[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     RENEWED U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE
                   PACIFIC: ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE
                         OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

=======================================================================


                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDO-PACIFIC

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             MARCH 23, 2023
                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-8
                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        


Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
56-815                    WASHINGTON : 2024                          


                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey        GREGORY MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK GREEN, Tennessee                TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California                COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida               ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              SARA JACOBS, California
AMATA RADEWAGEN, American Samoa      KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas                SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                    Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   GREG STANTON, Arizona
MIKE WALTZ, Florida                  MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
THOMAS KEAN, New Jersey              JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida                  SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas               JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan                 BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas

                Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
              Sophia A. LaFargue, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                    Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific

                   YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 AMI BERA, California, Ranking 
MARK GREEN, Tennessee                    Member
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA RADEWAGEN, American Samoa      BRAD SHERMAN, California
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
MIKE WALTZ, Florida                  WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
                                     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
                Dan Markus, Subcommittee Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               WITNESSES

                                                                   Page
Ms. Jane Bocklage, Deputy And Senior Advisor to the Special 
  Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, U.S. Department of 
  State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs................     7
Mr. Craig Hart, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Asia Bureau, U.S. 
  Agency for International Development...........................    12
Ms. Holly A. Haverstick, Director, International Affairs and 
  Foreign Policy Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard.......................    19
Mr. Keone Nakoa, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and 
  International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior.........    23

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    55
Hearing Minutes..................................................    57
Hearing Attendance...............................................    58

                        MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

Representative Sherman Material for the Record...................    36

                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Bocklage to 
  Representative Kim of California...............................    59
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Bocklage to 
  Representative Radewagen.......................................    64
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Bocklage to 
  Representative Castro..........................................    66
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Bocklage to 
  Representative Waltz...........................................    75
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Bocklage to 
  Representative Sherman.........................................    79
Responses to questions for the Record from Mr. Hart to 
  Representative Kim of California...............................    81
Responses to questions for the Record from Mr. Hart to 
  Representative Waltz...........................................    84
Responses to questions for the Record from Mr. Hart to 
  Representative Radewagen.......................................    87
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Haverstick to 
  Representative Kim of California...............................    89
Responses to questions for the Record from Ms. Haverstick to 
  Representative Waltz...........................................    91
Responses to questions for the Record from Mr. Nakoa to 
  Representative Radewagen.......................................    92

