[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 IMPLEMENTATION OF BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE 
                              ACTION PLAN

=======================================================================

                                (118-70)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                AVIATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
58-809 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025                  
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                

             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

		  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
		   Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member
		   
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  District of Columbia               Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California           Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana                Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona,                 Puerto Rico
  Vice Ranking Member                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas               Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire            Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York               Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                     Celeste Maloy, Utah
                                     Kevin Kiley, California
                                     Vince Fong, California

                        Subcommittee on Aviation

Garret Graves, Louisiana, Chairman
 Steve Cohen, Tennessee, Ranking 
              Member
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaic A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
Andre Carson, Indiana                Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California           Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Stanton, Arizona                Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Colin Z. Allred, Texas               Brian J. Mast, Florida
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska,        Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
  Vice Ranking Member                Tracey Mann, Kansas
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Burgess Owens, Utah
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Rudy Yakym III, Indiana, Vice 
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Chairman
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
  District of Columbia               Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Aaron Bean, Florida
                                     Kevin Kiley, California
                                     Vince Fong, California
                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening 
  statement......................................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, 
  opening statement..............................................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Hon Marcus J. Molinaro, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New York, prepared statement..........................    53

                               WITNESSES

Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, oral 
  statement......................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    11

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Fact Sheet--Mammoth Freighters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
  Marcus J. Molinaro.............................................    13
Letter of July 26, 2024, to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, 
  Federal Aviation Administration, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, 
  Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew............    40

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal 
  Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
  from Hon. Kevin Kiley..........................................    55

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                           September 20, 2024

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Implementation of 
Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, 
September 24, 2024, at 10:00 am ET in 2167 Rayburn House Office 
Building to receive testimony at a hearing entitled, 
``Implementation of Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan.'' 
Members will receive testimony from Michael Whitaker, 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), on 
the FAA's oversight of The Boeing Company (Boeing), including 
the agency's assessment of and actions in response to Boeing's 
comprehensive Product Safety and Quality Plan (the Plan), 
submitted by Boeing in the wake of a door-plug incident that 
occurred during Alaska Airlines flight 1282 on January 5, 2024.

                             II. BACKGROUND

ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 1282

    On January 5, 2024, a relatively new Alaska Airlines Boeing 
737 MAX 9 aircraft flying at an altitude of 16,000 feet had one 
of its two mid-cabin door-plugs separate from the aircraft 
during flight, causing a rapid depressurization of the cabin. 
No passengers or flight crew were seriously injured; 
fortunately, the two seats immediately next to the door-plug 
were not occupied. The following day, the FAA issued an 
emergency airworthiness directive temporarily grounding all 737 
MAX 9 aircraft with the plug door configuration pending the 
results of a limited number of exploratory inspections of part 
of the fleet.\1\ On January 24, 2024, based partially on the 
results of the exploratory inspections, the FAA approved a 
comprehensive inspection regimen that, upon its completion, 
would allow 737 MAX 9 aircraft to return to service shortly 
thereafter.\2\
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    \1\ Christine Boynton, et al., FAA Grounds, Orders Immediate 
Inspections of Most Boeing 737-9s, Aviation Week, (Jan. 8, 2024), 
available at https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-
regulation/faa-grounds-orders-immediate-inspections-most-boeing-737-9s.
    \2\ Amanda Maile and Lea Sarnoff, FAA releases instructions for 
airlines to begin inspecting Boeing 737 Max 9 planes, ABC News, (Jan. 
24, 2024), available at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/faa-releases-
instructions-airlines-begin-inspecting-boeing-737/story?id=106654582.
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NTSB INVESTIGATION

    The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) 
preliminary report on the incident, released on February 7, 
2024, revealed that when the aircraft was delivered from Boeing 
to Alaska Airlines, ``the four bolts that prevent upward 
movement of the [door-plug] were missing.'' \3\ The report also 
found that the four bolts in question had arrived intact when 
the fuselage was delivered to Boeing's facility in Reston, 
Washington from Spirit AeroSystems, indicating that such bolts 
had been removed at the Boeing facility.\4\
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    \3\ NTSB, Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report (2024), 
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA24MA063.aspx.
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 6 and 7, 2024, the NTSB held a public hearing on 
the accident. Chair Jennifer Homendy said on the record that 
the accident was avoidable because Boeing has documented and 
been aware of its unauthorized production work issues prior to 
the accident occurring.\5\ The hearing also confirmed that the 
door plug was removed at the Boeing factory in Renton, 
Washington, but that the necessary paperwork for its removal 
was not created.\6\ Elizabeth Lund, senior vice president of 
quality for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, explained that when 
workers replaced the door plug temporarily, other workers were 
unaware that bolts needed to be reinstalled due to the lack of 
documentation.\7\
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    \5\ See NTSB, Investigations: In-Flight Mid Exit Door Plug 
Separation, NTSB Investigative Hearing (Aug. 6-7, 2024), available at 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA24MA063.aspx.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
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    This investigation has raised concerns about quality 
control and production issues at Boeing facilities and the 
facilities of its 737 fuselage supplier, Spirit AeroSystems.\8\
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    \8\ Will Guisbond, NTSB confirms missing bolts, defective rivets 
preceded 737 Max 9 door plug incident, The Air Current, (Feb. 6, 2024), 
available at https://theaircurrent.com/feed/dispatches/ntsb-confirms-
missing-bolts-defective-rivets-preceded-737-max-9-door-plug-incident/.
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FAA OVERSIGHT ACTIONS

    Following the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 accident, and the 
subsequent grounding of all Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft with 
similar door-plug configurations, Administrator Whitaker 
announced on January 17, 2024, that the FAA had opened an 
investigation into Boeing's manufacturing and production lines. 
The investigation extended to subcontractors of Boeing, 
particularly Spirit AeroSystems. In the same announcement, the 
FAA noted it would conduct a concurrent six-week audit of 
Boeing's manufacturing processes.\9\ The FAA also sent an 
additional 20 inspectors to Boeing's Washington production 
facilities and an additional six inspectors to Spirit 
AeroSystems's fuselage production facility in Wichita, Kansas. 
Furthermore, the FAA has indicated that some of those 
additional inspectors may remain at those factories 
permanently.\10\
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    \9\ Federal Aviation Administration, Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max 
Aircraft (2024), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/updates-
boeing-737-9-max-aircraft [hereinafter Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max 
Aircraft].
    \10\ Id.
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    On February 12, 2024, Administrator Whitaker visited 
Boeing's factory floor in Renton, Washington, to hear directly 
from Boeing engineers, mechanics, and others about Boeing's 
quality control processes. Following the Administrator's site 
visit, the FAA announced it would not allow Boeing to increase 
its 737 Max production beyond its current rate of 38 jets per 
month until the agency was satisfied that Boeing's quality 
control issues had improved.\11\ On February 27, 2024, 
Administrator Whitaker met with Boeing's then-Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Dave Calhoun, and other Boeing senior leaders 
and imposed a requirement on Boeing to address its production 
lapses and ``systemic quality-control issues.'' \12\ The 
Administrator gave Boeing a 90-day deadline to provide the FAA 
with a comprehensive plan to address the following:
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    \11\ Joel Rose & Russell Lewis, NTSB says key bolts were missing 
from the door plug that blew off a Boeing 737 MAX 9, NPR, (Feb. 6, 
2024), available at https://www.npr.org/2024/02/06/1229528737/ntsb-
boeing-737-max-9-alaska-airlines-door-plug-missing-bolts.
    \12\ Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max Aircraft, supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LIdentified production and quality-control 
problems;
     LFindings of the FAA's audit of Boeing's 
manufacturing processes;
     LFindings of the FAA's expert panel report on 
Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for Transport 
Airplanes, written and compiled in response to a requirement 
from Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act (ACSAA); \13\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Federal Aviation Administration, Section 103 Organization 
Designation Authorizations (ODA) for Transport Airplanes Expert Panel 
Review Report (2024), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/
Sec103_ExpertPanelReview_Report_Final.pdf [hereinafter Section 103 ODA 
Review Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LActions Boeing will take to mature its safety 
management system (SMS) program.\14\
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    \14\ Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max Aircraft, supra note 12.

    On March 4, 2024, the FAA announced that the agency had 
identified ``multiple instances in which [both Boeing and 
Spirit AeroSystems] failed to comply with manufacturing quality 
control requirements,'' \15\ findings which resulted from the 
Agency's six-week audit of the companies. Non-compliance issues 
were found in Boeing's manufacturing process control, parts 
handling and storage, and product control.\16\ The FAA 
reiterated that these non-compliance issues must be addressed 
in Boeing's 90-day comprehensive plan. Boeing presented the 
company's comprehensive action plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024. 
In response, the FAA stated that ``it will hold Boeing 
accountable every step of the way to make sure these changes 
happen.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Press Release, FAA, FAA Continues to Hold Boeing Accountable 
for Implementing Safety and Production Quality Fixes, (May 30, 2024), 
available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-continues-hold-boeing-
accountable-implementing-safety-and-production-quality-fixes.
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FINDINGS OF FAA'S QUALITY-CONTROL AUDIT

    The FAA's audit of Boeing and its suppliers revealed 
instances of mechanics using liquid soap as a lubricant for 
fitting a door seal, despite it not being an approved 
lubricant. The FAA observed instances of mechanics at Spirit 
AeroSystems cleaning workstations with a wet cheesecloth, 
despite this practice not being an approved method of cleaning. 
During its six-week audit (January 17, 2024-March 4, 2024), the 
FAA found that Boeing had failed 33 of 89 aspects of the 
product audit, with a total of 97 instances of alleged 
noncompliance, and that Spirit AeroSystems had failed seven of 
13 audits.\18\ In general, the audit identified nine areas of 
focus which Boeing needed to address: parts and material 
control; tool control; foreign object debris (FOD); work 
instructions; stamping; training; documentation/command media; 
engineering; and quality escapes.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Briefing, Federal Aviation Administration, Special Audit Item 
Out-brief (Feb. 28, 2024) (on file with Comm.).
    \19\ Id.
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FINDINGS OF THE ACSAA ODA EXPERT PANEL REVIEW REPORT:

    On February 26, 2024, the FAA issued the report required by 
Section 103 of the ACSAA, which established the convening of an 
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Expert Review 
Panel to review and issue recommendations regarding Boeing's 
safety culture, ODA, and capability to perform FAA-delegated 
functions.\20\ The Expert Review Panel identified 27 findings 
and made 53 recommendations across five broad areas.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Section 103 ODA Review Report, supra note 13.
    \21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, the Expert Panel found that many Boeing 
employees did not demonstrate knowledge of Boeing's safety 
culture efforts. The Expert Panel further identified instances, 
including within Boeing's voluntary SMS framework, in which 
managers could lead an investigation within their own 
respective reporting chains, potentially leading to a 
hesitation in an employee's willingness to report safety 
concerns. Finally, the Expert Panel also found that the 
complexity and amount of SMS documentation, compounded by the 
frequency of changing documentation requirements, created 
employee confusion, contributing to the delay and improper 
development of SMS at Boeing.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the Expert Review Panel's findings, Boeing 
submitted a detailed plan of action, separate and independent 
from the comprehensive Product Safety and Quality Plan, which 
enumerated corresponding deliverables for each of the Expert 
Review Panel's findings and recommendations to the FAA.\23\ The 
company's responsive actions fall into four primary areas: (1) 
safety culture and reporting systems; (2) the structure and 
implementation of Boeing's SMS; (3) the structure and 
independence of Boeing's ODA unit; and (4) human factors and 
pilot input. Of note is the implementation of an Aviation 
Safety Action Program, in coordination with the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), 
restructuring the engineering unit members under its ODA and 
expanding the unit member pipeline, and fully implementing the 
Flight Deck Design, Operations and Training working group to 
formalize and strengthen the role of pilots and flight test 
personnel.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Boeing, Executive Summary of Product Safety and Quality Plan 
(2024), available at https://preview-www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/
boeingdotcom/safety/Safety-and-Quality-Plan_Executive%20Summary-5-30-
2024.pdf [hereinafter Boeing Executive Summary].
    \24\ Id.
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BOEING'S INDEPENDENT MITIGATION ACTIONS

LEADERSHIP CHANGES

    On February 21, 2024, Boeing announced Ed Clark, the head 
of Boeing's 737 MAX program at the time, would depart the 
company. Simultaneously, Boeing announced that it had created a 
new role, Senior Vice President of Quality, and named Elizabeth 
Lund to the position. Ms. Lund previously served as Boeing's 
Senior Vice President and General Manager of airplane programs 
for commercial airplanes.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Bill Chappell, How bad is Boeing's 2024 so far? Here's a 
timeline, OPB, (Mar. 20, 2024), available at https://www.opb.org/
article/2024/03/20/how-bad-is-boeing-s-2024-so-far-here-s-a-timeline/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 25, 2024, Boeing announced that the company's CEO, 
Dave Calhoun, would also step down at the end of 2024. 
Additionally, Boeing announced that Stan Deal, CEO and 
President of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, would retire 
effective immediately, replaced by Chief Operating Officer 
Stephanie Pope.\26\ On August 8, 2024, Kelly Ortberg replaced 
Mr. Calhoun as the President and CEO of Boeing. Mr. Ortberg was 
previously the CEO of Rockwell Collins, an avionics 
manufacturer.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Patrick Smith & Rob Wire, Boeing CEO, other executives 
stepping down amid safety crisis, NBC News, (Mar. 25, 2024), available 
at https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/boeing-ceo-dave-
calhoun-slew-executives-step-safety-crisis-rcna144882.
    \27\ Press Release, The Boeing Company, Boeing Board Names Kelly 
Ortberg President and CEO (July 31, 2024), available at https://
boeing.mediaroom.com/2024-07-31-Boeing-Board-Names-Kelly-Ortberg-
President-and-CEO.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

    Meanwhile, in March 2024, Boeing began discussions with its 
737 MAX fuselage supplier, Spirit AeroSystems, to reacquire the 
company. Boeing had previously spun off a large part of its 
manufacturing supply chain and created Spirit AeroSystems in 
2009.\28\ On July 1, 2024, Boeing announced that it had entered 
into an agreement to reacquire the company for $4.7 
billion.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Dominic Gates, Boeing seeks to buy Spirit Aero, unit it sold 
in push for outsourcing, The Seattle Times, (Mar. 1, 2024), available 
at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-seeks-
to-buy-spirit-aero-19-years-after-selling-off-troubled-wichita-plant/.
    \29\ Press Release, The Boeing Company, Boeing to Acquire Spirit 
AeroSystems (July 1, 2024), available at https://investors.boeing.com/
investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-to-Acquire-Spirit-
AeroSystems/default.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Boeing has also announced that it has instituted additional 
quality controls to inspections at its Renton, Washington 
facility, as well as at the Spirit AeroSystems facility that 
produces the 737 MAX fuselage in Wichita, Kansas.
    Finally, Boeing has taken the following measures to address 
quality control concerns:
     LDeploying a team of mechanics, inspectors, and 
engineers to work alongside the employees at Spirit 
AeroSystems;
     LOffering expanded training programs for employees 
to refocus on the fundamentals of their Quality Management 
System (QMS);
     LOpening up its factories to air carriers and 
operators of the 737 fleet for additional oversight 
inspections; and
     LHiring a third-party to review the company's QMS 
for commercial aircraft and suggest further improvements.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Boeing, Updates on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 and the 737-9 
(2024), available at https://www.boeing.com/737-9-updates/jan-15-2024-
boeing-announces-immediate-actions-to-strengthen-quality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIGHLIGHTS FROM BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLAN \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Boeing Executive Summary supra note 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Executive Summary of the Plan outlines the company's 
actions since the January 5, 2024, 737 MAX 9 accident to 
contain and mitigate risk in its production operations and 
supply chain.\32\ It identifies key performance indicators 
(KPIs) the company is using to measure the health of Boeing's 
production line and quality control reforms. It then enumerates 
the actions Boeing will take to improve quality control, as 
well as the company's plan to address the issues identified in 
both the FAA audit and the Expert Review Panel Boeing Safety 
Culture Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Action Plan also includes items specifically to address 
the door-plug incident, including:
     LRevising build plans, training, aircraft manual 
documentation, and removal and inspection criteria for the Mid-
Exit Door (MED) plug;
     LAdding conformance inspections to nine critical 
build points;
     LAdding new inspections and pre-shipment approval 
requirements on fuselages at Spirit AeroSystems;
     LProviding supplier bulletins to strengthen focus 
on product conformance and reduce the risk of defects being 
shipped; and
     LProcessing fleet and production inspection 
findings through Boeing's SMS and QMS.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Id.
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KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Action Plan identifies six critical, safety-focused Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI) that Boeing will use to monitor 
production system health, document improvements, and better 
identify quality and safety hazards across Boeing's programs. 
Those KPIs are:
     LEmployee Proficiency, which measures proficient 
employees currently staffed to commercial programs as a share 
of all employees required for the production at a given rate.
     LNotice of Escape Rework Hours, which measures the 
number of rework due to (a) internal Boeing fabrication and (b) 
supplier-provided escapes to final assembly per month.
     LSupplier Shortages, which measures fabrication 
and supplier shortages per manufacturing day--not including 
weekends--averaged over the month.
     LRework Hours per Airplane, which measures the 
average final assembly charged rework normalized on a per 
airplane basis, based on the date the aircraft was handed off 
to the field; this may include `notice of escape rework hours' 
caused by a supplier and any other Boeing-based rework.
     LTravelers at Factory Rollout, which measures jobs 
traveling per airplane from final assembly and rollout; 
``traveler'' is defined as incomplete or open work that was 
scheduled but not yet completed in final assembly.
     LTicketing Performance, which measures average 
escapes per airplane at time of FAA ticket; total escapes are 
inclusive of all nonconformances and FOD per airplane.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Id.

