[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-48]
REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ASSETS-
ASSESSING COCOM AND ALLIED DEMAND
FOR CAPABILITIES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 7, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-564 WASHINGTON : 2025
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama MARC VEASEY, Texas
Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
MG Gainey, Sean A., USA, Director, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Office, Director of Fires, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff....................................................... 5
BG Gill, Clair A., USA, Deputy Director for Regional Operations
and Force Management, Joint Staff.............................. 8
Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Missile Defense Policy..................................... 4
RADM Williams, Douglas L., USN, Director (Acting), Missile
Defense Agency................................................. 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
MG Gainey, Sean A............................................ 42
BG Gill, Clair A............................................. 59
Hill, John D................................................. 31
RADM Williams, Douglas L..................................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 69
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 73
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 78
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 79
Mr. Vasquez.................................................. 81
.
REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ASSETS-ASSESSING COCOM AND ALLIED DEMAND FOR
CAPABILITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, December 7, 2023.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Lamborn. The subcommittee hearing will come to order.
Today, we meet to receive testimony on regional missile
defense capabilities. This includes the Patriot system; the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system; and the
Aegis, or Aegis, weapons system.
Testifying before the subcommittee today are: Mr. John D.
Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and
Missile Defense Policy; Major General Sean Gainey, the Director
of Fires within the headquarters of the Department of the Army;
Rear Admiral Doug Williams, who, as of yesterday, is no longer
the Acting Director of the Missile Defense Agency but is now
Director of Test at MDA [Missile Defense Agency]--I guess there
have been a lot of promotions here in the last couple days----
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. --and finally, Brigadier General Clair Gill,
the Joint Staff's Deputy Director for Regional Operations and
Force Management.
Thank you all for being here with us.
As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East continue to
demonstrate, missile defense capabilities are becoming
increasingly important on the modern battlefield. However,
demand for these systems continues to outpace supply. In recent
years, the force has experienced significant stress attempting
to meet the needs of our combatant commanders. This suggests we
are far below what will be needed in a conflict with a near-
peer adversary.
This issue will only get worse as the need to increase
deterrence in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] theater
becomes more urgent. Over the last month, we have seen Iranian
proxies attempt to sink U.S. military and civilian vessels
transiting the Red Sea. These attacks by the Houthis, which
were named a foreign terrorist organization by the Trump
administration, have only intensified over the past week.
U.S. missile defense assets in the area, particularly those
aboard the USS [United States Ship] Carney, were able to
intercept some of the incoming missiles and UAVs [unmanned
aerial vehicles]. This quick action likely saved the lives of
U.S. Navy sailors and commercial seamen.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the
Department manages these scarce assets and whether additional
capacity is necessary.
While not the subject of today's hearing, I must express my
concern about reports that the Department is considering early
down-selects to a single contractor on several key missile
defense programs. Maintaining multiple competing industry teams
helps limit risk in developmental programs. And this
subcommittee will closely scrutinize any decision to eliminate
competition so as to ensure that a sufficient rationale exists.
I am similarly concerned that the Department may be
reconsidering a transfer of the Missile Defense Agency's
responsibilities for the THAAD program to the Army. The idea of
transitioning mature missile defense programs from MDA to the
services is not new; however, the Department's longstanding and
consistent position in the case of THAAD has been that doing so
would be disruptive and unnecessarily would add risk to the
program.
Based on this argument, last year's defense authorization
bill repealed a standing requirement for such a transfer. If
the Department's view has now changed, I would expect that it
would thoroughly consult with this committee. The Department
must explain why it is reopening this issue and considering
changes that, per the Department, would put THAAD at risk.
The fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act has
several key provisions on regional missile defense. Among other
things, it includes additional THAAD interceptors and an
acceleration of the Glide Phase Interceptor program for
hypersonic missile defense. I cannot emphasize enough how
critical it is that we get the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] signed into law at the soonest possible
time.
With that, I recognize Ranking Member Seth Moulton for any
opening comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to welcome our panel of distinguished
witnesses here on December 7th, the 82nd anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
In Ukraine, Israel, and around the world, our adversaries
are using missiles to attack not just military targets but
diplomatic facilities, energy infrastructure, commercial
shipping vessels, and civilian populations. Fortunately, their
success has been limited, in part due to deployed missile
defenses, many of which are developed and produced by the
United States.
During one of this subcommittee's previous hearings, I laid
out the four levels at which missile defenses might be used:
level one, strategic defense against peer adversaries; level
two addresses a capability to address rogue-nation threats;
level three, while somewhat of a nuance, is the ability to
defeat an accidental launch of a near-peer adversary; level
four is regional tactical-level missile defense; and level five
is the foundational level of being able to detect and track
threats from the moment they are launched throughout their
flight and up until they reach their impact point.
Today, we are focused on that fourth level, regional or
tactical missile defense.
In the last 2 years especially, we have seen how important
this is. Ukraine has received incredible support from allies
and partners on air and missile defense, which has enabled them
to fight back against near-nonstop Russian missile attacks. It
is safe to say that not only have these systems saved countless
civilian lives, but they are a key reason Ukraine has been able
to maintain its sovereignty almost 2 years after war criminal
Vladimir Putin's criminal invasion.
In Israel, we continue to witness the critical daily role
the tactical missile defenses play in defending Israeli
citizens from rocket, artillery, mortar, attack drone, and
ballistic missile threats being launched into the country.
For years, these defensive systems, like the famed Iron
Dome, have also saved Palestinian lives, because, previously,
the only protection Israel found against these attacks was
hitting back offensively. Imagine if the bombing like we have
seen over the past 2 months happened every time rockets were
fired at Israel over the past 2 decades.
The administration has also shifted U.S. force structure in
the region, deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,
or THAAD, battery to Saudi Arabia, adding Patriot battalions,
and increasing Aegis BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] at-sea
presence. These systems have not only defended against attacks
on U.S.-deployed forces but also against attacks aimed at
commercial shipping vessels in one of the most congested and
vital thoroughfares of global trade.
While these systems are performing well operationally, this
confluence of global aggression has spotlighted our limited
capacity to address the growing requirements from each of the
combatant commanders, primarily in INDOPACOM, CENTCOM [U.S.
Central Command], and EUCOM [U.S. European Command].
With a finite number of Aegis BMD-capable ships, THAAD
batteries, and Patriot battalions, at some point--a point we
may have already reached--any changes in our regional missile
defense posture will almost certainly induce risk somewhere
else in the world.
The limited capacity of regional missile defense
capabilities highlights a central issue in the missile defense
policy debate. Missile defense, to date, has been on the wrong
side of the cost equation, and at the end of the day, it is a
simple numbers game.
For example, the USS Carney has recently shot down several
Houthi missiles using Standard Missile-2 interceptors. Those
interceptors have a per-unit cost of $2 million, more than
double the cost of the cruise missiles they shot down.
This is why we must look at next-generation capabilities as
well, capabilities that can flip the cost paradigm, such as
directed energy, cyber, and other innovative solutions that are
not one-for-one point defenses. Only then will we have a decent
chance of stopping our adversaries from relying so heavily on
missile technology.
Lastly, while we are here today primarily to talk about
systems and capabilities, we would be remiss not to discuss our
greatest asset when it comes to missile defense: the soldiers
and sailors assigned to the Aegis BMD ships, Patriot
battalions, and THAAD batteries around the world.
I remember the early days of Iraq and Afghanistan, when the
missile defense community had little to do. But, recently,
these troops have been overtaxed, experiencing shorter and
shorter deployment dwell times. And GAO [U.S. Government
Accountability Office] has repeatedly reported on the negative
impact on readiness and training for the community.
The Navy, though less discussed, is not immune to these
issues either. The independent review conducted after the
collisions of the USS McCain and Fitzgerald, both Aegis BMD-
capable ships, highlighted the increased OPTEMPO on the crews
due to long at-sea deployments and increasing mission
requirements and how those contributed to basic training often
being skipped.
While this subcommittee tends to focus on the high demand
of the weapons systems, we cannot forget about the impact of
this intense global demand for missile defense that it places
on the men and women who are at the core of our capability.
Missiles are an integral part of the modern way of war,
and, thus, so too is missile defense. I look forward to
discussing with the witnesses where we can improve these
systems and innovate towards the future capabilities we need to
meet the increasingly complex missile threats proliferating
around the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. We hear that votes are projected to be
at 10:30. So we will go ahead and start in with our testimony,
and then we will move to members' questions.
You will each have 5 minutes. Your full statements will be
part of the record.
Mr. Hill, you are recognized first.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY
Mr. Hill. Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today alongside my distinguished
colleagues.
The ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East
underscore the centrality of missiles in modern warfare and
global strategy. Likewise, for U.S. forces and U.S. allies and
partners around the world, in this era of missile-centric
warfare, active missile defenses have become an essential
element of a credible military force posture.
In the most basic sense, integrated air and missile
defense, or IAMD, encompasses diverse sensors and shooters with
the command and control systems that network them together to
give battlefield commanders the optimal selection of
interceptors to defend against a given threat.
Space-based sensors and networks are an increasingly
important component of IAMD systems for homeland and regional
defenses. But in a broader sense, IAMD must also be integrated
with other elements of military posture, including strike
systems that can hold an adversary's critical military
capabilities at risk. Moreover, IAMD must also incorporate
passive defenses, including resilient critical infrastructure,
and broader missile-defeat options, such as electronic warfare
and supply-chain interdictions that disrupt proliferation
channels.
The IAMD efforts of the United States, our allies, and
partners are sound in the face of evolving and expanding
threats. These efforts are advancing shared national-security
interests in the defense of freedom and common values. However,
protecting national security is a process of continual
investment and funding.
And as Secretary Austin has emphasized, although the
passage of another continuing resolution has put off the threat
of a lapse of funding, operating under continuing resolutions
hamstrings the Department's people and programs and undermines
both our national security and competitiveness.
