[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE
FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE?

=======================================================================

(118-66)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

JULY 23, 2024

__________

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
_______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57-589 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking
Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
District of Columbia Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Puerto Rico
Vice Ranking Member Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
Mike Ezell, Mississippi
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida
Celeste Maloy, Utah
Kevin Kiley, California
Vince Fong, California
------

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management

Scott Perry, Pennsylvania,
Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada, Ranking Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Garret Graves, Louisiana
District of Columbia Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Sharice Davids, Kansas, Puerto Rico
Vice Ranking Member Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon,
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Vice Chairman
Grace F. Napolitano, California Anthony D'Esposito, New York
John Garamendi, California Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Jared Huffman, California Mike Ezell, Mississippi
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Celeste Maloy, Utah
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management, opening statement.................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6

WITNESSES

David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure Team, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, oral statement............... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service,
Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
oral statement................................................. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S.
General Services Administration, oral statement................ 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves' Request for
Information from Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings
Service, U.S. General Services Administration.................. 48

APPENDIX

Questions to Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective
Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, from Hon. Scott Perry................................ 51
Questions to Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings
Service, U.S. General Services Administration, from Hon. Scott
Perry.......................................................... 56

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

July 19, 2024

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Examining the
Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal
Buildings Secure?''
_______________________________________________________________________

I. PURPOSE

The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, July 23, 2024, at 10:00
a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive
testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Examining the Effectiveness
of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings
Secure?'' The purpose of the hearing is to examine the Federal
Protective Service's (FPS) protection of Federal buildings,
focusing on a United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) study which will be released at the hearing. Members will
receive testimony from the United States General Services
Administration (GSA), the FPS, and the GAO.

II. BACKGROUND

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

FPS authority to protect Federal buildings can be traced
back to the Federal Works Agency (FWA), an agency that was
established under President Franklin Roosevelt with the purpose
of consolidating the functions of other agencies dealing with
public works into one organization.\1\ In 1948, Congress
authorized the FWA to appoint uniformed guards to police public
buildings.\2\ The FWA was dissolved in 1949, with all of its
responsibilities then being integrated into GSA, an agency
founded that same year through the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act (P.L. 81-152) to take over all real
property authorities in the Federal Government.\3\ GSA
continued carrying out the same responsibilities held by the
FWA until 1961 when Congress authorized the GSA Administrator
to appoint non-uniformed guards, in addition to the already-
serving uniformed guards, to conduct investigations, enforce
Federal law, and make arrests without a warrant for offenses
committed on Federal property.\4\ These law enforcement
responsibilities came together in 1971, when GSA formally
established the FPS as a Federal law enforcement agency to
encompass those responsibilities and authorities.\5\ Following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the passage of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) FPS was transferred to the
then newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\6\
Currently, FPS is housed within the DHS Management Directorate,
but the agency was previously housed under both the National
Protection and Programs Directorate and United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nat'l Archives, General Records of the Federal Works Agency,
(July 2024), available at https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-
records/groups/162.html#::text=History%3A
%20FWA%20established%201939%20to,FEAPW)%3B%20the%20WPA%3B%20and.
\2\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (RS22706), The Federal
Protective Service and Contract Security Guards: A Statutory History
and Current Status, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15.
\3\ GSA, Who We Are, (July 2024), available at https://
disposal.gsa.gov/s/whoweare.
\4\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv., (RS22706), The Federal
Protective Service and Contract Security Guards: A Statutory History
And aurrent Status, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15.
\5\ DHS, FPS, Who We Are, (last updated June 17, 2024), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/who-we-are.
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id.
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FPS is responsible for the protection and security of
approximately 9,000 GSA leased and owned facilities, divided
into 11 regions Nationwide.\8\ FPS is entirely funded by the
fees it charges to its customer agencies (GSA and tenant
agencies) for the utilization of FPS services.\9\ The estimated
budget for FPS for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is $2.2 billion.\10\
FPS has more than 1,300 employees, including Law Enforcement
Officers, Security Specialists, Special Agents, and Mission
Support Staff.\11\ However, FPS has only 881 law enforcement
positions filled, despite a total authorized number of
1,140.\12\ FPS additionally oversees more than 15,000 contract
guards or Protective Security Officers (PSOs).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ FPS, FY 2025 Budget in Brief, (2024), available at https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/
2024_0311_fy_2025_budget_in_brief.pdf.
\9\ GAO, GAO-21-311R, Federal Protective Service: Projected
Outcomes of the New Fee Structure on Tenant Agencies' Costs (2021),
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-311r.pdf.
\10\ FPS, FY 2025 Budget in Brief (2024), available at https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/
2024_0311_fy_2025_budget_in_brief.pdf.
\11\ DHS, FPS, Operations, (last updated June 17, 2024), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/fps-operations.
\12\ E-mail from FPS Congressional Affairs to Staff, H. Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure (Apr. 24, 2024, 10:22 a.m. EST) (on file
with Comm.).
\13\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FPS' role in protecting Federal buildings is not limited to
providing a uniformed presence in those buildings, but also
includes maintaining and managing the contracts with companies
employing the contract guards for Federal facilities,
conducting risk assessments of buildings, and providing
recommendations to GSA and tenant agencies on any security
improvements needed for particular buildings.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong.
(Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, FPS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

RECENT INCIDENTS AT FEDERAL BUILDINGS

Federal buildings have long faced a variety of threats,
ranging from planes being crashed into them, to car bombings,
to attempted and active shooters.\15\ It is the duty of FPS
officers and PSOs to intercept these threats to protect the
safety of Federal employees and the public.\16\ Recently, FBI
field offices have faced several attempted breaches, including
an incident in August of 2022, when PSOs contracted by FPS
prevented an armed man from breaching the Federal Bureau of
Investigation office located in Cincinnati, Ohio.\17\ The man
would be later shot and killed by non-FPS police officers after
engaging in a violent shootout with the officers.\18\ Prior to
this incident, FPS has been involved in addressing a variety of
violent attacks directed at Federal buildings, and in just the
past five years, these attacks include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane Into Texas I.R.S. Office,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2010), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
02/19/us/19crash.htm; FBI, Oklahoma City Bombing, (July 2, 2024),
available at https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-
bombing; Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to
breach FBI office killed after standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available
at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-man-
b4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704.
\16\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv., (R43570), Federal Building and
Facility Security: Frequently Asked Questions, (last updated Mar. 6,
2017), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/
R43570/10.
\17\ Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to
breach FBI office killed after standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available
at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-man-
b4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704; see also Associated Press, Woman
taken into custody after armed standoff at FBI building in Seattle,
authorities say, AP, (June 12, 2024), available at https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/woman-taken-into-custody-after-armed-standoff-at-fbi-
building-in-seattle-authorities-say; Ryan Young et. al., Police ID
suspect after vehicle crashes into gate at the Atlanta FBI field
office, CNN, (Apr 2, 2024), available at https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/
01/us/vehicle-rams-gates-of-fbi-field-office-in-atlanta/index.html.
\18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOn April 20, 2022, a man armed with a knife
entered the Edmund S. Muskie Federal Building in Augusta,
Maine, and assaulted a guard employed by FPS.\19\ The man was
subsequently shot by another FPS guard who was on duty in the
building.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ WABI News Desk, Man shot after entering Augusta federal
building with knife and physically assaulting guard, FBI says, WABI5,
(Apr. 20, 2022), available at https://www.wabi.tv/2022/04/20/police-
presence-augusta-post-office/.
\20\ Id.

LOn July 21, 2020, FPS officers defended and
protected the Federal Courthouse located at 100 SE 3rd Ave. in
Portland, Oregon.\21\ At the time, numerous violent protesters
were attempting to attack and enter the building, using methods
including striking officers with blunt objects and setting off
fireworks in the vicinity of the entrance.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ FPS Incidents Report, FPS, (July 21, 2020), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/24_0202_fps-
incident_reports.pdf.
\22\ Id.

LOn June 17, 2019, a man opened fire outside the
Earle Cabell Federal Building in Dallas, Texas was shot and
killed in an exchange of gunfire with FPS officers who
responded to the incident.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The Latest Man who fired at Texas courthouse just graduated,
AP, (June 17, 2019), available at https://apnews.com/article/
14fea70091344c74b328557e3bf474fb.

Due to the nature of their mission, FPS officers and PSOs
are constantly putting their lives at risk to protect Federal
property, with seven sworn FPS officers and three PSOs having
died in the performance of their duties throughout FPS'
history.\24\ The most recent death in the line of duty occurred
in May of 2020, when David Patrick Underwood, a PSO contract
officer, was shot and killed by an assailant while protecting
the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building and United States
Courthouse in Oakland, California.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong.
(Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, FPS).
\25\ Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Two Defendants Charged with
Murder and Aiding and Abetting in Slaying of Federal Protective Service
Officer at Oakland Courthouse Building, (June 16, 2020), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-defendants-charged-murder-and-
aiding-and-abetting-slaying-federal-protective-service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. CHALLENGES FACING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

Over the years, GAO has conducted a number of
investigations and issued a series of reports that identified
key challenges and problems with respect to the FPS. Key
problems that those reports have identified are:
LFake bomb components, knives, and guns were
secreted past security in a number of cases. Penetration
testing conducted by the GAO and the FPS revealed serious
deficiencies in building security.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ GAO, GAO-10-341, Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard
Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract
Guards (2010), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-341.pdf.

LFPS has struggled to ensure that contract guards
have the training they need, including active shooter training.
FPS' paper-based system for auditing the required
certifications and training records of contract guards resulted
in a lack of quality control over whether guards were qualified
and trained to protect Federal buildings.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Id.

LThe systems FPS uses to track its contract guards
have faced significant challenges. Some Federal tenant agencies
have been forced to temporarily close their offices because of
a lack of guard coverage.\28\
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\28\ Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 11:00 a.m. EST).

LFPS has historically faced challenges in managing
its human capital. In 2019, FPS was moved under DHS' Management
Directorate to address some of those concerns; however, FPS has
continued to face staffing shortages.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ GAO, GAO-23-105361, Federal Protective Service: More
Collaboration on Hiring and Additional Performance Information Needed
(2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105361.pdf.

LFacility security assessments used to evaluate
the vulnerabilities at Federal facilities are often ignored.
Additionally, the tenant agencies are not held accountable for
failing to implement FPS' recommended security measures.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO, GAO-23-105649, Federal Facilities: Improved Oversight Is
Needed for Security Recommendations (2023), available at https://
www.gao.gov/assets/820/819849.pdf.

LAgreements and partnerships with local law
enforcement to respond to incidents on Federal property were
lacking. State and local law enforcement agencies, which may be
called to respond to a Federal building, often were not aware
whether they could even respond to and enter a Federal
building.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ GAO, GAO-12-434, Federal Protective Service: Better Data on
Facility Jurisdictions Needed To Enhance Collaboration With State and
Local Law Enforcement (2012), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-12-434.pdf.

LFPS Law Enforcement Officers (LROs) are spread
too thin, and FPS's non-core responsibilities have increased.
LRO's have been increasingly deployed to protect Federal
facilities during protests. Additionally, LRO's have also been
called on to assist DHS with activities not related to FPS's
core mission.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ GAO, GAO-22-106177, Federal Protective Service: Many Approved
Security Recommendations Were Not Implemented and Preliminary Work
Suggests Law Enforcement Deployments Have Increased (2022), available
at https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105361.pdf.
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IV. RECENT COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OVER THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

On March 6, 2024, Subcommittee Chairman Perry, along with
Subcommittee Members Chavez-DeRemer and Ezell, sent letters to
the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator.\33\ The letters
outlined how in recent years, ``the rise in crime, drug abuse,
and homelessness has created further challenges to the
protection of Federal buildings and the safety of those that
work and visit them.'' \34\ The letter also raises concern with
regard to how increasing crime rates may be creating more empty
and unused Federal building space.\35\ On May 29, 2024, FPS
provided an interim response to the letter.\36\ According to
FPS, from 2019 to March 21, 2024, there have been 6,929
arrests/citations related to crimes in or around Federal
buildings or involving Federal workers or visitors to Federal
buildings, with 964 of those arrests consisting of
assaults.\37\ In FY 2023, compared to FY 2022, FPS experienced
a 138 percent increase in demonstrations at Federal properties,
an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and
regulations, an overall 24 percent increase in assault on
government employees, and a 13 percent increase in the number
of inappropriate communications directed towards government
employees.\38\ To date, FPS and GSA have provided responses
that are not complete responses to the letters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Letter from Rep. Scott Perry, Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm.
on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. to Kris Cline, Director, FPS,
(Mar. 6, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Letter from Rep. Scott Perry,
Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al.
to the Honorable Robin Carnahan, Administrator, GSA, (Mar. 6, 2024) (on
file with Comm.).
\34\ Id.
\35\ Id.
\36\ Letter from Kris Cline, Director, FPS to Rep. Scott Perry,
Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al.
(May 29, 2024) (on file with Comm.).
\37\ Id.
\38\ Id.
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V. GAO'S RECENT EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

In the 117th Congress, the Committee requested that GAO
conduct a review of the physical security of Federal buildings
guarded by FPS.\39\ At this Subcommittee hearing, GAO will
release the findings of that report. GAO focused on two key
areas: (1) how effective are the PSOs in detecting prohibited
items, and (2) how FPS has used data systems to improve
oversight of the PSOs.\40\ GAO focused on building with public-
facing activities.\41\ GAO found some improvement in FPS's
ability to detect prohibited items including knives, batons,
and pepper spray.\42\ To test this, GAO conducted 27 instances
of covert testing and reviewed the covert testing done by FPS
that included improvised explosive device (IED) components and
firearms.\43\ Both sets of results aligned with an average
detection 50 percent of the time.\44\ The poorest results were
in Washington, D.C.\45\ GAO noted some improvement since the
last covert testing in 2009.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Letter from Peter DeFazio, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, et. al. to Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General, GAO, (Aug.
18, 2022) (on file with Comm.).
\40\ Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. On Transp. and
Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 11:00 a.m. EST).
\41\ Id.
\42\ Id.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
\45\ Id.
\46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, the GAO report also found that despite an
investment of nearly $30 million in new tracking and management
systems, FPS still has no meaningful way to monitor if a guard
is not at post or has completed needed certifications and
training--it remains largely paper-based.\47\ This lack of
tracking has raised specific concerns with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), which at times had to close 30 of their tax
centers because an FPS guard failed to report to their
post.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Id.
\48\ Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

While FPS has made some improvements in detecting
prohibited items like knives and pepper spray during covert
testing, significant challenges still remain with FPS's
protection of Federal buildings. Most notably, despite spending
millions of dollars on new electronic tracking and management
systems, the majority of tracking is still paper-based. This
lack of effective tracking has only exacerbated the existing
staffing shortage within the FPS and contract workforce. In
short, the findings of the recent GAO report leave significant
room for improvement for FPS.

VII. WITNESSES

LMr. David Marroni, Director, Physical
Infrastructure, United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO)
LMr. Richard ``Kris'' Cline, Director, Federal
Protective Service, United States Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)
LMr. Elliot Doomes, Public Buildings Service
Commissioner, United States General Services Administration
(GSA)

EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE
FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE?

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2024

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room
2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.
The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be
authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair also asks unanimous consent that Members not on
the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into
the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
The Chair now recognizes himself for the purposes of an
opening statement for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC
BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Mr. Perry. Before I begin, I first want to thank the
dedicated personnel of the Federal Protective Service who work
to protect Federal workers and visitors to Federal facilities
across our great country. Over the years, there have been FPS
law enforcement and contract guards who have made the ultimate
sacrifice to protect workers and visitors in Federal buildings.
Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000--1,000--assaults
at Federal facilities and nearly 7,000 arrests. Because of
this, it is critically important that the FPS law enforcement
officers and the thousands of contract guards known as
protective service officers, or PSOs, have what they need to do
and complete their job. Given the importance of this issue, the
committee requested that GAO review building security and, more
specifically, conduct covert tests similar to the work done by
GAO in 2009.
Today's hearing will examine the findings of GAO's work and
the current state of protection of our Nation's Federal
buildings.
FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are
responsible for the protection of and the security at
approximately 9,000 facilities, the majority of which are owned
or managed by GSA. FPS law enforcement officers manage the
PSOs, ensure they are properly trained, are at their post, and
respond when needed to any incident. However, there have been
ongoing challenges that impact the ability of law enforcement
to do their jobs.
Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug
use, and homelessness across the country that are impacting the
safety of those who work and visit Federal facilities. For
example, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services office in San Francisco advised some Federal employees
to work from home in light of conditions at the Federal
building.
Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell,
and I sent letters to the Director of FPS and the GSA
Administrator to assess how the increasing levels of crime,
drug abuse, and homelessness have impacted the protection of
Federal buildings and the safety of those that work and visit
them. The letter also raised concerns regarding how increasing
crime rates may be leading to more empty and unused Federal
building space. This is all happening while FPS is
understaffed, with 259 law enforcement positions currently left
unfilled.
Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while
there has been some improvement since building security testing
in 2009, the success rate in identifying prohibited items, on
average, is only 50 percent. I think we can do better.
Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to
effectively manage the PSOs don't work. As GAO found in their
latest report, the new data systems used by FPS law enforcement
to oversee their contract guards or PSOs have significant
flaws. Despite spending nearly $30 million of taxpayer funds on
new electronic systems, FPS struggles to know if a guard is at
their post or not, or if that guard even has the qualifications
needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of reliable data
tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like the
Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security
Administration.
And further, this lack of reliability has impacted the
accessibility of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the
IRS had to close 30--30--of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers
and the SSA closed over 500 locations for full days because a
contract guard failed to report to their post is absolutely,
completely unacceptable.
The GAO has issued report after report for years now on
many of these issues, yet FPS has not yet resolved them. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses today on these issues and
thank for them for being here.
[Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
Before I begin, I first want to thank the dedicated personnel of
the Federal Protective Service (FPS), who work to protect federal
workers and visitors to federal facilities across our country. Over the
years there have been FPS law enforcement and contract guards who have
made the ultimate sacrifice to protect workers and visitors in federal
buildings.
Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000 assaults at federal
facilities and nearly 7,000 arrests. Because of this, it is critically
important that the FPS law enforcement officers and the thousands of
contract guards, known as Protective Service Officers or ``PSOs'', have
what they need to do their job. Given the importance of this issue, the
Committee requested that GAO review building security and, more
specifically, conduct covert tests similar to the work done by GAO in
2009.
Today's hearing will examine the findings of GAO's work and the
current state of FPS' protection of our nation's federal buildings.
FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are responsible for
the protection of and security at approximately 9,000 facilities, the
majority of which are owned or managed by GSA. FPS law enforcement
officers manage the PSOs, ensure they are properly trained, are at
their post, and respond when needed to any incident. However, there
have been ongoing challenges that impact the ability of FPS law
enforcement to do their jobs.
Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug use, and
homelessness across the country that are impacting the safety of those
who work and visit federal facilities. For example, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services' office in San Francisco
advised some federal employees to work from home ``in light of the
conditions at the federal building.''
Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell, and I
sent letters to the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator
\\ to assess how the increasing levels of crime, drug abuse,
and homelessness have impacted the protection of federal buildings and
the safety of those that work and visit them. The letters also raised
concerns regarding how increasing crime rates may be leading to more
empty and unused federal building space. This is all happening while
FPS is understaffed with 259 law enforcement positions left unfilled.
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r.aspx?ID=484010-71706684
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Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while there has
been some improvement since building security testing in 2009, the
success rate in identifying prohibited items on average is only 50
percent.
Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to effectively
manage the PSOs don't work. As GAO found in their latest report, the
new data systems used by FPS law enforcement to oversee their contract
guards or PSOs have significant flaws. Despite spending nearly $30
million of taxpayer funds on new electronic systems, FPS struggles to
know if a guard is at their post or not, or if that guard even has the
qualifications needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of
reliable data tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Social Security
Administration (SSA), and further this lack of reliability has impacted
the accessibility of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the IRS
had to close 30 of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers and the SSA closed
over 500 locations for full days because a contract guard failed to
report to their post is unacceptable.
GAO has issued report after report for years now on many of these
issues, yet FPS has not yet resolved them. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses today on these issues and thank them for being here.