    The KPIs will be measured with reference to `control 
limits.' These limits are based on safety trends, historical 
analysis, and capacity planning. Any future adjustments to the 
limits will only be made after consultation with the FAA. The 
Plan also details the elevation processes associated with 
managing each set of thresholds and how those processes are 
tied to Boeing's SMS.\36\
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    \36\ Id.
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QUALITY CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Action Plan identifies product safety and quality 
attention areas, and attempts to address each with specific 
actions like the development of new tools, process changes, 
communication improvements, additional control mechanisms, and 
other solutions. These attention areas include:
     LSafety Management System Improvements--Boeing 
will improve its SMS by:
      + L(1) enhancing and streamlining its ``Speak Up'' system 
(the employee reporting channel);
      + L(2) reducing `traveled work' (tasks that are ``delayed 
and/or completed in a factory location other than what was 
originally planned); and
      + L(3) further integrating SMS with Boeing's Quality 
Management System (QMS).
      + LThese three areas of focus were selected based on 
feedback from the quality standdowns, input from regulators, 
and insights from Admiral Kirkland Donald's independent 
assessment team established in the wake of the January 5, 2024, 
accident.
     LSimplification of Processes and Procedures--Based 
off feedback from the FAA, the Expert Review Panel, and 
employees, Boeing believes that the complexity of its processes 
and paperwork pertaining to quality control efforts contributed 
to a decrease in quality control.
     LSupply Chain Defect Reduction--To address quality 
control issues within Boeing's supply chain, it has identified 
four areas for improvement:
      + L(1) enhancing data and analytics to provide proactive 
notifications of issues,
      + L(2) standardizing supplier oversight and prioritizing 
product safety,
      + L(3) simplifying supplier processes and expectations, 
and
      + L(4) driving industry change to improve. Boeing is also 
increasing its oversight resources at Spirit AeroSystems and 
Daher facilities, and strengthening its oversight procedures 
over suppliers.
     LIncreased Employee Training--New manufacturing 
and quality employees will receive two additional weeks of 
foundational training, followed by enhanced structured on-the-
job training (SOJT), among other actions.
     LProduction System Compliance--Based on the FAA's 
audit findings, Boeing will target improvement in four areas of 
production:
      + L(1) FOD control,
      + L(2) tool control,
      + L(3) parts and materials control, and
      + L(4) employees' adherence to work instructions.
     LInternal Engagement and Communication--Boeing is 
assessing its internal communications to elevate its safety 
culture and roll out new initiatives. These include full-day 
safety/quality standdowns, Employee Involvement Teams (EIT) to 
review employee feedback and host problem-solving sessions, a 
leadership program for managers, and improving the company's 
messaging.
     LInstallation Plan Improvements--Boeing is 
simplifying the work instructions for mechanics and inspectors, 
so it is easier to perform consistently.\38\
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    \38\ Id.
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                              III. WITNESS

     LThe Honorable Michael Whitaker, Administrator, 
Federal Aviation Administration

 
          IMPLEMENTATION OF BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLAN

                              ----------                              


                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Aviation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Garret Graves 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The Subcommittee on Aviation will 
come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Cohen. I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on 
the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Cohen. As a reminder, if a Member wishes to insert a 
document into the record, please also email it to 
DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
    I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARRET GRAVES OF LOUISIANA, CHAIRMAN, 
                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I want to begin by thanking 
Administrator Whitaker for being here, and I want to thank you 
and your team for all of your efforts to keep the subcommittee, 
to keep the committee apprised of everything going on regarding 
Boeing's corrective action plan in the wake of Alaska Airlines 
flight 1282.
    I also want to take a minute to thank NTSB and the Chair 
for all their efforts to keep us apprised as well. But the FAA 
and the staff have been very communicative on the status of 
efforts on the action plan, and we are very appreciative of 
that.
    Look, it is no secret--and we talk about it in almost every 
aviation hearing--that the United States has the gold standard 
of aviation. Some of the incidents that have happened in recent 
months and years have certainly called that into question and 
caused us to ensure that we are not--excuse me--to ensure that 
we are staying on top of that, ensure that we are continuing to 
work to maintain that standard, to improve that standard.
    Boeing's continuing challenges that were exemplified by the 
Alaska Airlines flight 1282 door plug accident represents one 
of the most visible elements of an aviation system that has 
been strained and sometimes past the breaking point. In the 
wake of the door plug accident, you took immediate action to 
enhance oversight of Boeing's production facilities while also 
demanding the company develop, present, and, most importantly, 
implement a comprehensive action plan to address production 
deficiencies.
    Today we are here to learn more about how this plan is 
being implemented, as well as what we can expect from Boeing 
and FAA's oversight of Boeing in the weeks, months, and years 
to come.
    I do, however, want to issue a word of warning. This latest 
challenge comes as your agency is tasked with not only 
implementing a historic 1,000-page FAA reauthorization bill 
that governs aviation over the next 5 years, a mandate with 
explicit timelines in many cases, with urgent actions to 
improve aviation efficiency and safety that is going to be 
incredibly time-consuming. But I also want to remind you that 
the FAA is also tasked with continuing to implement and conduct 
oversight over the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act, a law that made--a bipartisan law, it came 
out of this committee--that made targeted reforms to improve 
aircraft certification processes following the two 737 MAX 8 
crashes in 2018 and 2019.
    We have discussed in the past some of the delays that 
implementing provisions from 2016 and 2018 FAA bills, and as I 
have said to you, and to be fair, you have inherited much of 
this. But I do want to make crystal clear from this committee's 
perspective--and I think I speak on behalf of my friend, 
Ranking Member Cohen as well--we cannot continue this 
trajectory of slow implementation or not implementing.
    We did a tremendous amount of work, as did the aviation 
teams, in getting to a bipartisan agreement in an environment 
where people can't agree upon motherhood and apple pie in this 
Congress, and we expect that that is going to be implemented 
with urgency at the same time the FAA moves forward with the 
Boeing oversight plan. You can walk and chew gum. We are 
confident your agency can as well.
    Implementation of the 2018 FAA reauthorization bill and 
many other necessary initiatives were partially derailed by 
FAA's response to the last Boeing oversight challenge. But that 
can't happen again. Regardless of the challenges facing FAA and 
Boeing, the FAA must be able to move forward and do its full 
mission.
    So, today, Administrator, I want to hear about the steps 
being taken with your agency and Boeing to ensure that we are 
minimizing risk and making certain that safety comes first and 
foremost in all levels, from the C-suite to the factory floor, 
when it comes to building airplanes in Boeing facilities.
    We also want to hear about what the FAA is doing beyond the 
immediate response to these issues and learn about how the 
safety implementation bill is progressing and how FAA is going 
to ensure that day-to-day crises don't derail the year-to-year 
strategies.
    I look forward to hearing your testimony and thank you for 
being here today.
    [Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves of Louisiana, Chairman, 
                        Subcommittee on Aviation
    I want to begin by thanking you, Administrator Whitaker, for 
joining us today to update the Subcommittee on Boeing's corrective 
action plan in the wake of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 incident.
    I also want to note that we appreciate you and your staff's 
continued updates on this important matter, including the briefing 
earlier this summer in which you personally briefed members of the Full 
Committee on the FAA's oversight of Boeing.
    We are here today because it is no secret that America's gold 
standard in aviation safety is under the microscope, and the FAA's role 
in conducting safety oversight is paramount.
    Boeing's continuing challenges, exemplified by the Alaska Airlines 
flight 1282 door plug accident, represent the most visible element of 
an aviation system that has been strained to, and sometimes past, the 
breaking point.
    In the wake of the door plug accident, you took immediate action to 
enhance oversight of Boeing's production facilities while also 
demanding the company develop, present, and most importantly implement 
a comprehensive action plan to address production deficiencies.
    Today we are here to learn more about how this plan is being 
implemented, as well as what we can expect from Boeing, and the FAA's 
oversight of Boeing, in the weeks, months, and years to come.
    I do, however, want to issue a word of warning.
    This latest Boeing challenge comes as your agency is tasked with 
not only implementing a historic, thousand-page FAA Reauthorization 
bill--a mandate that is without a doubt time-consuming and staff 
intensive--but also the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act (ACSAA), a law that made targeted reforms to improve 
aircraft certification processes following the two 737 MAX 8 crashes in 
2018 and 2019.
    Your plate is full to say the least, and you've only been at the 
helm of the agency since the beginning of this year. Undoubtedly, you 
have a unique view of the agency's implementation efforts, and this 
hearing is an opportunity to talk about the progress that has been made 
on both of those bills.
    Implementation of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization bill, and many other 
necessary initiatives, were partially derailed by FAA's understandable 
response to the last Boeing oversight challenge.
    But that can't happen again. Regardless of the challenges facing 
FAA and Boeing, the FAA must be able to walk and chew gum at the same 
time.
    So today, Administrator Whitaker, we want to hear about the steps 
being taken at your agency and at Boeing to ensure that we're 
minimizing risks and making certain that safety comes first and 
foremost at all levels, from the C-suite to the factory floor, when it 
comes to building airplanes in Boeing facilities.
    But we also want to hear about what the FAA is doing beyond the 
immediate response to Boeing's issues and learn about how ACSAA 
implementation is progressing and how FAA is going to ensure that day-
to-day crises do not derail year-to-year strategy.
    I look forward to hearing your testimony, and I thank you for being 
here today.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I now recognize Ranking Member 
Cohen for 5 minutes.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE COHEN OF TENNESSEE, RANKING 
                MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for being with us 
today.
    We are here to discuss Boeing, not Boeing's problem with 
getting capsules up to and carrying back astronauts from the 
space station, and not concerning their pension plan where they 
took from the employees a decade ago, and the employees would 
like to get that fixed pension plan back. But we are here to 
discuss Boeing's ongoing challenges, as Mr. Graves has well 
pointed out, with safety, production quality, and company 
culture, which we were reminded of, unfortunately, in dramatic 
fashion with the door failure, the plug failure.
    Before I get to that, though, I do want to reemphasize what 
Mr. Graves mentioned about all of the things that are in the 
reauthorization bill.
    I get a lot of calls from people, have for years, about the 
EVAC Act, and having a process we know we are getting people 
off the airplanes in the required time that is set out there. 
We are not doing it. And the studies that they do in Oklahoma 
City are ridiculous. They don't have sample passengers of a 
typical airplane: people who wear braces, who have wheelchairs, 
who have crutches, who have babies, who have help dogs, or who 
are just old and a bit infirm, or real young and in their 
mother's arms.
    We have got to have another test soon that has real plane-
like, life-like features. I hope you will look into that and 
the other issues we had with safety. A lot of people were 
really happy about the issues that we put in there that draw 
attention to people with disabilities, to make sure those are 
implemented. I know you will, but I want to emphasize that.
    The FAA and the NTSB immediately began independent 
concurrent investigations on Boeing's plug failure. And we went 
over and we saw the items and all, and Ms. Homendy did a great 
job.
    The FAA also told Boeing to create a plan to address known 
issues at the time, and the plan was submitted to the FAA at 
the end of May.
    Now that Boeing has begun implementing its Safety and 
Quality Plan and the FAA has begun conducting its additional 
oversight, it is time to examine whether the promised changes 
are being made and whether promised improvements are being 
attained.
    I was real critical of Boeing, and properly so, when the 
two plane accidents, the crashes, that Boeing's top dog 
resigned finally. First he said he was whatever, but he wasn't 
taking a pay cut or anything else. Well, he is gone.
    It is amazing this has continued. You thought that would be 
a wakeup call. And I have tried since to kind of understand and 
think about Boeing as one of America's premier companies, one 
that we have been proud of, iconic, and we don't want Airbus to 
get all the planes.
    But Boeing keeps messing up. For America's interest, Boeing 
needs to get its act together. They want to be a good citizen, 
be safe. And I know you will oversee them and see that they 
are.
    Congress must continue to hold Boeing accountable for the 
safety of its aircraft, to continue to hold the FAA accountable 
also for its oversight of manufacturers' design and production 
processes.
    Moreover, while we are here today, I would like to go on 
record and thank NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and all the NTSB 
investigators, again, for their vigorous efforts as they work 
alongside FAA to expose critical issues and increase the safety 
of air transportation.
    Our subcommittee will work with all the relevant parties to 
enact any legislative changes necessary to resolve quality 
control problems, strengthen oversight of aircraft 
manufacturers and suppliers, and prevent further safety issues 
from arising.
    I was pleased Boeing chose an engineer and not a 
businessperson driven by a bottom line, bottom line that they 
were all considering, but their stock keeps going down even 
quicker than some of their airplanes have. So, they need to 
worry about that.
    Thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for being here today, 
and I look forward to our discussion and our work over the next 
years.
    [Mr. Cohen's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, Ranking Member, 
                        Subcommittee on Aviation
    Thank you, Chairman Graves, and thank you, Administrator Whitaker, 
for testifying today.
    We are here today to discuss Boeing's ongoing challenges with 
safety, production quality and company culture, which we were reminded 
of in dramatic fashion by Boeing's door plug accident earlier this 
year.
    In response, the FAA and NTSB immediately began independent, 
concurrent investigations. The FAA also told Boeing to create a plan to 
address known issues at the time. That plan was submitted to the FAA at 
the end of May.
    Now that Boeing has begun implementing its Safety and Quality Plan 
and the FAA has begun conducting its additional oversight, it is time 
to examine whether promised changes are being made and whether promised 
improvements are being attained.
    Congress must continue to hold Boeing accountable for the safety of 
its aircraft and continue to hold the FAA accountable for its oversight 
of manufacturers' design and production processes.
    Moreover, while they are not here today, I'd like to go on the 
record and thank NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and all of the NTSB 
investigators again for their vigorous efforts as they work alongside 
the FAA to expose critical issues and to increase the safety of air 
transportation.
    Our Subcommittee will work with all relevant parties to enact any 
legislative changes necessary to resolve quality control problems, 
strengthen oversight of aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and 
prevent further safety issues from arising.
    Thank you again, Administrator Whitaker, for being here today, and 
I look forward to our discussion.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. The gentleman yields 
back.
    I recognize Ranking Member Larsen for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Chair 
Graves, for calling this hearing today.
    Today we are really having two hearings in one:
    The first, motivated by the aftermath of the January 5th 
Boeing 737 MAX door plug accident, which will examine Boeing's 
safety culture problems, the FAA's subsequent investigation, 
and Boeing's comprehensive action plan to address these issues.
    The second, we will evaluate the FAA's general oversight of 
U.S. aviation manufacturing and the implications of any 
necessary reforms.
    Towards this end, we have to ensure the FAA has resources 
and tools that it needs to effectively conduct its 
investigation and help prevent accidents like this from 
happening again.
    Just as we did nearly 5 years ago, this committee must 
remain vigilant in our oversight and authorization roles and 
hold those responsible accountable, wherever the FAA and the 
NTSB investigations lead.
    Now, on January 5, 2024, a door plug was torn from a 737 
MAX 9 aircraft shortly after it departed Portland International 
Airport, forcing that flight and the flightcrew to make an 
emergency landing and return to Portland. This event was 
terrifying to all of those on board, but thanks to the calm and 
professional actions of Alaska's flightcrew, everyone returned 
to the ground safely.
    Shortly thereafter, the FAA cautiously and rightfully 
grounded the U.S. 737 MAX 9 fleet for nearly 20 days, and the 
NTSB initiated an accident investigation. The FAA also 
initiated a concurrent but separate investigation and further 
announced an audit of the 737 MAX production lines and its 
suppliers.
    The FAA has also placed a further safety limitation on 
Boeing, prohibiting any increase in the production rate of the 
737 MAX aircraft. This limit is still in place and will remain 
until the FAA is satisfied that certain, quote, ``quality 
control issues uncovered during this process are resolved,'' 
end quote.
    Unfortunately, it is not the first time we have seen 
quality control and production issues at Boeing's facilities. 
In May of 2021, then-Chair DeFazio and I wrote to the 
Department of Transportation, the FAA, and Boeing with concerns 
about no less than nine reports of quality control issues at 
Boeing production facilities. Since then, there have been 
dozens more reports, leading to emergency fixes in the fleet 
and halts in production.
    Given the pervasiveness of these issues across multiple 
locations, experts have pointed to an overarching cultural 
problem within the company, and it goes without saying: the 
safety culture of any institution flows from the top. However, 
a shakeup in leadership is not the final answer--it is only the 
beginning. The company must work to revamp its safety culture, 
particularly as it relates to its relationship with its 
greatest asset: its workers.
    The flying public deserves answers, and I am committed to 
using all the tools at my disposal to get them.
    I do want to highlight what I am hearing back home in 
Washington State. In the Pacific Northwest, aviation and 
aerospace are part of our DNA. More than 30,000 dedicated women 
and men go to work each day at the Boeing plant in Everett and 
throughout the State. These are hard-working individuals who 
punch the clock day in, day out and make significant 
contributions to our local communities.
    The consequences of Boeing leadership's repeated safety and 
quality missteps are felt hardest by the workforce, who strive 
each and every day to ensure Boeing's aircraft remain the 
safest in the world but are not always given the resources or 
direction to fulfill those duties. They deserve answers as 
well.
    I am grateful to all the Boeing workers that have come 
forward with information for the various Federal investigations 
and have made their own recommendations. However, these issues 
and the FAA's response extend well beyond Boeing and beyond 
Washington State. Boeing is the largest exporter in the 
country, so, these issues impact the entire U.S. economy. They 
impact workers across the country. They impact passengers' 
travel and the confidence of the flying public. They impact the 
supply chains that circle the globe.
    It is not enough to build airplanes in the U.S. U.S. 
aviation must build safe airplanes in the U.S., and how the 
Congress and the FAA respond to this event will have lasting 
repercussions. We have to get these changes right, and not just 
for Boeing's sake, but for the sake of aviation manufacturing 
throughout the country and throughout the world.
    As more is uncovered, it falls on Congress to support the 
FAA and NTSB in their ongoing investigations and to take the 
necessary actions to ensure the safety of our skies.
    The Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug accident is yet another 
reminder of the importance of this committee's work, of the 
FAA's efforts, and what is at stake it if we don't remain 
vigilant in addressing systemic safety issues in the U.S. 
aviation ecosystem.
    Now, with a plan in place to begin Boeing's cultural course 
correction, I look forward to hearing from Administrator 
Whitaker about how the action plan was developed, what role the 
FAA played in its creation, any progress or lack thereof with 
its implementation, and how the FAA plans to keep Boeing 
accountable to its execution.
    The U.S. is the leader in global aviation, and this 
committee's efforts, along with the FAA's, will have profound 
implications for air travel around the world.
    With that, I yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling this hearing on the 
``Implementation of Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan.''
    Today, we are really having two hearings in one:
    The first, motivated by the aftermath of the January 5th Boeing 737 
MAX door-plug accident, will examine Boeing's safety culture problems, 
the FAA's subsequent investigation and Boeing's Comprehensive Action 
Plan to address these issues.
    The second will evaluate the FAA's general oversight of U.S. 
aviation manufacturing and the implications of any necessary reforms.
    Towards this end, we have to make sure the FAA has the resources 
and tools it needs to effectively conduct its investigation and help 
prevent accidents like this from happening again.
    Just as we did nearly five years ago, this Committee must remain 
vigilant in our oversight and authorization roles and hold those 
responsible accountable, wherever the FAA and NTSB investigations lead.
    On January 5, 2024, a door plug was torn from a 737 MAX 9 aircraft 
shortly after it departed Portland International Airport (PDX), forcing 
that flight to make an emergency landing and return to Portland.
    This event was terrifying to all those on board, but thanks to the 
calm and professional action of Alaska's flight crew, everyone returned 
to the ground safely.
    Shortly thereafter, the FAA cautiously and rightfully grounded the 
U.S. 737 MAX 9 fleet for nearly 20 days, and the NTSB initiated an 
accident investigation.
    The FAA also initiated a concurrent but separate investigation and 
further announced an audit of the 737 MAX production lines and its 
suppliers.
    The FAA also placed a further safety limitation on Boeing, 
prohibiting any increase in the production rate of the 737 MAX 
aircraft.
    This limit is still in place and will remain until the FAA is 
satisfied that certain ``quality control issues uncovered during this 
process are resolved.''
    Unfortunately, this isn't the first time we've seen quality control 
and production issues at Boeing's facilities.
    In May 2021, then Chair DeFazio and I wrote to the Department of 
Transportation, FAA and Boeing with concerns about no less than nine 
reports of quality control issues at Boeing production facilities.
    Since then, there have been dozens more reports, leading to 
emergency fixes in the fleet and halts in production.
    Given the pervasiveness of these issues across multiple locations, 
experts have pointed to an overarching cultural problem within the 
company.
    It goes without saying that the safety culture of any institution 
flows from the top. However, a shakeup in leadership is not the final 
answer--it is only the beginning.
    The company must work to revamp its safety culture, particularly as 
it relates to its relationship with its greatest asset: its workers.
    The flying public deserve answers, and I am committed to using all 
the tools at my disposal to get them.
    I want to highlight what I'm hearing back home in Washington state.
    In the Pacific Northwest, aviation and aerospace are part of our 
DNA. More than 30,000 dedicated women and men go to work each day at 
the Boeing plant in Everett and throughout the state.
    These are hardworking individuals who punch the clock day in and 
day out and make significant contributions to our local communities.
    The consequences of Boeing leadership's repeated safety and quality 
missteps are felt hardest by the workforce--who strive each and every 
day to ensure Boeing's aircraft remains the safest in the world but are 
not always given the resources or direction to fulfill their duties.
    They deserve answers, as well.
    And I'm grateful to all the Boeing workers that have come forward 
with information for the various federal investigations and have made 
recommendations.
    However, these issues, and the FAA's response, extend well beyond 
Boeing and Washington state.
    Boeing is the largest exporter in the country, so these issues 
impact the entire U.S. economy.
    They impact workers across the country; they impact passengers' 
travel and the confidence of the flying public; and they impact supply 
chains that circle the globe.
    It is not enough to build airplanes in the U.S.--U.S. aviation must 
build safe airplanes in the U.S.
    How the FAA and we as Congress respond to this event will have 
lasting repercussions for decades to come; we have to get this right 
and not just for Boeing's sake--for the sake of aviation manufacturing 
across the country and the world.
    As more is uncovered, it falls on Congress to support the FAA and 
NTSB in their ongoing investigations and take the necessary actions to 
ensure the safety of our skies.
    The Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug accident is yet another reminder of 
the importance of this Committee's work, the FAA's efforts and what is 
at stake if we do not remain vigilant in addressing systemic safety 
issues in the U.S. aviation ecosystem.
    Now, with a plan in place to begin Boeing's cultural course-
correction, I look forward to hearing from Administrator Whitaker about 
how the Action Plan was developed, what role the FAA played in its 
creation, any progress or lack thereof with its implementation and how 
the FAA plans to keep Boeing accountable to its execution.
    The U.S. is the leader in global aviation, and this Committee's 
efforts, along with the FAA's, will have profound implications for air 
travel around the world.
    Thank you.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    I would again like to thank our witness, Administrator 
Whitaker, for being here today.
    Mr. Cohen. Briefly I would like to explain our system, 
which I imagine you understand already: the red, the green, and 
the yellow. To start, you have got 5 minutes. When you get down 
to 4 minutes, the yellow light goes on instead of the green 
light. And then when you get to no time left, red, stop.
    I ask unanimous consent the witness' full statement be 
included in the record.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Cohen. And I ask unanimous consent that the record of 
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witness has 
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to him 
in writing.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Cohen. I also ask unanimous consent that the record 
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and 
information submitted by Members or the witness to be included 
in the record of today's hearing.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Cohen. And I also ask that the Administrator be held in 
contempt if he doesn't get all that done.
    Just a joke. Just a joke.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Reserving the right to object.
    As your written testimony has been included in the hearing 
record, the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks 
to 5 minutes. And with that, Administrator Whitaker, thanks 
again for being here, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for 
your oral testimony.

  TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL WHITAKER, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
   AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Members 
Larsen and Cohen, members of the committee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to be here today.
    In early June, I had the opportunity to brief this 
committee on the agency's oversight of Boeing's production and 
manufacturing processes, and today I want to provide an update 
on our progress since then.
    This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a 
comprehensive plan to fix its systematic quality control and 
production issues. This plan was required to incorporate the 
results of FAA's special audit, as well as the findings and 
recommendations of the section 103 panel. Boeing provided that 
plan to the FAA on May 30th.
    Let me be clear. This plan does not mark the end of the 
FAA's increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There 
must be a profound shift in the company's safety culture to 
holistically address its quality assurance and production 
challenges. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the 
necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain 
those changes in the long term.
    Since January 5th, we have added more safety inspectors at 
Boeing and Spirit facilities, and we will maintain our 
increased onsite presence. Our oversight activities include 
more direct engagement with company employees, additional 
inspections at critical points of the production process, and 
increased auditing of quality systems and build processes.
    Our safety inspectors are embedded in each of the Boeing 
teams implementing the key components of the plan, allowing us 
to provide direct feedback on any proposed changes to the plan. 
We are closely reviewing Boeing's performance metrics to 
evaluate the overall health of their production system and will 
independently assess any early indicators of risk within the 
system.
    In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on 
the production oversight, we also have hundreds of FAA 
personnel who are focused on other aspects of our Boeing 
oversight. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet 
through our continued operational safety program, overseeing 
Boeing's ODA, and conducting certification activities.
    Addressing these issues also requires the FAA to 
continually examine the effectiveness of our own oversight 
model. We must be proactive and establish more dynamic 
oversight protocols that address changing technologies and 
changing business models and allow us to identify and mitigate 
risks before they manifest themselves as events.
    As a first step, we are reevaluating our current safety 
oversight models and establishing a strategy to revamp our 
agencywide safety management program. As part of this strategy, 
we will reconstitute our executive committee that oversees 
regulatory oversight and safety management programs, and this 
group, which I will chair, will continually monitor the safety, 
performance, and health of the system as a whole, and drive a 
process to continuously improve and update our oversight 
models.
    We are also examining opportunities to better leverage our 
vast data resources to become more predictive in identifying 
risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is 
undertaking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide 
more real-time insight into emerging safety trends and to share 
relevant data across various components of our safety 
ecosystem.
    To conclude, I want to stress that the safety and integrity 
of our air transportation system relies heavily on the 
operators in that system--all operators--having a strong safety 
culture, a culture where safety is first, not in name only but 
in how the operation is run. Safety must come before financial 
incentives, production targets, or operational goals, and 
employees must have the ability and, in fact, be encouraged to 
speak up and come forward with safety concerns without fear of 
reprisal. They must have confidence in the process to know that 
their report will be investigated thoroughly. And just as 
Boeing must develop a strong safety culture, so must all 
operators in our national airspace.
    Congress has expanded SMS requirements to most major 
operators in the system, including the major airlines, part 135 
operators, airports, and aircraft manufacturers. Having a 
robust SMS is key to operating safely within our system. It 
provides a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to 
managing risk. Ultimately, we must ensure that all operators 
participate in these programs, including new entrants.
    As we integrate these nontraditional operators into our 
airspace, whether advanced air mobility or commercial space 
operators, they must embrace SMS and the tenets of a healthy 
safety culture in order to ensure we continue to have the 
safest aerospace system in the world.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to be here, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Whitaker's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal 
       Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
    Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Subcommittee Chairman 
Graves, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today 
to provide an update on the FAA's oversight of Boeing's production and 
manufacturing system. I want to thank the committee for your hard work 
in passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA started 
implementation immediately, and we are committed to keeping you and 
your staff updated on our progress on a quarterly basis.
    I would like to begin by reiterating that the number one priority 
for the FAA is the safety of the flying public. As we carry out our 
regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will 
always inform our decision-making, and I am prepared to use the full 
range of my authority to ensure accountability whether from a 
manufacturer, an air carrier, or the FAA's own operations.
                      Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
    On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 
experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug 
blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on 
January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive 
grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug 
configuration.
    We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance 
process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to 
return to service. Our findings during those inspections revealed that 
the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required 
further scrutiny. We increased oversight activities including:
      Capping production of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to 
achieve system stability and compliance with required quality control 
procedures.
      Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing's 
compliance with manufacturing requirements.
      Increasing oversight of the production of new airplanes 
with more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing 
facilities.
      Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety 
issues.
      Commissioning an independent analysis of potential 
safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.
                       Boeing Comprehensive Plan
    This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive 
action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and 
production issues. During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely 
with Boeing as it developed its roadmap and plan for the path forward. 
I required this plan to address the findings from the FAA's special 
audit as well as the recommendations from the expert review panel 
report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, 
and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its plan to the 
FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of 
ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.
    However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA's increased 
oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the 
company's safety culture to holistically address its systemic quality 
assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing 
implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to 
sustain those changes in the long term.
    In April of this year, we issued regulations that require Boeing to 
have a Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured, 
repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing 
risk.
    As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the 
following:
      Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement, 
and communication;
      Encouraging its employees to speak up without fear of 
reprisal;
      Boosting supplier oversight;
      Increasing quality oversight at every step of the 
production process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence 
and are approved before moving forward;
      Getting more input from users of the system;
      Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
      Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and 
parts management.

    To monitor the health of Boeing's production and quality system, 
including the impacts of those changes, we also directed Boeing to 
identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly 
correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to 
improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the 
effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time 
visibility into the production system with specific control limits that 
will trigger corrective action if needed.
                       FAA's Oversight Activities
    Boeing's manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-
faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers. 
Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust 
safety system comprised of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate 
identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an 
effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production 
and delivery of safe airplanes.
    As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make 
significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the 
right layers of safety are in place. As FAA Administrator, I am 
directly engaged with Boeing's senior leadership to ensure they execute 
the necessary changes to transform Boeing's safety culture and address 
its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, 
last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes 
must be sustained in the long term.
    The safety and integrity of our air transportation system rely 
heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety 
concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the 
process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly. 
Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and 
promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its 
organizations.
    We have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit 
AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site 
presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities 
include:
      More engagement with company employees to hear directly 
from them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in Boeing's 
plan;
      Added inspections at critical points of the production 
process; and
      Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes, 
and changes outlined in Boeing's plan.

    Our safety inspectors are also monitoring each of Boeing's sub-
teams tasked with implementing the key areas of the plan. Our safety 
inspectors are providing direct feedback on Boeing's proposed changes 
and monitoring the KPIs to identify potential system risks. The FAA is 
closely reviewing the KPIs to monitor Boeing's production system health 
and will independently assess any early indicators of risks within the 
system.
    In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on 
production oversight, we also have hundreds of other FAA personnel who 
are focused on other aspects of our oversight of Boeing. These 
employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued 
operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing's Organization 
Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.
    Addressing these safety issues also requires that the FAA 
continually examine the effectiveness of its own oversight processes 
and make the necessary improvements. We must continue to be 
increasingly proactive and establish more dynamic oversight protocols 
that allow us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest 
themselves as events.
    As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety 
management initiatives and establishing a strategy to revamp our 
agency-wide safety management program. As part of this long-term 
strategy, we are in the process of elevating the role of our Executive 
Committee which oversees our regulatory oversight and safety management 
programs. To drive the necessary improvements to our oversight model 
across the agency, both the Deputy Administrator and I will serve on 
the Executive Committee. By doing so, this commitment underscores the 
importance of promoting an effective safety culture at every level of 
the agency.
    As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also 
examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data 
resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the 
aviation system. To this end, the agency is undertaking a fresh look at 
our current capabilities to provide more real-time insight into any 
emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various 
components of our safety ecosystem.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look 
forward to your questions.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator. I 
appreciate your testimony.
    The gentleman from Georgia, would you like to go first?
    If not, the gentleman from New York?
    Mr. Molinaro. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. From New York, Mr. Molinaro is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, if I might, I seek unanimous consent to enter a 
statement regarding Mammoth Freighters to the committee.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
      Fact Sheet--Mammoth Freighters, Submitted for the Record by
                        Hon. Marcus J. Molinaro


                               Background
    Mammoth Freighters LLC (Mammoth) was founded in December 2020 by 
cargo conversion program executives and backed by Fortress Investment 
Group LLC to develop and perform United States (U.S.)-based and 
manufactured Boeing aircraft passenger to freighter (P2F) conversions. 
The launch aircraft type is the Boeing 777. The Mammoth-converted 777 
is one of the world's most productive and economical 777 long haul 
freighters. Pending Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification 
results, the freighter will enter service with global airlines in 2025.
      Mammoth's Boeing 777MF converted freighter bolsters U.S. 
market leadership over European rivals such as Airbus.
      Mammoth freighters are designed and converted in the U.S. 
with over 99.5% parts Made in America from suppliers across 22 states.
      Mammoth has created over 500 new jobs in Dallas-Fort 
Worth and expects to create more than 1,000 direct jobs, not including 
job growth at our suppliers.
      Mammoth operates out of a large, Fort Worth City-owned 
ex-American Airlines maintenance facility at Alliance Airport, where 
sister company Aspire MRO performs 777MF conversions.
      Mammoth has secured 35 firm orders and more orders are 
expected.
      Mammoth expects to convert over a dozen airplanes per 
year for both the U.S. and global cargo markets.
      The Mammoth 777MF prototype is entering the critical test 
and final phases of FAA certification with the goal of obtaining 
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) approval by February 2025.
      Adherence to timelines is key to ensuring project 
success.
                                 Status
    Understanding FAA resource constraints, Mammoth and the FAA 
continue to collaborate with the shared goal of meeting certification 
project milestones. The Mammoth team and FAA designated engineering 
representatives (DERs) are highly experienced, well-known and 
respected. The FAA can leverage Mammoth's expertise and reduce its own 
workload through delegation, which will ensure on-time project delivery 
and enable U.S. global freight delivery competitiveness.
                     Immediate FAA Actions Needed:
      Ensure adequate resources for the Mammoth project 
(ST17720LA-T) despite competing Boeing, Israel Aerospace Industries 
(IAI), and other certification projects.
      Utilize FAA designees to the fullest extent possible to 
alleviate FAA resource challenges.
      Review project documents per the current FAA-published 
timelines (30-45 days depending on document type).
                               Conclusion
    FAA certification for the Mammoth project by February 2025 is 
paramount to extend the useful life of U.S.-produced Boeing 777s to 
support U.S. competitiveness and business growth in the global supply 
chain, grow U.S. manufacturing jobs across the Mammoth supplier 
footprint, and service key existing and prospective Mammoth partners 
such as Jetran, Kalitta, DHL International, FedEx, UPS, Air Canada, and 
STS Aviation Services.