Further, passing supplemental funding can ultimately
strengthen our national security, deter our adversaries, meet
our commitments to allies and partners, and ensure Israel and
Ukraine have the military capabilities they need to succeed.
I thank you again for this opportunity to testify. You have
my full written testimony for the record. And I thank you for
the role this subcommittee plays in supporting our homeland and
regional integrated air and missile defense interests around
the globe.
I look forward to our discussion and your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Major General Gainey.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL SEAN A. GAINEY (USA), DIRECTOR,
COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OFFICE, DIRECTOR OF FIRES,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
General Gainey. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, thank
you for the opportunity to highlight the importance of regional
missile defense.
As you know, air- and missile-related threats have rapidly
expanded in recent years in quantity, variety, and
sophistication. Current events around the world highlight the
criticality of missile defense as a force for deterrence and as
a central element of our national defense.
These are challenging and important times for the joint and
integrated air missile defense force, and while specific
details of current and planned deployments are more appropriate
for a closed session, I can say that the Army air and missile
defense remains the Army's most heavily deployed force with the
highest demand signal among the combatant commands every year.
In that context, the importance of the work that our air
and missile defense soldiers do each and every day in support
of the Army and the Nation cannot be overstated. And I want to
thank you for your continued support to them and their
families.
Our Army's contribution to defeating the wide range of
evolving threats is advancing and continues to improve in both
capability and capacity as we build towards the future Army.
This additive capability and its associated force structure is
designed not only to defeat the threat but to minimize the
impact on soldiers and their families.
But capability does not consist only of materiel solutions.
The amazing soldiers that operate and sustain these systems
remain our true center of gravity. Recruiting and retaining the
Nation's top talent for our Army and air and missile defense
forces is the linchpin of our success. Caring for our soldiers
and their family is paramount to win in any environment around
the globe.
A critical point to emphasize is that integrated air and
missile defense is a shared responsibility across the service.
No one service by itself will have enough capability and
capacity to protect every critical asset across the globe.
Therefore, to reduce the burden, the Army continues to work
with our joint service partners, to include the U.S. Navy Aegis
ballistic missile defense and the U.S. Air Force offensive
counter-air operations.
Integration with allies and partners on missile defense is
also an important priority to strengthen international
cooperation and defeat our shared threats. Integrated
deterrence with our allies and partners provides commanders
layered and tiered options to degrade, disrupt, and defeat
adversary air and missile defense threats. Our ability to
protect the homeland and our collective interests abroad is
dependent on burden-sharing between our air and missile
defenses and that of our partners.
Let me conclude by saying that I take great pride in the
efforts and sacrifices made by all soldiers and their family on
behalf of the Nation. The Army recognizes the demand placed on
the force and has taken significant and aggressive steps to
enhance regional air and missile defense capabilities and
capacity as well as implementing important quality-of-life
improvements. The Army will continue to work with joint service
partners and allies to better integrate their defenses into the
overall missile defense architecture.
The Army appreciates the continued support and significant
investments from Congress. Thank you for shedding light on this
important issue today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gainey can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Williams.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DOUGLAS L. WILLIAMS (USN), DIRECTOR
(ACTING), MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
Admiral Williams. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor
to appear before you today.
Since its inception in 2002, Missile Defense Agency has
developed numerous missile defense capabilities to enhance the
regional defense posture of combatant commands to counter
increasingly diverse missile threats.
Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis ballistic
missile defense capabilities are a critical part of the missile
defense system. There are currently 49 Aegis BMD-capable ships
as well as Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland.
The Standard Missile-3 class of missiles provide BMD
mission capabilities across fleet areas and have been vital to
the success of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which is
the U.S. contribution to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] missile defenses.
Additionally, the SM-6 is available to the Navy for a
limited defense against hypersonic missile threats and is a key
part of the sea-based terminal defenses currently in operation.
MDA develops, produces, and fields the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, weapons system for the Army.
The THAAD system is combat-proven. And eight THAAD batteries
have been procured, and seven are currently fielded to the U.S.
Army.
Current plans for improving Aegis BMD and THAAD system
performance involve efforts to increase missile defense
quantities and to improve the quality of missile defense
through greater integration of deployed capabilities and
development of new systems, such as our efforts with the
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Glide Phase
Interceptor.
Additionally, MDA continues to strengthen defenses against
all regional missile threats by our continued close work with
allies and partners to improve missile defense capability,
integration, and interoperability.
MBA has developed and fielded a command and control battle
management and communications system that operates in a joint
multidomain environment and connects ground, air, sea, and
space sensors and shooters. The C2BMC [Command Control Battle
Management Communications] system ties in, for example, the
Aegis BMD and THAAD weapons systems as well as our homeland
defense system.
MDA and the Israel Missile Defense Organization continue to
cooperate on engineering, development, co-production, testing,
and fielding of the Arrow weapons system, the David's Sling
weapons system, and the Iron Dome defense system. Since October
7, 2023, each of these multitiered defense elements have
successfully intercepted multiple air and ballistic missile and
rocket attacks against Israel and deployed U.S. personnel
during Operation Swords of Iron.
Finally, MDA will continue to support the Army to meet the
INDOPACOM requirement to deliver a persistent, 360-degree,
integrated air and missile defense capability to defend the
people, infrastructure, and territory of Guam from advanced
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats.
Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate your continued support for the
Missile Defense Agency and the missile defense mission, and I
look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Williams can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Brigadier General Gill.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CLAIR A. GILL (USA), DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND FORCE MANAGEMENT, JOINT
STAFF
General Gill. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thanks for the opportunity to discuss missile defense in the
context of the Joint Staff, specifically as we consider
combatant commanders and allied demand and service capacity.
As you have heard, missile-related threats have rapidly
expanded in recent years, and adversary missile systems are
showing more maneuver capability as well as greater
survivability, reliability, accuracy, and lethality.
The increase in adversary capabilities and combatant
command demand, Russia's war in Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas
conflict place an ever-increasing strain on joint integrated
air and missile defense forces. As you will hear today, these
forces comprise one of the most stressed force elements across
the entirety of the joint force.
For context, I serve as the Deputy Director for Regional
Operations and Force Management in the Joint Staff Operations
Directorate, the J-3. I assist in providing policy, readiness,
force sourcing, and force employment expertise to the Director
of Operations and coordinate with the services and combatant
commands on the input to the annual Global Force Management
Allocation Plan, the GFMAP, and the emergent Secretary of
Defense Orders Book, SDOB, processes.
The GFMAP is our annual strategic force allocation plan,
built over the course of the entire preceding year, that orders
forces to deploy in the framework of our Department's guiding
intent, our National Defense Strategy.
The SDOB process allows combatant commanders to request
forces in an emergent manner and source immediate needs in the
context of the ever-changing global environment. In this role,
the J-35 reviews, adjudicates, and recommends allocation
decisions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense on a recurring basis.
Additionally, as the focal point for global current and
future operations on the Joint Staff, the J-35 is responsible
for providing directives and communications to and from the
joint force, while ensuring we assist the Chairman in his role
as principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the President.
Many surmise that global force management is about
allocation and assignment of forces and equipment. To be sure,
it is, but it is really about prioritization and risk. We have
finite joint forces as we contemplate addressing the global
challenges that require appropriate military solutions.
When the Joint Staff presents recommendations through the
Chairman to the Secretary, the conversation always ends up
focusing on risk: Do we risk deploying units early? Do we
jeopardize service modernization plans? Or do we mortgage dwell
time at home station?
Moreover, if the Secretary must decide between combatant
commands, where does he assume risk--in a priority theater or
in theater with an emergent requirement? We often discuss the
balance between the ``tactical now'' and the ``strategic
future.'' And we always take into consideration the
capabilities of our allies and partners.
As we cover protecting the force today, I am prepared to
discuss our missile defense contributions as it relates to
supporting our allies and partners in the Russia-Ukraine war
and the Israel-Hamas conflict and their impacts on the safety
of our own deployed troops.
In conclusion, I share my colleagues' pride in the efforts
made by all our servicemembers and their steadfast families in
support of these critical missile defense capabilities that
protect our Nation and its interests. We will continue to work
with our service partners and allies to better align our
efforts into the overall missile defense architecture.
Thank you again for the continued support of the Congress
to resource and improve our IAMD capacity and capabilities. I
look forward to our discussion and answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gill can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And thank all of you for providing your testimony and for
being here today.
It was mentioned earlier that there have been some
excellent defense by our sailors and soldiers against missiles
fired in CENTCOM at our own forces and vessels and at Israeli
targets.
Would you agree that we have had excellent operations on
the part of our sailors and soldiers in shooting down some of
these missiles? Admiral Williams and General Gill, would you
agree with that assessment?
Admiral Williams. Thank you for the question, sir.
Absolutely agree with that assessment.
And I will offer a vignette. Just over a month ago, sir,
you know, we had the opportunity to align with the Navy on a
really complex flight test off the coast of Hawaii, where we
fired simultaneously in a raid scenario two ballistic missiles
and two cruise missiles. And the Aegis destroyer successfully
intercepted all of those threats simultaneously.
And it was a little omniscient because, you know, lo and
behold, a few weeks later, you know, the Aegis, you know, ships
in the Red Sea were up against a similar threat. And the
weapons system continues to perform as designed, with the
sailors, the weapons system, the tactics, techniques, and
procedures working as we expect it to.
Mr. Lamborn. General.
General Gill. Chairman, thank you.
This is exactly why the combatant commanders ask for those
assets to be in the region. I think the actions of the Carney,
the Hudner, and the Mason have all demonstrated the discipline
of our sailors who deployed to the theater, on short notice in
some cases, and demonstrated their proficiency.