 
    RENEWED U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC: ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE
                         OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific,
                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:22 p.m., in 
Room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Young Kim [chair of the 
subcommittee] presiding.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The Subcommittee on the Indo-
Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to help shape how Congress 
should be thinking about the strategic importance of the 
Pacific Islands.
    With that, I would like to recognize myself for an opening 
statement.
    You know, I am really excited that this is my first hearing 
as the chair of this Indo-Pacific Subcommittee.
    [Applause.]
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. And also the first 
subcommittee hearing in this Congress. And I look forward to 
working with Ranking Member Bera, who has been sitting in this 
chair when you guys were in the majority, and now we take the 
gavel, and we are in the majority. I look forward to working 
with both members of both sides of the aisle on policies that 
strengthen American leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
    This hearing will examine renewed U.S. engagement in the 
Pacific Islands and assess the importance of the Pacific 
Islands. The Pacific Islands, which have long been a linchpin 
of the United States' foreign policy in the Eastern Hemisphere, 
face unique security, environmental, and economic challenges. 
They face an increasing number of natural disasters, and some 
islands have challenges mitigating the environmental cleanup 
from the U.S. nuclear testing during the Cold War.
    Many of the islands' economies are critically reliant on 
tourism and were devastated by COVID-19. Their road to economic 
recovery is a very long one, and many of their ambassadors have 
expressed their concerns that the Pacific Islands will never 
recover.
    As someone who has spent much of my time, my childhood, on 
that island of Guam, I am very familiar with these challenges, 
and I am committed to ensuring that the U.S. Pacific Islands' 
diplomatic and economic relationship remains a priority for our 
committee's agenda.
    The timing of this hearing is critical. The U.S. is 
currently in negotiations with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, or FSM, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, or RMI, to renew the Compacts of Free Association, 
known as COFA. This provides economic assistance, certain 
federal benefits for their citizens, and allows the U.S. to 
maintain a military presence in those countries.
    The compacts with the FSM and RMI are set to expire this 
year, and the compact with Palau will expire next year. So much 
of today's hearing will be focused on getting updates on the 
compact negotiations from the State Department and other 
agencies involved. I am concerned that we have not received 
much information on the status of the negotiations, and going 
forward I ask that the State Department regularly update our 
committee on your progress.
    I cannot understate the importance of renewing the COFA 
agreements. Our military installations in these countries are 
vital logistics hubs for our operations in the Pacific, and the 
agreements provide the citizens of these countries with 
benefits that they otherwise would not have.
    During the Second World War, most of the Pacific faced a 
brutal Japanese occupation, and the U.S. fought a bloody 
campaign to liberate the Pacific Islands, and tens of thousands 
of U.S. service members lost their lives on those islands that 
today the U.S. has COFA agreements with.
    Seventy years later, the Pacific Islands are facing a 
variety of new threats. We were recently alarmed by the 
outgoing FSM president's detailed accounts of the PRC's 
political warfare, including the dispatch of the People's 
Liberation Army surveillance vessels in Micronesian territorial 
waters and the CCP's overt efforts to bribe high-ranking 
government officials. He went as far as saying, ``What else do 
you call it when an elected official is given an envelope 
filled with money after a meal at the PRC Embassy or after an 
inauguration?''
    Last year, the U.S. and its allies in the region were 
shocked by the announcement of an ambiguous security agreement 
between the CCP and the Solomon Islands, which is roughly 20 
pages long and would guarantee that the People's Liberation 
Army could send troops to the Solomon Islands to ``protect the 
safety of the Chinese personnel and major projects.''
    The FSM president's letter and the Solomon Islands' 
security agreement with the PRC should be treated as a wake-up 
call for the U.S. and its allies. The Pacific Islands cannot 
tackle these challenges alone, and the U.S. strategic interests 
in the region are too great to let the CCP coerce our friends 
in the Indo-Pacific into sacrificing their sovereignty and 
becoming rubber stamps for the CCP's demands.
    This committee stands ready to work with the Administration 
to ensure that our interests in the Pacific Islands are 
protected and that our allies and friends in the Pacific 
Islands have the tools they need to tackle the new security, 
economic, and environmental challenges they face.
    So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and the 
members of this subcommittee.
    With that, I would like to now recognize ranking member, 
the gentleman from California, Mr. Ami Bera, for any statements 
that he may have.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am particularly 
delighted. Obviously, the chairwoman and I have a great working 
relationship, and the fact that she has chosen this topic as 
her initial hearing, you know, demonstrates the bipartisan 
support and the importance of the relationship with the Pacific 
Island nations. When I had the privilege of being chairman, 
certainly we dedicated a hearing to that importance as well, 
and I know Mr. Sherman did the same. So this is not a partisan 
issue.
    I am often--I think we often forget that we are a Pacific 
Island nation as well, the United States, and, you know, we are 
in brotherhood and sisterhood with the Pacific Island nations, 
so it is incredibly important. This is one of the most diverse 
regions in the world. The Pacific Islands span roughly 15 
percent of the Earth's surface, and, you know, are vibrant 
cultures and, you know, in my home State of California, there 
are vibrant diasporas as well.
    I want to appreciate and congratulate Ambassador Yun and 
his team, as well as the governments of the Freely Associated 
States, for signing MOUs earlier this year and reaffirming our 
partnership that benefits our people and the entire Pacific 
region.
    I also--earlier this morning we had a chance to interact 
about the Administration's budget with Secretary Blinken, and I 
pointed out, you know, that the Fiscal Year 2024 Presidential 
budget requests 7.1 billion in mandatory funds over 20 years to 
support the Compact of Free Association with the Freely 
Associated States.
    It is now up to Congress, and specifically the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, to pass authorizing legislation to 
provide these mandatory funds. This is incredibly important. 
And by making these funds mandatory, it really does signal a 
long-term commitment to the region. And I hope we do our work 
on the committee, and the House as a whole, to provide these 
funds.
    I also think it is incredibly important to recognize the 
urgent challenges that the region faces, and, you know, there 
is no better way to articulate those challenges than using the 
voice of folks in the region. And with that, you know, I would 
like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record an op-ed 
by Tuvalu Prime Minister Natano that was published in Time 
Magazine in September of 2020.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]
    Mr. Bera. It really does capture the urgency of climate 
change. You know, if you look at the people that live in the 
region and the proximity that they live towards the coast, 
rising sea level is not just something esoteric. It is an 
essential threat to their livelihood and existence, and there 
is an urgency for us to address this.
    In addition, you know, this is not a bipartisan issue. You 
know, I was honored to co-sponsor legislation with the late 
Representative Don Young in the last Congress, the Honoring 
OCEANIA Act, to elevate the Pacific Islands in U.S. foreign 
policy-making by delivering a more robust diplomatic and 
development commitment to the region.
    I also was honored to be an original co-sponsor of 
Representative Ed Case's BLUE Pacific Act. Together these two 
pieces of legislation would expand U.S. economic, development, 
security, and people-to-people engagement with the Pacific 
Islands. And I look forward to their reintroduction in this 
Congress.
    With that, Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to working with 
you on this, look forward to making sure we continue to elevate 
the importance of our relationship with the Pacific Islands, 
and making sure that we are providing the firm financial 
commitment, the firm security commitments, for the long haul.
    So, with that, I will yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Mr. Bera.
    And I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Hawaii, 
who I recognize over there by the door, Mr. Case, be allowed to 
sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered. Please join us.
    And other members of the committee are reminded that 
opening statements may be submitted for the Record.
    And today we are very pleased to have a distinguished panel 
of witnesses before us on this very important topic. First, Ms. 
Jane Bocklage is the Deputy and Senior Advisor to the Special 
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations at the Department 
of State. Thank you for joining us.
    And Mr. Craig Hart is USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator 
of the Bureau for Asia. Thank you for joining us.
    And Ms. Holly Haverstick is the Director of the 
International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor of the U.S. 
Coast Guard. Thank you for being with us.
    Mr. Keone Nakoa is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Insular and International Affairs at the Department of the 
Interior. Thank you for being with us.
    Now I want to thank you for being here today. Your full 
statements will be made part of the record, and I will ask each 
of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes in order to 
allow time for member questions.
    And let me first recognize Ms. Bocklage for your opening 
statement.