    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Whitaker, thanks very much for being here. I 
heard you talk about the changes at FAA to obviously address 
the needed oversight: ``process to continuously improve and 
update our oversight models.'' Give me a practical application 
of what that might look like. And additionally, how might that 
change at FAA--how might that change have called into question, 
or at least alerted us, of the potential risk of the Alaska 
Airlines incident?
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir. So, I think one feature is, 
we need to not set an oversight model in place and just let it 
run forever. So, I think we need to constantly see, are we 
looking at the right data, as business models change, as 
technology changes.
    I think a good example of a more dynamic approach is how we 
oversee airlines. We have an index that accounts for about a 
dozen different data points, and that index gives us a real-
time picture of how the airlines are doing, how they are 
trending. And if we start to see a trend that we don't like, we 
implement an audit that is tied to those features.
    Mr. Molinaro. So, we know from your report and, of course, 
Boeing's response to the incident, what was the trend that 
might have been identified in this particular case to have 
helped us avert such a tragic situation?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I think if you look at what we have 
implemented since January 5th, we put in these key performance 
indicators--there are six of them--and they give us a reading 
month by month on how Boeing is doing in those six areas.
    That includes how much traveled work--how much work is done 
out of order in the manufacturing process, for example. That 
indicator would have shown that there was a lot of work being 
done out of process, which creates a safety risk, because work 
is done not on the factory floor but when the airplane has 
already been pushed out onto the tarmac and it is not part of 
the system.
    So, we would have that real-time sort of monthly indicator 
to show us if things are moving in the wrong direction.
    Mr. Molinaro. So, do you feel confident at this point that 
Boeing has--switching to Boeing and attention to Boeing--has 
made adequate adjustments to at least the culture to address 
these safety issues?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I think there are really two parts to the 
plan with Boeing. One is the short term and one is long term, 
and I would put culture in the long-term category. It is not a 
6-month program. It is a 3-year to 5-year program.
    There has been significant progress made, for example, on 
traveled work. Boeing moved about 100 inspectors down to 
Wichita to Spirit to make sure that the product coming out of 
Spirit was properly completed.
    So, there has been some short-term progress, but on 
culture, I think it is a long-term project, and I have talked 
to the board and the CEO about the need to be in it for the 
long term and making sure they arrive in that place.
    Mr. Molinaro. But it is fair to say that you feel that, at 
the very least, both short term and long term, Boeing is making 
adequate adjustments to provide for safety in the immediate 
situation and address the cultural deficiencies?
    Mr. Whitaker. We are currently writing the airworthiness 
certificate on each aircraft. Normally that would be delegated 
to Boeing, but we have taken that over so that we are making 
sure that every airplane that comes out there is safe.
    So, we are not to the point where we are turning that over. 
We are working with them to develop their safety management 
system, and we are in it pretty intensively with them. So, we 
are monitoring that progress, there is progress, but they are 
not where they need to be yet.
    Mr. Molinaro. So, my constituents will ask a very simple 
question: Is it safe to fly in a Boeing 737 MAX 9?
    Mr. Whitaker. It is safe. We certify each one of them. We 
do a final inspection in addition to the Boeing inspection. So, 
we are keeping a close eye on them.
    Mr. Molinaro. So, I will see you on one.
    I do want to just express our appreciation for your 
leadership at FAA. I know obviously implementing the 
reauthorization package, 1,000-some-odd pages. And for the 
airports that I represent or at least the people in the 
communities with those airports--regional airports--Binghamton, 
Ithaca, and now to a degree the Capital District in Albany, New 
York--a greater investment in those smaller regional airports, 
critically important not only to moving people but to building 
up economies. Look forward to your partnership and grateful 
that you are at the helm----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Molinaro [continuing]. At this moment. Thanks very 
much.
    I yield the balance of my time.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman from New York yields 
back.
    The gentleman from Tennessee, Ranking Member Cohen, is 
recognized.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
    Mr. Whitaker, as you well know, plans often must be 
reviewed, revised during the execution to reflect unforeseen 
challenges and factors. Over the past few months, has Boeing 
taken any additional steps, outside its Safety and Quality 
Plan, in response to new discoveries or new information?
    Mr. Whitaker. I am sorry, sir, I am having a little bit of 
trouble hearing. Can you just repeat the question, please?
    Mr. Cohen. As we all know, plans often must be revised 
during execution to reflect unforeseen factors and challenges. 
Over the past few months, has Boeing taken any additional 
steps, outside its Safety and Quality Plan, in response to any 
new information or new discoveries?
    Mr. Whitaker. I can't give you specific examples. What I 
can say is that we have teams on the ground with Boeing, and 
they do give real-time feedback. So, for example, as they are 
simplifying business processes or rolling out a tool management 
program, they are getting real-time feedback from the FAA, and 
the approach and the plan is designed to be flexible to account 
for that feedback.
    So, I would anticipate that the answer is yes, but I don't 
have specific examples to give you.
    Mr. Cohen. Do you know if at Boeing, if an employee sees 
what he thinks is a problem in manufacturing safety, can he 
report that, if he chooses or she chooses, to the union, so 
that the union can look into it and take it up to Boeing, or 
does he have--are there requirements that it go straight to 
Boeing and to the----
    Mr. Whitaker [interrupting]. So, the employee has multiple 
avenues. They can certainly go to their union. Making sure that 
there is a system that encourages them to speak up directly to 
Boeing is in place. We are monitoring very closely. That is a 
key factor of a good safety culture.
    And they can also report directly to FAA through our 
website. They can log in to AIR21 Whistleblower and file a 
complaint right on our website.
    Mr. Cohen. Changing Boeing's culture, systems, and 
processes will take time. What changes has the FAA seen so far 
in these areas, and which parts of the company have been the 
most resistant to any needed cultural changes?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the safety culture change is going to 
be a long-term project. They have put together a safety 
training program to roll out. That has been put on hold as 
union negotiations continue. That is ready to roll out, but I 
think it is going to take years of delivering that safety 
message and the employees actually seeing that safety is more 
important than production for that culture to change. So, it is 
going to take a very long-term sustained commitment.
    The changes we have seen in the short term have been around 
deploying new technologies, assessing employee culture, and 
things of that nature.
    Mr. Cohen. Did they ever ascertain who the individual was 
who didn't put the plugs back on the Alaska airplane?
    Mr. Whitaker. That incident is still under investigation 
from the NTSB, so, I don't have any additional information to 
provide at this time.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
    And you have met with Mr. Ortberg, I know. Do you think he 
will lead the company differently from Mr. Calhoun and his 
predecessors, and if so, how?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think we have been very careful not 
to have opinions on personnel changes. There have been a lot of 
personnel challenges, and I have spoken to the board fairly 
extensively about what we think management should be focused 
on.
    I have had those conversations with Mr. Ortberg, too. I 
think because he is an engineer, because he comes from 
aerospace, I think he has a pretty good understanding of the 
need for safety culture, and we will make sure that he pursues 
that.
    Mr. Cohen. As I understand it, Boeing has purchased or 
taken back Spirit. And Boeing at one time had Spirit, separated 
it, brought it back. Do you think that is going to help, and do 
you think that the costs that are spinning off Spirit and some 
of the labor issues they might have had then might have 
contributed to less than a perfect situation for the employees' 
diligence?
    Mr. Whitaker. I do think that the amount of outsourcing 
that Boeing undertook strategically created a lot of supply 
chain challenges that other companies may not have experienced 
if they had more control over their supply chain. And Boeing 
seems to be taking a different direction in that approach. We 
have been agnostic about whether it is a good idea or a bad 
idea for them to execute that specific transaction, but if 
Spirit is part of Boeing, it gives us direct authority over 
Spirit.
    Currently, Boeing has a responsibility to oversee Spirit as 
a supplier. So, it gives us a better line of sight into what 
they are doing.
    Mr. Cohen. Airbus is Boeing's major competitor. Embraer 
also produces a lot of airplanes. Do either one of them have 
different systems that Boeing could incorporate or needs to 
look at and incorporate? Because they haven't, to the best of 
my knowledge, have not have these similar problems.
    Mr. Whitaker. I think--I don't have intimate knowledge of 
the Embraer and Airbus manufacturing challenges. I know that as 
we benchmark airworthiness directives and faults and production 
faults, we find that there is not a big difference between the 
two.
    I think when you look at the key indicators we are 
monitoring, those would be the same for most manufacturing 
facilities.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. In the spirit of George Miller 
and Sheila Jackson Lee, who always gave up their time when they 
didn't have any time, I give up the rest of my time.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I appreciate the generosity, 
Ranking Member Cohen.
    The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Sorry about that earlier. I was listening and changing up 
some in my questioning and thought pattern, and I want you to 
kind of go with me, because I want to kind of set the stage, 
first of all.
    As it was stated earlier, culture starts at the top, and 
that is what shapes and forms the rest of the organization and 
where they are going. And I want you to think back through the 
entire Department of Transportation--the derailment of the 
railroad, the train, over and above--way above average on near-
misses at our airports, even parts falling off of planes.
    And I say that because the Department of Transportation 
under Pete Buttigieg has had a focus of not hiring qualified 
people and looking at qualified people but pushing a social 
agenda, or a DEI initiative, to the point where people that are 
under this industry, this umbrella of the Department of 
Transportation, actually focus more on DEI initiatives instead 
of hiring qualified people to build planes or to operate 
railroads, waterways, whatever it is, under the purview of the 
Department of Transportation.
    So, I guess what I want to know on the Boeing side of this 
thing is, I know they have opened up to operators so that they 
can look at the 737. Have you seen any other thing that you are 
concerned with on that airplane?
    Mr. Whitaker. Have I seen anything other than what we are--
--
    Mr. Collins [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. Addressing in the comprehensive 
plan? As I mentioned, this is a pretty intensive monitoring 
process, so, we meet with their safety team weekly. The 
management team meets monthly, and I meet with the CEO 
quarterly. Anything that arises gets incorporated into the 
plan. So, if anything new comes up, we look at those types of 
issues.
    Mr. Collins. You know, safety, safety, safety--I have heard 
that numerous times, and we haven't even been in the meeting 
here 30 minutes or so. So, that is the focus. And I want to 
kind of look at one other quick thing before I am finished.
    I know that the GAO--the nonpartisan GAO, put out a report 
that they assessed 138 systems that you all have. According to 
them, 51, or 37 percent, are unsustainable. Fifty-four, or 
another thirty-nine percent of them, are potentially 
unsustainable. And that the FAA has been extremely slow to 
modernize the most critical and at-risk systems.
    Now, we are sitting here talking about Boeing, but you have 
also got a lot of things at risk in the FAA. And I am just 
curious, where is our initiative and where is our push on that 
to get this fixed?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the FAA facilities have been somewhat 
famously underinvested in over the years. The centers--we have 
21 centers that control high-altitude aircraft. Those were 
designed to be a maximum life of 50 years. They are now, on 
average, between 60 and 70 years old. All these facilities need 
to be replaced and upgraded.
    It is a fairly heavy lift financially. We have requested $8 
billion in next year's budget to begin working on some of that 
replacement. There is a huge backlog of sustainment and 
modernization and, right now, 90 percent of our budget for 
facilities goes on sustainment rather than new systems. So, we 
have a lot of work to bring the system up to speed.
    Mr. Collins. I would agree.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I brought that up, and I want you to 
understand where I look at this thing. I go back to the focus 
of the Department of Transportation overall, and the focus is 
in the wrong area.
    Instead of us focusing on making sure that we have the 
safest planes and the safest waterways and railroads and 
airports and hiring qualified people to do that, this 
administration and that agency are focused on social agendas, 
and they don't have their focus on making sure that we keep 
people safe. And that to me is the bigger issue that we have 
underlying right here, right now.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Collins. Mr. 
Collins, I do want to apologize to you. You had two or three 
people that were in front of you, and they all jetted, and so, 
I put you on the spot, and I apologize for that. But thank you 
for staying.
    I recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 
Larsen from Washington, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    So, I think it is generally agreed that late 1990s, early 
2000s, Boeing began to shift from being an engineering company 
to a financial services company, focused on revenue for 
shareholder value as primary instead of safety as primary. I 
think our investigation showed that when we wrote the reform 
bill. It has been the consensus conclusion from a lot of folks.
    And what we need to--somebody earlier said we need to move 
from thinking just about building the best airplanes in the 
world here in the United States. We need to build the safest 
airplanes here in the United States. And safety itself is a 
shareholder value, and that needs to be communicated to 
shareholders at Boeing as well, and they need to expect that 
from their leadership because that is what the workers expect 
as well. So, that is, I think, very critical.
    And on these points, as you move forward in thinking about 
safety, the first question I wanted to ask you is about these 
key performance indicators, KPIs, the six of them you have 
outlined and how you would assess Boeing's progress generally 
on each of them. You don't need to go through all six, but how 
you assess progress on these KPIs, because they seem to be the 
linchpins that you are using to kind of turn Boeing on or off 
in terms of progress or moving backwards.
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the KPIs cover the key elements of 
the plan, so they let us know how they are doing on what they 
need to do in the plan. So, for example, we talked about 
traveled work. So, if a fuselage leaves Spirit AeroSystems in 
Kansas and goes to Seattle, and it has a series of faults in 
it, those have to be reworked in an out-of-order sort of 
fashion. And I think that--I think that was implicated in the 
January 5th event.
    So, for example, we measure how much work is done out of 
work as one of those metrics. We are measuring how they are 
doing with their supply chain, whether they have other 
shortages, because supply chain shortages lead to out-of-order 
work in the process; how the employee proficiency is doing and 
how much rework is done. So, the things that you would expect.
    They have been trending in positive directions mostly for 
the 737 line, and they have now been rolled out to other lines 
at Boeing. So, these will be metrics in place for all the 
aircraft that they are building. And what we want to see is 
those metrics all be green and stable before there is growth in 
production.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. And have you concluded that those 
apply directly to building a safer airplane, and is this 
process getting incorporated into the safety management system 
and the quality management system?
    Mr. Whitaker. They are all interrelated, and, in fact, they 
are raising the types of issues you would be looking for in a 
robust safety management system. So, if you saw a lot of out-
of-sequence work, you would identify that as a risk and you 
would say, okay, what do we need to do to mitigate this risk. 
So, we are sort of doing that process for them--or overseeing 
that process.
    But as the safety management system develops, if they are 
finding some other problem, they would identify that and 
mitigate the risk. We are now there with them to look at those 
potential problems.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. So, when we wrote the reform bill 
a couple years back, one of the things I had emphasized is that 
people say, well, this is a Boeing bill. It is like, it is not 
a Boeing bill. This is an FAA bill. It is an aviation 
manufacturing bill. This applies to everybody that it applies 
to, not just--it applies to certainly Boeing as the source of 
the problem, but this gets to the bigger issue of, I said, we 
have two hearings really today. One is what is happening at 
Boeing. The other one is, what is happening with you at FAA 
overseeing the aviation manufacturing process to ensure that we 
have a safe aviation manufacturing process.
    So, can you talk, can you help us understand your comment 
about moving towards a proactive approach versus a reactive 
approach as you apply these principles to overseeing the 
manufacturing of parts, components, and airframes that go into 
flying?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, as we look at oversight, we oversee half 
a dozen or so major actors in the safety system, if you will: 
the airlines, the manufacturers, repair stations and the like, 
including the Air Traffic Organization.
    For each of those, we want to have metrics that we can look 
to, in real time, to see how they are doing and how they are 
trending in the way that we do with airlines, with this index I 
referred to.
    So, this KPI model likely will be a model that we use in 
OEMs to oversee how they are doing and give us a real-time idea 
of how things are trending that goes all the way up to the 
front office of the organization so we have a better view into 
the health of the safety ecosystem.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Thank you.
    I yield back, but I will hang around if we get a second 
round here. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ranking Member Larsen.
    We now go to Senator Hawley--oh, I am sorry--Congressman 
Kiley from California. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kiley. Good morning, Administrator Whitaker. Thank you 
for being with us today. I appreciate your testimony and the 
thoroughness of your testimony regarding oversight of Boeing 
and the comprehensive plan.
    Obviously, there has been a great deal of public concern 
following the flight 1282 incident, among others, and so, I was 
hoping you could take a moment just to sort of speak directly 
to my constituents, folks across the country.
    What is the best assurance that you can provide people to 
give them confidence that these issues are being addressed and 
that the use of Boeing aircraft is safe?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I think we are doing--we are engaged in a 
very intensive oversight of Boeing. So, we have people on the 
floor talking to the employees, watching the inspections take 
place. We have put a cap on production, so they can't increase 
production beyond what we feel like they can safely accomplish.
    When Boeing is ready to deliver an aircraft that they say 
is fully in compliance, we then do our own comprehensive review 
of that aircraft, and we write the airworthiness certificate 
ourselves. So, we are giving a stamp of approval of every 
aircraft that is coming off the line. That is not the normal 
process that would be in place, so, it is a much heightened 
level of scrutiny.
    Mr. Kiley. I appreciate that.
    Now, of course, Boeing's issues have also been in other 
areas, including most recently with regard to their space 
operations and the Starliner mission that wasn't able to return 
the astronauts from the International Space Station, and now 
NASA is relying on SpaceX to bring them home.
    And so, that sort of has put in sharp relief an issue that 
many have raised regarding perhaps the undue scrutiny that your 
agency is giving to SpaceX with a $633,000 fine for launches 
last year recently. And then recently as well, delaying the 
launch, the fifth mission for Starship, 2 months past what the 
license previously said.
    So, I was hoping you could speak to that issue and, in 
particular, whether you think the delay of the Starship launch 
is in the public interest.
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I think safety is in the public interest, 
and that is our primary focus. With the proposed civil penalty, 
it involved a failure to comply with disclosing--well, comply 
with the launch requirements before launching. They launched 
without a permit. The allegations are that they moved a fuel 
farm closer to the population and did not do a risk analysis 
before launching. It is the only tool we have to get compliance 
on safety matters. I think----
    Mr. Kiley [interrupting]. So, how about this delay, are you 
saying that the delay of Starship is for safety reasons?
    Mr. Whitaker. That--well, the civil penalty matter wasn't 
delayed. They launched without a permit. The delay of the 
Starship had to do with SpaceX filing an application and not 
disclosing that they were in violation of Texas and Federal law 
on some matters, and that is a requirement to get a permit.
    Mr. Kiley. So, my question, though, is, is it a safety 
issue? Is that why it is being delayed?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think it is--I think launching these 
rockets is a safety issue into the NAS, and I think it is a 
situation that requires the same level of safety management and 
safety culture that we are working to implement at Boeing, 
needs to also exist with commercial space.
    Mr. Kiley. Yes, I totally agree with you on that. I am 
saying, are the reasons for this delay, which is moving the 
launch back from what was previously communicated, are the 
reasons for the delay safety related?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, the first reason to delay was that 
SpaceX failed to provide an updated sonic boom analysis, so, 
there was a 30-day delay due to that. And then the latest delay 
was their failure to comply with Texas law, which is a 
prerequisite to getting a launch permit.
    Mr. Kiley. Okay. So, assuming for the sake of argument that 
is true, but these are not safety-related reasons?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the sonic boom analysis is a safety-
related incident, so----
    Mr. Kiley [interrupting]. You think the 2-month delay is 
necessary to assure a safe launch?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the 2-month delay is necessary to 
comply with the launch requirements, and I think that is an 
important part of safety culture.
    Mr. Kiley. I guess that my concern is--and you have heard 
this from former FAA officials, you have heard it from both 
sides of the aisle--that our leadership in the commercial space 
industry is absolutely vital to U.S. national security, our 
global leadership, and yet the FAA does not seem like it is 
operating in a way that is conducive with continued innovation 
and that this is an issue where we could have resolved that--
whatever the issues you bring up are without delaying this 
entire launch by 2 months.
    Do you agree that the FAA needs to be reformed in a way 
that is better suited towards the type of innovation that we 
should be moving towards in the commercial space industry?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I agree that this is a vital mission. 
And I think SpaceX has been a very innovative company, but I 
think they are also a mature company. They have been around 20 
years, and I think they need to operate at the highest level of 
safety, and that includes adopting an SMS program, and it 
includes having a whistleblower program.
    Mr. Kiley. So, is there any path to moving up that launch?
    Mr. Whitaker. Complying with the regulations would be the 
best path.
    Mr. Kiley. I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Kiley.
    We have the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Stanton, recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you for being here, Administrator Whitaker, to 
discuss the FAA oversight on Boeing's action plan after the 
concerning events we all witnessed this past January.
    I would first like to ask about Boeing's safety management 
system, the enterprisewide plan across their production system 
that includes streamlining employee reporting channels, 
addressing traveled work risks, and deepening the integration 
between safety and quality measures.
    Mr. Whitaker, Boeing committed to mature its SMS as part of 
its comprehensive action plan. However, Boeing originally 
committed to developing its SMS in 2015, again in 2019, and 
today, and it is still not fully developed. In fact, its 
current SMS has allowed multiple safety incidents, including 
the January 5th 737 MAX door plug accident, to continue to 
occur.
    What is the FAA doing to ensure Boeing fully develops its 
SMS as soon as possible, and how will the FAA ensure Boeing's 
SMS can avoid future production safety issues, including the 
circumstances leading up to the January 5th door plug accident?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, thank you for that. I think that is the 
key question in all of this, because I think a healthy SMS 
system is really the key to operating safely, and Boeing has 
failed to successfully implement in the past. I think the 
difference this time--there are a couple differences. One is 
the requirement to have SMS is now mandatory by law, so, they 
have to comply with it in order to operate.
    And secondly, it is a key element of the comprehensive 
plan, and we are monitoring that very intensively going 
forward, and they will not be able to grow and increase 
production unless they are successful in meeting these safety 
challenges.
    Mr. Stanton. Has the FAA found any indication Boeing 
suppliers contributed to any of the safety lapses the FAA 
identified in its initial audit of the door plug accident?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, the actual investigation into the door 
plug incident is still ongoing, so, I can't comment on that. 
But I think it has been well understood that the quality of 
products that was coming out of Spirit AeroSystems was not 
sufficient, and Boeing has shifted their inspectors down to 
Wichita to make sure that that traveled work problem gets 
resolved.
    Mr. Stanton. What is the agency doing to ensure the 
integrity of the U.S. aerospace supply chain?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, the supply chain is really a corporate 
decision that the OEMs are making. So, some do a lot more in-
house and some delegate. I think Boeing learned that there may 
have been too much delegation that led to some of those supply 
chain issues. But we are making sure that OEMs are holding 
their suppliers to the highest levels of safety, and they are 
responsible for the quality of those products.
    Mr. Stanton. I want to switch gears here and ask you about 
an issue that is very important to the people of my 
constituency in Mesa, in the East Valley part of Phoenix. I 
want to ask you about the Phoenix-Mesa Gateway's air traffic 
control tower. Despite the fact that this is one of the fastest 
growing commercial airports in the country, staffing shortages 
have forced the airport to reduce operations in the tower.
    The FAA reauthorization included my provision directing the 
FAA to establish a pilot program to convert high-activity air 
traffic control towers operating under the contract tower 
program to FAA-staffed visual flight rule towers to alleviate 
issues like the one Mesa Gateway is facing. My office heard 
from the city of Mesa just last week that FAA officials had a 
great meeting with them to discuss next steps forward.
    Do you see any challenges with implementing this staffing 
solution by the 18-month deadline outlined in the 
reauthorization bill?
    Mr. Whitaker. I also heard that there was a very productive 
meeting, so, hopefully that means that we are on track and we 
will work to make sure that we meet that deadline.
    Mr. Stanton. Do you, the agency, need anything else from us 
and Congress to keep this as an important priority?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I would just say that our system is 
full of very old infrastructure, so, we are constantly in need 
of upgrading the infrastructure. The BIL funding for 
infrastructure, while extensive, only allowed us to upgrade 
about 10 percent of our infrastructure. So, we still have a 
significant backlog in that space.
    Mr. Stanton. Okay. I just want you to know that that is a 
very important issue to the entire airspace issue in the 
Phoenix metropolitan region. It is obviously a former Air Force 
facility that can grow, and as the number of flights are 
growing in and out of the region, it is a real opportunity. And 
one of the major limiting factors is having a contract tower, 
not it being an FAA tower. So, we got it in the bill. Your 
support to make that happen is very much appreciated.
    Mr. Whitaker. Great.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you so much.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Stanton.
    The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Whitaker--Administrator Whitaker, excuse me--one of the 
big issues at Boeing is the breakdown in communication, the way 
I see it. I appreciate the Speak Up program, but how is Boeing 
improving communication between different teams to ensure 
quality control issues do not slip through the cracks?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, making sure that there is a robust 
program in place where the employees can speak up is a key 
component of the safety management system, and it is required 
for success. That is where you get your best information, is 
from the floor. So, we are watching very diligently to make 
sure that that program is available and is being used. So, we 
are doing surveys of employees and talking with folks on the 
ground.
    But the employees have multiple pathways, including coming 
directly to FAA if they don't feel like they can speak up at 
Boeing. They can come to our website and file information there 
as well.
    Mr. Burchett. How will folks be reviewed or responded to 
that do those kind of things?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, there is--at FAA, we have a very 
regimented program to protect identity, and each claim gets 
investigated very thoroughly. And we are working to make sure 
that that same approach is taken at Boeing so there is no 
retaliation. In fact, people should be recognized for speaking 
up, and we are seeing an uptick in reports over the course of 
this year.
    Mr. Burchett. Do we have any metrics that show that it has 
improved the operations through this new line of 
communications--or old line, I guess I should say?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the best metric is going to be 
employee surveys, and I can respond back to your office to see 
if we have any additional specific information about that.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay. Most of the folks up here, me included, 
our space exploration or rocketry skills basically are 4th of 
July shooting some bottle rockets or maybe have an Estes rocket 
that their dad helped make, a very cool D-2 that the first 
launch went into a huge oak tree in my neighbor's yard and 
still never been able to recover that.
    But I am curious about those poor folks that seem to be 
trapped in outer space. Are they--I had a constituent lady, 
Denise Lambert I believe was her name, had asked about those 
folks. And do we think they are going to get home safely and 
soon?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, it is a little bit outside my portfolio. 
My oversight----
    Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. I realize that, but that is--
--
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Burchett [continuing]. That is kind of what everybody 
is talking about.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes. Well, all I can say is I hope so.
    Mr. Burchett. Well, that is a very graded answer, I will 
say. Thank you.
    Another area of concern, of course, is the employee 
training, specifically, employees' adherence to work 
instructions. In the comprehensive action plan, they committed 
to simplifying work instructions for mechanics and inspectors 
so that they be able to perform checks in a consistent manner.
    Now, to your knowledge, has Boeing revised any of their 
preexisting instructions manuals yet?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, my understanding is they have completed 
an assessment of the work instructions to identify the areas 
where they need to simplify the instructions. So, that process 
has been underway. How many have actually been simplified at 
this point, I don't know, but I do know that there has been 
progress in that space.
    Mr. Burchett. Do you think that simplifying the processes 
and procedures helps increase consistency during that process?
    Mr. Whitaker. It helps increase consistency, it reduces 
confusion and conflict, and it needs to correspond with more 
training as well.
    Mr. Burchett. Did you all consider the stakeholder and the 
FAA's feedback when you developed those simplified processes 
and procedures?
    Mr. Whitaker. Can you say that again?
    Mr. Burchett. Did you consider--sorry, I am from east 
Tennessee. It is the only place in America where people don't 
speak with an accent, so, I guess I can understand you not 
getting that.
    Did Boeing consider stakeholder and Federal Aviation 
Administration feedback when developing simplified processes 
and procedures?
    Mr. Whitaker. They did. They had the results of our own 
audit, they had the results of the section 103 panel that was 
put together, and also employee feedback directly.
    Mr. Burchett. What about the FAA, have they changed their 
approach to oversight of industry compliance?
    Mr. Whitaker. We have changed our oversight to Boeing 
extensively by having inspectors on the floor, by putting this 
cap on production, by having these metrics that we are 
monitoring. And then we are looking more broadly at the 
oversight models for all segments of aviation, including OEMs.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, since I am a generous soul, I am going to 
yield back the remainder, 20 seconds, of my time.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    The gentleman from Tennessee, were you trying to draw a 
connection between the rocket that got stuck in the oak tree 
and--otherwise it would have reached the International Space 
Station? Is that what you were----
    Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. I was. I was actually making 
the point that that is about my knowledge, and I realize that 
is about everybody up here's knowledge. And they have all 
googled some really cool stuff on this, I am sure, but the 
reality is that is about as far as it goes, Mr. Chairman.
    Sorry to deflate everybody's ego on both sides of the 
aisle. But if you know how to get that thing out of that oak 
tree, I will be with you. My brother climbed up there years 
ago, and he never could quite make it to the top.
    So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for pointing out something 
very important to me.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Yes. Yes, we will get the full 
resources of the Transportation Committee on that. Thank you.
    The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Administrator, before I ask you about Boeing, I want to 
switch topics for just a minute. Section 502 of the FAA 
reauthorization bill authorized 10 new slot exemptions at DCA 
for service to domestic airports either within or beyond the 
1,250-mile perimeter.
    That decision was supposed to have been made last month. 
There was a 60-day deadline. I know it is not right on you, but 
I am asking you if you would talk to the Secretary and see if 
you can get us some idea of what is happening with that or if 
it is coming soon or if there is a problem.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you. Thank you, ma'am. As you say, it 
is a DOT process that has been running, and I know they have 
received a lot of comments in that process. And they are 
certainly adjudicating those comments, but I will certainly 
take that up.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. Thank you.
    Reid International Airport is in my district and the air 
traffic is just increasing by leaps and bounds. I think we 
welcomed 57.6 million passengers last year, and that shattered 
the previous record by 5 million.
    So, what is happening in the airspace is really important 
to our economy, and I am concerned about the safety and 
efficiency and all that. So, I appreciate what you are doing.
    I would like to ask you, though, about section 430 of the 
FAA reauthorization bill, and that requires you all to update 
the aviation safety inspector model within 2 years so you can 
have a better idea of the workforce.
    During a recent Senate hearing, you testified the FAA had 
deployed 24 inspectors to Boeing, and your target was 55 
inspectors. And then in your testimony today, you mentioned 
that you have added some more safety inspectors at Boeing and 
at Spirit.
    I wondered just how many you have added and what you have 
been doing to recruit, hire, and train these new inspectors.
    Mr. Whitaker. So, the goal is to have 55 inspectors 
deployed at the Boeing and Spirit facilities by the end of the 
year. We are on track to do that. I don't know our exact number 
today, I think it is in the 40s.
    We have been able to hire fairly experienced inspectors on 
average with 20 years of experience, and we have also brought 