Mr. Perry. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Ms.
Titus, for 5 minutes for her opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DINA TITUS OF NEVADA, RANKING MEMBER,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
this important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. Some are
very familiar. They have been here before, and they always
provide us with excellent information in a very professional
way.
It is very important to talk about the Federal Protective
Service and all that they do to keep us safe in our Federal
buildings, especially important in my district in Las Vegas,
where we had the shooting at the Lloyd George Federal
Courthouse. That was a number of years ago, but a security
guard was killed there, and we never forget that.
As the chairman said, you all are tasked with protecting
more than 9,000 owned and leased facilities, and responsible
for keeping those workplaces safe for people who work there,
people who are contractors, people who come and visit, or who
conduct business with those Government agencies. So, ensuring
that you have the resources you need to keep people and
property safe and secure while you are facing a wider range and
growing number of threats is really critical to keeping our
Government functioning and serving the public.
In recent history, we have seen dangerous situations and
threats posed to our Federal buildings. These have included
plane crashes, car bombings, active shooters, you name it. It
has practically happened there in a Federal building, and you
need to be prepared to address any of these situations and
more.
Currently, DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency--CISA--heads the Interagency Security Committee which
sets those standards that need to be met by our Federal
facilities. And based on these standards, then the FPS can
identify risks and recommend actions to mitigate those risks,
including additional resources you might need such as screening
equipment and security cameras.
Among my many concerns is that, even though the FPS has
sent thousands of these assessments to Federal agencies, many
of their recommendations have just been ignored, and it is
apparent that there are a number of vulnerabilities that could
have been, but need to be, addressed.
In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, I found it
shocking to know that when the GAO conducted covert tests to
test some of these vulnerabilities, FPS contract guards were
unable to detect weapons ranging from batons to multipurpose
tools with knives in half of the tests. Half of the tests. And
what is more concerning is then when the FPS conducted its own
covert testing, this time with firearms and components for
making explosive devices, the detection rate was almost the
same. So, this is just unacceptable and not good for anybody
involved.
I appreciate very much the work of the FPS and its
contractors, and the potential harms that they face every day
because they are on the front line. But these exposures have to
be addressed, and that is why I am interested in hearing from
you all just what the extent of the problem is, how we can
address it, what resources you might need, and what changes in
policy we should perhaps put forward. So, thank you for joining
us, and I look forward to the hearing.
[Ms. Titus' prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for joining
us today to discuss the state of the Federal Protective Service (FPS)
and the security of our federal buildings.
As the law enforcement agency tasked with protecting the more than
9,000 GSA owned and leased facilities, the FPS is responsible for
keeping these workplaces safe for the thousands of federal employees
and citizens who visit every day.
Ensuring the FPS has the resources it needs to keep people and
property secure, while facing a wide range of threats, is critical to
keeping our government functioning.
In recent history, we have seen the dangerous situations and
threats posed to federal buildings including plane crashes, car
bombings and active shooters, and the FPS needs to be prepared to
address any of these situations and more.
Currently, DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) heads the Interagency Security Committee which sets the security
standards that need to be met by federal facilities. Based on these
standards, the FPS can identify risks and recommend actions to mitigate
those risks, including through additional resources such as screening
equipment and security cameras.
Among my many concerns is that even though the FPS has sent
thousands of these assessments to federal agencies, many of their
recommendations are ignored, and it's apparent that as a result there
are numerous vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.
In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, it is shocking to know
that when GAO conducted covert tests to test some of these security
vulnerabilities, FSP contract guards were unable to detect weapons
ranging from batons to multipurpose tools with knives in half of the
tests. What's more concerning is that when the FPS conducted its own
covert testing, this time with firearms and components for making
improvised explosive devices, the detection rate was almost identical.
I appreciate the work of the FPS and its contractors, and the
potential harms they face every day, but these exposures are
unacceptable which is why I look forward to today's hearing so we can
learn more on the extent of the problem and where changes should be
made.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back.

Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
Larsen, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair
Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Titus, for calling
today's hearing on Federal buildings. I want to thank our
witnesses today.
Commissioner and Director, I appreciate you once again
making time to discuss Federal facility issues with the
subcommittee. And Director Cline, I recognize you have very
heavy demands on your time and attention, so, I appreciate your
participation, as well.
Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City, the Federal Government had no established
approach to security for federally owned or leased facilities.
Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed
the DOJ to assess the vulnerability of Federal facilities to
terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum
security standards.
Despite agencywide coordination and the establishment of
the Interagency Security Committee process, the ISC process,
Federal facility security has remained on the Government
Accountability Office's high-risk list for the past 21 years.
In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021, FPS
made more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000
Federal facilities. So, while Facility Security Committees
approved 27 percent of those recommended countermeasures, most
of those countermeasures were not implemented.
The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and
retaining law enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems
developed specifically to track and to verify guard training
and certifications are not reliable. Entry access points are
not always staffed, and GAO's covert testing program has found
that contract guards did not consistently detect prohibited
items when screening bags.
Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests
at Federal facilities around the country and the use of drones
near Federal facilities and high-profile public events.
So, this hearing is taking place at a particularly
important time of political and social unease, and I hope
today's witnesses will share their ideas for improving the
security of Federal buildings and the safety of the employees
who work there.
And with that, I want to thank the chair and yield back.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking
Member Titus, for calling today's hearing on the security of federal
buildings.
Thank you, also, to our witnesses. Commissioner Doomes and Director
Marroni, I appreciate you once again making time to discuss federal
facility issues with the Subcommittee. Commissioner Cline, I recognize
that you currently have heavy demands on your time and attention, so I
appreciate your participation today.
Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City, the federal government had no established approach to
security for federally owned or leased facilities.
Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed the
Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities
to terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum
security standards.
Despite agency-wide coordination and the establishment of the
Interagency Security Committee (ISC) process, federal facility security
has remained on the Government Accountability Office's High-Risk list
for the past 21 years.
In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021 FPS made
more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 federal
facilities. While facility security committees approved 27 percent of
the FPS recommended countermeasures, most of those countermeasures were
not implemented.
The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and retaining law
enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems developed specifically
to track and verify contract guard training and certifications are not
reliable.
Entry access points are not always staffed, and GAO's covert
testing program has found that contract guards did not consistently
detect prohibited items when screening bags.
Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests at
federal facilities around the country and the use of drones near
federal facilities and at high profile public events.
This hearing is taking place at a particularly important time of
political and social unease.
I hope today's witnesses will share their ideas for improving the
security of federal buildings and the safety of the employees who work
there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. I now welcome
our witnesses and thank them for taking the time to be here
today, some of you more familiar than others, but I am still
going to go through the process of explaining our lighting
system to our witnesses, maybe for the benefit of everybody
else here.
There are three lights in front of you. Green means go,
yellow means you are running out of time, and red means please
conclude your remarks.
The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full
statements be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses
have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to
them in writing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
the record of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5
minutes.
With that, Mr. Marroni, you are recognized for 5 minutes
for your testimony, sir.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; RICHARD K. CLINE,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND ELLIOT DOOMES,
COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Marroni. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Titus, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss FPS's efforts to secure about 9,000 Federal
facilities and oversee the more than 13,000 contract guards who
protect those buildings and their occupants nationwide.
The security of Federal facilities has been a longstanding
area of concern. Our work has highlighted several persistent
challenges over the years. In particular, we have identified
weaknesses in how contract guards detect and prevent prohibited
items from entering Federal buildings. We have also identified
significant and ongoing problems with the data systems FPS uses
to oversee its security program. These challenges are a key
reason that Federal real property management remains on GAO's
high-risk list after more than 20 years.
Continuing threats to Federal facilities make it absolutely
critical for FPS to successfully resolve these issues. Doing so
will best ensure that the men and women who protect these
buildings have the training and tools they need to carry out
their mission.
At this committee's request, we have been reviewing how FPS
is doing in addressing some of these persistent challenges. We
focused on two areas: first, how effective contract guards are
at detecting prohibited items; and whether FPS data systems
have improved agency oversight of its contract guard program.
While our final report will not come out until the fall, the
bottom line is clear: FPS continues to face significant
challenges on both fronts.
In terms of detecting prohibited items, our investigators
conducted 27 covert tests at 14 Federal buildings earlier this
year. During those tests, they attempted to bring bags into the
buildings with prohibited items like pepper spray, batons, and
a multipurpose tool with a knife. The FPS contract guards
detected those prohibited items about half of the time.
However, the other half of the time the items got through.
While we only did a small number of tests, our results are
consistent with the results of FPS's own more extensive covert
testing program. These results are cause for concern. To FPS's
credit, they have several reform efforts underway that aim to
improve the detection of prohibited items. For example, FPS is
redesigning the initial training course for contract guards,
and it is also working to identify common causes of covert test
failures to better target potential remedies. These are
positive steps. However, continued attention and sustained
action in this area will be important.
As for the data systems FPS uses to oversee its contract
guard program, we found significant problems that continue what
has been a very longstanding challenge for the agency. For
example, FPS's Post Tracking System, which is meant to be the
system of record for ensuring that every post is staffed by a
qualified guard, was initially piloted in 2018. However, after
6 years, it has yet to be fully implemented in any region. As a
result, FPS still requires contractors to use an old, paper-
based system for billing and guard verification, which creates
double work.
Moreover, the system continues to have significant
technology, data reliability, and interoperability problems,
and has not delivered on its promised capabilities. The
stubborn and ongoing problems with this and other FPS data
systems undermine the agency's productivity and its oversight
of contract guards.
In conclusion, the security of Federal facilities remains a
high-risk area. FPS and the contract guards it oversees play an
essential role in ensuring the safety of those who work in and
visit Federal buildings. If the persistent challenges I have
described today are to be resolved, FPS will need to pay
sustained attention to these issues and take deliberate action.
By doing so, the agency will be able to best ensure the
security of FPS protected facilities going forward.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I will
be happy to take any questions you may have.
[Mr. Marroni's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Federal Facility Security: Preliminary Results Show That Challenges
Remain in Guard Performance and Oversight
Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
Federal real property has been on GAO's High-Risk List since 2003,
in part due to threats to federal facilities. Past attacks on federal
buildings demonstrate that the security of federal facilities remains a
high-risk area. FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security, is
responsible for protecting thousands of federal facilities. FPS employs
contract guards at 2,500 federal facilities at a cost of almost $1.7
billion in fiscal year 2024.
This testimony discusses the preliminary results of an ongoing GAO
review that focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract guards are at
detecting prohibited items and FPS's efforts to improve detection, and
(2) stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have improved
oversight of the contract guard program.
To determine the effectiveness of FPS guards in detecting
prohibited items, GAO conducted 27 covert tests at a nongeneralizable
sample of 14 federal facilities and analyzed data from FPS's covert
tests. To obtain stakeholders' views on FPS's data systems, GAO
reviewed information on the systems and interviewed stakeholders,
including FPS officials, federal tenants, guard unions, and security
guard companies.
GAO provided a draft of this statement to FPS. FPS determined that
some information was law enforcement sensitive. We withheld that
information from this statement and incorporated other comments as
appropriate. GAO plans to complete its work and issue a report on these
issues by the end of the year.
What GAO Found
To secure federal facilities and protect employees and visitors,
the Federal Protective Service (FPS) manages and oversees more than
13,000 contract guards, whose duties include controlling facility
access and screening visitors to detect prohibited items. To determine
if FPS was effectively protecting federal facilities, GAO investigators
conducted 27 covert tests at 14 selected federal buildings in early
2024. During these tests, GAO investigators had a prohibited item--a
baton, pepper spray, or a multi-purpose tool with a knife--inside a bag
that they attempted to bring into the building. FPS contract guards
failed to detect prohibited items in about half of GAO's tests.
FPS conducts its own covert tests, the results of which were
consistent with GAO's tests. While FPS determined that the specifics of
its testing program are law enforcement sensitive, FPS officials said
they have several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards'
detection of prohibited items. Those efforts include (1) redesigning
the initial training course for contract guards, (2) increasing on-the-
job training, and (3) collecting covert testing data to identify common
causes of covert test failures.
Stakeholders identified data system challenges that undermine FPS's
productivity and oversight of contract guards. FPS developed data
systems to improve oversight of the contract guard workforce in
response to previous GAO recommendations. The Post Tracking System,
initially piloted in 2018, was expected to be the system of record for
ensuring that every post was staffed by a qualified guard for the
correct time frames, but it has yet to be fully implemented in any
region. In addition, stakeholders said the system continues to face
technology, data reliability, and interoperability challenges and has
not delivered the promised capabilities. This negatively affects the
productivity of FPS's oversight efforts, according to stakeholders.
Some FPS officials also said they do not use the reports for billing
the government because the data are inaccurate or incomplete.
Consequently, even in areas that have deployed the system, FPS
continues to use an old paper-based system for billing and oversight
tasks.

__________
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work
on security at Federal Protective Service (FPS) facilities, in two
areas: (1) detection of prohibited items by the guards who work under
contract with FPS, and (2) FPS's oversight of Protective Security
Officers (i.e., contract guards).\1\ For 21 years, managing federal
real property has remained on GAO's High-Risk List, in part due to
threats to federal facilities.\2\ Past attacks on federal facilities
include the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City, in which 168 people died. More recent attacks--which
were stopped by FPS contract guards--include a 2019 shooting at a
Dallas federal facility, a 2021 shooting at a Social Security
Administration facility, and an armed attempt to breach security at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cincinnati Field Office in 2022.
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\1\ For the purposes of this statement, we call Protective Security
Officers ``contract guards.''
\2\ The Managing Federal Real Property area was added to GAO's
High-Risk List in 2003 and remained on the most recent update to the
High-Risk list in 2023. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-
119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003) and High-Risk Series: Efforts Made
to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address
All Areas, GAO-23-106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023).
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FPS is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is
responsible for protecting about 9,000 federal facilities. FPS spent
almost $1.7 billion on contract guards, which represented more than 76
percent of its budget, in fiscal year 2024. FPS officers and more than
13,000 contract guards control access to facilities, conduct access
point screenings to detect prohibited items, and respond to safety and
security emergencies.
In our past work, we identified several challenges to the security
of federal buildings. In covert tests conducted in 2009, we carried
components of improvised explosive devices into federal facilities,
undetected by FPS guards. In 2010, we reported that in FPS's internal
covert testing, FPS guards identified prohibited items in 18 of 53
tests. We found these security vulnerabilities were potentially caused
by insufficient training for guards and FPS's failure to maintain a
comprehensive system to ensure that guards were appropriately trained.
Other challenges included staffing levels, human capital management,
and inconsistent guidance about how and when guard inspections should
be performed. We have made a number of recommendations to FPS to help
address these issues, some of which FPS has implemented.
Given the potential threats, it is imperative that FPS provides its
more than 13,000 contract guards the training they need to secure
federal facilities and protect employees and visitors. However, we have
identified guard training and oversight weaknesses since 2008.\3\
My testimony today provides our preliminary observations from our
ongoing review of security at federal facilities and FPS oversight of
contract guards. My statement focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract
guards are at detecting certain types of prohibited items at selected
federal facilities and FPS's efforts to improve detection, and (2)
stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have improved oversight
of the contract guard program. In reviewing a draft of this statement,
FPS determined that some information was law enforcement sensitive. We
withheld that information from this statement. In the coming months, we
plan to finalize our review and issue a final report, which may include
a restricted version.
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\3\ GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal
Facilities, GAO-08-914T (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 18, 2008); GAO, Federal
Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better Manage
Contact Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 10, 2012); GAO, Federal Protective Service: More Collaboration on
Hiring and Additional Performance Information Needed, GAO-23-105361
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2022); GAO, Federal Facilities: Continued
Oversight of Security Recommendations Needed, GAO-24-107137
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2023).
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To determine how effectively FPS guards detected and excluded
prohibited items from being brought into selected federal facilities,
we conducted 27 covert tests by attempting to bring prohibited items
(specifically, a knife, a baton, and pepper spray) into a
nongeneralizable sample of 14 federal facilities.\4\ The Interagency
Security Committee Standard for determining facility security levels
outlines several factors facility managers should use, including the
facility's population and facility size. Facility security levels range
from level 1 (lowest risk) to level 5 (highest risk).\5\ These
facilities had varying levels of security and screening procedures, in
part because of their security level. We selected these federal
facilities based on several factors, including public access, location,
size, and the number of federal tenants in the facilities.
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\4\ Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the
specifications of prohibited items listed in the following federal
standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal
Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard, (Washington,
D.C.: 2022). In some cases, we conducted multiple tests at the same
facility, which means that the number of tests is larger than the
number of facilities tested. We conducted multiple tests in all high-
risk facilities, and in one low-risk facility, to test the ability of
contract guards to detect different types of prohibited items. We
attempted to smuggle one type of prohibited item during each test.
\5\ Interagency Security Committee, The Risk Management Process: An
Interagency Security Committee Standard, (Washington, D.C.: 2021). The
Interagency Security Committee (ISC), housed within DHS's Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, is responsible for developing
federal security policies and standards to enhance the quality and
effectiveness of security in, and protection of, civilian federal
facilities. The ISC was established in 1995 under Executive Order 12977
to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection
of federal facilities in the United States occupied by federal
employees for nonmilitary activities. Executive Order 12977,
Interagency Security Committee, 60 Fed. Reg. 54411 (Oct. 19, 1995), as
amended by Executive Order 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and
Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to
the Secretary of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (March 5, 2003).
Executive Order 14111, Interagency Security Committee, issued in
November 2023 supersedes Executive Order 12977. Executive Order 14111,
88 Fed. Reg. 83809 (Nov. 27, 2023).
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We also analyzed FPS data from fiscal years 2020 to 2023 about the
outcomes of FPS internal covert tests. We assessed the reliability of
the data by reviewing FPS guidance and processes for safeguarding and
checking the data for accuracy and completeness. When we found
discrepancies such as missing data or data entry errors, we brought
them to FPS's attention and worked with FPS to correct the
discrepancies before conducting our analyses.
To collect stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have
helped address challenges with overseeing the contract guard program,
we interviewed FPS officials, federal tenant agencies, unions, and
security guard companies about system capabilities that support
contract guard oversight. We also observed the operation of the systems
and reviewed agency policies and guidance related to oversight efforts.
Specifically, we reviewed FPS guidance and documentation on several
data systems to determine their purpose and the information used by
agency officials.
The ongoing work on which this statement is based is being
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We conducted our related investigative work in accordance with
investigation standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Background
FPS Responsibilities
FPS conducts physical security, law enforcement, and contract guard
oversight activities at federal facilities across the country, a
majority of which are under the custody or control of the General
Services Administration (GSA).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ FPS is funded through fees it charges agencies for its services
and does not receive a direct appropriation from the general fund of
the Treasury.
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Physical security activities. FPS develops individual
facility security assessments to identify and assess threats to and
vulnerabilities for about 9,000 facilities. FPS then recommends
appropriate countermeasures, such as security equipment, to address
those threats and vulnerabilities.\7\
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\7\ In 2023, we recommended the Department Homeland Security
improve its oversight ability to assess countermeasure implementation;
GAO, Federal Facilities: Improved Oversight Needed for Security
Recommendations, GAO-23-105649 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2023).