Mr. Lamborn. I am going to ask about rules of engagement
here, to take a little diversion from my questions I was going
to ask. And that is, if targets are in Israel itself, I assume
that Israel takes the responsibility for how to respond to the
source of those attacks, although it is wonderful that we can
help our partner by shooting down these threats.
But when Iranian forces or Iranian proxies are shooting at
our ships or our installations in CENTCOM, what are the rules
of engagement for us to respond? Or do they have impunity to do
whatever they want and we just take it? Which I hope is not the
case.
General Gill. Chairman, all of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen deployed always have the right of self-defense. So that
is primary. We also have the Spartan Shield EXORD [executive
order], which gives authority for us to protect our allies in
Israel.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral?
Admiral Williams. I have nothing further to add than what
General Gill just added, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Shifting gears to the production supply lines and
production of missiles and precision-guided munitions, part of
the administration's supplemental budget request includes $755
million to expand production of Patriot interceptors from 550
to 650 annually.
Would you agree that that is something we need, or should
we even go beyond that, let's say?
General Gainey. Sir, thank you for the question
specifically referenced to the Patriot system. As you know, the
Army maintains the Patriot system and runs the Patriot system
and our great soldiers man the Patriot system globally today.
Yes, the additional interceptors are welcome. As you know,
the Patriot interceptor is in demand globally by the United
States and our partners, so any additional help in that area
will be very helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Do any of you have suggestions on how our
Nation's supply lines could be better equipped and constituted
for future potential demands?
I mean, we look at Ukraine, we look at Israel, we look at
the threats against Taiwan, and who knows what else might crop
up?
Starting with you, Secretary, and anyone else.
Mr. Hill. Certainly. Chairman, I think your previous
question about the supplemental, there is also $50 billion in
that that is focusing on industrial base. And that is something
we have seen, the ability to produce munitions, meet the need,
is very important. That would be strengthening that.
Additionally, in the NDAA, there is legislation on
multiyear procurement. That is another tool we can have to
improve our Nation's ability to respond rapidly to the rapidly
changing environments.
Mr. Lamborn. Did you say $50 billion?
Mr. Hill. Yep.
Mr. Lamborn. And what would that go for, as far as you
know?
Mr. Hill. There is a variety of investments in the
industrial base improving capacity. But, certainly, with
respect to Patriot, other munitions, that is key parts of it,
and a lot of skilled manufacturing in there.
Mr. Lamborn. Do either of the rest of you have any
suggestions on improving our Nation's production?
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. I guess I will just add, you
know, we found tremendous value in cooperative development,
cooperative production, and foreign military sales. It allows
the industrial base--it allows three things, right?
It allows the industrial base to be energized, to include
potentially foreign-nation industrial base, which was the case
with, you know, our ally Japan when we did the cooperative
development for the SM-3 IIA.
It allows us to control cost even further.
And then it really allows us to improve on the overall
integration of the weapons system with our foreign allies, with
our partners, and the interoperability, as well as the
industrial-base capacity, the supply chains that all get
energized from these cooperative developments with these
foreign military sales, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, and I am really happy to hear about our
ongoing cooperation with Japan. They have an excellent
manufacturing base and creativity and hard work in their
society. And I just think that that is wonderful, that we are
partnering with them like that.
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Anything else to add by either of the two
generals?
General Gill. Chairman, the only thing I would add is that
we monitor the total munition requirements of the entirety of
the force. The Chairman holds a readiness tank quarterly right
now where we look at the entirety of what we have in the
inventory, what our consumption rates are, so that we can then
turn the lever, if need be, particularly as we are providing
munitions to some of our allies, in the case of Ukraine and
Israel.
General Gainey. And, sir, nothing additional to add. Thank
you.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Very good.
Thank you all for your answers.
And I will turn it over to Ranking Member Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MDA has a responsibility to ensure both the sustainment of
missile defense today and to look ahead to ensure sufficient
missile defense capabilities into the future.
Now, this year, MDA is procuring the minimum sustaining
rate of interceptors for THAAD and Aegis.
Rear Admiral Williams, do you think MDA has the right
balance between the money spent on procurement and the money
spent on RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] to
ensure we can handle the ever-increasing threat from our
adversaries?
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
Absolutely, I do.
And I just will say, you know, MDA has various venues and
vehicles to stay tightly coupled and synchronized with the
combatant commanders to understand their priorities, their
needs. We have, you know, a tremendous number of venues and
vehicles to ensure we stay synchronized with the services. And
then, when we align with defense planning guidance, with
resources and our budget, you know, we get together and we
deliver capability that gets aligned with the Joint Staff's
global force management process that allocates that.
And then I will also say, you know, although, you know, our
budgets may go down for certain production lines, many times
and in cases like with THAAD, you know, the production line
gets bolstered with, you know, foreign military sales--and, in
this case, you know, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is procuring, you
know, several missile interceptors--that keep that production
line warm and hot so that, if and when we do have to surge in
the later part of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we
can do that, sir.
Mr. Moulton. Got it.
Rear Admiral Williams, last year, we visited the Aegis
Ashore site in Poland, which must have some of the most
luxurious accommodations for anyone in the United States Navy
on deployment. As a U.S. Marine, I confused the barracks for a
five-star resort when I walked in.
But while the sailors were enjoying their deployments, MDA
remained over half a decade behind schedule--half a decade--in
getting the site operational. Given the pace of evolving
threats today, this is grossly unacceptable.
But what was particularly shocking to me was learning that
construction would be completed in what I now understand is a
week from today, but then the site would not be operational for
months longer because it was going into a maintenance period.
Now, forgive my simpleton questions, but I wondered out
loud why you would immediately go into a maintenance period
right after you finished construction. And what I was told is
that the reason is because the software needed to be upgraded,
all sorts of new systems had to be installed, because the
original contract was for the old systems.
So the question I asked was: How much is the American
taxpayer spending to install an entirely outdated software
system--and I believe there was a lot of hardware associated
with it, as well, a network system--only to have it ripped out
on day one and replaced with an upgraded system? We haven't
received an answer to that question yet.
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. I will find out where we are in
answering that question.
I will say this, sir. You know, we have statements of work,
we have contracts, we have deliverables. And I don't believe,
you know, the maintenance that we do is as violent as ripping,
you know, hardware out, although hardware may be replaced. We
are in a constant----
Mr. Moulton. Well, whatever it is, we just want to know the
cost.
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. And I will take that for the
record and get back to you to understand the cost, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
A theme we have we have heard in this hearing, already in
previous hearings, is how overstretched our regional missile
defense capabilities are.
Mr. Hill, the administration's Missile Defense Review
acknowledged regional missile threats were continuing to grow
and emphasized the need to pace these changes, but it did not
recommend significant adjustments to U.S. regional missile
defense posture or force structure.
Do you believe that is still the correct approach? If no
force structure changes are needed, could you please describe
the Department's approach to countering these growing threats?
Mr. Hill. Yes. Thank you, Ranking Member Moulton.
In the Missile Defense Review, what we did differently this
time than in past years was, first, we integrated with the
National Defense Strategy, wrote them at the same point,
recognizing that missile defense is fundamentally not something
separate from the national defense; it is part and parcel of
that larger whole.
The second thing we did was we decided that we were not
going to try and identify in 2022, in a document issued in
2022, fixed targets for the different things we would be
needing, but we would be working that through the regular
process of the program budget review, the global force
management contingency planning, and we would be adapting what
we would need each year as we went through the regular
processes, so that if the demand grows and we have situations
like we have, we would be flexible and not tied to a document
that would be published in one year and be static.
That is the way we have been implementing it.
Mr. Moulton. Okay.
And then briefly, General Gill, you talked about this a
little bit with the chairman, but, as new threats arise,
sometimes on very short notice--for example, the October 7th
attack--and a regional, an AOR [area of responsibility]
commander asks for new capabilities, how do you manage the
tradeoffs, the process for allocating these missile defense
capabilities all around the globe?
General Gill. Thank you, sir. So this gets to the emergent
Secretary of Defense Orders Book process.
When a combatant commander has a requirement, they send a
request for forces into the Joint Staff. We adjudicate it, we
validate it, we check it for legal and policy implications, and
then we present the recommendations to the Chairman.
We always try to take the lens of the immediate problem to
be solved in the context of this strategy. And that gets to the
point I made earlier about looking at priority theaters versus
immediate demand to solve a problem. There is always a balance
that has to be made. The combatant commanders each provide risk
statements to us to the proposed courses of action. And then
the Chairman considers that in his recommendation to the
Secretary.
Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense has to make those hard
choices.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, you
talked about how limited our magazines are for missile defense
all around the world. And, of course, that is due to how
effectively they have been used.
But I think we need to dig into a little bit more not just
how were the tradeoffs that are associated with making these
allocations, as General Gill just described, but also the fact
that, you know, there are certain parts of the world,
especially the Pacific, where we simply need to have a lot of
missiles ready for deterrence.
Mr. Lamborn. Absolutely.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Absolutely. I would absolutely agree with
that.
And, now, Representative Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn.
And Chairman Lamborn was ahead of the curve by bringing up
about source of attacks. And so, Secretary Hill, this really
concerns me. We are at a war we did not choose. It is Iran.
Their puppets--the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas--trained by war
criminal Putin, are attacking our troops; it was brought to our
attention yesterday by Lord Cameron, the Foreign Minister of
U.K., their troops; we have got other allied troops. But they
are at direct risk of--and we have already had so many
injuries, but over 70 attacks. And I am very concerned.
I believe--and back to rules of engagement--that, with the
capabilities we have, what can we do to, by trajectory and by,
hey, satellite surveillance--as we wave to the satellite over
our head today--what can be done to identify the site of the
attack?
And why would there not be, as Secretary Panetta has said,
an immediate response?
Mr. Hill. Congressman Wilson, you are right to be
concerned.