some inspectors in from other areas of FAA. We have a training 
program at Oklahoma City that we put new inspectors through and 
then on-the-job training. So, we have been able to find good 
inspectors and experienced inspectors to deploy onto this 
project.
    Ms. Titus. So, you are optimistic that you are going to 
meet that goal?
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. Well, that is good to hear.
    Another question. Since the Alaska Airlines incident in 
January, it has become real apparent, we have heard about it 
here today, that there was a need for cultural change at Boeing 
when it came to safety. It should have been the priority, but 
it kind of slid a bit.
    The new CEO, Mr. Ortberg, is an engineer. Are you confident 
that this change at the executive level will foster a change in 
that culture and help to kind of move Boeing back in the 
direction where it should be?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, as you indicated, Mr. Ortberg is an 
engineer with an aerospace background. But I am not necessarily 
placing my confidence in that solving all problems. So, we are 
going to continue our intensive oversight.
    I have had a couple of conversations with Mr. Ortberg, and 
he understands our focus on that long-term project to change 
the safety. And we will stay very engaged to make sure that 
happens.
    Ms. Titus. The Boeing comprehensive action plan seems to be 
a step in the right direction, I have heard you say, but I want 
to know how the FAA is going to enforce oversight if they 
should fall short of their key performance indicators.
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the key difference now between 
previous challenges with Boeing is that we have put a 
production cap in place. In order for Boeing to meet any of its 
other financial objectives, it is going to have to get past 
those production levels, which means it has to operate safely. 
It has to have a robust safety risk assessment system. And we 
are going stay very intensely engaged with them as they go on 
that journey.
    Ms. Titus. And what are the consequences if they don't meet 
those requirements?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, the consequences are they can't 
increase production, from our perspective.
    Ms. Titus. All right.
    Mr. Whitaker. We are not really focused on what the 
financial outcomes are. But we are really just focused on 
making sure that those indicators are green, they are stable, 
and if they are going to grow, they have a plan for how to keep 
those indicators green.
    Ms. Titus. Okay. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Whitaker, Boeing has made multiple commitments to the 
FAA to strengthen certain safety practices in exchange for 
deferring civil penalties or other enforcement actions. This 
includes settlement agreements made in 2015, 2021, 2024 with 
the FAA and the Department of Justice to, among other things, 
enhance its safety compliance programs. Despite these 
agreements, Boeing has continued to experience multiple safety 
issues.
    Has the FAA seen any progress in FAA safety compliance 
programs as a result of these settlements?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I have been quite focused on--since I 
joined 11 months ago, I have been very focused on the events of 
January 5th which happened 10 weeks into my tenure. I have done 
a little research into some previous efforts, so, I am aware 
that there have been challenges before.
    That is really one reason why we have taken a different 
approach in a couple of key ways. One is that production cap, 
which really gives us the leverage we need to make sure these 
changes happen, but also getting these key performance 
indicators so we have a real-time view on how things are going 
on the floor, on the production line, and then also having 
direct contact with employees to understand what is happening 
on the safety culture.
    So, those, I think, make a different situation than there 
was before.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Whitaker, whistleblowers have been an important part of 
the investigation process. Since the January 5th accident, we 
have been tracking a significant increase in employee concerns.
    What is the FAA doing to ensure that any whistleblower 
complaints are properly vetted in a timely manner, and has this 
increase in quantity resulted in any processing delays?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, we have had an increase in quantity. We 
have a very regimented program at the FAA. So, these complaints 
are immediately examined for safety-of-flight concerns and 
analyzed to see if there is immediate action taken, and then 
they are assigned to the relevant group that oversees that 
particular subject matter area.
    We also work to protect the identity of the whistleblower, 
and then ultimately respond to that whistleblower with an 
outcome after the investigation.
    Mr. Carbajal. How have you, what steps have you taken to 
safeguard the employees from retaliation, which is a natural 
thing that happens in many of these environments?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, any allegations of retaliation that we 
receive we refer to the Department of Labor which has 
jurisdiction over that aspect of employment in the country. So, 
they follow those matters through their own processes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr.--actually, you are not here.
    I recognize Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for sharing your 
insights with us today.
    The aviation industry is not just dealing with isolated 
technical failures; we are confronting a troubling pattern. 
Incident after incident has revealed the culture of compromised 
safety, diminished trust, and inefficiency.
    When passengers board a plane, they place their trust in us 
to ensure their safety from takeoff to landing. Likewise, over 
1 million aviation workers rely on a safe environment to do 
their jobs. Yet tragically, that trust is eroding.
    Last month's Boeing tire explosion in Georgia is a stark 
reminder of our shared responsibility and the urgent need for 
reform. The message is clear: Safety cannot be rushed.
    As the FAA has made clear, restoring public confidence in 
our air travel must be our top priority. We need a firm 
commitment to empower regulatory bodies like the FAA with the 
resources and authority to hold companies accountable. Safety 
protocols must never be optional or negotiable.
    Administrator Whitaker, in your testimony, you mentioned 
the FAA has increased the number of safety inspectors at Boeing 
and Spirit AeroSystems facilities in response to systemic 
production quality issues. Does the FAA have the capacity to 
sustain this increased oversight, and are there any plans to 
expand it further?
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir.
    We do have the capacity to maintain this level of 
oversight, and we intend to maintain this level of oversight 
indefinitely, certainly till we see the culture change and SMS 
deployment that is expected, and that is probably measured in 
years. So, we are in it for the long term.
    We will continue to assess, as we go along, if we have 
additional need for additional inspectors. And then we will 
either reallocate resources or come back to you and ask for 
more.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. In your testimony, you 
emphasized the FAA's commitment to safety and the need for 
increased oversight and accountability following safety 
incidents like the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 incident.
    Do you foresee a need for increased resources and 
authorities at this time in order to effectively implement the 
comprehensive action plan for Boeing to ensure continuous 
oversight of its manufacturing processes?
    Mr. Whitaker. I believe we have the resources that we need 
to carry out this oversight with Boeing. And as we continue to 
review our other oversight models in the system, we will keep 
this committee informed on whether there are additional needs 
for resources or whether we need to reallocate resources 
between groups.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
    In your testimony, you mentioned how the FAA has capped the 
production of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to achieve system 
stability and compliance with quality control procedures.
    Can you explain what FAA means by system stability and how 
it would measure system stability and at what point production 
can be safely ramped up again?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, one example of system stability is 
measuring whether the work is done in the proper sequence. As 
an aircraft moves through the production line, there are 
specific tasks at specific stations. If those are done out of 
order, it creates a risk that there will be some mistake in 
that work or that you will have to disassemble some other part 
to do an assembly that should have happened earlier in the 
process.
    So, that is an example of a metric that we look at very 
closely to make sure the proper order of assembly is completed, 
and that gives us a sense of whether there is stability in the 
system.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
    Boeing's new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, has emphasized the 
importance of safety culture reforms. How will the FAA monitor 
and verify these cultural shifts within Boeing over the long 
term, and what measures will be implemented to ensure that 
employees feel safe coming forward with their concerns?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think the key metric in that is going to be 
employee surveys, and we will be looking at the employee 
surveys that Boeing completes and then complete our own level 
of assessment of employee surveys. I think that is the best way 
of understanding whether the safety culture is taking. We will 
also be looking at the number of whistleblower complaints and 
how people are--whether they are feeling free to speak up.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman yields back.
    The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Garcia, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, 
and Administrator Whitaker for being here today.
    This past July, Boeing announced that it intends to 
reacquire Spirit AeroSystems, one of its major suppliers and 
manufacturing partners. And they previously had sold Spirit in 
2009 as part of a decision to cut costs.
    Although reacquiring Spirit would simplify manufacturing 
processes and could help reduce errors, the missing bolts that 
caused the door plug incident were removed at a Boeing 
facility, not Spirit AeroSystems.
    Given that the FAA's quality control audit of Boeing 
discovered 97 instances of noncompliance, why should we be 
confident that Boeing has the capacity to manage the extra 
manufacturing responsibilities?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, the manufacturer, of course, makes 
decisions about supply chain policy and strategy. And Boeing is 
making the decision that it can exercise more control over 
Spirit if it acquires it. We don't have an opinion on whether 
that is a good idea or a bad idea. We just need to make sure 
that they are exercising that control.
    They have made quite a few changes in the process already 
to make sure fewer defects are coming out of Spirit AeroSystems 
by moving inspectors down to that facility. But our main focus 
is whether they are getting products that are complying with 
the type design. So, whether that is through direct ownership 
or other means of oversight is really a corporate decision.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Administrator.
    And as a followup to that, what is the FAA doing to ensure 
that, if this acquisition goes through, that Boeing has the 
protocols in place to implement the strong safety standards?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, we will continue to look at the 
oversight that they are exercising directly, if they acquire 
Spirit. We currently have five inspectors at Spirit. But once--
if this acquisition goes through, then we will also have direct 
regulatory authority over Spirit. So, we will be able to have 
direct inspections and oversight of their operations.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
    Next, I would like to focus on worker experience and the 
factors that play into Boeing's culture of safety. One of the 
items that Boeing outlined in its action plan is to improve the 
employee reporting channel called Speak Up. It is crucial that 
employees feel empowered to report safety concerns at any point 
in the production process, something that has been lacking up 
until now.
    Boeing has a documented history of prioritizing a high-
production volume and profits over safety. It also has a 
history of ignoring and retailing--retaliating--pardon me--
against employees who report concerns. Former engineers of the 
company have testified before Congress describing how reporting 
safety concerns has been met with hostility.
    Boeing's action plan says it aims to improve reporting by 
creating, quote, ``a more user-friendly reporting interface and 
increasing promotion of the benefits of reporting.'' This 
doesn't sound that convincing of an attempt to change a deeply 
dysfunctional culture.
    Can you elaborate on Boeing's plans to address employee 
reporting, and does the FAA plan to conduct oversight on this 
action?
    Mr. Whitaker. We do plan to conduct oversight. In fact, the 
willingness of employees to speak up and identify safety 
concerns is really one of the key sources of safety information 
for a safety management system. Safety management systems are 
designed to find risk, and then the company needs to mitigate 
those risks. And employees are a great source of information.
    Boeing knows that this is priority. We are monitoring their 
deployment of the system, and we will continue to engage with 
employees and watch to see the level of reporting that results.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And are you optimistic that there 
will be culture change as it relates to safety practices?
    Mr. Whitaker. There has to be culture change. They won't be 
able to go back to producing aircraft at the level they want 
without that culture change.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Administrator, for your 
time.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentlelady from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for joining us again 
here today. We really appreciate your time.
    I really want to echo the sentiments that our ranking 
member said as well. We really do feel there are two hearings 
going on today, one about Boeing but one about the overall job 
that the FAA is doing, particularly on the air maintenance and 
technician staffing that we currently have, obviously a 
critical shortage that impacts many aspects of overall aviation 
safety.
    Can you speak to the progress that Boeing is making as they 
implement its action plan for increased mechanic and technician 
training goals as well as overall boosting public trust on this 
particular issue?
    There is only so much that good internal policies can do if 
we are not externally communicating them and making sure the 
public is aware of it. That provides a critical oversight layer 
as well. And then a subpart of that is, what, more broadly, is 
the FAA doing to ensure a broad and ready workforce here?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, three questions there.
    And I will start by, I think the maintenance and training 
has been a challenge for Boeing. It has been a challenge 
throughout the industry after COVID because of all the 
retirements and the loss of, I think, a natural transfer of 
knowledge from generation to generation. The best companies 
recognize that as a safety risk with their safety management 
program, and they mitigate those risks by putting in extra 
training, bringing back retired employees to do mentoring, 
those types of things.
    Boeing recognizes that was a problem. The level of 
experience they are getting in their hiring is much lower than 
it used to be. So, they are now increasing that training. And 
part of the comprehensive plan was assessing those training 
levels and deploying more training, and that is underway.
    I think as far as the public trust is concerned, I think 
the most important thing is that we hold Boeing to all of the 
elements of this comprehensive plan and see progress on that 
safety culture change and continue to deliver over the years. 
It is probably a little bit of a long-term project to rebuild 
that trust, but I think it will flow naturally out of having 
that safety culture and continuing to improve their operations.
    From our perspective, we are also recruiting from the same 
pool of potential aviation employers. And we work very hard to 
increase the size of that pool and including programs where we 
work in elementary schools and in high schools to get younger 
students interested in the career field. It is very 
competitive, and we have quite a few initiatives underway to 
generate interest among younger generations to join this field.
    Ms. Scholten. Well, I would encourage you as well to 
continue to seek ways that you can get that information out 
into the public. I actually disagree that it flows naturally. 
While making the internal changes is the most important thing, 
the safety concerns that have been raised by high-profile 
incidents in the last several years permeate into the public 
conscience and really hurt the industry.
    It is important for the public to know and for the FAA to 
proactively communicate about those things so that the public 
can know what they can count on, the measures that are being 
taken, and so that they can play an important role in that 
critical oversight as well.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
    Ms. Scholten. I want to move on to one other quick 
question. The Alaska Airlines flight 1282 incident was, of 
course, unacceptable and tragic. Fortunately, thanks to 
coordination between the pilot and air traffic control, no one 
was harmed during the emergency. Air traffic control towers are 
paramount to everyday flight operations, protecting safety and 
efficiency of our National Airspace System.
    You know that I have been a huge champion of replacing our 
air traffic control tower, one of the oldest FAA-owned air 
traffic control towers in the entire country. At 60 years old, 
it is the oldest among the top 75 busiest airports in the 
entire country.
    This tower is out of compliance with safety and ADA 
regulations, raising serious safety concerns for west 
Michiganders. I am thankful that we have had several productive 
conversations, but we are ready to move into the action phase.
    So, on behalf of all Michiganders, does the FAA have any 
updates that it can give to us today on how it can address 
these critical concerns with GRR's air traffic control tower so 
that the airport can best be equipped to respond to emergencies 
in the, God forbid, event that they might occur?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, we can certainly respond directly to your 
office on any updates that we may have, but I think it raises a 
very important point that our infrastructure is in need of 
significant investment across the board. And the 2025 budget 
that was presented includes $8 billion to continue the 
infrastructure upgrading that happened under BIL, and there is 
a lot more to do.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you for the additional time. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ms. Scholten.
    The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Auchincloss, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    Welcome back, Administrator.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
    Mr. Auchincloss. When you last came here, it was a more 
informal roundtable discussion. I asked you about FAA 
investigations into the two runway near-misses that had 
occurred, both of those flights. One was at Logan, I believe, 
and was en route from DCA to Logan. So, they affect my 
constituents in Massachusetts. You assured me of a swift, 
certain, and comprehensive investigation.
    What is the status of those investigations?
    Mr. Whitaker. I am happy to respond to your office with any 
specifics around those particular investigations. I don't have 
that information with me right here.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Do you know, have they concluded at this 
point?
    Mr. Whitaker. They would normally have been concluded by 
this point, yes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Okay. So, we would like to see the results 
of that investigation----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Sure.
    Mr. Auchincloss [continuing]. And any remedial actions that 
are being taken.
    Similar note, can you talk about the implementation of 
increased hiring for new air traffic controllers now that we 
have passed the FAA reauthorization and the new statute behind 
that? How is that going, and how is the relationship with the 
air traffic controllers evolving? I know there was some 
friction with the New York issue. Give us an update on the 
ATCs.
    Mr. Whitaker. I think we have a strong relationship. I was 
at the air traffic controller safety conference last week, 
speaking. So, I think it is a good relationship.
    The hiring process has been fairly intensive. We have 
really looked at every possible knob that we can turn to 
increase the field of qualified hires. Last year's objective 
was 1,650 hires. This year it was 1,800. We announced yesterday 
that we have exceeded that slightly for this year. Next year, 
the goal will be 2,000, and that will be a heavy lift.
    We are continuing to expand capacity at the academy. We are 
also working with the CTI schools to develop an enhanced CTI 
program that allows the CTI schools, if they have the proper 
equipment and the proper curriculum, to train air traffic 
controllers so all they have to do is take the aptitude test 
and then be hired right into the facilities.
    Now, there is a long lead time on that. This would be the 
first academic year that we hope to have some students. It will 
probably be another year before we start to see more output.
    We have also made it easier for military controllers to be 
hired in upon retirement. So, it used to be a twice-a-year 
event. Now it is a rolling event. So, your retirement date 
doesn't matter.
    So, we have really kind of looked under every rock to try 
to make the system better. I think this year the focus is going 
to be making the actual processing part more efficient. It 
involves medical, background check, all these other steps that 
folks have to go through, so, try to make that process easier.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Understood. And, of course, recruitment is 
important but also, so is retention, particularly if you are 
experienced ATCs. And that requires engagement and solicitation 
from the air traffic controllers about their quality-of-life 
concerns, their scheduling concerns, their safety concerns. So, 
I just encourage you to really----
    Mr. Whitaker [interrupting]. In that regard, we have 
implemented new fatigue rules that just were rolled out this 
year that will make sure that we are having adequate rests 
between shifts. So, I think that is going to be not only a 
safety enhancement but a quality-of-life improvement as well.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Logan is one of the more challenging 
airports for the air traffic controllers. We have got an old 
tower----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Auchincloss [continuing]. As well.
    Mr. Whitaker. I have visited that. Yes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Those women and men work hard and they 
work in pretty tough conditions, and we need to ensure that 
they are set up for success in their safety mission.
    Mr. Whitaker. I would--I actually identify Logan tower as 
of an example of our underinvestment----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. In the sense----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. We would agree.
    Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. We haven't been able to deploy 
DataComm in Boston because there is no physical space in that 
tower for the computer rooms with adequate air-conditioning and 
cooling. So, it is an example of how that old infrastructure is 
really hampering modernization.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Final question for you. Does the FAA have 
any scope or opinion on the decision by some American airlines 
to cease flights into Israel? I believe Delta and United have 
stopped flying. Is that an area that they check in with the FAA 
on, or is that a unilateral decision that they make?
    Mr. Whitaker. That would be an airline decision. The role 
of FAA really is around NOTAMs and safety of flight, that type 
of issue. So, we do communicate with, particularly in this 
instance which is constantly changing in real time, and we 
provide guidance on NOTAMs and safety.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Do you have guidance from the FAA on the 
safety of flying into Tel Aviv or Jerusalem?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think at this point we are mirroring the 
NOTAMs that are put in place by Israel for where you can fly 
and don't fly. So, we don't provide anything beyond that. But 
we do have--for the carriers that fly to that region, usually 
they have a classified status, so we can give them intel 
briefings when they make their decisions.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Okay. I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    The gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As cochair of the Quiet Skies Caucus and the Member who 
represents the District of Columbia, which is plagued by 
airplane and helicopter noise, I urge the FAA to do more to 
combat aviation noise and to engage more with affected 
communities on this matter. If the FAA needs additional 
authority or resources to combat aviation noise, I urge the FAA 
to inform this committee of what it needs.
    Mr. Whitaker, safety must be the FAA's top priority. Should 
the American public have confidence that it is safe to fly on 
Boeing airplanes?
    Mr. Whitaker. They should. We write the air worthiness 
certificate for each aircraft that comes off the line. We have 
inspectors that are on the floor every day overseeing the 
process, talking with employees. We are monitoring the health 
of the production facility, and we do our own inspection of the 
aircraft before they get their air worthiness certificate. So, 
they can be confident that the aircraft are safe.
    Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that.
    In its comprehensive action plan, Boeing committed to 
encouraging its employees to report safety concerns.
    What assurances can the FAA offer that Boeing will not 
retaliate against employees for reporting safety concerns?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, this is something that we monitor 
closely because the ability of employees to speak up is a key 
component of a healthy safety management system and a healthy 
safety culture. So, we will watch that closely.
    We talk to employees directly. We look at employee surveys 
and culture surveys. And if there are any claims of 
retaliation, we refer those to the Department of Labor for 
investigation.
    Ms. Norton. In its comprehensive action plan, Boeing--I 
guess I asked that question. I am sorry. Thank you very much.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
    Administrator--sorry. Allergies. That is another problem.
    First of all, thank you for the work you have done so far. 
Very challenging times. The last time we spoke at the 
roundtable, we talked a little bit about the challenges 
changing a culture. We have found out a lot since you have been 
there, including a story today in the New York Times about the 
GAO's report just confirming a lot of things we already knew.
    But my question was consistent with our previous 
conversation, if you remember it, when you brought up General 
Electric. In that conversation, my memory is there had just 
been a story about Boeing that it used to be an engineering 
company, and it had changed, which is an example of a culture 
change in multiple things.
    We have done a lot of research on the pharmaceutical 
industry. Used to be that people were researchers and they were 
chemists and biologists, and then the chief financial officer 
became the CEO. Nothing wrong with that.
    But then the challenge for you in this culture where safety 
is such a premium for long-term investment, whether it is 
Boeing or the airlines or any other subcontractor, there is so 
much pressure to get return on investment, under the Supreme 
Court's decision, that for a publicly traded company, your 
number one liability is the better business plan, which means 
return on investment.
    So, here is an industry that is sort of a utility in an 
old-fashioned way where it is a public-private partnership, and 
the EU looks at it that way and Japan looks at it this way. But 
because of the investment community, starting with Carl Icahn, 
I mean, it is sort of a canary in the coal mine when you look 
back at this period.
    Balancing that responsibility, given these other moving 
parts and regulatory and judicial decisions and congressional 
decisions, getting Boeing to becoming an engineering company 
where the investors value that for long-term and short-term 
investments, how do you view that when you--you have got the 
inspectors on the ground. You have got risk assessments. They 
are worried about liability. Certainly, the air carriers are 
worried about that one big incident that will crater return on 
investment, which is where I started in the near-miss at SFO.
    So, talk to me a little bit about that challenge. You have 
very specific regulatory administrative authority in a world 
where there is lots of different pressures.
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, it is an interesting observation. And I 
think I would say that even if profits were your number one 
goal, safety really needs to be your number one goal because it 
is hard to be profitable if you are not safe. And I think 
Boeing certainly has learned that. Whatever money might have 
been saved has certainly been lost in the fallout.
    So, regardless of what your other objectives are, if you 
don't start with safety, your chances of succeeding are very 
poor, whether you are an airline or a manufacturer.
    So, that is what we are looking at is just to see that 
there is a real safety culture, not just ``safety is first'' as 
a slogan, but a real safety culture that permeates everything 
that is done and comes first before production goals or 
operational goals or mission goals or financial goals. So, that 
is really our focus.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. So, just to follow up on that on the risk 
assessment. And I am not complaining about return on 
investment. It is just a reasonable rate of return for long 
term. So, companies constantly do risk assessment. Boeing has 
done it, to the ranking member's earlier questions about risk 
assessment, but risk assessment when these competing interests.
    So, right now, my sense is that Boeing in the industry has 
generally realized, okay, the spotlight is on us. We have got 
to let our investment community--but in a world where investors 
are instantaneously mobile and could go to a higher rate of 
return with--they are looking for lower risks, therein lies, I 
think, one of the real challenges to get this as a sustainable 
safety culture for as long as possible for all of the 
stakeholders, the flying public in particular.
    I get it. I understand right now the spotlight is on them. 
But if we start moving back to quarterly returns and 
pressures--and they are legitimate concerns. I am not--these 
are the challenges that we are partners to.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes. And I think our oversight model of 
Boeing has certainly changed dramatically this year. So, we 
have moved from an audit approach to much more of a boots-on-
the-ground inspection approach. We have got these key 
performance indicators that we monitor on a weekly basis so we 
can see exactly what is happening in the system. And, of 
course, we have a cap in place on production. So, we feel like 
we have the tools to monitor this carefully and closely, and I 
think this is a model for how we should be monitoring the 
safety of the NAS.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. You got my mind started on when 
you made the Jack Welch observation.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    The gentleman from South Dakota, Mr. Johnson, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Administrator, obviously there has been a lot of public 
attention paid to the challenges Boeing has faced, as well as 
the FAA's role in all of that.
    What do you think is the most commonly misunderstood aspect 
of what is going on between the FAA and Boeing?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the comprehensive plan, as we 
have talked about with Boeing, includes some very short-term 
changes. But the ultimate mission is very long term. So, we are 
sort of balancing these two: the short term and the long term.
    Short term is employee training. It is cutting down on 
traveled work. It is deploying tool tracking technology, part 
tracking technology. These things are happening, and they are 
making progress.
    Long term is a years-long process to really change that 
safety culture, let the employees feel like it has really 
changed, and start to see that evidence.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, yes, let's continue to 
talk about culture. I thought my colleague immediately prior 
did a good job of trying to tease out some of the culture 
issues.
    Clearly, there are some short-term issues that I think are 
complicating your long-term push. I mean, we have got 
machinists striking at Boeing. I assume that is an impediment 
to some of the culture change?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, the strike stops some of the work that 
is going on. So, some of the pilot programs to deploy new 
technologies, some of the training certainly is stopping, and 
we are monitoring that situation closely. So, when and if 
workers go back to work, we will assess how much additional 
training might be needed. So, it does interrupt this process, 
but the plan itself will still need to be deployed.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. And then we talked a little 
bit about new CEO Ortberg being on the job for less than a 
month or I guess about a month. I am not really asking about 
the top spot. A CEO is incredibly important as a culture 
officer, but we also know that culture is a lot--is way more 
than just one person.
    What is your assessment about the next two or three rungs 
of top management? I mean, has the wakeup call been sufficient 
enough for them to understand the magnitude of the change that 
is needed?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I have had several conversations with 
various board members around the need for a long-term plan on 
safety and what needs to happen, what the primary focus ought 
to be. They have made some changes at the board level. 
Obviously, the CEO changes have been made. And there have been 
changes in that next layer of management as well.
    So, I can't sort of grade each official in that realm. We 
are really just focused on performance and making sure that 
they are actually executing the plan and monitoring that very 
closely.
    So, we have weekly meetings on the floor. We have monthly 
meetings of the safety leaders and then quarterly meetings with 
the CEO and that senior team. And these are day-long, roll up 
your sleeves, go through 8 hours of PowerPoints and tours kind 
of meetings to get a sense of how this is going. So, we are 
evaluating that at every level.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. You talk about the need to 
pursue both some short-term objectives as well as the longer 
term mission. What is the most concerning threat in your mind 
toward actually accomplishing the long-term goal?
    Mr. Whitaker. Sustaining the momentum, and I think this 
can't be viewed as a 9- or 12-month project. Year by year, the 
message has to be safety, communications have to be safety, and 
then the employees have to see it in action. If something is 
wrong, an employee says something, the reaction has to be, 
okay, let's assess this safety risk and do what we need to, not 
hurry up and get back to work.
    So, I think on the floor, they are going to be able to 
detect whether it is happening.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. You want a heightened urgency, 
a focused attention day in and day out.
    You talked about these extended meetings, working through 
PowerPoints. How do you gauge in these conversations whether or 
not real progress is being made?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, those conversations don't necessarily 
tell us the real progress. We do surveys of employees. We have 
our folks on the ground talking to employees so we can gauge 
how they are feeling about speaking up, whether they are seeing 
something change. And the inspectors on the floor are able to 
understand what the communications are that are coming out. Is 
it about production, is it about hurry up, or is it about 
safety and training and that type of thing? So, we are 
assessing it at all levels.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Very good. Thank you much.
    Sir, I yield back.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
    The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Whitaker, thank you for being here.
    I have a very brief statement first before I have some 
questions.
    For two decades, as we know, Boeing has promoted 
unqualified managers who have made disastrous decisions like 
outsourcing America's supply chains. And this has happened, 
quite frankly, in Government. It has happened in corporate 
America. It has happened at just about every level of our 
society.
    The best way to create opportunity for those who don't have 
it is not by lowering standards. It is by increasing education 
for them. It is by increasing focus. It is by increasing energy 
and meritocracy. I hope as we go forward--because Boeing is a 
very physical sign of what has happened, and it is a bigger 
issue than just even Boeing. It is something that is running 
through our country right now, and it is serious.
    And if we want to be number one in the world, which is my 
goal always for the United States of America, we need to change 
the way we are going about business. We need to help people, to 
give them opportunity. But they need to be able to rise to the 
occasion, and we need to help them to do that, not to lower the 
standards, not to put people in jobs in which they are not 
qualified.
    So, that is my statement.
    In July, I sent you a letter on the FAA reauthorization, as 
you know. We heard from your office actually this morning, 
which I now submit for the record.
    This letter includes an invitation for you to come----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
   Letter of July 26, 2024, to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, 
    Federal Aviation Administration, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, 
          Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
                     Congress of the United States,
                                House of Representatives,  
                                          Washington, DC 20515,    
                                                   July 26, 2024.  
The Honorable Michael Whitaker,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
        Washington, DC 20591.