Law enforcement activities. FPS's law enforcement
activities include patrolling facilities, responding to incidents,
conducting criminal investigations, and making arrests.\8\
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\8\ GAO-23-105361.

Contract guard oversight. FPS manages and oversees contract
guards for various federal agencies at roughly 2,500 of the overall
facilities it protects.\9\ In its oversight role, FPS monitors vendor-
provided training, manages the contracts of vendors who provide
contract guards, and conducts other oversight activities, such as post
visits and post inspections. For example, FPS officials review the
operational readiness of contract guards at posts by conducting post
visits, during which they evaluate the contract guard's knowledge of
post orders and operational readiness requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ FPS charges federal agencies additional fees for agency and
building specific services beyond basic security, such as contract
guards and security patrols.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staffing
In fiscal year 2024, FPS employed about 1,260 staff across 11
regional offices and headquarters.\10\ The FPS workforce consists of
law enforcement and non-law enforcement staff (see fig. 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ For fiscal year 2024, FPS was authorized for 1,692 positions,
according to FPS officials.
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Figure 1: Federal Protective Service Law Enforcement and Non-Law
Enforcement Staff

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Law enforcement staff include inspectors and criminal
investigators. Non-law enforcement staff provide business support such
as staff training, contract management, human capital services, and
information technology.\11\ Both types of FPS staff provide oversight
to over 13,000 contract guards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO-23-105361.
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The FPS Protective Security Operations Division is responsible for
contract guard oversight. Figure 2 depicts staffing shortages among
personnel who provide oversight to contract guards.

Figure 2: Selected FPS Protective Security Operations Division Program
Staffing
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: FPS officials said additional headquarters and regional
officials also play a role in providing oversight of the contract guard
workforce but are not depicted in the above graphic.

FPS Inspectors, Contracting Officer Representatives (COR), and
Business Operation Managers (BOM) are responsible for managing contract
guards. Inspectors conduct monthly post inspections, Contracting
Officer Representatives verify guard training and certification
monthly, and Business Operation Managers oversee contract
administration.\12\ Contract guard vendors are responsible for training
and documenting training and certifications in FPS systems.
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\12\ Business Operation Managers provide oversight and monitoring
over COR programs for FPS regions including budget, financial planning,
revenue management, and acquisition.
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In 2022, we reported FPS employed roughly 1,300 staff for fiscal
year 2021, which reflected a staffing shortage of 21 percent.\13\ FPS
has 409 vacant positions, as of July 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO-23-105361.
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Contract Guard Responsibilities
Approximately 13,000 contract guards control access to about 2,500
federal facilities. Contract guards' responsibilities include screening
at access points to prevent the entry of prohibited items, such as
weapons and explosives, and responding to emergencies involving
facility safety and security.
Prohibited Items
The Interagency Security Committee, of which FPS is a member,
issued the Items Prohibited in Federal Facilities, An Interagency
Security Committee Standard, which establishes a baseline list of
prohibited items that includes firearms, dangerous weapons, or
explosives because those items are designed, redesigned, used, intended
for use, or readily converted to cause injury, death, or property
damage. The Interagency Security Committee's Items Prohibited in
Federal Facilities Standard notes that prohibited items also include
any item banned by any applicable federal, state, local, or tribal
ordinance. According to this standard, the list of prohibited items
applies to all facility occupants, contractors, and visitors.
In some cases, the list of prohibited items is broader than what is
legal to carry in the locations where federal facilities are located.
For example, carrying pepper spray for self-defense purposes or
pocketknives with a blade over certain lengths might be otherwise legal
within a particular jurisdiction, but they are on the Interagency
Security Committee's baseline list of items generally prohibited inside
federal facilities. According to FPS officials, if an individual
attempts to enter a federal facility with a prohibited yet otherwise
legal item, the individual must remove the item from the property.
Contract guards are authorized to detain individuals who refuse to
comply with the contract guard's request to remove the item, according
to FPS. FPS officials said that if an individual attempts to enter a
federal facility with an illegal item, contract guards are authorized
to seize the item; it is up to FPS personnel to issue a citation or
arrest the individual if necessary.
Data Systems
We have found longstanding challenges with the data systems FPS
uses to oversee contract guards.
In 2009, we reported that FPS was using the Contracting
Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System to monitor and verify
contract guard training and certifications. However, the system was not
fully reliable.\14\ This system was replaced later that year by the
Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP).\15\
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\14\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-859T
(Washington, D.C.: Jul. 8, 2009).
\15\ GAO-12-739.

In 2010, we recommended that FPS verify the accuracy of
guard certification and training data in RAMP.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of
Contact Guards, GAO-10-341 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2010).

In 2012, we reported that RAMP, which was expected to
improve FPS employees' administrative worktime efficiency, was no
longer used after 3 years due to system issues.\17\ FPS replaced this
system with an interim vulnerability assessment tool, the Modified
Infrastructure Survey Tool. This tool enabled FPS to conduct facility
security assessments, but the program did not allow for oversight of
the contract guard program. We recommended FPS address the Modified
Infrastructure Survey Tool's limitations and develop and implement a
new comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ GAO-12-739.
\18\ GAO-12-739.

In 2014, we found that FPS continued to lack a
comprehensive and reliable contract guard management system.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ GAO, Federal Protective Service: Protecting Federal Facilities
Remains a Challenge, GAO-14-623T (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2014).

As part of its efforts to address two of our recommendations from
these reports, FPS developed two separate data systems to conduct
contract guard oversight: the Post Tracking System and the Training and
Academy Management System. FPS also developed PostNow to provide post
data for contract guards. See table 1 for information on selected FPS
data systems.

Table 1: Selected Federal Protective Service (FPS) Data Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation Time
Data System System Users System Purpose Frame
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Post Tracking System............. Contract guard vendors, Verifies individual FPS expects all
FPS employees. contract guard security contractors
identities and to be using the system
requisite in accordance with
qualifications to contractual terms by
staff for a specific the end of fiscal year
post. 2024.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PostNow.............................. FPS employees.......... Provides post data Fully implemented.
including type of
post, type of security
required, and assigned
Contracting Officer
Representative.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Training and Academy Management Contract guard vendors, Tracks and maintains FPS expects this system
System. FPS employees. documentation for all to be fully
required contract implemented by
guard training and calendar year 2025.
certifications.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of FPS information. GAO-24-107599

Contract Guards Regularly Failed Covert Tests at Selected Facilities,
but FPS Has Efforts Underway to Improve the Detection of Prohibited
Items
Contract Guards Did Not Detect Prohibited Items about Half the Time in
Covert Tests
Our covert testing. In 13 of the 27 tests we conducted at selected
locations, FPS contract guards did not detect the prohibited items we
were attempting to smuggle into the facility. During our covert tests,
our investigators had a prohibited item--specifically, a knife, a
baton, or pepper spray--inside of a bag that they were bringing into
the facility.\20\ See figure 3 for a photo of a contract guard who
successfully detected one of those prohibited items.
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\20\ Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the
specifications of prohibited items listed in the following federal
standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal
Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard (Washington,
D.C.: 2022). We packed each prohibited item in a backpack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 3: Contract Guard Detecting a Prohibited Item During GAO's
Covert Testing
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

FPS Has Several Efforts Underway to Improve Detection of Prohibited
Items
FPS has several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards'
detection of prohibited items. These efforts include (1) redesigning
the initial training course for contract guards, (2) adding more
frequent opportunities for on-the-job training, and (3) collecting
information about common causes of covert test failures.
Redesigning the initial training course for contract guards. FPS is
in the process of redesigning its National Weapons Detection Training
Program (NWDTP) course, according to an FPS official. The NWDTP is a
16-hour course that trains guards how to screen individuals at facility
entrances and how to use tools--such as X-ray machines and metal
detectors--to detect prohibited items. According to an FPS official,
during the redesign process they reviewed industry standards, academic
research about guards' use of screening tools, and leading screening
practices that other federal agencies and the private sector have
implemented. An FPS official said they plan to incorporate what they
have learned into the updated course to ensure that guards are
receiving the training they need to effectively detect prohibited
items. According to an FPS official, they expect the updated course to
be piloted by the end of fiscal year 2025.
Adding more frequent opportunities for on-the-job training. To
supplement the NWDTP training, FPS developed an on-the-job training
program to provide contract guards with more frequent learning
opportunities. In 2023, FPS added a requirement for inspectors to
conduct an on-the-job training at every screening post at least once
annually. In addition, vendors must provide 2 hours of on-the-job
training every 60 days for all contract guards who work at screening
posts.
According to officials, FPS designed on-the-job trainings to
reinforce NWDTP strategies and to provide contract guards with regular
practice detecting prohibited items. FPS presents these trainings as
learning opportunities; they are not covert tests. The on-the-job
training kit includes several items that can be used in various
training scenarios, such as a non-functioning firearm, a knife with a
blade that is longer than 3 inches, and an inert pipe bomb. Inspectors
use the items in the kit to evaluate guards' ability to accurately
detect specific prohibited items, and to provide feedback if the guard
has difficulty identifying the item. FPS is evaluating the
effectiveness of its on-the-job training program and plans to use those
findings to improve the program.
Collecting covert testing data. FPS also regularly conducts covert
testing to evaluate contract guards' ability to detect prohibited
items. FPS's testing results were consistent with our results. However,
FPS determined that the specifics of the tests were law enforcement
sensitive.
FPS currently compiles an internal covert testing database that
houses information about the results of internal covert tests, causes
for failures, and the types of remediation required when guards fail
covert tests. However, based on our preliminary analysis, information
in the database is inconsistent or insufficient in the following areas:
data entry, information provided about root causes of failures, and
information provided about remedial training for contract guards.
Data entry. In our preliminary analysis of FPS data, we
found that FPS staff enter covert test data inconsistently. For
example, similar outcomes of similar tests are recorded differently
(some appear as ``pass'' and some as ``fail''), narrative descriptions
have inconsistent levels of detail, and labels for test scenarios do
not always match the narrative descriptions. FPS agreed that additional
data quality checks could catch data entry errors and improve the
accuracy of the data in the dataset. In addition, FPS acknowledged that
providing consistent levels of detail in the narrative descriptions
would help FPS staff better determine the root causes for failures and
appropriate corrective actions to address those failures.

Root cause. According to our preliminary analysis of FPS
data, the most common cause FPS listed in the dataset provides
insufficient information about the root cause of a failure to detect a
prohibited item. Specifically, when contract guards fail covert tests,
FPS listed ``human factor'' as the cause more than 80 percent of the
time.\21\ When ``human factor'' is listed as the cause, we found
multiple instances when the narrative description indicated the cause
could be more accurately described as being due to the following:
equipment issues, guards' failure to conduct secondary screenings
properly, guards' failure to notify officials after detecting
prohibited items, or other factors. According to FPS officials, ``human
factor'' is too broad to identify the root cause of the failure or
proactive steps that could prevent similar failures in the future. FPS
acknowledged that updating the term ``human factor'' could provide more
specific information about the cause of the failure. However, according
to FPS, it will take time and additional resources to update the
dataset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Although ``human factor'' is the most common cause, three
other causes appear in the data set: ``training/process/technique'' (15
percent), ``equipment'' (1 percent), and policy/post orders (0.4
percent).

Remedial training. In our preliminary analysis of FPS
data, we found that vendors assigned remedial training for similar
failures inconsistently, in part because the root cause of the failure
is not clearly identified in the dataset. For example, the types of
assigned remedial training--and the duration of that training--varied
when guards failed to detect improvised explosive devices during FPS
covert tests. Some guards received explosive detection remedial
training that was clearly aligned with the failure, some received
unrelated training that focused on screening sensitive areas of the
body, and some were required to retake the entire NWDTP course, only
part of which is directly related to detection of improvised explosive
devices. In explaining the variation, FPS officials told us that they
do not dictate the type of remedial training that vendors should
provide. Instead, FPS allows vendors to determine what type of training
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
they will provide for their guards.

Our forthcoming report will further address these issues.
Stakeholders Identified Data Systems Challenges That Undermine FPS's
Productivity and Oversight of Contract Guards
In response to our prior recommendations, FPS developed two systems
to oversee its contract guard workforce.\22\ We previously recommended
that FPS develop and implement a comprehensive and reliable system to
provide oversight and verify that contract guards are current on all
training and certification requirements.\23\ We reported in April 2023,
that the Post Tracking System and the Training and Academy Management
System were neither completely implemented nor interoperable.\24\
According to FPS officials we interviewed, the two systems FPS
developed are unable to communicate with each other and have data
reliability and technology challenges. In some cases, agency, union,
and security guard contractors said these systems have not delivered
promised capabilities and negatively affect the productivity of FPS's
oversight efforts. Our forthcoming report will further address these
issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need
to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas, GAO-23-106203
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023).
\23\ GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk
and Better Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2012).
\24\ GAO-23-106203.
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Post Tracking System (PTS)
Under development since 2013 and initially piloted in 2018, PTS was
expected to be the system of record for ensuring that every post was
staffed by a qualified guard for the correct time frames in every FPS--
protected facility.\25\ More specifically, PTS was to facilitate
signing in and out of the guard post, remotely verify that guard posts
are staffed as required, and track guard certifications to ensure that
qualified and cleared guards staff FPS posts. PTS was also expected to
verify billing for guard contracts and report prohibited items that are
detected. PTS was intended to interface with other agency systems (see
fig. 4).
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\25\ FPS defines a post as a defined security function (e.g., X-
ray, magnetometer, Wand) for a guarded location.
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Figure 4: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Systems That Inform the Post
Tracking System
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The nationwide deployment of PTS is ongoing; however, the system is
not fully functional in any region because of technology, data
reliability, and interoperability issues identified by FPS and security
guard contractor officials. According to FPS data, 61 security guard
contracts require deployment of PTS. FPS plans to add these
requirements to additional contracts by the end of fiscal year 2024.
However, PTS usage by regions and contractors varies, and PTS is not
the system of record for any guard contract according to FPS officials.
More specifically, some FPS regional officials said PTS utilization is
never higher than 60 percent and can fall as low as 20 percent
systemwide due to functional challenges. In April and May of 2024, FPS
reported average daily utilization percentages for guards standing post
per contract ranging from zero to 95 percent for 61 contracts. Of those
61 contracts, FPS reported most contracts had utilization percentages
less than 75 percent.\26\ Consequently, even in areas that have
deployed PTS, FPS continues to require use of its old paper-based
system for billing and guard verification.
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\26\ FPS data provided covered the week ending on May 26, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FPS and security guard contractor officials identified several
challenges that continue to prevent PTS' successful deployment:
PTS interoperability. According to the PTS Manual, the
system is populated with data from five systems with information on
training, security clearances, facilities, post responsibilities from
contracts, and contractor information.\27\ However, an FPS official
said PTS does not have full automated interoperability, requiring FPS
staff to manually upload data from each of the five systems. Several
regional FPS officials and security guard contractors said this effort
causes delays and extra administrative work. Furthermore, officials
noted that because PTS relies on manual uploading data, PTS is not
operating with the real-time data needed to inform FPS officials
whether contract guards are qualified to stand post. In addition,
several FPS officials said that PTS is not a user-friendly system for
exporting the information needed to support oversight capabilities.
Contract guards can enter detected prohibited item reports in PTS;
however, the information cannot be exported to other FPS systems. These
reports are required weekly from each FPS region. One FPS official told
us that it takes 2 to 3 days each week to meet the requirement because
the reports must be manually entered into another FPS system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The five systems are the Training and Academy Management
System, Integrated Security Management System, Modified Infrastructure
Survey, PostNow, and the Procurement Request Information System
Management. In previous PTS manuals, PostNow was referred to as PostX.
Federal Protective Service. Federal Protective Service Post Tracking
System, User Manual for Administrator Contracting Officer
Representatives (COR), Version 3.5. (Washington, D.C. Dec. 28, 2023).

PTS technology issues. FPS officials told us that
security guard contractors routinely inform them that PTS does not
allow qualified guards to sign into the system due to technology issues
with guard identification cards, vendor-supplied equipment, or Internet
connection problems. Security guard contractors said that their guards
become frustrated by the myriad of problems and give up on using the
system. There is an FPS Help Desk to help with tech issues; however,
FPS officials said that PTS is used infrequently and continues to
require security guard contractors to complete paper forms to document
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
guard posts and work hours as an ongoing workaround.

When multiple posts exist in one facility, FPS may set up a
single post where contract guards sign in using PTS. However, according
to a security guard contractor, the system sometimes crashes or stops
working when multiple contract guards sign in or out around the same
time. For example, one security guard contractor official said it is
common for multiple contract guards to stand in line waiting to sign in
or out creating a long delay during shift changes. Furthermore, the
company official said that if the contract guard cannot sign out by the
time their shift ends, the company pays overtime; an additional cost
the company did not anticipate.

PTS data reliability. FPS officials we interviewed
identified numerous errors in PTS's underlying data, such as inaccurate
descriptions of post requirements. Also, officials said the manual
upload of data from multiple data systems into PTS can cause errors.
For example, FPS is manually uploading information into PTS from
another FPS system, PostNow, to indicate which posts need guard
coverage and to outline the required guard qualifications for each
post.\28\ However, several FPS regional officials told us that due to a
lack of guidance or standards, the aggregated information causes errors
once uploaded to PTS. FPS officials said these errors can incorrectly
flag contract guards as not qualified to stand post. Furthermore, this
information must then be corrected by FPS officials, which is a time-
consuming process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ PostNow is a system that provides information on FPS contract
guard posts, responsibilities, type of security required, expenditures,
facility number, and duty hours. It was initially developed as a stand-
alone financial system to track expenses by post and was not intended
to be used for other FPS databases.

Several FPS guard contractors we interviewed said they could not
use PTS to document contract guards' time and attendance because the
data are unreliable--too often they cannot connect to the server, or
the system will not allow a contract guard to sign in due to a
technical issue. A Help Desk provides support for technical issues, but
all the security guard contractors we interviewed said they instead
rely on the legacy paper process and their own company software to
track time and attendance for contract guards. Furthermore, some FPS
officials we interviewed said they do not use the reports from PTS
because the data are inaccurate or incomplete for billing verification.
According to security guard contractors we interviewed, FPS has not
requested security guard contractors' feedback on deficiencies or
evaluated deficiencies within the system. These officials said they
continue to spend valuable time and resources troubleshooting
technology issues. Two guard contractors said that they needed to
assign additional IT specialists to exclusively troubleshoot PTS
issues, further increasing costs for a system that they have no plans
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to use as the system of record.

Due to the technology issues discussed in this section, FPS
officials told us that PTS has not yet delivered on promised
capabilities. According to the PTS Vendor Guide, the system should
automate oversight of contract guards, including automatically and
remotely monitoring guard posts in real time to ensure that the post is
staffed as required by qualified and cleared guards.\29\ However,
officials told us that PTS cannot remotely verify that guard posts are
staffed based on real-time data. Tenant agency officials that have FPS
contract guards protecting their facilities said that real-time
information could inform FPS, security guard contractors, and tenant
agencies. This in turn would allow them to reallocate resources to
address a shortage of contract guards in specific locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Federal Protective Service, Federal Protective Service Post
Tracking System, Protective Security Officer Vendor Guide, Version 3.0.
(Washington, D.C. May 4, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, officials from two tenant agencies--Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and Social Security Administration (SSA)--expressed
frustration with the lack of contract guards available to stand post at
federal facilities.
IRS officials said that they do not receive timely
communication about how guard shortages affect their facilities, often
learning weeks later that posts were not staffed from local IRS agency
officials. IRS officials said these guard shortages have caused
problems, security vulnerabilities, employee delays, and increased
traffic due to closed entrances. Since fiscal year 2022, IRS officials
reported they closed 30 Taxpayer Assistance Centers for a full day
because of the lack of contract guards. IRS officials said that real-
time information on post staffing and better communication would have
allowed them to take proactive steps to limit such problems.

