[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     SNOWED IN: UNITED STATES DISINVESTMENT IN 
                                      THE ARCTIC

=======================================================================

                                (118-73)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 14, 2024

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
58-691PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025                  
          
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

			  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
			 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking 
                                                     Member
                                                     
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  District of Columbia               Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California           Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana                Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona,                 Puerto Rico
  Vice Ranking Member                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas               Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire            Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York               Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                     Celeste Maloy, Utah
                                     Kevin Kiley, California
                                     Vince Fong, California
                                ------                                7

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
             Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member
Brian Babin, Texas                   John Garamendi, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida               Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice          Vice Ranking Member
    Chairman                         Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
Aaron Bean, Florida                      Officio)
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     2
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
  Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement...........     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8

                               WITNESSES

Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 
  U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...............................     9
Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., Deputy Commandant for Mission 
  Support, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement......................    11
    Joint prepared statement of Vice Admirals Gautier and Allan..    12
Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    16
    Prepared statement...........................................    18

                                APPENDIX

Question to Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
  Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew.....    41
Questions to Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., Deputy Commandant 
  for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jefferson Van 
  Drew...........................................................    41
Questions to Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
  Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, and Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, 
  Jr., Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, 
  from:
    Hon. Jake Auchincloss........................................    41
    Hon. Hillary J. Scholten.....................................    42
Question to Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
  Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. 
  Jefferson Van Drew.............................................    42

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                           November 12, 2024

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Snowed In: United 
States Disinvestment in the Arctic''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet 
on Thursday, November 14, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 
Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony at a hearing 
entitled, ``Snowed In: United States Disinvestment in the 
Arctic.'' The Subcommittee will receive testimony from the 
United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard or Service) and the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the 
Coast Guard's icebreaker recapitalization efforts and the 
ability of the Service to meet its icebreaking and polar region 
responsibilities.

                             II. BACKGROUND

THE MISSIONS:

    The United States has relied on the Coast Guard's 
persistent presence in the polar regions to facilitate American 
leadership since the United States acquired Alaska in 1867 and 
took over responsibility for Antarctic icebreaking in 1966.\1\ 
With substantial territorial and economic interests in the 
Arctic, including one million square miles of territorial 
waters and Exclusive Economic Zone, a $3 billion arctic seafood 
industry, 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil reserves, 30 
percent of the world's undiscovered natural gas, $1 trillion in 
rare earth minerals, and increased commercial and tourism 
activity, the importance of the Arctic to the United States 
cannot be overstated.\2\ Today, the Coast Guard projects United 
States sovereignty in the Arctic in the face of challenges by 
Russia and China, and represents American interests in 
international bodies governing navigation, search and rescue, 
vessel safety, fisheries enforcement, and pollution 
response.\3\ As the Arctic continues to open, and strategic 
competition in the region attracts more actors, the demand for 
Coast Guard leadership and presence has only grown. The Service 
also maintains responsibility for Antarctic icebreaking, a 
mission it has conducted since 1966. Additionally, the Coast 
Guard is responsible for domestic icebreaking missions in the 
Great Lakes and other areas subject to freezing conditions.\4\
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    \1\ See United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook (Apr. 
2019) available at https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategic_Outlook_APR_2019.pdf [hereinafter OUTLOOK].
    \2\ Id.
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Ronald O'Rourke, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34391, Coast Guard Polar 
Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background And Issues For 
Congress, (Oct. 2, 2024), available at https://www.crs.gov/reports/pdf/
RL34391/RL34391.pdf [hereinafter CRS PSC Report].
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THE FLEET:

    The Coast Guard's operational ocean-going icebreaking fleet 
consists of the medium icebreaker HEALY and the heavy 
icebreaker POLAR STAR.\5\ The heavy icebreaker POLAR SEA is no 
longer operational and has been used for parts in an effort to 
keep the POLAR STAR operating over the last few years.\6\ The 
Coast Guard is also in the process of acquiring a commercially 
available oceangoing icebreaker, the AIVIQ.\7\ The Service 
maintains icebreaking capacity on the Great Lakes and in other 
domestic areas of operation. It seeks to recapitalize these 
assets in the future with the Great Lakes Icebreakers. In 
addition, the Service has stated an intention to build a new 
class of medium icebreakers, the Arctic Security Cutters, to 
reestablish the presence in the North Atlantic.\8\
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    \5\ Id.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id.
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    Despite the importance of the Coast Guard's icebreaking 
missions, the current operational ocean-going icebreaking fleet 
is limited to two vessels.\9\ Conversely, with significant 
territory in the Arctic, Russia has a fleet of 55 icebreakers, 
including 18 military icebreakers.\10\ While China cannot claim 
any territory in the Arctic, it has declared itself a ``near 
Arctic state,'' and operates a fleet of two medium and two 
heavy icebreakers, with more planned for construction later 
this decade.\11\ The Coast Guard's latest fleet mix analysis 
calls for eight to nine icebreakers to fulfill the Coast 
Guard's missions.\12\ While the Service is embarking on a 
substantial recapitalization campaign to replace its aging 
fleet of icebreakers, as discussed in greater detail below, the 
recapitalization program is experiencing significant 
challenges, including design and production delays, substantial 
cost overruns, and challenges in hiring the necessary 
workforce. Recognizing the need for greater investment and 
collaboration, on July 11, 2024, the United States, Canada, and 
Finland announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE 
Pact).\13\ Details are still being developed, however, the 
initial agreement focuses on information sharing, collaboration 
on workforce development, and an invitation to allies and 
partners to purchase icebreakers built in American, Canadian, 
and Finnish shipyards, with the underlying concept being to 
increase production and reduce overall costs.\14\
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    \9\ Id.
    \10\ Abbie Tingstand et. al., Report on the Arctic Capabilities of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, Rand Corporation (2023) available at https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1638-1.html.
    \11\ Id.
    \12\ United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Fleet Mix Analysis 
Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress, (on file with Comm.).
    \13\ Press Release, The White House, Biden-Harris Administration 
Announces New Polar Partnership ``ICE Pact'' Alongside Finland and 
Canada (July 11, 2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/biden-harris-
administration-announces-new-polar-partnership-ice-pact-alongside-
finland-and-canada/.
    \14\ Id.
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         III. COAST GUARD ICEBREAKING MISSIONS AROUND THE GLOBE

ARCTIC:

    In the last decade, the world has witnessed rising access 
to the Arctic through shipping routes. In 2017, a Russian 
tanker became the first ship to complete the Northern Sea Route 
between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans without the aid of 
icebreakers.\15\ By 2021, an astounding 414 ships transited 
this route.\16\ Although the total number of voyages fell in 
2022, to only 314 vessels, Russia dominated the activity, as 88 
percent of the vessels were Russian-flagged.\17\ In 2023, the 
Coast Guard cutter HEALY successfully transited the Northern 
Sea Route north of Russian territorial waters.\18\ Both Russia 
and China have declared operations in the Arctic a national 
priority and made corresponding investments in the capability 
and capacity to expand their influence.\19\ They have also 
challenged the rules-based order as they jockey for increasing 
power and dominance.\20\
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    \15\ Russell Goldman, Russian Tanker Completes Arctic Passage 
Without Aid of Icebreakers, N.Y. Times, (Aug. 25, 2017), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/world/europe/russia-tanker-
christophe-de-margerie.html.
    \16\ Northern Sea Route Sees Lots of Russian Traffic, But No 
International Transits in 2022, High North News, (June 20, 2023), 
available at https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/northern-sea-route-sees-
lots-russian-traffic-no-international-transits-2022. [hereinafter 
Northern Sea Route]
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Malte Humpert, U.S. Coast Guard Icebreaker Sails in Proximity 
to Russia's Northern Sea Route, High North News, (Sept. 4, 2023), 
available at https://www.arctictoday.com/us-coast-guard-icebreaker-
sails-in-proximity-to-russias-northern-sea-route/?wallit_nosession=1.
    \19\ Northern Sea Route supra note 14.
    \20\ Id.
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    As the Nation's primary maritime presence in the polar 
regions, the United States has increasingly turned to the Coast 
Guard to secure the Arctic.\21\ To facilitate a myriad of 
strategic goals, the Coast Guard published an ``Arctic 
Strategic Outlook'' in April 2019 and an ``Arctic Strategic 
Outlook Implementation Plan'' in October 2023.\22\ The 
Strategic Outlook focuses on three lines of effort to achieve 
the Service's overarching objectives: 1) enhancing the 
capability to operate effectively in the Arctic; 2) 
strengthening the rules-based order; and 3) innovating and 
adapting to promote resilience and prosperity.\23\ The 
Implementation Plan is comprised of 14 interconnected 
initiatives to execute the lines of effort and identifies the 
lead organizations or offices responsible for overseeing each 
initiative, as well as critical action items to advance 
them.\24\ Of particular note are the initiatives to expand 
Arctic surface capabilities, associated support infrastructure, 
and aviation and communication capabilities.\25\ It also 
highlights the need to strengthen internal coordination 
mechanisms, like the Centers for Arctic Study and Policy and 
the Polar Coordination Office, as well as international 
partnerships like strengthening the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
and preserving United States leadership in the Arctic 
Council.\26\
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    \21\ United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan (Oct. 2023) available at https://media.defense.gov/
2023/Oct/25/2003327838/-1/-1/0/ARCTIC%20STRATEGIC
%20OUTLOOK%20IMPLEMENTATION%20PLAN%20508%20COMPLIANT.PDF [hereinafter 
IMPLEMENTATION].
    \22\ See OUTLOOK, supra note 1; See also IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 
21.
    \23\ OUTLOOK, supra note 1.
    \24\ IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 21.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id.
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ANTARCTIC:

    Each year, the Coast Guard deploys its only heavy 
icebreaker to break out the National Science Foundation's 
McMurdo Station in Antarctica. The POLAR STAR leads Operation 
Deep Freeze breaking through ice up to 21 feet thick to restock 
the McMurdo Station, and in turn, the South Pole Station, 
allowing those facilities to continue operations.\27\ The joint 
mission includes components from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and 
Coast Guard to provide support for the Nation's Antarctic 
research program.\28\
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    \27\ U.S. Department of Defense, Coast Guard Crew Takes on Deep 
Freeze (Jan. 11, 2024), available at https://www.defense.gov/News/
Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3637624/.
    \28\ Id.
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    United States presence in the Antarctic is becoming 
increasingly critical as other nations are making investments 
in the region. Last November, the Chinese sent two icebreakers 
and a cargo ship to the Antarctic to complete construction of 
China's fifth research station in the region, which marked 
China's largest deployment to the Antarctic.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Biggest Chinese Antarctic fleet sets off to build research 
station, Reuters (Nov. 1, 2023), available at https://www.reuters.com/
business/environment/biggest-chinese-antarctic-fleet-sets-off-build-
research-station-2023-11-01/.
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GREAT LAKES AND OTHER DOMESTIC ICEBREAKING MISSIONS:

    The Coast Guard maintains and operates domestic icebreaking 
vessels to promote safety in United States waters and access to 
navigation and commerce. This includes four main purposes: 
search and rescue; urgent response to vessels; exigent 
community service requests; and to facilitate navigation. The 
Service conducts domestic icebreaking operations in three of 
its nine districts--the Great Lakes, New England, and the Mid-
Atlantic.\30\ In general, two-thirds of the domestic 
icebreaking mission occurs on the Great Lakes, where 55 percent 
of the regional economy is dependent on key shipping 
channels.\31\ On the Great Lakes, the Coast Guard's icebreaking 
efforts are coordinated with the Canadian Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ GAO, GAO-24-106619, Coast Guard: Improved Reporting on 
Domestic Icebreaking Performance Could Clarify Resource Needs and 
Tradeoffs (Jan. 16, 2024), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/
gao-24-106619 [hereinafter Domestic Icebreaking Performance].
    \31\ Id.
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    With three of America's eight major industrial regions 
located within 100 miles of the Great Lakes, year-round flow of 
raw materials in the Great Lakes region is vital to American 
industry and the economy. Additionally, although harsh winter 
conditions cause commercial shipping activity to reduce 
significantly, demand for bulk commodities such as coal, road 
salt, home heating oil, and fuel products ensures that a few 
bulk carriers, tank vessels, and tug/barge companies remain 
active throughout the closed navigation season.\32\
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    \32\ U.S. Coast Guard Great Lakes Domestic Icebreaking Frame Work, 
available at https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/Content/Attachments/610/
Great%20Lakes%20DOMICE%20Framework.pdf.
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    Currently, the Coast Guard operates a total of nine Great 
Lakes icebreakers, including one heavy icebreaker, the USCGC 
Mackinaw, six 140-foot Bay-class icebreaking tugs, and two 225-
foot Juniper-class seagoing buoy tenders displacing about 2,000 
tons each that have a light icebreaking capability.

NORTH ATLANTIC:

    The Coast Guard's icebreaking presence in the North 
Atlantic dates back to Operation Nanook in 1946, where the 
Coast Guard Icebreaker NORTHWIND supported a mission to 
establish a radio and weather station in Thule, Greenland.\33\ 
While the Coast Guard no longer engages in icebreaking missions 
in the North Atlantic, one impetus for the need of a new class 
of medium icebreakers is to access areas in the region that are 
too shallow to allow Polar Security Cutter operations. More 
recently, the Coast Guard participated in joint training 
exercises with the Canadian Coast Guard in the region, 
utilizing Fast Response Cutters and Medium Endurance 
Cutters.\34\
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    \33\ The National Iron & Steel Heritage Museum, USCGC Northwind, 
available at https://steelmuseum.org/icebreakers_exhibit_2021/
north_wind.cfm.
    \34\ U.S. Coast Guard Completes Operation Nanook 2021, Seapower 
Magazine (Aug. 18, 2021) available at https://seapowermagazine.org/u-s-
coast-guard-completes-operation-nanook-2021/.
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                   IV. COAST GUARD LEGACY ICEBREAKERS

POLAR STAR AND POLAR SEA:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                       Figure 1: USCGC POLAR STAR

    As the Nation's only heavy icebreaker, the POLAR STAR 
annually breaks ice up to 21 feet thick to ensure the resupply 
of McMurdo Station in Antarctica.\35\ In the last few years, 
this has been its only patrol, yet continues to have increasing 
mission requirements. Commissioned in 1976, the POLAR STAR has 
far surpassed its regular service life and has been dependent 
on constant service life extension programs to allow it to 
function, heavily straining Coast Guard resources.\36\ Despite 
this, the vessel is currently undergoing a substantial overhaul 
to further extend its service-life into the next decade. The 
POLAR SEA, another heavy icebreaker and the sister ship of the 
POLAR STAR, is no longer operational, although it is still 
owned and maintained by the Service. Most recently, it has been 
used for parts to keep the POLAR STAR operational. This was 
critical, in January, when the POLAR STAR was disabled just a 
few miles from McMurdo Station and was unable to break ice or 
transit due to the failure of cooling systems in its 
controllable pitch propeller, rendering the shafts inoperable. 
The needed parts were sourced from POLAR SEA.
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    \35\ See United States Coast Guard--Pacific Area, USCGC Polar Star 
(WAGB 10), available at https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Cutters/cgcPolarStar/.
    \36\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Polar 
Security Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker/.
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HEALY:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                         Figure 2: USCGC HEALY

    HEALY is the Coast Guard's only icebreaker specifically 
designed for Arctic research and is operated in collaboration 
with the National Science Foundation, as well as other 
agencies.\37\ It deploys annually to the Arctic to support 
multiple science missions and Operation Arctic Shield, the 
Service's annual operation to execute Coast Guard missions, 
enhance maritime domain awareness, strengthen partnership, and 
build preparedness, prevention, and response capabilities 
across the Arctic domain.\38\
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    \37\ U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, National Science Foundation 
embark on Arctic Ocean mission, United States Coast Guard News, (Aug. 
26, 2023), available at https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/
Article/3506293/us-coast-guard-cutter-healy-national-science-
foundation-embark-on-arctic-ocean/.
    \38\ Id.
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    HEALY is considered a medium endurance icebreaker and was 
built more than 25 years ago. This summer it suffered a major 
casualty, which cut its deployment short. Notably, for the 
duration of this casualty, the United States was left without 
an operational polar icebreaking-capable vessel since the POLAR 
STAR was in drydock for service life extension repairs. This 
left a gaping hole in the Nation's capabilities and security. 
HEALY was able to resume its voyage in October.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Email from Coast Guard Legislative Affairs to H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure staff (Oct. 4, 2024 8:08pm) (on file with 
Comm.).
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MACKINAW AND OTHER DOMESTIC ICEBREAKING CAPABILITIES:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                        Figure 3: USCGC MACKINAW

    The Coast Guard operates a fleet of 33 vessels capable of 
domestic icebreaking missions that include a dedicated Great 
Lakes icebreaker, 20 icebreaking tugs, and 12 buoy tenders 
capable of light icebreaking.\40\ MACKINAW is the lone Great 
Lakes heavy icebreaker and is the most capable, able to break 
ice greater than 32 inches thick.\41\
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    \40\ Domestic Icebreaking Performance, supra note 28.
    \41\ Id.
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                 V. COAST GUARD ICEBREAKER ACQUISITIONS