RE:  The Federal Aviation Administration's Organizational Structure, 
and Programs to Unleash American Aviation

    Dear Mr. Whitaker,
    On May 16th of this year the FAA Reauthorization of 2024 became 
law. This landmark aviation legislation includes policies of great 
consequence to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and to my 
community of South Jersey. South Jersey has been the proud home of the 
FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center for 65 years. Recently, the 
Technical Center served a critical role in the FAA's NextGen airspace 
modernization program and is correspondingly located within the 
``Office of NextGen.'' The FAA Reauthorization mandates major changes 
to these programs and directs the establishment of new organizational 
structures.
    This policy letter contains views of legislative intent and 
recommendations to aid the FAA in executing the FAA Reauthorization and 
your broader mission. Major themes include:
      That the Airspace Modernization Office (AMO) should adopt 
an all-of-agency approach that coordinates business lines to facilitate 
the integration of new systems and capabilities into the national air 
transportation system.
      That the NextGen Office (ANG) should be combined with 
certain Program Management Office (PMO) functions to form an AMO with a 
direct report line to the Administrator.
      That the FAA Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace 
should function semi-autonomously under the unitary management of the 
Technical Center Director and be organizationally located within AMO.
      That the Technical Center is positioned to administer new 
programs and capabilities, including the Center for Advanced Aviation 
Technologies.