SSA officials also said that FPS has been unable to
provide a sufficient number of contract guards in the last 3 fiscal
years, resulting in 510 offices that were closed for several hours or a
full day.\30\ Consequently, contract guard shortages negatively
affected the agency's ability to serve the public, specifically
vulnerable populations that needed assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ SSA officials estimated in the last three years, there were
approximately 15,000 hours that posts were unguarded by FPS contract
guards.

FPS officials said that open posts are due to security guard
contractors hiring insufficient personnel to meet contract guard
requirements to meet regional needs. However, security guard
contractors said they face challenges in recruiting, training, and
retaining contract guards. According to FPS officials, they prioritize
open posts and address this issue with security guard contractors
through corrective action plans.
Training and Academy Management System (TAMS)
FPS implemented TAMS in 2019 to allow FPS personnel to track,
monitor, and verify training records for FPS's contract guard
workforce. Also, contract guard companies use TAMS to enter and update
guard training and certification information, along with supporting
documentation, such as electronic copies of training and certification
records. FPS staff conduct oversight of guard training using TAMS.
According to some FPS officials, TAMS is an improvement over the
previous process, which did not provide a consolidated source for guard
training records. However, other FPS officials have found the database
inefficient in completing tasks because of data reliability and
technology issues. While the system has been in use for more than 5
years, FPS officials said TAMS guidance and directives remain in draft
form. FPS officials said the guidance and directives will be submitted
to the policy review process by the end of fiscal year 2024.
TAMS data reliability. Stakeholders identified data
issues that affect the quality of data in TAMS, including missing data
for contract guards and a lack of controls to verify that vendors
provided guards with required training. According to FPS headquarters,
regional, and union officials, because TAMS depends on contractors to
upload training records, that information could be susceptible to human
input errors or manipulation. FPS officials cannot use this database
independently to verify the accuracy of the training data for contract
guards. Union and FPS officials said they still need to collect
additional data from security guard contractors to have a complete
picture of compliance with training requirements. For example, FPS
reported 13,377 active contract guards in TAMS as of April 2024, but
TAMS' training records do not reflect the necessary levels of training
or documentation for all contract guards on staff.

FPS officials said there were various reasons for not having
training records for all 13,377 active contract guards. One reason is
that security guard contractors had not entered all the records into
TAMS. Another reason is that all contract guards had not yet completed
the training courses and not all courses are mandatory. Furthermore,
following our covert testing, we requested training records for the
contract guards at the facilities that did not detect our prohibited
items. FPS officials said they could not provide training records for
some contract guards who were on duty during the time of our covert
testing. FPS officials could not identify the appropriate contract
guards on post based on PTS records, which identify the contract guards
on duty. Officials said that since PTS has not been deployed to all
guard contracts, they could not identify the names of the contract
guards from PTS. Consequently, they could not collect the training and
certification records for those contract guards in TAMS. FPS officials
said if GAO had provided the names of the contract guards at the covert
testing locations, they could have provided the training records for
those contract guards. We did not gather the names of individual guards
during our covert testing, since the purpose of the audit was to review
FPS efforts to improve detection and data systems, not to investigate
individual guard performance.

TAMS system design. When conducting required quarterly
training audits, FPS officials must access different parts of TAMS to
confirm contract guard training requirements are met. This process is
inefficient because it increases the time needed to complete each audit
for thousands of contract guards. Some FPS staff said this design flaw
makes it more time-consuming and difficult to use TAMS than traveling
to the contractor's site to audit training files by hand, as they did
before TAMS.

An agency official said that while TAMS can collect a
lot of information, it is poorly organized, affecting the system's
performance and speed. For example, agency officials must confirm that
contract guards have completed X-ray screening training, which produces
a three-page report. According to a regional official, after running so
many reports, the system runs out of storage space, and TAMS
administrators must develop another file folder to save new reports. As
a result, agency officials said they had to search five or six file
folders to verify training information. Regional officials said it may
take days to find pertinent information with a sluggish computer
program.

Several regional officials also mentioned that
completing their work efficiently is difficult because the program is
not user-friendly. An FPS official who was responsible for implementing
TAMS in FPS said (1) the system was not intended for its current use of
documenting all training requirements and (2) there are limits to how
much the system can be modified for current FPS needs. While FPS
officials have not addressed issues identified by stakeholders, FPS
officials told us they are working to develop initiatives to capture
technological best practices and enhance TAMS.

In conclusion, as the agency responsible for protecting thousands
of federal facilities nationwide, FPS relies heavily on more than
13,000 contract guards. Failure to keep prohibited items out of federal
facilities can compromise the safety of the people who work in and
visit them. Moreover, threats to federal facilities persist even as FPS
is experiencing a shortage of staff to provide oversight for the
contract guard workforce. Therefore, it is essential that FPS improve
the guards' success rate in detecting prohibited items and provide
oversight of the contract guard workforce. Again, we plan to finalize
our review of FPS's efforts to improve detection and data systems and
issue a report later this year.
We shared a draft of this statement with FPS, the Department of
Treasury, the GSA, and the Social Security Administration. FPS provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The remaining
agencies informed us that they had no comments.
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Marroni.
Mr. Cline, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your
testimony, sir.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. CLINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY

Mr. Cline. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Titus, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. My name
is Kris Cline, and I have the privilege of serving as the
Director of the Federal Protective Service, or FPS.
I have served my country for the last 42 years in the Army
and as a career civil servant, and I am honored to be here
today to represent the outstanding men and women of our agency,
and to discuss the critical mission of FPS, as well as the
state of Federal facility security. I am pleased to be sitting
alongside our partners from GSA, with whom we have an excellent
and longstanding partnership, and the GAO, who provides
impartial and independent reviews and recommendations for
improving the operations of the agency.
FPS is a Federal law enforcement agency of 1,642 Federal
employees, including 1,140 Federal law enforcement officers and
approximately 14,000 contract Protective Security Officers, or
PSOs. FPS protects approximately 8,500 Federal facilities
located in every State and Territory. We protect the Federal
Government's infrastructure, employees, contractors, and
members of the public seeking Government services, from
incidents ranging from terrorist attacks to prohibited items in
Federal facilities.
Our most visible countermeasure is our contract PSOs, who
are the front line of security at our Federal facilities. Our
PSOs stand post at thousands of Federal facilities across the
Nation, and are in daily contact with Federal employees and
visitors. They conduct a variety of security functions such as
visitor screening operations, roving patrols, and control
center operations. FPS personnel conduct oversight inspections,
on-the-job training, covert security tests, and administrative
audits of the PSOs. Our contract PSOs work diligently to
prevent dangerous items from entering Federal facilities. Every
year, PSOs detect and prevent hundreds of thousands of
prohibited items from entering Federal facilities. In the last
year, more than 2,000 firearms were prevented from entering
Federal facilities.
Our dedicated Federal law enforcement officers and PSOs put
their lives at risk every day to accomplish our mission. Over
the last several years, our PSOs have been instrumental in
stopping attacks at Federal facilities, placing themselves
between an attacker and those we protect. Our law enforcement
officers and PSOs have been shot, stabbed, and physically
assaulted while performing their duties. Just 2 weeks ago, one
of our PSOs was injured when an individual intentionally drove
into him at a Federal facility in south Florida. I spoke with
this PSO last week, and I am happy to report that he is
recovering from his injuries.
Since our inception in 1971, FPS has lost seven law
enforcement officers in the line of duty. Since 2015, three
PSOs have sacrificed their lives protecting Federal employees.
Over the past few years, we have seen a significant increase in
crimes at Federal facilities and, more importantly, threats to
Federal civil servants. Last year, we noted a 29-percent
increase in disorderly conduct incidents, an 84-percent
increase in violations of Federal facility rules and
regulations, and a 24-percent increase in assaults on
Government employees.
During this dynamic threat environment, we have increased
our vigilance and coordination with Federal, State, and local
law enforcement partners and stakeholders, and are prepared to
respond quickly should a threat be identified. We are also
working closely with GSA as co-leads of the Government Services
and Facilities Sector, established under National Security
Memorandum 22, which was issued in April of 2024. We firmly
believe that our partnership under the Government Services and
Facilities Sector will enhance the sector's security posture
and resilience through enhanced collaboration and information
exchange.
During today's hearing, you are going to hear about
additional improvements needed in the oversight and management
of our PSO program. I am taking deliberate corrective actions
to address GAO's findings, in addition to our routine program
management improvement activities. However, make no mistake, it
is our top priority to keep Federal facilities and employees
safe. And every FPS employee and PSO is dedicated to public
safety and security, and will continue to stand ready to
protect our homeland.
I would like to thank this subcommittee for your interest
in the security of Federal facilities and allowing me the
opportunity to testify on this critical role that the Federal
Protective Service performs every day to ensure our Nation's
overall security. FPS is and will continue to make a
difference, providing a safe and secure work environment at our
protected facilities across the Nation. I look forward to
addressing any questions you may have.
[Mr. Cline's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective
Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective
Service (FPS) regarding FPS's critical mission to protect and secure
federal government employees and the facilities in which they work.
My name is Kris Cline, and I was appointed as the Director of FPS
in January 2023. As Director, I am the Senior Law Enforcement Officer
responsible for the protection of a nationwide portfolio of buildings,
grounds, and properties that are owned, occupied, or secured by the
Federal Government, as well as the persons on those properties. FPS is
a recognized, award-winning leader in law enforcement and facility
protection. It is my immense honor to lead the agency's great men and
women, and I am inspired by their dedication, innovation, and
achievements every day.
Security of federal facilities is an important subject, and I am
pleased to join the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and General
Services Administration (GSA) for today's hearing. GAO's continued
efforts to review our programs and identify recommendations that
improve the security we provide are invaluable. Similarly, GSA is a
critical partner in our shared vision of a safe and secure federal
workforce. No matter how many times we get things right, it only takes
one successful attempt by our adversaries to negate our efforts, which
is why FPS relies on our federal law enforcement officers, armed
contract security guards we call Protective Security Officers (PSOs),
technology, training, and partnerships to detect and deter crime and
keep people safe.
FPS History
In 1790, six ``night watchmen'' were hired to protect government
buildings in our newly designated nation's capital. Over time, a
network of security guards evolved and was known as the U.S. Special
Police. In 1971, the ``Federal Protective Service'' was established
within GSA. FPS was transferred to DHS on March 1, 2003, pursuant to
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 101 et. seq) in
recognition of its role in securing the homeland. FPS now resides under
the Management Directorate within DHS Headquarters. FPS is
headquartered in Washington, D.C., and it is organized across the
nation into three zones and 11 regions for command and control and
mission execution.
FPS has a presence in every U.S. state and territory and is charged
to protect more than 8,500 federal, non-military facilities and more
than 1.4 million people who daily work, visit, or conduct business at
these facilities. Our mission serves 66 federal agencies, ensuring safe
work environments for federal employees performing essential duties
that impact day-to-day lives of Americans. FPS continually adapts to
meet threats, working with our federal, state, and local partners to
ensure complete security coverage and efficient communication to
protect people and property.
FPS Authorities
FPS has broad law enforcement authorities and jurisdiction to
prevent, investigate, mitigate, and protect against threats to federal
property and people on federal grounds. Section 1706 of the Homeland
Security Act, 40 U.S. Code Sec. 1315, grants FPS traditional police
powers, including the authority to enforce federal laws and make
arrests. In certain circumstances, FPS enters into agreements and
utilizes other federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities
and laws to protect federal property more fully.
The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorized the
Secretary of Homeland Security with the statutory authority to counter
credible threats from unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Within DHS, this
authority was granted to FPS, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, and the U.S. Secret Service. Authorized actions
include detecting, identifying, monitoring, and tracking UAS;
disrupting control of UAS; seizing or exercising control of UAS; or
confiscating UAS. DHS's current Countering UAS (C-UAS) authority is set
to expire on October 1, 2024. Any lapse in DHS's current C-UAS
authority would entail serious risks for our homeland security and
FPS's missions. Specifically, FPS would have to cease existing C-UAS
operations. Congressional action is required to prevent any lapse in C-
UAS authority on October 1, 2024.
FPS Workforce
FPS is allocated 1,642 positions to execute our expansive mission.
Of these, 1,140 are sworn federal law enforcement officers who perform
vital functions, including enforcement of federal laws and regulations,
conducting investigations into crimes and threats, conducting
comprehensive security assessments to identify vulnerabilities at
federal facilities, developing and implementing protective
countermeasures, leading explosives detection canine teams, and
providing uniformed police presence and response in support of the DHS
and FPS missions. Our law enforcement officers risk their lives every
day. Notably, amid the February 21, 2024, mass shooting during the
Kansas City Chiefs Super Bowl parade, FPS law enforcement officers,
assigned to protect nearby federal buildings, selflessly ran toward the
gunshots, and detained two armed suspects to protect the public.
Whether protecting U.S. Courthouses, Social Security Administration
customer service centers, and all types of federal facilities in
between, the level of dedication to our country's security comes with
great sacrifice. Seven sworn FPS officers have died in the performance
of their duties since FPS's formation. These tragedies serve as a stark
reminder that the men and women who wear the FPS uniform are prepared
to sacrifice all in service to our country and government, and we must
ensure they are supported in every way possible to respond to and
prevent threats against our nation's people, property, and
institutions. FPS also employs more than 500 professional staff who
provide essential mission functions, such as: intelligence analysis;
human capital, financial, contractual and information technology
management; security training; and additional disciplines.
Responding to the Current Threat Environment
Over the past year, we saw increased incidents at federal
properties involving arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, motor vehicle
theft, assault on government employees, and threats to harm government
employees. Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 saw a 138 percent increase over FY
2022 in demonstrations at federal properties, a 19 percent increase in
alarm response incidents, a 29 percent increase in disorderly conduct
incidents, an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and
regulations, a 24 percent increase in assault on government employees,
and a 13 percent increase in the number of inappropriate communications
directed towards government employees.
We remain focused on harnessing efforts to counter these ever-
evolving threats to federal facilities and keeping people safe. In FY
2023, FPS investigated 362 threats that led to seven convictions, 25
arrests, and 10 citations for federal, state, and municipal penal code
violations, U.S. District Court Notices of Violations, and criminal
charges under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. To effectively operate in the
current environment and moving into the future, FPS is emphasizing
innovation and reinforcing our standards of excellence. We elevated our
criminal intelligence capabilities by providing real-time operational
intelligence and are sharing law enforcement intelligence with our
officers and PSOs as well as with federal, state, and local partners to
create an added layer of operational protection and insight.
Securing Federal Facilities
FPS utilizes a layered approach to protect and secure federal
facilities across the Nation, including our territories.
Facility Security Assessments (FSAs) represent a cornerstone of our
layered approach to comprehensive security. Our inspectors are
rigorously trained to identify and mitigate potential facility
vulnerabilities. Working with security specialists, countermeasure
experts, and FPS leadership, our inspectors provide detailed reports to
Facility Security Committees (FSC) and facility tenants as our expert
recommendations for adequate building security and coverage. FPS
designed and implemented the Modified Infrastructure Security Tool, or
MIST, which is a certified and industry recognized, award-winning
assessment program, to support evaluation and identification of
potential threats at FPS-secured locations. Using both our inspectors'
institutional knowledge and MIST's high-performance capabilities
ensures our assessments are a trusted resource for providing our
customers with the best possible security enhancement recommendations.
In FY 2023, FPS made 4,102 recommendations to add or upgrade
countermeasures at FPS-protected federal facilities. FPS also assisted
the U.S. Marshals at Federal Courthouses nationwide during many high-
profile judicial proceedings.
As with our relationship with GSA, FPS works closely with DHS's
Interagency Security Committee (ISC), the organization that creates
standards for security measures at federal facilities. Having a
membership role on the ISC gives FPS access to and support from other
leaders in the government security industry. In fact, Executive Order
14111 names the FPS Director as a permanent voting member of the ISC.
While FPS's recommendations address security enhancements, the ISC
Risk Management Process requires the agency or agencies to accept and
implement received FPS recommendations. GAO issued a report in May
2023, examining FPS customer agencies' perspective on why they do not
consistently implement recommended security measures to improve
security at FPS-protected facilities. FPS continues to look for new
strategies to support customer agencies and various FSCs responsible
for making security countermeasure decisions that take into account
risks associated with not implementing FPS security recommendations.
One example of our approach is through evolving the FSA processes and
associated training to enable our staff to develop more detailed cost
estimates for recommended security measure improvements.
We are also working with GSA and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to implement the April 2024 GSA order requiring occupant
agencies in GSA's federally owned facilities to provide funding to
maintain and update Visual Surveillance Systems (VSS) and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies identified by FPS
of these two systems. The GSA order also requires all agencies that are
part of an FSC in a multi-occupant facility, and the occupant agency in
a single-occupant facility, to fund their portion of the purchase,
installation, and replacement of VSS and IDS through a security work
authorization agreement with FPS. In consultation with GSA, FPS
identified and prioritized GSA-controlled federally owned facilities
for FPS to implement VSS and IDS updates or new installation projects.
We believe the order will enhance the security of the buildings we
protect and those who work at and visit those facilities. Working with
GSA, FPS developed a five-year plan to conduct these installation
projects at 467 facilities, and work is underway now to start
procurement actions on 43 projects during first quarter of FY 2025.
Our most visible countermeasure are our armed contracted PSOs, who
are in daily contact with our federal facility customers and visitors
and are the front line of security in federal facilities. As such, PSOs
put their lives at risk to accomplish FPS's mission. In recent years,
FPS contracted PSOs were instrumental in thwarting attacks at several
facilities, notably the FBI Cincinnati Field Office in Cincinnati,
Ohio, in August 2022; the Edmund S. Muskie Federal Building in Augusta,
Maine, in April 2022; and a Social Security Administration office in
Norfolk, Virginia, in February 2021. Sadly, FPS has lost three PSOs in
the line of duty since 2015, all of whom were tragically killed
protecting federal facilities and employees.
FPS oversees a PSO program that utilizes more than 90 contracts and
is valued at $1.4 billion. Through this program, FPS works closely with
commercial security vendors across the country to staff and train
approximately 15,000 PSOs at 6,600 security posts. PSO vendors, as with
many other industries, experience challenges in fully staffing their
contracts resulting in open posts. Our manning analysis indicates FPS
PSOs are on-post and available approximately 99.7 percent of scheduled
post hours; however, we are sensitive to the concerns of all unstaffed
requirements particularly when a service agency cannot open due to
security gaps. In these instances, FPS is assessing the impact and
alternative solutions, including having an FPS Officer take on those
responsibilities.
In addition to manpower availability, FPS must also verify and
validate the quality of PSO services being delivered. To achieve this,
FPS conducts a variety of compliance checks to provide oversight of the
PSO program and individual contracts. Post visits and inspections
provide an opportunity for FPS law enforcement officers to provide on-
the-job training to PSOs in various aspects of their duties. Post
inspections are formal inspections of PSOs and PSO posts to ensure
contractual compliance. FPS continues to implement the Post Tracking
System to automate and create efficiency for FPS and PSO vendor
personnel.
FPS manages a National Weapons Detection Program to teach PSOs how
to utilize technical countermeasures to screen personnel and packages
for dangerous weapons and explosives. Since January 2024, FPS PSOs have
prevented more than 346,000 dangerous and prohibited items (e.g.,
firearms, bladed items, club-like items, flammable items, and disabling
chemicals) from entering federal facilities, but it is equally
important to determine where prohibited items may not be detected by a
PSO. To validate a PSO's capability to detect weapons and explosives,
FPS employees operate a Covert Security Testing (CST) Program. These
tests are conducted randomly and examine the ability of the PSOs to
detect prohibited items from entering the buildings. Test results are
shared with PSO vendors who are required to take appropriate steps to
retrain personnel when necessary. FPS also reviews the CST data to look
for trends to improve the program nationally. Further, as new threats
are identified, updated guidance and requirements are built into the
program to drive continuous improvement.
FPS Funding
FPS does not receive a direct appropriation--the agency is entirely
funded by the fees charged to the federal departments and agencies we
protect to conduct our mission. There are three components to the fees
charged to our customers: 1) a Basic Security Fee, which is the primary
source of funding for FPS operations, and provides funding for
statutory and regulatory service requirements from activities
associated with law enforcement, threat management and information
sharing, protective and criminal investigations, and risk management;
2) agency-specific fees for security services performed for an
individual customer through Security Work Authorization (SWA)
agreements, as well as other reimbursable activities; and 3) building-
specific fees for security services to implement and maintain security
requirements specifically designed for a particular facility.
Conclusion
FPS continues to demonstrate its capabilities to deter and respond
to threats directed toward federal employees, visitors, and facilities.
As the law enforcement agency responsible for securing these sacred
governmental institutions, FPS personnel must maintain constant
vigilance to ensure the continuity of the U.S. Government and our great
country. I am very proud of all that FPS has accomplished in its rich
53-year history, and while there are ways to improve what we are doing,
I know our talented and committed workforce will always ensure we are
ready to meet our mission.
I would like to acknowledge and thank the distinguished members of
this Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to testify today, and
I am pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Cline.
Mr. Doomes, as you know, you are now recognized for 5
minutes for your testimony. You should almost get a time card
in this place, I think. Good morning, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ELLIOT DOOMES, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS
SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Doomes. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Titus, Ranking Member Larsen, and other members of the
subcommittee. My name is Elliot Doomes, and I am the
Commissioner of GSA's Public Buildings Service. Thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today to discuss safety and
security in Federal facilities. My testimony today will
highlight some of GSA's roles and responsibilities in keeping
Federal facilities secure.
Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security
Committee following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The ISC was established to
improve governmentwide coordination of security initiatives,
and to address the need for increased security and protection,
particularly in buildings housing Federal employees. The ISC
also created standards for security measures at Federal
facilities.
Recognizing that we must balance protections for our
Federal employees and contractors while keeping buildings
accessible to the public, GSA has been an active participant in
the development of these security standards, working with the
Interagency Security Committee and other Federal partners.
GSA's Office of Mission Assurance was established to integrate
security, continuity, and readiness expertise within the agency
and with critical stakeholders.
In addition to OMA, the Public Buildings Service is
continuously working with customer agencies to identify the
best space to meet their mission needs, including physical
security. GSA's physical security responsibilities include
working with our security partners and tenant agencies to
reduce the risk in GSA facilities. To provide these services,
GSA works with tenant agencies in the planning stage of
projects to ensure that its space has the proper security
requirements to meet its missions needs.
The ISC risk management process requires individual
agencies, or the Facility Security Committee in multitenant
facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures
to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by
the facility security assessment. Although tenant agencies can
select optimal countermeasures for their facilities, FPS and
GSA are responsible for ensuring security countermeasures
equipment conforms with ISC standards, as well as repairing and
replacing security countermeasures.
GSA has a longstanding partnership with FPS, which provides
law enforcement and related security services for Federal
buildings in all aspects of security. The Administrative Office
of the United States Courts and the United States Marshals
Service also serve as partners to deliver security services to
the Federal judiciary and courthouses. To codify these
partnerships, GSA currently has memorandums of agreement with
FPS, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the
United States Marshals Service outlining roles and
responsibilities for security at GSA-controlled facilities, as
applicable.
FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the
decisionmaking process with FPS and tenant agencies to review
building security. Facility Security Committees composed of and
governed by the tenants in multitenant facilities hold the
responsibility of addressing facility-specific security issues,
including improving the implementation of security
countermeasures recommended by FPS. When FPS completes an
assessment and recommends security countermeasures for
implementation, those recommendations go to the FSC for funding
approval and implementation. If FSC does not approve the
funding, those countermeasures go unimplemented, and the
agencies in that individual building accept the security risk.
GSA and FPS do consider certain minimum security standards
for every Federal facility, and those can evolve over time. For
instance, GSA recently collaborated with FPS, the ISC, and the
Office of Management and Budget to implement an April 2024 GSA
order making security camera and alarm systems part of the
baseline minimum security standards for GSA federally owned
facilities.
GSA has also been working to enhance security at
courthouses around the country in light of recent incidents.
GSA is working in concert with the Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts to modernize courthouse infrastructure, including
building hardening such as replacing or adding break-resistant
glass. And to date, GSA has received $15 million in fiscal year
2022 and $12.5 million in fiscal year 2023 for the Judiciary
Capital Security Fund to complete these projects. There are
currently 67 courthouses undergoing this program, with 36
projects in the design stage and ready for construction.
GSA is also using landscape architecture to serve as
perimeter security measures to discourage potential crime on or
around our Federal facilities. Landscape architecture can
provide natural barriers at Federal sites that prevent hiding
places and restrict unwanted pedestrian access to building
facades. This can be accomplished through the use of dense
plantings, walls, fencing, topography, or other means. These
features eliminate the need for separate, standalone security
elements, saving money and making the areas around the
facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting to
visitors.
To conclude, ensuring the safety of building occupants is
paramount at GSA, and we take such matters seriously at all
times. With congressional support of the fiscal year 2025
budget request and legislative proposals, GSA will be one step
closer to modernizing our Federal footprint, which will advance
key security priorities in our facilities. Through continued
partnership with agencies like the FPS, GSA will continue
providing support to ensure security at every Federal facility
across the country.
Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
[Mr. Doomes' prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings
Service, U.S. General Services Administration
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Elliot Doomes and I am the Commissioner of
GSA's Public Buildings Service (PBS). Thank you for inviting me to
appear before you today to discuss safety and security in federal
facilities. My testimony today will highlight some of GSA's roles and
responsibilities in keeping federal facilities secure.
GSA has custody and jurisdiction of more than 1,600 federally-owned
and 6,500 leased facilities across the nation. Over one million federal
workers, contractors and visitors access GSA-controlled facilities
regularly to interact with the government. We take security at federal
facilities seriously, and work closely with partners such as the
Federal Protective Service (FPS), U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and
others to ensure the safety of tenant agency personnel, contractors and
visitors.
Establishment of the ISC
Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security
Committee (ISC) following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The ISC was established to improve
government-wide coordination of security initiatives, and to address
the need for increased security and protection, particularly in
buildings housing federal employees. The ISC also created standards for
security measures at federal facilities.
On November 27, 2023, President Biden signed Executive Order 14111
(Interagency Security Committee) to enhance the quality and
effectiveness of security and protection of buildings and facilities in
the United States occupied by federal employees or federal contractor
workers for nonmilitary activities. As a result, increased security
standards continue to be developed to protect federal employees and
contractors in all federally-occupied space. Regardless of whether GSA
owns or leases a facility, a Facility Security Level (FSL), ranging
from Levels 1-5, establishes the baseline level of protection and may
warrant a specific countermeasure in the federal facility.
Recognizing that we must balance protections for our federal
employees and contractors while keeping buildings accessible to the
public, GSA has been an active participant in the development of these
security standards working with the Interagency Security Committee and
other federal partners. GSA's Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) was
established to integrate security, continuity and readiness expertise
within the agency and with critical stakeholders. OMA provides services
for all GSA staff, and GSA's owned and leased public buildings. These
services include: (1) managing the vetting process for GSA employees
(2) determining employee suitability for covered positions and (3)
fitness determination for GSA contractors. In addition to OMA working
to ensure safety and security for GSA employees and contractors, the
Public Buildings Service (PBS) is continuously working with customer
agencies to identify the best space to meet their mission needs,
including security. GSA's goal is to provide a safe building
environment allowing agencies to focus on their mission needs to ensure
their employees, contractors and the visiting public are able to
conduct their business.
GSA's Role in Ensuring Building Security
GSA's physical security responsibilities include working with our
security partners and tenant agencies to reduce the security risk in
GSA facilities. In order to provide these services, GSA works with
tenant agencies in the planning stage of projects, resulting in
proposed security requirements for new construction, renovation and
leased space projects to ensure that its space has the proper security
requirements to meet its mission needs. Because every facility has
unique security and accessibility requirements, and tenant agencies
have varying mission needs, the ISC risk management process requires
individual agencies, or the Facility Security Committee (FSC) in multi-
tenant facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures
to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by the
Facility Security Assessment. Although tenant agencies can select
optimal countermeasures for their facilities, FPS and GSA are
responsible for ensuring security countermeasure equipment conforms
with ISC standards, as well as repairing and replacing security
countermeasures.
In addition to partnering with FPS, GSA also has a robust
partnership with The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS) to deliver security services for the federal court
system. Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) outline roles and
responsibilities to provide law enforcement and related security
services at federally-owned and leased facilities under the
jurisdiction, custody or control of GSA.
A MOA between GSA and FPS expands on 6 U.S.C. Sec. 232, detailing
roles and responsibilities of each agency in order to protect federal
facilities and grounds. While FPS is largely responsible for providing
security, law enforcement and criminal investigations at federal
facilities, the FPS also coordinates with GSA on crime prevention and
security awareness training for GSA's tenant agencies and employees.
GSA also coordinates with FPS when FPS performs routine vulnerability
assessments that are submitted to FSCs.
Role of the Facility Security Committee
FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the decision
making process with FPS and tenant agencies to review building
security. FSCs, composed of and governed by the tenants in multi-tenant
facilities, hold the responsibility of addressing facility-specific
security issues, including approving the implementation of security
countermeasures recommended by FPS as noted in building security
assessments. When FPS completes an assessment and recommends security
countermeasures for implementation, those recommendations go to the FSC
for funding approval. When the FSC approves funding for
countermeasures, FPS or GSA, as applicable depending on the nature of
the countermeasure, can move forward with implementation. However, if
an FSC does not approve the funding, those countermeasures go
unimplemented, and the agencies in that individual building accept the
security risk. If an FSC makes the decision not to approve or provide
funding for a countermeasure, the decision is documented.
GSA and FPS consider certain minimum security standards for every
federal facility, and these can evolve over time. For instance, GSA
recently collaborated with FPS, the ISC and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to implement an April 2024 GSA order, making security
camera and alarm systems part of the baseline minimum security
standards for GSA's federally-owned facilities. The GSA order also
requires tenant agencies in GSA's federally-owned facilities to provide
funding to maintain and update Video Surveillance Systems and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies identified by FPS.
GSA is confident that this order and the continued collaboration with
FPS, OMB and tenant agencies will improve the security of GSA's
federally-owned facilities.
Implementing Security Standards at Federal Facilities
At owned and leased facilities as appropriate, GSA provides space
for control rooms, screening stations, guard booths and other similar
space, serving the security and infrastructure needs of tenant
agencies. When recommended in the FSA and funded by the FSC, GSA
provides physical security infrastructure, like vehicular barriers,
exterior security specified doors, exterior and building common area
security specified locks, HVAC security items, security specific
exterior lighting, physical access control systems, security specified
garage doors, security fencing and gates, and blast-resistant
countermeasures. In these cases GSA also provides advanced notification
of situations such as scheduled building maintenance that will affect
the operation of building security equipment. For leased facilities,
GSA follows ISC standards issuing leasing guidance and instructions for
competitive lease procurements.
Security implementation can vary greatly depending on factors like
the location of a property, size of the facility and the tenant
agency's mission. A FSL, ranging from Levels 1-5, is determined from
five factors, based on mission criticality, symbolism, facility
population, facility size and threats to tenant agencies. The FSL
establishes the baseline level of protection and as the FSL increases,
additional security measures, such as increased setbacks, site
planning, facade hardening, and structural measures to prevent
progressive collapse may be necessary. Setback requirements can result
in agencies seeking space outside of urban areas and additional land
acquisition costs for new facilities. GSA refers to ISC standards to
determine if security barriers are needed based on the FSL. Currently
GSA's security barrier inventory consists of over 14,000 security
barriers of various types, providing tenant agencies with appropriate
options to meet their facility needs.
GSA also responds to feedback on ways to improve building security
by participating in each facility's FSC or coordinating with a single
occupant agency in its jurisdiction. For example, at a federal facility
in California, there were concerns that illegal drug activity was
taking place in the federal plaza after hours. In response to this and
as a result of extensive community outreach efforts, a perimeter fence
and locking gate were constructed at the perimeter of the plaza and
operationally the site closes to the public during non-working hours.
GSA Child Care Centers
GSA child care centers are designed to keep children safe within
the center, to safeguard them from outside intruders, and to protect
them from hazards, consistent with the established risk management
process. GSA works with FSCs and sponsoring agencies to maintain
security standards for child care centers in GSA-controlled facilities.
Child care center entrances are secured at all times and parents,
guardians and child care staff have immediate access through an
electric strike release with a keypad or card reader. GSA provides
electronic security systems for child care centers, including video
surveillance systems (VSS) at all entrances and exits, including the
playground area.
GSA partners with FPS during the assessment process to identify
security risks in child care centers based on the ISC risk management
process appendix C. GSA uses these assessments to develop security
mitigation projects. Typical projects include the installation,
repairing, or replacing cameras, fences, blast protection and security
countermeasures to safeguard child care centers from intruders.
In FY 2022, GSA was appropriated $15 million for the Child Care
Special Emphasis Program. The program is addressing the most important
projects, and sought to reduce risks in the maximum number of child
care centers in our inventory. Twenty-six projects received funding
across 10 regions. As part of GSA's FY 2025 budget request, GSA is
seeking $14.25 million to continue funding this Special Emphasis
Program to expedite action to enhance security at all child care
centers in GSA controlled buildings to the applicable security
standards. GSA is committed to ensuring child care centers are
maintained in safe locations that meet applicable security standards.
Security Enhancements
Courthouse Hardening
In light of recent incidents, and continuing threats to our U.S.
Courthouses, GSA is working in concert with the Administrative Office
of the Courts to modernize courthouse infrastructure, including
building hardening. Building hardening projects include; replacing or
adding break-resistant glass or glass coverings for pedestrian-
accessible windows, hardening exterior doors with break-resistant glass
or glass coverings, roll-down gates, and other capabilities, installing
magnetic automatic door locks that can be engaged by security officers
at their guard stations and from the control room, and installing
temporary or permanent barriers and fencing, where appropriate, to
protect the perimeter of the facility.
GSA received $15 million in Fiscal Year 2022 and $12.5 million in
FY 2023 from the Judiciary Capital Security Fund. There are currently
67 courthouses receiving funding through this program, with 36 projects
in the design stage and ready for construction. Two projects are
finalizing construction in Portland, OR and San Francisco, CA.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
GSA is also working to design exterior landscapes that serve as
perimeter security measures to discourage potential crime on or around
our federal facilities. Good site design considers security in the
overall landscape visioning. Landscape architecture can provide natural
barriers at federal sites that can prevent hiding places without
obstructing security cameras. Good landscape architectural design can
also restrict unwanted pedestrian access adjacent to building facades.
This can be accomplished through the use of dense plantings, walls,
fencing, topography, or other means. These features eliminate the need
for separate standalone security elements like continuous rows of
bollards or planters, potentially saving money and making the areas
around facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting to visitors.
While security features such as bollards, planters, or jersey
barriers can be important security measures, they can also be an
eyesore in communities; they often clash with local streetscape
standards and can impede pedestrian access and connectivity. GSA is
working with designers to provide a better first impression at federal
facilities while still enhancing security. An example of this was the
modernization of the Columbus, New Mexico Land Port of Entry (LPOE),
delivered in 2019, where a depressed stormwater management facility was
used as an effective barrier between vehicular traffic and the main
port building.
Conclusion
Ensuring the safety of building occupants is paramount at GSA, and
we take such matters seriously at all times. With Congressional support
of the FY 2025 budget request and legislative proposals, GSA will be
one step closer to modernizing our federal footprint, which will
advance key security priorities in our facilities, particularly those
in our child care centers. Through continued partnership with agencies
like FPS, GSA will continue providing support to ensure security at
every facility across the country. Thank you for your time today and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. Perry. Well, thank all of you for your testimony, and
we would normally turn to questions right now. But as you can
see, we are being informed that there will be a series of votes
occurring on the floor starting now. So, at this time, the
committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of the
chair.
[Recess.]
Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management will reconvene the
previously recessed hearing.
Sorry for the delay. The Chair now yields himself 5 minutes
for questioning.
Director Cline, the FPS has spent $30 million on tracking
and management systems. I mean, it blows my mind. I feel like--
probably just buy some off-the-shelf management system. It
can't be the only one that is trying to track your employees.
But the cost is probably actually more than that. But can you
give us a date when these systems will be fully up and running
so that your law enforcement officers can do their jobs better
and manage the PSOs? Thank you.
Mr. Cline. Thank you, Chairman Perry.
So, the Post Tracking System began development back in
2018/2017 timeframe, and it was designed to allow the PSOs to
utilize their PIV card, their Personal Identification
Verification card, to log in and enter a PIN number. And at the
time, we also asked for a thumbprint for 100 percent, three-
factor authentication. We have allowed that to incrementally
grow more than it needed to. We need to get back to the basics
of the intention of the Post Tracking System. We want it to tie
to our isthmus, our suitability program, to make sure the
guards are fully certified, their background investigation is
up to date.
And also TAMS, our Training and Academy Management System.
TAMS was designed for law enforcement. We are adding PSO
records to that, and now we are blending the two together. So,
I have recently assigned a senior advisor to take
responsibility for this program. We have also directed the
assignment of acquisition people, because this is an IT-based
system--acquisition people to embed with the Post Tracking
System team to continue the development of it. And we are
prepared to initiate a tiger team to review the entire aspects
of the Post Tracking System as soon as the GAO report is
finalized.
But we have already started to get this corrected, sir.
Putting the right people in the right box to fix this, it is
not a hard thing to fix, but it takes the people with the right
responsibilities and the right----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. So, is there a particular region?
And is there a timeframe where we can see some successful--you
know, I get the mission creep, I get you want to use it for a
lot of things, like do one thing right and then figure out the
rest from there. But you've got to do one thing right.
Mr. Cline. Absolutely, sir. The Post Tracking System is
being deployed by region, so, we have 11 regions. On one
contract, we are 98 percent deployed. Other contracts, we are
zero percent deployed. And there are a variety of reasons, sir.
It is no excuse, but there are connectivity issues, but--this
is a cellular-based tablet that they are using to sign in.
Connectivity issues, there are firewall issues----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. So, what do you project is the
first region, and when they are going to be able to utilize it
effectively?
Mr. Cline. So, PSOs are using it now, but it is not being
fully implemented----
Mr. Perry [interposing]. Right.
Mr. Cline [continuing]. On any of our guard contracts. To
give you a date, sir, I need to dive back into this to give you
an exact date. I would have to get back to you----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. Well----
Mr. Cline [continuing]. With that information.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. As a guy who served in uniform, the
troops pay attention to what the commander is looking at.
Mr. Cline. Right.
Mr. Perry. So, you tell me what you are looking at, give me
a date so--you have got a suspense date so we can all get
there, we can know what the expectation is, and know when you
are going to get there.
Director, of the Law Enforcement Authority of FPS is
section 1315 of title 40, United States Code. The authority is
vested in the DHS Secretary, who can and has delegated the
authority outside of the FPS in the past. There have been
reports--and this is what I am trying to verify--that Homeland
Security Investigations, or HSI, was involved in security for
former President Trump's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. Is
FPS's law enforcement authority delegated to HSI?
Mr. Cline. No, sir.
Mr. Perry. OK. So, that is just a blanket answer. It is not
delegated, so, we don't need to care who oversees it because
you are--it is not being delegated.
Mr. Cline. Right. Exactly, sir. We have not delegated this
authority to anyone in DHS right now.
Mr. Perry. Do you know if it has been--can you provide a
list of the delegations in the past of FPS authority?
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, just off the top of my head, sir,
so, during the summer of 2020, we coordinated with the
Department to receive additional assistance from ICE, primarily
ERO, the Border Patrol, primarily their tactical teams, the
Federal Air Marshals, just to assist us in the protection of
Federal facilities during the summer of 2020. Those
delegations, we monitor those. We train the officers and agents
on that delegation in what they can and can't do based on that
authority. But there is a time that goes along with that, and
all those have ended a year ago.
Mr. Perry. OK. If you could, please, in the remaining time
that I have, if you could at some point here--next 60 days or
something--put a list together of when that delegation
happened, when it started, who it was with, and when it ended.
We want to make sure that we have a full view of how that has
been used in the past, who has used it for what duration, and
so on and so forth. You obviously understand that unresolved
rumors with something so consequential as what happened in
Butler are not good for the country, your agency, or the
general public's viewpoint of things. So, we would like to make
sure that that is cleared up.
Mr. Cline. Absolutely.
Mr. Perry. And with that, the Chair now recognizes the
ranking member, Ms. Titus from Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cline, after the assassination attempt on the
former President, there was a lot of talk about drones and the
Secret Service not using the drones, but the shooter did use
the drones. FPS has counter-UAS authorities, thanks to an
extension in the recent FAA bill. I wonder if you can tell us
how you all use drones, and if the fact that this runs out
pretty soon in October, will that make a difference in how you
are able to or what you would like to do with the use of
drones?
Mr. Cline. Absolutely, ma'am. Our counterdrone program is
essential for the safety and security of our Federal
facilities. This is 6 U.S.C. 124(n), the Preventing Emerging
Threats Act of 2018. And you are correct, ma'am, it does expire
1 October. We request that that be extended or made into full
legislation.
We utilize that. We have a mobile system that we utilize
when we work with the Marshals Service to protect a high-risk
trial that is going on at a courthouse. The most recent one was
in Brunswick, Georgia, for the Ahmaud Arbery civil rights trial
that was held there. We put up our system, we mitigated seven
drones that were there. Most of them were from news media
trying to get a closeup of the family. But we were able to
mitigate those.
The mobile kit is very valuable for us. We can move that to
courthouse to courthouse, and use it wherever we need it. We do
have counter-UAS permanently implemented at a covered asset
here in DC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and we have eight
personnel that man that system.
Ms. Titus. Well, good. Thank you. Then we need to do what
we can to extend that authority, right, come October?
Mr. Cline. I am sorry, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. I said then we need to do what we can to extend
that authority.
Mr. Cline. Absolutely, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. All right, thank you. Another question I have is
that in May of 2023, the Department of Homeland Security issued
a National Advisory System Bulletin, and it warned--and this is
quotes--``The United States remains in a heightened threat
environment. In the coming months, factors that could mobilize
individuals to commit violence include their perceptions of the
2024 general election cycle and legislative or judicial
issues.''
Now, that bulletin expired in November 2023. Do you know
why it wasn't extended, and should it be extended?
And if it was in place, how would that make a difference
with the way you operate?
Mr. Cline. Thank you, ma'am. So, the NTAS did expire
September 2023--or, I am sorry, November 2023. In September of
2023, the 2023 Homeland Threat Assessment was put out. And I
believe that Homeland Threat Assessment covered a wider variety
and audience than the NTAS did. And I believe that is why the
NTAS was expired, to allow the new Homeland Threat Assessment
to replace it.
Ms. Titus. So, you think that covers it adequately, we are
not facing some problem with the upcoming election because this
isn't in place?
Mr. Cline. I think we are in a very dynamic threat
environment right now, ma'am, you saw last Saturday. I mean, it
continues throughout the country, different issues, different
grievances that people have for one reason or another. I think,
we are--for FPS, we are operating under this environment and
prepared to respond as necessary, but I think that the reason
that it was allowed to expire is because the Homeland Threat
Assessment took it over.
Ms. Titus. OK. Well, thank you.
Mr. Marroni, when you talked about some of your studies of
weapons that got through, and some of the way the guards on the
scene missed some of this, I don't want to criticize the people
who were there, but did you look at turnover, and did you look
at the notion of if benefits were better for some of these
guards, morale might be better and you wouldn't have turnover
and you might have better results in the long run?
Mr. Marroni. So, we didn't look at that. We didn't look at
the causes behind the failures to detect that half of the items
we tried to get through. That is an important piece of the
analysis. FPS does have a more extensive covert testing
program, where they try and get at the causes for testing
failures, and that is important. That is--you need that data
and to look at what are the root causes of why we are having
this failure rate so they can remediate it.
Ms. Titus. And does that have to do with turnover, or not
adequate benefits for the people who are there?
Mr. Marroni. I don't know.
Ms. Titus. Mr. Cline, do you want to talk to that?
Mr. Cline. So, ma'am, the contract guard program, 14,000;
Federal facilities across the country, right now at this minute
there are 6,250 guard posts that are open. A guard is standing
at that post. If a vendor gets a new contract, and they are now
paying $1 more per hour, then our PSOs will leave to go--I
mean, it is----
Ms. Titus [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Cline [continuing]. And it is a constant churn to keep
them in one place.
We renew contracts, there are 5-year contracts that are
renewed every year, based on their performance that we have
indicated in their Contract Performance Appraisal Rating
System, CPARS. Whether they are going to be renewed or not is
something that we work through.
But it is a competitive, very competitive market. It is
just like the market for hiring law enforcement. We are all
fighting for the same person between all of our agencies. And
it is very similar with the PSO program, because a guard
company will have a new contract and they are going to start
doing what they can to pull--especially if they meet all the
training requirements. There are a number of requirements they
have to meet for us. If they meet those requirements and this
person gets a new contract, they are going to do what they can
to hire them over. They don't have to train them.
Ms. Titus. Salary, benefits----
Mr. Cline [interposing]. Yes.
Ms. Titus [continuing]. Retirement.
Mr. Cline. Exactly.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Mr. Perry. The gentlelady yields. The chairman recognizes
the gentlelady from Utah, Ms. Maloy.
Ms. Maloy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been sitting
here listening, thinking how Americans expect to be safe in
Federal buildings, and that is what you are tasked with. But we
have got some holes here that need to be addressed. We have got
some problems that need to be addressed. And to that end, I am
going to yield the remainder of my time to Chairman Perry so he
can follow up on the rest of the questions that he has.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Representative Maloy.
Mr. Marroni, in your testimony you highlighted incidents
where contract guards failed to be at their post, and as a
result, both the IRS and the Social Security Administration had
to close offices that serve the public. I know that both of
those are critical in the district that I am honored to
represent, and I hear regularly claims from constituents--my
bosses--about their anger and their irritation about not being
able to get their problems resolved for one reason or another.
Nobody is at work, or they can't get a return phone call, or
whatever, and this is part and parcel of that.
Can you detail whether FPS was immediately aware of when a
guard was not at his or her post?
And can you further describe exactly what happened in these
incidents?
Mr. Marroni. So, they were not in these situations, not
instantly aware, not in real time. And that was part of the
issue, is that the tenants--SSA, IRS--didn't know what was
going on. FPS didn't have that information in real time,
either, which is a problem because then you can't mitigate, you
can't come up with a solution quickly.
In theory, PTS, the system we have talked about previously,
could--was supposed to provide the capability remotely for FPS
to see if these posts are being staffed. That would be an
important capability, because then you could say, OK, this post
isn't there, let's reach out to the vendor. Let's tell IRS and
SSA. Let's figure out are there mitigations we can do.
Mr. Perry. And then, Director Cline, look, it is hard to
fix a problem that you don't know exists, right? You are
wherever you are. Like you said, there are thousands of
buildings across the country. Whether it is in the district I
represent or somebody else's, if you don't know it is
happening, you can't address it. But at the same time, it has
to be addressed.
And so, I am wondering. What are the steps taken to
eliminate the problem? And surely, everybody must have known
when you set the system up that sooner or later this
eventuality is possible, right? And you have got to have, like,
a backup. That is obvious. So, where do we stand?
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, typically, right now--so, the Post
Tracking System is designed to notify us when someone is not on
post. We are not there yet. So, the system we put in place--you
mentioned the Social Security Customer Service Centers and the
IRS Tax Assistance Centers. They won't open unless one of our
PSOs is there, because they want to make sure there is security
there.
And if the office manager goes to the office and is waiting
on the PSO to show up and they don't, they will contact us and
say, ``Your PSO isn't here.'' We immediately coordinate with
the vendor: What is going on? Where is your backup? Where is
your other person? At the same time, now we are dispatching our
law enforcement officers to respond to that location to either
work to open the facility with the law enforcement officer
there while we get a PSO on post, or get the PSO there
immediately.
It is not the final solution, but it is what we put in
place now until----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. Yes, obviously, you need to fix
in the meantime.
Commissioner Doomes, was GSA aware of these occurrences,
these failings, if so-called?
And if so, is GSA engaged with FPS to ensure that the use
of GSA facilities going forward is not impacted by the lack of
security?
Have you been involved in the process?
Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
We do have a memorandum of agreement with the Federal
Protective Service and an ongoing relationship where we share
information with them about who is in the building, who our
leasing facility manager is, as well as they are sharing
information with us about incident reports.
When there is an incident in a building, the PSOs are often
the first responders, and they are working with the Facility
Security Committee and the tenant agencies to understand what
the threat is, and whether there has been an incident, and
whether there needs to be additional countermeasures. So, our
Office of Mission Assurance is working on a consistent and
regular basis with the Federal Protective Service.
Mr. Perry. All right. Well, we have got to solve this
problem, right? These offices can't go--they can't remain
closed for lack of security. And so, we will probably look for
kind of a review maybe after 6 months to see how that is
working as we wait on other things, the other system, to come
online more fully.
Director Cline, an average 50 percent success rate in the
covert testing is not really a success by anybody's measure.
The FBI Director continues to sound the alarm. I am sure you
know that terror threats are at an all-time high. Crime and
drug abuse is out of control in many places. FPS law
enforcement officers and contract guards are the first line of
defense at these Federal facilities. And unfortunately, as you
know, some have lost their lives. I can't imagine the numerous
altercations on a probably regular basis.
Can you talk just briefly about training, upgraded
training, and then detecting threats and what they are advised
to do when these things happen?
Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir. So, first, we can talk about
threats and how they go about detecting those.
All the guard contractors are required to have radio
communications to communicate to our dispatch centers. So, when
an incident occurs, or there is a threat, or there is a
suspicious vehicle, whatever it may be, they immediately notify
our dispatch center and an officer is dispatched to that
location. In some instances, it may be a city, county, or State
officer, based on where our local police officer is staffed.
But they have a process to use to report that type of activity.
Sir, like you mentioned, the PSOs are the first line of
defense. They are the ones who are getting shot, getting run
over, getting stabbed on a daily basis. Their training--let's
focus on their National Weapons Detection Training Program, how
they detect prohibited items in screening. Right now, it is a
16-hour training program that teaches them how to detect items
in an x ray machine, and there is an 8-hour training program
for the magnetometer.
We have our Training and Professional Development
Directorate working with academia to enhance that training to
make sure that we are teaching adults how to properly detect
that equipment. Our equipment is not much different than TSA's
equipment. We are going to have our folks go to the TSA Academy
and find out how they do their training. Is it something that
we might be able to leverage, or at least get lessons learned
from how they do it?
We know we need to increase our ability to detect
prohibited items. A big priority for us right now is to get
this fixed. I mentioned before they are detecting 400,000
prohibited items a year. But as was pointed out by the GAO, we
are missing items that are prohibited, that they should pick
up. We are actively working to enhance our training program,
and then to get them through the training to make things better
for the screening.
Mr. Perry. Ms. Maloy's time has long since expired. The
Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee,
Mr. Larsen from Washington.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Cline, the IG recommended after the 2020 Portland riots
that there be an implementation of a process to improve
preparedness for multicomponent response, including
recommendations for FPS. Have you implemented any of those
recommendations?
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, there are three recommendations.
The first two have been implemented. The last one is a policy,
a directive on our approach to public order. That policy is
with the Department for review and signature, so, that has gone
through now.
A lot of lessons learned out of Portland. Our approach to
civil disorder, the training that we have conducted to all of
our employees now to redesign our approach has all been
completed. We are just waiting on now the policy to be signed.
And that policy will be for all of DHS, not just FPS.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks. Ranking Member Titus
mentioned the counter-UAS, and you discussed it. And I think it
is very important to have the coordination. In fact, the
leadership of this committee, of the Homeland Security
Committee, and the Judiciary Committee have a joint bill to
extend those authorities through 2028, including, if I am not
mistaken, to extend FPS authorities and expand them.
Mr. Cline. Right.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And I don't want to ask you a
softball question to say can you tell us how great that is, but
can you tell us how great that is?
No, can you explain to this committee a little bit why FPS
needs those expanded authorities, and how do you use them?
Mr. Cline. So, sir, we think it is critical for our
protection efforts of our Federal facilities.
I did mention that we have implemented a 24/7 counter-UAS
operation at a covered asset, a high-risk covered asset here in
DC. And every day, that system is picking up drones. Typically,
it is someone playing with a drone they got for their birthday
or for Christmas. But there have been times when our folks have
electronically mitigated those drones, and brought them down,
and took control of those. Without that ability to do this, not
only would our facilities be vulnerable, but a number of other
facilities that have the authority right now to implement that:
Secret Service, Coast Guard, CBP. If we all lose that
authority, then I think there are a lot more vulnerabilities
that we would have to deal with.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Commissioner Doomes, how has
the underfunding of the Federal Building Fund impacted your
ability to implement security standards that the ISC developed?
Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member
Larsen.
The underfunding of the Federal Building Fund makes it
difficult for us to optimize and modernize the portfolio. If we
had fewer buildings, we think FPS might be able to secure those
fewer buildings that are better utilized. We have been missing
about $1 billion a year for the last decade. We have proposed
in fiscal year 2024 and 2025 a fix for the Federal Building
Fund that would allow us to spend all of the revenue that came
in and to accelerate the modernization of our portfolio.
Over the last 4 fiscal years, we have shed 8 million square
feet of space, and that is with it being underfunded. But if we
were able to get this fixed in the fiscal year 2025 legislative
proposal, we could continue to shed space on a faster basis,
get higher utilization at our buildings, and, frankly, give the
Federal Protective Service fewer buildings that they have to
actually defend and secure.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks.
Director Cline, back to you. During the break, we chatted a
little bit about the Paris Olympics coming up starting Friday,
the L.A. Olympics in 2028. But in between, the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico--but mainly U.S.--is hosting the 2026 World Cup. And
the way it is described is that it is a Super Bowl in every
city--in every host city--for, like, 3 straight weeks. You are
talking about 85,000 to 90,000 people attending events,
attending the event, plus maybe half of that outside each of
the venues in large cities like Seattle and L.A. and others.
Tell me it is on your radar. Tell me you are part of the
planning team for the security in these cities, and that we can
at least know that FPS is on top of this.
Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir. So, the planning efforts
continue for these events.
I mean, they are all large events. Counter-UAS will be
instrumental. Our focus, of course, will be the Federal
facilities that are in the cities where those events will take
place. We are planning and preparing for deployments of
officers and agents to increase the protection efforts at those
facilities.
Just like we did last week in the RNC, all of our
coordination efforts are in conjunction with the Secret Service
as the lead for the NSSE-type event. We make sure that we are
at the command post, we are working with all the partner
agencies that are there. But, obviously, our focus is Federal
facilities, but we also maintain awareness of what is going on
within those locations.
Planning efforts have already started, sir, and they are
looking at who has the counter-UAS capability to go to all
these locations. If we lose that authority, then obviously we
lose the ability to do counter-UAS operations. But it has
started. The DHS Special Events Working Group is already
digging into it and preparing for those events.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Fair enough.
Thanks, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Oregon, Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you. I want to first thank
Chairman Perry, Chairman Graves, and this committee for their
support in helping me pass two bills through the House this
past March: the FOCUS Act and the Impact of Crime on Public
Building Usage Act.
The GSA's Public Buildings Service exists to provide safe
and effective workspace for Federal employees across more than
100 Federal agencies at the best value for taxpayers. The
Federal Oversight of Construction Use and Safety, or FOCUS, Act
would make commonsense reforms to the GSA's real estate
practices through information sharing between agencies and
Congress, consolidating unused office space, reducing real
estate costs, and saving taxpayers' dollars.
With the new post-pandemic world we are now living in, it
is time we review why taxpayers are paying for empty Federal
office spaces, especially when, under this administration,
there is now a work-from-home preference. Mr. Doomes, a recent
tour of several Federal buildings this month by my committee
staff revealed how few people are in many of their Federal
buildings. Do you agree there is a need to review GSA real
estate for consolidations and space reductions?
Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman.
What I will tell you, I agree that we should be reducing
the footprint, and we should be optimizing and modernizing and
get better utilization in our Federal buildings. And I
appreciate any and all efforts in that direction.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you. In addition to the letter
that Chairman Perry led to the GSA and FPS, my other bill that
passed the House echoes the letter's concern and aims to
address them. The Impact of Crime on Public Building Usage Act
requires the GAO to study the impact of crime, including the
use of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, on workers'
utilization of these public buildings. It also requires the GSA
to submit a report to Congress on the impacts and costs
associated with building operations related to crime and public
safety in and around those Federal buildings.
Mr. Marroni, you submitted testimony identifying challenges
that undermine FPS's productivity and oversight of contract
guards at Federal buildings leading to instances of prohibited
items entering buildings undetected. In this report, did you at
all consider fentanyl or other illicit drugs having entered
these public buildings due to the contract guard failures?
Mr. Marroni. That was not a part of our study. We looked at
weapons that were being brought in, but not at illicit drugs.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Mr. Doomes, has concern of increased
fentanyl use, crime, and homelessness negatively impacted the
safety at Federal buildings?
And if so, does the GSA have a concrete plan to address
those concerns and keep our Federal workers safe?
Mr. Doomes. I appreciate that question, Congresswoman.
What I will tell you is that GSA is always concerned about
the tenants that are coming into our buildings, as well as the
American citizens that come to receive services in Federal
buildings.
Earlier this year, the Administrator of GSA issued a new
minimum level of security for federally owned facilities where
we said, if it is a GSA facility, we are going to have video
security, as well as an alarm system on every building. And
what I will say is that security in these buildings is not
static. It is constantly evolving. And we are working with our
partners at the Federal Protective Service.
So, we understand that there is a need, that there is a
problem, and we continue to work with the FPS, who has the
primary responsibility for securing these Federal buildings.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. So, to follow up on that ``minimum
level,'' is technology replacing the contract guards?
Mr. Doomes. No, it is there to complement that.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Complement. OK.
Mr. Cline, I do appreciate the attention that FPS is giving
to ensuring Federal facilities are safe places to work as we
deal with ever-changing threats. As part of these ever-changing
threats, has FPS considered the rising antisemitic threats to
Federal workers from pro-Hamas sympathizers, or possibly peer-
to-peer antisemitic threats to the individuals' safety?
Mr. Cline. Thank you ma'am.
So, we have a lot of demonstrations at Federal facilities.
FPS was built in 1971 as part of GSA due to the large-scale
demonstrations that were taking place in our country at that
time. We deal with demonstrators on a daily basis. It is a
First Amendment-protected activity. Normally, outside of DC,
the Federal facility with the big flag in front represents the
United States Government. And that is where people tend to
demonstrate.
We have had a 14-percent increase in demonstrations from
last year to this year. Since October 7th, 652 demonstrations
at our FPS-protected facilities. Some have included some level
of violence, graffiti, breaking some windows, some attempted
arsons, but all the demonstrations we approach the same way. It
doesn't matter the topic, it doesn't matter the issue. We are
there to protect the Federal facilities, to ensure that the
employees can come and go.
We have had some instances in the last 6 months where the
demonstrators were blocking entrances, and we coordinated with
the tenants in the building to make avenues of exit if they
needed to leave, but we primarily just sheltered the building
in place for an hour until the demonstration was over.
It is something we focus on every day. This week here in
DC, you know what is occurring tomorrow, the joint session of
Congress. We have about 100 of our law enforcement officers
here in town because Federal facilities are on each side of the
Capitol that we are responsible for protecting, and we want to
make sure that the demonstrations don't get out of hand.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank----
Mr. Cline [interrupting]. We did work with the Federal
tenants in those buildings, and recommended maximum telework,
not to bring people in to be confronted.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you, Mr. Cline. I am sorry, I
see my time has gone past.
So, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms.
Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner Doomes, we continue to miss your excellent
work as a staffer on Capitol Hill. So, welcome.
In November 2023, GSA announced plans to dispose of 23
properties, including 2 in the District of Columbia: the Daniel
Webster School and the DHS Nebraska Avenue Complex. In April
2024, GSA announced plans to dispose of the Liberty Loan
Building in DC. What is the status of those dispositions?
Mr. Doomes. Thank you, Congresswoman.
What I want to give an update to is on the Webster School,
the Liberty Loan Building, as well as the Nebraska Avenue
Complex, because we have heard the imperative from this
committee to move forward on disposing of underutilized
property.
So, in terms of the Webster School, that facility has
already been reported excess. Federal screening and the
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance screening have already taken
place. Right now, we are screening for a possible public
benefit conveyance. We expect that those application deadlines
for those uses are on August 15 and August 16. If there is no
application in that timeframe, we will move forward on a
private sale. We have worked closely with the Department of
Homeland Security in order to put in some security covenants
that will run with the land, but that disposal is moving
forward.
In terms of the Liberty Loan Building, that asset has also
been reported excess. And right now, we are engaged in due
diligence activities such as environmental and title work. In
March of 2025, we expect the employees in that building to be
moved out of that building to a different location. And after
those due diligence activities are finished, the Federal
screening will commence, and we will move forward with that on
a private sale, as well.
In regards to the Nebraska Avenue Complex, this is where we
are looking for some help from Congress. We are trying to
finish the consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security
at the West Campus. Right now, there is one agency component
left on the Nebraska Avenue Complex, the Intelligence and
Analysis Unit. We are working very closely with the Department
of Homeland Security to put together a housing plan for that
agency. While we are waiting for that, so that we can move that
agency off the Nebraska Avenue Complex, I have directed the
Assistant Commissioner of Dispositions to begin work with the
District of Columbia to start the small area planning necessary
for the Nebraska Avenue Complex because we think that is going
to generate the best return for taxpayers. The District of
Columbia has spoken loudly and definitively about what the use
is for the Nebraska Avenue Complex, and therefore, generating a
greater return for taxpayers.
So, all three of those disposals are moving forward. But
the Webster School is the furthest along, then the Liberty
Loan, and we are planning for the Nebraska Avenue Complex
disposal.
Ms. Norton. Thank you for that statement. Given that the
Webster School has been vacant since the 1980s, Chairman Perry
and I introduced a bill to direct GSA to dispose of the
property by December 31, 2025. The House passed the bill. The
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works passed the
bill, and it is now pending on the Senate calendar. I hope the
Senate will pass it soon.
I thank the subcommittee for holding this critical hearing
on protecting Federal employees and Federal buildings.
I want to take a step back to discuss balancing security
and public access to public property in a democracy. Since
2000, I have introduced the United States Commission on an Open
Society with Security Act, which would create a commission to
investigate how we can maintain public access to public
property while actively responding to substantial security
threats. The impetus for this bill was the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995. Its importance grew after the terrorist
attacks on September the 11th, 2001, and it has reached a peak
urgency since the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January
6, 2021.
The succession of tragic events endured by our Nation has
led to a series of sweeping security increases that are deemed
both necessary and temporary in the moment but create lasting
security infrastructure and practices that are difficult to
dismantle on our open, democratic society. What we thought
would be temporary infringements on our open society have
turned into permanent restrictions on how citizens interact
with each other and our democratic institutions. We must
acknowledge and accept that we have entered an era of constant
domestic and institutional threats, requiring ever-higher
levels of security for our people and public spaces.
However, because emergencies typically dictate security
decisions, essential decisions on the proper balance between
security, individual rights, and freedoms enjoyed in an open
society have been repeatedly deferred. My bill would ensure
that these long-overdue discussions take place in a public
forum with experts drawn from across the spectrum. To date,
security planning has been delegated almost exclusively to
security intelligence and military experts. Although their
input is indispensable, they cannot be expected to consider
matters outside their expertise.
To strike a better balance that gives sufficient importance
to our democratic traditions, we must invite experts from
diverse fields to do the same. Therefore, the commission would
be composed not only of security, intelligence, and military
experts, but also experts from such fields as business,
architecture, technology, law, city planning, art, engineering,
philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology.
I urge the committee to take up this bill, and I yield
back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady as I channel my
inner Garret Graves reasonableness. And now the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Ezell.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing today for us, and thank you all for being
here today.
This hearing comes at a very crucial time. As we deal with
the assassination attempt on former President Trump, securing
our Federal buildings is paramount. The Federal Protective
Service must have the capability to respond and make decisions
in the interest of security, and these decisions cannot be
based on political bias.
When I was a sheriff and an officer, recruiting, retention,
and training was always at the top of my mind. However, these
issues seem to have gotten only worse here over the last few
years. The manpower challenges the FPS is facing, coupled with
the difficulties faced by vacant buildings, the rise of
homelessness, and drug abuse is deeply concerning. That is why
I sent a letter, along with subcommittee Chairman Perry and
Congresswoman Chavez-DeRemer, expressing concern and demanding
answers to this.
Director Cline, you stated in response to the letter, ``FPS
experienced a 138-percent increase in demonstrations and an
overall 24-percent increase in assault on Government
employees.'' If you could, expand on this a little bit, and how
has this impacted the health and safety of our law enforcement
personnel and Protective Security Officers since 2020.
Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir, I appreciate the question.
First, the Protective Security Officers--the number of
increased assaults that we have indicated, 85 to 90 percent of
those are on either our uniformed police officers or our
contract Protective Security Officers. And it typically occurs
at an entrance or at a screening station when someone is just
not happy with what is going on there, or they are not happy
with a benefit that was either denied or reduced by a
Government agency.
Recruiting and retention is huge for us. We are competing
in the same market as everyone else. I took over as the
Director a year and a half ago. We had almost 500 vacancies. We
are down to 409 vacancies today, and we continue to chip away
at this. By the end of next month, we will have an additional
67 new employees on board. We have five new police officer
training classes scheduled for next year. We just offered 45
tentative job offers at the DHS job fair out in Dulles a couple
of weeks ago. And based on the shortage of staff that I have,
we recently implemented a retention incentive to keep our
current workforce with us until we get through the entire
election cycle. You have seen what type of activity we have.
Mr. Ezell. Right.
Mr. Cline. We have got an election coming up, we have got a
certification, we have got an inauguration. I need to keep as
many people as I can on board until I can fill those current
vacancies, and then we can get rid of the retention incentive.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ezell. I was even more surprised to learn that, despite
your agency's recommendations to improve security, they often
go ignored. In the time that we live in, we cannot afford to
have lax security as we head towards November. In response, I,
along with my colleague from Louisiana, Troy Carter, introduced
the Federal Protective Service Reform Act, which requires each
agency to provide a written reason as to why they did not
implement FPS recommendations.
Mr. Cline, do you believe that receiving similar responses
will help you better protect your Federal buildings?
Mr. Cline. Thank you, Congressman. Absolutely. Your
introduction of your bill, the Senate-side introduction of a
similar companion bill, GSA's recent order requiring the
implementation of the video surveillance systems and the
intrusion detection systems at GSA-owned facilities, and then
the new ISC Executive order is really going to strengthen our
position and strengthen the requirement for those agencies to
fund the implementation of those countermeasures.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Mr. Marroni, you stated in your testimony, during your
covert testing, approximately 50 percent of prohibited items in
Federal buildings went undetected by FPS. Even so, 80 percent
of the time, FPS blamed a human factor as the cause. While FPS
has implemented several changes since this test, what do you
think accounts for contract guards missing this inexcusably
large percentage of hazards?
Mr. Marroni. So, there could be a number of reasons.
``Human factor'' is a pretty broad term. That could mean the
person has been trained appropriately, but they just didn't
carry out the techniques like they should have. It could mean
there is an equipment issue. It could mean they didn't report
properly in the system, and so, the data is not entirely
correct.
So, what is important there is for FPS to take deliberate
actions, as they have already started to do, to figure out what
are these issues, what are the root causes of items getting
through at this rate, and then taking actions to address those
specific issues. So, the data is a first step. The next step is
to figure out what are the root causes.
Mr. Ezell. Very good. Do you think hiring more Federal
agents, rather than contracting guards, will help with the
accountability issue?
Mr. Cline.
Mr. Cline. I am sorry. The beginning of your question?
Mr. Ezell. Yes, yes. I have been responsible in my lifetime
as a sheriff and as a chief of police of being in charge of
making sure a building was secure. I always had full-time,
State-certified law enforcement officers under my control and
my staff. Nothing against security officers, but a lot of times
these security officers do not have arrest authority like a
police officer or a certified officer.
So, my concern is that we have officers in place to protect
a building or whatever it may be. They don't have arrest
authority, so, that poses another issue. I would--and I know I
am kind of talking a little bit about my feelings about this,
but it is very important that we start looking at full-time
certified officers to maybe transition into these part-time
positions so that they can have the full authority that they
need to get the job done. So, if you could, just talk about
that a minute.
Mr. Cline. Certainly, sir. That is a discussion we have had
in the past. We mentioned before our contract PSOs. If another
guard company takes another contract and they are offering
$0.50 more per hour, or $1 more per hour, then we are probably
going to lose that person to go to the other. It is a higher
paying job.
So, first, we have got some legislation we have pursued
that would give our Protective Security Officers a little bit
more of our authority, our Federal authority. Right now--you
are correct, sir--they can only detain. They have the
authority----
Mr. Ezell [interposing]. Right.
Mr. Cline [continuing]. To detain someone, not arrest them.
The legislative proposal that we put forward would allow a
couple of things.
First, it would allow us to cross State lines with those
PSOs. So, a good example is Superstorm Sandy in New York. We
needed to bring in more PSOs to protect FEMA sites where they
were bringing in equipment. We wanted to bring them in from
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh into New York. We had to get approval
from the State attorney general's office to waive that
licensing requirement to bring them in as armed guards. This
legislative proposal we have submitted would allow us to
delegate some Federal authority so we don't have to go and ask
for approval to cross State lines.
Secondarily, this new legislative proposal will also allow
the Protective Security Officer to pursue an active shooter.
Right now, they are licensed by the State. They can man a post.
That is their duty assignment. In theory, they don't have the
ability to run and respond to an active shooter. They would. We
all know that no one is going to stand by while someone is
getting shot. But this new authority will allow us to train
them on offensive tactics to go and pursue an active shooter
event.
But I agree with you, sir. We have looked at and continue
to look at the possibility. Do we Federalize some of this, some
of the PSO functions? It is a big program, but we are
considering what next steps to take to make it better.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you sir.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [presiding]. The gentleman's time,
plus an additional 3 minutes and 41 seconds, have expired.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I want to thank you all for being
here today.
Mr. Marroni, I appreciate the work that the GAO has done to
help identify some of these concerns to the Congress. I am
curious about a few things. You all have done similar work at
airports. And as you know, there are airports that have private
contract security. Have you seen similar concerns or failures
at airports at a rate that may exceed TSA, meaning private
contractors failing at a higher rate than TSA?
Mr. Marroni. So, we certainly have done work at the TSA. I
am not your best expert on that, but I can get better----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. OK, all right. I
tell you what. We will follow up with a question for the record
there.
Mr. Marroni. Yes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So, you are not here to
necessarily say that the contracting officers are the problem
then, is----
Mr. Marroni [interrupting]. Right.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Let me ask you this question.
How many failures would it take for us to have a potentially
catastrophic incident?
Mr. Marroni. Well, one failure could potentially----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. That is right, one
failure. And what you evaluated was nearly a 50-percent failure
rate.
So, another question--and I am not a math whiz, but as I
recall, there was an assessment that was done by, I believe,
GSA--and Mr. Doomes can correct me--that found that 17 of 24
Federal buildings in the Washington, DC, area had occupancy
rates of lower than 25 percent, some as low as 9 percent.
So, let me say it again. I am not a math whiz, but if we
actually consolidated the Federal space and shrunk the
footprint that was required to be secure, would it be easier to
better protect a smaller footprint?
Mr. Marroni. It would certainly cost less. And it
potentially--if you have a smaller amount of facilities to do,
the shortage issues that Director Cline has discussed might be
less of an issue.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Cline, would you agree with
that?
Mr. Cline. I would agree, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. So, I just want to make note
that that is something that we need to be more aggressive about
in addition, obviously, to helping you fill your vacancies.
Mr. Cline, have you seen any trends where the private
contractors are less successful at providing security, compared
to your own officers?
Mr. Cline. No, sir. So, our law enforcement officers don't
do the screening operations, x ray, mag, visitor check. It is
done by the contract PSOs. Our responsibility is to oversee
that, and to conduct on-the-job training, conduct compliance of
contract staff.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, let me ask you to probably go
a little bit outside of your scope then. What about CSOs for
some of the Federal courts? Have you seen where the Federal
employees that are working for the Marshals Service have a
higher rate of success, compared to the private contractors?
And if you don't know, that is a fine answer.
Mr. Cline. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, OK. I would just ask Mr.
Marroni and Mr. Cline if you could both look into that question
and follow back up with us, as well. Mr. Marroni, that would be
the second one for you.
And then lastly for Mr. Cline, I assume that you are the
contractor to these private security companies, is that
correct?
Mr. Cline. They are on contract from the Federal Protective
Service.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Is there any type of
performance requirement to where taxpayers would actually save
money as a result of these folks not doing their job?
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, when a PSO fails a covert test, we
are deducting the hours that PSO has stood that post from the
payment to the vendor. It takes a while to get that processed.
There are a lot of hands involved in that pot.
And it is the same with an open post. The chairman
mentioned Social Security Customer Service Centers and IRS Tax
Assistance Centers. When the vendor fails to post a PSO at that
post, which is called an open post, we don't pay the vendor for
those hours that were left open.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So, I just want to make sure I
understand before you get too far down.
So, number one, you are not paying them during the periods
when they are not there, which makes sense.
Mr. Cline. Exactly, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. But then you are also saying that
you are not paying them during the periods when they failed.
Mr. Cline. When they failed. Yes, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, so--but you are not doing
anything to extrapolate out--for example, Mr. Marroni's team
found that nearly 50 percent of the time, these folks are
failing. So, you are not extrapolating that out and saying we
are cutting half of your funding, correct?
Mr. Cline. That is correct, sir, because it is multiple
contracts that were in place when the GAO--and same with us
when we do our----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. You do see the
concern that I am highlighting, though.
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, all right. I do think that we
need to be thinking about a remedy there, because there needs
to be a performance--if people aren't performing, they
shouldn't be paid. And all the people that work on our team,
they know that. I say it every week. We don't pay them to sit
there, we pay them to perform. And I think that is really
important because, if they are failing 50 percent of the time
when his teams are testing them, they are probably failing 50
percent of the time.
Mr. Cline. Yes, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And I think we need to look at
that.
Mr. Doomes, it is good to see you again. We just need to
get you a permanent seat here with a permanent nameplate. I
hope you and your family are doing well. Again, good to see you
again. Back to our dialogue about the footprint, and just--it
would be easier to secure a smaller footprint, especially if it
is not being needed because that way we save taxpayer money on
the excess of space. We also can help Mr. Cline secure a
smaller space by allowing him to focus on what truly needs to
be protected, as opposed to vacant office buildings. Would you
concur that that makes sense?
Mr. Doomes. Congressman, I agree, and that is why in fiscal
year 2025, we made a request for a $425 million space
optimization program where we would be able, for the first time
ever, to front the cost of furniture, fixtures, and equipment,
and the move costs so we can move agencies out of buildings
where they aren't fully utilizing into a building where we can
get a higher level of utilization rate, which is why it is so
important that we get full funding on the Federal Building
Fund.
We have done a pretty decent job of reducing the footprint
over the last 4 fiscal years. We have gotten rid of 8 million
square feet. We could do more if we have the money.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Doomes, you can understand, I
am sure, my initial reaction when you said you needed money to
save space. I am thinking that that seems a little bit
backwards, in that it seems like saving space would actually
result in cost savings. Can you help me understand, if we were
to invest $425 million, what type of cost savings we would see
over what period? Just a rough order of magnitude.
Mr. Doomes. I believe we can save--I think the number is $6
billion over 10 years.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. $6 billion over 10 if we--and
again, ballpark, I am not going to hold you to it, but just a
ballpark range.
Mr. Doomes. Well, I will follow up with a precise number,
sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, great, great. I would
appreciate that.

Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves' Request for Information
from Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S.
General Services Administration
The FY 2025 Optimization Fund has the potential to yield $1 billion
in long-term federal taxpayer savings, if invested as proposed. GSA
continues to identify projects that represent strong investment
opportunities for the federal taxpayer.
If GSA was provided full access to the annual revenues and
collections deposited in the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), GSA would be
able to reduce the backlog of projects, deferred maintenance, and
needed repairs that have accumulated as a result of chronic
underfunding over the past 13 fiscal years.
If the current funding levels remain, deferred maintenance,
currently at $4.6 billion, is expected to exponentially increase. Since
we cannot maintain our buildings sufficiently when needed, PBS has to
delay repairs, which ultimately costs the government more money. As
noted by the GAO in its November 2023 report, ``Federal Real Property:
Agencies Should Provide More Information about Increases in Deferred
Maintenance and Repair,'' GAO estimates that ``inflation from fiscal
years 2017 through 2022 effectively eroded the purchasing power of
maintenance and repair funding by about 26 percent, particularly in the
past several years. Put another way, $1 million in funding in fiscal
year 2022 would only accomplish what $740,313 would have accomplished
in fiscal year 2017. These inflationary effects make it challenging to
complete ongoing and deferred maintenance projects, placing further
constraints on agencies' ability to address their DM&R backlogs.''
Additionally, modernizing federally owned facilities will enable
GSA to consolidate and reduce the Federal Government's heavy reliance
on space leased from private lessors, which will provide cost avoidance
many times over. Since 2018 through the end of 2023, GSA has achieved
over $7.7 billion in lease cost avoidance. GSA will be able to maximize
lease cost avoidance with full access to the FBF.
Furthermore, GSA conservatively estimates that we could save at
least $40 million per year if our prospectus threshold was increased to
$10 million from the current $3.926 million to construct, alter or
acquire federally owned facilities or to lease space. This higher
threshold will allow GSA to more quickly tackle routine projects, which
will reduce repair costs, shorten delivery times, and support agencies'
mission needs more effectively.