 STATEMENTS OF JANE BOCKLAGE, DEPUTY AND SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE 
   SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS; 
 CRAIG HART, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, EAST ASIA AND THE 
 PACIFIC, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; HOLLY A. 
HAVERSTICK, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 ADVISOR, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND KEONE NAKOA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
     SECRETARY FOR INSULAR AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. 
                   DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

                   STATEMENT OF JANE BOCKLAGE

    Ms. Bocklage. Thank you very much. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking 
Member Bera, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs 
Indo-Pacific Subcommittee, thank you so much for this 
opportunity to testify before you today. I am grateful for the 
bipartisan approach of this subcommittee regarding the Compacts 
of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of 
Palau, collectively known as the Freely Associated States, or 
the FAS.
    The Pacific Islands are globally and strategically 
important, and the United States must continue to support their 
security, stability, and prosperity. The U.S.-Pacific 
partnership strategy launched in 2022 as an addendum to our 
Indo-Pacific strategy elevates the Pacific Islands within U.S. 
foreign policy. It describes U.S. plans to address unique 
opportunities and challenges the Pacific Islands face and 
outlines how we build capacity to fulfill and increase U.S. 
commitments in the Pacific, collaborate with allies and 
partners to elevate the Pacific in the regional architecture, 
and empower Pacific Islands to prosper and build resilience to 
21st century challenges.
    The United States shares an especially close relationship 
with the Freely Associated States. Our relationships with the 
FAS allow the United States to guard our long-term strategic 
and defense interests in the region. Finalizing the next 
iteration of U.S. assistance to the FAS under the compacts is 
key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest 
Pacific Island neighbors and partners and demonstrating to the 
rest of the Pacific that the United States is here to stay.
    Our strategic competitors are well aware that the scheduled 
end of U.S. economic assistance is fast approaching. Now is not 
the time to leave the FAS open to predatory and coercive 
behavior. We cannot take for granted goodwill generated from 
our historic bonds of friendship at a time of increasing 
competition with the PRC.
    We have signed a memorandum of understanding with each of 
the FAS that reflect our shared understanding of the levels and 
types of future U.S. assistance for each country that we intend 
to request. The compact team is now focused on continuing our 
productive talks with each country to negotiate the final 
agreement texts.
    Our negotiating team continues to work diligently and in 
close cooperation with the National Security Council and other 
interagency stakeholders to facilitate progress on these 
complex negotiations. To that end, the President's Fiscal Year 
2024 budget request includes $7.1 billion over 20 years to 
amend and extend the economic provisions of the compacts and 
their associated agreements. This total increase 6.5 billion in 
direct economic assistance and 634 million for the unfunded 
costs of extending the U.S. Postal Services and the FAS.
    In a few months, the Administration expects to submit a 
full proposal for implementing legislation upon completion of 
the negotiations. This proposal will include authorization and 
mandatory appropriations to fund the costs of future additional 
compact assistance for the expected 20-year period.
    We look forward to continuing to consult with Congress as 
the compact-related negotiations progress and conclude. 
Successful negotiations are crucial to deepening our strategic 
partnerships in support of a free, open, and secure Indo-
Pacific. We appreciate your continued support for these ongoing 
negotiations and welcome the opportunity to work with Congress, 
especially this subcommittee, to secure long-term U.S. 
strategic impact in this vital region.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Bocklage follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Bocklage.
    I now recognize Mr. Hart for your opening statement.