And what is happening, as you are seeing, an awful lot of
entities--Hamas, Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, even Russian
forces--using equipment provided by Iran. And so the source of
that equipment, you know, we know it comes from Iran.
You can see, of course, in any particular physical attack,
whether it is an attack on Ukraine coming from Russia or an
attack on Israel coming from Gaza, you can see with the
overhead. And we can share--we have shared early-warning
arrangements with many countries around the world----
Mr. Wilson. But, hey, back specifically, my concern are
rocket attacks on our forces. And we know----
Mr. Hill. Yeah.
Mr. Wilson. --from Yemen or wherever, we know--we should
know, I hope, the exact site.
And somehow there should be--back on rules of engagement--
announced that there will be an immediate response within 5
minutes of once it is identified so that, if it is indeed
located at a school or a hospital--which they use human
shields.
Mr. Hill. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. The American people need to know that too.
And so why is there not immediate response? It is
impressive to attack an empty warehouse, but we need to go
after--we need to stop it. I just can't visualize--as a father
of four sons who served in the Middle East, I would be
disgusted if I had family there now, knowing the level of lack
of response.
Mr. Hill. Yeah, I understand what you are saying now.
The question of what the United States does in response, in
a striking-back sense, is a question that would go to the
Secretary of Defense and the President for decisions on that.
But, certainly, the defensive capabilities we have and that
we have to support our allies right now, who are responding in
their contexts, are in place.
Mr. Wilson. Well, hey, we want President Biden to be
successful--and Secretary Austin, everybody, and all of you.
But we need to respond immediately to stop this, because the
loss of life is really inexcusable.
And on the rules of engagement, I have never gotten over
that the sniper at Kabul Airport had the suicide bomber in his
sights, but rules of engagement prevented saving 13 American
lives and 276 Afghanis'. And this is setting up, indeed, more
human shields by not responding right away. And so I hope this
is done.
Also, I am really concerned, Admiral Williams, defense of
the very remarkably strategic American territory of Guam for
our national security. The Missile Defense Agency is
responsible to integrate the Army Integrated Air and Missile
Defense and Navy Aegis ballistic missile defense in support of
the defense of Guam.
Is there any additional requirements or resources that the
Missile Defense Agency may need to ensure the critical function
is established on Guam? Can you highlight the challenges and
limitations?
Admiral Williams. Sir, thank you for the question.
And, you know, we are aligned to deliver, with our Service
Acquisition Executive lead, which is the U.S. Army, to deliver
the INDOPACOM requirement of 360-degree Guam defensive system
against advanced ballistic missile threats, against hypersonic
threats, and against cruise missile threats.
You know, the Missile Defense Agency's portion of the
defense-of-Guam system is a command and control system, as well
as the Aegis weapons system that will include the SM-3 and SM-
6, and then that will integrate with the Army's capabilities
and architecture. And it will start showing up in the 2027
timeframe per the PB24 [President's Budget Request for 2024]
budget, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and for our witnesses
being here today.
I want to backtrack a little bit on what both the Ranking
Member and the Chairman had talked about, and that is our
industrial base.
Mr. Hill, how would you assess the condition of our
domestic industrial base when it comes to the manufacturing of
these systems?
Mr. Hill. Broadly, the industrial base is strong, but there
are weaknesses, as we have seen, in particular areas.
You know, the point about munitions that I made before.
What we have seen is, our ability to respond, not just in the
United States--allies also have seen that their industrial base
is not prepared to produce what we would want it to produce.
The supply chains also have vulnerabilities, where there is
reliance, over-reliance, on foreign sources that aren't as
assured as we would want them to be.
So these are areas that need to be addressed. And that is
some of what is in the supplemental bills, to try and improve
on those.
Mr. Norcross. So two issues that you mention--the foreign
materials that are coming in, it has been years since we have
identified the vulnerabilities of those. Why would they still
be a problem with us literally 4 years after we really started
to look at that problem?
Mr. Hill. Yeah. The issues of stockpiling taking time. So,
when you are dealing with critical minerals where you don't
have the production here locally so you are looking to
stockpile, that takes some time. The----
Mr. Norcross. But stockpiling it is above and beyond.
Mr. Hill. Right.
Mr. Norcross. I understand that.
Mr. Hill. So you will also have places where sometimes what
you are relying on is critical electronic components, where,
when you are wanting to have your assured production of supply
chains that you trust, the commercial marketplace that leads to
where companies make their investment decisions doesn't--it
leads to them wanting to be producing offshore. So you have to
work to figure out, where will it be acceptable? Which allies
will it be from? And which things do I then need to pay the
extra money to move on shore because the regular marketplace
that is driven by the commercial demand won't take care of
that?
Those are some of the factors that go into the industrial-
base questions. More in the lane of my acquisition and
industrial-base counterparts. But as I see it from the missile
defense area, those are the things that relate to the munitions
concerns that we have.
Mr. Norcross. You have talked about the additional moneys
that is going into the industrial base. Can you talk about that
with a little bit more specificity when it comes to, are we
looking at materials? Manpower? Industrial capacity?
Mr. Hill. Yes. All of that needs to be part of it. When you
are talking about increasing the production rates, you are
needing to have--that requires more skilled labor. It results
in more investment in plant and----
Mr. Norcross. So what are we doing to try to get that
labor, is the point I am trying to make.
Mr. Hill. Yeah, that is part of the objective of some of
the supplemental funding request, is to be able to invest in
that capacity so you would be able to have more production
lines working. Am I mis----
Mr. Norcross. I think we are talking past each other.
Mr. Hill. Okay.
Mr. Norcross. How are we recruiting that next generation?
You are saying there is money there, and I understand that----
Mr. Hill. Yeah.
Mr. Norcross. --but where is the money being spent? How are
we recruiting that next generation of worker?
Mr. Hill. So that recruitment obviously comes from the
companies, themselves, who do the hiring. The----
Mr. Norcross. Well, the--forgive me. This is the point I am
trying to make: Our industrial base for submarines, very
focused on that.
Mr. Hill. I see.
Mr. Norcross. And what we are doing through Department of
Defense and certainly through the Navy is helping to recruit
those. Are we looking at that same model for something as
critical as this?
Mr. Hill. I don't know, personally, on that aspect of the
industrial base. I would be happy to take the question back----
Mr. Norcross. Okay.
Mr. Hill. --for my colleagues who do industrial-base
matters.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Real quickly, Admiral Williams, you talked about the
cooperation with Japan helps control cost. Can you tell us how
that helps to control the cost?
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Or is it the capacity?
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
As we work-share--you know, as we defined our work-share,
the aspects for--in this case, the example I will give is SM-3
IIA.
Mr. Norcross. Right.
Admiral Williams. You know, Japan took ownership of the
second- and third-stage rocket motor development. So that was
their allocation that they were able to invest in, which
lowered our overall development, NRE, engineering that we, you
know, did not have to come up with. And, therefore, those costs
were shared and ultimately lowered the overall----
Mr. Norcross. So that was the development side, not the
production side.
Admiral Williams. Correct. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Mr. Hill, the Missile Defense Review
emphasizes the role of allies and partners in regional missile
defense.
Can you expand on what this looks like? And how is the
Department encouraging greater international participation in
this regards?
Mr. Hill. Absolutely. In my full written statement, I
address several of these points.
One of the things we are doing, in the Indo-Pacific area,
moving from the immediate fights, with Japan and Korea, we are
putting in place an ability to do trilateral shared early
warning. So they both have radars; they can benefit each other.
As we have been able to benefit them bilaterally, now you are
having a trilateral arrangement.
Of course, in the context of immediate fights in Europe, it
is not just the United States that has been supplying Ukraine.
Our European allies have provided a tremendous amount, some of
them larger shares of their GDP [gross domestic product] and
assistance to Ukraine than what we have been supplying as our
GDP, even though our aggregate gross number is quite large, of
course.
And so, then, in the Middle East, likewise. We are talking
about where we are deploying; the Gulf countries are some of
the largest investors in missile defense assets. And, as was
noted earlier, their demand is one of the things that keeps our
production base open and warm and available and gives us some
surge capacity.
Those are a few examples, sir.
Dr. DesJarlais. Great. Thank you.
General Gainey, demand for Patriot and THAAD capabilities
in recent years has put enormous stress on Army air defenders.
This is something that I have personally talked about with
General Karbler on a few occasions.
Can you talk about how the Army has tried to manage this
and the steps you all have taken to stabilize the force?
General Gainey. Sir, thank you for your question
specifically in that area and focus on our soldiers.
We have asked a lot of our air and missile defense
formations, and in every instance they have responded to every
call. However, the cost has been decreased time home. Right
now, all of our Patriot units are below the Secretary of
Defense's red line of deploy 1 year and return home for 2
years. And so it is having a strain on the force.
The Army leadership recognizes that strain and, as you
heard earlier, put in measures through our Health of the Force
initiative to get after initiatives to help improve areas as
far as soldiers. And the Joint Staff and the leadership has
also looked at reducing demand.
So we were on a glide path to improve deploy-to-dwell
readiness; however, the global demand again has caused those
units to fall back below the 1-to-2 red line and will continue
to be a challenge.
However, the Army leadership will look at other levers to
pull within our Health of the Force study to be able to address
the challenge with our highly deployed force.
Dr. DesJarlais. What does the training pipeline for this
capability look like? How long does it take the Army to develop
a trained air defender?
General Gainey. Yes, sir. So our officers come in and it is
about a 6-month school training before they go to a unit. And
same with our soldiers. Our soldiers are 6 to 9 months they
will get trained and move off to a unit, execute deployment or
garrison operations.
Dr. DesJarlais. Where do the retention rates stand today?
And so, once you've gotten them in the door, have you made
progress in retaining them?
General Gainey. Absolutely. Thank you for that question,
sir. And, again, important aspect of our ability to assess the
readiness of our force.
