[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 743 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 743
To require the establishment of a joint task force to identify and
eliminate barriers to agriculture exports of the United States.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 26, 2025
Mr. Cassidy (for himself, Mrs. Hyde-Smith, Mr. Boozman, Ms. Ernst, and
Mr. Tuberville) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Finance
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the establishment of a joint task force to identify and
eliminate barriers to agriculture exports of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Prioritizing Offensive Agricultural
Disputes and Enforcement Act'' or the ``Ag Disputes Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Agricultural competitiveness through access to
international markets is a vital part of the economy of the
United States.
(2) A healthy, well-functioning, rules-based trading system
is the basis for the success of agriculture exports of the
United States.
(3) When foreign governments erect trade barriers, that
makes it difficult for agricultural exporters in the United
States to compete in the global marketplace and undermines the
rules-based trading system.
(4) Those trade barriers can harm farmers, ranchers,
workers, and businesses in the United States and can also lead
to higher prices for consumers and a less resilient
international trading system.
(5) Dispute settlement is available to the President
through trade agreements with 163 countries, and there are
protectionist trade barriers to agriculture exports of the
United States in many of those countries.
(6) Many of those barriers are systemically important. For
example, the use by the Government of India of unrestrained
price support programs violates the commitments by that
government under the World Trade Organization.
(7) The Government of India recognizes that its price
support programs violate its commitments under the World Trade
Organization, so instead of reforming its programs, it has
repeatedly demanded an exemption from disputes for those
programs. Moreover, the Government of India has tried to
prevent discussions at the World Trade Organization of any
other significant agricultural trade issue unless it gets a
permanent exemption from disputes for those programs.
(8) The Government of India has repeatedly raised its
minimum price supports, which has had negative effects on
several commodity markets and most notably has led to its
dominance of the global rice trade, with a 40-percent share of
the global market since marketing year 2020 through 2021. India
is also the world's largest producer of pulses and second
largest producer of wheat, peanuts, and cotton.
(9) The United States Trade Representative submitted a
counter notification at the World Trade Organization in 2023
showing that price supports by the Government of India for rice
increased from 78.6 percent of the value of production in
marketing year 2014 through 2015 to 93.9 percent of the value
of production in marketing year 2020 through 2021, compared to
the limit at the World Trade Organization on increased price
supports of 10 percent of the value of production. That counter
notification also showed price supports by the Government of
India for wheat increasing from 77.7 percent to 81.3 percent
during the same period. Previous counter notifications have
shown similar violations by the Government of India for other
commodities. For example, in the marketing year 2016 through
2017, price supports by the Government of Indian were 67.9
percent for cotton, 31.7 percent for chickpeas, 41 percent for
lentils, and 47.4 percent for pulses overall.
(10) Minor attempts to reform the agriculture subsidy
system in India in marketing year 2020 through 2021 failed to
produce results. Reforms enacted as a result of those attempts
would not have changed the policies that violate commitments
under the World Trade Organization, but would have merely
provided farmers in India with opportunities to sell their
products outside of the government-run mandi system, but those
reforms were ultimately repealed.
(11) Dispute settlement is an effective way to provide a
neutral assessment of compliance with terms of trade agreements
and empower internal reformers who recognize a problem but have
not been able to overcome entrenched resistance.
(12) Global agriculture is uniquely susceptible to trade
barriers and requires special attention to resolve myriad
systemic and economically significant trade violations that
impede the development of a resilient, sustainable, and rules-
based agricultural trading system.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should accelerate efforts to address
foreign trade barriers that harm agriculture exports of the
United States;
(2) the United States Trade Representative and the
Secretary of Agriculture both have a critical role in
developing agricultural trade disputes;
(3) Congress and the private sector have key roles to play
in the development of disputes and agricultural trade
enforcement strategy;
(4) in the case of price supports by the Government of
India, the President has exhausted other options available
through the World Trade Organization short of requesting
consultations under the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the
World Trade Organization;
(5) there should be a plan and definitive deadlines in
place for a request for consultations and establishment of a
panel under the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
(6) the United States Trade Representative and the
Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with Congress and the
private sector, should jointly develop a proactive enforcement
strategy for addressing systemic and economically significant
trade barriers in the agriculture sector; and
(7) the Office of the United States Trade Representative is
the lead agency for trade policy of the United States.
SEC. 4. AGRICULTURAL TRADE ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a joint task force
to be known as the ``Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force'' (in
this section referred to as the ``Task Force'').
(b) Membership.--The Task Force shall be comprised of the following
members:
(1) Employees of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the
Department of Agriculture, who shall be appointed by the Under
Secretary of Agriculture for Trade and Foreign Agricultural
Affairs.
(2) Employees of the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, who shall--
(A) be appointed by the General Counsel and the
Chief Agricultural Negotiator; and
(B) have appropriate expertise in agricultural
trade policy and trade enforcement.
(3) Employees from other Federal agencies as determined by
the United States Trade Representative or the Secretary of
Agriculture.
(c) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall--
(A) identify trade barriers to agriculture exports
of the United States that are vulnerable to dispute
settlement under the World Trade Organization or other
trade agreements to which the United States is a party;
(B) develop and implement a strategy for enforcing
violations of trade agreements related to those trade
barriers;
(C) identify like-minded trading partners that
could act as co-complainants or primary complainants on
disputes relating to specific trade barriers that are
systemically or economically important to the United
States; and
(D) report to Congress pursuant to subsection (d).
(2) Consultation.--In carrying out the duties under
paragraph (1), the Task Force shall regularly consult, to the
extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector,
including the agricultural trade advisory committees.
(B) Federal agencies that are not represented on
the Task Force.
(C) Like-minded trading partners that are similarly
concerned with trade barriers and are potential
participants in a dispute settlement process.
(d) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than
quarterly thereafter, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a
report on the progress of the Task Force in identifying and
addressing trade barriers to agriculture exports of the United
States.
(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) The systemic and economically significant trade
barriers that have been identified by the Task Force.
(B) A justification for including those trade
barriers in the report.
(C) The progress that has been made in developing
dispute settlement cases and an assessment of whether
further information is required.
(D) The current status of ongoing disputes and the
implementation of panel decisions, arbitration
decisions, or decisions by the Appellate Body of the
World Trade Organization.
(3) Confidential information.--
(A) In general.--The Task Force shall remove from
each report submitted under paragraph (1) any
information determined by the Task Force to be
confidential.
(B) Briefing.--For each report required to be
submitted under paragraph (1), the United States Trade
Representative and the Secretary of Agriculture shall
provide to members of Congress, congressional staff,
and cleared advisors a briefing on the information
determined by the Task Force to be confidential and
removed from the report pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(e) Consultations With India.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall include as part of
the first report required under subsection (d)(1) a plan for
filing a request for consultations under the World Trade
Organization with respect to the price supports implemented by
the Government of India with respect to agricultural products,
which shall include other members of the World Trade
Organization that have been identified and approached as
potential co-complainants.
(2) Elements.--The plan required under paragraph (1) shall
include--
(A) specific claims that the United States Trade
Representative intends to make during the consultations
requested pursuant to the plan; and
(B) a timeline for--
(i) requesting those consultations; and
(ii) requesting the establishment of a
panel under the World Trade Organization in the
event that the Government of India fails to
provide a satisfactory path to compliance by
the date that is 60 days after the date of
receipt of the request for consultations.
<all>