    This letter also serves as a personal invitation for you to visit 
South Jersey and meet with our robust aviation research community.
               Forming the Airspace Modernization Office
    ``Section 206. Future of NextGen'' gives the FAA until December 31, 
2025, to operationalize and sunset the NextGen Office. ``Section 207. 
Airspace Modernization Office'' gives a deadline of January 1, 2026, to 
establish the eponymous organization. This new AMO has responsibilities 
that include research and development, systems engineering, enterprise 
architecture, portfolio management, National Airspace System (NAS) 
digitization, system interoperability, and a major emphasis on long-
term integration planning.
    The FAA's greatest airspace modernization challenge is coordinating 
the integration of new entrants and technologies that improve safety. 
The AMO presents an opportunity to reorient the FAA organization and 
finally solve the integration puzzle. AMO must be broader in scope than 
the NextGen project and must be empowered to mobilize dissonant 
business lines in common purpose. It must be a distinct office; siloing 
it within an existing organization precludes the necessary horizontal 
orientation to facilitate coordination. AMO must not be made subsidiary 
to an existing business line and so must be a direct report to the 
Administrator.
    The AMO must adopt an all-of-agency approach that coordinates the 
activities of the FAA's many business lines towards the objective of 
efficiently integrating new capabilities into our air transportation 
system through the development and execution of a cohesive business 
plan. Forming this type of organization requires functions from both 
ANG and PMO.
    ANG should be the foundation for AMO. ANG's current activities 
comprise most of the anticipated activities of AMO. However, ANG lacks 
the implementation functions necessary for AMO's expanded role. These 
functions are presently within PMO.
    Although PMO is currently located within the Air Traffic 
Organization (ATO), AMO cannot be located within ATO. ATO is an 
operational organization and should be exclusively an operational 
organization. AMO explicitly will be involved in research and 
development. Anything not safety related is a distraction from the 
paramount safety mission of ATO. And again, siloing AMO within ATO will 
diminish its ability for cross-cutting coordination. Because of these 
conflicts, AMO cannot be within ATO. Because PMO is currently within 
ATO, and AMO needs PMO capabilities, this means that PMO must be 
reorganized.
    PMO functions should be distributed appropriately throughout ATO 
and AMO. PMO functions can be put into two buckets; maintenance and 
acquisition. Components of the PMO related to the maintenance of 
systems and support operations going on already today should be 
distributed through ATO, most probably to the Technical Operations 
Office. Components of the PMO related to the acquisition and deployment 
of new capabilities and implementing new systems and services should be 
transitioned into AMO to support the integration mission.
    Thus, AMO should be a distinct organization with a direct reporting 
line to an FAA Administrator who empowers it to coordinate. It should 
be formed through the fusion of ANG and the functions of PMO related to 
new systems implementation. It should be oriented as a cross-cutting, 
all-of-agency organization that coordinates the many FAA business lines 
towards the long-term integration of novel systems and capabilities 
into our air transportation system.
     FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace
    ``Sec. 206--Future of NextGen'', in addition to sunsetting NextGen 
also establishes the ``William J. Hughes FAA Technical Center for 
Advanced Aerospace,'' in Section 106 of Title 49 of the United States 
Code. This prestigious section of statutory law now clarifies the 
Center's role as a ``technology center'' within the FAA.
    Through the codification of the Technical Center, Congress has 
defined it as the FAA's permanent and semi-autonomous agent for the 
research, development, testing, evaluation, validation and sustainment 
of products for use in the NAS.
    The Technical Center creates value through coordinating programs, 
partnerships, and assets that are interconnected by the physical space 
of the New Jersey campus. Previous reorganization proposals confused 
this relationship by suggesting a separation between the programmatic 
responsibilities of the Technical Center Director and the management of 
the physical campus. The law now emphasizes the importance of unitary 
management of the programs that flow through the Center, the 
partnerships that advance those programs, and the physical assets that 
facilitate all activities.
    Congress acted on this question by establishing that activities 
managed by the Director include ``developing and stimulating technology 
partnerships,'' ``managing technology demonstration grants,'' 
``managing the facilities'', and ``supporting the work of collocated 
facilities and tenants,'' all of which occurs through the Director 
``providing access to the properties, facilities, and systems of the 
Technical Center through appropriate agreements.'' By establishing this 
breadth of interconnected responsibilities under the Director, Congress 
has decided that unitary management under the Director is best for the 
Center and the Nation. While the Director does ultimately report to the 
Administrator, this arrangement allows the Center to operate in the 
semi-autonomous manner most appropriate for its role as an independent 
validator.
    The Center's critical role as an independent validator requires it 
to lead many activities including the research, development, testing, 
evaluation, validation and sustainment of products for use in the 
National Airspace System. These activities are broadly captured in 
subparagraph (C), which states that the activities of the Technical 
Center shall include:

        Identifying software, systems, services and technologies that 
        could improve aviation safety and the operations and management 
        of the air traffic control system and working with relevant 
        offices of the Administration to consider the use and 
        integration of such software, systems, services, and 
        technologies, as appropriate.

    This catch-all language is intended to provide the FAA the 
flexibility to route all appropriate research, development, testing, 
evaluation, validation and sustainment activities through the Center. 
This language importantly emphasizes ``integration,'' which positions 
the Center to absorb future programs related to emerging technologies 
including UAS, AAM, sustainable aviation fuel, hypersonics, electric 
and hydrogen propulsion, commercial space, and the truly limitless 
future evolutions of aerospace operations. This integration-specific 
language also indicates that the Technical Center must play a central 
role in the coordination activities that will soon be managed by the 
Airspace Modernization Office.
    Consistent with the FAA Reauthorization and the strong arguments 
for transitioning ANG assets into AMO, the Technical Center should be 
located under AMO. Within AMO, the Technical Center should perform 
research, serve as project manager for development, lead independent 
validation for Testing and Evaluation program activities, and maintain 
laboratories in support of these missions. Importantly, Testing and 
Evaluation direction should be kept separate from the program 
management locus as the validation function must remain independent. 
These activities should flow into systems engineering to facilitate 
integration through the broader organization. We also should provide 
outside stakeholders greater opportunities to proactively put their 
technological solutions in front of the FAA for evaluation, a program 
for which is described below.
               Emerging Technologies Accelerator Program
    The FAA's Fiscal Year 2025 budget generously reflects the 
importance of the Technical Center to the FAA and the Nation by 
including historic levels of infrastructure investments in the 
Technical Center laboratories and electric utility. I am working with 
the House Appropriations Committee to fund the Technical Center at your 
requested amount, which investments will provide a strong foundation 
for the Technical Center's future activities.
    An important capability that the Nation must develop is the 
Emerging Technologies Accelerator Program. This program will provide an 
effective pathway for development, demonstration, and transfer of 
technology applications that lead to a tangible operational improvement 
to the air transportation system. It will be conducted through the 
issuance of solicitations for technological solutions to pressing 
aviation problems. It will serve as a bridge between outside 
stakeholders and the integration activities being led by the Airspace 
Modernization Office.
    This program is necessary for the Technical Center to meet its new 
statutory objectives of stimulating technology partnerships and 
managing technology demonstration grants. The accelerator program 
offers a proactive model that provides non-public stakeholders an 
opportunity to get novel, beneficially applicable technologies 
expeditiously evaluated by the federal government and integrated across 
the NAS. This is an essential capability for AMO's new integration 
model to achieve maximum effect.
    This program was listed in previous budgets and should be relisted 
to advance the Technical Center and AMO's new mission. This program 
will only receive funding from Congress if it is included in the FAA's 
R&D budget request, and so I strongly urge you to develop an FY26 
budget request that includes this program at the previously requested 
level of $10 million.
               Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies
    ``Sec. 961--Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies,'' of the FAA 
Reauthorization directs the agency to establish a Center for Advanced 
Aviation Technologies that will support the testing and advancement of 
new and emerging aviation technologies. I urge you to prioritize 
implementation of this section by developing a national network of test 
corridors and summarily establishing the William J. Hughes Technical 
Center for Advanced Aerospace as the administrative program lead for 
the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies under the Airspace 
Modernization Office.
    The Technical Center's newfound statutory jurisdiction largely 
encompasses the roles and responsibilities of the Center for Advanced 
Aviation Technologies. The slate of tasks includes developing AAM 
airspace laboratories, validating air traffic requirements, developing 
technology partnerships, and identifying new and emerging aviation 
technologies. All these tasks fall squarely within the statutory 
jurisdiction of the Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace. These 
legal facts dictate that the administration of the Center for Advanced 
Aviation Technologies should be led by the Technical Center for 
Advanced Aerospace.
    Much of the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies activities 
will be conducted through the establishment of multiple national 
testing corridors for the evaluation and validation of technologies 
such as remote identification, BVLOS and detect-and-avoid. The 
Technical Center will need to be the central administrative component 
of this program because of its leadership in the validation of systems. 
The entire point of testing corridors is validation--it is the 
Technical Center's statutory mission to lead that validation process in 
pursuit of integration.
    While the Technical Center should be the administrative lead in any 
case, New Jersey is well-positioned across its geography, 
infrastructure and partnerships to host its own testing corridor within 
the program.
    The geography of New Jersey offers a unique ecosystem of airspaces 
with variety and flexibility for AAM testing. The region is proximal to 
numerous large commercial airports including JFK, LGA, EWR, PHL, ILM, 
and ACY where the Technical Center is located. These include the 
densest, most complex airspaces in the country, and will provide a 
robust environment for the testing of all sorts of advanced types and 
systems. South Jersey has multiple smaller general aviation airports 
including MIV, WWD, and OBI. These are in rural areas that offer 
substantial low-density airspace for different types of testing 
activities.
    Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which houses the United States 
Air Force's 305th Air Mobility Wing, is working with South Jersey's 
National Aviation Research and Technology Park to establish a civilian/
military dual use UAS/AAM test corridor that can be used as one of 
several premier national testing corridors.
    The Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies is an exciting 
project whose idiosyncrasies fall squarely within the statutory 
jurisdiction of the Technical Center. We hope to serve as the 
administrative lead for this program and coordinate the validation of 
activities of testing ranges that will be established across the 
country, including in New Jersey.
                               Invitation
    I formally invite you to come to South Jersey and meet with our 
aviation community. I would like for you to meet the many researchers, 
businesses, and public officials who are working hard to make this 
vision a reality. I hope to work closely together over the coming years 
to realize the full potential of the Technical Center, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the United States of America.
            Sincerely,
                                             Jeff Van Drew,
                                                Member of Congress.

    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
    This letter includes an invitation for you to come to South 
Jersey and meet with many of our aviation stakeholders.
    Can you confirm, and I know that you did this morning, that 
you have received the letter and the invitation?
    Mr. Whitaker. I look forward to it. Thank you.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Me too. Me too. It will be good to 
have you in South Jersey.
    I have received several questions about the FAA reauth and 
the technical center, and I provided this to your team. We 
tried to provide you in advance not to blindside you, out of 
respect for you and out of respect for the issues.
    Under the new FAA law, the NextGen Office will become the 
Airspace Modernization Office. The Airspace Modernization 
Office cannot succeed without control of program management 
functions related to technology integration.
    Does the FAA plan on reorganizing the Program Management 
Office as a component of the Airspace Modernization Act?
    Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir.
    First off, I will mention, when I was deputy, I had the 
opportunity to visit the tech center several times. And I 
actually visited it very early in this tenure, but I look 
forward to coming there to visit. And I think it is not only a 
national treasure, but it is international standards for 
airspace research in this space. So, looking forward to that.
    The reauth, I will say that we are--and this was mentioned 
several times in opening comments. We are treating the 
provisions of reauth as a program that we have program 
management protocols around. So, we are tracking all of the 
various items.
    With respect to the reorganization of NextGen, there is a 
working group that is looking at best practices, talking to all 
the teams within FAA. And we will come up with a plan on how to 
reorganize that, and I will keep you informed on that.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Whitaker.
    And I know the answers are short, and we will have a lot 
more time to speak when you come down to South Jersey. But I 
just have a few more, and I appreciate your----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Sure.
    Dr. Van Drew [continuing]. Brief answers.
    The FAA codified the FAA Technical Center in statute. 
Statute means that the technical center, as you know, is now 
legally protected from predatory organizations or 
reorganizations, that it is locally controlled, and that it is 
the FAA's undisputed leader in technology, research, testing, 
and validation.
    And, again, quick answer. Can you assure me that attempts 
to dismantle the tech center are finally over and that, going 
forward, the center will be provided the necessary programs, 
resources, and authority to execute this new and important 
mission?
    Mr. Whitaker. I can assure you I agree with those 
provisions, and we will uphold that. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, sir.
    Congress is preparing historic infrastructure investments 
for the tech center, but we must invest more into programs such 
as the Emerging Technology Accelerator, which you are familiar 
with. This program would empower the tech center to solicit 
partnerships and develop innovative improvements for our 
aviation system.
    Can we work together, can we work together and get the 
Emerging Technology Accelerator in the fiscal 2026 FAA budget 
request? Can we do that?
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
    Section 961 of the FAA law established a Center for 
Advanced Aviation Technologies. I want to be unequivocal that 
under the technical center statute, overall management of this 
program legally falls under the center's jurisdiction.
    Is the FAA considering the technical center's new statutory 
authority in designing this very program?
    Mr. Whitaker. We will certainly consider that authority, 
and there is a team working on what that advanced center would 
look like. So, we will keep you informed of that as well.
    Dr. Van Drew. You will. We would love to have that 
communication.
    South Jersey is prepared to absorb the responsibility. They 
are. They are ready to go. I am already working with the United 
States Air Force on a drone testing corridor in New Jersey, as 
you know. However, I don't think this program should be limited 
to a single test range in a single region.
    Is the FAA amenable to a program with multiple national 
test ranges that are programmatically managed out of the FAA 
Tech Center? My last question.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, if you could be 
brief and if you would like to follow up in writing.
    Mr. Whitaker. I am sorry.
    Dr. Van Drew. Brief answer and then we are done.
    Mr. Whitaker. That is still being looked at, but we will 
certainly keep you informed on how that plan gets put together.
    Dr. Van Drew. Please work with our office on that.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your discretion. I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Van Drew.
    Administrator, I want to say thanks again for being here, 
and I appreciate your endurance.
    I do have a few questions, and we also want to go to a 
quick round 2. Ranking Member Larsen has a few followups.
    First of all, soon we are going to have 2,000 aircraft 
parts manufacturers and part 135 operators that are going to be 
required to have an SMS. But it is also important to keep in 
mind that from 2015 to the current, you have had the 
requirement that part 121 operators already have an SMS.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. But that still resulted in us 
having safety issues and some of the incidents that we are here 
talking about today.
    In my opinion--and I have heard lots of questions on the 
SMS that have occurred here today--the SMS is only as valuable 
as, number one, the SMS plan is, meaning, is it truly 
applicable and sensitive to the safety threats that may occur 
in the manufacturing process?
    And number two, the actual execution and oversight of that 
SMS--and so, you probably see where I am going. If an SMS 
system has been required for part 121 operators and we have had 
problems, are we supposed to feel confident that all of these 
new operators, hundreds of new operators coming online 
operating under part 135, that that is actually going to solve 
problems in regard to safety?
    Can you explain to me how this is going to be different and 
give me some comfort that, moving forward, that the development 
of SMS plans and the actual execution and oversight is going to 
result in the types of outcomes that I know you and I share in 
regard to safety?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, I think the rollout of SMS with part 121 
carriers has been quite successful, and we see that in action 
as they identify risks. We hear about risks from them directly. 
They are mitigating those risks.
    It certainly takes some time, I think, for companies to 
embrace. SMS can sound like an administrative burden until you 
really understand the value that it can contribute in keeping 
you safe.
    One of the things that we saw with Boeing, which clearly 
did not take its 2015 mandate to have an SMS system seriously 
enough, we found that after the events of January 5th, that we 
consciously put Boeing together with some of the carriers to 
say, go talk to them. They have been deploying this for a long 
time. And Boeing has met with UPS and some of the other 
carriers to talk about their SMS and customize it to their own 
operation.
    So--and it is not a one-size-fits-all. We know some of 
these part 135 operators are quite small. So, we need to make 
sure we have a streamlined approach so they are not burdened by 
that process.
    But it is a very effective risk management system, and that 
is what we need is every operator constantly evaluating their 
risk and then taking steps to mitigate it. That is really the 
thing that keeps us safe.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    In my opening, I mentioned the 2020 law that I know Mr. 
Larsen and other leadership of the committee felt was 
appropriate action, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act, ACSAA. Here we are 4 years later, and as 
you know, major components of that legislation remain 
unaddressed or not fully implemented.
    Can you tell me how many provisions--do you know how many 
provisions of that are not implemented? And give me an idea on 
the implementation plan, when we are going to have a 4-year-old 
law fully implemented.
    Mr. Whitaker. So, my understanding is that we are about 75 
percent implemented on that, and we can provide your office 
with some more detail about where that implementation is.
    It was a very comprehensive and I think very helpful plan, 
and we are continuing to not just rest on the designs from that 
plan, but to also look at our oversight model more holistically 
going forward as well.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, Hunter told me if I 
said something about walking and chewing gum again that he was 
going to lash me. But I--look, I will tell you, I think I can 
speak on behalf of Mr. Larsen and all of us. No one expected it 
was going to take 4-plus years to implement the law. I think we 
viewed it with much urgency. We spent a lot of time working 
through it and trying to make sure it addressed major issues 
that were outstanding.
    And with an issue as urgent as that, it is difficult for me 
to sit here and understand how it takes 4 years to implement. I 
talked in my opening statement about how we just passed a 
1,000-page bill. And so, I assure you that all of us up here 
have strong concern about the FAA's ability to implement that 
with the urgency that we intend.
    And so, I would like for you to submit something to us in 
the record following up on why this has been so difficult and 
so time-consuming.
    And I will say it a second time at this hearing. I know 
that you have inherited much, but perhaps your feedback could 
help us understand how we can write laws in ways that are more 
efficient or allow the FAA to implement with the urgency that I 
think we intend.
    With that, I am going to yield for a second round to Mr. 
Larsen for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 
I appreciate that.
    Just some followups that I had on a few of the questions 
that have been asked.
    One is, after the 90-day plan came out in May, or maybe a 
little before that, got a flood of whistleblower calls to the 
AIR21 number. A lot of news made about how many calls there 
were in local papers back home.
    Has that leveled off, or is the rate at which you are 
receiving calls the same?
    Mr. Whitaker. We have received a large volume of 
whistleblower calls, and they get investigated as part of the 
process. And we view that as a healthy sign. We want people to 
speak up. So, we take each one seriously, and it runs through a 
safety analysis and investigation process.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Has the number leveled off in 
terms of the rate of calls coming in?
    Mr. Whitaker. I will circle back with your office and give 
you specifics on the sort of month to month.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. That would be fine.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Back to an earlier question I had 
about proactive versus reactive. There is criticism the FAA is 
trending behind other civil aviation authorities in 
transitioning from a reactive approach to a proactive approach.
    Can you highlight, just again for the record, maybe the 
three steps to show that the FAA is moving towards a proactive 
approach on these issues?
    Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the essence of the proactive 
approach is more reliance on data and better tools to analyze 
the data. So, right now, if you view the aviation safety system 
as a series of layers that protect us from bad outcomes, right 
now, we are noticing layers that are failing and then 
addressing that. We want to be ahead of that to try to 
understand layers that may have some weakness, so, really just 
kind of move one step ahead of that process.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that changing your 
organization at the FAA to do that?
    Mr. Whitaker. So, we are going to change the--there is an 
executive committee that oversees safety. We are going to 
reconstitute that committee. We are going to make sure the 
Administrator is on that committee and chairing that committee, 
and that is going to be the committee that has a holistic view 
of the various actors in the NAS and how they are doing on 
safety so we have a sort of NAS-wide view of safety based on 
data. That is ambitious, because getting data and analyzing 
data is challenging and expensive, but that is the goal.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Getting back to maybe Mr. 
Collins' comments earlier about the data systems at the FAA. Is 
this thing going to require an additional investment, a new 
investment into, more likely than not, software models that use 
AI algorithms to search for trends that then can be highlighted 
for you all as decisionmakers?
    Mr. Whitaker. It is a little early to know what the 
investments might be and what our options are. We are running 
some trial programs with some outside vendors who are basically 
going to show us some capabilities that we could utilize. We 
will assess those test cases and start to put together some 
assessment.
    It is an issue that we have to work extensively with 
industry on and also work with our colleagues at IASA and 
elsewhere to make sure we have a full set of data. And we 
shouldn't all have to reinvent the wheel. We should come up 
with a system that allows everybody to have access to data that 
gives them insight into safety risks.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. I know we are probably a little 
bit aways from it, and this will be the last comment I have and 
question. But at some point you are using the KPIs to determine 
that on-off switch for production rate increases at the Renton 
plant for the 737 MAX. And, again, I am not suggesting that you 
are at a point where you can turn that on at all. That is not--
but I do think that getting to that point, as you are getting 
to that point, helping us understand the progress on meeting 
the KPIs that then lead to that decision, it would be helpful 
for us so that we are not surprised by an FAA decision to turn 
those lights green on production, just to assure us that, 
again, you are doing your work, holding Boeing accountable so 
we can do our work to hold you accountable.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes. I will--I think right now, we are 
following this labor action which, obviously, has interrupted 
production.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, right.
    Mr. Whitaker. I think----
    Mr. Larsen of Washington [interposing]. You are not the 
only one.
    Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. At some point in the future, we 
will have a briefing with you on, as production starts to ramp 
up, more visibility into how we see that progressing.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Just assure me and assure us that 
you are going to----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington [continuing]. Keep us in the loop 
on that----
    Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. We will do that.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington [continuing]. So it is less of a 
surprise.
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks a lot. I yield back.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
Menendez, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member.
    Thank you for your testimony here today. I know we are in 
the homestretch here, and I appreciate your patience.
    And I just want to go over a couple of topics first with 
respect to Boeing. When we have folks, different industry 
participants come in and we talk about safety, often safety is 
everyone's number one priority. But, obviously, there is always 
the tension between profits and safety.
    From your perspective, how has Boeing historically and more 
recently handled the tension between prioritizing safety while 
also being a moneymaking enterprise?
    Mr. Whitaker. I think it is an interesting question. I 
would hope that at this point they have concluded that, without 
safety, the profits aren't going to follow under any 
circumstance. And I think for all operators in our airspace, 
whether it is an airline or a manufacturer, if you don't meet 
those fundamental safety requirements of building a safety 
culture and an open, just culture that allows whistleblowers to 
step forward, it is going to be very hard to sustain your 
business.
    So, hopefully that has been a lesson learned. From our 
perspective, that has to be the first order of business. And to 
your point, everybody talks about it but not everybody does it, 
so, our focus is to making sure they are actually doing it.
    Mr. Menendez. Yes. And, obviously, we always hope folks 
self-regulate, right, and do right by their customers and by 
the entire industry, right, because safety is our number one 
priority. You saw that with the FAA reauthorization through 
this committee.
    But I also find it is sort of thinking about ways that we 
can ensure there are guardrails and hardwiring safety being the 
priority, because when you do have a series--a time stability 
and ensured safety, sometimes the attention shifts, right.
    And what we need to ensure for all American people who use 
these aircraft, who travel through commercial airlines, to 
ensure that people are always focused on safety, even when 
there has not been an incident like what we are here to discuss 
today, that refocuses back on safety and sort of that 
continuous dogged approach to making sure that we are always 
best in class.
    And safety is something that, on your end and our end, we 
want to make sure that we are always thinking about so that way 
we don't need an incident to return to the table to have a 
conversation about safety.
    Mr. Whitaker. And I think one of the things as we look at 
our own oversight model is to make sure we are looking at the 
right data so we get early indicators when that trend occurs 
and someone takes their eye off the ball.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate it.
    If you don't mind, I want just want to switch gears 
briefly.
    Last time you testified before this committee, we spoke 
about the persistent issue of helicopter noise in my district, 
New Jersey's Eighth Congressional District. Earlier this month, 
we held a workshop with the FAA in Jersey City to begin working 
towards a solution. I thank the FAA for their participation in 
this workshop. I look forward to continuing to work with you on 
putting an end to this problem.
    In the interim, I wanted to talk briefly about the FAA 
Reauthorization Act and the FAA's efforts to implement the new 
law. Section 792 of this law requires the FAA to establish a 
Noise Advisory Committee. It is my understanding that the FAA 
is currently working to stand up this committee.
    Can you provide a brief update on the status of the Noise 
Advisory Committee?
    Mr. Whitaker. We are scheduled to provide a staff briefing 
in just, I think, about 2 weeks on all of the reauth 
provisions. So, we will make sure that that is part of that. I 
don't have any specific information, but we can get that to 
your office directly as well.
    Mr. Menendez. And I appreciate it.
    And sort of in the coming weeks before we have that staff 
meeting, I think what is so incredibly important for us--I 
represent a densely populated district. And so, there is a 
heliport on one side of the district and New York City on the 
other. The Statue of Liberty sits right off our shoreline.
    You can tell Dan Goldman the Statue of Liberty is in New 
Jersey, not New York. He will appreciate it.
    But what I think is important is making sure that as this 
Noise Advisory Committee is set up, that sort of in certain 
areas where we really deal with noise and noise pollution, 
densely populated areas--because we also have Newark airport in 
the district--that we get community stakeholders to be a part 
of the process. Because it was one of the challenges that we 
had with the voluntary air tourism agreements that created 
these buffer zones, which actually put helicopters into my 
district, right, when we are trying to eliminate or reduce the 
volume of trips.
    And so, without having the communities that are subject to 
all of this noise at the table, I feel like that voice is lost. 
And I think it is something that is critically important to 
make sure that they are a part of the process. And any way that 
we can include stakeholders like that, as you think about the 
committee, would be extremely--it would be very much 
appreciated by myself and so many others.
    Mr. Whitaker. I will. I think that you make a very good 
point, and I think that is true. We will do that.
    Mr. Menendez. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, I am going to 
recognize myself, and then we will wrap here.
    In the FAA bill, I have described a lot of the provisions 
we included in there where sort of the Congress acting on 
behalf of the Administrator in cases when I think decisions 
kind of got backlogged prior to you coming on board.
    One of those is on BVLOS, and I know that we had some 
pretty strict language with very tight timelines. And I know 
that the FAA pushed back a little bit and said timelines were 
unreasonable. I would argue that when laws put a timeline in 
place, then what an agency should do is calibrate their answer 
to the time that is available.
    Could you give us an update on the timing for BVLOS which, 
of course, is beyond visual line of sight for unmanned systems?
    Mr. Whitaker. Yes, sir. I think the internal goal had been 
early January since the onset, and we hope to exceed that. We 
are hoping to have that out, if not the next few weeks, by the 
end of the year.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Okay. Administrator, thank you.
    And just along the lines of some of the new entrants in the 
market, as you know, there were a number of provisions in the 
FAA bill. Those are strong priorities for me and for this 
committee in that I am concerned if we don't provide better 
certainty for those innovators, for those entrepreneurs, we are 
going to see those folks take their resources and go overseas. 
And I know that you are aware, in some cases, where that has 
occurred.
    It is not just about the platforms themselves. It is about 
the technology associated with those as well, including some of 
the sensors and others, in addition to the conveniences that it 
can apply in Louisiana.
    We recently had Hurricane Francine, and having the ability 
to send out reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned platforms to go 
out there and go do some of the recon helps us to triage our 
response activities and resources.
    And we could sit here and talk for days about all the 
application. And I just really want to emphasize to you the 
importance of providing predictability, regulatory certainty 
for these folks so they can get investment certainty. I think 
that is fair, and I think they deserve it.
    A few things closer to home. We have a provision related to 
NPIAS airports in populated counties or--I know the other 49 
States are confused--we call them parishes at home, and I just 
want to highlight the provision in the bill related to that. 
Very, very important.
    We also have another provision related to expanding the use 
of innovative technology into the Gulf of Mexico that is really 
important, and I would appreciate you working and making sure 
that those provisions are prioritized. And we are not talking 
about the implementation of them years from now; that hopefully 
months from now we can get some clarity on interpretation 
there.
    Mr. Whitaker. Great. Thank you. I will do that, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you very much.
    So, I am going to yield back. And I don't see any other 
further questions from the subcommittee, and so, that concludes 
our hearing today. And I want to thank the Administrator for 
being here and, again, for your perseverance through the 
committee.
    The subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