The retention remains strong. Our largest air missile
defense formation, the 32nd AAMDC [Army Air and Missile Defense
Command], leads FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command], a division-
size element, in retention. And all of our units are at the
Army goals for retention.
Dr. DesJarlais. Is there anything we can do to support the
work in this area?
General Gainey. Sir, we appreciate the continued support
and the support to the Army modernization. The Army's
modernization, with the Integrated Battle Command System as the
cornerstone of our modernization, will allow the branch to
build capacity and capability against threats.
The ability to integrate all of our sensors and shooters--
that will provide us the ability to, through one operator,
leverage the best sensor and best shooter--will allow us to
reduce the strain on several different organizations deploying
to one organization.
And so your support in allowing us to maintain funding in
that area will be helpful. Thank you, sir.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah.
Thank you all for your testimony today.
I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Vasquez.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Hill, General Gainey, Admiral Williams,
General Gill, for taking the time to speak with us this
morning.
I represent New Mexico's Second District, and it is the
proud home of White Sands Missile Range. White Sands is the
birthplace of America's Michelin space program, beginning as
the original testing site for the first atomic bomb. It
continues to serve as the Department of Defense's premier
research, development, and testing facility to this day.
White Sands is also home to some of our finest
servicemembers, contractors, and scientists in this Nation. And
the research and testing they conduct has been key to
developing and deploying many of the missile defense systems
that we have discussed today.
General Gainey, beyond the contributions that White Sands
has made to develop and test many of the weapons systems
currently in our arsenal, how can we ensure that White Sands
Missile Range continues to be the premier facility that
fulfills our missile modernization priorities?
General Gainey. And, sir, thank you for that question. And
thank you for your support to White Sands. As you know, it is a
critical component of our testing strategy.
White Sands will always be a critical part of the testing
environment because it provides the optimal opportunities for
us to test our capable systems, not just our current programs
of record, but also our future programs that are highlighted in
our modernization strategy--our IBCS [Integrated Battle Command
System] system and the components that will integrate into
IBCS; and, also, Increment 3 of our Indirect Fire Protection
system, where we will start looking at high-power microwave
capability, directed energy capability, and some of our cyber/
electronic-warfare-type capability. White Sands Missile Range
provides a great opportunity to test those systems.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, General.
And as we continue to see these destabilizing global
events, such as in Ukraine, the Middle East, and escalating
tensions with other global powers, I strongly believe that it
is important for the United States to have the most robust
fighting force possible with the capability to defend our
Nation. And I have often stated in committee hearings before
that if we can design it in New Mexico and test it in New
Mexico, we should also be able to build it in New Mexico.
So this question is for both Mr. Hill and Admiral Williams.
What are the advantages, the strategic advantages, of co-
locating missile production capabilities in regions like New
Mexico, where we already have the research, development, and
testing, as well as national labs and places like WSMR [White
Sands Missile Range]?
Admiral Williams. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
And I think all three of us have probably spent some time at
White Sands, and so it is a premier and an incredible range
that--and testing range that we have all used. We have
leveraged heavily White Sands for the THAAD and the THAAD
capabilities, from the development to the incremental upgrades
that we do to THAAD.
With respect to the aligning production line in the State
of New Mexico, you know, from an acquisition perspective, we
rely on our prime contractors to really determine their optimum
location for production lines, and so I don't know if I am
going to be able to answer your question directly.
I just will say, you know, from our regional defense that
the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for, our SM-3 class
of missiles, those interceptors have a production line in
Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, as well as the THAAD production
line operated by Lockheed Martin is out of Troy, Alabama.
In the future, is there possibility to establish a
production line in the State of New Mexico? Absolutely, but
that would have to be coordinated with our prime contractors as
far as optimally, economically, and just ensuring that, you
know, we manage the cost, schedule, performance, and quality
coming off that production line.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you.
Mr. Hill.
Mr. Hill. I wouldn't have too much more to add to what my
acquisition colleague would say.
The prime contractors typically are looking very carefully
at where they to want make their investment decisions, and
certainly the availability of related types of facilities,
related expertise is one of the things they take in mind, as
you have pointed out.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Hill.
And I would just continue to stress that, in economically
depressed States like New Mexico, having the production
capability that supports the testing and development of these
systems is critically important, especially in our rural
communities.
And so taking that into account as you are working with
contractors, more than just ability in existing facilities, but
also the needs of some of these communities that depend and
have, for many years, been the backbone of our missile defense
system is also critically important in those considerations as
we work with those contractors.
Thank you so much, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Strong.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn.
It is great to be with each of you again today. Thank you
for your commitment to the Missile Defense Agency.
Admiral Williams, I appreciate you taking time to stop by
my office yesterday. It is always great getting to chat with
someone who loves Huntsville, Alabama and its role in national
security. If you think about it, THAAD, SM-3, SM-6, Patriot,
PAC-3, along with many others--that is Rocket City, USA.
Congratulations, again, on being able to focus on your
actual job. And everyone knows how much you love test.
Admiral Williams. Thank you.
Mr. Strong. While this hearing is focused on regional
missile defense, it is important to remember that the threats
facing the United States do not occur in a vacuum. I agree with
testimony; THAAD is battle-tested, battle-proven, and we need
to increase production.
As the Missile Defense Agency has consistently
communicated, the missile defense system is an integrated
architecture of regional and homeland missile defense
capabilities. Accordingly, it is my belief that we should
balance our resources appropriately across the architecture.
Admiral Williams, I am concerned by reports that the
Department is considering down-selecting to a single design
earlier than planned for both the Next Generation Interceptor
and the Glide Phase Interceptor programs.
I know you cannot comment on predecisional matters, but
don't you believe a lesson learned from other now-canceled
portions of the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system is
the importance of maintaining competition, especially earlier
in the program's development?
Admiral Williams. Sir, thank you. Thank you for the
question.
And, yes, the Missile Defense Agency absolutely embraces,
endorses the spirit and intent of competition. And I will speak
to both programs, both the Next Generation Interceptor, NGI,
and the Glide Phase Interceptor, GPI.
So, for, you know, NGI, it is a gold standard for
competition. We are getting the right behavior by the two
competitors. We have accelerated the original baseline by as
much as 12 months. We held, you know, a major technical design
review with one of the offerors 2 months ago, and we are
holding the first technical design review for the second
offeror next month, in the month of January. Both offerors are
performing. I mean, they--and we have really produced an
incredibly mature design to date.
And so, yes, you know, for PB24, we are baseline to down-
select after the next major technical design review, known as
the critical design review. That is the baseline. You know,
anything beyond that is predecisional.
But, I guess, I just will offer this: You know, the
Department has to make hard decisions. Program managers, we
have to make hard decisions at times. And sometimes you have
to, you know, really appreciate where risk is and ensure those
resources are prioritized accordingly.
Decisions that we make at the Department level will be
communicated down to the service level and in a very
transparent way with, obviously, the Congress as well as our
industrial base. And any down-select that we do, you know,
ahead of the baseline that is already set will be communicated
and will be very fair.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
NGI is the future of homeland missile defense, and GPI is
the only purpose-built program to defend against hypersonic
threats. We don't have other capabilities in the pipeline if
these programs fail.
Are you concerned about the amount of risk this potential
cost-cutting measure--that it would add?
Admiral Williams. So, again, sir, I mean, managing risk is
a day-after-day, week-after-week, month-after-month, year-
after-year, decade-after-decade evolution that we do. We are
managing that risk appropriately. As I said, with NGI,
Congressman, we are really satisfied with the performance and
where we are to date with a very mature design.
And, again, we will ensure we are communicating with our
senior leaders if we think we are putting this country and the
national security of this country in a bad light, in a bad
space. And that is my job--was my job as the Acting Director,
but that will be the job of the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency--to ensure that we continue to, you know, provide that
constructive feedback and that constructive tension to ensure
we maximize the national security of this country, sir.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
If the NGI program failed like its predecessor, what would
that mean for the homeland missile defense? That would be an
extremely bad thing, and--and I am right. I mean, you know, you
think about it; we are fortunate there to have both Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman doing an exceptional job, and I
think that competition has worked well for our country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Appreciate the testimony. It is extremely useful.
I have one question for each of you. I would like to start
with Mr. Gill.
What is the most important lesson that you have learned
from the war in Ukraine?
General Gill. I think the power of a coalition, allies and
partners, and what we can do if we all come together.
Mr. Garamendi. Now, translate that into your task now in
missile defense systems.
General Gill. So I don't have a particular task in my role
as the J35 on the Joint Staff. We, however, track all of the
things we donate as a country and what other countries are
donating----
Mr. Garamendi. No, no.
I am going to be very, very clear, gentlemen. A 2-year test
of missile defense systems has occurred in Ukraine and is
continuing to occur. My question to you is, what is the single
most important thing that you have learned from that 2-year war
with regard to missile defense?
Mr. Gill.
General Gill. Congressman, I think----
Mr. Garamendi. So it is the integration? Is that it?
General Gill. No, I am going to talk to you about the
effectiveness of the weapons system.
So we have donated Patriots to the Ukrainians. We haven't
shot a Patriot in 20 years. The Ukrainians have used it very
effectively against the Russian missile attacks. So I think we
are----
Mr. Garamendi. So, going forward, more Patriots.
General Gill. I think we are seeing very effective use of
it.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Let's go on down the line.
Admiral Williams. Yes, sir. And if I could, you know, the
missile defense, you know, contributions to the war in Ukraine
is mainly through analysis and support with information, but if
I could, I will pivot into the Israeli conflict.
And I think the lessons learned with our Israeli allies is
critical with the integration of the weapons system writ large,
with the various subsystems of the Arrow, of David's Sling, of
Iron Dome, to integrate effectively for one, you know, complete
command-and-control picture so that they can, you know, select
the optimum, you know, missile system to engage the threats,
whether they are coming from Gaza with, you know, rockets or
from the Houthis, you know, originating out of Yemen with a
ballistic missile shot, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Gainey. General. Excuse me.
