[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      COMBATING THE GREY ZONE: EXAMINING 
                     CHINESE THREATS TO THE MARITIME DOMAIN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              JUNE 4, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-69

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     
        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
58-918 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025                  
          
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                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas                Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Nick LaLota, New York                Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Robert Garcia, California
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking 
Nick LaLota, New York                    Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Robert Garcia, California
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
                  Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     2
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                               Witnesses

Captain Brent D. Sadler, USN (Ret.), Senior Research Fellow, 
  Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Allison Center for 
  National Security, The Heritage Foundation:
  Oral Statement.................................................     6
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8
Captain Eric M. Cooper, USCG (Ret.), Senior Policy Researcher, 
  RAND Corporation:
  Oral Statement.................................................    18
  Prepared Statement.............................................    20
Mr. Christopher H. Sharman, Director, China Maritime Studies 
  Institute, United States Naval War College:
  Oral Statement.................................................    29
  Prepared Statement.............................................    30

                                Appendix

Statement of Isaac B. Kardon, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment 
  for International Peace........................................    47

 
  COMBATING THE GREY ZONE: EXAMINING CHINESE THREATS TO THE MARITIME 
                                 DOMAIN

                              ----------                              


                         Tuesday, June 4, 2024

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                        Subcommittee on Transportation and 
                                         Maritime Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Gimenez, Higgins, Thanedar, and 
Garcia.
    Mr. Gimenez. The Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Maritime Security will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee 
in recess at any point.
    Today's hearing will examine Chinese gray zone coercion in 
the maritime domain and ways the Department of Homeland 
Security can leverage its component to combat these threats.
    Without objection, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, 
and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Suozzi, are permitted to 
sit with the subcommittee and ask questions of the witnesses.
    So ordered.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Today our subcommittee will examine the Chinese Communist 
Party, CCP, use of gray zone tactics in the maritime domain and 
ways in which the U.S. Government, and particularly the 
Department of Homeland Security, must adapt to counter this 
threat. The Department of Homeland Security was stood up in the 
aftermath of 9/11 to be a crosscutting, information-sharing 
agency to safeguard the homeland from terrorism. Now, more than 
20 years later, the threat landscape has significantly evolved 
and so, too, must the Department.
    Today we are facing a complex adversary who actively 
employs the resources of the world's second-largest economy to 
reshape the world order and undermine U.S. interests and 
security. The CCP seeks to impose their totalitarian vision on 
the high seas that disregards international law and undermines 
national sovereignty. Their efforts to implement this vision in 
the maritime domain often goes unchallenged.
    The CCP has made unlawful claims to expand China's 
territorial waters leveraging gray zones tactics, such as 
sending Chinese maritime militias, fishing vessels, and Coast 
Guard ships into contested waters to bully and coerce other 
nations. No country is more familiar with this tactic than the 
Philippines, where resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal 
are met with water cannons and ramming from CCP Coast Guard 
ships.
    Earlier this year, several American international 
journalists witnessed the CCP's hostile tactics up close during 
an incident at sea that resulted in the injuries to Philippine 
Coast Guard personnel and damage to Philippine vessels. The CCP 
has exploited the U.S. and other nations' exclusive economic 
zones, or EEZs, through illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing that is threatening local economies and populations who 
depend on the fish as a food source. CCP's distance water 
fishing fleet pillage fish stocks around the world, including 
U.S. territories like American Samoa.
    The maritime domain is complex, and the U.S. possesses the 
second-largest exclusive economic zone in the world. The U.S. 
EEZ contains and facilitates enormous wealth from offshore 
energy reserves, such as oil and natural gas, to mineral 
deposits and fish stocks. The Department of Homeland Security 
must reposition itself to combat this threat and allocate 
resources to the components best positioned to protect U.S. 
sovereignty.
    Throughout the 118th Congress, this subcommittee has 
examined a multitude of DHS mission sets and operational 
capabilities. Last month, we examined the Department's and the 
Coast Guard's efforts to procure new cutters and how some of 
their key programs have fallen dangerously behind.
    In February, we examined port security, specifically the 
threat posed by Chinese manufactured cranes, a vulnerability 
the Coast Guard is working to mitigate. Additionally, our 
committee has examined threats in the Arctic and the Indo-
Pacific. Each of these hearings feature a common thread: the 
CCP waging a gray zone conflict against U.S. maritime domain.
    The CCP poses the most significant challenge to the United 
States, our way of life, and the freedoms that we enjoy. We 
must work together in Congress to protect the homeland and 
ensure that the agencies we oversee are prepared and equipped 
to defeat the many threats that we face.
    I am grateful that we are joined by a distinguished panel 
of witnesses who are prepared to provide critical insights to 
the subcommittee. Mr. Sadler, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Sharman, 
thank you for appearing before us this afternoon on this 
important topic, and I look forward to your testimony.
    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
    Today our subcommittee will examine the Chinese Communist Party's 
(CCP) use of ``grey zone'' tactics in the maritime domain and ways in 
which the U.S. Government, and particularly the Department of Homeland 
Security, must adapt to counter this threat.
    The Department of Homeland Security was stood up in the aftermath 
of 9/11 to be a cross-cutting, information-sharing agency to safeguard 
the homeland from terrorism.
    Now more than 20 years later, the threat landscape has 
significantly evolved, and so too must the Department.
    Today, we are facing a complex adversary who actively employs the 
resources of the world's second-largest economy to reshape the world 
order and undermine U.S. interests and security.
    The CCP seeks to impose their totalitarian vision on the high seas 
that disregards international law and undermines national sovereignty.
    Their efforts to implement this vision in the maritime domain often 
goes unchallenged.
    The CCP has made unlawful claims to expand China's territorial 
waters, leveraging ``grey zone'' tactics such as sending Chinese 
Maritime Militias, fishing vessels, and Coast Guard ships into 
contested waters to bully and coerce other nations.
    No country is more familiar with this tactic than the Philippines 
where resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal are met with water 
cannons and ramming from CCP Coast Guard ships.
    Earlier this year, several American and international journalists 
witnessed the CCP's hostile tactics up close during an incident at sea 
that resulted in the injuries to Philippine Coast Guard personnel and 
damage to Philippine vessels.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Feliz Solomon, How China's Aggressive Sea Tactics Look From the 
Deck of an Opposing Ship, WSJ (2024), https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/
how-chinas-aggressive-sea-tactics-look-from-the-deck-of-an-opposing-
ship-a942f912 (last visited May 31, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The CCP has exploited the U.S. and other nations' Exclusive 
Economic Zones or EEZs through illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing that is threatening local economies and populations who depend 
on the fish as a food source.
    The CCP's distance water fishing fleet pillages fish stocks around 
the world--including in U.S. territories like American Samoa.
    The maritime domain is complex, and the United States possesses the 
second-largest exclusive economic zone in the world.
    The U.S. EEZ contains and facilitates enormous wealth, from 
offshore energy reserves such as oil and natural gas to mineral 
deposits and fish stocks.
    The Department of Homeland Security must reposition itself to 
combat this threat and allocate resources to the components best 
positioned to protect U.S. sovereignty.
    Throughout the 118th Congress, this subcommittee has examined a 
multitude of DHS mission sets and operational capabilities.
    Last month, we examined the Department's and the Coast Guard's 
efforts to procure new cutters and how some of their key programs have 
fallen dangerously behind.
    In February, we examined port security, specifically the threat 
posed by Chinese-manufactured cranes--a vulnerability the Coast Guard 
is working to mitigate.
    Additionally, our committee has examined threats in the Arctic and 
in the Indo-Pacific.
    Each of these hearings feature a common thread: the CCP is waging a 
``grey zone'' conflict against the U.S. maritime domain.
    The CCP poses the most significant challenge to the United States, 
our way of life and the freedoms that we enjoy.
    We must work together in Congress to protect the homeland and 
ensure that the agencies we oversee are prepared and equipped to defeat 
the many threats we face.
    I am grateful that we are joined by a distinguished panel of 
witnesses who are prepared to provide critical insights to this 
subcommittee.
    Mr. Sadler, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Sharman, thank you for appearing 
before us this afternoon on this important topic.
    I look forward to your testimony.

    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Thanedar. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman 
Gimenez, for calling today's hearing.
    Thank you to our witnesses for sharing their expertise with 
us today.
    The People's Republic of China has grown increasingly 
aggressive within the maritime domain. The PRC has made many 
illegitimate territorial claims and has directed its naval 
forces to defend waters that are not China's waters to defend. 
The PRC's actions have threatened the free flow of travel and 
commerce throughout the Indo-Pacific, increasing tensions in an 
irresponsible manner.
    Most recently, the PRC issued rules allowing China's Coast 
Guard to detain foreigners who cross into waters China 
illegitimately claims as its own. These rules, if acted upon, 
have the potential to significantly increase tension in the 
region, which are already high.
    In addition, many Chinese fishing vessels continue to 
participate in illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, 
fishing. Huge populations are reliant on the stocks of fish in 
the Indo-Pacific region. IUU fishing threatens to damage the 
ecosystem and deplete these stocks threatening the livelihood 
of those populations.
    Taken together, the PRC's actions in the maritime domain 
undermine the rules-based order the global maritime community 
relies on to maintain safety, security, and sovereignty at sea. 
The United States and its partners face tremendous challenges 
in responding to PRC's activities, especially in a way that 
seeks to ease tensions rather than further inflame them.
    China is a key U.S. trading partner, and according to the 
United Nations, one-third of global shipping passes through the 
South China Sea. The United States must be strategic in its 
efforts to counter the PRC's aggression and not simply build 
toward conflict. The U.S. Coast Guard is key to such strategic 
efforts. The Coast Guard is uniquely able to help counter the 
PRC's gray zone tactics in collaboration with international 
allies and partners.
    The Coast Guard's multifaceted missions allow the service 
to partner with countries in the region on a range of 
operations from search and rescue to disaster relief to 
fisheries enforcement, all of which help to improve diplomacy. 
Congress must ensure the Coast Guard has the necessary 
resources to maintain a steady presence in the Indo-Pacific and 
help counter PRC aggression. I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses how this committee can be helpful in advancing those 
efforts.
    Thank you again to all of our witnesses.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
                              June 4, 2024
    The People's Republic of China has grown increasingly aggressive 
within the maritime domain. The PRC has made many illegitimate 
territorial claims and has directed its naval forces to defend waters 
that are not China's waters to defend. The PRC's actions have 
threatened the free flow of travel and commerce throughout the Indo-
Pacific, increasing tensions in an irresponsible manner.
    Most recently, the PRC issued rules allowing China's Coast Guard to 
detain foreigners who cross into waters China illegitimately claims as 
its own. These rules, if acted upon, have the potential to 
significantly increase tensions in the region--which are already high. 
In addition, many Chinese fishing vessels continue to participate in 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or ``I.U.U.'' fishing.
    Huge populations are reliant on the stocks of fish in the Indo-
Pacific. I.U.U. fishing threatens to damage the ecosystem and deplete 
those stocks, threatening the livelihood of those populations. Taken 
together, the PRC's actions in the maritime domain undermine the rules-
based order the global maritime community relies on to maintain safety, 
security, and sovereignty at sea.
    The United States and its partners face tremendous challenges in 
responding to the PRC's activities--especially in a way that seeks to 
ease tensions rather than further inflame them. China is a key U.S. 
trading partner, and according to the United Nations, one-third of 
global shipping passes through the South China Sea. The United States 
must be strategic in its efforts to counter the PRC's aggression and 
not simply build toward conflict. The U.S. Coast Guard is key to such 
strategic efforts.
    The Coast Guard is uniquely able to help counter the PRC's ``grey 
zone'' tactics, in collaboration with international allies and 
partners. The Coast Guard's multi-faceted missions allow the service to 
partner with countries in the region on a range of operations, from 
search and rescue, to disaster relief, to fisheries enforcement, all of 
which help to improve diplomacy.
    Congress must ensure the Coast Guard has the necessary resources to 
maintain a steady presence in the Indo-Pacific and help counter PRC 
aggression. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how this 
committee can be helpful in advancing those efforts.

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member Thanedar.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                              June 4, 2024
    The U.S. Coast Guard and its partners are increasingly challenged 
to secure the maritime domain and enforce an international rules-based 
order within the Indo-Pacific region.
    The region faces a variety of challenges, from rising sea levels as 
a result of climate change, to massive amounts of trade over vast 
expanses of sea, to aggressive territorial claims and fishing tactics 
from malign state actors, including the People's Republic of China. The 
PRC has used aggressive, ``grey zone'' tactics to assert territorial 
claims, exploit fishing stocks, and restrict freedom of movement within 
the South China Sea.
    These ``grey zone'' tactics do not rise to the level of warfare, 
but they defy international maritime law and agreements, posing direct 
challenges to China's neighbors and the global maritime community--
including the United States.
    Safe and secure maritime travel, trade, fishing, and sovereignty 
depends upon the good-faith implementation and enforcement of 
international laws, agreements, and customs. The PRC's activities 
undermine such efforts, and countering them requires the cooperation 
and collaboration of the international community to enforce a rules-
based order. The U.S. Coast Guard is well-positioned to lead such 
efforts, in partnership with the State Department, the U.S. Navy, and 
foreign allies and partners.
    The Coast Guard's engagements with counterparts throughout the 
Indo-Pacific are key to advancing U.S. interests in the region. The 
Coast Guard engages in valuable exercises, training, and personnel 
exchanges with partners in the region to bolster maritime law 
enforcement, port security, search and rescue, disaster response 
capabilities, and enforcement of illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing.
    The Coast Guard has limited resources, however, and the vastness of 
the Pacific makes it impossible for the service to deploy everywhere it 
would like to. Congress must invest in the Coast Guard's cutter 
programs and workforce to maximize its ability to deploy throughout the 
Indo-Pacific.
    I look forward to learning more about how the Coast Guard and its 
partners can further advance efforts to counter the PRC's aggressive 
tactics in a way that advances trade and freedom of movement, without 
increasing the chance of traditional warfare.

    Mr. Gimenez. Again, I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I 
ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have 
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses: 
Captain Brent Sadler, retired U.S. Navy captain, who currently 
serves as a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation; 
Captain Eric Cooper is a retired U.S. Coast Guard captain who 
currently serves as a senior policy researcher at the RAND 
Corporation; Mr. Christopher Sharman serves as director for 
China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. 
I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here 
today.
    I now recognize Captain Sadler for 5 minutes to summarize 
his opening statements.

   STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN BRENT D. SADLER, USN (RET.), SENIOR 
RESEARCH FELLOW, NAVAL WARFARE AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, ALLISON 
     CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Sadler. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be 
with you today. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member 
Shri Thanedar, the chance for--to speak specifically to your 
committee on a topic of very important national interest.
    China poses several threats to our Nation's maritime 
sovereignty, most notably in the Pacific. The most insidious 
threats are termed gray zone because China's acts weaken the 
United States while avoiding an effective response. Unchecked, 
these acts weaken confidence in the United States and alienate 
our Nation from allies. Should these gray zone acts escalate, 
it further exposes a Coast Guard of limited wartime utility 
expected to support a too-small Navy.
    My comments this afternoon are born from 3 maritime threats 
germane to our discussion today: No. 1, predatory Chinese 
distant water fishing fleets; No. 2, Chinese fentanyl precursor 
trade with narcotics cartels; and, No. 3, the unchecked Chinese 
gray zone operations and their potential for escalation.
    Weakness in responding to these threats are exposing 
several vulnerabilities that invite future provocations that 
include, No. 1, limited options to respond to Chinese maritime 
gray zone threats or tactics. These include shouldering; that 
is the pushing of one ship by another and, as mentioned 
already, the well-known water cannoning of Philippine vessels 
in the South China Sea.
    Failing to control the gray zone better will see U.S. 
maritime rights ceded to China or escalation unless more non-
lethal options are provided our cutter and warship captains. 
Should conflict come, the Coast Guard would be expected to 
support naval operations, but the Navy and Coast Guard have 
devoted little time to training together. Moreover, today's 
Coast Guard cutters are not designed for naval warfare nor 
readily able to be up-armed to support, for example, escort 
missions that would involve anti-submarine warfare.
    Second, the lack of presence in what is today's New Great 
Game for the south and central Pacific. In an arc stretching 
over 1,400 miles from Wake Island to Johnston Atoll and south 
1,900 miles to American Samoa are 6 U.S. exclusive economic 
zones rich in fish and untapped natural resources. Too few 
cutters with inadequate range for Pacific operations are 
providing a vacuum for Chinese distant water fishing fleets as 
well as nefarious influence campaigns.
    The movement of medium-endurance cutter Harriet Lane in 
January to Hawaii is good, but it is not enough. Recent poor 
recruiting and cratering retention is seeing too many cutters 
being idled, like medium-endurance cutter Dependable sidelined 
in March, and more likely to follow.
    Third, limited maritime counternarcotics capacity is 
allowing Chinese criminal elements in league with narcotics 
cartels a vehicle to harm Americans. Consider that in 2022 the 
Coast Guard removed over 212,000 pounds of cocaine, 54,000 
pounds of marijuana, worth a wholesale value of $2.9 billion--a 
lot for sure, but for the cartels and increasingly Chinese 
criminal syndicates amounts little more than an accounting 
error in a trade that is worth--estimated to be worth well over 
$652 billion.
    Securing Americans from the scourge of illegal drugs will 
mean putting the cartels out of business by more fully 
utilizing the proven successes of organizations such as Joint 
Interagency Task Force South and leveraging--better leveraging 
their partners. This could begin with reactivating Navy's 2 
Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships with more than 10 years of 
life left.
    No. 4, and last, when a port is closed due to a natural 
disaster, or as we saw in Baltimore this March, an allision by 
today's massive ships, there is too little capacity to reopen 
these ports. In peacetime, this is inconvenient and 
economically crippling at best and, during wartime, 
unacceptable. More is needed to ensure prompt reopening of 
strategically important ports in our Nation, such as increased 
salvage capacity, heavier lift loading cranes, and firefighting 
boats, to name a few.
    In closing, our ports are our lifeblood for trade and vital 
and sustaining wartime operations. In our Nation's expansive 
and rich Pacific waters are billions of dollars of minerals and 
fish stocks all vulnerable to poaching. Today on our streets 
are narcotics enabled by cartels fed the chemicals to make 
possible a fentanyl epidemic killing now over 70,000 Americans 
yearly. A response to these threats is needed and starts at sea 
with a stronger Coast Guard and an invigorated maritime sector 
at home.
    Thank you very much, and I look forward to the questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sadler follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Brent D. Sadler
                              June 4, 2024
                              
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Captain Sadler.
    I now recognize Captain Cooper for 5 minutes to summarize 
his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN ERIC M. COOPER, USCG (RET.), SENIOR POLICY 
                  RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION

    Mr. Cooper. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify before you today. I am a senior policy researcher at 
RAND, a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization.
    Prior to joining RAND, I served in the Coast Guard for 30 
years in multiple roles, to include the director for maritime 
security for the National Security Council, commanding officer 
of Maritime Security Response Team West, deputy director of 
operations at Coast Guard Pacific Area, and aboard Coast Guard 
cutters conducting U.N. Security Council sanction enforcement, 
fisheries enforcement, security cooperation, and joint 
operations with partner nations.
    The opinions and recommendations in this testimony build on 
my own research and experience in the Coast Guard and center 
around a perspective editorial I wrote while at RAND. In this 
testimony, I focus on developing the international partnership 
of like-minded nations that can create a concerted effort to 
establish rule of law in the Indo-Pacific in what has become an 
ungoverned and sometimes misgoverned space.
    The concept is built around the use of a consolidated force 
of Coast Guards and law enforcement agencies to combat the use 
of gray zone tactics by the Chinese. Not everyone may be 
familiar with the term or tactics of gray zone activities, and 
not everyone may agree on all aspects of it. So, to clarify, 
when I use the term it is based around activities that occur in 
an operational space where an entity is trying to challenge the 
status quo, coerce other nations, or obfuscate legal 
definitions by being provocative above what is considered 
normal nation-state activities but below what is considered the 
threshold for military response.
    A typical example in the Indo-Pacific, as has been 
mentioned, is how China is attempting to rewrite the law of the 
sea convention through its Nine-Dash-Line enforcement. They use 
the ambiguity of their people's armed forces maritime militia 
to harass and coerce other vessels by ramming other fishing 
vessels in these contests areas.
    The Chinese Coast Guard has used the water cannons and 
threats of force to expel other sailors from rightful fishing 
grounds or territory. One of the reasons that this occurs, in 
my opinion, is that it goes unchecked and unchallenged. Even 
when other nations push back, China has more power both 
economically and militarily to escalate the situation and use 
the fog of the gray zone tactics to claim self-defense or use 
misinformation to confuse the actual scenario.
    I offer that one way to close the gray zone gap is to 
reduce ambiguity by better defining the rule of law and 
reinforcing the scene through a coalition of partners. Defining 
the law is one step, but it only works if there's enforcement, 
and to do that you need presence. The way that I propose doing 
this is through the development of a combined maritime force 
comprised of Coast Guards and law enforcement agencies of Indo-
Pacific nations.
    The reason I focus on a combined maritime force is that 
it's a known entity, and we've used joint and combined agencies 
in the maritime domain extensively throughout time. Currently, 
the combined maritime force that is based in Bahrain has 5 task 
forces that focus on different aspects in the region. Nations 
in the Indo-Pacific would likely be interested in joining this 
kind of group if properly built. Primarily, it will provide an 
opportunity to build partnerships, push back against the 
hegemony of China, and focus on other key issues.
    I offer as a start that there are 3 areas for the CMF to 
focus on: Information and maritime domain awareness, training 
and capacity building in illegal and unregulated, unreported 
IUU fishing enforcement. Maritime domain awareness is critical 
because, without this first step, it's going to be very 
difficult to perform operational activities in such a vast 
region. Leveraging the already-established Indo-Pacific 
partnership for maritime domain awareness to work under the 
coordination of the CMF would contribute to achieving this 
goal.
    The second step is the development of a task force that 
focuses on cooperative and coordinated trading. Again, this is 
something that is needed to help with the next steps of 
building an operational task force since the Indo-Pacific is 
massive and you want to empower and enable nations to do this 
without U.S. presence.
    Focusing the first operational task force on IUU fishing is 
important, because it is a key concern not only for all of the 
nations in the region but globally. Moreover, most nations in 
the region will agree to this effort because it protects their 
resources, it builds operational skills, it enhances 
cooperative partnerships, it pushes back against China's 
illegal fishing activity, and it's supported by international 
law and agreement. It also addresses the issues of sovereignty, 
which is what gray zone tactics are exploiting.
    Finally, my recommendation is have the U.S. Coast Guard 
lead this for several reasons: The U.S. Coast Guard is a 
respected entity that already operates in the region; it is 
less escalatory than the Navy; the Coast Guard authorities and 
partnerships already exist; and the Coast Guard is already 
doing training law enforcement in the region. It provides an 
opportunity for the United States to lead without conflating 
the Navy's role and current mission.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Eric M. Cooper \1\ \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are 
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those 
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research.
    \2\ RAND is a research organization that develops solutions to 
public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world 
safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is 
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's 
mission is enabled through its core values of quality and objectivity 
and its commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. RAND subjects its 
research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance 
process; avoids financial and other conflicts of interest through staff 
training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and 
pursues transparency through the open publication of research findings 
and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published 
research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. This 
testimony is not a research publication, but witnesses affiliated with 
RAND routinely draw on relevant research conducted in the organization.
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                              June 4, 2024
    Good afternoon, and thank you for the honor of testifying today. I 
am a senior policy researcher at RAND, a nonprofit and nonpartisan 
research organization. Prior to joining RAND, I served in the U.S. 
Coast Guard for 30 years in multiple roles, including as director for 
maritime security for the National Security Council; commanding officer 
of Maritime Security Response Team West, the Coast Guard's west coast 
counterterrorism team; deputy director of operations at Coast Guard 
Pacific Area; a crisis action planner in the Future Operations Division 
at U.S. Northern Command; and aboard several Coast Guard cutters 
conducting United Nations (UN) Security Council sanction enforcement, 
fisheries enforcement, security cooperation, and joint operations with 
partner countries. At RAND, I have been a contributing author on a 
number of projects associated with U.S. Coast Guard operations, 
strategy, policy, and acquisition programs, as well as projects 
involving uncrewed systems and Indo-Pacific operations. The opinions 
and recommendations in this testimony build on my own research and 
experience in the Coast Guard.
    My testimony today is focused on potential ways to improve 
cooperation and effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific using a combined 
maritime force that consists of coast guards and similar maritime law 
enforcement agencies. This structure can be useful in improving unity 
of effort and enforcing a rules-based order while simultaneously 
countering Chinese hegemony and coercion against U.S. allies and 
partners in the region. My comments apply to how gray zone tactics have 
eroded rule of law, how a Combined Maritime Force (CMF) can achieve 
U.S. objectives, and why the U.S. Coast Guard is the best-positioned 
agency to lead this effort. I will discuss how a CMF of international 
coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies, under the 
leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard, might institute a shared vision 
focused on the enforcement of maritime law and international norms.
                gray zone activities in the indo-pacific
    The Indo-Pacific is a critical region of the world. More than one-
third of global shipping transits the South China Sea, it is the home 
of more than half the world's population, and the region will likely 
drive global growth in the next several decades.\3\ U.S. strategy in 
the Indo-Pacific under the Biden, Trump, and Obama administrations has 
clearly outlined a commitment to a free and open international order 
upheld by partnerships and a shared vision.\4\ Despite this renewed 
emphasis to defend democratic principles and protect the rules-based 
paradigm, there is evidence that international norms continue to slowly 
erode under China's ascending power.\5\ For example, although China is 
a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it 
has ignored decisions by the U.N. arbitral tribunal that do not match 
China's preferred resolution of events.\6\ Furthermore, in violation of 
UNCLOS, China passed legislation in 2021 that allows China's Coast 
Guard to use lethal force against foreign military ships operating in 
waters that China considers to be under its jurisdiction.\7\ Moreover, 
China has empowered fishing vessels to operate as the People's Armed 
Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and harass and forcefully coerce other 
vessels to comply with its wishes.\8\ Along with these activities, 
China's enforcement efforts for its expansive 9-dash line, which claims 
most of the South China Sea, are clear examples of gray zone tactics--
activities that are below armed conflict but above normal peacetime 
behaviors, designed to change the status quo without the use of lethal 
force.\9\
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    \3\ China Power Project, ``How Much Trade Transits the South China 
Sea?'' webpage, Center for Strategic and International Studies, updated 
January 25, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-
south-china-sea/; White House, ``Fact Sheet: In Asia, President Biden 
and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework for Prosperity,'' press release, May 23, 2022.
    \4\ National Security Council, Executive Office of the President, 
Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, White House, February 2022.
    \5\ Lynn Kuok, How China's Actions in the South China Sea Undermine 
the Rule of Law, Global China Project, Brookings Institution, November 
2019.
    \6\ Caitlin Campbell and Nargiza Salidjanova, ``South China Sea 
Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What's Next?'' issue brief, U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 12, 2016.
    \7\ Japan Ministry of Defense, ``The Coast Guard Law of the 
People's Republic of China,'' webpage, undated, https://www.mod.go.jp/
en/d_act/sec_env/ch_ocn/index.html.
    \8\ Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, ``A Short History of China's 
Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us,'' RAND Blog, April 6, 2020, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-
fishing-militia-and-what.html.
    \9\ ``A gray zone is an operational space between peace and war, 
involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold 
that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, 
often blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and 
the attribution of events'' (Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey 
W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Kepe, Gaining 
Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive 
Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War, RAND Corporation, RR-2942-
OSD, 2019, p. 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR2942.html).
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    China's stance is misaligned with international norms--
specifically, UNCLOS. In 2016, The Hague-based Permanent Court of 
Arbitration unanimously declared that China's 9-dash line claim was 
``contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent 
that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China's 
maritime entitlements'' under the Convention.\10\ Despite this ruling, 
China ignored the court--alleging that it was not relevant--and has 
continued to assert influence and defend its claim with the 
multipronged maritime forces of the People's Liberation Army Navy, 
China Coast Guard, and the PAFMM. Although China has officially claimed 
that the PAFMM is independent of the State, the militia is a key 
component of China's maritime strategy.\11\ It consists of a 
conglomeration of fishing vessels staffed with crew members who are 
armed, trained, and loyal to the government. The PAFMM uses 
intimidation, harassment, and other unlawful actions--including 
blocking and ramming other countries' vessels--to impose China's 
illegal claims but with plausible deniability from the Chinese 
government: ``In the view of some observers, the PAFMM--even more than 
China's Navy or Coast Guard--is the leading component of China's 
maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the 
[South China Sea].'' Evidence shows that there continues to be an 
increasing number of PAFMM vessels operating near disputed islands in 
the South China Sea as a method to assert influence over other 
nations.\12\
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    \10\ Permanent Court of Arbitration, ``Arbitration Between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China,'' press 
release, October 29, 2015, p. 3.
    \11\ Micah McCartney, ``China's Maritime Militia: The `Gray Zone' 
Force in the South China Sea,'' Newsweek, December 22, 2023, https://
www.newsweek.com/china-maritime-militia-gray-zone-tactics-1854766.
    \12\ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ``The Ebb and Flow of 
Beijing's South China Sea Militia,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, November 9, 2022.
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    Such actions by China Coast Guard and the PAFMM are not only 
dangerous but are also in violation of global agreements, including 
UNCLOS and the Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, which establishes the responsibilities of 
maritime vessels and how they should safely act when operating near 
other vessels. Recent examples of Chinese vessels ramming other ships 
and using water cannons go against the international rules-based order 
and specifically against the obligation outlined in UNCLOS to ensure 
safety at sea. China's use of gray zone tactics to intimidate other 
countries will continue unless checked by a unified and persuasive 
international approach.
    Although gray zone tactics are below the threshold of what would 
constitute acts of war, they can and should be addressed through legal 
avenues. UNCLOS stipulates that warships and government ships will be 
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign countries while on the high 
seas, but this immunity does not apply to the PAFMM, which consists of 
vessels that are classified as commercial or private, including 
registration by China as fishing vessels.\13\ When actions resulting in 
collision and death occur in the territorial seas of another country, 
Article 27 of UNCLOS stipulates that those actions fall under the 
criminal jurisdiction of that country's laws ``if the consequences of 
the crime extend to the coastal state; [or] if the crime is of a kind 
to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the 
territorial sea.''\14\
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    \13\ Novena Clementine Manullang, Achmad Gusman Siswandi, and 
Chloryne Trie Isana Dewi, ``The Status of Maritime Militia in the South 
China Sea Under International Law Perspective,'' Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia 
Iustum, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2020.
    \14\ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed 
December 10, 1982, entered into force November 16, 1994, Part II, 
Section 3, Subsection B, Article 27(1).
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    Therefore, if PAFMM vessels are conducting criminal activities, as 
defined in UNCLOS, while operating in waters already determined by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to be territorial waters under a 
country's (e.g., the Philippines) jurisdiction, PAFMM crew members are 
subject to law enforcement action by that country's law enforcement 
agency. A country's enforcement against these activities would likely 
also be supported under the right of self-defense and customary 
international law, which ``permits a state to take reasonable measures 
to defend itself from aggressive threats to its political security or 
territorial integrity.''\15\ Furthermore, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
provides another enforcement avenue against a vessel that commits 
violence against a person or damages another vessel.
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    \15\ Robert C.F. Reuland, ``Interference with Non-National Ships on 
the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-
State Jurisdiction,'' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 22, 
No. 5, 1989, p. 1206.
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    As the United States strives for a free and open Indo-Pacific, the 
foundations of international law need to be reinforced as the bedrock 
of global relationships. In particular, sustained enforcement of 
established maritime legal principles offer critical means for the 
United States and its allies and partners to meet strategic objectives 
in the Indo-Pacific, especially given China's frequent use of 
nonmilitary actions to subvert international norms.\16\ The 
establishment of a CMF that is focused on law enforcement and consists 
of international coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies 
working together to address illegal activity is a potential solution to 
the continued degradation of the rules-based order and would underpin a 
free and open Indo-Pacific.
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    \16\ China uses primarily nonmilitary and financial sources to 
influence countries in the region. For a more in-depth discussion, see 
Christopher Paul, James Dobbins, Scott W. Harold, Howard J. Shatz, Rand 
Waltzman, and Lauren Skrabala, A Guide to Extreme Competition with 
China, RAND Corporation, RR-A1378-1, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RRA1378-1.html.
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                 structure of a combined maritime force
    CMFs are not a new concept. International maritime coalitions have 
been in existence since the 19th century, when U.S., British, and 
French forces worked to eradicate piracy off the coasts of Africa 
following the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law.\17\ 
Today, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy routinely participate in 
international maritime coalitions on critical issues, including 
combating transnational criminal organizations under Joint Interagency 
Task Force (JIATF) South and JIATF West. The United States also leads 
the Bahrain-based CMF, which is made up of 38 member nations and exists 
to uphold ``the International Rules Based Order . . . by countering 
illicit non-state actors on the high seas and promoting security, 
stability, and prosperity.''\18\
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    \17\ Caitlin M. Gale, ``Barbary's Slow Death: European Attempts to 
Eradicate North African Piracy in the Early Nineteenth Century,'' 
Journal for Maritime Research, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2016.
    \18\ Combined Maritime Forces, homepage, undated-b, https://
combinedmaritimeforces.com/.
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    A significant advantage of the CMF concept is that the level of 
involvement is voluntary and the participation by each country ``varies 
depending on its ability to contribute assets and the availability of 
those assets at any given time.''\19\ Some countries might be able to 
provide only a single member to serve as a liaison officer, while 
others might be able to conduct training or provide ships and aircraft 
to support operations.
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    \19\ Combined Maritime Forces, ``About CMF,'' webpage, undated-a, 
https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about.
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    There is currently no equivalent CMF operating in the Indo-Pacific, 
although countries work together intermittently to address specific 
issues. On-going law enforcement initiatives in the region include the 
Oceania Maritime Security Initiative, the Southeast Asia Maritime Law 
Enforcement Initiative, and the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training 
exercise, but each operates independently, without a common 
architecture or unifying organization. These independent initiatives 
and unilateral efforts are valuable, but such activities could be 
improved by operating under the umbrella of a dedicated CMF construct 
that aligns comprehensive objectives and incorporates more partners.
  advantages of a law enforcement-led combined maritime force over a 
                         military-led approach
    International coalitions have repeatedly demonstrated the ability 
to enhance multinational partnerships and develop synergies to tackle 
global issues in the maritime commons. The Bahrain-based CMF has 
demonstrated impressive efficacy and has basically eradicated piracy 
off the Horn of Africa, enforced U.N. sanctions around the region, 
stopped the flow of hundreds of thousands of pounds of narcotics, and, 
in 2021 alone, seized more than 8,700 illegal weapon systems and 
rocket-propelled grenades.\20\
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    \20\ NAVCENT Public Affairs, ``Record Seizures in 2021 After 
NAVCENT and CMF Increase Patrols,'' U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, 
U.S. 5th Fleet, January 18, 2022.
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    Although the U.S. Navy has been successful in promoting U.S. 
presence and developing partnerships in the Middle East through the CMF 
based in Bahrain, the gray zone threats in the Indo-Pacific require a 
different approach. The U.S. Navy is already fully engaged in the Indo-
Pacific by providing forward presence, theater ballistic missile 
defense, and military-to-military cooperation. Adding the 
responsibility of maritime law enforcement, training, and support 
operations to the U.S. Navy's repertoire could divert its focus from 
its other missions and would likely heighten tensions between China and 
the United States, which is a key concern of regional countries. In 
addition, the creation of a CMF under the purview of the 7th Fleet has 
a high potential of receiving a negative response from China and could 
compound tensions because of a perceived increase of militarization in 
the region.
    The situation in the Indo-Pacific today calls for the employment of 
softer power that reduces the risk of armed conflict. An international 
coalition of maritime law enforcement agencies would be poised to 
demonstrate appropriate conduct by applying international standards in 
the maritime domain. Moreover, the U.S. Coast Guard possesses 
authorities and several unique capabilities that make it ideally suited 
to support the U.S. contribution in a leadership role. The service 
maintains tactical skill sets through its expert boarding parties and 
training teams, conducts routine operational engagement with partners 
in the region through various conventions and shiprider agreements, and 
supports a strategic approach outlined in its own plans and in the 
current administration's goals for the Indo-Pacific.\21\
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    \21\ National Security Council, 2022. Only one agency--the U.S. 
Coast Guard--is specifically mentioned in the entire strategy document.
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    Although several countries possess dedicated coast guards, many 
have singular maritime services, which are more similar to the U.S. 
Coast Guard than to the U.S. Navy. Maritime forces often have limited 
regional reach and are focused more on sovereignty and coastal 
protection than on global force projection. For example, India, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam 
maintain a coast guard (or a coast guard-like organization) that has 
law enforcement authority. Some countries, such as Indonesia and 