POLAR SECURITY CUTTER (PSC):
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Figure 4: Design Mockup of Polar Security Cutter

    The Coast Guard anticipates the need for enhanced Arctic 
capabilities in the coming years to support United States 
economic, security, and scientific interests, and carry out 
Coast Guard missions.\42\ The Service is working to replace and 
expand its fleet of heavy icebreakers with at least three 
PSCs.\43\ Additionally, the Service is considering the 
acquisition of additional medium icebreakers through the Arctic 
Security Cutter Program.\44\ In 2019, the Coast Guard and 
United States Navy, operating through an integrated program 
office, awarded VT Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, 
Mississippi, a fixed price incentive contract for the detailed 
design and construction of the lead PSC.\45\ The yard was 
subsequently purchased by Bollinger Shipyards, LLC. 
Construction on the first PSC was planned to begin in 2022 with 
contract delivery planned for the mid-2020s.\46\ Design delays 
have plagued the program, and despite repeated requests from 
the Committee, the Coast Guard is unable to commit to a 
timeline or cost for the first PSC.\47\ While the Coast Guard 
is in the process of renegotiating the contract to arrive at a 
new price and timeline, the first hull is likely to be 
substantially delayed and have a significantly higher cost than 
originally estimated.\48\
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    \42\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Polar 
Security Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker/.
    \43\ CRS PSC Report, supra note 3.
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ Review of Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the Coast Guard: 
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. of 
the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2023) 
(response from Admiral Linda Fagan, Commandant of the United States 
Coast Guard).
    \48\ Briefing from United States Coast Guard staff to H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure staff (Jan. 11, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard faces many hurdles in building the PSC, 
including building the first heavy icebreaker in the United 
States in more than 50 years.\49\ Icebreakers have substantial 
design and construction differences from traditional vessels, 
including hulls with thicker steel and dense framing 
structures.\50\ A GAO study found that the program suffers from 
unreliable schedule and cost estimates, and the complexity of 
the design has led to substantial schedule delays.\51\ To date, 
the final design is still incomplete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ GAO, GAO-23-105949, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security 
Cutter Needs To Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and 
Improve Schedule Oversight: (2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-23-105949.
    \50\ Id.
    \51\ Id.
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    The Coast Guard has received appropriations for PSC hulls 
one and two.\52\ However, because of cost increases, it is 
unlikely the appropriated money intended for the first two PSCs 
will be sufficient to cover the cost of even one PSC.\53\ The 
Coast Guard did not request funding for the PSC program in the 
President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Request but will 
require substantial additional funding in future years.\54\ The 
Coast Guard plans to homeport the PSCs in Seattle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2024, H.R. 7659, 118th Cong. 
(2024) (noting this legislation was passed out of the House of 
Representatives on May 14, 2024) [hereinafter CGAA 2024].
    \53\ CRS PSC Report, supra note 3.
    \54\ United States Coast Guard, FY 2025 Congressional Budget 
Justification (2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/2024-04/2024_0322_us_coast_guard.pdf.
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COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE ICEBREAKER:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            Figure 5: AIVIQ

    The Coast Guard is in the process of purchasing a 
commercially available icebreaker with medium icebreaking 
capability to supplement its oceangoing icebreaking fleet. 
There is currently only one commercially available icebreaker 
that meets the requirements, the AIVIQ, which is owned by 
Edison Chouest.\55\ The Coast Guard was appropriated $125 
million in FY 2024 to purchase the vessel.\56\ The Coast 
Guard's Unfunded Priorities List for FY 2025 includes a request 
of $25 million to missionize the vessel. The Coast Guard has 
announced that it plans to homeport the ship in Juneau, 
Alaska.\57\ This will require significant improvements to the 
infrastructure in Juneau, specifically reinforcement of the 
pier in preparation for routine use and providing additional 
housing for the crew.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Contract Opportunity, United States Coast Guard, USCG Intent 
to Sole Source Commercially Available Polar Icebreaker (Updated), (Mar. 
1, 2024), available at https://sam.gov/opp/
a12ad39d150d4df0ab6e4773d1cf17d0/view.
    \56\ Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 
118-47 (2024).
    \57\ See Press Release, United States Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard 
Announces Juneau Homeporting for Future Icebreaker, (Aug. 14, 2024); 
See also U.S. Coast Guard Closes In on Purchase of Icebreaker Aiviq, 
Maritime Executive, (Aug. 14, 2024); See also Heather Mongilio, Coast 
Guard Names Juneau as Home Port for New Icebreaker, USNI News, (Aug.) 
15, 2024); See also James Brooks, Coast Guard Confirms Plans to Buy 
Polar Icebreaker, Station It in Juneau, Alaska Beacon, (Aug. 17, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARCTIC SECURITY CUTTER:

    The Arctic Security Cutter is the Coast Guard's potential 
program to acquire a fleet of medium icebreakers.\58\ The 
design, cost, fleet mix analysis, and overall need is still to 
be determined. Given the challenges associated with the PSC 
program, there is substantial concern about the Coast Guard 
embarking on an additional icebreaker acquisition effort. A 
2017 National Academies Report questioned the need for a medium 
icebreaker to fulfill the Coast Guard's statutory missions, and 
asserted that the most cost-effective solution is likely a 
single design.\59\ The Coast Guard asserts that the PSC's draft 
will limit operations for certain missions where a vessel with 
shallower draft would be better suited to fulfil the mission 
needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ CRS PSC Report, supra note 3.
    \59\ National Academies of Science, Acquisition and Operation of 
Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation's Needs (July 11, 2017), 
available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/24834/
acquisition-and-operation-of-polar-icebreakers-fulfilling-the-nations-
needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GREAT LAKES ICEBREAKER:

    The Coast Guard estimates an additional icebreaker, similar 
in capability to the MACKINAW, will cost $350 million.\60\ The 
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2024 directs the Coast Guard 
to submit a plan to Congress on the acquisition strategy for an 
additional Great Lakes Icebreaker.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ CRS PSC Report, supra note 3.
    \61\ CGAA 2024, supra note 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             VI. WITNESSES

     LVice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant 
for Operations, United States Coast Guard
     LVice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., Deputy 
Commandant for Mission Support, United States Coast Guard
     LHeather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, United States Government Accountability Office

 
          SNOWED IN: UNITED STATES DISINVESTMENT IN THE ARCTIC

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
                                    Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I ask unanimous consent that the Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder, if Members want to insert a document into 
the record, email us at DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
    SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Today, the subcommittee will 
receive testimony from the Coast Guard's icebreaking 
recapitalization efforts and the ability of the Service to meet 
its icebreaking and polar region responsibilities.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses today, Vice Admiral 
Peter Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations; Vice Admiral 
Thomas Allan, Deputy Commandant for Mission Support; and 
Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and Justice at 
the Government Accountability Office. Welcome, all of you.
    The United States has relied on the Coast Guard's 
persistent presence to demonstrate America's sovereignty in the 
Arctic since the United States acquired Alaska in 1867, and in 
the Antarctic since the Navy gave up Antarctic icebreaking in 
1966.
    In the Arctic, the Coast Guard projects America's 
sovereignty in a region containing substantial resources that 
support a robust fishing industry, vast energy and mineral 
resources, and new routes to facilitate maritime commerce. 
Given these immense resources, it should come as no surprise 
that adversaries, including Russia and China, are working to 
assert themselves in the region, with Russia fielding 55 
icebreakers and China deploying 4.
    At the same time, our Nation has two operational 
icebreakers, one of which is dedicated to the Service's 
Antarctic mission in support of the National Science Foundation 
and is operating well past its intended service life. Not even 
John Rayfield, who's sitting beside me as the subcommittee 
staff director, he wasn't even here when the Polar Star was 
commissioned in 1977. That is a long time.
    Mr. Rayfield. Yes, I didn't miss it by much.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. No, when was it?
    Mr. Rayfield. I came in 1980.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay.
    To ensure continued polar icebreaking capability, the Coast 
Guard embarked on the Polar Security Cutter program that was 
intended to deliver three new icebreakers beginning this year. 
That timeline and associated cost estimates were unrealistic, 
and the Coast Guard has yet to approve a final design for the 
vessel and is unable to provide Congress with a new timeline or 
a new cost estimate for the first vessel.
    I am optimistic that progress is being made at the shipyard 
under the new owner and operator, but it is well past time that 
the Coast Guard provide us a plan to acquire the needed vessels 
to carry out its polar mission and execute it.
    So, Vice Admiral Gautier, nearly 1 year ago, this 
subcommittee examined the Service's Arctic missions, and during 
that time, you assured us that the Coast Guard would provide a 
plan on how the Service will acquire its new fleet of 
icebreakers. Nearly 1 year has passed since that took place, 
and we don't have a plan. I expect you and Admiral Allan to 
clearly articulate how you will acquire these vessels and what 
resources are required to carry out the Coast Guard's polar 
mission.
    I also note that nearly 2 months ago, the bipartisan full 
committee and subcommittee leadership wrote Admiral Fagan 
requesting an update on the progress towards the PSC program 
milestones which the Coast Guard has stated it would meet by 
the end of the year. While the Commandant replied to the letter 
earlier this week, she failed to provide any meaningful answers 
to the questions. Accordingly, we expect to visit with the 
Commandant in person after the Thanksgiving holiday to discuss 
the Coast Guard's continued lack of action.
    Outside our polar regions, the Coast Guard provides 
critical icebreaking capabilities to keep commerce moving 
safely on our Great Lakes and at the United States Northeast 
ports. These missions are critical. It is important that the 
Service have the necessary assets to carry out these missions.
    [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Today the Subcommittee will receive testimony on the Coast Guard's 
icebreaker recapitalization efforts and the ability of the Service to 
meet its icebreaking and polar region responsibilities. I'd like to 
welcome our witnesses today--Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, Deputy 
Commandant for Operations; Vice Admiral Thomas Allan, Deputy Commandant 
for Mission Support; and Heather MacLeod, Director of Justice and 
Homeland Security at the Government Accountability Office.
    The United States has relied on the Coast Guard's persistent 
presence to demonstrate American sovereignty in the Arctic since the 
United States acquired Alaska in 1867, and in the Antarctic since the 
Navy gave up Antarctic icebreaking in 1966.
    In the Arctic, the Coast Guard projects American sovereignty in a 
region containing substantial resources that support a robust fishing 
industry, vast energy and mineral reserves, and new routes to 
facilitate maritime commerce. Given these immense resources, it should 
come as no surprise that adversaries, including Russia and China, are 
working to assert themselves in the region, with Russia fielding a 
fleet of 55 icebreakers and China deploying four.
    At the same time, our nation has two operational icebreakers, one 
of which is dedicated to the Service's Antarctic mission in support of 
the National Science Foundation and is operating well past its intended 
service life. Not even John Rayfield, the Subcommittee's staff 
director, was on the Hill when the POLAR STAR was commissioned in 1977.
    To ensure continued polar icebreaker capability, the Coast Guard 
embarked on the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program that was intended 
to deliver three new icebreakers beginning this year. That timeline and 
the associated cost estimate were unrealistic, and the Coast Guard has 
yet to approve a final design for the vessel and is unable to provide 
Congress with a new timeline or a new cost estimate for the first 
vessel.
    I am optimistic about progress being made at the shipyard under its 
new owner and operator, but it is well past time that the Coast Guard 
provide us a plan to acquire the needed vessels to carry out its polar 
missions and execute on it.
    Vice Admiral Gautier, nearly a year ago, this subcommittee examined 
the Service's Arctic missions, and during that time you assured us that 
the Coast Guard would provide a plan on how the Service will acquire 
its new fleet of icebreakers. Nearly a year later we still do not have 
that plan. Today, I expect you and Admiral Allan to clearly articulate 
how you will acquire these vessels and what resources you require to 
carry out the Coast Guard's polar missions.
    I also note that nearly two months ago, the bipartisan full 
Committee and Subcommittee leadership wrote to Admiral Fagan requesting 
an update on the progress towards PSC program milestones which the 
Coast Guard has stated it will meet by the end of the year. While the 
Commandant replied to our letter earlier this week, she failed to 
provide any meaningful answers to our questions. Accordingly, we expect 
to visit with the Commandant in person after the Thanksgiving holiday 
to discuss the Coast Guard's continued lack of action.
    Outside our polar regions, the Coast Guard provides critical 
icebreaking capability to keep commerce moving safely on our Great 
Lakes and at United States Northeast ports. These missions are 
critical, and it is important the Service have the necessary assets to 
carry out these missions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. To our witnesses, thank you for 
participating today. Thank you for coming. I really appreciate 
it. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
    Now, I recognize the former chairman, now the ranking 
member of the committee. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Chair, for calling 
this hearing on a topic of great importance, our Nation's 
icebreaking capabilities.
    We could have just as easily called this hearing ``Iced 
Out.'' But whether we're iced out or snowed in, we're stuck 
when it comes to icebreaking capability.
    There's never been a more important time for the United 
States to maintain and expand its leadership in the Arctic. The 
region is rich in natural resources, including 90 billion 
barrels of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's 
undiscovered natural gas, and $1 trillion in rare earth 
minerals.
    Depending on who develops these resources and how, the 
Arctic can either challenge or accelerate the global transition 
to clean energy and transportation. In the last decade, we have 
all seen the rise of Arctic shipping routes. Over 400 ships 
transited the Northern Sea Route between the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans in 2021, a route previously impassable without 
an icebreaker.
    However, this activity has been dominated by Russian-
flagged vessels, and both Russia and China have jockeyed for 
control of the region. In addition, the region hosts a $3 
billion seafood industry, increasing tourism activity, and 
critical scientific research missions.
    So, to do any of this work in the Arctic, the U.S. relies 
on the Coast Guard and its icebreakers to represent our 
interest in the region, including leadership roles on 
international bodies governing navigation, search and rescues, 
vessel safety, fisheries, and pollution.
    Icebreaking vessels are critical for the Coast Guard to 
effectively traverse the treacherous polar conditions, provide 
access for other stakeholders, and complete it missions in the 
Arctic. Our presence equals our sovereignty.
    However, decades of underinvestment have left the Coast 
Guard with only two oceangoing icebreakers, the medium 
icebreaker Healy and the heavy icebreaker Polar Star, which has 
already been extended far past its regular service life.
    In conjunction with polar icebreaker missions, the Coast 
Guard is charged with domestic icebreaking in three of its nine 
districts. The Coast Guard also needs to expand its domestic 
icebreaker capability and infrastructure to support that 
mission.
    Plans to homeport the Polar Security Cutters in Seattle 
necessitate improvements to Base Seattle, as Base Seattle is 
the gateway for Arctic missions and supports critical 
maintenance.
    So, all of this is in contrast to Russia. Russia operates a 
fleet of 55 icebreakers, including 18 military icebreakers. 
China also operates a fleet of two medium and two heavy 
icebreakers, with more planned for constructions.
    These nations have recognized the value of the Arctic and 
invested heavily in securing dominance in that region. So, make 
no mistake, the U.S.' growing fleet disadvantage presents an 
existential threat to our interests, our leadership, and our 
national security in the Arctic. That is why the Coast Guard is 
working to replace and expand its fleet of icebreakers, 
including an effort to acquire three heavy icebreakers through 
its Polar Security Cutter program.
    Originally, construction of the first cutter was scheduled 
to begin in 2022 with delivery in the mid-20s. Unfortunately, 
we have reached the mid-20s, and the shipyard that won the 
contract has been sold, the design is only 60 percent complete, 
and the Coast Guard has not determined the delivery date or the 
final cost for the cutters.
    It is important to note that acquiring these vessels is no 
easy task. This is the first domestic construction of a heavy 
icebreaker in the U.S. in over 50 years, which only underscores 
the need for continued investment in U.S. shipyards and 
shipbuilding capabilities.
    Without a robust domestic shipbuilding industry, the Coast 
Guard will continue to face challenges acquiring any vessel. 
That is why it is critical that the U.S. recently, in fact, 
yesterday, signed the ICE Pact, a collaboration between the 
U.S., Canada, and Finland to share information and technology 
and increase the supply of icebreakers for our allies. 
Leveraging these international partnerships is crucial if the 
U.S. hopes to increase production, reduce cost, and rebuild its 
domestic shipbuilding industry.
    However, despite repeated requests from this committee, the 
Coast Guard has also not committed to a timeline or cost for 
construction of the first Polar Security Cutter. So, today's 
hearing is an opportunity for this committee to receive more 
information about the Coast Guard's plan to complete 
construction.
    I also look forward to hearing how the Coast Guard intends 
to improve its Polar Security Cutter program, including 
addressing the GAO's open recommendations.
    Finally, Congress has to recognize the Coast Guard will 
require additional resources in future years to complete 
construction and to expand its icebreaker fleet in the Arctic. 
While the Coast Guard has received appropriations for two 
vessels, that funding is now unlikely to cover construction for 
the first Polar Security Cutter.
    So, Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal, thanks 
for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses.
    And with that, I yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chairman Webster, for calling this hearing on a topic of 
great importance: icebreaking capabilities.
    We could have just as easily called this hearing, ``Iced Out.'' 
Whether we're iced out or snowed in, we're stuck when it comes to 
icebreaking capability.
    There has never been a more important time for the United States to 
maintain and expand its leadership in the Arctic.
    The region is rich in natural resources including 90 billion 
barrels of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's undiscovered 
natural gas and $1 trillion in rare earth minerals.
    Depending on which actors develop these resources--and how--the 
Arctic could either challenge or accelerate the global transition to 
clean energy and transportation.
    In the last decade, we have also seen the rise of Arctic shipping 
routes. Over 400 ships transited the Northern Sea Route between the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in 2021--a route previously impassible 
without an icebreaker.
    However, this activity has been dominated by Russian-flagged 
vessels, and both Russia and China have jockeyed for control of the 
region.
    In addition, the region hosts a $3 billion seafood industry, 
increasing tourism activity and critical scientific research missions.
    To do any of this work, the U.S. relies on the Coast Guard--and its 
icebreakers--to represent our interests in the region, including 
leadership roles on international bodies governing navigation, search 
and rescue, vessel safety, fisheries and pollution.
    Icebreaking vessels are critical for the Coast Guard to effectively 
traverse the treacherous polar conditions, provide access for other 
stakeholders and complete its missions in the Arctic. Our presence 
equals our sovereignty.
    However, decades of underinvestment have left the Coast Guard with 
only two ocean-going icebreakers: the medium icebreaker HEALY and the 
heavy icebreaker POLAR STAR, which has already been extended far past 
its regular service life.
    In conjunction with the Polar icebreaking missions, the Coast Guard 
is charged with domestic icebreaking in three of its nine districts. 
The Coast Guard also needs to expand its domestic icebreaking 
capability and infrastructure to support that domestic mission.
    Plans to home port Polar Security Cutters in Seattle, Washington, 
necessitate improvements to Base Seattle.
    Base Seattle is the gateway for our Arctic missions and supports 
critical maintenance.
    All of this is in contrast to Russia who operates a fleet of 55 
icebreakers, including 18 military icebreakers. China also operates a 
fleet of two medium and two heavy icebreakers, with more planned for 
construction.
    These nations have recognized the value of the Arctic and invested 
heavily in securing dominance in the region.
    Make no mistake, the United States' growing fleet disadvantage 
presents an existential threat to U.S. interests, leadership and 
national security in the Arctic.
    That is why the Coast Guard is working to replace and expand its 
fleet of icebreakers, including an effort to acquire three heavy 
icebreakers through its Polar Security Cutter program.
    Originally, construction of the first Polar Security Cutter was 
scheduled to begin in 2022, with delivery in the mid-2020s.
    Unfortunately, we have reached the mid-2020s, and the shipyard that 
won the contract has been sold, the design is only 60 percent complete 
and the Coast Guard has not determined the delivery date or the final 
cost for the cutters.
    It is important to note that acquiring these vessels is no easy 
task. This is the first domestic construction of a heavy icebreaker in 
the United States in over 50 years, which only underscores the need for 
continued investment in U.S. shipyards and shipbuilding capabilities.
    Without a robust domestic shipbuilding industry, the Coast Guard 
will continue to face challenges acquiring any vessel.
    That is why it is so critical that the United States yesterday 
signed the ICE Pact, a collaboration between the U.S., Canada and 
Finland to share information and technology and increase the supply of 
icebreakers for our allies. Leveraging these international partnerships 
is crucial if the U.S. hopes to increase production, reduce costs and 
rebuild its domestic shipbuilding industry.
    However, despite repeated requests from this Committee, the Coast 
Guard has also not committed to a timeline or cost for construction of 
the first Polar Security Cutter.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Committee to receive 
more information about the Coast Guard's plans to complete 
construction. I also look forward to hearing how the Coast Guard 
intends to improve its Polar Security Cutter program, including 
addressing the Government Accountability Office's open recommendations.
    Finally, Congress must recognize that the Coast Guard will require 
additional resources in future years to complete construction and 
expand its icebreaking fleet in the Arctic. While the Coast Guard has 
received appropriations for two vessels, that funding is now unlikely 
to cover construction for the first Polar Security Cutter.
    Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal, thanks for holding 
this important hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Representative.
    So, Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
                         TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Webster, for calling 
today's hearing.
    The Coast Guard is the premier agency tasked with 
projecting sovereignty in the Arctic, which is a critically 
important mission.
    The region is slowly opening to all forms of commerce. The 
Arctic region has a $3 billion seafood industry, vulnerable to 
overfishing, and contains billions of dollars in natural 
resources. A U.S. presence is required to ensure safe and 
responsible development and the protection of resources and the 
environment.
    Unfortunately, the Coast Guard icebreaker mission is 
woefully underresourced. The Service's only two oceangoing 
icebreakers are well past their service life and often the 
victims of machinery casualties. This is simply unacceptable.
    I've had the privilege of seeing firsthand the capability 
of our Coast Guard icebreakers, and I understand the important 
service they provide to our Nation.
    While recapitalization of the icebreaking fleet was 
identified as a priority almost two decades ago, we are still 
several years and over $1 billion away from the delivery of the 
first Polar Security Cutter. As a result, the United States is 
missing out on the opportunity to enforce rules-based order and 
freedom of navigation in a geopolitically competitive arena in 
the Arctic. It's not simply about icebreaking.
    On the Great Lakes, the Coast Guard operates nine 
icebreakers and only one is a heavy icebreaker. For the region 
itself, which is heavily dependent on commercial shipping, the 
need for more capable assets cannot be understated. Fifty-five 
percent of the regional economy is dependent on key shipping 
channels, and two-thirds of domestic icebreaking operations 
happen on the Great Lakes.
    It is no secret that the United States has fallen behind 
the curve when it comes to the number of ice capable ships in 
our arsenal and the time spent in the Arctic. This hearing 
today is focused on the need for the United States to invest in 
newer and better ships, more sophisticated technologies, and 
the capabilities to sustain the invaluable geostrategic 
presence in the region.
    While the Coast Guard has done as much as they can with 
only two ships, we need to give them the opportunity to do more 
with more. I have major concern about the delayed PSC program 
and the amount of funding actually needed to just get one ship 
built. This is a far cry from the over 55 ships that are at our 
adversary's disposal. From a national security perspective 
alone, this, again, is unacceptable.
    I want to be clear, the resources required to build, 
homeport, and maintain Polar Security Cutters are substantial. 
If Congress does not double the Coast Guard's budget in 2026, 
the Service will either have to abandon the program, cease 
construction of Offshore Patrol Cutters, or cut significant 
portions of its operations.
    The House passed an authorization bill earlier this year 
that begins to appropriately resource the Coast Guard, and I 
implore my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to follow 
suit.
    The Service has proven time and time again that even in the 
face of ship casualties and little to no resource support, they 
continue to sail onward. But how much can we keep asking of 
them? It's time for Congress to step up.
    I am proud to advocate for America's Coast Guard and 
advocate for increased resources.
    I look forward to the testimony today and to hear about how 
Congress can better support the Service.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
    Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Thank you, Chairman Webster, for calling today's hearing.
    The Coast Guard is the premier agency tasked with projecting 
sovereignty in the Arctic, which is a critically important mission.
    The region is slowly opening to all forms of commerce. The Arctic 
region has a $3 billion seafood industry vulnerable to overfishing and 
contains billions of dollars of oil and natural gas. A U.S. presence is 
required to ensure safe and responsible development and the protection 
of resources and the environment.
    Unfortunately, the Coast Guard's icebreaking mission is woefully 
under-resourced. The Service's only two ocean-going icebreakers are 
well past their service life and often the victims of machinery 
casualties. This is simply unacceptable.
    I have had the privilege of seeing firsthand the capability of our 
Coast Guard icebreakers, and I understand the important service they 
provide the nation.
    While recapitalization of the icebreaking fleet was identified as a 
priority almost two decades ago, we are still several years and over $1 
billion away from the delivery of the first Polar Security Cutter.
    As a result, the U.S. is missing out on the opportunity to enforce 
rules-based order and freedom of navigation in a geo-politically 
competitive arena in the Arctic. It's not simply about breaking ice.
    On the Great Lakes, the Coast Guard operates nine icebreakers, and 
only one is a heavy icebreaker.
    For the region itself, which is heavily dependent on commercial 
shipping, the need for more capable assets cannot be understated. 
Fifty-five percent of the regional economy is dependent on key shipping 
channels and two-thirds of the domestic icebreaking operations happen 
on the Great Lakes.
    It is no secret that the United States has fallen behind the curve 
when it comes to the number of ice capable ships in our arsenal and the 
time spent in the Arctic. This hearing today is focused on the need for 
the U.S. to invest in newer and better ships, more sophisticated 
technologies and the capabilities to sustain the invaluable 
geostrategic presence in the region.
    While the Coast Guard has done as much as they can with only two 
ships, we need to give them the opportunity to do more with more.
    I have major concerns about the delayed PSC program and the amount 
of funding actually needed to get just one ship built. This is a far 
cry from the over 55 ships that are at our adversary's disposal. From a 
national security perspective alone, this is unacceptable.
    I want to be clear: the resources required to build, homeport, and 
maintain Polar Security Cutters are substantial. If Congress does not 
double the Coast Guard's budget in 2026, the Service will either have 
to abandon the program, cease construction of Offshore Patrol Cutters 
or cut significant portions of its operations.
    The House passed an authorization bill earlier this year that 
begins to appropriately resource the Coast Guard, and I implore my 
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to follow suit.
    The Service has proven time and time again that even in the face of 
ship casualties and little to no resource support, they continue to 
sail onward--but how much can we keep asking of them? It's time for 
Congress to step up.
    I am proud to advocate for America's great Coast Guard and advocate 
for increased resources. I look forward to the testimony today to hear 
about how Congress can better support the Service.
    I yield back.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Briefly, I would like to take a moment and explain the 
lighting system. Green is go. Yellow is slow down. Red is stop. 
Pretty simple.
    I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as the witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 
writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 
days for additional comments and information submitted by 
Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's 
hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the committee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5 
minutes.
    With that, Vice Admiral Gautier, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER W. GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 
FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS G. ALLAN, 
 Jr., DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD; 
 AND HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, 
             U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

 TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER W. GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 
                FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Gautier. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Larsen, 
Ranking Member Carbajal, distinguished members of this 
subcommittee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity, 
especially during this particularly busy time in Congress, to 
share your Coast Guard's important work to advance maritime 
safety, security, and stewardship in our Arctic homeland and 
across the entire Arctic region.
    Your Coast Guard is in greater demand today than ever 
before, and upholding our proud 234-year history of serving the 
homeland and providing national security beyond our borders, 
including in the high latitudes, remains a top priority.
    Through routine presence, meaningful engagements, and 
deliberate actions that strengthen maritime governance, the 
Coast Guard provides a full suite of missions and services to 
Americans living in the U.S. Arctic and preserves our national 
interest and promotes a peaceful, stable, prosperous, and 
cooperative Arctic during a great, great time of regional 
change.
    With our unique combination of authorities as an Armed 
Force, a law enforcement and regulatory agency, and a 
humanitarian service, the Coast Guard is an ideal instrument 
for the Nation to responsibly engage in this unique and 
challenging maritime environment.
    We are operating forward to address the safety and security 
of our Arctic residents and mariners who make their living 
there, homeporting new cutters, investing in infrastructure and 
capabilities, prioritizing our operations in the region, and 
strengthening our international partnerships.
    And I would just like to acknowledge a theme of your 
opening statements that the Arctic physical, operational, and 
geostrategic domains are changing rapidly, and that just drives 
increased demand for Coast Guard services.
    Russian and Chinese activities have dramatically increased 
in the U.S. Arctic. Between July and October, the Coast Guard 
monitored three Chinese research vessels operating above the 
U.S. extended continental shelf, as well as a PRC Naval Surface 
Action Group and a separate Russian Federation Surface Action 
Group with our cutters and aircraft.
    And what's really notable, for the first time, we witnessed 
the joint operation between the China Coast Guard and the 
Russian Border Guard in the Surface Action Group operating high 
in the Bering Sea, and that is a first. That just tells us that 
their Arctic cooperation is only expanding.
    The Coast Guard tracks these activities, and we continue to 
meet increasing presence with our presence along the U.S.-
Russian maritime boundary line and within the U.S. EEZ. Through 
Operation Frontier Sentinel, we protect our sovereign 
interests, and we ensure that behaviors are in keeping with 
international laws and norms.
    As this type of activity increases, our Coast Guard will 
ensure the international rules-based order is maintained, and 
the sovereignty of the U.S. is protected.
    I personally traveled to Alaska in early October, 
connecting with Coast Guard operational units and partners 
throughout the region. Local and indigenous groups are alarmed 
about Russian and Chinese activities in their backyard, the 
growing risks to the maritime environment from increased 
shipping, and the existential threat that they view from 
climate change.
    Coast Guard units in the region perform exceptionally under 
some of the most austere operating conditions on planet Earth, 
covering an EEZ greater than the lower 48 combined. However, 
our units are facing readiness challenges that threaten our 
ability to continue to meet the growing demand for our services 
across the Arctic.
    We are experiencing historic shortfalls in maintenance 
funding and a shrinking military industrial base that impacts 
material readiness of our assets. Our current shortfalls in 
personnel and material readiness create an imperative for 
action to adjust our fore-structure and posture and operate 
differently.
    Looking forward, we must continue to evolve how the Coast 
Guard operates, utilizing more capable assets and, with your 
support, increased resources to meet the critical demands that 
continue to grow both in breadth and in consequence and 
complexity.
    Coast Guard presence and leadership in the Arctic has never 
been more important than it is right now, and our service 
continues to be the right investment to protect the American 
people and the homeland.
    Thank you for the committee's enduring and strong support 
for America's Coast Guard, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Vice Admirals Gautier and 
Allan is on page 12.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Next we have Vice Admiral Allan. You are recognized for 5 
minutes.

    TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS G. ALLAN, Jr., DEPUTY 
        COMMANDANT FOR MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Allan. Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Larsen, Ranking Member Carbajal, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee.
    I am pleased to be here to highlight the Coast Guard's 
continued investment and presence in Alaska, the U.S. Arctic, 
and the polar regions.
    The Coast Guard is working hard to meet growing mission 
needs in the polar regions. The Service remains a unique 
instrument of national power, supporting national security and 
strategic objectives around the globe.
    As Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, I am focused on 
delivering solutions that equip our people with assets, tools, 
and support to project U.S. presence and mission capability in 
the high latitudes.
    The polar regions are experiencing an ever-increasing rate 
of change requiring asset systems and infrastructure to enable 
Coast Guard operations in some of the harshest and most remote 
environments on the Earth. With the strong support of the 
subcommittee, the Service is prioritizing significant 
acquisitions and modernization programs to meet national 
demands.
    I am clear-eyed about the challenges that we face in 
recapitalizing the Nation's fleet of polar icebreakers. Put 
simply, polar icebreakers are the foundation of the U.S. 
operational presence, I say that again--presence--and influence 
in the polar regions. Our Nation needs these multimission 
cutters to provide assured year-round access and the resulting 
security to our national interest in the high latitudes.
    The Coast Guard is diligently working with Bollinger 
Mississippi Shipyard building the Polar Security Cutter, and 
thanks to enormous efforts from many dedicated people, I am 
very pleased to report that we are on track to seek approval 
from the Department to begin production by the end of this 
calendar year.
    The Coast Guard works with the U.S. Navy as part of an 
integrated program office to design and deliver at least three 
Polar Security Cutters. This arrangement leverages each 
Service's experience and expertise in large, complex vessel 
acquisitions.
    The Navy support is critical as the United States seeks to 
construct its first heavy polar icebreaker in nearly 50 years, 
at a time when the demand for new maritime assets exceeds 
national shipbuilding capacity.
    We are working with our partners in the maritime industry 
base to address unique challenges in producing a large complex 
ship like Polar Security Cutter. In conjunction with the prime 
contractor, we are nearing the end of a long and complex 
process to modify the contract and formalize cost and schedule 
requirements before production activities can begin.
    The Polar Security Cutter remains one of the Coast Guard's 
top priority acquisition priorities and retains the attention 
and focus of Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security 
leadership. As we work to advance the acquisition, we are 
completing service life extension activities on Polar Star and 
planning major maintenance to address obsolescence and outdated 
systems on Healy.
    Additionally, we are moving quickly to acquire a 
commercially available polar icebreaker as part of our Arctic 
bridging strategy. While icebreakers are currently in the 
spotlight, our acquisition portfolio also includes the 
construction of National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol 
Cutters, and Fast Response Cutters that already or will operate 
in Alaskan waters, as well as delivery of upgraded C-130 long-
range surveillance aircraft and MH-60 Tango helicopters that 
are well suited for the distances and challenges that operators 
face in that region.
    These efforts complement significant investments and shore 
infrastructure to support the Service's full range of missions, 
including construction of home port facilities for the Polar 
Security Cutters in Seattle and a new home port in Juneau for 
the support of the future operations of the commercially 
available polar icebreaker.
    All of these investments are critical to ensuring Coast 
Guard presence to safeguard America's interest as an Arctic 
nation, as well as protection of the people, traditions, and 
resources of Alaska.
    I appreciate the subcommittee's continued bipartisan 
support, and I look forward to our continued work together on 
advancing these critical efforts in the high latitudes.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Vice Admirals Gautier and 
Allan follows:]