General Gainey. Sir, thank you.
And in my role as the joint counter-UAS [unmanned aerial
systems] office executive agent for the Army, we have looked
extensively at the Ukraine conflict. And I can tell you that
the use of drones and how we are seeing drones being utilized
in that conflict and other conflict highlights the need for an
integrated approach, netting all your sensors and shooters
together, so that when you are faced with the appropriate
threat, you are able to leverage the appropriate effector
against, whether it is a drone, cruise missile, or a tactical
ballistic missile.
And this is how the Army is moving forward with the Army
modernization--taking our Integrated Battle Command System,
netting our sensors into that capability, and then have an
effector where you can shoot a Coyote interceptor, a counter-
drone interceptor--low-cost--or you can shoot an IFPC [indirect
fire protection capability] cruise missile capability or a
Patriot interceptor, all integrated into one common system.
And I think, from what we learned in this conflict, it is
validating our approach as we move forward.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Hill.
Mr. Hill. Sir, a couple points on the key thing.
First, integrated air and missile defense is why Ukraine
remains sovereign. And our alliances are defending interests
that are fundamental to American national interests.
In Israel, integrated air and missile defense has given
Israel options, as was mentioned, I think, in the ranking
member's testimony, not just to have to always just hit back
immediately. They have options. It is very important in that
sense.
The investments that we need to continue making--and,
frankly, we need to improve our industrial base ability to
support that--are fundamental to the credibility of our
commitments around the world that are in our fundamental
national interests.
Mr. Garamendi. That is fine.
Mr. Hill. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Now, in the next 49 seconds, what do you
need from us to do what each one of you said is the most
important and that is the integration of the existing systems
that we have? What do you need?
We have $106 billion supplemental that speaks to part of
this, we have the NDAA out there, and we have the
appropriations out there. Do you have in those pieces of
legislation what you need to achieve what you have said is your
principal lesson that you have learned?
Mr. Hill, this is your turf. Yes or no, do you have it? And
if not, why not?
Mr. Hill. Yes, in those and in full appropriations, sir.
Those are the things that we need. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Between the two--that is, the supplemental
and the NDAA?
Mr. Hill. Yeah, the supplemental, the multiyear procurement
that is in the NDAA, for example. And regular appropriations
are just fundamental to doing the business of the Defense
Department.
Mr. Garamendi. Then I shall focus my time on what you
gentlemen have suggested we spend--that you are spending your
time on.
Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I apologize for
being late. I hope that these questions haven't already been
asked, and if so, I apologize for that as well.
I serve as one of the people on the Quality of Life panel,
one of the leads on that panel. And I know Rep. Bacon would
probably ask the same sorts of questions.
General Gainey, you mentioned a little bit about
recruiting, retention, the OPTEMPO, how long people are being
deployed for, and that you were happy with retention rates. But
I was wondering if you could kind of go into some of the
quality-of-life improvements that perhaps you have been making
and if there are any further ones that we should be focused on
the quality-of-life panel.
General Gainey. Absolutely, ma'am. And thank you for that
question.
And that was one of the areas that I wanted to highlight
when I highlighted my answer earlier, that support to the
quality-of-life programs will also be a critical part to
continue the improvement in getting after the health-of-force
initiatives.
The air and missile defense formations, as I highlighted
earlier, are the most deployed formations in the Army. And,
several times, those systems are deployed early into an
environment, and the quality-of-life facilities aren't in place
for the soldiers as they deploy into those locations, and they
are often built around the unit. And so, over time, the
quality-of-life initiatives arrive.
However, as we build our defense-of-Guam Army architecture,
we are looking at MILCON [military construction] and quality of
life on the forefront. And we can use your help in ensuring
that we get the MILCON funding so that when our soldiers move
into the defense of Guam to occupy their systems, that they
have quality-of-life initiatives in place to support them.
Ms. Houlahan. That is very helpful.
My next question is for DASD [Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense] Hill, but I am actually quite interested in
everybody's response. And, again, apologies if this has been
asked.
I was listening to some conversation about Ukraine. But,
DASD Hill, you wrote in your testimony and emphasized the
importance of continued support of Ukraine and that this has
been essential in their successful campaign against Russia and
keeping their sovereignty.
As you probably are following, this is pretty contentious
here on the Hill. And I was wondering if you could elaborate a
little bit on why you think it is so important to continue to
support Ukraine.
Mr. Hill. Ukraine is fighting NATO's and America's battle.
They are facing a threat from Russia, from Moscow, Putin, that
is the same threat that we decided over 75 years ago we were
going to stand up against.
Ukraine has demonstrated that you can't put over-reliance
on hoping that somebody has changed their ways, and they are
paying a terrible price for it.
Our commitment to Ukraine demonstrates the credibility of
the commitments we make all around the world. And standing up
and supporting Ukraine in that fight is standing up and
supporting American national interest.
Ms. Houlahan. And in relevance to this particular hearing,
are you aware of any outstanding requests that they have for
missile systems that are unaddressed right now?
Mr. Hill. The concern is what needs to be funded yet to
come. That is the biggest part of it. My colleagues may have
many more specifics on that, but I think it is what is yet to
come and needing that continued funding to keep the
sustainment.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you all have things to offer there?
General Gill. Yes, Congresswoman.
So we track every bullet, every missile that we send to
Ukraine, and we track a burnout date. We are going to get to a
point where we can't keep up the production level with what our
contributions are. And so, you know, in terms of providing them
more, we are going to get to a point where we are not going to
be able to deliver.
So it gets a little bit to the conversation about the
industrial base and making sure that the industrial base is
producing at pace, but it is also some funding.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you also share the perspective that we
need to continue funding Ukraine and their battle?
General Gill. I absolutely agree with Mr. Hill's point.
This is our credibility as a Western Nation that believes in,
you know, the rule of law. So I do, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
And, gentlemen, anything further in that subject?
Admiral Williams. Nothing further to add from me, ma'am.
Thank you.
Ms. Houlahan. Excellent. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
I want to thank all the witnesses for your very helpful
testimony. I think members have asked a lot of excellent
questions as well.
Because of impending votes, we won't be having a second
round of questions and we won't be having a closed hearing, so
the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
December 7, 2023
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 7, 2023
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
December 7, 2023
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Admiral Williams. On December 15, 2023, Aegis Ashore Poland was
officially accepted by the Navy for operational tasking. As with all
new afloat (and Aegis Ashore) weapon systems platform construction
efforts, and similar to the Aegis Ashore Romania delivery and
employment timeline, Aegis Ashore Poland has been scheduled for a
follow-on Chief of Naval Operations sponsored Selected Restricted
Availability for maintenance and modernization.
The original Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (C4I) network Integrated Shipboard Network Systems for
Aegis Ashore Poland was procured in 2011 at a cost of $3 million (M),
with the intent of deploying that system in 2018. The CANES system was
immature in that timeframe.
In coordination with the Navy, the following systems will be
upgraded to modernize the C4I network, totaling $11.34M ($6.93M in
procurement costs; $4.41M in manpower installation costs).
1. CANES at a procurement cost of $4.8M. 2. Global Positioning
Navigation and Timing System at a procurement cost of $1.31M. 3.
Automated Digital Network System at a procurement cost of $0.82M.
Post-delivery modernization availabilities address C4I system
upgrades and enhancements to address obsolescence, new required
capabilities and security enhancements. These key upgrades will enhance
the warfighter's ability to defend the theater with the most up-to-date
C4I capabilities to include improvements in the Cyber Security posture,
network applications, and command and control capacity throughput. Upon
completion of this availability, both Aegis Ashore Poland and Romania,
will be outfitted with the most capable, interoperable, and secure C4I
systems employed in our afloat and ashore platforms today. [See page
12.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 7, 2023
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The Missile Defense Review also emphasized the role of
allies and partners in regional missile defense; how is the Department
encouraging greater international participation in this regard and what
opportunities for co-production and co-development is the Department
exploring?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. What demand signal have you seen from partners about
these capabilities, particularly since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. Can you please provide us with an update on timing for
launching HBTSS. What steps are your offices taking to ensure prompt
fielding?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. Demand for Patriot and THAAD capabilities in recent
years has put enormous stress on Army air defenders; can you talk about
how the Army has tried to manage this and the steps it's taken to
stabilize the force? Specifically, what is the current dwell time for
these units and how retention rates?
General Gainey. Please see accompanying document.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7564.036
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lamborn. What does the training pipeline for these
capabilities look like? How long does it take the Army to develop a
trained air defender, and are there challenges to growing the force?
General Gainey. To create a Patriot Soldier, it takes between 17 to
29 weeks depending on the Soldier's specialty within the unit. For
Soldiers assigned to a THAAD unit, they attend a follow-on course that
is THAAD specific adding between 3 to 10 weeks of additional training.
Patriot and THAAD units contain 3 of the 5 ADA MOSs (14E, 14H, and
14T).
Mr. Lamborn. Can you please explain the timeline for the fielding
of an 8th THAAD battery?
General Gainey. THAAD Battery #8 is stationed at Fort Bliss, TX.
The battery will begin fielding the THAAD system in FY25, with a
projected operational availability date of FY27.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Lamborn. Can you talk about the beneficial role
international partners play on impact international partners have on
your programs, whether through co-development efforts or Foreign
Military Sales?
General Gainey. International Partners are instrumental to Army
programs and often leveraged through various Security Cooperation
tools, including cooperative research and development, and via Security
Assistance (Foreign Military Sales (FMS), etc.). Co-production and co-
development optimizes both US and foreign industrial bases, decreases
weapons systems cost through economies of scale, and shapes future
shared supply chains by increasing production capacity and shortening
lead times for critical supply items. In addition, FMS is critical to
building a partner's capacity in today's complex global security
environment, while promoting interoperability and providing the added
benefit of maintaining production lines during times of decreased US
requirements.