Thailand, have a coast guard but also provide law enforcement authority 
to their navy, while others, such as Australia, Brunei, and Cambodia, 
do not maintain a coast guard but provide law enforcement authority to 
their navy or a similar organization. Thus, concentrating on maritime 
law enforcement rather than on military competition makes sense. The 
U.S. Coast Guard also brings a mix of other types of authority and 
expertise that is important to Indo-Pacific partners, and the 
organization can easily operate alongside foreign militaries, coast 
guards, and maritime police, as evidenced in their robust cooperative 
interdiction operations in the Western Hemisphere.
    Several U.S. strategies already support the development of an 
international maritime law enforcement coalition in the Indo-
Pacific.\22\ Moreover, the United States routinely conducts patrols in 
Oceania with regional partners, including through its permanently-based 
U.S. Coast Guard cutters in Guam. Eleven Pacific Island countries have 
signed shiprider agreements with the United States to share resources 
when conducting boardings to enforce laws and treaties.\23\ The U.S. 
Coast Guard has established a strong regimen of tailored training 
through its International Mobile Training Branch in support of the 
Pacific Partnership Strategy.\24\ Additionally, Japan-based U.S. Coast 
Guard Activities Far East provides routine maritime security assistance 
across the Indo-Pacific and Oceania through the International Port 
Security Program.\25\ In a show of trust and confidence in the U.S. 
Coast Guard, both Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia recently 
signed agreements that allow the United States to enforce maritime law 
on behalf of those countries without having a representative 
onboard.\26\ With the help of U.S. leadership, these types of 
agreements could be expanded under a coalition of countries. Aligning 
these bilateral efforts under a single multinational organization is a 
sensible solution to challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
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    \22\ National Security Council, 2022; U.S. Department of Defense, 
The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, 
Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019; White 
House, Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States, September 
2022.
    \23\ These countries are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu (U.S. Mission China, ``Pacific Islands 
Forum--U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Islands,'' U.S. Embassy and 
Consulates in China, August 20, 2019, https://china.usembassy-
china.org.cn/pacific-islands-forum-u-s-engagement-in-the-pacific-
islands/).
    \24\ U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia, Sector Guam, ``U.S. Coast 
Guard Forces Micronesia Sector/Guam's Fast Response Cutters Bolster 
Pacific Partnership Strategy and Strengthen Pacific Island Country 
Relations,'' press release, U.S. Coast Guard News, August 18, 2023.
    \25\ U.S. Coast Guard--Pacific Area, ``International Port Security 
Program,'' webpage, undated, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/District-14/D14-Units/Activities-Far-East-FEACT/FEACT-
Maritime-Security/.
    \26\ ``U.S. and Republic of Palau Sign Agreement to Strengthen Ties 
with New Chapter in Maritime Security and Stewardship in the Pacific,'' 
press release, U.S. Coast Guard News, August 29, 2023.
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the potential benefits of a combined maritime force of coast guards and 
                        law enforcement agencies
    The establishment of a regional CMF coalition would have 3 distinct 
advantages: (1) It would create a cohesive structure for addressing 
critical issues in the Indo-Pacific, (2) it would enhance partnerships 
that focus on reinforcing a rules-based order, and (3) it would 
counterbalance China's hegemonic approach.
    The development of a CMF would build a much-needed structure to 
consistently address critical issues in the Indo-Pacific. A cohesive 
organization would allow a more-efficient exchange of information and a 
more effective distribution of resources to address challenges. The 
greatest current threat is illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, as evidenced by the fact that 76 countries signed the 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, which prevents vessels 
engaged in IUU fishing from using signatory ports to land their 
catch.\27\ In the 1980's and 1990's, a coalition of 6 countries joined 
together to enforce laws against illegal high seas driftnet fishing 
under Operation North Pacific Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard reported that 
``our collective efforts have been overwhelmingly successful in nearly 
eliminating illegal high seas driftnet fishing in the North Pacific 
Ocean.''\28\ The development of an international coalition of coast 
guard and law enforcement agencies built by like-minded countries that 
govern under a rules-based approach would also reinforce agreed-on 
international norms in the Indo-Pacific.
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    \27\ Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, rev. ed., 
approved November 22, 2009, entered into force June 2016.
    \28\ U.S. Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
Strategic Outlook, September 2020, p. 2.
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    The creation of a CMF would not be easy nor guaranteed to be 
successful. There is always the challenge that countries would not want 
to participate for fear of retaliation by China or that their limited 
resources would strain other priorities. For example, in much of 
Oceania, Pacific Island countries, such as the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Nauru, and 
the Solomon Islands, do not maintain a military or a coast guard (with 
the exception of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, which have limited 
capacity). Moreover, China has already criticized a cooperative 
agreement between Taiwan and the U.S. Coast Guard, and further U.S. 
international engagement could be perceived as an encroachment and a 
threat to Chinese sovereignty and security.\29\ An expanded U.S. 
presence could also increase the risk of miscommunication, accidents, 
or unplanned escalation by competing maritime forces. Despite these 
risks, investing in the region would demonstrate U.S. commitment and 
increased presence, which would allow the United States to provide more 
constructive operational support to partners. This would likely lead to 
more-robust participation by the United States in decisions about 
governance architecture rather than letting Beijing control the rules 
through coercion.
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    \29\ ``China Denounces US-Taiwan Coast Guard Cooperation 
Agreement,'' Associated Press, March 26, 2021.
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    A benefit of a CMF structure is that countries are only required to 
provide assets at the level that they can contribute, which opens the 
door for more access to participation. For countries without a maritime 
capability, this could include providing liaison officers, executing 
shiprider agreements, or establishing logistics hubs for other 
participating countries. Countries with more resources are already 
conducting operations or activities in the region--albeit in an 
uncoordinated and sometimes ad hoc manner--and this provides an 
opportunity improve coordination among like-minded countries. For 
example, the United Kingdom has permanently stationed 2 Royal Navy 
ships in the Indo-Pacific to provide maritime security and combat 
illegal fishing and has conducted joint patrols with U.S. Coast Guard 
ships including signing a memorandum of agreement that allows U.S. 
Coast Guard shipriders aboard the vessels.\30\ France has a vested 
interest with territories in the region and has permanently stationed 
Maritime Gendarmerie (French maritime law enforcement) patrol boats 
there. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines regularly 
conduct operations with countries in the region. Additionally, 21 
countries have signed on to the Singapore-based Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) as a demonstration of ``government-to-government agreement to 
promote and enhance cooperation'' of maritime law enforcement in the 
region.\31\ More than 20 countries have participated in the Southeast 
Asia Cooperation and Training Program, which focuses on multilateral 
cooperation in support of maintaining rules and norms in the maritime 
domain across the Indo-Pacific.\32\ Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam have participated in the Southeast Maritime 
Law Enforcement Initiative alongside the U.S. Coast Guard and would 
likely be contributing partners to increase coordination and training 
to improve law enforcement capabilities. Organizing these disparate 
activities under a single construct, such as a CMF, would greatly 
enhance the coordination and unified understanding of maritime threats 
and law enforcement responses in the region. Although it is not 
anticipated that this approach will occur overnight or even in the next 
several years, the absence of a coordinated international maritime law 
enforcement approach will continue to cede influence and control to 
China.
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    \30\ Royal Navy, ``Pacific Patrol Ships Begin Third Year Deployed 
Broadening Their Mission,'' September 12, 2023, https://
www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/september/12/
20230912-pacific-patrol-ships-begin-third-year-deployed-broadening-
their-mission.
    \31\ ReCAAP, ``About ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre,'' webpage, 
undated, https://www.recaap.org/about_ReCAAP-ISC.
    \32\ Rebecca Moore, ``20 Indo-Pacific Maritime Forces Commence 22d 
SEACAT Exercise,'' U.S. Pacific Fleet, August 15, 2023, https://
www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3493679/20-indo-pacific-
maritime-forces-commence-22nd-seacat-exercise/.
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    The presence and influence of a multinational force will create a 
unified front against China's hegemonic activities. As previously 
noted, China has used gray zone tactics to advance its political and 
strategic agendas. The PAFMM currently creates an asymmetric advantage 
for China, but building capacity and coordination now and influencing 
the rules-based order through a CMF would provide a bulwark against 
this asymmetry: ``Introducing a robust Coast Guard [and law enforcement 
force] would provide the U.S. with options for responding to Chinese 
tactics while still operating below the threshold of military 
conflict'' and would simultaneously establish a precedent that would 
diminish China's illegal claims.\33\
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    \33\ Blake Herzinger, ``Reorienting the Coast Guard: A Case for 
Patrol Forces Indo-Pacific,'' War on the Rocks, November 5, 2019, 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/reorienting-the-coast-guard-a-case-
for-patrol-forces-indo-pacific/.
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  the foundation of a combined maritime force of coast guards and law 
                          enforcement agencies
    The CMF in Bahrain consists of 5 combined task forces (CTFs) that 
are geographic or mission-driven.\34\ The creation of a CMF should 
follow a similar structure of diverse CTFs, but focused on the most 
pressing threats to the Indo-Pacific.
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    \34\ The five task forces are combined task force (CTF) 150, 
Maritime Security; CTF 151, Counter-Piracy; CTF 152, Gulf Maritime 
Security; CTF 153, Red Sea Maritime Security; and CTF 154, Maritime 
Security Training. CTF 154 was established in May 2023 and is based in 
and focuses on the Middle East. See Combined Maritime Forces, undated-
b.
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    The road to success for building strong international partnerships 
and an effective CMF includes establishing a solid foundation focused 
on the issues that are important to the region and developing agreement 
about how to address these challenges. Two key regional bodies in the 
Indo-Pacific are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). ASEAN lists its priority 
maritime security areas of cooperation as follows:
   ``Shared Awareness and Exchange of Information and Best 
        Practices,
   ``Confidence Building Measures based on International and 
        Regional Legal Frameworks, Arrangements and Cooperation 
        including the 1982 UNCLOS, and
   ``Capacity Building and Enhancing Cooperation of Maritime 
        Law Enforcement Agencies in the Region.''\35\
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    \35\ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ``Priority Areas of 
Cooperation,'' webpage, undated, https://asean.org/our-communities/
asean-political-security-community/peaceful-secure-and-stable-region/
maritime-security/.
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    The APEC Ocean and Fisheries Working Group lists combating IUU 
fishing as its top priority.\36\ Given the priorities of these regional 
organizations, the logical foundation for a CMF would center on the 
establishment of 3 dedicated CTFs focused on:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ``Ocean and Fisheries,'' 
webpage, last page update September 2023, https://www.apec.org/groups/
som-steering-committee-on-economic-and-technical-cooperation/working-
groups/ocean-and-fisheries.
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   information and maritime domain awareness
   training, exercises, and capacity building
   countering IUU fishing.
Information and Maritime Domain Awareness
    The development of comprehensive maritime domain awareness is 
critical when establishing a law enforcement presence. Understanding 
the type, location, and activities of maritime vessels is a critical 
step before applying limited enforcement resources across a vast ocean. 
The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), 
which is focused on ``maritime domain awareness and maritime security 
in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands using advanced 
commercial satellite data'' can be a starting point for the development 
of this first task force.\37\ In addition to providing data to the 4 
fusion centers in India, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, 
IPMDA can be an opportunity to increase awareness by members that 
commit to abiding by the foundational principles and participating in 
the CMF. With additional intelligence provided by these international 
partners, this task force could provide a better picture and 
understanding of what is happening in the region to support operations 
by deployed assets and regional law enforcement agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Joseph R. Biden, Jr., ``Combating Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses,'' memorandum to 
Cabinet-level Secretaries et al., White House, National Security 
Memorandum 11, June 27, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training, Exercises, and Capacity Building
    The second task force would focus on building the capacity of 
regional partners. Even when a country has the will, it might lack the 
background, expertise, or resources to fully enforce laws within its 
jurisdiction. A core tenet of maritime security is that all countries 
are interested primarily in protecting their own resources and 
territorial waters, which can add value to a joint regional approach. 
To enable success, the CMF could establish a dedicated arm focused on 
training and exercises to build capability, competency, and consistency 
for the least capable countries. Structured training programs and 
exercises are critical components of developing capabilities. A 
systematic approach under a CMF would allow international partners to 
participate in a persistent training and exercise regimen that is 
coordinated, complementary, and concentrated on priority concerns. 
Classroom training can be reinforced through on-the-job operational 
training implemented through shiprider agreements on afloat resources 
performing duties under an operational CTF.
Countering Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
    The third task force of the CMF and the first component consisting 
of operational assets should focus on IUU-fishing enforcement and the 
creation of sustainable fisheries. In 2020, according to statistics 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 85 
percent of the world's fishers and aquaculture workers are in Asia, and 
the waters around the continent account for more than 60 percent of the 
global catch.\38\ The top locations for illegal fishing were in the 
western, central, and south Pacific.\39\ Dwindling fish stocks in the 
Indo-Pacific are a global problem, and countries taking action 
independently is not enough. Commercial fishing activity is not 
expected to decrease, and fish stocks will continue to decline without 
a coordinated methodology. The development of a CMF would create the 
beginnings of a unified approach to address the IUU-fishing problem and 
the depletion of fish stocks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The 
State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Toward Blue Transformation, 
2022.
    \39\ Derek Grossman, Chinese Strategy in the Freely Associated 
States and American Territories in the Pacific: Implications for the 
United States, RAND Corporation, CT-A2768-1, 2023, https://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CTA2768-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The establishment of a CMF would do more than just build a 
coalition of countries to address IUU fishing. As highlighted in the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's strategy, 
``addressing IUU fishing is not just about fish: it is a multi-faceted 
problem that covers other core policy concerns, including human rights, 
food security, and maritime security.''\40\ A CMF would create the 
foundation for addressing the core components of combating IUU fishing, 
including information sharing, joint operations, and international 
prosecution. A cohesive and coordinated maritime force in the region 
could also serve to quickly transition to search-and-rescue service, 
environmental pollution response, or a natural disaster-relief response 
force. Moreover, such a force would establish the foundation for a 
robust law enforcement presence to respond to UNCLOS violations and 
enforce international norms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing, National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: 2022-2026, 2022, p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
leadership and membership of a combined maritime force of coast guards 
                      and law enforcement agencies
    Creating a CMF offers a key opportunity for the United States to 
show commitment and leadership while building partnerships that focus 
on the issues that matter most in the Indo-Pacific region. As I implied 
earlier, the United States should consider coordinating with regional 
partners on establishing a U.S. Coast Guard admiral as the CMF 
leader.\41\ The Coast Guard has already committed to supporting Indo-
Pacific operations through its routine patrols with national security 
cutters, law enforcement detachment deployments, and home-porting fast 
response cutters in the region. Having the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead 
or as an executive agent would be a natural fit and would likely 
promote unity of effort among other countries that are already engaged 
in multilateral coast guard forums and multinational exercises, 
including through the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement 
Initiative and Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training programs. A 
combined multinational force with U.S. backing provides opportunities 
for countries without robust maritime law enforcement agencies to 
provide other contributions while reaping the benefits of CMF 
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Although an analysis of this issue was beyond the scope of 
this testimony, this arrangement would be challenging for the U.S. 
Coast Guard in its current structure. A reorganization might be 
necessary, including revisiting the JIATF West organization, which is 
headed by a U.S. Coast Guard admiral but operates under the umbrella of 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the CMF would be led by the United States, the task forces 
would be led by a rotating leadership of member countries. The Quad 
countries (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) are already 
invested in the IPMDA and are natural partners.\42\ Pacific Island 
countries already place a high priority on illegal fishing and would 
likely seek to become part of a coalition. Countries that are parties 
to existing international conventions--of which there are many--would 
also likely be interested in participating. In addition, the U.S. Coast 
Guard has already transferred ownership of former high-endurance 
cutters to the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. These 
ships provide the opportunity to participate and cooperate with the 
U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy with significant capability, including 
serving as on-scene leaders supporting CMF missions. Moreover, in 
February 2023, the United States and the Philippines restarted joint 
patrols in the South China Sea, further enabling a coordinated approach 
to an operational arm of a CMF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ ``The partnership is known formally as the `Quad,' not the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, noting its nature as a diplomatic, not 
security, partnership'' (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ``The 
Quad,'' webpage, Australian Government, undated, https://
www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The eventual goal is to have Indo-Pacific countries participate in 
a CMF with the purpose of a free and transparent Indo-Pacific. Some 
countries might be concerned about upsetting China and hesitate to join 
a coalition, but I submit that a large majority of countries would 
support this approach. Moreover, focusing on a rules-based order 
through law enforcement with an emphasis on maritime domain awareness, 
training, and countering IUU fishing could temper that concern.
                         resource contributions
    Similar to other international coalitions, funding for a CMF should 
be spread across participating countries to the level that each country 
can afford. For the United States, Congress might have already provided 
an avenue for funding through the Maritime Security and Fisheries 
Enforcement Act as part of the 2020 National Defense Authorization 
Act.\43\ This legislation directs agencies to focus on combating IUU 
fishing, including assessing opportunities to use the CMF in Bahrain 
and to create partnerships in priority regions. Building on this 
legislation--potentially in coordination with the Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative--Congress has an opportunity to authorize and appropriate 
funds for the establishment of a CMF in support of the U.S. Indo-
Pacific strategy.\44\ Recognizing that smaller countries might not be 
able to marshal resources, discussion about the reinvestment of ship 
seizure sales, judicial proceeds, and profits from the captured biomass 
of participating countries should be considered to offset costs. This 
could help incentivize the involvement of these countries, particularly 
those ``at high risk for IUU fishing activity . . . [and that] lack the 
capacity to fully address the illegal activity.''\45\ If Congress 
decides to pursue this course of action, the U.S. Coast Guard would 
need authorization and additional appropriations, along with 
significant coordination with the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense, to fully resource a CMF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Public Law 116-92, National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020, December 20, 2019, Division C, Title XXXV, Subtitle 
C.
    \44\ U.S. Department of Defense, Pacific Deterrence Initiative: 
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, March 2023.
    \45\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing, 2022, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               conclusion
    I'd like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify 
today and discuss one potential way to improve cooperation and 
effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific using a combined maritime force that 
consists of coast guards and similar maritime law enforcement agencies. 
China's continued use of gray zone tactics have eroded international 
norms, and the United States should counter this coercion and illegal 
activity by increasing presence, partnerships, and unity of effort 
toward establishing rule of law in a free and open Indo-Pacific.