Mr. Doomes. But just for clarification, we can not only
sell buildings, I mean, move people out of buildings where they
are underutilized, we can turn around and sell those buildings,
and we have got a pretty good track record. We put up 25
buildings for sale in November 2023, or announced that we were
moving them through the disposition process. We have got a
great track record with the Volpe Project, where we disposed of
10 acres and built on the other 4 acres and used the value
there. And we are looking for other projects like that across
the Nation.
So, we are going to have to spend money in order to save
money, but we have the track record, and we can provide you
more details----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. The rough order of
magnitude of savings that you noted seems like it would be more
than worth it, and I look forward to receiving your followup on
that.
Last question, Mr. Doomes. If there is an agency I don't
like, could I get you to just get rid of their space, and then
that way we can deal with them that way? Would that work?
Mr. Doomes. I can't recommend that course of action.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Doomes.
I want to thank Ranking Member Titus' patience as I went a
little overboard, as well as a couple of others.
Ms. Titus, Ranking Member Titus, do you have any followup
or closing?
Ms. Titus. No.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, great. So, I yield back, and I
don't think there are any further questions from the
subcommittee. And so, that does conclude our hearing for today.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses. As you know,
the record remains open. There are some questions for the
record that we have dialoged here, as well as others that will
be submitted. But I appreciate you being here today.
And the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Appendix