Mr. Lamborn. How is the Missile Defense Agency shaping its
management of Aegis and THAAD programs to ensure there's sufficient
interceptor production capacity to meet requirements for the defense of
Guam without taking from other missions?
General Gainey. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. How important is it to expand production capacity for
the Patriot MSE missile to be able to meet this and other emerging
challenges?
General Gainey. Increasing production capacity is an area that is
very important to the Army. The Army has awarded a contract that
increases production capacity of PAC-3 MSE to 550 annually, with
deliveries at that rate beginning in FY25. However, forecasted US
government and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) demand through FY 28
exceeds 650. As Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) threats continue to
expand it is reasonable to assume that demand for the Patriot system
will continue to grow annually. The continued proliferation of PATRIOT
will be integral to other integrated air-defense systems and expanding
capacity of interceptors will be required to meet expanding US Army
Total Munition Requirements as well as the high FMS demand.
Accordingly, the Army is evaluating the need to expand production
further.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you talk about the beneficial role international
partners play on impact international partners have on your programs,
whether through co-development efforts or Foreign Military Sales?
Admiral Williams. As highlighted in the 2022 Missile Defense
Review, America's alliances and partnerships around the world are one
of its greatest assets. In line with federal law and Department of
Defense (DoD) policy and priorities, MDA actively engages on
international cooperative efforts to benefit the United States (U.S.)
and our allies and partners. These efforts build and strengthen
security relationships to promote U.S. security interests, while
developing allies' and partners' capabilities for self-defense and
multi-national operations.
FMS provides our allies and partners with highly effective U.S.-
developed systems, which in many cases augment and support American
warfighters and reduce regional demand on U.S. units and systems. FMS
systems provide defense capability for our international partners that
are largely interoperable with U.S. assets and reduce the cost for DoD
acquisition through economies of scale. In the maritime realm, the U.S.
has sold Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA, IB, and IIA to Japan via
FMS by exercising priced options on multiple U.S. contracts. While
specific savings to the U.S. and FMS customer depend on various
factors, the additional FMS quantities help to maximize the efficiency
of the SM-3 production lines to achieve the best unit price.
In the land domain, the U.S. has sold Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) to United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA). The U.S. was able to procure an eighth THAAD battery more
quickly and affordably due to FMS re-opening cold production lines and
paying down obsolescence. Through previous synergized buys with two FMS
customers, KSA and UAE, the U.S. has procured THAAD interceptors for
approximately $1-2 million less per unit. Another benefit of FMS is the
increased opportunity to demonstrate the utility and operational use of
U.S. systems, further proving to the world their effectiveness. For
example, the UAE has executed the only operational intercept using
THAAD.
Through international agreements with our partners, cooperative
development and co-production allows cost sharing and technology
contributions to develop and field current and future capabilities for
the U.S. and our partners. The MDA and Japan cooperatively developed
the SM-3 Block IIA, with Japan investing $1 billion. Japan produces
approximately 50 percent of the missile hardware. The success of the
SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development Project helped lead the United
States and Japan to agree to cooperatively develop the Glide Phase
Interceptor (GPI), announced by President Biden and Prime Minister
Kishida in August 2023.
This project is the only effort under development that contests
hypersonic threats in the glide phase. While project arrangement
negotiations for GPI are not complete, MDA anticipates a significant
cost benefit to the U.S. The U.S. and Israel co-develop and produce the
David's Sling and Arrow Weapon Systems. The U.S. provides $500 million
for Israeli Cooperative Programs, including $80 million in procurement
support for the Iron Dome Defense Systems. These three systems have
demonstrated multiple combat intercepts in recent months, providing
critical protection to the citizens of Israel.
In addition to FMS, International Partnering provides focused
maturity to various Science and Technology (S&T) critical areas
allowing MDA to capitalize on the technical expertise of Allies,
Friends and Partners. These S&T partnerships serve to further
accelerate development of critical missile defense technologies.
Mr. Lamborn. How is the Missile Defense Agency shaping its
management of Aegis and THAAD programs to ensure there's sufficient
interceptor production capacity to meet requirements for the defense of
Guam without taking from other missions?
Admiral Williams. The current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) Program has the capacity to produce up to 8 interceptors per
month for a total of 96 per yearly lot buy and the ability to direct
Lockheed Martin to surge to up to 12 interceptors per month, for a
total of 144 per yearly lot buy with 24-month advance notice required.
This approach will ensure sufficient THAAD interceptor production
capacity for both the defense of Guam and other contractual
obligations.
The Sea-Based Weapon Systems (Aegis) Standard Missile (SM)-3
Program has the capacity to produce up to 24 SM-3 Block IIA All Up
Rounds (AUR), and up to 52 SM-3 Blk IB AURs annually. That capacity is
used to fulfill both United States (U.S.) Government and Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) partner demands. The combination of U.S. and FMS
procurements planned through Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 consume the entire
SM-3 Block IIA production capacity in that timeframe, while the SM-3
Block IB production line has capacity beyond currently planned
procurements. The prime contractor has the existing capacity to surge
one additional missile per quarter of each block, for a limited period
of time. Any sustained increase above the maximum production rates
listed above would require capital investment and a three year lead
time to bring production equipment online at Raytheon and sub-tier
suppliers.
The SM-6 Blk I/IA Program is under contract with Raytheon to
deliver 29 Blk I and 96 Blk IA AURs per year. Capacity surges on the
SM-6 program's production line is capable as long as there is a steady
flow of hardware to support. There are multiple programs that utilize
Raytheon Redstone Missile Integration Facility, which affects overall
capacity and rate, but ideally, SM-6 production should be able to surge
without affecting other missions/contractual obligations with an
alternative quantity mix of Blk I and IA builds. SM-6 Blk IA Upgrade
(IAU) is currently in development and does not have a production
contract. Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems 3 is
planning for initial deliveries to occur beginning in FY 2028.
Expecting SM-6 Blk IAU to maintain similar production capacities and
surge capabilities as what is currently being produced for SM-6
variants.
The Missile Defense Agency is not funded to procure missiles
specifically for the Defense of Guam mission and because of multiple
operational commitments for missiles, the allocation of missile
inventory will be via the Global Force management process.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you discuss MDA's efforts to integrate Patriot and
THAAD capabilities, and the operational benefit this additional
capability will bring?
Admiral Williams. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
System Build 4.0 was developed for United States Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) Joint Emergent Operational Need PC-0021 and encompasses
all of the following capabilities:
THAAD Remote Launcher: This capability increases the
THAAD defended area and improves defense against specific regional
threat concerns.
Patriot Launch on Remote (THAAD): Increases the Patriot-
defended area and engagement opportunities by allowing the Missile
Segment Enhancement (MSE) Interceptor to leverage the highly effective
THAAD Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillence-2.
Initial THAAD/MSE Integration: Improves THAAD self-
defense without requiring a dedicated Patriot Battery, expands defended
area, and increases engagement opportunities, while conserving THAAD
interceptors by adding MSE launchers and MSE missiles as a component of
the THAAD Weapon System.
Both USINDOPACOM Batteries received THAAD System Build 4.0. In
Calendar Year (CY) 2024 the THAAD Project Office and the U.S. Army will
continue to coordinate fielding to the remaining 5 Batteries; subject
to Battery availability.
In 1Q CY2024, the THAAD Project Office will review Critical Design
Review-level content for THAAD System Build 5.0. THAAD System Build 5.0
contains improvements for Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 MSE Cold
Fire Prevention, the PAC-3 MSE Electronic Thermally Initiated Venting
System, software improvements for PAC-3 MSE Manual Emplacement, updates
to the PAC-3 MSE fire control contained within the THAAD Fire Control,
and improvements in the management of Patriot Launch on Remote THAAD
for radar prioritization and resource usage. In 4Q CY2024, the THAAD
Project Office will begin integrating the final engineering release of
THAAD 5.0 software into the Government-run hardware in the loop
laboratory at Redstone Arsenal in preparation for the Missile Defense
Agency system-level testing in CY2025.
In 3Q CY2024, the THAAD Project Office plans to award Long Lead
Systems Engineering requirements for THAAD System Build 6.0. THAAD
System Build 6.0 initially planned for delivery in 2032, has been
accelerated to deliver in December 2027, in response to emerging
Warfighter needs and will include additional THAAD/MSE Integration
upgrades as well as provide the initial capability against non-
ballistic threats, increase the Threat Engagement Space and improve
THAAD Integrated Battle Command System Integration via Link-16.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you please provide us with an update on timing for
launching HBTSS. What steps are your offices taking to ensure prompt
fielding?
Admiral Williams. The two Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Hypersonic
and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototype demonstrator
space vehicles (SVs) are completing final functional testing and are
manifested on U.S. Space Force (USSF) -124 for launch on February 14,
2024, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. USSF-124 will carry the two MDA
HBTSS SVs and four USSF/Space Development Agency Wide Field of View
SVs. The February 14, 2024, launch represents a 4.5 month delay in
previous program plans to launch at the end of Q4FY23. This delay is
specific to one HBTSS vendor, Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC),
experiencing a technical issue with sensor pointing functionality.
NGC's SV will launch in a partially degraded configuration in order to
support timely collection of data to anchor models supporting
development, fielding, and operation of the Space Force's Proliferated
Warfighting Space Architecture. The technical issue has been mitigated
through work-arounds to an acceptable level of risk, independently
verified, to meet HBTSS program objectives to demonstrate latency,
sensitivity, and quality of service for engaging hypersonic threats.
Mr. Lamborn. What are MDA's plans to test and ensure HBTSS sensors
are properly calibrated to track realistic hypersonic once it is in
orbit?