    Mr. Gimenez. I thank you, Captain Cooper.
    I now recognize Mr. Sharman for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER H. SHARMAN, DIRECTOR, CHINA MARITIME 
       STUDIES INSTITUTE, UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

    Mr. Sharman. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for having 
me here today. It's truly an honor. It's especially poignant 
that I'm here today, of all days, the 35th anniversary of 
China's brutal crackdown on human rights in Tiananmen Square. 
Today, it's appropriate that we're talking about China gray 
zone operations, as it's an extension of what we saw 35 years 
ago.
    I'm here to tell you today that Beijing is waging what some 
PRC sources refer to as a war without gun smoke in the gray 
zone of maritime East Asia. China's Coast Guard and maritime 
militia are on the front lines of a seaward expansion, 
asserting China's maritime claims through nonlethal means, 
operating in the gray zone that falls below the threshold of 
war. They are supported in the distance by People's Liberation 
Army Navy, which compels foreign states to compete on China's 
terms. Together, China's 3 maritime forces enable the PRC to 
leverage its national power as part of a quest for China to win 
without fighting.
    China has the world's largest Coast Guard by number of 
ships and operates more maritime law enforcement vessels than 
the Coast Guards of all its regional neighbors combined. 
China's maritime militia possesses ships that resemble fishing 
trawlers but are ideally suited for gray zone operations.
    China's 3 sea forces are all part of China's armed forces. 
They operate under a chain of command that leads up through the 
PLA Central Military Commission and, ultimately, to China's 
paramount leader Xi Jinping himself. As such, China's Coast 
Guard and maritime militia are state-sponsored, and one should 
not consider them to be civilian vessels.
    The PRC empowers its maritime forces with domestic laws 
that it imposes on international waters, the international 
maritime commons. China's 2021 Coast Guard law includes a 
provision that permits the Coast Guards to take all necessary 
measures, including the use of force within the maritime areas, 
under China's jurisdiction. Effective as of June 15 this year, 
China's Coast Guard will possess authority under PRC law to 
detain foreigners for up to 60 days without trial, namely those 
who are suspected of illegally crossing into PRC's claimed 
maritime boundaries.
    PRC gray zone operations directed at Taiwan are escalating 
rapidly. Back on February 14, a speed boat from China's Fujian 
province capsized off the eastern coast of Taiwan's offshore 
island of Kinmen as it was being chased by the Taiwan Coast 
Guard resulting in the deaths of 2 of the 4 people on board. 
The mainland vessel had crossed into Taiwan's claimed 
prohibited waters and refused to be subjected to Taiwan's Coast 
Guard inspections.
    In response to the incident, Taiwan's Taiwan affairs 
office--China's Taiwan affairs office--took direct aim at 
Taiwan sovereignty and ability to police its own waters by 
announcing that there was no such thing as prohibited or 
restricted waters.
    Several days later, the PRC followed up on its rhetoric 
with actions by employing its Coast Guard to board and inspect 
the Taiwan sightseeing ship Golden, which was operating in the 
vicinity of Kinmen. This was the first time that the PRC Coast 
Guard inspected a Taiwan sightseeing ship and diverged from the 
status quo that it held since the 1990's when Taipei 
established the concept of restricted waters.
    China Coast Guard ships then began to regularly patrol 
waters around Kinmen. PRC entered these waters 4 times in 
March, 4 times in April, and 8 times in May. As recently as 
last week, China turned up the rheostat one more time. China's 
two small Chinese Navy vessels entered these same waters, 
penetrated these same waters south of Kinmen. Although, through 
these incursions the PRC has used gray zone tactics to 
eviscerate Taiwan's sovereignty around its offshore islands and 
to pressure Taipei.
    PRC maritime coercion around Taiwan's offshore islands is 
part of a larger all-domain pressure campaign to undermine 
Taiwan's sovereignty and legitimacy. The PLA recently executed 
a pre-planned 2-day military drill following the inauguration 
of Taiwan's new president. A near-record number of PRC Navy 
vessels operated around Taiwan, and it included an 
unprecedented integration of China Coast Guard operations both 
around Taiwan's offshore islands and also to the east of 
Taiwan, a potential harbinger of PRC law enforcement operations 
in the Western Pacific.
    Our allies can teach us valuable lessons about how to 
counter PRC gray zone tactics. Japan publicly disseminates 
information about each PRC incursion in the waters around the 
Senkaku Islands and releases photographs demonstrating that its 
Coast Guard remains on the landward side of China's Coast Guard 
vessels, thereby conveying administrative control. Japan's 
maritime presence and law enforcement response to China's 
incursions underscores Japan's legal claims while pushing back 
against PRC gray zone tactics.
    The Philippines employs a similar transparency tactic, as 
you have seen. Manila's policy is to respond to PRC's bad 
behavior with measured transparency by documenting and 
publicizing each incident. This name-and-shame approach has 
drawn the world's attention to the plight of the Philippine 
vessels and has helped place the PRC on the defensive.
    In my written statement, I include a few recommendations as 
well. Thank you, sir.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sharman follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Christopher H. Sharman
                         Tuesday, June 4, 2024
The personal views expressed here and in all related remarks are solely 
        those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the 
        official policies or estimates of the United States Navy, the 
        Department of Defense, or those of the U.S. Government.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thenedar, Members of the 
subcommittee: thank you for devoting your time and attention to the 
topic of PRC gray zone threats in the maritime domain.
    At the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), I lead a team of 
prominent academics within the Naval War College's research arm--the 
Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
    Broadly speaking, what we do in CMSI is to draw on original Chinese 
language open-source material to offer unique insights, particularly 
related to developments, capabilities, and the future trajectory of 
China in its military maritime domain. In doing so, we offer a feel and 
help to paint a picture where other sources and methodologies typically 
don't offer enough insights. At our best, we help to answer questions 
the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense as a whole didn't know to 
ask. CMSI has published 2 conference volumes on China's maritime gray 
zone operations and I'd commend them as a resource to amplify my 
personal comments here today.
    Beijing is waging what some PRC sources refer to a ``war without 
gun smoke'' in the gray zone of maritime East Asia.\1\ China's Coast 
Guard and maritime militia are on the front lines of its seaward 
expansion, asserting China's maritime claims through non-lethal means, 
operating in the ``gray zone'' that falls below the threshold of war. 
They are supported in the distance by the People's Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN), which compels foreign states to compete on China's terms.\2\ 
Together, China's 3 maritime forces enable the PRC to leverage its 
national power, as part of a quest for China to ``win without 
fighting.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute 
Press, 2019. Pg. 291.
    \2\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations. P. 2.
    \3\ Mazarr, Michael J. Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a 
Changing Era of Conflict. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2015. P. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC's gray zone operations are designed to reshape the 
international order without triggering war; they are intentionally 
ambiguous, thereby complicating efforts to respond; and they pursue 
their aims in a gradual manner.\4\ PRC authors and strategists refer to 
these operations as efforts to ``safeguard China's maritime rights and 
interests'' or in short, ``rights protection law enforcement'' 
missions.\5\ These operations include actions to assert not only PRC 
sovereignty over waters adjacent to disputed land features, but also 
jurisdiction over other parts of the Indo-Pacific region, based on 
China's liberal interpretation of international law.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations., p. 3.
    \5\ Ryan Martinson, ``Early Warning Brief: Introducing the `New, 
New' China Coast Guard'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume 21 
Issue 2, 25 January 2021. https://jamestown.org/program/early-warning-
brief-introducing-the-new-new-china-coast-guard/.
    \6\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations., p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China has the world's largest Coast Guard by number of ships and 
operates more maritime law enforcement vessels than the coast guards of 
all its regional neighbors combined.\7\ In recent years, PRC Coast 
Guard vessels have improved qualitatively. They are larger, faster, 
more maneuverable, and physically imposing. China's maritime militia 
possesses ships that resemble fishing trawlers but are ideally suited 
for gray zone operations.\8\ In some cases, China has relied on 
layered, multi-sea force ``cabbage'' tactics to achieve its objectives 
in which China deploys its Maritime Militia, Coast Guard, and Navy in 
concentric rings around its target. More often, however, China employs 
its Coast Guard and maritime militia forces to engage in small-scale 
actions aimed at strengthening its administration of areas--
particularly within Beijing's claimed 9-dash line in the South China 
Sea.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations. P. 5.
    \8\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations. P. 6.
    \9\ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson, eds. China's 
Maritime Gray Zone Operations. P.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's 3 sea forces are all part of China's armed forces. They 
operate under a chain of command that leads up through the PLA's 
Central Military Commission (CMC), ultimately to China's paramount 
leader, Xi Jinping himself.\10\ This allows the PLA to have a single 
entity empowered with the authority to prioritize and mediate inter-
service competition. As such, the China Coast Guard and maritime 
militia are state-sponsored, and one should not consider them to be 
``civilian'' vessels.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures 
in the Indo-Pacific. P. 56.
    \11\ Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures 
in the Indo-Pacific. P. 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC empowers its maritime forces with domestic laws that it 
imposes on international waters--the international maritime commons. 
China's 2021 Coast Guard Law includes a provision that permits the 
Coast Guard to take all necessary measures, including the use of force 
within maritime areas under Chinese jurisdiction.\12\ A careful reading 
of this law and Chinese commentary about it, suggests this law applies 
to all 3 million square kilometers of ``blue national territory'' that 
Beijing claims--much of which is contested by regional neighbors.\13\ 
China recently added ``Regulation No. 3'' to its 2021 Law. Effective as 
of June 15 of this year, China's Coast Guard will possess authority 
under PRC law to detain foreigners for up to 60 days without trial, 
namely those who are suspected of ``illegally'' crossing into PRC-
claimed maritime boundaries.\14\ This is another vehicle for the PRC to 
impose domestic jurisdiction on foreign flagged vessels, possibly 
across the entirety of its sweeping maritime claims.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Ministry of Defense of the Government of Japan. https://
www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/ch_ocn/index.html.
    \13\ Ryan Martinson, ``Gauging the real risks of China's new 
coastguard law'' The Strategist. 23 Feb 21. https://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/gauging-the-real-risks-of-chinas-new-
coastguard-law/.
    \14\ Vanessa Cai. ``Beijing clarifies coastguard's detention powers 
as activists converge on Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea''. 
South China Morning Post.com. 16 May 24. https://advance.lexis.com/api/
document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6C1W-NDK1-JC8V-1034- 
0000000&context=1516831; See also: Li Honglei and Sun Nanxiang, ``China 
Coast Guard Procedures fully legitimate'' China Daily, 31 May 24. 
https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/584568.
    \15\ This new regulation is the first known China Coast Guard 
policy that explicitly authorizes detention of foreign vessels and 
individuals for ``trespass'' in ``waters under China's jurisdiction.'' 
See: ``China Coast Guard Regulation No. 3'', INDOPACOM, 30 May 24. 
https://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/Legal/
J06%20TACAID%20%20CCG%20Regulation- 
%203%20(FINAL)%20%20VER%202.pdf?ver=DbFQtB0oqN0l2NcJ_55HNA%3D%3D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PRC gray zone operations directed at Taiwan are escalating rapidly. 
On February 14, a speedboat from China's Fujian Province capsized off 
the eastern coast of Kinmen as it was being chased by the Taiwan Coast 
Guard, resulting in the deaths of 2 of the 4 people on board.\16\ The 
boat possessed no name, no paperwork, and no registration, but the 
mainland vessel had crossed into Taiwan's claimed prohibited waters 
\17\ and refused to be subjected to Taiwan's Coast Guard 
inspections.\18\ In response to the incident, China's Taiwan Affairs 
Office took direct aim at Taiwan's sovereignty and ability to police 
its own waters by announcing that there was no such thing as 
``prohibited or restricted waters.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ ``After incident, Chinese boats patrol waters near Taiwan-held 
Kinmen'' Focus Taiwan. 19 Feb 24. https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/
202402190011.
    \17\ Taiwan originally declared ``prohibited and restricted'' 
waters in its 1992 ``Cross-Strait Act,'' and since then, these 
boundaries have served as a basis for maritime law enforcement and 
rescue operations by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
See: Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan), ``MAC Press 
Release No. 012'', 18 Feb 24. https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/
News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E79&s=343ADEA7- 
F444B698#:?:-
text=The%20MAC%20explained%20that%20the,revisions%20'since%20then%-
20duly%20announced.
    \18\ Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu Branch Coast Guard Administration, 
``Coast Guard News'' 20 Feb 24. https://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/
ct?xItem=159714&ctNode=8195&mp=9996.
    \19\ ``China using `gray zone' tactics after deadly Kinmen boat 
case: Experts'' Focus Taiwan. 18 Feb 24. https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-
strait/202402180013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several days later PRC followed up on its rhetoric with actions by 
employing its Coast Guard to board and inspect the Taiwan sightseeing 
ship ``Golden,'' which was operating in the vicinity of Kinmen. This 
was the first time that the PRC Coast Guard inspected a Taiwan 
sightseeing ship and diverged from the status quo that has held since 
the 1990's, when Taipei established the concept of ``restricted 
waters''.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu Branch Coast Guard Administration, 
``Coast Guard News'' 20 Feb. 24. https://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/
ct?xItem=159716&ctNode=8195&mp=9996; Thompson Chau, ``Taiwan and China 
spar over capsizing inspections near Kinmen islands''. Nikkei Asia. 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-
tensions/Taiwan-and-China-spar-over-capsizing-inspections-near-Kinmen-
islands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China Coast Guard ships then began to regularly patrol waters 
around Kinmen. On February 26, 5 China Coast Guard ships entered 
Kinmen's prohibited or restricted waters.\21\ Subsequently, the PRC has 
expanded its use of lawfare by ordering its Coast Guard to conduct 
regular incursions into the prohibited or restricted waters of several 
of Taiwan's offshore islands. The PRC entered these waters 4 times in 
March, 4 times in April, and conducted at least 8 incursions in 
May.\22\ Of note, on May 9, 7 PRC government vessels including Chinese 
fishing vessels and those from the China Coast Guard, China Maritime 
Surveillance, and China's Fishery Administration, conducted a fishery 
safety exercise in Kinmen's Liaoluo Bay that simulated a collision at 
sea under harsh weather conditions and involved search-and-rescue 
operations. This was the first time that China Coast Guard ships and 
other PRC official vessels sailed into Kinmen's prohibited or 
restricted waters simultaneously.\23\ And most recently, last week, 2 
small Chinese navy vessels penetrated Taiwan's restricted waters south 
of Kinmen.\24\ Through these incursions, the PRC has used gray zone 
tactics to eviscerate Taiwan's sovereignty around its offshore islands 
and pressure Taipei. Yet, these gray zone operations receive little 
attention here in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, ``Taiwan says 5 China coast guard 
ships entered waters near frontline islands'' Reuters, 26 Feb 24. 
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-minister-says-5-
china-coast-guard-ships-entered-waters-around-kinmen-2024-02-27/
    \22\ Li Chengyin and Cai Jiazhen, ``The fifth formation of land and 
sea police ships sailed into Kinmen waters in May more frequently than 
in the previous 2 months''. United Daily News. 14 May 24. https://
udn.com/news/story/10930/7963862; Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu Branch Coast 
Guard Administration, ``Coast Guard News'' 24 May 24. https://
www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=160523&ctNode=8195&mp=9996.
    \23\ Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu Branch Coast Guard Administration, 
``Coast Guard News'' 9 May 24. https://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/
ct?xItem=160424&ctNode=8195&mp=9996.
    \24\ Wu Shu-Wei, Hung Hsueh-kuang and James Lo, ``Taiwan's Coast 
Guard expels two PLA vessels around Kinmen'', Focus Taiwan. 1 Jun 24. 
https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202406010005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's gray zone operations target critical seams. Taiwan's 
offshore islands are not covered by the United States Taiwan Relations 
Act. Nor does the United States recognize Taiwan's claims of 
``prohibited'' and ``restricted'' waters. PRC law enforcement 
operations within Taiwan's prohibited or restricted waters, therefore, 
aim to apply pressure on Taipei while minimizing the potential for a 
U.S. response.
    PRC maritime coercion around Taiwan's offshore islands is part of a 
larger all-domain pressure campaign to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty 
and legitimacy. Since the visit of former Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi to Taipei in August 2022, the PRC has intensified diplomatic, 
economic, and cognitive pressure on Taiwan. Military pressure has 
included establishing a ``new normal'' of PRC Air Force flights across 
the Taiwan Strait centerline and into the Taiwan Air Defense 
Identification Zone as well as Naval patrols encroaching on Taiwan's 
claimed 24nm contiguous zone. These military tactics have the effect of 
both undermining Taiwan's sovereignty as well as Taiwanese people's 
confidence in their democracy by demonstrating Taiwan's inability to 
counter China's overwhelming military superiority.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Thomas Shattuck, ``One Year Later: How Has China's Military 
Pressure on Taiwan Changed Since Nancy Pelosi's Visit'' Global Taiwan 
Institute 20 Sep 23. https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/09/one-year-later-
how-has-chinas-military-pressure-on-taiwan-changed-since-nancy-pelosis-
visit/; ``Tracking China's April 2023 Military Exercises Around 
Taiwan'', Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power. 
https://chinapower.csis.org/tracking-chinas-april-2023-military-
exercises-around-taiwan/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of the PRC's on-going pressure campaign, the PLA executed a 
pre-planned 2-day military drill following the inauguration of Taiwan's 
new president. Advertised as ``punishment'' for separatist acts of 
Taiwan independence forces, the exercise consisted of combat readiness 
and law enforcement operations around Taiwan.\26\ The exercise included 
several exercise areas surrounding Taiwan and its offshore islands, 
which appeared to signal PRC willingness to inhibit commercial ship 
access to Hualien, the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's offshore islands, and 
Taiwan's Kaohsiung's commercial port, for example. During this 
exercise, a near-record number of PRC navy vessels operated around 
Taiwan and included the unprecedented integration of China's Coast 
Guard operations east of Taiwan, a potential harbinger of PRC law 
enforcement operations in the western Pacific.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Kathrin Hille, ``China starts military drills around Taiwan as 
`harsh punishment' '' Financial Times, 22 May 24. https://www.ft.com/
content/e64ca81b-c028-4204-a0b6-1b5182ee8bec.
    \27\ ``How is China Responding to the Inauguration of Taiwan's 
President William Lai?'' Center for Strategic and International Studies 
China Power. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-respond-inauguration-
taiwan-william-lai-joint-sword-2024a-military-exercise/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our allies can teach us valuable lessons of how to counter PRC gray 
zone activity. Japan routinely responds to China Coast Guard incursions 
into the contiguous zone and territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, 
which Tokyo administers. As of late May, China's Coast Guard set a 
record of 158 consecutive days of Coast Guard operations in these 
waters.\28\ China's goal is to force Japan to concede these islands are 
in dispute.\29\ For each incursion, Japan's Coast Guard is present. 
Japan publicly disseminates information about each incursion and 
releases photographs demonstrating that its Coast Guard remains on the 
landward side of China Coast Guard vessels; thereby conveying 
administrative control.\30\ Japan's maritime presence and law 
enforcement response to China's incursions underscore Japan's legal 
claims while pushing back against PRC gray zone tactics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ ``Japan spots China ships near Senkaku Islands for record 
158th day'' Kyodo News, 27 May 24. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/
2024/05/a74760a3229a-urgent-japan-spots-china-ships-near-senkaku-
islands-for-record-158th-day.html.
    \29\ Japan Coast Guard, ``Movements of China's Coast Guard vessels 
in the waters around the Senkaku Islands and Japan's Response.'' 
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html.
    \30\ Japan Coast Guard, ``Movements of China's Coast Guard vessels 
in the waters around the Senkaku Islands and Japan's Response.'' 
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html; Japan Coast 
Guard, ``Guarding TWs and EEZ'' https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/mission/
guarding_tws_and_eez.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Philippines employs a similar transparency tactic. China's 
Maritime Militia and Coast Guard vessels routinely interfere with 
Philippine attempts to resupply the grounded Sierra Madre vessel at 
Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, which is located within the 
Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone--less than 200nm from the island of 
Palawan.\31\ Nevertheless, China claims ``indisputable sovereignty over 
the feature.\32\ Manila's policy is to respond to PRC bad behavior with 
``measured transparency'' by documenting and publicizing each 
incident.\33\ This name and shame approach has drawn the world's 
attention to the plight of Philippine vessels and helped place the PRC 
on the defensive.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Pham Ngoc Minh Trang, ``Second Thomas Shoal: A Legal 
Perspective.'' Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 23 Jan 24. https:/
/amti.csis.org/second-thomas-shoal-a-legal-perspective/.
    \32\ https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-and-philippines-step-
up-strategic-partnership-as-china-threats-loom-in-south-china-sea.
    \33\ Matthew Lee, ``U.S. and Philippines step up strategic 
partnership as China threats loom in South China Sea'', Associated 
Press, 12 Apr 24. https://tribune.net.ph/2024/02/02/no-changes-in-
approach-to-china-nsc-says [sic].
    \34\ Jim Gomez, ``Philippines says it will forge security alliances 
and stage combat drills despite China's opposition'' Associated Press, 
24 May 24. https://apnews.com/article/philippines-defense-teodoro-
south-china-sea-0bbf4abc858484395365c3ee217ab2c2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ensuring freedom of the seas requires Washington to take further 
steps.
   Recognize the PRC's triple maritime threat.--China's Navy, 
        Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia all report to the CMC. The 
        United States must deal with them holistically. As such, 
        Washington should communicate both publicly and privately to 
        Beijing that the United States expects all three PRC sea forces 
        to abide at all times by the same internationally recognized 
        standards of law, seamanship, and communication to which U.S. 
        maritime forces adhere.
   Name and shame.--Washington must develop a public relations 
        narrative about PRC gray zone forces in partnership with our 
        Indo-Pacific friends to ensure Washington and our partners are 
        ahead of any PRC narrative at the time of a crisis. Washington 
        can do this by publicly exposing dangerous actions of PRC gray 
        zone forces--especially China's Coast Guard and maritime 
        militia and providing information and imagery to our regional 
        partners to enable them to do the same.
   Sail wherever international law allows.--The United States 
        must maintain a clear ability and resolve to deny China's gray 
        zone forces the ability to impede U.S. operations that are of 
        consistent with international law. American officials must 
        clearly communicate the consequences of unacceptable Chinese 
        behavior in the maritime domain.
   Empower Friends and Allies.--U.S. forces must play a much 
        more direct role in helping allies defend their own maritime 
        rights and ensure that any settlement of disputes is by 
        peaceful, legal means rather than through PRC coercion. This 
        may take the form of training to counter PRC gray zone 
        operations or sharing intelligence about the disposition of PRC 
        military maritime forces in the region.
   Leverage the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).--The U.S. Government 
        must establish a funding mechanism to provide the Coast Guard a 
        reliable budget stream to fully support the increasing 
        operational demands in distant waters. Deployments of the 
        white-hulled USCG to the Indo-Pacific region are a force 
        multiplier. The Coast Guard is a useful sentinel in theater 
        engagement and freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), that 
        offers the INDOPACOM Commander with a less-escalatory asset 
        than a warship. Coast Guard efforts enhance theater security 
        cooperation with island nations and hard-to-access places where 
        a larger navy just cannot go or might not be welcomed. USCG 
        presence also arms the INDOPACOM Commander with an additional 
        tool to help shape optics of interactions by employing a 
        ``white hulled'' USCG ship to counter PRC ``white hulled'' 
        Coast Guard gray zone tactics.