                                 
   Joint Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy 
Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, and Vice Admiral Thomas G. 
  Allan, Jr., Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Good morning, Chair Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is our pleasure to be 
here today to discuss the Coast Guard's Arctic investments and 
operations, and their benefits to our national interests. The United 
States is an Arctic nation, and the Coast Guard has been a key leader 
and interagency and international partner in advancing maritime safety, 
security, and stewardship in our Arctic homeland and across the entire 
Arctic region for over 150 years. Through routine presence, meaningful 
engagements, and deliberate actions that strengthen maritime 
governance, the Coast Guard provides a full suite of missions and 
services to Americans living in the U.S. Arctic and promotes a 
peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative Arctic during a time of 
great regional change.
    The Arctic is undergoing a dramatic transformation across the 
physical, operational, and geostrategic domains. We are witnessing 
firsthand the increasing impacts of climate change and how it is 
enabling new access to Arctic waters. Arctic activity is increasing and 
evolving at a rapid pace, from migrating fish stocks and changing 
fishing patterns to growth in types and locations of vessel transits, 
including an expansion of tourism. Greater storm impacts and thawing 
permafrost affect maritime communities across the U.S. Arctic. 
Accelerated changes in the Arctic environment make Arctic waters more 
accessible, creating both opportunities and challenges.
    At the same time, the Arctic is a region of increasing geostrategic 
activity, amongst partners and competitors alike. In and near the U.S. 
Arctic, the Coast Guard is observing increased presence by the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which are engaged in unilateral and 
combined military and coast guard activities, as well as increased 
research vessel presence. Internationally, the Coast Guard and Arctic 
partners are increasing activities and engagements that support our 
common goals.
    The Coast Guard has the right combination of authorities, mission 
expertise, and partnerships to address U.S. Arctic equities head on. 
However, the Service needs significant investment to modernize and grow 
our capabilities to keep pace with rapidly evolving challenges and to 
advance our Nation's interests in the Arctic, and we appreciate the 
trust and support of Congress and the American people. The Service will 
continue to prioritize actions that safeguard U.S. interests and serve 
Americans while promoting safe, secure, and environmentally responsible 
maritime activity in the Arctic.
               Arctic Strategies and National Priorities
    The Coast Guard is guided in our actions and investments through a 
set of national, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Coast Guard 
strategies. The National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes 
constraining Russia and outcompeting the PRC, and the National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region (NSAR) emphasizes national defense and homeland 
security and states that our highest priority is to protect the 
American people and our sovereign territory. In 2022, the 
Administration released the Implementation Plan for the NSAR, which 
serves as a blueprint for the Nation's investments to achieve these 
national priorities. In addition, in July 2024, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) published the 2024 Arctic Strategy, which outlines DoD's 
plan to enhance its Arctic capabilities, deepen engagements with allies 
and partners, and exercise calibrated presence in the Arctic. The Coast 
Guard contributed to the development of both the NSS and NSAR and its 
Implementation Plan, and we will continue to be at the forefront of 
Arctic strategic leadership.
    In October 2023, the Coast Guard published its Arctic Strategic 
Outlook Implementation Plan to fulfill our obligations across national 
strategies. This plan underscores the Coast Guard's commitment to 
promoting safety, sovereignty, and stewardship in the region by 
describing actions the Service will take over the next decade, given 
the requisite support and investment. In addition to expanding the 
Coast Guard icebreaker fleet, the plan aspires to develop additional 
capabilities and capacity, increase Arctic domain awareness and 
communication capabilities, strengthen the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
(ACGF) and Arctic Council leadership, and modernize the U.S. Arctic 
Marine Transportation System (MTS). These actions are necessary to meet 
national strategic objectives and to advance the Arctic priorities of 
DHS, for which the Coast Guard has a leading role.
                           Strategy to Action
    A peaceful, stable, and prosperous Arctic region that is 
increasingly open to human activity requires sound rules-based 
governance and responsible behavior in accordance with international 
norms. As the NSAR states, we continue to ``expand U.S. engagement and 
leadership, pursue new partnerships and arrangements that advance 
shared interests, and prepare for increased and evolving activity in 
these regions.'' With our unique combination of authorities--as an 
armed force, a law enforcement agency, a regulatory agency, and a 
humanitarian service--the Coast Guard is an ideal instrument for the 
Nation to responsibly engage in this unique maritime environment. 
However, given the vast and unforgiving reaches of the Arctic region, 
the Coast Guard needs more capable modern assets and resources.
    We continue to strengthen maritime safety, security, and 
stewardship in Alaska and the U.S. Arctic through Operation Arctic 
Shield, providing persistent cutter presence, rotary wing aircraft 
positioned seasonally, and sustained personnel engagements for search 
and rescue, law enforcement, and security missions. As maritime traffic 
through the Bering Strait and Northern Sea route increases because of 
receding sea ice and Russia's changing economic factors, the Coast 
Guard tracks vessel movements and continues to engage in spill response 
preparedness with partners. Additionally, through partnerships with 
Alaska communities and federal partners, the Coast Guard will continue 
to build resilience to the impacts of climate change to conserve 
critical Arctic maritime ecosystems.
    The geopolitics in the Arctic continue to evolve as state and non-
state actors seek to advance their interests in the region. As allies, 
partners, and competitors increasingly contend for diplomatic, 
economic, and strategic advantage and influence across the globe, these 
trends also manifest in the Arctic region. Russia and the PRC exemplify 
this competition--both declared the Arctic a strategic priority; both 
made significant investments in new or refurbished capabilities; and 
both are attempting to exert direct and indirect influence across the 
region.
    Russian, PRC, and joint Russian-PRC activities are dramatically 
increasing in the U.S. Arctic. The Coast Guard tracks these activities, 
and we continue to ``meet increasing presence with presence'' along the 
U.S.-Russian maritime boundary line and within the U.S. Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) through Operation Frontier Sentinel, both to ensure 
our sovereign rights and assure behavior is in keeping with 
international norms. Between July and October 2024, the Coast Guard 
monitored three Chinese research vessels operating in the area above 
the U.S. extended continental shelf. The Service also monitored a PRC 
Naval Surface Action Group (SAG) and a separate Russian Federation Navy 
SAG with our cutters and aircraft. Additionally, this year, for the 
first time, we observed a joint Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast 
Guard exercise in the Arctic, an indication that their Arctic 
cooperation is expanding. As this type of activity continues to 
increase, the Coast Guard remains committed to meeting presence with 
presence to ensure that Russian and PRC vessels operate in accordance 
with international law in a region important to the United States.
    This summer, CGC Healy conducted underway operations to enhance 
presence in the U.S. EEZ in the Arctic, support the National Science 
Foundation's research into global climate change impacts, and further 
enhance the safety of the Arctic MTS. These operations were conducted 
in addition to Coast Guard fisheries enforcement, search and rescue 
cases, and other extensive marine safety-oriented regulatory activities 
in Alaskan villages. For each village engagement, Coast Guard members 
integrate with the local communities and governments to enhance 
relationships, build partnerships, and provide training in areas such 
as boating safety and ice rescue.
    To reinforce our role as a trusted and reliable partner, the Coast 
Guard actively participates in bilateral and multilateral Arctic 
exercises and at-sea engagements with Canadian and European partners. 
These are critical for advancing multilateral capabilities, integrating 
with multinational defense allies, and exchanging best practices during 
fleet integration training. Collectively, they improve our capacity to 
respond to maritime threats and advance Coast Guard and broader U.S. 
government interests with key Arctic partners.
    The Coast Guard remains a principal member of the ACGF, the North 
Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, 
and supports U.S. efforts in the Arctic Council. The ACGF is a bridge 
between diplomacy and operations, serving as an independent, 
complementary body to the Arctic Council with an operational focus on 
safe and environmentally responsible maritime activity. The Coast Guard 
conducts exercises with partner Arctic states through the ACGF to 
enhance interoperability and provide a platform for direct dialogue 
among Arctic agencies fulfilling coast guard-like functions. The ACGF 
is planning its first live exercise since a pause due to COVID and 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The exercise will occur in April 2025, 
ahead of Norway's scheduled transfer of the Arctic Council and ACGF 
chairmanship to Denmark.
    The Arctic Council is the principal multilateral forum for Arctic 
governance. The Coast Guard provides expertise and leadership in Arctic 
Council working groups, particularly those related to environmental 
protection and search-and-rescue. These investments position the United 
States to model responsible governance and sustainable development 
across the region.
                    Investing in Arctic Capabilities
    These broad operations and wide-ranging activities are executed in 
one of the globe's most expansive, remote, and unforgiving maritime 
environments. We are the only federal agency responsible for assuring 
surface vessel access to polar regions. Our vast responsibility 
supports myriad national security and strategic objectives and requires 
commensurate investment. To maintain operational readiness while we 
recapitalize and build the capacity and capability necessary to meet 
increasing Arctic challenges, the Coast Guard requires predictable, 
consistent, and expanded investment. To keep pace with the ever-
increasing rate of change, we must provide our workforce with modern 
assets, systems, and infrastructure to support mission execution. In 
line with this direction, and with strong congressional support, the 
Service continues to invest in a multibillion-dollar portfolio of 
acquisition programs established to deliver capabilities to meet these 
national demands.
    With strong support from Congress, the Coast Guard is investing in 
Arctic capabilities to meet these challenges. We are building Polar 
Security Cutters (PSC), Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), Fast Response 
Cutters (FRC), aircraft, and vital shore infrastructure required to 
meet America's operational needs. Over the past five years, Congress 
appropriated more than $500 million that directly invests in Alaska's 
shore infrastructure, $1.1 billion for the two OPCs that will be 
homeported in Kodiak, over $250 million for four FRCs homeported 
throughout Alaska, and $125 million for a Commercially Available Polar 
Icebreaker that will be homeported in Juneau. Alaskans are already 
benefiting from earlier funding that included $625 million for the five 
C-130s and nearly $200 million for the six MH-60T helicopters that are 
already operating out of Air Station Kodiak. Other investments include 
more than $800 million for the PSC, $60 million to sustain CGC Polar 
Star, and $350 million for the PSC's homeport in Seattle, Washington, 
that will advance Coast Guard mission execution in the Arctic.
    All told, these amount to just over $3.3 billion in investments 
over the past five years. The combined $3.3 billion represents more 
than one-third of the $9.6 billion the Service has received in 
Procurement, Construction, and Improvement (PC&I) appropriations over 
the same five-year timeframe.
    Highlighting the importance of the investments in polar 
icebreakers, the United States, Canada, and Finland earlier this year 
announced their intent to create the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort 
(ICE) Pact. This proposed trilateral arrangement is intended to 
strengthen the shipbuilding industry and industrial capacity of each 
nation and build closer security and economic ties among our countries 
through information exchange and mutual workforce-development focused 
on building polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard is supporting DHS and 
the Department of State's effort to craft the framework of this 
agreement and looks forward to working with our trilateral partners to 
advance our Nation's icebreaking capacity through collaboration.
                           Polar Icebreaking
    Heavy polar icebreakers are the foundation of U.S. operational 
presence and influence in the polar regions. These multi-mission 
cutters provide assured, year-round access not only for Coast Guard 
missions, but also in support of critical activities that protect key 
U.S. interests in the high latitudes. The Coast Guard faces gaps in 
capability that challenge our ability to operate reliably and meet 
mission needs. For instance, achieving persistent presence in the 
Arctic and seasonal Antarctic presence requires a fleet mix of eight to 
nine icebreakers--including both heavy and medium types. Today we rely 
on an aging and limited ice-breaking fleet.
    With the strong support of this Subcommittee, we are moving forward 
with the acquisition of the Nation's first new heavy polar icebreakers 
in nearly five decades. When fully operational, PSCs will provide the 
global reach and icebreaking capability necessary to project U.S. 
presence and influence, conduct Coast Guard missions in the high 
latitudes, and advance our national interests.
    Through an Integrated Program Office (IPO), the Coast Guard and 
Navy are leveraging each Services' experience and expertise in large, 
complex vessel acquisition programs. The Coast Guard and Navy remain 
committed to attaining the necessary design maturity prior to beginning 
production activities. Detail design activities are very nearly 
complete, and long lead-time material for the lead ship has been 
delivered to the shipyard. The IPO has adopted an innovative and 
incremental approach to support early production, Prototype Fabrication 
Assessment (PFA), which is based on Navy best practices. By 
prioritizing and starting production on up to eight low-risk modules, 
PFA allows the shipbuilder to progressively build workforce capability, 
test new processes and equipment, and reduce production risk. Six 
modules are currently under construction. These modules have achieved 
near 100 percent design maturity and present very low risk of re-work. 
All of these efforts combined are aimed to begin PSC production as soon 
as possible.
    Earlier this year, the Coast Guard notified Congress that the PSC 
program would exceed cost and schedule thresholds. The program has been 
working closely with Bollinger Shipyards, who acquired the shipyard 
from VT Halter Marine in 2022, and is nearing the end of the long and 
complex process of reviewing their proposal and, following Bollinger's 
acquisition of the shipyard from VT Halter Marine, negotiating the 
contract modifications necessary to formally establish new cost and 
schedule parameters in the updated acquisition program baseline. This 
work is occurring in parallel with ongoing program activities to 
support delivery of the PSC fleet as quickly as possible.
    To maintain heavy polar icebreaking capability until the PSC class 
is delivered, the Coast Guard will complete an innovative and 
successful service life extension on Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star, the 
Nation's only operational heavy polar icebreaker, in 2025. The cutter 
recently completed the fourth of five planned annual work periods which 
will enable continued operation of the aging cutter.
    Likewise, the Service has initiated a service life extension 
program for Coast Guard Cutter Healy, the Service's only operational 
medium polar icebreaker, which was commissioned in 1999. The five-year 
phased production builds upon the lessons learned from Polar Star's 
service life extension and is planned to be completed between 2026 and 
2030. This effort will recapitalize a number of major systems while 
addressing significant operational degraders to maintain the Coast 
Guard's required medium icebreaking capability.
    In addition to the ongoing maintenance and service life-extending 
work in the Service's current fleet and with the Subcommittee's 
support, the Coast Guard received funding in Fiscal Year 2024 to 
procure a commercially available polar icebreaker. The purchase of a 
commercially available polar icebreaker is an effective strategy to 
increase operational surface presence in the near-term and add long-
term national capacity in the Arctic. Under the authority granted by 
the Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2022, as 
augmented by the temporary correction in the current short-term 
continuing resolution, the Coast Guard intends to acquire the motor 
vessel Aiviq, which is the only available U.S.-built icebreaker that 
meets the Service's requirements.
    The negotiations to purchase Aiviq are underway, and the Coast 
Guard's initial activities will be directed at achieving initial 
operational capability for deployment to District 17 in the spring of 
2026. A series of phased modifications will occur between annual Arctic 
operations to achieve full operational capability. We look forward to 
adding this important medium icebreaker to our fleet furthering our 
ability to meet increasing demands in the Arctic.
                               Conclusion
    The physical, operational, and geopolitical environment in the 
Arctic continues to change rapidly, driving demand for U.S. 
investments, to include Coast Guard presence, influence, and services. 
The Coast Guard has shaped national security in the Arctic for over 150 
years and is central to a U.S. whole-of-government approach to securing 
national interests in the Polar Regions.
    Continued support for a modernized and capable polar fleet and 
increased Coast Guard Arctic capacity and capabilities will fortify the 
Nation's position in the increasingly critical Arctic domain. Coast 
Guard leadership is essential in maintaining a coalition of like-minded 
partners to shape the Arctic domain as a peaceful, stable, prosperous, 
and cooperative region. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before 
you today and for your actions to support the members of the Coast 
Guard.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Ms. MacLeod, you are recognized.