Admiral Williams. Launch of the two HBTSS prototype demonstration
SVs will be followed by the Launch and Early Orbit Testing (LEOT)
period. This early on-orbit testing is conducted by the Performers and
overseen by the HBTSS Program Office, and it serves to ensure the
prototype demonstration SVs are properly calibrated to track hypersonic
and ballistic threats while on orbit. LEOT will be followed by on-orbit
testing, utilizing the MDA Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), non-IMTP
partner flight test events, and Targets of Opportunity to test,
characterize, and validate the HBTSS performance. Following the
successful demonstration of HBTSS capabilities, the responsibility for
HBTSS operational fielding will be transferred to United States Space
Force and MDA will continue the development of the next generation of
space-based fire-control sensors for missile defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. General Gainey, Can you discuss what the Army is
doing to improve recruiting and retention for Air Defense?
And, can you touch on how the Army is providing predictability to
soldiers and their families as the increase in requests for Air Defense
deployments are on the rise?
General Gainey. Recruiting and Retention efforts for 14-Series: The
Army has placed Non-Prior Service (NPS) accessions and Retention
incentives on all 5 ADA MOSs. A decisive increase in an Enlistment
bonus for 4--6 years could significantly impact the branch's immediate
need for NPS recruits and would provide the stability needed to
maintain a healthy Air Defense force in the near-term. Additionally, an
increase in retention bonuses for every MOS in Career Management Field
(CMF) 14 would ensure that ADA retains the human capital and experience
required for the future in the long-term. Average Dwell Time for ADA
Soldiers by AAMDC: 10th AAMDC (Europe)--between 8 and 15 months over
the last 3 years 32nd AAMDC (CONUS/CENTCOM)--between 11 and 15 months
over the last 3 years 94th AAMDC (PACOM)--between 23 and 27 months over
the last 3 years
Mr. Carbajal. Can you briefly describe the training pipeline for
Army Air Defenders?
How long does it take to develop these individuals, and do you
anticipate any challenges with growing that force to the anticipated
levels needed?
General Gainey. To create a Patriot Soldier, it takes between 17 to
29 weeks depending on the Soldier's specialty within the unit. For
Soldiers assigned to a THAAD unit, they attend a follow-on course that
is THAAD specific adding between 3 to 10 weeks of additional training.
Patriot and THAAD units contain 3 of the 5 ADA MOSs (14E, 14H, and
14T).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. Is it important to have China's missile capabilities
integrated into US arms control frameworks like New Start? Is this
something the administration is pursuing? Will DOD advocate for
reauthorizing New Start when it comes up again without Chinese
involvement?
Which countries are most militarily important for basing
theater missile defense sites? Have you begun discussions with them?
How are those discussions going?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. The plan for building out a layered missile defense plan
in the Pacific relies on bringing onboard systems like Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability, and our BMD
ships.
Can you be more specific about where the land-based
systems will be stationed, and the expected footprint of the
deployments?
Given the size of China's Strategic Rocket Forces and our
own limited footprint, what is the US employment strategy for theater
force posture--delaying the effects of an attack, blocking parts of an
attack, or deterring an attack on the most critical US sites?
What will be the role of hypersonic missiles I this plan,
and what is the current status of their integration in what I hope is
an evolving integrated air and missile defense system that is robust,
survivable, and increasingly agile?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. COCOM demand for BMD ships and carrier escort duties and
independent deployments can very easily outstrip supply, and excessive
COCOM request for forces often does.
How will the Pentagon manage BMD ships as strategic
national assets to prioritize and achieve high readiness for the at-
sea, mobile part of the layered defense which is arguably among the
most survivable--are additional request for Forces putting pressure on
readiness of the force, missile inventory flexibility, and
prioritizations within the Global Force Management Plan (GFMAP)?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. Over the last several weeks we have seen multiple
attacks emanate from the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels targeting Israel,
including drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. We have also
seen attacks from Yemen targeting maritime shipping in the Red Sea.
U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria also continue to be attacked in various
escalations.
Can you please detail to the committee the extent of the
Houthi threat on freedom of navigation?
What missile and drone capabilities do the Houthis
currently have and to what extent are those capabilities indigenous as
opposed to directly abetted by Iran?
To what extent are Houthi threats affecting our allies?
How do you assess our ability to protect them in a complex threat
arena?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. It is critical that Congress quickly approve the
supplemental aid package to Israel. Israel has already faced thousands
of rockets from Hamas and has used many of its Iron Dome interceptors.
If Iranian-proxy Hezbollah gets involved, Israel could face hundreds of
thousands of rockets. It is critical that Israel have enough Iron Dome
interceptors as well as other military supplies to deter Hezbollah from
joining the conflict and continue to defend themselves against Hamas.
I understand the administration needs Congressional action to lift
the statutory limits on the value of arms that can be placed in the
stockpile. Can you discuss the state of the U.S. war reserve stockpile
in Israel?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. Israel is in the midst of a war that is testing the
limits of its multilayered missile defense architecture. Pursuant to
the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Security Assistance, the
U.S. invests $500 million annually for development and procurement of
the Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow systems, all which Israel has
needed to use during the course of the ongoing war.
In your assessment, how have the various missile defense
systems Israel has in place have performed so far during the course of
the ongoing war with Hamas?
Since the outbreak of the war, the U.S. has deployed
significant missile defense assets to the region to protect Israel and
deter a broader conflagration. Can you please detail those additional
assets deployed to the region and assess their performance thus far, as
much as possible in this setting?
To the extent possible, can you discuss how our missile
defense cooperation with Israel has served U.S. national security
interests?
What else should we be doing to ensure we can continue to
support our allies?
What are your thoughts on an integrated regional missile
defense architecture in the Middle East?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. COCOM demand for BMD ships and carrier escort duties and
independent deployments can very easily outstrip supply, and excessive
COCOM request for forces often does.
How will the Pentagon manage BMD ships as strategic
national assets to prioritize and achieve high readiness for the at-
sea, mobile part of the layered defense which is arguably among the
most survivable--are additional request for Forces putting pressure on
readiness of the force, missile inventory flexibility, and
prioritizations within the Global Force Management Plan (GFMAP)?
Rear Admiral Williams. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Waltz. The plan for building out a layered missile defense plan
in the Pacific relies on bringing onboard systems like Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability, and our BMD
ships.
Can you be more specific about where the land-based
systems will be stationed, and the expected footprint of the
deployments?
Given the size of China's Strategic Rocket Forces and our
own limited footprint, what is the US employment strategy for theater
force posture--delaying the effects of an attack, blocking parts of an
attack, or deterring an attack on the most critical US sites?
What will be the role of hypersonic missiles I this plan,
and what is the current status of their integration in what I hope is
an evolving integrated air and missile defense system that is robust,
survivable, and increasingly agile?
General Gill. Determining missile defense requirements for one
Combatant Command given the many competing global priorities remains a
dynamic process with a variety of time sensitive considerations.
Maintaining the right posture for missile defense in a given region
depends primarily on the baseline priorities laid out in national level
guidance. But, other considerations, such as the likelihood and
magnitude of the assessed threat, the implications to our relationships
with allies and partners, our ability to provide alternative defensive
options (such as passive defense actions), the location and capability
of alternate missile defense forces, including allies and partners, and
potential sustainment implications are all weighed in the decision
process. Additionally, the availability of assigned missile defense
forces to a Combatant Commander provides forces that can be moved
internally by the Commander to meet specific local missile defense
needs. USINDOPACOM has the largest missile defense force assigned
outside of crisis allocation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VASQUEZ
Mr. Vasquez. Recently, there have been discussions about adding
Counter--Drone/Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities on
military installations. However, I'm aware that current policy does not
allow DOD to engage drone threats. What authorities would DOD need to
be permitted to use C-UAS capabilities on a military installation to
defeat, deter, or disrupt UAS intrusions?
General Gainey. Thank you for your recent inquiry and demonstrated
concern relating to the Department's legal authorities and associated
policies underpinning DoD's ability to protect our Homeland
installations, assets, and personnel from the threats posed by unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS). The Department currently possesses the legal
authority to protect its Homeland installations from threats posed by
UAS; however, this authority is limited in scope to certain covered
facilities or assets, the majority of which will expire in 2026.
The deployment of counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities across DoD
installations is based on Service Secretary and Global Priority List
(GPL) prioritization factors. The Department's domestic C-UAS
authority, 10 U.S.C.Sec. 130i, Protection from Unmanned Aircraft
Threats, provides DoD with the statutory authority to protect its
Homeland ``covered facilities or assets'' from threats posed by UAS to
their safety or security. The statute allows appropriately trained DoD
uniformed and civilian personnel to engage in C-UAS activities to
detect, identify, track, and monitor UAS posing a potential threat to
DoD covered facilities and assets.
It further authorizes these personnel, where appropriate, to
disrupt the control of, exercise control over, seize, confiscate, or
use reasonable force necessary to disable, damage, or destroy threat
UAS. The statute limits the Secretary's authority to designate Homeland
``covered facilities or assets'' to those directly relating to one of
nine distinct mission areas, namely: nuclear deterrence and nuclear
command, control, and communications (NC3); missile defense; national
security space; assistance in Presidential or Vice Presidential
protection; air defense of the United States, to include the National
Capital Region integrated air defense system (NCR IADS); combat support
agencies; special operations activities; production, storage,
transportation, or decommissioning of high-yield explosive munitions;
and the DoD's Major Range and Test Facilities.
The Department has previously proposed expanding the section 130i
authority to, among other things, identify additional mission areas for
designation of covered facilities and assets, as well as to extend the
expiration date of this authority. Additionally, the CJCS Standing
Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US
Forces, CJCSI 3121.01, provides commanders of the Department's Homeland
installations the authority to exercise the inherent right of self-
defense--which is to say, to utilize that force which is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances to defend DoD personnel and critical
assets against physical attacks.
[all]