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Sharman.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for the 5 
minutes of questioning.
    There's so much to talk about, and I don't know where to 
begin, but let's start with capability. About 6 months ago, 9 
months ago, I actually was in the South China Sea and saw 
first-hand Chinese naval vessels and Chinese Coast Guard 
vessels. What struck me was that there's very little difference 
between the two.
    So, Captain Sadler, can you tell me about what the 
difference is between a Chinese naval vessel and a Chinese 
Coast Guard vessel, because they sure as heck look real similar 
to me.
    Mr. Sadler. Maybe the paint scheme. It's no secret when 
they first started standing up a Chinese Coast Guard they 
repurposed Navy frigates and older vessels. So they were, by 
all intents and purposes, other than the paint scheme, Navy 
vessels. They remain larger than even Japanese Coast Guard, 
which is a very capable Coast Guard, and they have a--they 
certainly outclass in tonnage and the ability to carry weapon 
systems that any one of their neighbor countries in the South 
China Sea.
    Mr. Gimenez. So how do our Coast Guard vessels stack up 
against their Coast Guard vessels, or don't they stack up?
    Mr. Sadler. It's--again, they are--they're the most largest 
or the larger of the Chinese Coast Guard vessels are larger 
than our Coast Guard vessels. The NSC might be comparable. I 
would defer to my fellow shipmates here that have been--served 
in the Coast Guard. But the size of the Coast Guard ships that 
the Chinese are putting to sea are meant for distance sea 
operations, which really puts at risk, and we should be looking 
at where they plan to operate from the Aleutian Islands to the 
central Pacific and as far away as the Gulf of Guinea 
potentially.
    Mr. Gimenez. Captain Cooper.
    Mr. Cooper. I would echo my colleague's compartments--
remarks here. The Chinese vessels are extremely large. They're 
incomparable to the Coast Guard vessels, particularly if you 
look at the Fast Response Cutters which we're looking out 
there, which we are placing out there, which are significantly 
smaller. But I would say the biggest component is the number of 
Chinese vessels out there. We're talking roughly 700 vessels 
that they have in the region as opposed to the handful, the 
dozen that are out there by the U.S. Coast Guard when they're 
not performing other missions.
    Mr. Gimenez. Seven hundred Coast Guard vessels or 700 in 
total vessels?
    Mr. Cooper. There's 700 Chinese Coast Guard vessels of 
varying sizes.
    Mr. Gimenez. In the region?
    Mr. Cooper. In the Indo-Pacific, yes.
    Mr. Gimenez. How many Coast Guard vessels do we have in our 
region, let's say, in the United States? I mean, that's their 
neighborhood, so how about us? What do we have running around 
here?
    Mr. Cooper. So currently we have 3 Fast Response Cutters in 
Guam, we have 3 Fast Response Cutters in Hawaii. There's 2 
National Security Cutters in Hawaii and a buoy tender in Guam.
    Mr. Gimenez. I'm talking about the United States, around 
the United States.
    Mr. Cooper. Oh.
    Mr. Gimenez. So we can have--let's do apples to apples. 
Their Coast Guard--that Coast Guard is--that's next to China, 
OK. That's their neighborhood. What about in our neighborhood? 
How many Coast Guard vessels do we have running around here?
    Mr. Cooper. Around the United States?
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes.
    Mr. Cooper. Oh, I mean, I don't know the exact numbers that 
we currently have around, but it's not 700. Maybe----
    Mr. Sadler. Yes, I happen to have those numbers in front of 
me. Coast Guard at their website, they have their overall fleet 
size is about 259. But if you really want to get at what the 
Coast Guard, our Coast Guard has in its arsenal, its fleet to 
go into distant, deep, blue water kind of patrols, you've got 8 
National Security Cutters. You've got 2 High Endurance Cutters. 
These are older vessels, 28 medium endurance. Then you've got 
41 Fast Response Cutters, which are kind-of, I would say, in 
the Pacific you're really pushing it, but that's the total.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. One of you just said you defined--we need 
to better define laws, OK. What laws? I think that was Captain 
Cooper. Is that you?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. Yes, sir. So I think that the biggest 
issue is the gray zone itself is--encompasses those activities, 
which may or may not be illegal. With the way China looks at it 
is what they're doing is enforcing what they believe is legal, 
but is in disagreement with what the rest of the international 
community agrees.
    So doing the gray zone tactics that they're performing in 
the Indo-Pacific is clearly in violation of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. So by not establishing what our responses are makes 
it very challenging for the Coast Guard and for the Navy and 
for other nations to be able to respond, because we don't have 
a planned response and we haven't identified what that looks 
like.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, I would assume that they would say that 
this is totally legal because these are our waters, right? So 
our disagreement is what are their waters and what are not 
their waters. Is that the disagreement?
    Mr. Cooper. That's correct. So, going back to my combined 
maritime force, I think that by building a coalition we can 
build some international consensus over what those rules should 
look like and how to respond to them.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, how do--OK. My time is up, so--I'll 
probably have a second round coming around.
    So now I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Thanedar.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez.
    Thank you, all, for testifying this afternoon. The threat 
that People's Republic of China possesses to the international 
maritime domain has evolved through the years. China's 
continued aggressive behavior and use of gray zone tactics 
toward Taiwan, the Philippines, and other countries in the 
region has led to periodic standoffs and clashes.
    Captain Sharman, what are examples of model responses to 
the PRC's gray zone tactics in the Indo-Pacific?
    Mr. Sharman. Ranking Member Thanedar, thank you for the 
question. The countries in the region have demonstrated 
different tactics in response to gray zone. Each--the various 
tactics that they have demonstrated, in various ways, there has 
been some success. There is some lessons that we perhaps can 
take from our partners in the region. Let me just run through a 
couple examples as I think about it.
    I mentioned in my written testimony about Japan. I call 
Japan's tactics persistence; that is, they never cede anything. 
Japan's actions around the Senkaku Islands never cede that the 
islands themselves are in dispute, which is what China's goal 
is. Japan's Coast Guard is always there.
    Vietnam uses a tactic called--I would call more 
brinkmanship. Back, in 2014, the Chinese deployed an oil rig 
into disputed waters. Vietnam responded very aggressively and 
didn't fare well at sea, but this started causing problems in 
Vietnam. The whole-of-nation pressure from Vietnam onto China 
caused China to back off of where they were.
    Philippines, we've seen their aggressive transparency. 
Malaysia, I call that partnership. Malaysia, back in 2020, the 
CTF 76 stood up, and they did--demonstrated--that was with 
Australia and the United States Navy, and there was--they 
demonstrated persistent presence in the area so that--and that 
was enough to push China back.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    How might the United States strengthen communication and 
coordination with its allies and partners to counter the PRC's 
tactics more effectively?
    Mr. Sharman. Thank you, sir. From a strategic perspective, 
our partners are looking to see if the United States is going 
to be there for them, so we need to demonstrate that we are 
going to be there now and in the future. The more confident 
they are in our support, the more willing they will be to push 
back on PRC coercive actions. So we build trust through 
exercises, education, and routine interaction.
    We can't just have this as a check in the box; we have to 
be there regularly. But a goal should be to develop shared 
awareness in the maritime domain, and the Secretary of Defense 
recently highlighted the Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime 
domain, which is--enhances partnership and the ability for 
nations to police their own waters. So there is opportunities 
to build common operational pressure.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Another question for Captain 
Cooper: You testified about the potential benefits of a 
combined maritime force that could be created by the United 
States and its partners in the region. What impact do you 
believe such a force would have on the PRC's ability to 
continue to threaten Taiwan's sovereignty?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes, thank you for the question, Mr. Thanedar. 
The CMF, what that will do is create this coalition of like-
minded nations, and so by training those nations in some of 
those tactics and increasing their capability and their 
capacity, I think what we'll have is an increased presence in 
the region, and presence can lead to deterrence in some cases. 
So, by having a force that the--that is consolidated under one 
organization, of which the United States has influence, I think 
would be very beneficial in pushing back against some of 
China's tactics.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. My last question, Captain Sharman, 
what are some of the actions the United States should consider 
taking immediately to counter the PRC's threat toward Taiwan? 
How about longer-term solutions that should be considered?
    Mr. Sharman. OK. Real quickly, regarding Taiwan, I think 
there's some near-term and some long-term options. From a near-
term perspective, I think delivery of already---Congressionally 
already-approved munitions and equipment to Taiwan and making 
good on our promises would be an effective first step. The goal 
really should be for Xi Jinping to wake up every morning and 
say, ``Today is not the day.'' The more powerful, the more that 
we can enhance Taiwan's capabilities, the more we can make that 
happen.
    We also should seek to expand Coast Guard cooperation. We 
have a good working relationship with the Taiwan Coast Guard, 
with a memo signed back in 2021. I think there's opportunities 
to expand that.
    Real quickly, a longer-term perspective, I think we need 
to--echoing SecNav Del Toro, who called for revitalizing our 
maritime industry, I think there's an opportunity here for ship 
building, coalition building, and maritime statecraft. I think 
he has it right.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you so much, and my time is up. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Captain Sharman, or do you prefer professor?
    Mr. Sharman. Sir, I've learned not to specify what I'm 
called here at today's committee. Mister works great.
    Mr. Higgins. Smart fella. So I'm going to refer to you as 
captain. Captain, for the benefit of Americans watching today, 
would you just summarize briefly what exactly is gray zone 
coercion by China, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Mr. Sharman. Gray zone actions--and there are many 
definitions of gray zone actions. Gray zone actions are actions 
below the threshold of war. It's a tactic that is used to 
achieve a strategic objective. In this case, the PRC is 
attempting to advance its strategic goals, so they use this 
tactic to execute operations to--that are not going to perhaps 
prompt a response by other countries in the region, United 
States, et cetera, so they keep those gray zone operations just 
ambiguous enough that there is plausible deniability.
    Mr. Higgins. OK. I would concur, that's a--it's a pretty 
good assessment. Essentially, again, for Americans paying 
attention here, we certainly recognize, as a people, we 
recognize that the Communist Chinese leadership poses a 
potential threat to world peace and particularly their threat 
to seize essentially control and possession of Taiwan as an 
important ally for the United States and the free world.
    These are--this is what regular Americans discuss when we 
talk about, you know, what is the potential for war with China. 
So the gray--the gray zone coercion and their tactics to 
advance their own causes in that region while staying below the 
threshold of what would internationally be recognized as an act 
of war, they're still being very aggressive using war cannons 
and water cannons rather and quite aggressive maneuvers with 
their ships.
    Just recently, they conducted a very threatening naval 
blockade around Taiwan, and there was American presence there, 
which is normally the case in Taiwan. So I ask you, Captain, do 
you--did you serve with Admiral Philip Davidson? Are you 
familiar with Admiral Davidson? Are you familiar with the 
Davidson window?
    Mr. Sharman. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. His anticipated potential manifestation of 
conflict, he called it, within 6 years. That was 2021. So we've 
reached the edge of the Davidson window here. How likely are we 
to face significant conflict with China, specifically regarding 
Taiwan, in the coming year or two? You teach at the war 
college, right?
    Mr. Sharman. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. The Naval War College. You're a gentleman of 
distinguished accomplishment. I've read your bio, and thank you 
for your service. So just tell America, how likely are we to 
face conflict with China in the Pacific?
    Mr. Sharman. Congressman Higgins, thank you so much for 
your question, and it is a really good one. I think putting 
time lines on is very dangerous, but because--the PRC has put 
very specific dates that they are looking at. Twenty-twenty-
seven is a modernization goal to have capabilities that they 
need for Taiwan. Twenty-thirty-five is a modernization goal 
where they want to be fully modernized.
    Mr. Higgins. You're talking about China.
    Mr. Sharman. China.
    Mr. Higgins. China has a 2027 goal?
    Mr. Sharman. China has a 2027 goal----
    Mr. Higgins. OK. In my remaining 30 seconds, I would like 
to intersect and associate a question here for you, because you 
also have training in language, Japanese, Chinese, and 
Vietnamese, my understanding is. I recall in the 1980's you 
used to advise us, ``Don't pay attention to what Yasser Arafat 
was saying in English; pay attention to what he's saying in 
Arabic.'' So I'm asking you, what is the president of China 
saying in Chinese about Taiwan?
    Mr. Sharman. He is directing his military to absolutely 
prepare him options for Taiwan. He is on a determined--we call 
this the decade of maximum danger, is what we call it in my 
office. Xi Jinping is not getting any younger, and he wants to 
resolve the Taiwan question and not pass it onto another 
generation. It's his birthday in 2 weeks; he turns 71. So the 
next decade is going to be particularly difficult as new 
capabilities continue to come along--come on-line and their 
capacity increases overall.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, gentlemen. I have questions in 
writing I'll submit to you each. Thank you for appearing here 
today.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Higgins, I plan on having a second round, 
so if you have some additional questions, please stick around.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today. Appreciate that.
    You know, our country obviously faces unprecedented 
challenges and threats on both the domestic and international 
stage. We're just discussing one of our major threats, of 
course, globally. We also know that climate catastrophes like 
the Maui fires to repelling Russian expansion in the Arctic to 
supporting our allies in the Indo-Pacific in the face of 
Chinese aggression, all of these are absolutely critical to the 
Coast Guard, to Coast Guard readiness, to the ability for the 
Coast Guard to do its job.
    In a world that's becoming more and more dangerous, our 