                    STATEMENT OF CRAIG HART

    Mr. Hart. Thank you very much. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking 
Member Bera, distinguished subcommittee members, thank you very 
much for allowing me to testify today regarding the strategic 
importance of the Pacific Islands and how USAID is deepening 
our engagement in this area.
    The Pacific Islands, as you have noted, face numerous 
challenges, increasingly intense environmental changes and 
climate shocks, distance and disconnection from major markets, 
and decline in tourism due to COVID-19. They are also 
navigating the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges posed 
by the People's Republic of China, which is capitalizing on 
instability and natural disasters in this vulnerable region.
    USAID seeks to partner with the Pacific Island countries 
with a development model rooted in economic trade and 
integration and inclusivity, locally led solutions, and 
democratic values.
    When I traveled to Palau, Fiji, the PNG, as well as the 
Solomon Islands this past April, it was an eye-opener for me. 
And Pacific Islands leaders really stressed the importance of 
being present. That is exactly what USAID is focused on now. We 
are focused on bolstering our existing presence, including 
reestablishing our USAID Pacific Islands mission in Fiji, as 
well as elevating the presence of our office in Papua New 
Guinea to a country representative office. And we anticipate 
both of these to be in place by September.
    At this time, the PRC government is assertively seeking to 
expand its influence. This elevation of USAID presence in the 
Pacific Islands is critical to ensuring that the United States 
remains the partner of choice for the region.
    So, under COFA, USAID's involvement supports Article 10, 
enhanced disaster assistance. USAID has played a heightened 
role in the Republic of the Marshall Islands as well as the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and we both respond in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster as well as help with the 
long-term recovery, including reconstruction.
    So, for example, in response to Typhoon Wutip, which 
devastated 30 communities in FSM in 2019, USAID provided more 
than $7 million in funding to address disaster relief needs, as 
well as nearly $23 million to assist with reconstruction of 
damaged homes and public infrastructure.
    Since 2021, USAID and FEMA have been closely coordinating 
with the Department of State's COFA negotiation team working to 
improve the language in Article 10 to ensure that disaster 
relief and recovery assistance are both more effective and more 
flexible. USAID works with the Pacific Islands and fellow 
donors, importantly--to identify areas of focus, which include 
climate, sustainable fisheries, good governance, economic 
growth, health systems and strengthening, and the COVID 
response as well.
    So in Papua New Guinea, for instance, USAID is 
collaborating with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand to expand 
access to renewable energy. We are also protecting the 
environment, addressing HIV/AIDS, and promoting peace and 
stability. In Palau, USAID partnered with Australia and Japan 
to support the development of an undersea cable spur that will 
increase internet bandwidth and spark economic growth.
    Similarly, USAID is providing technical assistance to the 
East Micronesia cable project, which will connect the people of 
Kiribati, Nauru, and Micronesia, to faster, higher quality, and 
more reliable internet. At last week's East Micronesia cable's 
executive board meeting, USAID represented the U.S. Government 
as senior representatives from Australia, Japan, FSM, Kiribati, 
and Nauru, met to advance key milestones, including signing 
donor grant agreements and finalizing the vendor contract.
    During the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders this past 
September, I heard leaders very clearly also underscore the 
importance of ensuring that climate financing is solving real 
challenges on the ground, and that is exactly where we are 
focused. Our climate-ready program since 2016 has been able to 
do just that: mobilize more than $500 million from climate 
finance institutions for Pacific Island countries.
    And just this week in Vanuatu, USAID Assistant 
Administrator Michael Schiffer announced that USAID has 
allocated $3.2 million in humanitarian assistance in the wake 
of Tropical Cyclones Judy and Kevin, which made landfall over 
Vanuatu between February 28 and March 4.
    So this assistance will provide shelter as well as looking 
at how we can go about working with communities to provide the 
rebuilding of homes. It will also provide the agricultural 
support, safe drinking water, and supplies and protections that 
those communities need.
    So while USAID definitely remains one of the largest donors 
in the Pacific, we continue to work with our partners very 
closely. And I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, 
and I also look forward to your counsel and questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Hart.
    I now recognize Ms. Haverstick for your opening statement.

