibly dangerous. The right to dissent in our country, the freedom
of speech, First Amendment--you do not have to agree. I was on my
campus when I didn't agree with what people said about immigrants and
what people said about other countries. I understood the American value
of people having their rights and their First Amendment right to speak
up.
What we are doing here is attacking and targeting universities
because we don't like that their student body read about the atrocities
that the Government of Israel is doing. That is what this is about. I
think people need to be honest what this is about and not shy around
about it.
I will say the international court system that is in place was
created because of some horrific history that has happened in our
world, and we are trying to prevent it. For us to now say it is
illegitimate is wrong, and it is not the direction we should be going
in. This is literally the place, again, that is investigating a number
of other countries for egregious war crimes and egregious violence on
women and children.
Now, because we don't agree that they went after one country--again,
many of my colleagues disagree with me--I can tell you it takes a lot
of investigation, talking to doctors, nurses, so many people on the
ground, NGOs and other international organizations that led to, again,
the investigation that has led into International Criminal Court.

Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Michigan has 30 seconds
remaining.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, in closing, I think it is important to know
right now the International Court of Justice is investigating Congo,
Uganda, Philippines, Venezuela, and Sudan. These are countries that
have been under investigation by the International Criminal Court.
I don't have all the details, but it I think it is important to
understand we can't delegitimize when it is a country that we disagree
is committing these crimes. The process is there for a reason, Mr.
Chair. Again, it is to make sure we uphold international human rights
laws, no matter who is committing those egregious crimes.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I appreciate the concern and the passion of
my colleague from Michigan. I concur that I and sponsors and cosponsors
of this bill believe in First Amendment liberties and freedom of
expression.
This bill is about specific concerns, not all of the countries of the
world. I am not sure if my colleague was here during the debate to hear
the actual statistics of the dollars that have been invested by malign
actors, countries of concern, in this country that don't compare with
any other that was in the list that my colleague read.
Again, this amendment on this bill, outside of the specifics of the
bill, is designed to attack Israel for daring to defend itself from
terrorists, which they did. This amendment has no place in the bill.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. Tlaib).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. TLAIB. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Michigan
will be postponed.
The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 7 will not
be offered.

{time} 1600

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Thompson of Pennsylvania) having assumed the chair, Mr. Amodei, Acting
Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union,
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill
(H.R. 1048) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to strengthen
disclosure requirements relating to foreign gifts and contracts, to
prohibit contracts between institutions of higher education and certain
foreign entities and countries of concern, and for other purposes, had
come to no resolution thereon.

____________________