partnerships and alliances keep us strong. Our Coast Guard's 
presence and operations across the globe are vital to 
maintaining those friendships. I was mayor of Long Beach, 
California, prior to this. I think we've--I've met some of you 
before and obviously worked with our Coast Guard very closely. 
We have one of America's largest ports, and so the work the 
Coast Guard does there is incredibly important. The 
professionalism of the Coast Guard is incredible, so thank you.
    Obviously, this work is bipartisan, which is really 
important. We also know in talking about China that China is 
clearly a competitor and someone that our relationship is 
increasingly complicated, and we also need to recognize at the 
same time that China is our largest trading partner. It's 
America's No. 1 trading partner by far, and our economies are 
also linked together by trade, particularly coming in through 
our West Coast ports.
    We also want to make sure that the Coast Guard has an 
important relationship to play in that relationship.
    Mr. Cooper, I want to thank you for being here and your 
many years of service to the Coast Guard. I wanted to ask, you 
know, we've recently seen escalations of China's behavior both 
on the economic side and on the military side. These actions 
have endangered the economies and livelihoods of the island 
nations and, of course, threatened our U.S. interests. What can 
the Coast Guard do perhaps separately than DOD, that's 
different than DOD, that maybe DOD can't do to further our U.S. 
interests in the region?
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir. Appreciate the question. The 
Coast Guard obviously does a lot more than just security, 
right. There--they do the environmental response. They also 
have the ability to project defense operations. They do port 
waterway coastal security. They aid navigation. So working with 
the partners in the Indo-Pacific, it allows--their presence 
there allows them to not only provide training for security but 
also search and rescue, if needed, as well as environmental 
response or humanitarian assistance. So it's a multipronged 
capability that the Coast Guard brings to the table.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. To expand on some of the challenges 
particularly with China, according to the illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing index, China ranks as the worst 
offender of all 152 countries world-wide that are tracked. A 
recent strategic report from the U.S. Coast Guard assessed that 
illegal fishing has replaced piracy as a leading global 
maritime security threat. Clearly, we're destroying ocean 
ecosystems, crippling food chains, threatening sustainable 
fisheries. Of the 36 nations within the Indo-Pacific region, 
nearly all are maritime nations with over one-third being 
smaller island nations.
    Mr. Cooper, can you walk us through the role the Coast 
Guard is playing in supporting these nations and addressing the 
issue of China's illegal fishing?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. Thank you, again, for the question, 
Congressman. So the Coast Guard has been very innovative and 
leaning forward in some of their support to the Indo-Pacific 
nations, not only with the training. When I was Active Duty, we 
would train a lot of those forces on securing their own 
sovereignty, providing them the capabilities and the capacity 
to do that.
    So, in addition, they--we work closely with the Navy 
through the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative, which focuses 
on IUU fishing. They've put the additional Fast Response 
Cutters in region. Then they also have the Indo-Pacific support 
tender, which is out there doing IUU fishing. They've signed 
some pretty substantial shiprider agreements with 12 of the 
countries or 12 of the nations in the region, particularly 
allowing the Coast Guard to do boardings and enforce IUU 
fishing infractions in those nations' waters without a 
shiprider presence, which is a tremendous capability that 
they've provided to those countries.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. We know, you know, that China has a 
massive fishing fleet, much larger than any other nation in the 
world. Illegal behavior around fishing from the Chinese is very 
common. Our partners like Vietnam and Philippines and the 
Pacific and smaller island nations, of course, don't have 
anywhere near the resources or capabilities to secure their own 
waters.
    Now, I understand and we've discussed this here actually at 
this subcommittee before, that the Coast Guard only has about 5 
cutters that are currently operating in the Indo-Pacific 
region, which spans, of course, 40 million square miles. Mr. 
Sadler, can you give us insight on to how an expanded fleet of 
cutters would actually enable the Coast Guard to both 
effectively enforce the maritime law but also safety for 
mariners and coasties?
    Mr. Sadler. Absolutely. Thank you. The question is having--
how can you maintain the right presence at the right place in 
an immense Pacific Ocean, and it comes down to numbers. Coast 
Guard is long overdue in providing publicly what that force 
would require, fixed-wing aircraft at places like Canton Island 
in Kiribati. So you have to also have places as well as ships 
to do repairs, having repair facilities in, say, American 
Samoa, and then having those cutters out patrolling our EEZs 
first and then working and playing--to use a football term--
playing man, using collective intelligence gathering and 
following these dark fleets and then vectoring in with our 
allies and partners in the region to watch and to ensure and 
regulate these largely unregulated distant fishing fleets, 
Chinese fishing fleets.
    Things like the Pacific QUAD, with France, New Zealand, and 
Australia, long-standing is a venue for doing that. Then, also, 
as already mentioned by Captain Cooper, using shipriders and 
actually having virtual call-in to the Justice--the equivalent 
of the Justice Departments in these island nations to effect 
arrests and then to transfer those people to their own 
shoreside justice system. So there's a lot that we can do. 
There's little examples of it. But to really get it to the 
scale that's meaningful against the threat, we have to get more 
cutters into the theater.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you.
    I'm now going to have a second round of questioning. So, 
Mr. Sharman, do you agree with the statement that every dollar 
that an American spends on Chinese goods will eventually be 
used for, (A) the Chinese Communist Party oppressing and 
suppressing its own people, and, (B) be used against--counter 
to American interests?
    Mr. Sharman. Mr. Chairman, I think there's certainly a heck 
of a lot of repression that's going on in the PRC. I don't know 
if I could say every single dollar, but I will chalk it up to 
folks who say that, and there are folks who do a lot more 
research than I do on that part.
    Mr. Gimenez. But would you agree that we are funding--we 
could be funding our greatest strategic threat globally right 
now, that the--America is partially funding that threat?
    Mr. Sharman. There's no question that we have relationships 
with China and Chinese companies that are state-owned 
enterprises that are filtering money directly back to the 
Chinese Communist Party. There is no question that there is a 
challenge we face because our trade is so interconnected and 
intertwined, and it's difficult to disentangle ourselves. So I 
do agree, yes, sir, that there is a--some funding that is going 
back.
    Mr. Gimenez. I may be more to the right on this and more 
hawkish on this, but I do believe that we need to start 
decoupling ourselves from the CCP, because I believe we are 
funding the instruments of our demise, and we're also funding 
the instruments that are suppressing and suppressing the 
Chinese people today on the 35th anniversary of Tiananmen 
Square.
    I also believe that our policy of, you know, done some 30, 
35 years ago of trying to bring China into, you know, the world 
of nations and the World Trade Organization will go down as one 
of the biggest miscalculations of policy in American history, 
and we're going to be paying for it. So, while it will be 
painful to decouple ourselves, we need to decouple. We need to 
decouple yesterday, because the only way that we may not 
avoid--the way that we may avoid a kinetic conflict is by 
weakening them economically, because that's the only way that 
they fund the PLA and all the other activities that they're 
doing.
    One question that I have for you, again, is you said that 
this gray zone activity was part of a strategic plan by China, 
and, frankly, I'm not understanding the strategic plan. I could 
understand them doing gray zone activities against Taiwan and 
probing that and probing that and probe--I don't understand why 
they're also poking Japan and the Philippines and Vietnam and 
other people or nations in their region, because those folks 
are starting to wake up and, ``Hey, we need to do something 
about this,'' and actually bringing them together, coalescing 
them against China.
    So what is the strategic vision or plan or outcome that 
China is looking with these gray zone activities?
    Mr. Sharman. So, Mr. Chairman, I think what--where China is 
going is in what they would refer to as the near seas, that 
being the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, South China Sea. They 
want to make that essentially a law enforcement area. They want 
to demonstrate authority and the ability for their, say, their 
Coast Guard to be able to enforce their laws and basically 
subjugate the entire areas to Chinese law and their 
institutions and their way of how they look at the world.
    That frees up then the Navy, the People's Liberation Army 
Navy to expand, to go increasingly going global. So, from a 
strategic perspective, you have kind-of a near seas, you have a 
far seas, and frankly you have an Arctic that I think is coming 
down the road. So this is what is ahead. China seeks to have a 
world-class military by 2049, and that world-class, their 
concept of world-class is the gold standard, the United States 
military. They want to have those--some of the same 
capabilities to be able to go around the world and conduct 
operations around the world.
    Mr. Gimenez. Now, let's turn our attention--OK. Yes, I 
agree with that.
    Now, one final thing, and I want for Captain Sadler, maybe, 
during my time, fentanyl. Fentanyl is killing 70,000, 80,000 
Americans every single year. We know that the precursors 
chemicals are actually being manufactured in China. Not only 
are they being manufactured in China, they're being subsidized 
by the CCP. Even though those precursor chemicals are actually 
illegal to sell in China, they subsidize those companies so 
they can export this poison into the United States. How does 
that poison make its way into the United States? I know it goes 
to the Mexican cartels, but how does it get to them?
    Mr. Sadler. So there's two main avenues: One is, they come 
through the partial coast system. They come right into our 
ports of entry. At LAX right now, there's stories that we're 
starting to find because we're actually inspecting more 
rigorously there. More needs to be shown on that.
    But at the other end of this, with the heavier--because 
there's a number of precursor chemicals, some of which wouldn't 
fit into a partial of which you could easily cover up with 
false statements. So you need barrels of this stuff. That's 
coming in by ships mostly, some by aircraft, coming into, say, 
Mexico or other countries in the region and then ferried out to 
the border and then manufactured on either the north or the 
south side of the border.
    It's wherever they can get away with it. It's constantly 
moving and changing. But you have to put the cartels out of 
business, and the way you hurt their bottom line and take away 
that vehicle for Chinese crimes and also the Chinese Communist 
Party to get that poison into the United States is you have to 
sever off the sea routes that the cartels rely on.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. My time is up.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member.
    OK. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 
Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Captain Sadler, could you give us your assessment of how 
you feel about the Navy's current shipbuilding evolution with 
embracing emerging technologies of smaller, relatively less 
expensive, perhaps expendable, autonomous vessels, and what 
role they should play in the Navy's future, including our 
engagements on-going with China below the threshold of war? Or 
should that threshold be crossed and we're in open conflict 
with China, what role would smaller, less expensive, 
expandible, autonomous vessels play, and should the Navy 
embrace that emerging technology?
    Mr. Sadler. I will try to be as short as I possibly can and 
narrowly focused. First is an example of success. Task force 
59, the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, where they used 
unmanned vessels very rapidly by using some very unconventional 
approaches in procurement and also partnering with other 
countries. That's being--in the process of being replicated in 
Fourth Fleet, which is southern command, which is, a lot of 
these illicit trades routes that I'm talking about, that's 
inside their area of responsibility. That needs to happen now, 
and it should be supported. It's going to rely on small, 
unmanned vessels as sensors, like sail drone, but also even 
aircraft drones as well. They need something to operate 
sustained way off out at sea, like a mothership.
    In the Pacific, now you've got Pacific Fleet that also 
stood up in the last couple of years a development squadron of 
pairing a manned ship Zumwalt-class destroyer with large and 
medium unmanned vessels. That has a very high-end operational. 
But, again, if you don't have that upper-level control, the 
Chinese are going to be able to push that red line further and 
further north and get away with more and more. So you have to 
get those unmanned vessels out into the Pacific. You need to 
use them as sensors and also as a backstop as a weapons 
platform should things go higher.
    Mr. Higgins. I generally agree with your assessment. It's 
become very clear that the expense of large traditional, sort-
of, 20th-Century envisioned massive vessels of war that are 
incredibly expensive to build and remarkably easy to sink 
apparently with small, inexpensive, expendable, properly armed, 
autonomous craft. This is a reality that we are hopeful that 
our Navy can embrace, and we think that it would be quite 
effective in pushing against the momentum that China has 
established with its shipbuilding, which is important to note 
greatly outpaces American shipbuilding. We believe that--I 
believe that we can build a force that is so overwhelmingly 
daunting to the vessels that China has constructed, we think we 
can further secure the world including Indo-Pacific region.
    Captain Cooper, same question for the Coast Guard: What 
role would smaller, less expensive, autonomous vessels play for 
the Coast Guard?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 
So the Coast Guard has written unmanned systems strategy. In my 
opinion, it needs to be implemented much more quickly. If you 
look at the Indo-Pacific, similar to what Captain Sadler is 
saying, I think there's a lot of potential to include unmanned 
systems to help with the maritime domain awareness 
specifically.
    Also, a lot of those partner nations are fairly weak in 
their maritime capability and not as--don't have as much 
funding as the United States, and so these cheaper systems 
would be useful in allowing those countries to actually use 
them for maritime domain awareness and to be able to control 
their own sovereign waters.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Mr. Chairman, those were my additional questions. I yield.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you.
    I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the 
Members for their questions.
    The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to 
respond to those in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