                 STATEMENT OF HOLLY HAVERSTICK

    Ms. Haverstick. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be 
appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard's enduring 
efforts to promote a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific in 
support of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
    The Coast Guard is a multi-mission maritime service 
responsible for safety, security, and stewardship of waters and 
vessels subject to jurisdiction of the United States at all 
times. A branch of the Armed Forces, a law enforcement agency, 
and a regulatory agency, the Coast Guard operates on all seven 
continents and throughout the homeland, serving a nation whose 
economic prosperity and national security are inextricably 
linked to a vast maritime interest.
    The Coast Guard protects, defends, regulates, and 
safeguards the world's largest exclusive economic zone 
encompassing 4.5 million square miles of oceans, which include 
1.3 million square miles within the Indo-Pacific. The strong 
global, maritime governance includes both defense and law 
enforcement missions and is closely connected with the 
capabilities, actions, and intentions of other nations far from 
our shores on the high seas and within the waters of our 
partners.
    This is especially true in the Indo-Pacific. Coast Guard 
missions focus on issues that directly support and advance our 
partners--regional partners' efforts to protect fish stocks, 
ensure safety of life at sea, and support environmental 
response, and, in addition, provide disaster relief.
    The Coast Guard has operated in the Indo-Pacific for over 
150 years, an enduring role that complements Department of 
Defense missions. The Service's unique authorities and 
capabilities bridge gaps and create opportunities to enhance 
partner nation capacity while ensuring prosperity for our 
Nation. We are also able to leverage our environmental response 
and disaster relief expertise to help nations prepare for 
climate change, a critical concern for the region.
    The Coast Guard is focused on three lines of effort in the 
Indo-Pacific: promoting maritime governance, establishing 
persistent U.S. presence, and conducting meaningful engagements 
in the region. To accomplish these goals, the Coast Guard 
employs a modest expeditionary footprint and closely partners 
with Departments of State and Defense.
    Around the globe, the Coast Guard operations protect our 
maritime borders and sovereignty and strengthen partner 
nations' ability to protect their own sovereign rights and 
support a rules-based international order.
    The Coast Guard regional activities bolster partner 
operational capabilities and strengthen legal foundations that 
underpin many of the multi-lateral regional coordinating 
mechanisms among the Pacific Islands nations for fisheries 
management, search and rescue, and law enforcement. These 
important activities promote the free and open Indo-Pacific at 
a time when the region is experiencing increased coercive 
activities, including illegal over-fishing, transnational 
organized crime, and corruption, which result in adverse impact 
on indigenous economies, governance, and survivability.
    The Coast Guard values strong partnerships with the Pacific 
Island nations. The Service works together with each nation to 
help assess their needs and develop tailored strategies 
avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach to the engagement. The 
Coast Guard also works closely with regional allies, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to provide both joint and 
complementary training.
    This establishes strong foundations on which to build 
lasting relationships, solidifying the United States as a 
trusted partner. The result of the Service's positive global 
engagement is demonstrated through more than 60 multi- and 
bilateral agreements, 11 of which are in the Pacific Island 
states.
    These agreements establish the framework for mutual 
cooperation and allow us, alongside our partners, to address 
widespread geostrategic issues affecting both our partners and 
U.S. national security. Our activities and uniqueness allow the 
Coast Guard to successfully operate in the space between 
Department of State's diplomacy and the Department of Defense's 
lethality.
    The Service is well-positioned, working with partners, to 
establish capabilities, presence, and maritime government. 
These strong international efforts promote security and 
prosperity within the Indo-Pacific region.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 
and for the continued support of your Coast Guard. I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Haverstick follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Haverick--
Haverstick. I am sorry.
    I now recognize Mr. Nakoa for your opening statement.