 TESTIMONY OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Larsen, 
Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee, thank 
you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's 
recent work on Arctic operations.
    As an Arctic nation, the United States has substantial 
interest in the region. Warming temperatures and melting sea 
ice have opened new shipping routes, and U.S. adversaries have 
taken note. This includes growing interest by Russia and China 
as they seek greater access to the region and its resources.
    This has become even more evident as the United States has 
monitored Chinese and Russian military vessels conducting joint 
exercises off of Alaska.
    My testimony today will focus on two main areas: Coast 
Guard efforts to assess Arctic risk and challenges the Service 
faces in carrying out its missions in the region.
    As you know, Coast Guard plays a key role in United States 
Arctic policy. Our work found that the Coast Guard has done a 
good job of assessing evolving risks in the region, such as 
those resulting from increased vessel traffic. These may 
include greater chances of incidents like oilspills or ships in 
distress.
    The Coast Guard has also taken steps to manage risk by 
deploying cutters and aircraft to the region during times of 
peak maritime activity, but the Coast Guard has not fully 
tracked the time and resources spent on its Arctic activities. 
Complete information on the assets used and the missions 
conducted in the region would help the Coast Guard better 
monitor use of its resources and enable it to make more 
accurate assessments of future needs.
    In prior hearings, we have discussed Coast Guard 
recruitment and retention challenges that affect the Service's 
ability to carry out its missions, and workforce shortages 
continue to be an issue. Our work has found that the Coast 
Guard asset and infrastructure challenges can negatively impact 
retention. These issues are particularly acute in the Arctic.
    Related to assets, reliance on an aging cutter fleet and 
the need for additional capacity has hindered the Service's 
activity in the Arctic. The availability of the Coast Guard's 
two aging icebreakers is also limited given the substantial 
maintenance required to keep them operational.
    As discussed, to address this gap and maintain reliable 
Arctic operations, the Coast Guard is procuring three new heavy 
polar icebreakers known as Polar Security Cutters. However, as 
GAO has previously reported, this program has experienced 
design challenges that have caused significant delays.
    In addition to its asset challenges, limited infrastructure 
further hinders Coast Guard's ability to conduct missions in 
the Arctic. For example, the Coast Guard operates its forward 
deployed helicopters from a leased aircraft hangar in Alaska 
because it lacks its own infrastructure.
    In 2019, GAO reported that almost half of the Coast Guard's 
shore infrastructure was beyond its service life, resulting in 
costly project backlogs. At that time, the backlogs totaled at 
least $2.6 billion. Our updated preliminary analysis shows that 
this total is likely now close to $7 billion. This is 
particularly concerning in the Arctic because there is limited 
infrastructure to begin with.
    Further, given competing demands of managing the growing 
backlog while replacing its aging assets, the Coast Guard will 
likely face challenges carrying out its Arctic missions, 
including assisting efforts to counter Russia and China's 
activities in the region.
    In closing, the Coast Guard has a critical role in 
protecting U.S. interests in the Arctic. It faces growing 
responsibilities to manage risk to maritime security and 
national security. Conditions in the region continue to change.
    GAO has made recommendations that could help the Coast 
Guard improve its planning, acquisition, and data collection 
efforts. Implementing our recommendations will help the Coast 
Guard to better manage its Arctic-related resource needs and 
ensure the Service is able to meet its growing responsibilities 
in the region.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of 
this subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I 
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
    Thank you.
    [Ms. MacLeod's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
             Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
 Coast Guard: Arctic Risks Assessed, but Information Gaps and Numerous 
                     Challenges Threaten Operations
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the U.S. Coast 
Guard's risks and challenges in the Arctic.\1\ As an Arctic nation, the 
United States has substantial security and economic interests in the 
region. Current geopolitical trends indicate that it is growing more 
important to the United States, its allies, and strategic 
adversaries.\2\ In recent years, there has been an escalation of 
competition among the United States, Russia, and China in the region. 
The effects of climate change, technological advancements, and economic 
opportunities have also driven increased interest and activity in the 
region, which has increased maritime activity and risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In general, the Arctic is the polar region located at the 
northernmost part of the Earth. Arctic stakeholders define the Arctic 
geographical area in different ways. For example, the Arctic Research 
and Policy Act of 1984 defined the Arctic as all United States and 
foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States 
territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, 
Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers (in Alaska); all contiguous seas, including 
the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the 
Aleutian chain. Pub. L. No. 98-373, tit. I, Sec.  112, 98 Stat. 1242, 
1248 (codified at 15 U.S.C. Sec.  4111). The Arctic Circle is the line 
of latitude located at 66+ 33, 44,, north of the equator. Other 
definitions of the Arctic use markers such as the southernmost extent 
of winter sea ice for oceanic boundaries or the northernmost tree line 
for terrestrial boundaries.
    \2\ GAO, Arctic Region: Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the 
Advancement of U.S. Priorities, GAO-23-106002 (Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the Arctic is largely a maritime domain, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, a multi-mission military service within the Department of 
Homeland Security plays a key role in Arctic policy implementation and 
enforcement. As more navigable ocean water has emerged and human 
activity increases in the region, the Coast Guard faces growing 
responsibilities to assess and manage risks there, including those 
posed to maritime security, safety, and the environment. These include, 
among others, (1) security risks from increased militarization of the 
Arctic region and potential conflict with Russia or China; (2) safety 
risks from more frequent and intense winter storms and greater shipping 
traffic; and (3) environmental risks, such as coastal erosion and oil 
spills.
    My statement today addresses (1) the Coast Guard's actions to 
assess and mitigate risks in the Arctic region, and (2) key challenges 
the Coast Guard faces that may affect its Arctic operations and its 
ability to meet its strategic commitments.
    This statement is based primarily on our 2024 report examining the 
Coast Guard's efforts to plan for and mitigate its Arctic operational 
risks and our 2023 report on Coast Guard acquisitions that could affect 
its Arctic operations.\3\ This statement also includes data on the 
Coast Guard's shore infrastructure backlog that we previously reported 
on in 2019, as well as updated data from 2024.\4\ For the reports cited 
in this statement, we analyzed Coast Guard and Department of Defense 
documentation and data, and interviewed officials from these agencies, 
among other methodologies. More detailed information on our scope and 
methodology can be found in the reports cited in this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data 
Would Better Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 13, 2024); GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security 
Cutter Needs to Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and 
Improve Schedule Oversight, GAO-23-105949 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2023).
    \4\ The Coast Guard uses a variety of shore infrastructure assets, 
such as piers, maintenance buildings, and warehouses, to support its 
missions. We previously reported on the Coast Guard's backlog of 
construction and improvement projects within its shore infrastructure 
portfolio. See GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6 
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since 2016, we have made 38 recommendations to the Coast Guard and 
the Department of Homeland Security in reports related to Coast Guard 
Arctic operations, acquisition, and shore infrastructure issues.\5\ As 
of November 2024, 15 of 38 recommendations have been implemented and 19 
remain open.\6\ We will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's progress 
in implementing them.
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    \5\ See GAO-24-106491; GAO, Coast Guard: Improved Reporting on 
Domestic Icebreaking Performance Could Clarify Resource Needs and 
Tradeoffs, GAO-24-106619 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2024); GAO-23-
105949; GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program 
Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 20, 2023); GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to 
Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2020); GAO-19-82; GAO, Coast Guard 
Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs to Address Risks before 
Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018); 
GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address Longstanding 
Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 
2018); GAO, Coast Guard: Status of Polar Icebreaking Fleet Capability 
and Recapitalization Plan, GAO-17-698R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2017); GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could 
Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps, 
GAO-16-453 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016); and GAO, National 
Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems 
Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed, GAO-16-148 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2016).
    \6\ We closed four recommendations related to the Coast Guard's 
acquisition efforts for cutter assets. They were overcome by events and 
thus were no longer valid.
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    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 The Coast Guard Has Assessed and Taken Steps to Mitigate Arctic Risks 
          but Lacks Complete Information to Inform Its Efforts
The Coast Guard Has Identified and Assessed Arctic Risks and 
        Collaborates with Federal and Regional Partners to Mitigate 
        Them
    The Coast Guard has identified and assessed risks--such as those 
posed by climate change and increased maritime activity--that affect 
its ability to carry out its missions in the Arctic region and 
incorporated this information in various planning documents. These 
documents include the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook 
(Coast Guard Arctic strategy), its 2023 Arctic Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan (Coast Guard Arctic implementation plan), and other 
region-specific documents that identify risks specific to their areas 
of operation.\7\ For example, the Coast Guard Arctic strategy notes 
that Russia seeks to consolidate sovereign claims and control access to 
the region while China aims to gain access to Arctic resources and sea 
routes to secure and bolster its military, economic, and scientific 
rise.
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    \7\ U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic 
Outlook (Washington, D.C.: April 2019) and United States Coast Guard 
Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: October 
2023).
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    The Coast Guard and Department of Defense collaborate to mitigate 
risks in the Arctic in several ways, including sharing relevant 
information and expertise and providing operational assistance. 
Officials from both agencies told us they collaborated on the 
development of their respective Arctic strategies, work with one 
another to maintain Arctic maritime domain awareness, and participate 
in joint exercises in the region.\8\ For example, the Coast Guard 
provides standby search and rescue support for Operation Arctic Edge, 
the Department of Defense's joint biennial exercise with the Canadian 
Armed Forces.
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    \8\ According to the Coast Guard, maritime domain awareness is the 
effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime 
domain that could affect the United States' security, safety, economy, 
or environment. Per the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its 
accompanying implementation plan, the Department of Defense is to lead 
efforts to modernize systems that detect and track potential airborne 
and maritime threats, and the Coast Guard is to support the 
department's efforts. The Coast Guard is to provide effective maritime 
security, law enforcement, search and rescue, and emergency response, 
and expand its icebreaker fleet to support increased presence in the 
Arctic. The Department of Defense is to support these efforts.
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    The Coast Guard's collaboration to develop region-specific 
documents has generated maritime security plans and contingency plans 
for its field units that identify various risks specific to their 
operations in the Arctic region and elsewhere, among other efforts.\9\ 
To develop these plans, the Coast Guard collaborates through various 
committees, which may include maritime industry stakeholders; federal, 
state, territorial or Tribal governments; and others, to identify 
security and marine environmental risks.
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    \9\ These plans include, for example, Area Maritime Security Plans, 
which identify critical port infrastructure, operations, and security 
risks, and determine mitigation strategies and implementation methods, 
and Area Contingency Plans, which identify plans for oil and hazardous 
substance spill response, incident management, and all-hazards 
preparedness.
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The Coast Guard's Arctic Implementation Plan Lacks Key Performance 
        Information
    The Coast Guard Arctic implementation plan outlines initiatives and 
actions that it intends to take to achieve the strategic objectives 
identified in the Coast Guard Arctic strategy. However, we found in 
August 2024 that the plan generally does not include key metrics such 
as performance measures, targets, or time frames for action items.\10\ 
This may make it difficult for the Coast Guard to plan activities, 
determine resource needs, assess its progress toward strategic 
objectives, and ensure its efforts are aligned with national efforts. 
As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard include performance 
measures with associated targets and time frames in its implementation 
plan. The Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation, and we 
continue to monitor its progress.
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    \10\ GAO-24-106491.
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The Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Mitigate Arctic Operational 
        Challenges, but Lacks Key Planning Data
    The Coast Guard has taken steps to mitigate the effects on its 
missions resulting from its limited available assets. For example, the 
Coast Guard forward deploys cutters and helicopters into the U.S. 
Arctic region seasonally to reduce transit and response times, which 
helps to mitigate the effects of having limited assets available for 
Arctic missions. Similarly, the Coast Guard annually deploys its medium 
polar icebreaker, the Healy, to the Arctic region in support of 
national objectives and research efforts for several federal agencies. 
This deployment provides additional seasonal presence in the region 
that helps to mitigate operational risks. However, the Healy's ability 
to carry out its annual planned deployments has been limited in recent 
years in part due to fires onboard the ship in 2020 and 2024.
    In August 2024, we reported that key Coast Guard mission 
performance information was incomplete or missing, such as the number 
of days that cutters were deployed and the time they spent on various 
missions in the region.\11\ Specifically, from fiscal years 2016 
through 2023, Coast Guard operational performance reports were either 
partially complete, incomplete, or unavailable, for reasons such as 
losses during data migrations and shortages of qualified personnel, 
according to Coast Guard officials.\12\ These performance reports noted 
that data system limitations may also have affected the accuracy of 
resource hour use and mission performance data.
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    \11\ GAO-24-106491.
    \12\ When we evaluated the reports, ``complete'' meant that 
elements of the performance reports contained complete resource hour or 
mission performance data for all missions executed in Coast Guard field 
units. ``Partially complete'' meant that elements of the performance 
reports contained data for some missions but not others. ``Incomplete'' 
meant that elements of the performance reports lacked data for all 
missions. ``Unavailable'' meant that we could not evaluate performance 
reports because the Coast Guard could not provide those reports.
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    The Coast Guard's performance reports are a key input in its 
operational planning process because they enable the service to 
quantitatively assess its mission performance, identify capability 
gaps, and forecast future operational requirements. Accordingly, in 
August 2024 we recommended that the Coast Guard collect and report 
complete information about resource use and mission performance in 
accordance with its guidance. This would better position the service to 
monitor its activity and make more informed operational planning 
decisions for the Arctic region. The Coast Guard concurred with our 
recommendation, and we continue to monitor its progress.
  The Coast Guard Faces Asset and Infrastructure Challenges That May 
 Affect Its Ability to Carry Out Arctic Operations and Meet Strategic 
                              Commitments
    The Coast Guard has multiple strategic commitments for operations 
in the U.S. Arctic region but has been unable to meet all of them in 
recent years for various reasons.\13\ According to the Coast Guard, 
these include asset availability challenges, such as a lack of reserve 
major cutters, and competing demands for major cutters in other areas 
such as the Indo-Pacific region, among other factors.\14\ Further, 
limited infrastructure and logistics capabilities in Alaska amplify 
asset availability challenges. Efforts to address these challenges in 
the long term via major acquisitions, such as the Polar Security Cutter 
program, continue to face significant delays. This program also faces a 
pending cost increase that puts pressure on the Coast Guard's resource-
constrained acquisition budget. At the same time, the Coast Guard has a 
backlog of shore infrastructure projects that is contributing to 
affordability concerns for recapitalization and related efforts to 
sustain existing and planned assets. Collectively, these factors will 
continue to limit the operational availability of Coast Guard assets in 
the Arctic region, jeopardizing the service's ability to meet its 
Arctic strategy goals and conduct planning efforts to address known 
capability gaps.
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    \13\ For example, the Coast Guard has maintained a strategic 
commitment to have a 365-day major cutter presence in U.S. Arctic 
waters, specifically the Bering Sea. However, it has not always been 
able to meet this commitment recently due to asset availability 
challenges. Specifically, in fiscal year 2022, mechanical problems 
prevented the Coast Guard from deploying a major cutter to the Bering 
Sea as planned, resulting in a 27-day coverage gap. To help address 
these types of gaps, the Coast Guard plans to acquire 28 new cutters, 
including at least 3 new icebreakers.
    \14\ GAO-24-106491. Coast Guard officials also cited the COVID-19 
pandemic and environmental factors, such as the presence of sea ice 
that can limit major cutter access to areas north of the Bering Strait, 
as other factors affecting the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 
strategic commitments in the Arctic.
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The Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter Program Continues to Experience 
        Significant Schedule Delays and Pending Cost Increases
    To address operational challenges and meet its strategic 
commitments in the Arctic, the Coast Guard plans to acquire three new 
Polar Security Cutters capable of traversing the Arctic and Antarctic 
regions (see fig. 1).\15\ These ships will be the first heavy polar 
icebreakers that any U.S. government agency has acquired in almost 50 
years.\16\ However, until these ships are fully operational, the Coast 
Guard has assessed that it currently does not have the capability to 
assure continuous presence and reliable access to the Arctic.
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    \15\ In addition to these three new heavy polar icebreakers, the 
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 
includes a provision that authorized $150 million for the acquisition 
or procurement of a United States built available icebreaker. See Pub. 
L. No. 117-263, div. K, tit. CXI, Sec.  11104(a)(5), tit. CXII, subtit. 
C, Sec.  11223(a), 136 Stat. 2395, 4004, 4021. The Further Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision appropriating over $1.41 
billion for necessary expenses of the Coast Guard for procurement, 
construction, and improvements, including vessels and aircraft. See 
Pub. L. No. 118-47, div. C, tit II, 138 Stat. 460, 600. The joint 
explanatory statement for the act includes a provision specifying that 
$125 million is provided for procurement of a commercially available 
polar icebreaker. See Staff of H.R. Comm. on App., 118th Cong., Joint 
Explanatory Statement for Division C--Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act 31 (Comm. Print 2024).
    \16\ The Coast Guard's current polar icebreaking fleet comprises 
two operational polar icebreakers--the Polar Star and Healy. The Polar 
Star, a heavy icebreaker, has operated in the Arctic. For example, in 
2021, it went to the Arctic to support science missions. However, only 
the Healy is currently active and operating in the Arctic. The Healy is 
a medium icebreaker that primarily supports Arctic research. While it 
is capable of carrying out a wide range of activities, it cannot ensure 
timely access to some Arctic areas in the winter given that it does not 
have the icebreaking capabilities of a heavy polar icebreaker. An 
additional Coast Guard heavy icebreaker, the Polar Sea, has been 
inactive since 2010 when it experienced a catastrophic engine failure.
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Figure 1: Coast Guard Operational, Decommissioned, and Planned Fleet of 
                        Polar Icebreakers, 2024