       Prepared Statement of Hon. Marcus J. Molinaro of New York
    Thank you for holding today's hearing, Mr. Chair.
    I am pleased that FAA Administrator Whitaker is here today 
discussing safety oversight and appreciate his continued leadership.
    The FAA's priority is to advance the safety of the nation's 
aviation system. Part of this safety mission is the FAA's comprehensive 
aircraft certification regulations that cover the airplane from initial 
design through final assembly.
    I had the opportunity to visit the ASPIRE MRO in Fort Worth, Texas, 
where Mammoth Freighters is executing passenger-to-freighter (P2F) 
conversions of the Boeing 777 passenger airplane in a state-of-the-art 
800,000 square-foot facility. The facility allows Mammoth to convert 
over a dozen airplanes per year for both the U.S. and global cargo 
markets. The Mammoth and Aspire teams, now well over 700 employees, 150 
of which are engineers, have been working on this conversion program 
for almost four years. Over $250 million has been invested to date.
    Certification of the Boeing 777 conversions will help supply 
growing global air cargo freight demand and bolster United States 
(U.S.) market leadership over European rivals. Converted freighters 
have lower costs and better availability than new freighters, while 
reducing our carbon footprint through the replacement of old three and 
four engine aircraft. Recycling aging passenger airplanes creates 
demand for new, more environmentally friendly passenger airplanes.
    Furthermore, Mammoth freighters are designed and converted in the 
U.S. with over 99.5 percent parts that are Made in America from 
suppliers across 22 states. Mammoth expects to create more than 1,000 
direct jobs, not including job growth at their suppliers. They have 
secured 35 firm orders, with more expected, from partners such as 
Jetran, Kalitta, DHL International, Air Canada, and STS Aviation 
Services.
    I understand that the program is entering the critical phase of the 
certification process with the FAA. I encourage the FAA to meet their 
published turnaround times and follow its prior practices and 
procedures that the Mammoth team has experienced in previous conversion 
programs. By doing this and utilizing the professional safety assets at 
its disposal, this critical program can avoid unnecessary delays that 
could lead to significant disruptions including potential job losses, 
delays in aircraft deliveries and operational impacts to cargo 
customers.
    FAA certification is paramount to support U.S. global 
competitiveness and U.S. job growth, and to maintain the American gold 
standard in aviation safety and aircraft conversions.


                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


  Questions to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, from Hon. Kevin 
                                 Kiley

    Question 1. You claimed that SpaceX launched recent Falcon missions 
without a permit. SpaceX has said these claims are completely false, 
and that the FAA has not alleged previously that the company was not 
permitted or licensed to launch these missions. Can you share the 
evidence for your claim that SpaceX launched these missions without a 
permit?
    Answer. To clarify, once a license is granted by the FAA, the 
licensee is required to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
license as well as any representations the licensee made in its license 
application. Notice 2023WA990028 was issued because it appears SpaceX 
(1) used a launch control center not listed in its approved 
communications plan, and (2) failed to complete a T-2 hour readiness 
poll required by its approved communications plan for its PSN Satria 
Mission launch on June 18, 2023. The launch was licensed but, for these 
reasons, it does not appear that SpaceX was in compliance with the 
terms of its license for that launch.

    Question 2. You claimed that SpaceX moved a fuel farm closer to the 
population without completing a risk analysis statement. SpaceX says 
that the new location was twice the distance from the nearest publicly 
accessible area, that the company provided the FAA with all the 
required analysis, and that the FAA ultimately approved the revised 
location. Please supply all correspondence between the FAA and SpaceX 
relative to the fuel farm.
    Answer. It appears that SpaceX moved the fuel farm to a location 
further from a public roadway, but nearer to a publicly accessible 
parking area. SpaceX is correct that the FAA did ultimately approve the 
revised location but, notably, the FAA informed SpaceX in or around 
December 2022 that it would need to update its application to address 
the relocated fuel farm, and SpaceX did not provide the FAA with 
appropriate supporting data until approximately 9 days before the July 
28, 2023 launch, at which point the FAA did not have sufficient time to 
address the application change prior to the launch.

    Question 3. You claimed that SpaceX failed to provide an updated 
sonic boom analysis. SpaceX refutes this and says that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service had already reviewed Starship's sonic booms and 
determined they had no environmental impact. While SpaceX has 
acknowledged it recently provided the FAA data showing a slightly 
larger sonic boom area than originally anticipated, the company 
maintains this results in no new environmental impact.
    Question 3.a. What evidence does the FAA have of a new 
environmental impact?
    Question 3.b. How long will it take the FAA to make this minor 
paperwork update?
    Question 3.c. What evidence does the FAA have for your assertion 
that this is a safety related incident?
    Answer to 3.a., 3.b., & 3.c. SpaceX applied to the FAA to modify 
its existing vehicle operator license for the operation of the 
Starship/Super Heavy launch vehicle from its existing Boca Chica Launch 
Site in Cameron County, Texas. After completing an evaluation of all 
applicable Vehicle Operator License requirements, the FAA issued a 
modification of SpaceX's Vehicle Operator License for launches of the 
Starship/Super Heavy Launch Vehicle Program in Cameron County, TX on 
October 12, 2024. The modification authorized Flight 5 of the Starship 
Super/Heavy.
    As part of its determination to authorize the modification for 
Flight 5 of the Starship Super/Heavy, the FAA developed a written re-
evaluation (WR) to determine whether SpaceX's following updates are 
substantively consistent with the contents of the 2022 Final 
Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the SpaceX Starship/Super 
Heavy Launch Vehicle Program at the SpaceX Boca Chica Launch Site in 
Cameron County, Texas (2022 PEA):
      Proposed project updates to the location of the expended 
forward heat shield in the Gulf of Mexico,
      Additional information regarding sonic booms resulting 
from a landing of the Super Heavy booster,
      Updates to sonic boom modeling, and
      Updates to use of the water deluge system.

    The affected environment and environmental impacts of Starship/
Super Heavy operations at the Boca Chica Launch Site were analyzed in 
the 2022 PEA.
    Based on the WR, the FAA concluded that the contents of the 2022 
PEA remain current and substantially valid and that the decision to 
issue a modification of the existing vehicle operator license for 
updated operations for the Flight 5 mission profile for Starship/Super 
Heavy operations at the Boca Chica Launch Site does not require the 
preparation of a new or supplemental EA or EIS to support the Proposed 
Action.
    The WR was signed on October 12, 2024. For more information, please 
view the electronic version of the document on the FAA's website at: 
https://www.faa.gov/space/stakeholder_engagement/spacex_starship.

    Question 4. You claimed that SpaceX was in violation of Texas state 
law. What Texas laws did SpaceX violate?
    Answer. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and 
SpaceX signed an agreed order on August 13, 2024, to resolve a TCEQ 
investigation report, dated August 2, 2024. The TCEQ report found that 
SpaceX discharged wastewater from its Starship/Super Heavy operations 
at the launch site into waters of the United States in violation of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. Sec.  1251 et seq.) and Texas 
environmental quality and water control laws (30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE Sec.  
305.42(a) and TEX. WATER CODE Sec.  26.121(a)(1)). Under the terms of 
the agreed order, among other requirements, SpaceX agreed to obtain an 
individual Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) 
industrial wastewater permit and discharge industrial wastewater from 
its facility in accordance with this permit. TCEQ stated that SpaceX 
paid a penalty assessed by TCEQ as well.

    Question 5. Does the FAA need to be reformed to keep up with 
innovation in the commercial space industry?
    Answer. The Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), in accordance 
with Title 51 of the United States Code, regulates and oversees U.S. 
commercial space transportation operations, which include launch and 
reentry operations worldwide, the operation of launch and reentry 
sites, and human space flight missions. This authority has been 
delegated by the Secretary to the FAA. Because of this, the FAA does 
not need to be reformed to keep up with innovation in the commercial 
space industry. AST carries out these authorities to protect public 
health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to these 
important responsibilities, AST is also responsible for encouraging, 
facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches and reentries by 
the private sector and facilitating the strengthening and expansion of 
U.S. space transportation infrastructure while protecting the public 
health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States.
    While keeping public safety at the forefront, AST strives to 
provide operators with maximum flexibility to by regulating launch and 
reentry operations only to the extent necessary and in an efficient 
manner. As a performance-based rule, 14 CFR part 450 offers applicants 
flexibility in how they demonstrate compliance and allows operators to 
apply for and the FAA to grant a single license for multiple launches 
using different vehicle configurations and mission profiles. However, 
in order for a license to authorize multiple mission profiles and 
launch vehicle configuration, an operator must be able to submit 
license application material to the FAA that describes the different 
launch vehicle configurations that it proposes to launch and the 
corresponding range of launch parameters (e.g., flight azimuths and 
trajectories). New operators that are initially conducting test or 
research and development flights tend to have more license 
modifications as they continue to expand their flight envelope and make 
changes to the launch vehicle configuration. Once an operator's vehicle 
configuration and operations stabilize, it should be able to minimize 
the number of license modifications.
    AST prioritizes regulatory clarity and is working to ensure 
industry has a full understanding of how to achieve compliance with 
part 450 and how to take advantage of its intended benefits. To 
facilitate industry transition to part 450, we have provided an 
assortment of aids, including license application checklists, issuing 
17 advisory circulars in FY23 and 10 advisory circulars in FY24, as 
well as virtual tutorials, office hours, and workshops. Part 450 will 
move us in the right direction toward efficiency and workload 
reductions for both the government and industry without compromising 
safety. As we look to the future, AST will also continue to consider 
opportunities to improve the rule to better meet its objectives and 
identify other aids and resources to facilitate industry transition to 
part 450. Additionally, we are also working to utilize advanced tools 
to adapt to the changing landscape. AST is developing a Licensing 
Electronic Application Portal (LEAP), which will be used to accept, 
modify, exchange, and approve licensing materials under part 450. LEAP 
is expected to enhance AST's ability to identify, track, and quickly 
resolve questions and issues both internally and externally with 
applicants. LEAP will streamline the licensing process for applicants, 
provide more transparency into the process, and guide applicants in a 
step-by-step process.

                                [all]