----------

Questions to Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service,
Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, from Hon.
Scott Perry

Question 1. The law enforcement authority for FPS is section 1315
of title 40, United States Code. That authority is vested in the DHS
Secretary, who can, and has, delegated the authority outside of FPS.\1\
There have been reports that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was
involved in security for former President Trump's rally in Butler,
Pennsylvania.\2\ During the hearing, you indicated that FPS' law
enforcement authority is not delegated to HSI. You further indicated
that the authority is not delegated to ``anyone in DHS right now.'' \3\
In the past, entities outside FPS within DHS were delegated authority
under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315.\4\
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\1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the
Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan.
24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf; Office of
Inspector General, Dep't of Homeland Security, Management Alert--FPS
Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal
Properties under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), available
at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-
05-Nov20.pdf.
\2\ Letter from Sen. Josh Hawley, to the Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, (July 19, 2024),
available at https://www.hawley.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/
Hawley-Letter-to-Mayorkas-on-whistleblowers-re-assassination-attempt-
on-Trump.pdf.
\3\ Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service:
Are Federal Buildings Secure? Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, of
the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024)
\4\ Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the
Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan.
24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf; Office of
Inspector General, Dep't of Homeland Security, Management Alert--FPS
Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal
Properties under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), available
at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-
05-Nov20.pdf.
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Question 1.a. Please provide a list of past delegations of FPS law
enforcement authority under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315 to entities outside of
the FPS, and dates and details as to when those delegations were
rescinded.
Answer. As background, 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315 authorizes the
Secretary of Homeland Security to designate employees of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as officers and agents for the
purpose of protecting federal property and people on the property. This
authority is found at 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315(b)(1). Additionally, 40
U.S.C. Sec. 1315 authorizes the DHS Secretary to delegate 40 U.S.C.
Sec. 1315 authority for the protection of specific buildings to
another federal agency where, in the Secretary's discretion, the
Secretary determines it necessary for the protection of that building.
This authority is found in Historical and Statutory Notes to 40 U.S.C.
Sec. 1315.
Past authority to designate DHS employees under 40 U.S.C. Sec.
1315 occurred in situations where the Federal Protective Service (FPS)
did not have law enforcement resources to protect certain FPS-protected
federal facilities and property. In the past, employees of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration's Federal
Air Marshal Service have been cross-designated with 40 U.S.C. Sec.
1315 jurisdiction and police powers for specific FPS protected
facilities and property. Homeland Security Investigations law
enforcement personnel were not cross-designated under 40 U.S.C. Sec.
1315 for former President Trump's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and
there are no current cross-designations in place within the Department.
The Secretary delegated 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315 authority to two
entities within DHS: the Office of the Chief Security Officer and FPS.
Additionally, authority to designate employees of another federal
agency outside of DHS was delegated to the Under Secretary for
Management and the delegation process is the responsibility of FPS.
There were 26 past delegations of law enforcement authority issued
to four departments that have been rescinded. Some of those delegations
were originally issued by the General Services Administration, which
was the parent agency of FPS prior to the establishment of DHS.
Law enforcement delegations are issued for specific locations.
Often, as one delegation for a location expires, another one is issued
for the same location. As such, over time, there are multiple
delegations associated with the same locations.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rescind
Department and Total # Delegations Date(s) Location(s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) 1. 9/16/08 100 Bureau Dr,
(8). 2. 12/3/10 Gaithersburg, MD;
3. 11/28/11 325 Broadway St,
4. 12/1/12 Boulder, CO; The
5. 11/27/13 Table Mountain
6. 10/27/18 Field Site & Radio
7. 12/9/20 Quiet Zone, Plateau
8. 7/10/23 Rd/N 39th St,
Longmont, CO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of the Interior 1. 3/18/13 Hoover Dam, NV
(DOI) (4).
2. 2/16/15
3. 2/8/18
-------------------------------------
4. 10/11/22 Chemawa Indian
School, OR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 1. 10/1/93 J Edgar Hoover Bldg.
(8).
-------------------------------------
2. 9/30/98 J Edgar Hoover
Bldg., Main Justice
Bldg.
-------------------------------------
3. 8/10/99 J Edgar Hoover
Bldg., Main Justice
Bldg., Lincoln
Place (VA), Control
Data (MD)
-------------------------------------
4. 7/26/17 J Edgar Hoover
Bldg., FBI Field
Office
-------------------------------------
5. 12/9/20 J Edgar Hoover
Bldg., FBI Field
Office, FBI Field
Office Automobile
Maintenance
Facility
-------------------------------------
6. 12/15/22 J Edgar Hoover
Bldg., FBI Field
Office, FBI Field
Office Automobile
Maintenance
Facility
-------------------------------------
7. 12/1/14 FBI Field Office, MO
-------------------------------------
8. 9/30/99 Bicentennial Bldg.,
DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of the Treasury 1. 10/13/88 Internal Revenue
(USDT) (6). Service location in
WV
2. 10/31/93
3. 7/7/97
4. 12/9/20
-------------------------------------
5. 5/11/18D US Mint and Bureau
6. 4/23/20 of Engraving and
Printing (BEP) six
locations in DC,
NY, PA, KY, CO, and
CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question 1.b. In 2015, FPS authority had been delegated to 21
departments and agencies outside of DHS.\5\ Are there currently
delegations of FPS authority outside of DHS? If so, please provide a
list of such delegations, including to which other departments and
agencies. If not, please provide the dates of when such delegations
were rescinded.
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\5\ Dep't of Homeland Security briefing materials for Staff of the
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (July 2015), Delegations of
Authority (on file with Comm.).
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Answer. There are currently eight delegations of law enforcement
authority issued to departments outside of DHS. Seven are renewals of
prior delegations for the same locations.
DOC (1)--renewal
+ 100 Bureau Dr, Gaithersburg, MD
+ 325 Broadway St, Boulder, CO
+ The Table Mountain Field Site & Radio Quiet Zone, Plateau Rd/N
39th St, Longmont, CO
DOI (1)--renewal
+ Chemawa Indian School, OR
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (3)--
renewal
+ Bethesda and Poolesville Locations, MD
+ National Cancer Institute at Ft. Detrick, MD
+ Rocky Mountain Laboratory, MT
DOJ (1)--renewal
+ J Edgar Hoover Bldg., Washington, DC
+ FBI Washington Field Office NW, Washington, DC
+ Automobile Maintenance Facility, Washington, DC
+ 26 Federal Plaza Floors 20-29, New York, NY
+ 290 Broadway Floors 8-10, New York NY
+ 2400 Schuster Dr., Hyattsville, MD
+ 395 Patriots Plaza Floors 3-4, Washington, DC
+ 375 Patriots Plaza Floors 3-10, Washington, DC
+ 355 Patriots Plaza, Washington, DC
USDT (1)--renewal--US Mint and BEP facilities
+ BEP--three locations in MD, DC, and TX.
+ US Mint--six locations in DC, NY, PA, KY, CO, and CA
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)--1--new
+ Location in Bannister Federal Complex, MO.

Question 2. Last year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report highlighting how much space is being wasted at empty
Federal buildings.\6\ For example, GAO's review of headquarters
buildings in D.C. revealed that 17 of the 24 buildings had a 25 percent
or less occupancy rate, with some as low as 9 percent.\7\ FPS spent
almost $1.7 billion on contract guards--76 percent of FPS's budget in
Fiscal Year 2024.\8\
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\6\ GAO, Federal Real Property: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Buildings Remain Underutilized Due to Longstanding Challenges and
Increased Telework, GAO-23-106200 (July 13, 2023), available at https:/
/www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106200.
\7\ Id.
\8\ Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service:
Are Federal Buildings Secure? Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024)
(statement of Mr. David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
GAO).
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Question 2.a. What is the average cost to protect a Federal
building?
Answer. The average annual cost of protecting a federal building is
$176,490 regardless of occupancy rate. This reflects the total cost for
all of FPS services divided by the total building count of 10,088.
Tables 1 and 2 below provide greater detail explaining this average
cost.

Question 2.b. Provide a breakdown of the average costs of
protecting a Federal building.
Answer. Determining the average cost per building requires an
assessment of FPS's building portfolio for all services. For example in
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, there were a total of 10,088 buildings with
operating expenses for FPS protective services recorded against these
properties; 3,023 of these buildings specifically had Protective
Security Officers (PSO) support as a form of protective service; and
672 of the 10,088 buildings had Technical Countermeasures (TCM)
support. The tables below show various combinations and associated
average costs.

Table 1: Breakdown of Average Cost per Program, Project, or Activity (PPA)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building
FPS PPA \9\ FY 2023 Total Count per Average Cost
Cost Per PPA PPA Per PPA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Expenses................................................ $460,635,526 10,088 $45,661.73
Protective Security Officers...................................... $1,301,976,955 3,023 $430,690.36
Technical Countermeasures......................................... $17,824,420 672 $26,524.43
---------------------------------------------
Totals.......................................................... $1,780,436,901 10,088
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2: Average Cost per Building by Scenario
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined
Scenario Average Costs
from Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Expenses Only................................. $45,661.73
Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers....... $476,352.09
Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers + $502,876.52
Technical Countermeasures..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question 2.c. Provide\\ the costs associated with protecting the 24
headquarter buildings identified in GAO's 2023 report, including a
breakdown by building, for the last full fiscal year.
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\9\ FPS Operating Expenses:
Salaries and Benefits for the federal staff;
Protective Services for Law Enforcement Operations,
Investigations, Criminal Intelligence, Information Sharing, K-9
Operations, MegaCenter Operations, Critical Incidents and Special
Security Operations, Fleet, and Facilities;
Equipment for Law Enforcement including, firearms, body
armor, protective eyewear, body cameras, dash cameras, and personal
protective equipment;
Training for Law Enforcement including entry-level
training, Law Enforcement advanced and refresher training, Law
Enforcement standards and certification training, and administrative
training;
Agency-wide support for Policy and Planning, Acquisition
Management, Personnel Security (Background Investigations and
Adjudications), Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12),
Budget, Finance; and Revenue, Environmental Compliance, Workforce
Planning (Human Capital), and Information; and
Technology, Facilities and Fleet Management, Logistics,
and other business support services.
PSO: A nationwide program that provides professionally trained and
certified contractor security guards stationed onsite at FPS-protected
federal facilities. PSOs are trained in the protection of life and
property and are certified in the use of firearms, batons,
magnetometers, and X-ray machines.
TCM: TCM constitutes capabilities or services that provide
technical and subject matter expertise to the design, implementation,
and operations and maintenance of TCM projects and equipment at FPS-
protected federal facilities.
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Answer. The following table provides the details requested for the
24 Agency Headquarters Buildings identified in GAO's 2023 report.\\
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\10\ Facilities with $0 in costs are included in response to the
request. However, FPS did not provide services to these specific
buildings and therefore no costs were incurred during the covered
period.

Table 3: FY 2023 Buildings Costs by Category
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Building Data FY 2023 Cost by Building \10\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Total Cost Per
Building Code Agency Address/Name Expenses PSOs TCMs Building
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0459.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1300 Pennsylvania Ave $1,015,007.95 $32,382,098.43 $578,946.65 $33,976,053.03
NW/Ronald Reagan
Building.
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DC0003.............................. U.S. Department of 1400 Independence Ave $126,477.51 $- $- $126,477.51
Agriculture. SW/Whitten and South
Buildings.
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DC0013.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1401 Constitution Ave $125,777.09 $- $56,480.40 $182,257.49
NW/Herbert Hoover
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VA0919.............................. U.S. Department of 4825 Mark Center $- $119,652.94 $- $119,652.94
Defense. Drive, Alexandria, VA/
The Mark Center.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0010.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 400 Maryland Ave SW/ $244,639.03 $3,645,311.44 $48,763.12 $3,938,713.59
Lyndon Baines Johnson
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0093.............................. DOE................... 1000 Independence Ave $153,557.88 $- $- $153,557.88
SW/Forrestal Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0115.............................. HHS................... 200 Independence Ave $95,447.79 $- $27,301.32 $122,749.11
SW/Humphrey Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0031.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 301 7th Street SW / $376,986.19 $3,336,233.10 $39,588.84 $3,752,808.13
7th and D Streets.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0092.............................. U.S. Department of 451 7th Street SW / $133,057.81 $10,386,472.40 $48,761.52 $10,568,291.73
Housing and Urban. Robert C. Weaver
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0023.............................. DOJ................... 950 Pennsylvania Ave $69,983.80 $- $- $69,983.80
NW/Robert Kennedy
Building.
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DC0116.............................. U.S. Department of 200 Constitution Ave $228,662.15 $- $52,343.40 $281,005.55
Labor. NW/Frances Perkins
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0046.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 2201 C Street NW / $89,835.01 $- $52,343.40 $142,178.41
Harry S. Truman
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0020.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1849 C Street NW / $70,162.96 $- $38,721.72 $108,884.68
Stewart L. Udall
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1500DC.............................. USDT.................. 1500 Pennsylvania Ave $- $- $- $-
NW/Treasury Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0687.............................. U.S. Department of 1200 New Jersey Ave SE/ $33,957.50 $- $- $33,957.50
Transportation. William T. Coleman
Jr. Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0007.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 810 Vermont Ave / VA $270,820.38 $2,713,667.02 $29,251.32 $3,013,738.72
Admin Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0028.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1200 Pennsylvania Ave $370,961.48 $3,185,632.74 $75,129.17 $3,631,723.39
NW/William J. Clinton
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0021.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1800 F St. NW / No $542,043.54 $3,868,930.82 $20,078.64 $4,431,053.00
Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0369.............................. National Aeronautics 300 E Street SW / Mary $36,857.99 $- $- $36,857.99
and Space W. Jackson Building.
Administration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VA1413.............................. National Science 2415 Eisenhower Ave / $269,033.39 $3,149,276.95 $46,370.88 $3,464,681.22
Foundation. No Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MD0199 #1........................... Multi-Tenant.......... 11555 Rockville Pike, $577,853.86 $6,776,656.92 $- $7,354,510.78
MD0254 #2........................... Rockville, MD / White
Flint Buildings #1 &
#2.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0082.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 1900 E Street NW / $211,083.45 $- $- $211,083.45
Theodore Roosevelt
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0365.............................. Multi-Tenant.......... 409 3rd St. SW / No $243,066.38 $2,783,424.59 $20,078.64 $3,046,569.61
Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MD1295.............................. Social Security 1500 Woodlawn Dr, $39,495.62 $- $- $39,495.62
Administration. Baltimore, MD /
Arthur J. Altmeyer
Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................................................... $5,324,768.77 $72,347,357.35 $1,134,159.02 $78,806,285.14
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Questions to Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service,
U.S. General Services Administration, from Hon. Scott Perry

Question 1. In your testimony, you highlighted special emphasis
programs to enhance security for childcare centers and at courthouses.
What are the estimated total costs across GSA's inventory of needed
security upgrades?
Answer. GSA is committed to ensuring the safety of our tenants and
visiting public. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, GSA received $15 million to
address identified vulnerabilities for childcare centers to fund 26
projects throughout GSA's inventory. The President's FY 2025 Budget
also includes a request for an additional $14.25 million to continue
addressing these security vulnerabilities.
The Judiciary Capital Security Program (JCSP) received $15 million
in FY 2022 and $18.5 million in FY 2023. The President's FY 2025 Budget
Request includes $30 million for Judiciary Capital Security. To date,
this program has received over $120 million since FY 2012. GSA is
currently estimating a funding need of $130.5 million for four JCSP-
prioritized projects and plans to study an additional three locations.
Cost estimates for the three additional locations will be developed as
the studies progress.
The GSA and Federal Protective Service are working closely to
identify security costs associated with the upgrade of electronic
countermeasures over the next 5 years. This will be a significant
investment that will be funded by the tenants in each facility
identified.

Question 2. Crime in many areas has increased, impacting the use of
Federal buildings. For example, last year, HHS's office in San
Francisco advised its employees to stay home because of the public
safety issues at their building.\1\ Is GSA, as landlord, tracking
incidents when crime rises to a point that use and occupancy of GSA
Federal buildings is impacted? What steps has GSA taken to address
these issues?
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\1\ Megan Cassidy, Crime is so bad near S.F. Federal building
employees are told to work from home, officials said, San Francisco
Chronicle, (Aug. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/
sf/article/drugs-crime-nancy-pelosi-federal-building-18292237.php.
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Answer. GSA partners closely with FPS, the Department of Justice's
U.S. Marshals Service, and others to ensure the safety of occupant
agency personnel and visitors within facilities under GSA's
jurisdiction, custody or control. FPS tracks incidents related to crime
in areas where Federal buildings are located.
The GSA Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service
require that all Federal buildings must comply with the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC) standards for non-military facilities as
published in the ISC Risk Management process. GSA works closely with
FPS to administer the ISC process, especially as it relates to the
evaluation of Federal facilities. The ISC requires that every Federal
facility be evaluated based on assessment factors and assigned a
Facility Security Level (FSL). The security level determines the
specific countermeasures recommended for the facility. These factors
include the mission and criticality of the tenant agencies, possible
threat to those agencies, and the facility's size, symbolism, and
population. As part of this assessment process, FPS reviews crime
statistics for the area around the facility and includes that
information in their determination of the appropriate level of
countermeasure to implement.
Specifically for the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal Building, GSA, in
coordination with FPS, employs a number of security protocols to ensure
the building is safe. These protocols include FPS Protective Security
Officers patrolling the building and stationing at secure checkpoints.
GSA coordinated with FPS to have additional FPS officers onsite during
commute times in the morning and late afternoon to enhance the safety
of employees coming to and leaving from the building. GSA also placed
temporary fencing in three strategic areas around the building to
further increase security.
GSA leadership continues to meet with FPS biweekly, and GSA
conducts a bimonthly safety and security meeting with the Facility
Security Committee representatives from all Federal tenant agencies at
the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal Building. The meeting is coordinated
with Federal and local law enforcement to share actions in the
neighborhood aimed at improving conditions and increasing neighborhood
safety awareness through programs such as the City of San Francisco's
311 Community Ambassadors Safety Escort program. Further, when
appropriate, GSA contracts with the Mid Market Community Benefit
District to hire additional San Francisco Police Department officers to
patrol the civic center area. Lastly, GSA has awarded a design contract
to investigate additional ways to enhance the physical security around
the perimeter of the building.

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