    Since 2016, we have issued several reports and made 27 
recommendations addressing the status of Coast Guard acquisition 
programs, including seven recommendations related to the Polar Security 
Cutter program, which is at least 4 years behind schedule.\17\ Our 
prior work found that four primary factors contributed to the Polar 
Security Cutter program delays, according to program officials: (1) 
lack of shipbuilder experience designing and building polar 
icebreakers; (2) complexity of the design; (3) significant changes from 
the original design; and (4) COVID-19 pandemic impacts.\18\ As of April 
2024, the program had not yet established an updated schedule. A 
preliminary draft schedule projected a lead ship delivery by the end of 
2029.
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    \17\ See GAO-23-105949; GAO-23-105805; GAO-21-9; GAO-18-600; GAO-
18-454; GAO-17-698R; and GAO-16-148.
    \18\ GAO-23-105949.
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    The Polar Security Cutter program has also been subject to 
significant cost growth, with the full extent yet to be determined. As 
of 2023, the Coast Guard planned to invest about $3 billion to acquire 
the three Polar Security Cutters and $9 billion to maintain them.\19\ 
However, in November 2023, based on updated cost data, the program 
determined it required additional funding of at least $600 million (or 
20 percent) above its previous threshold.\20\ Moreover, an April 2024 
Congressional Budget Office estimate showed costs for the program, not 
including maintenance, increasing by over 60 percent, to $5.1 billion. 
As we previously reported, the issues affecting the Polar Security 
Cutter program raise questions about scheduled delivery of these ships, 
as well as the affordability of this program in a constrained budget 
environment.\21\
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    \19\ The Coast Guard also plans to procure a Great Lakes heavy 
icebreaker to augment its only heavy domestic icebreaker in the region. 
We recently reported on the Coast Guard's domestic icebreaking 
capability; see GAO-24-106619.
    \20\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition: Actions Needed to Address 
Affordability Challenges, GAO-24-107584 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 
2024).
    \21\ See GAO-24-107584; GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: 
Opportunities Exist To Improve Shipbuilding Outcomes, GAO-24-107488 
(Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2024); and GAO, Coast Guard Recapitalization: 
Actions Needed To Better Manage Acquisition Programs And Address 
Affordability Concerns, GAO-23-106948 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2023).
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    In the interim period before its fleet of new polar icebreakers are 
complete, the Coast Guard anticipates it will have a reduced number of 
ships available for Arctic operations. To mitigate this, the Coast 
Guard is relying on its aged fleet of existing polar icebreakers. While 
these ships have generally maintained operations, their continued use 
increases the risk they will fail before they are replaced. For 
example, the Coast Guard is annually accomplishing its Antarctic 
mission with its sole existing heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star, 
which is 48 years old and well beyond its 30-year service life. 
However, there is no backup if the Polar Star becomes inoperable before 
the Polar Security Cutters are delivered. We have an ongoing review 
that discusses the Coast Guard's role and how its current polar 
icebreakers enable it to operate in the Arctic; how the Coast Guard 
analyzed its polar icebreaking needs; and the extent to which it has 
considered options to expand the future fleet. We expect to issue a 
report on the results of this review in fall 2024.
The Estimated Cost of the Coast Guard's Backlog of Shore Infrastructure 
        Projects Has More than Doubled Since 2019
    The Coast Guard uses its shore infrastructure assets--such as 
piers, maintenance buildings, and warehouses--to support legacy assets 
such as polar icebreakers and other major cutters that operate in the 
Arctic region. However, the estimated cost of the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure project backlog has more than doubled since 2019, 
according to our preliminary 2024 analysis. In February 2019, we found 
that the Coast Guard had a backlog of shore infrastructure projects 
related to docks, air stations, and other assets that totaled at least 
$2.6 billion. We made six recommendations to address these issues, two 
of which the Coast Guard has fully implemented.\22\ However, as of 
November 2024, our preliminary analysis of Coast Guard data found that 
the estimated cost of this backlog exceeded $7 billion and included 
over 1,900 recapitalization, new major construction, and deferred 
maintenance projects.\23\ Moreover, our analysis of the Coast Guard's 
fiscal year 2024 shore infrastructure project list found that 235 of 
the projects lacked cost estimates, making it difficult to determine 
the costs of addressing many of these projects.\24\
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    \22\ GAO-19-82.
    \23\ These include projects for the acquisition, procurement, 
construction, rebuilding, and improvement of Coast Guard buildings such 
as military housing or cutter support facilities, as well as 
maintenance on structures such as aircraft hangars or boat docks.
    \24\ We have an ongoing review that updates our 2019 work on the 
Coast Guard's shore infrastructure portfolio. We expect to issue a 
report on the results of this review in 2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In conclusion, the Coast Guard faces growing responsibilities to 
assess and manage risks to safety and security in the Arctic region as 
conditions continue to change. The Coast Guard has taken actions to 
manage these risks by including them in strategic planning documents 
and deploying cutters and aircraft to the U.S. Arctic region during 
peak maritime activity. The Coast Guard has also initiated plans to 
acquire new polar icebreakers to enhance its capabilities in the 
region. However, the Coast Guard Arctic implementation plan--a key 
planning document used to inform its efforts in the region--does not 
include key metrics that would help the Coast Guard plan activities, 
determine resource needs, and assess its progress toward strategic 
objectives. Further, continued delays in delivering the Polar Security 
Cutter increase the likelihood of operational capability gaps in the 
region. As we previously reported, the Coast Guard faces service-wide 
limitations that can affect its ability to plan for, and meet, its 
strategic commitments in the Arctic region and throughout its operating 
domain. Implementation of our recommendations would help the Coast 
Guard manage its Arctic-related resource needs. It would also help 
ensure that the service makes progress toward achieving its strategic 
objectives and remains aligned with national Arctic priorities.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much for your 
testimony, all three of you.
    Now, we turn to questions from the panel. I recognize 
myself for 5 minutes for questions.
    Admiral Gautier, Russia has 55 icebreakers, and China, 
which is not even an Arctic nation, has 4 and more on the way. 
For the foreseeable future, we have two, and hopefully a third 
if the Coast Guard can find or acquire a commercially available 
icebreaker.
    How does the mismatch in capabilities impact the Coast 
Guard's Arctic operations, and how can the Service effectively 
project sovereignty and protect our Nation's vast resources in 
the Arctic when confronting increasing aggressive behavior by 
China and Russia?
    Admiral Gautier. Chairman, our ability, as United States 
Coast Guard, and as a Nation, to do the things that you 
described to project our sovereignty and ensure our interests 
are met, we would like to say that presence equals influence. 
You have to be there physically in order to assure our own 
sovereignty. That requires for the United States a surface 
presence, which means icebreakers, in terms of getting access 
to ice-covered, ice-filled waters.
    Now, with regards to the difference that you describe, 
Russia having 55 icebreakers, PRC having two medium and now two 
recently constructed light icebreakers, we are concerned about 
the growing gap between the United States Coast Guard's 
icebreaking capability and our competitors' capability, 
especially as we see them operating more often and more often 
together in Arctic waters.
    This is why it is so important to have your enduring 
support for icebreaker growth in what we describe in our fleet 
mix analysis to having eight to nine Coast Guard heavy and 
medium icebreakers as a mix so we can be present to shape the 
international rules-based order, to check our adversaries when 
they do wrong, and to make sure that our national interests are 
met.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you for your answer.
    I am hoping that there is also coming with that nine 
necessary vessels some sort of timeline. We would really 
appreciate it.
    Admiral Allan, as I mentioned in my opening statement, this 
subcommittee was told nearly 1 year ago that we would soon 
receive a plan to procure the Service's much needed fleet of 
PSCs. To date, we have yet to see such a plan, let alone a cost 
estimate or a timeline of the first vessel in the fleet.
    On September 26th, the committee sent a bipartisan letter 
asking that by November 15th, the Service provide the committee 
with a determination on: reaching sufficient design maturity to 
allow for a decision to proceed to full production, whether the 
prototype modules of hull 1 can be used in construction, the 
cost estimate for the first PSC, the timeline for construction, 
and whether the funds appropriated to date for the PSC program 
will be sufficient to cover the cost of the first PSC.
    These are all items which the Service has said it will 
provide by the end of the year. Unfortunately, the response we 
received ahead of this hearing did not provide any meaningful 
answers to our questions. What actual metrics and data are you 
able to share today to assure us that the PSC program is moving 
forward? When will you be able to communicate an updated 
timeline and the cost estimate?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for the question.
    I think in June, we came and saw this subcommittee. We said 
by the end of this calendar year, we would be back to say that 
we are moving forward with a production decision through DHS. I 
am still confident that that is where we are headed.
    Right now, we had a final critical design review on 
September 23rd. When we got there, Bollinger Marine Shipyard is 
doing incredible things to raise the percentage of completion 
of our design. We are over 80 percent, and that was as of 
September 3rd. I think we are going to have our procurement 
readiness review in November, and we are going to see that we 
are even further.
    We are continuing to negotiate with them on cost. We are 
continuing to work with them for the production readiness 
review with our prototype fabrication assets that are really 
providing the baseline and the foundation of the Polar Security 
Cutter.
    What I think is, sir, we are going to seek from DHS in mid-
December an approval for a production decision, and we will 
have that by the end of this calendar year.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay. Well, we are counting on it.
    My time has expired. So, let's see.
    Mr. Larsen, you are recognized for questions.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Admiral Allan, where does the planning, funding, and 
construction of Base Seattle project currently stand? And how 
is Coast Guard continuing to engage the relevant stakeholders 
there?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for that question.
    Seattle is going to be a very important launching point for 
our Polar Security Cutters to do the missions we need within 
the Arctic and Antarctic.
    Right now, we are able to receive $100 million in 2024. We 
are completing our environmental impact statement for how we 
would put those Polar Security Cutters in at the base there in 
Seattle, working with the Port of Tacoma and Port of Seattle. 
That will be out in the Federal Register this Saturday.
    In addition, we are working to put out a record decision 
and then looking at the $180 million that we think we need in 
fiscal year 2025 to keep this project going. It is going to be 
expensive to bring these new cutters into a very compact area 
and put them where they need to be with the infrastructure 
support that they need to make sure that they are ready to go 
as we talked about with eight to nine of them over time and 
continued presence up in the Arctic and Antarctic.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that the DEIS on Saturday?
    Admiral Allan. Yes, sir. The PEIS, yes, sir.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. The draft. Okay.
    And then how are you engaging with the stakeholders there?
    Admiral Allan. So, sir, we have been up there a couple 
times. I am going to be there again next Thursday to talk to 
them. Now that our Federal Register announcement will be out, 
they will be able to see what our alternatives are and the one 
that we have selected as the best for the Coast Guard.
    But we know this is a negotiation, and we know this is a 
partnership. So, we are going to be working closely with them 
to figure out the best way forward, not only for the Coast 
Guard, not only for the Nation, but the Port of Seattle and the 
Port of Tacoma.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Ms. MacLeod, which of the GAO's 
open recommendations for the Coast Guard's icebreaker programs 
are the highest priority both with respect to the urgency and 
the potential for benefit?
    Ms. MacLeod. GAO's multiple recommendations regarding the 
Polar Security Cutter are very important, especially at this 
time. Key to one of our recommendations would be that this 
design stability is reached before construction of the Polar 
Security Cutters to avoid future cost increases.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. How has the Coast Guard and the 
Navy partnership worked? The whole idea of having the Navy be 
part of this was to bring the Navy's experience into the 
design, the development. But it doesn't seem to have worked as 
planned.
    Ms. MacLeod. GAO's report is the partnership between the 
Navy and the Coast Guard has worked well for this procurement, 
these procurements. I think that there is a range of reasons 
for the delays from contractor to Coast Guard acquisition and 
experience. But the partnership itself seems to be working well 
and has benefited the Coast Guard.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Admiral Allan, how is the Coast 
Guard planning to address the remaining open recommendations, 
which are double digits?
    Admiral Allan. So, sir, I think when you look at the 
recommendations that they are making, it is always good to have 
someone looking over your shoulder, correcting your work, and I 
think they are providing us a lot of goodness as far as that 
goes.
    I think what we are trying to do is make sure that we are 
incorporating as many of those recommendations in the way 
forward because I think they have the same goals as we do. Do 
we have schedule right, and do we have cost right? And the more 
we can do up front, that will allow us to stop going over 
budget or over our time schedule.
    So, we are looking at each one of those. I think we are 
trading off and on of what those percentages are. I don't think 
we will be at 100 percent when we finally get to full design, 
but I think when you look at where we are at and how we are 
going and how we are building these Polar Security Cutters, we 
will have substantially complied with the recommendations that 
GAO is making.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Well, as noted earlier, the last 
one was built before John Rayfield joined this committee, I 
would like to get the next one built before he leaves the 
committee.
    Admiral Allan. Sir, we are barreling ahead to make sure 
that he sees one of these.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Babin, you are recognized.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
witnesses. I appreciate you being here.
    As the sea ice in the Arctic recedes, Arctic routes remain 
open for longer periods of time. We are all reading about that. 
They are staying open each year longer. This has resulted in a 
drastic increase in military and civilian maritime traffic.
    Just last month, China's Coast Guard claimed to transit the 
Arctic Sea for the first time, and both Russia and China have 
announced their intentions to take advantage of the new 
shipping routes.
    Over the long term, how does the Coast Guard plan to meet 
the threats of our adversaries and protect freedom of movement 
in the Arctic?
    And this is for your, Admiral Gautier.
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, in a couple of different 
ways. First is through resource growth. And we actually have 
made tremendous progress in doing things like recapitalizing 
our C-130 fleet from an older C-130H to a C-130J in Kodiak. By 
shifting our helicopter fleet from a mixed H-60 and H-65 fleet 
into an all H-60 fleet out of Kodiak. It is by homeporting 
additional Fast Response Cutters. It is by bringing this 
commercially available icebreaker into play in terms of that.
    We have a long way to go, and I think that is the theme of 
this particular hearing in terms of the growth necessary in 
terms of Polar Security Cutters.
    But, sir, we also need to operate differently, and that is 
why we are investing more in forward operating locations where 
we put our helicopters and our Coast Guard members closer to 
the area of operations, where the fishermen are moving and 
where our competitors are operating.
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
    And also, for whoever can answer this, Admiral Allan or 
anyone else, Ms. MacLeod, you, too, we have been following the 
icebreaker collaboration effort, or ICE Pact between the United 
States, Canada, and Finland. And I understand just yesterday, 
our Nation signed a new memorandum of understanding on 
icebreakers. In yesterday's press release, I saw the memorandum 
of understanding included, and I quote, ``the exchange of 
knowledge, information, and resources in each of our 
countries.''
    Given the timeliness of this hearing, I would like to give 
you just a minute to discuss what you see in terms of the 
expectations of this committee, and Congress at-large, to 
support this new initiative. If you could specifically dive 
into the word ``resources'' piece here and what you expect 
Congress to be involved with, I would sure be very 
appreciative.
    Admiral?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, yes, in keeping with the 
nature of your question, we are pretty excited about the 
promise of ICE Pact. As you mentioned, it was signed yesterday. 
Secretary Mayorkas was the signatory on behalf of the United 
States.
    This is a launching pad for a tremendous amount of 
possibility. With the collaboration of the U.S. and two of our 
allies, we really think that there is a lot of promise in terms 
of sharing the research and development, information 
technologies, workforce knowledge, and so on, that it will 
better enable us to collectively build more and more capable 
icebreakers at better cost moving into the future.
    We have just begun to form a number of work groups. The 
Coast Guard is in charge of two of them. So, we will all have 
to stay tuned on the progress made and how we can collaborate 
with Congress to make this a success.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you.
    I still have some time left, so, I wanted to ask another 
question.
    The Coast Guard and Navy are planning to invest more than 
$11.8 billion to build and maintain three Polar Security Cutter 
heavy icebreakers. The first ship was scheduled for delivery 
this year, but, at this point, we are hoping to get it before 
the end of the decade, lamentably.
    Given the importance of Arctic operations, what is being 
done to prevent operational gaps?
    Admiral Allan. So, sir, I will just say, or reiterate, we 
are looking forward to making an announcement to Congress by 
the end of this year that we are moving forward with production 
on that Polar Security Cutter. But as you say, we have got to 
deliver that in 2030.
    One of the good news stories I think and through the help 
of this committee and others, the commercially available polar 
icebreaker, we are also going to say that we are going to have 
that in the Coast Guard inventory by the end of this fiscal 
year.
    If you were to take a look at it today, it is painted about 
one-quarter of the way Coast Guard icebreaker red. It is 
underway today with a team from the owners and ABS doing an 
evaluation, and in the future weeks, we are going to be able to 
get on that vessel and be able to understand how we can operate 
that within the Arctic. And it is a proven vessel that has 
operated in the Antarctic and the Arctic.
    We will need that $25 million in fiscal year 2025 to crew 
and provision that vessel, but I think we are working to close 
those gaps through some of our acquisition programs.
    Dr. Babin. Excellent. Thank you, Admiral, very much.
    I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, so, I yield back. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Representative Carbajal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Admiral Allan, the Coast Guard icebreaking requires 
Coasties to operate the cutters. You are currently operating 
down 10 percent of your workforce. Are you confident that you 
will have the requisite personnel to operate and maintain the 
PSCs while conducting other missions?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for that question.
    One of the things I like to say is that we are making great 
advancements on bringing crews into the Coast Guard. Last year, 
in fiscal year 2024, that was our best year for bringing people 
into the Coast Guard since 2007. That is across Activity Duty, 
Reserve, and our Enlisted workforce.
    We have all of our companies that are going into Cape May 
full up through March. So, we are starting to close that gap, 
but we have got a long way to go, especially with the growth 
that we have.
    So, we are going to continue to work with this committee 
and work with others to understand where our highest priority 
needs are, how we are moving people to those areas, and making 
sure that we are continuing to bring in recruits at the highest 
numbers we can based upon our support infrastructure to meet 
that need.
    Mr. Carbajal. Moreover, do we have the infrastructure 
available to house and support these members assigned to these 
assets, whether in Seattle or Alaska?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for that question.
    I think when the Commandant was here in front of you, she 
told you that the Coast Guard needs to be a $20 billion 
organization by 2033, and that we need to have a $3 billion 
PC&I budget immediately growing to $4 billion by 2033.
    I will tell you that as we make tradeoffs within our own 
budget, a lot of times we are trading offshore infrastructure. 
We are trying to bring in the capabilities, the OPCs, the PSCs, 
the 60s and C-130s, and we are relying on Congress' help 
through the unfunded priority list to help us with that shore 
infrastructure.
    So, no, I don't think we have that in there right now, and 
I think that that is important to our people.
    I just was a district commander in a recent job, and I 
would go out to our stations that are falling apart and watch 
as we are losing crewmembers to the local fire department, the 
local police department that had just upgraded their facilities 
and assets that they are using.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Ms. MacLeod, while we have discussed several factors that 
have delayed the Polar Security Cutter program, we cannot 
ignore that this is the first attempt to construct a heavy 
icebreaker on U.S. soil in over 50 years. Undoubtedly, our 
underdeveloped shipbuilding industry has also challenged the 
Coast Guard's efforts.
    How can Congress continue to invest in our domestic 
shipbuilding industry so that it can best support the Coast 
Guard's icebreaker programs? And how is that partnership with 
the Navy going?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, I think as you look at that 
partnership, we need that partnership. But, more importantly, 
we need that national industrial base to increase in size. It 
needs to be not an investment on individual ships but an 
investment on how we are doing that across the Nation.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Admiral Allan, but that question 
was directed to Ms. MacLeod. I apologize if I . . .
    Ms. MacLeod. For sure, there has been a lack of U.S. 
shipbuilding experience that has definitely contributed to the 
issues that we are discussing today. It is something that we 
continue to look at, the types of experience that can be 
leveraged here in the United States going forward.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, actually, I have a little bit more time.
    Admiral Allan, back to you.
    Budgetary decisions associated with the procurement of 
icebreakers cannot be made in a vacuum. The maintenance backlog 
of your shoreside infrastructure is growing at an alarming 
rate, affecting the housing, workstations, docks, and shoreside 
facilities needed to homeport PSCs.
    What will happen if Congress and the Coast Guard do not 
address the shoreside infrastructure backlog?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for that question.
    When you look at the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure, we 
are a $24 billion organization. We should be investing $500 
million to $1 billion in that infrastructure every year to make 
sure that it is maintained at a modern standard to support our 
people.
    Without it, we watch people making decisions because they 
are living in facilities that they aren't proud of or can't do 
their mission. We are watching as we are putting more and more 
of our maintenance dollars into facilities that are failing 
that should have been replaced long ago.
    So, I think it is a very important part for us not only to 
look at the assets that we are bringing on but the shore 
infrastructure to make sure that it is in line with the 
expectations that people would have where they want their sons 
and daughters serving.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    I am out of time, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 
our witnesses for being here again. And Admiral Allan, it is 
good to see you again. I appreciate all of you very much.
    As we focus on the Coast Guard's icebreaker 
recapitalization efforts and their abilities to meet the needs, 
I want to place an important emphasis on our adversaries, 
Russia and China, and the threat that they pose.
    I am proud that Bollinger Shipyard has stepped up to the 
plate to help the Service meet its goals and combat our 
adversaries. Bollinger's commitment to building the first U.S.-
made heavy icebreaker in over 50 years underscores their 
dedication to national security and creating jobs here at home.
    When Bollinger acquired VT Halter, the latter had amassed 
one-quarter of a billion dollars in losses on the PSC program.
    Fast-forward to today, Bollinger has invested over $100 
million in Mississippi, and the returns have been almost 
immediate. Bollinger has also expanded its Mississippi 
workforce by nearly 50 percent. Its new construction workforce 
in Mississippi alone has more than doubled.
    Future success will require strong coordination, 
flexibility, and the willingness to solve problems as they 
arise. Effective and realistic planning, budgeting, and funding 
allocations are going to be critical for the success of 
shipbuilding programs.
    Endless studies by the Government failed to produce 
realistic assessments, which diminished competition among 
American shipyards.
    Admiral Gautier--``Gochay'' as we say it in Mississippi--I 
want to discuss some of these funding efforts. We know that 
there is a shortfall in funding. Uncertainty surrounding award 