                    STATEMENT OF KEONE NAKOA

    Mr. Nakoa. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific. 
Thank you for convening this hearing on the U.S. engagement of 
the Indo-Pacific--on the Pacific today.
    A warm aloha to Congressman Case, and talofa to Congressman 
Radewagen.
    The Department of the Interior welcomes this opportunity to 
update Congress on how we carry out our responsibilities in the 
Pacific Islands, strategically vital homelands, which include 
Hawaii, Guam, the CNMI, and American Samoa.
    As the ranking member said, the U.S. is a Pacific Nation. 
From 1951 to 1986, the Interior was also a lead agency--lead 
federal agency administering a U.N. trusteeship for the islands 
now comprising the nations of Palau, FSM, and RMI, collectively 
the Freely Associated States, or FAS.
    In approving the compacts, Congress gave the secretaries of 
the Interior and State shared responsibility to implement the 
agreements. For the past 35 years, the compacts have been a 
foreign policy, national security, and people-to-people success 
story. While FAS economies have not fully realized all economic 
development goals, COFA programs have sustained a stable 
standard of living and FAS citizens have contributed 
significantly to the fabric of our country.
    According to GAO, in 2018, an estimated 94,000 FAS 
individuals were living in the U.S., in nearly every state and 
territory, with an estimated 25,000 in Hawaii, 6,000 in 
Arkansas, 4,000 in California, and 2,000 in Missouri. Further, 
roughly half of the FAS population in the United States are 
also now U.S. citizens, and I note for the committee that FAS 
citizens proudly serve in the U.S. military at high per capita 
rates, and they live, work, and pay taxes in our communities.
    In this context, I am happy to share with this subcommittee 
that Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Carmen Cantor, just 
signed letters confirming the Administration's support for the 
bipartisan Compact Impact Fairness Act, CIFA, which restores 
access to inadvertently removed federal public benefits for 
persons lawfully living in the United States pursuant to the 
compacts.
    As illustrated today, our strong continuing relationships 
with the FAS support U.S. interests across the larger Indo-
Pacific region. And, if passed, CIFA would help alleviate the 
costs being borne by our states and our territories and 
strengthen our relationships with the FAS.
    Moreover, the compacts and amendments being negotiated will 
confirm the U.S. commitment to our COFA partners--``one of the 
cornerstones of the U.S.-Pacific cooperation for nearly 4 
decades,''--and that is why the U.S.-Pacific Islands Summit 
declaration placed the highest priority on the completion of 
COFA negotiations and recognized that new resources must be 
included.
    I have been a member of the U.S. interagency COFA 
negotiating team since my appointment in 2021. Our team was 
strengthened in 2022 under the new leadership of Special 
Presidential Envoy Joe Yun and Assistant Secretary Cantor.
    The substantial progress made in the last year culminated 
in the MOU signed earlier this year, and we strive to complete 
negotiations as soon as possible, so we can propose 
implementing legislation to include mandatory appropriations to 
fund most compact assistance for the expected 20-year period.
    Swift Congressional action will be imperative to support 
the shared interests of the U.S. and our friends in the 
Pacific, who are under more pressure now than at any time since 
World War II.
    As Chair Kim mentioned in her opening, official filings and 
reports by U.S. and FAS authorities assert bullying and 
surreptitious political-influenced tactics are being used in 
the Pacific today. While some may be concerned that U.S. is 
expending too many resources for COFA, others emphasize the 
U.S. cannot afford to append in these special relationships.
    The DoD recognizes the compacts are essential for 
maintaining combat-credible presence and represent the Indo-
Pacific Command's highest diplomatic priority. We seek strong 
agreements that reverse any misperception of U.S. disengagement 
in the region, to include assistance for education, health, and 
infrastructure, and the continuation of federal programs and 
services that preexist COFA by 35 years.
    As confirmed in the U.S.-Pacific Islands Summit 
declaration, we, too, acknowledge the nuclear legacy of the 
Cold War, and the U.S. remains committed to addressing the 
RMI's ongoing environmental public health concerns and other 
welfare concerns.
    Now is the time to send a clear signal across the Pacific 
that the compacts truly are a cornerstone of U.S. national 
interests in the Pacific. We look forward to working with 
Congress to secure bipartisan success that solidifies the 
U.S.'s commitment to the Pacific and to remain the preferred 
partner for our friends and cousins in the Pacific Islands.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nakoa follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Mr. Nagoa. Nakoa, I am 
sorry. I am butchering everybody's name today. Sorry.
    As we begin our line of questioning, I will first recognize 
myself for 5 minutes.
    The question will be to both Ms. Bocklage and Mr. Hart. The 
COFAs expire this year, as you know, but what has the 
Administration done to ensure a timely negotiation of the 
agreements? And when can Congress expect to receive the final 
negotiated text?
    Ms. Bocklage. Thank you. We are working very, very hard 
with all three countries to complete the final negotiations. We 
are aiming for weeks, not months, but we are working with three 
countries that of course have their own internal political 
processes, their own bureaucratic reviews of documents, and so 
forth.
    There are 10 separate agreements, all the various 
subsidiary pieces that have to be put into place across the 
three countries. And so it is a complex, multi-layered effort, 
but we have the full support of the White House, and our 
interagency partners have been fantastic, responsive, and are--
we are all very eager to make progress and are very hopeful 
that we will get there as soon as possible. We do recognize 
that Congress does need those documents as soon as we can get 
them.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. As Mr. Hart also 
responds to that same question, would you be able to tell us if 