  Statement of Isaac B. Kardon, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for 
                          International Peace
                              June 4, 2024
    Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thenedar, and other 
Members of the subcommittee, for granting me the honor of submitting 
testimony for the record. The primary question posed in this hearing 
concerns how best to ``combat Chinese threats'' in the gray zone, so 
this brief is addressed toward better comprehending the nature and 
scope of those threats.
    So-called ``gray zone'' activities or tactics are recognizable and 
controversial elements of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) 
strategy in maritime East Asia. Chinese leaders' primary aims are to 
assert sovereignty over disputed island territories, effectively 
control strategic maritime and air space, and gradually erode U.S. 
power and alliance commitments in the region.
    Most definitions of the gray zone key on the uncertain political 
and operational space between war and peace; they describe calibrated 
coercion that does not breach certain escalatory thresholds while 
achieving certain coercive effects. PRC practices fit this general 
pattern, the archetypal cases of which are in fact PRC maritime 
campaigns beginning in the South China Sea (SCS) in the late 2000's, 
extending into the East China Sea (ECS) in the 2010's, and creeping 
into the Taiwan Strait in the 2020's.\1\ These campaigns involve 
diverse PRC state and non-state actors operating across the East Asian 
littoral, in furtherance of one or more of the following strategic 
objectives:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Andrew Chubb, ``PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea: 
Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970-2015,'' International Security 
45.3 (2021): 79-121; Ketian Zhang. China's Gambit: The Calculus of 
Coercion (Cambridge 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (1) Gradual encirclement and establishment of effective control 
        over disputed island territories (viz., Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyu 
        Islands, Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank features)
    (2) Imposition of PRC (enforcement) jurisdiction over water and air 
        space surrounding disputed territories (e.g., Kinmen Island, 
        Paracel Islands)
    (3) Interference with legitimate commercial activity by coastal 
        States (e.g., harassment of Indonesian oil and gas activities 
        near Natuna, exclusion of Philippines fishing from Scarborough 
        Shoal)
    (4) Challenges to lawful freedoms of navigation and overflight by 
        the United States and its allies (e.g., dangerous intercepts of 
        vessels and aircraft of the United States and Australia 
        exercising high seas freedoms in and around the South China Sea 
        and Taiwan Strait)
    (5) Undermining the credibility of U.S. alliances (e.g., exploiting 
        divergent threat perceptions between United States and 
        Philippines re: Second Thomas Shoal, U.S. and Japan re: Senkaku 
        Islands).
    China's maritime gray zone actions are multifaceted, and typically 
include some combination of the following: (a) PRC maritime law 
enforcement (MLE) vessels, (b) enforcing PRC maritime law and 
regulations, and (c) implementing maritime and boundary policies issued 
by the state bureaucracy, (d) under the political direction of central 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. These tactics are often 
observed (e) in coordination with maritime militia forces, as well as 
(f) in concert with the PRC civilian fishing fleet, marine scientific 
vessels, and offshore oil and gas industry assets, with (g) People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) forces available, but just over the horizon and 
typically not employed as the direct instruments of coercion.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See Isaac Kardon, China's Law of the Sea: The New Rules of 
Maritime Order (Yale 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Leaders in Beijing have found this tactical package to work 
reasonably well against each of China's maritime neighbors: Japan, 
North and South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam. Not one of these rival claimants has managed to 
settle its maritime boundaries with the PRC, which is unique among 
claimants in having no (0) settled maritime boundaries. Nor do any 
claimants have any meaningful bilateral negotiations under way with 
Beijing concerning disputed territorial sovereignty and maritime 
jurisdiction. In multilateral settings, only a protracted and dilute 
``Code of Conduct'' process is in effect, which does not even aim to 
resolve but rather to palliate conflicts over some but not all of the 
disputed SCS islands.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Vietnam is the sole disputant over the Paracel Islands, which 
have been excluded from the COC process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These are the unusual geopolitical conditions under which China has 
built up its capacity to operate in the gray zone, and thus far 
successfully make incremental gains at its neighbors' expense without 
any effective American counter across 4 administrations. Washington's 
fixation with upholding freedom of military navigation has persisted, 
and still does not meet the central concerns of regional claimants. For 
these coastal countries, their maritime resource entitlements and 
jurisdictional space are slowly being subsumed by the PRC. The United 
States, meanwhile, has no jurisdiction to defend, only a bedrock 
interest in military and economic access. That orientation makes each 
Chinese gray zone provocation appear marginal and not worth the risk of 
further escalation; yet each such action is cumulative. Over the last 
20 years, China has normalized ever-greater effective control over 
disputed waters that should, by rights, be foreign exclusive economic 
zones.
    Basic uncertainty about exactly what is at stake in the gray zone 
is a part of the appeal of this concept of operations. Rather than make 
explicit, legally cognizable claims and bargaining on that basis, 
Chinese officials have for decades declined to define the scope and 
substance of their territorial and jurisdictional claims. This 
strategic ambiguity is most infamous in the case of the unaccountable 
``9-dash line'' in the SCS, but it is characteristic of the whole 
program. China's varied coercion tactics are non-uniform in different 
sectors, creating just enough friction and doubt to deny the activities 
of other states, and to promise sustained higher levels of coercion if 
targets do not back down.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See Kardon, China's Law of the Sea, Chapters 3-6; see also 
Zhang, China's Gambit, Chapters 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While specific PRC gray zone activities vary in each case and over 
time in long-running campaigns (see, for example the patterns of 
Chinese law enforcement activity in the territorial seas and contiguous 
zones around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or episodic enforcement of 
hydrocarbon rights in southern tier of SCS against Malaysia and 
Indonesia but not Brunei),\5\ there is an overall unity to the approach 
across the whole region. Generally, Chinese gray zone campaigns 
establish localized PRC advantages that can be sustained over time 
without precipitating acute crisis. When these actions target American 
allies, Beijing has also used its campaigns to degrade alliance 
cohesion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``Trends in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the Waters 
Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response,'' Japan Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (April 2024), https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
page23e000021.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the intensity and efficacy of PRC gray zone activity has 
increased over the past decade. Access to well-positioned operating 
bases at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Subi Reef allows China to 
employ the superior mass of their constabulary and fishing fleets and 
remain permanently on station in remote waters. Meanwhile, 
modernization and expansion of China's Coast Guard enables PRC law 
enforcement across the East Asian littoral, creating the permissive 
conditions for regularized PRC presence in the disputed territorial 
waters of the Senkaku Islands as well as the far reaches of the SCS.
    Recommendation 1.--The U.S. Government should launch a bottom-up 
comparative review of how regional states have both failed and 
succeeded in disrupting or rolling back PRC gray zone operations. 
Existing State and Defense Department efforts have improved maritime 
domain awareness and interoperability with allies and partners, but 
more systematic attention is warranted from the administration. 
Comparative insights are urgently needed because the Taiwan Strait is 
now the site of the most conspicuous new cases of PRC gray zone 
activity, particularly notable around the now-defunct median line and 
mainland-adjacent offshore islands.\6\ Fortunately, much hard-won 
experience, knowledge, and capacity is already resident in the region. 
Japan, for example, has dealt with Chinese patrols in disputed 
territorial seas for 15 years; their close observation of Chinese 
behavioral patterns and Coast Guard tactics in particular can yield 
practical lessons for countering the on-going encirclement campaign 
around Kinmen Island. The Philippines is currently contending 
effectively with certain PRC gray zone tactics employed around Second 
Thomas Shoal; any lessons from this campaign can be applied to check 
creeping mainland encroachment into the Taiwan Strait.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Isaac Kardon and Jennifer Kavanagh, ``How China Will Squeeze, 
Not Seize, Taiwan,'' Foreign Affairs (May 21, 2024), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-will-squeeze-not-seize-taiwan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recommendation 2.--The primary targets of these gray zone actions 
are regional states, whose interests must figure more prominently in 
U.S. policy objectives in East Asia. Reframing U.S. policy objectives 
in terms that will resonate with allies and partners in the region will 
also require bottom-up review of the maritime rights and interests of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam. While the United States is directly affected to 
some degree by PRC gray zone activities, it is rival claimants in the 
region that are most persistently harmed. Despite that, American policy 
in the South and East China Seas has become one-dimensional and ill-
suited to our broader national interests in maritime East Asia. Freedom 
of navigation operations (FONOPs) are the poster-child for an 
ineffective policy that prioritizes a narrow self-interest in military 
navigation over a strategic interest in maintaining good order and 
access to the region, in part by upholding the specific sovereign 
rights--especially to fisheries and offshore oil and gas--that the 
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles 
them to enjoy.
    Recommendation 3.--China's efforts to gradually change the 
international law of the sea can be disrupted by prompt U.S. 
ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. China's gray 
zone approach exploits the basic indeterminacy of international law. 
Beijing benefits from the United States failing to pursue declarative 
policies that shore up UNCLOS, restore U.S. standing, and cost little 
to implement. By professing to be acting in line with their 
interpretation of the international law of the sea, Chinese officials 
``use the weapon of international law'' to gradually change regional 
norms--and perhaps even general customary international law.\7\ If the 
United States is to succeed in maintaining a stable maritime order, we 
will have to invest over the long term in the law of the sea. The 
current policy of nominal adherence to customary international law does 
not meet the pointed challenge posed by China in the contemporary 
international environment. An American self-exemption from certain 
binding rules (like those governing dispute resolution) is too 
legalistic to provide meaningful leadership to the international 
community. Senate advice and consent on UNCLOS--as well as the new High 
Seas Treaty--would signal renewed American capability to bolster and 
rejuvenate ``rules-based international order'' against cynical appeals 
to sovereign self-interest from China (and Russia).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ For discussion of scope of challenge to ``the rules,'' see 
Kardon, China's Law of the Sea, Chapter 7.
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