methods have led to reallocating funds from other programs from 
fiscal year to fiscal year. This cycle further destabilizes the 
domestic maritime industry.
    Why did the Coast Guard not request funding for the PSC 
program for 2025?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, if it is all right, it is 
probably better for Admiral Allan to answer that question.
    Admiral Allan. So, sir, I think the reason we didn't 
request in 2025 is we are looking to get ahead of the curve. 
Right now we have the money we need based upon the progress we 
make.
    However, to your point, we have seen a lot of that progress 
made in just a short period because Bollinger Mississippi 
Shipyard has been involved, has been engaged, and they are 
bringing in the right people to make this thing not just an 
idea but a way forward. So, we are looking forward to doing 
that.
    I think we will be requesting additional money for our 
ship, but I think that will come as we finalize arrangements 
and negotiate the final cost.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good.
    Going back to the activity by our adversaries, I was 
encouraged that on the very first page of your testimony, you 
addressed the increased presence of the PRC and Russia, 
including unilateral and combined military and Coast Guard 
activities we are seeing now in the U.S. Arctic.
    Can you please expand a little bit on how the Coast Guard's 
Arctic strategy and implementation addresses these concerns?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, first off, the increased 
presence that we are seeing from PRC forces, both Navy and 
Coast Guard, is not a surprise because they have actually told 
us they intended on doing that through their Arctic strategy in 
terms of having increased presence up there. So, not a surprise 
to us.
    Our key element here is to meet presence with presence to 
assure our national sovereignty. Usually, they are there 
seasonally in the summertime, although it has been going later 
into the fall. So, we have been mobilizing some additional 
National Security Cutter time to operate in and along the 
maritime boundary line and in the Aleutians to make sure that 
in conjunction with the Department of Defense, because they 
also share a presence and a responsibility there, that we are 
there when our competitors are in or near our exclusive 
economic zones.
    We also overfly as well with our Coast Guard aircraft out 
of Kodiak.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good.
    What would you say to those who raise concerns that the 
plan does not include key metrics, such as performance measures 
or timeframes for action items? Are these tracked anywhere?
    Admiral Gautier. Yes, we support the findings in that 
regard that GAO put in their report, and we are taking steps to 
address that. I will just say--and some of these elements are 
enduring, and many of them are dependent on factors outside of 
the Coast Guard's purview in terms of, say, budgeting certainty 
and so on.
    But, in large part, we are making substantial progress 
across those lines of effort that we put into our 
implementation plan for the strategy.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    And I appreciate all of your hard work. We have total 
confidence in the United States Coast Guard, and as long as I 
am sitting here, we are going to continue to support you.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This is tiresome. We have gone round and round on this for 
more than a decade, and we still are looking at another half a 
decade at the best to get a heavy icebreaker.
    The GAO report, unfortunately, doesn't get into the details 
of why we are so far behind and into the intricacies of 
Bollinger's successes and failures. We need to know that.
    The other, I think, Admiral Gautier, you said something. It 
sounded like ``budget.'' I think you used that word. That's 
money and the appropriation.
    The bottom line here, I am going to ask you guys, is there 
a national security threat in the Arctic as a result of the 
inability of the United States to have a presence in the 
Arctic?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, we have not failed as a 
United States Coast Guard, year end and year out, to have 
assured presence with our Coast Guard assets. Cannot guarantee 
that moving forward as adversaries' presence increases, as the 
conditions of our current two icebreakers age, and until we get 
recapitalized new cutters in the theater.
    Mr. Garamendi. So, this year, or this last summer, your 
answer is it was not a threat to our national security. You 
were able to have the necessary presence. Did I hear you say 
that next year there may be a national security threat for lack 
of an operable icebreaker capacity in the Arctic?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, I acknowledge we have a 
national security threat now from increased presence of 
competitors and working together in ways that we have not seen 
yet. The challenge is how do we mitigate, ameliorate that 
threat through Coast Guard and U.S.----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. How do we mitigate that 
threat?
    Admiral Gautier. I'm sorry?
    Mr. Garamendi. How do we mitigate that threat?
    Admiral Gautier. By being present with our asset.
    Mr. Garamendi. Can we be present given the present 
icebreakers that we have?
    Admiral Gautier. I'm sorry?
    Mr. Garamendi. Can we be present given the icebreakers that 
we currently have?
    Admiral Gautier. We have been and we can continue, but we 
are at risk without recapitalizing these icebreakers to be 
present.
    Mr. Garamendi. To recapitalize, have you given this 
committee the specific number of vessels or icebreakers that we 
need and when we need them?
    Admiral Gautier. The Coast Guard believes that we need 
eight to nine icebreakers.
    Mr. Garamendi. When do you need them?
    Admiral Gautier. As soon as possible.
    Mr. Garamendi. That's not an answer. When do you need them? 
Tomorrow? Next year?
    Admiral Gautier. I think----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. When do you need them?
    Admiral Gautier. We have a sense of urgency----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Listen, what I am trying to 
do is to put on the record here that we've got one very serious 
national security problem. Don't dance around. The fact of the 
matter is, we will not have a presence in the Arctic. We know 
where the Polar Star is. Eventually you are not going to be 
able to cannibalize other icebreakers to maintain the Polar 
Star.
    The bottom line here is, there is a national security 
threat of great significance as a result of the inability of 
the Coast Guard to have adequate presence in the Arctic. Do you 
agree or disagree with me?
    Admiral Gautier. I agree.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good. Now, what does it take? Eight to 
ten icebreakers, of which three are heavy icebreakers, which 
will probably be able to be delivered sometime around 2040. Is 
that correct?
    Admiral Gautier. It is going to take a long time to 
produce----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. A long time. A decade. 
Minimum of a decade, for the first one, and then who knows for 
the next two and the third one.
    Bottom line here--and this is really for us [indicating the 
subcommittee]--we have continually underfunded the Coast Guard 
icebreaker program--continually. And unfortunately, the Coast 
Guard has not sounded the red alarm and laid down: ``Give us 
the money or we cannot do it.''
    So, we are going to have to come forward here with the 
money necessary to do it. The question is: Can it be built in 
the United States in a timely manner? There is plenty of 
indication the answer is: We ain't doing very well now.
    So, we are going to have to rethink this. We are going to 
have to rethink it. If you need 8 to 10 now, next year, year 
after next, the only way we are going to do it is to rethink 
how we are going to get those icebreakers.
    Made in America, nobody's been stronger on that than I have 
over these years, but we are failing. Our industrial base has 
failed us, and frankly, the Coast Guard has failed us by not 
sounding an alarm loud.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Van Drew, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Me? Okay, I didn't hear you, Chairman. Thank 
you, Chairman.
    Let me start by saying I want to associate myself with the 
remarks that Mr. Garamendi made. I think he is on target, and 
he is on point, and I want to dig into that a little bit.
    In most areas, our military is well positioned to protect 
our homeland and our allies abroad. There does seem to be an 
alarming gap in the Arctic Circle, and I think you would all 
agree with that.
    Quite frankly, I think most Americans would be surprised 
how big the gap is. When you consider that Russia alone has 55, 
am I correct, 55 cutters? And we have, at most, two, correct? 
That is unbelievable, just that statistic alone.
    So, we've got to do everything in our power to ensure the 
necessary provisions are in place so we can bridge the gap in 
the Arctic and continue to protect our people and our allies.
    And I want to say, and I think we all know, that I am more 
than willing to work across the aisle, I am more than willing 
to work with everybody on this, I think we all are. It is dire.
    The main competition that we have is Russia and China. This 
is serious stuff. Russia, like I said, has 55, and they are 
going to expand their fleet. China is expanding their fleet. I 
mean, this is a big deal. It really is.
    So, before I even go on, I want to get something clear in 
my mind, and Vice Admiral Allan, thank you for being here. I 
really do appreciate you. I know I ask hard questions. It's not 
a personal thing. It is really concern. And I respect the work 
that you all do. I want you to know that.
    But based on your response to my colleague from 
Mississippi, does that not mean the Coast Guard has sufficient 
appropriated money to complete polar security ice-cutter 1? Do 
you believe that we have enough money to complete it? I think I 
know the answer.
    Admiral Allan. Sir, we do not have enough money to complete 
the number 1. The question is: How much more do we need? And we 
think by December we will understand, final contract 
negotiations, what that dollar amount is, and what gap exists.
    Dr. Van Drew. Because we, again, in a bipartisan way, want 
to try to fight for that. I mean, it is everything. I mean, I 
think this is kind of bipartisan at least with most folks--
peace through strength. I mean, we need the strength. And it is 
scary to me. I don't know that we have the strength there.
    Regardless of all the other things that you are doing, and, 
Vice Admiral Gautier, I listened to what you said, and I 
appreciate those things, but we don't have the money, and we 
have got to start--the way this place works is making the 
request, putting in for it, advocating for it, fighting for it, 
so that you get what you need. Everybody's at the trough, 
everybody's competing, but this is stuff that crosses all 
boundaries and is really serious and real important.
    I am curious--I wrote some of the questions down I wanted 
to ask--how did we get here? How did, how did we--Congressman 
Garamendi said that it has been going on for a decade. That is 
longer than I have been here. This is my third term, and I can 
remember this discussion even now, which is on my sixth year.
    How did we get here? How did this multiple administrations 
through time, what went wrong? Something went wrong. We 
shouldn't have fallen this far behind. Please give me a candid 
and blunt answer.
    Admiral Allan. Yes, sir. So, what I would say is, the Coast 
Guard is a capital-intensive organization in the nondefense 
side of budget authorities.
    When you look at that, our percentage of increase every 
year is much lower than what DoD is, so, we fall further and 
further behind each year. Creates our requirements to, almost 
as a flat line since 2010, to make tradeoffs, and a lot of 
those tradeoffs are keeping assets going, as opposed to 
reacquiring what we need.
    As the Commandant said, we need to be a $20 billion 
organization with 5 percent growth. That needs to happen by 
2033, or, to your point, sir, we are not going to be able to 
deliver the Coast Guard that the Nation is asking us to have--
--
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. As we spoke yesterday about a 
different subject, and I appreciated your input and candor with 
that, I mean, with the cost of everything going up, it is of 
major, major concern with the inflation we have, which is still 
there. Costs are going up, as you know, exponentially in some 
cases.
    I think we need--I would love to see us turn a page. You 
tell us what you need. Now, we can't guarantee just on this one 
subcommittee that we can deliver that, but, again, across the 
aisle--and, again, I associate myself with the remarks 
Congressman Garamendi, the gentleman from California, made.
    I want it to sort of stop. I want to turn a new page. I 
want you to be working with us, that we are advocating hard. If 
we fail, so be it, but we should know what hill we are fighting 
on, what we are fighting for, how much we need, what we want to 
do. We really got to get focused here.
    This can't--I don't want it to go on for another 10 or 20 
or 30 years. I don't want it to go on to where we have a 
confrontation, and literally the greatest country on the face 
of the Earth can't deal with it. This is serious, serious 
stuff.
    Ms. MacLeod, can you highlight the strategic advantages 
that Russia and China have over the United States when it comes 
to these assets? I know you know your stuff. I know you have 
done it already, but we just want to hear it again.
    Ms. MacLeod. Quantity of icebreakers, in short, assets in 
the Arctic.
    Dr. Van Drew. You know how heartbreaking that is for me to 
hear America, the greatest country on the face of the Earth, 
and let's call it what it is, is behind. We are behind. We are 
behind Russia. We are going to be behind China. Maybe we are 
already, I don't know.
    And I don't want that to get worse. I don't think any 
Member here wants it to get worse. It is important stuff.
    I guess I have used up my time. I appreciate your service, 
I really do, and I am not blaming you, but I am blaming the 
process. We absolutely have to do better on this.
    I don't want to look back someday, you know, you worry 
about your children, your grandchildren, your great-
grandchildren, man, we got to--we lead, we are America, we 
don't want to fall behind.
    With that, I yield back to the chairman.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mrs. Peltola, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Peltola. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So, the benefit of being a low-ranking Member is that most 
of the questions have been asked. And I am really thankful that 
there have been a couple Members here who have really been 
trying to dig deep on why the Coast Guard is so in the hole.
    And my reluctance to talk about this is: Why would I want 
to disadvantage the United States even further by putting on 
the public record our vulnerabilities?
    But it has also been really frustrating, having known a 
couple of your Enlisted members personally and having visited 
where they are stationed, the vessels they are on, hearing 
about how old the helicopters are.
    It is frustrating because I have been in this committee 
when Representative Carbajal has been, like, begging you, the 
Coast Guard, to give us a list of what you need. I mean, like, 
we are standing on the tables jumping up and down, saying, how 
can we help you, and wanting you to stand up on the tables and 
jump up and down and shout back how we can help you.
    I know that there is concern about the Coast Guard being 
gobbled up into DoD and swallowed up by the Navy, and nobody 
wants that. I am such a fan of the culture of the Coast Guard 
and the work that you do and the way that you train people, and 
as an Alaskan, of the services you provide.
    And this is a really interesting committee, and given that 
I probably won't be here after December, it seems like, why 
would I stick around to ask questions? But since this is about 
the Arctic, and I am the one Member on this committee from the 
Arctic, I am curious.
    How are there 11 icebreakers in Michigan in the Great 
Lakes, which are not Arctic or polar, and we are going to get 
one coming up someday soon for Alaska? And how does Alaska get 
more resources?
    And one of the things I will say is, I am very hopeful that 
since there won't be any tug-of-war between the parties in any 
of the Chambers or the White House, there should be a concerted 
effort just to resource-up.
    And I was glad to hear Representative Van Drew talk about 
his concerns and all the Members on the right-hand side because 
it is now their time to shine. There are no excuses for saying, 
well, somebody didn't like somebody on the other side because 
of personalities or whatever. Now is the time.
    I had prepared questions about Alaska, but I guess I want 
you to talk more about what your needs are in a delicate way so 
we are not announcing it to all of our adversaries, but tell us 
how we can help you. Tell us a number. Give us a number to 
shoot for.
    Admiral Gautier. Congresswoman, we do deeply appreciate the 
support of this subcommittee. You get us, and you have had 
enduring support for us.
    Take, for example, what you authorized, $3.5, $3.6 billion 
in our capital improvement element of the budget. If that could 
translate to appropriations, that will go a very long way in 
helping the Coast Guard.
    How we also transmit our needs is through the unfunded 
priorities list, through the budget process, and for the fiscal 
year 2025, we have $1.4 billion of things on the unfunded 
priorities list that are actually quite crucial--just couldn't 
fit them within our top line--in order to keep the Coast Guard 
operational, and a number of things that are particularly 
relevant to Alaska.
    We need help recapitalizing our aviation fleet, to move to 
an all H-60 fleet, so, purchasing more H-60s for the United 
States Coast Guard so we can pull the older 65s out of service.
    We need more C-130Js. We have recapitalized all those in 
Alaska, but we still have a ways to go in other parts of the 
country.
    We are now decommissioning our Medium Endurance Cutters 
without replacement, and it is very uncomfortable for us when 
you look at what is going on, in particular, say, in Haiti and 
in Cuba, and the potential for a mass migration.
    We need money for the Offshore Patrol Cutters so we can get 
those in play as we decommission our older cutters.
    Those needs are replicated in terms of C5I, in terms of the 
people support, the housing, the childcare centers that we need 
to make sure we get and retain the best people.
    So, the needs are urgent. The unfunded priorities list is a 
good place to start, and we do appreciate your support.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay. The gentlelady yields back.
    So, Mr. Graves, you are not a Member, but you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all 
the Coasties here, Admirals, and, excuse me, all the folks 
behind you, I want to thank you for being here, and I 
appreciate your service.
    Admiral, I heard Congressman Van Drew and others talking 
about the Arctic. Obviously Congresswoman Peltola has been a 
big advocate and supporter in educating the committee and 
following in the footsteps of Congressman Don Young in 
advocating for that State.
    You know, the reason that we purchased Alaska was largely 
the geography, as well as the natural resources, and the 
abundance of that State is profound and just critically 
important.
    And I think as we have seen in recent trends, the 
importance of that region strategically grows, and you all have 
talked much about access to the Arctic in terms of icebreaking 
capabilities. And, again, I heard Congressman Van Drew talking 
about the disparity in capabilities in the United States in 
terms of our heavies.
    And I believe the Healy being the medium and the awful 
shape that we have allowed both the Polar Sea and Polar Star to 
get into, without having a replacement, and now we are moving 
forward on that.
    We have pushed the Coast Guard now for, gosh, probably the 
entire time I have been here, to do something to acquire better 
icebreaking capabilities.
    And of course one of the solutions, whenever the withdrawal 
of energy production in some areas of the Arctic, the Aiviq 
became available, and the Coast Guard pushed back and pushed 
back, and I thought it was a mistake then, and I think that we 
were right in our position.
    The Coast Guard believed that if they acquired the Aiviq, 
then they weren't going to be able to get the funds from 
Congress to build a heavy. I think you can do both, and now we 
are seeing we absolutely need to do both. So, I am glad that 
the Coast Guard included the Aiviq on the unfunded priorities 
list. I am glad the funds were provided.
    Can you now give an update on the status of that 
acquisition?
    Admiral Allan. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question, and 
thanks for the push on the commercially available polar 
icebreaker. We are making tremendous strides in that with the 
owner. They have already painted about one-quarter of it Coast 
Guard icebreaker red. They have got it in the water today with 
ABS, and they are taking a look at those systems.
    And then we are going to be going on board to finalize 
negotiations and look how we, in a short time, crew that with 
those commercial operators.
    So, it is going to be, I think, within the Coast Guard 
inventory before the end of this calendar year, and we will be 
sailing that up into the Arctic in 2026, the spring to summer--
--
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. And do I recall 
that that is going to be homeported in Juneau?
    Admiral Allan. Yes, sir----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interposing]. Okay.
    Admiral Allan [continuing]. We are looking to homeport that 
in Juneau. Of course, there is a big delta there right now, 
because the pier that has been provided is an old NOAA pier and 
needs a lot of maintenance and a lot of work, but we are going 
to strive to at least make sure we have the presence of that 
vessel up there.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. And, Admiral, I appreciate 
the update. I am doing this from memory which means I may be a 
little bit off, but as I recall, the Coast Guard had identified 
some mission capability gaps in regard to the vessel that was 
designed while providing heavy access. It was designed to 
provide a little bit different mission.
    Can you talk a little bit about some of the mission 
capability work that needs to be done in order to sort of 
operationalize that vessel?
    Admiral Allan. Sir, thank you for that question. I think 
that is an important change in how we are doing business with 
this one, right? Before, we usually go through and develop a 
long list of requirements and then build to meet all those 
requirements.
    This time, we are taking a vessel that has successfully 
operated in the Arctic, successfully operated in the Antarctic, 
and we are going to get on board and try to understand what 
capabilities it has and how we can use those to make some of 
our needs, not only with presence on presence as we look for 
sovereignty up in the Alaska area, but also to bring on 
additional missions where we think we need additional capacity.
    We are not sure how that is. We know that we need that 
vessel. I don't think we are looking to make tremendous 
investments in that vessel going forward. We just need that for 
presence and to be able to operate.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you very much. Last 
question, just because I got a little bit of time left.
    Congressman Van Drew again cited the disparity in 
icebreaking capabilities between the United States and other 
Arctic nations and including other non-Arctic or Arctic wannabe 
nations.
    Could you just talk a little bit about the importance of 
domestic shipbuilding capability and how that helps to 
capitalize or address the Coast Guard's needs?
    Admiral Allan. Yes, sir. Thank you for that. Down in the 
gulf region, we have got a bunch of shipyards that are building 
Coast Guard cutters right now. We have got two shipyards that 
are building OPCs. We still are building NSCs. We are starting 
to build a WCC, and we've got the PSC.
    What we know is that the need that the Nation has from our 
industrial base is outstripping the capacity it has. We need 
help with that.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. I know I am out of 
time. Just one closing comment, Mr. Chairman.
    Admirals, I want to just really emphasize something. I went 
round and round with the previous Commandant--won't get into 
names--about the flaws with the approach on the OPC. And we 
have all seen we wasted hundreds of millions of dollars and an 
extraordinary amount of time.
    I think we are now seeing another lessons learned on 
icebreaking capabilities, and I don't even want to go back to 
deepwater.
    I strongly want to urge, as we move forward, look, all of 
us are huge supporters. You have an extraordinary mission. You 
guys are the Swiss Army knife of the sea. We say it all the 
time.
    I really hope that moving forward that we apply the lessons 
learned in both successes and failures because as Admiral 
Gautier noted, we have got to make sure you have the 
capabilities and the resources that you need to do your complex 
job.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay. Sounds like we want a second 
round.
    Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, maybe I will take half of the 5 
minutes very, very quickly.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay, half.
    Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Gautier, you, in your testimony just 
a moment ago, really came to what we need, and that is, you 
talked about the unfunded priorities. It is absolutely 
essential that you give to this committee the obligation to 
meet the needs of the Coast Guard.
    I understand the organization you are working in, it is 
difficult, but you have got to be very, very clear with us. The 
unfunded requirements, why are they critical?
    We have talked around here back and forth on this. The 
Arctic is one. In response to our Alaska Representative, you 
began talking about the shoreside issues. You have got to make 
that clear to us. Don't be shy. Don't be timid.
    Your needs, the needs of this Nation that are carried out 
by the Coast Guard, will not be achieved unless the Coast Guard 
comes to us with clarity and the argument: Give us the money or 
else we will fail to address the challenges in the South 
Pacific, the challenges in the Caribbean, the challenges in the 
Arctic. You have got to do that.
    I want you to be bold. I want you to take the risk of 
challenging us, and then the problem is ours. In the 10 years--
14 years I have been wrestling with this, the Coast Guard has 
never said: If you fail to give us the money for these 
activities, we cannot do our job, and this national security 
cannot be achieved.
    So, I am challenging you: Challenge us--don't dance, come 
very clear--if we do not have the money for the 8 to 10 
icebreakers now or next budget year, we will fail to achieve 
the necessary presence in the Arctic. Similarly with the other 
parts of the world.
    And it is time for us to realize that you are carrying out 
activities for the Department of Defense for which you receive 
no money. The Persian Gulf, the Houthi missiles are delivered 
by ship--dhows or whatever. The Navy can't board them, so, they 
call you.
    Challenge us. Give us the facts, give us the truth, give us 
the failure if we fail to fund you. That is our problem.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, that was a great finale.
    Admiral Gautier. Sir, got it and support it.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Okay. Well, that brings us to an 
end of this hearing. It concludes the hearing. We thank you for 
coming, presenting, answering questions.
    We just want to get ships built. That is all we want to do. 
Tell us how to do it. We will get the money for you. Thank you 
so much.
    Meeting adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