you plan to share the draft of the text in the interim? Mr. 
Hart?
    Mr. Hart. Yes. Thank you, Chairwoman. I would say that in 
terms of USAID engagement within this process we really have 
been focused on Article 10 in terms of looking at humanitarian 
assistance and that specific aspect of this. And so I think Ms. 
Bocklage is truly positioned much better to answer the timeline 
question.
    Ms. Bocklage. So in terms of drafts, they are continuing to 
go back and forth between the two countries. And so as the--it 
is an ongoing negotiation process, we wouldn't normally make 
drafts of that nature public. However, I know Special Envoy Yun 
is eager to engage Congress, and so at any time if you would 
like----
    Mrs. Kim of California. So maybe perhaps we can do some 
sort of, you know, briefings in the interim.
    Ms. Bocklage. Absolutely.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Okay. Thank you. We will take you 
up on that.
    And also, what are the remaining irritants in the 
negotiations? Are there any major issues that remain 
outstanding that might delay that final agreement? For example, 
I am aware that nuclear cleanup assistance in the Marshall 
Islands, and also the economic assistance to the Freely 
Associated States, are still a significant issue in that 
negotiation process.
    Ms. Bocklage. Thank you. In terms of significant irritants, 
each country is different, and you have cited two particular 
issues. We have--the goal of the memorandums of understanding 
was to agree on our top line numbers with each country and to 
understand what their needs were in terms of economic 
assistance and to be responsive to those.
    As we have those memorandums of understanding signed, we 
are now very much focused on the technical aspects of the 
agreement language, and so we don't expect any major irritants 
to upset those discussions.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Okay.
    Ms. Bocklage. But they are--they do include fiscal 
procedures, auditing procedures, accountability for funds, 
grant procedures, and so forth, that are quite technical and 
take some time to work out. There is also the federal programs 
and services agreements, which involve multiple agencies across 
the United States Government, including our USAID colleagues on 
the disaster assistance side.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. The president of FSM 
recently published a letter--I mentioned that in my opening 
statement--detailing Beijing's efforts to influence and bully 
Micronesian leaders. So how do the COFAs serve as a tool to 
counter PRC malign influence in the Pacific?
    Ms. Bocklage. Well, the compacts are really the 
underpinnings of our relationship with these three countries. 
As you well know, we have our longstanding historical 
relationships. But absent the new economic assistance 
provisions, we really leave the three countries open to 
predatory behavior, coercive behavior.
    And we are well aware of President Panuelo's letter. We 
have read it in detail, and it does lay out a disturbing 
pattern that we are quite concerned by and that we see across 
the Pacific, not just in the three countries. The compacts aim 
to support the governments--good governance, economic 
development, social cohesion, as well as health, education, and 
across the full spectrum, as well as the climate and 
environmental challenges that you have also mentioned--so that 
we don't leave our partners open to this type of influence.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. My time is up, so I will 
now recognize Ranking Member Bera for your questions.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Mr. Nakoa, for again reminding us that we 
are a Pacific Island nation, because my good friend, 
Congressman Case from Hawaii, would get mad at me if I didn't 
constantly remember that, and we should all remember that, you 
know, and the long history that we share with the Pacific 
Island nations.
    Let me ask the first question to Mr. Hart. You talked about 
aid and development priorities, and some of the partnership 
with our like-valued allies--New Zealand, Australia, the 
French, that have longstanding relations there--could you 
highlight some of those areas of partnership, some of the areas 
of focus that we should prioritize, and, obviously, climate 
change being one that is an esoteric threat?
    Mr. Hart. Absolutely. Thank you so much for the question. 
And I think that, one, we recognize that we have to be working 
together with partners, other donors, but also regional 
partners in terms of the Pacific community, for example, and 
making sure that we are really looking at the entire structure 
of the Pacific and utilizing those organizations that are well 
developed there.
    And so as we look at some of the economic growth aspects, 
because indeed COVID has really hit the islands hard in terms 
of economic growth, we need to be pursuing at multiple levels 
the efforts in terms of the Palau cable spur and looking at the 
East Micronesia cable as well. Those are inroads for 
communications which very much relate to health issues, very 
much relate to economic growth aspects, very much are driving 
and have the potential to drive workforce and jobs as well.
    And so as we look at those types of foundational types of 
investments, that is exactly where we are reaching out to our 
partners and making sure that we are coming together to provide 
a very solid, secure option for communication, and so--as per 
my examples earlier.
    I think the other aspect that we are looking at is in terms 
of humanitarian assistance and working with our Australian and 
New Zealand counterparts in particular, looking at France's 
engagement in that as well, and how we can go about utilizing 
some of the coordination mechanisms that exist to further 
expand that.
    Those are some examples.
    Mr. Bera. Fantastic. You know, in the last Congress, when 
the Administration hosted the Pacific Islands Summit, you know, 
you have leaders from all of the Pacific Islands nations as 
well as the ambassadors, and we had a chance to sit in a 
roundtable and interact.
    And, you know, when I mentioned ways that I think we could 
use some of the technologies that we have and address some of 
the issues, and I talked about desalination and providing fresh 
water. And I think we look at the Islands sometimes and think 
they are surrounded by water, but, you know, could any of you 