   Question to Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
       Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew

    Question 1. In your shared testimony, both you and Vice Admiral 
Allan reference ``meeting presence with presence'' in the Arctic when 
it comes to competition with Russia and China. However, it appears that 
the Service only plans on expanding the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) 
fleet by 3 and acquiring a handful of others through the Arctic 
Security Cutter Program.
    Do you anticipate this will be enough to face the growing threat of 
Russia and China in the Arctic?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

 Questions to Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., Deputy Commandant for 
    Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew

    Question 1. In your testimony, you mention that the Coast Guard 
needs ``significant investment'' to modernize and grow capabilities in 
the Arctic, yet the Service made no funding request for the Polar 
Security Cutter program in FY 2025.
    Question 1.a. What was the reason behind this choice?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

    Question 1.b. Is there a plan to make this request for FY 2026?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

   Questions to Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
 Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, and Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., 
Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jake 
                              Auchincloss

    Question 1. Russia and China have both made significant investments 
in the Arctic region, while the U.S. has lagged behind on icebreaking 
capability and arctic presence. China has declared itself a ``near-
Arctic state'' and aims to develop a ``Polar Silk Road''--it has 
invested billions in its Belt and Road initiative in Russia to achieve 
these goals. The U.S., Canada, and Finland signed the ICE Pact 
Memorandum of Understanding yesterday, which marks an important first 
step in re-prioritizing icebreakers and U.S. and allied presence in the 
Arctic.
    How is the Coast Guard planning to leverage ICE Pact and make the 
most of this new agreement to address the lack of resources we have in 
the Arctic?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

    Question 2. Approximately 80% of the world's icebreakers are 
designed by Finnish firms and more than 60% of icebreakers are built in 
Finnish shipyards. The average Finnish icebreaker would cost about a 
fifth of the price of a U.S.-build icebreaker and would be completed in 
about 24 months after a contract is signed.
    How is implementation of ICE Pact going to bring costs down for new 
ship construction for all three countries?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

    Question 3. The Polar Security Cutter program is plagued by cost 
increases and delays. The first PSC may not be delivered until 2029 at 
the earliest. The U.S. is facing significantly increased competition in 
the region, including increased Russian and Chinese presence.
    Given the operational need for icebreakers, should the U.S. 
consider simply buying ships directly from our new NATO ally, Finland?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

   Questions to Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
 Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, and Vice Admiral Thomas G. Allan, Jr., 
  Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. 
                          Hillary J. Scholten

    Question 1. In a June 2021 report to Congress, the Coast Guard 
provided a construction timeline for an additional heavy Great Lakes 
icebreaker. This schedule included an Acquisition Decision Event One--
which underscores the need for this additional icebreaker--due for 
completion during the fourth quarter of 2022. We're now late in 2024 
and it's my understanding that Acquisition Decision Event One has still 
not been completed and likely won't until 2025. What is the Coast 
Guard's plan to get back on schedule in order to meet the report's 
delivery date of 2032?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

    Question 2. I am encouraged to see the United States, Canada, and 
Finland coming together with the intent to establish an Icebreaker 
Collaboration Effort, or the ICE Pact, to ensure we're working with our 
allies to keep our waters safe and bolster our industrial capacity. The 
ICE Pact seeks to ramp up the Coast Guard's icebreaking capabilities 
and the Biden administration's announcement of this partnership 
rightfully points out our need for icebreaker acquisitions for the 
Arctic. Could you please outline how the inclusion of a heavy Great 
Lakes icebreaker in the final ICE Pact agreement could boost 
collaboration with allies, notably Canada, to keep the North American 
supply chain running during the winter?
    Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.

 Question to Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew

    Question 1. In your testimony, you state that the Polar Security 
Cutter program will not be able to produce a lead ship delivery until 
2029.
    How does this timeline affect the Service's ability to carry out 
its core missions in the Arctic?
    Answer. Continued delays in delivering the Polar Security Cutter 
increase the likelihood of operational capability gaps in the region 
which may affect the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its Arctic 
missions. Specifically, the Coast Guard anticipates it will have a 
reduced number of ships available for Arctic operations, jeopardizing 
its ability to assure continuous presence and reliable access to the 
Arctic. To mitigate this, the Coast Guard is relying on its two aged 
existing polar icebreakers and other large vessels capable of operating 
in the Arctic region. While the icebreakers have generally maintained 
operations, their continued use increases the risk they will fail 
before they are replaced. For example, the Healy has had two fires on 
board--in 2020 and 2024 which have forced the vessel to return to 
Seattle, WA for repairs.
    In addition to delays for its Polar Security Cutter, the Coast 
Guard faces other challenges that can affect its ability to plan for 
and meet strategic commitments in the Arctic. As we reported in 
November 2024, these include (1) asset availability challenges, such as 
the lack of reserve major cutters, and competing demands for these 
cutters in other areas such as the Indo-Pacific region; (2) limited 
infrastructure and logistics capabilities in Alaska; (3) cost increases 
for major acquisition programs such as the Polar Security Cutter; and 
(4) a significant backlog of shore infrastructure projects that is 
contributing to affordability concerns for recapitalization and related 
efforts to sustain existing and planned assets.\1\
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    \1\ GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Risks Assessed, but Information Gaps 
and Numerous Challenges Threaten Operations, GAO-25-107910 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 14, 2024).
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    Over the past decade, we have made numerous recommendations for the 
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to change their 
acquisition approach and align it with leading practices for 
shipbuilding and acquisition. While the Coast Guard has taken some 
action, it continues to make decisions that imperil its highest 
priority programs. For example, in September 2018, we found that the 
Polar Security Cutter's planned delivery dates were not informed by a 
realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities.\2\ We recommended that 
the program develop a schedule, in accordance with best practices for 
project schedules, to set realistic schedule goals for all three Polar 
Security Cutters before awarding the contract option for construction 
of the lead ship. However, we closed the recommendation as not 
implemented because the program proceeded with the award in April 2019 
without developing a realistic schedule. As of April 2024, the program 
had not yet established an updated schedule.\3\ The program is in the 
process of updating its schedule estimates to develop a new acquisition 
program baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs 
to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
    \3\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Shipbuilding Outcomes, GAO-24-107488 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We issued a report in December 2024 that discusses the Coast 
Guard's role and how its current polar icebreakers enable it to operate 
in the Arctic; how the Coast Guard analyzed its polar icebreaking 
needs; and the extent to which it has considered options to expand the 
future fleet.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Further Cost and Affordability 
Analysis of Polar Fleet Needed, GAO-25-106822 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
19, 2024).
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