talk about the impact of--you know, we know how to do 
desalination fairly well. And, you know, the impact of 
providing something like that to the Islands, something than 
just the basic necessity.
    Mr. Hart. Absolutely, if I could, sir. So one of the other 
areas that we have is--and we are very much promoting is the 
fact that we need to listen to local voices, local solution 
sets. And so our Pacific American Fund is an opportunity to be 
able to provide some grants, significant grants, to local 
solutions and local problems, and salinization of water is a 
great example of exactly that.
    The existential threat that when you do not have water is 
very evident, very, very rapidly, in addition to other climate 
resilience types of activities, and in addition to natural 
disasters, of which I mentioned a couple already.
    And so I think the Islands, what I have seen and heard from 
them, is that, one, listen to our local voices, which I think 
is why it is so important to get our presence there beefed up 
and increasingly engaged with the Islands. Two, when it comes 
to local solution sets, we need to have access to those funds 
that are referenced in terms of the climate financing solution 
sets.
    And so one of the things that we have done is work with 
local entities to be able to access directly from those 
climate--a variety of GF and other types of climate financing 
opportunities to link it to the real problem on the ground and 
make sure that those funds are flowing.
    Mr. Bera. Right. And maybe just the last few seconds, to 
the Coast Guard or to Interior, on the fisheries question, you 
know, obviously, it does seem like there is a lot of illegal 
fishing that is taking place in these regions. Can you touch on 
that and touch on the impact that that is having?
    Ms. Haverstick. Thank you, sir. We actually do see quite a 
bit of illegal fishing in the region. We work very closely with 
the Pacific Island Fisheries Forum, and we have agreements with 
many of the member states there that allows us to work and 
answer--help identify where there is illegal fishing.
    We also have bilateral agreements with individual states 
that allow us to have them board our vessels, and we can 
jointly do some law enforcement operations to stop the fishing.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Wagner for any questions you may have.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and I want to 
thank our witnesses for their service and their time. I would 
ask them just to pull the microphones close to their face and 
speak clearly into them. We are having a little difficulty 
hearing.
    Increasingly, the Pacific Islands are on the front lines of 
Sino-U.S. rivalry as China attempts to erode support for Taiwan 
and push the borders of its sphere of influence out to the so-
called second island chain, a line that passes through Marshall 
Islands, Guam, and Palau.
    China does not share our vision for a free and open Indo-
Pacific. It seeks to intimidate, to entrap, and coerce these 
countries into increasing China's prestige and furthering its 
agenda.
    As co-chair of the Pacific Islands Caucus, I am proud to 
support the special relationship the United States shares with 
the Marshall Islands and Micronesia and Palau. The United 
States must continue to stand together with the Freely 
Associated States in defense of our common interests.
    China is seeking to build military dual-use infrastructure 
throughout the Pacific Islands region, such as piers that can 
accommodate Chinese navy ships.
    Ms. Haverstick, what is the status of Chinese 
infrastructure investment in the region, particularly the dual-
use infrastructure? And what are the implications for U.S. 
interests?
    Ms. Haverstick. Thank you, ma'am. I can say that we have 
seen--our cutters have witnessed and seen that there is some 
infrastructure being built up. However, we have not necessarily 
seen that it has been influencing our ability to work with the 
partner nations.
    Mrs. Wagner. Mr. Hart.
    Mr. Hart. Thank you, ma'am. So when I was in the Solomon 
Islands this past year, I saw some of the infrastructure that 
was being presented, and we met also with the civil society and 
the press, who were able to bring forth a light to shine on the 
practices that were happening both in terms of the 
infrastructure but also in terms of the IUU fishing and the 
forestry and some of the deals that were under the table.
    And we heard about those deals under the table from civil 
society, who are there and we are supporting to bring these 
issues to light and to truly present the other side of the 
story.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. Australia and New Zealand have been 
valuable partners in the Pacific Islands region, helping the 
United States maintain strong relations with small, remote 
countries scattered across a massive geographic area.
    Ms. Bocklage, how can the U.S. cooperate more closely with 
Australia and New Zealand to deepen engagement across the 
region? And what other nations should the U.S. be working with?
    Ms. Bocklage. We have continued to engage with Australia, 
New Zealand, and have stepped up our game with them, 
particularly related to the compact countries. They have shown 
renewed interest in engaging with the Marshall Islands, Palau, 
and the Federated States of Micronesia. And so we are working 
closely with them to ensure that our assistance that we are 
providing under the compact and will provide going forward is 
complementary, and we are not stepping on each other's toes, 
that it is very much a cooperative effort.
    In terms of other countries that are engaged in the region, 
Taiwan is also stepping up across the Compact of Free 
Association countries, as well as Japan, South Korea. The EU 
and Germany have also showed renewed interest as well as the 
U.K. So we have quite a number of allies and partners who are 
in the game with us and very interested in building these 
relationships. Thank you.
    Mrs. Wagner. Compacts of Free Association between the 
United States and the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, 
set out the terms of our unique relationship with these states. 
The agreements prevent our adversaries from exploiting a huge 
swath of the Pacific Ocean and guarantee the United States a 
foothold from which to protect its interests.
    Mr. Hart, to what degree does China seek to undermine 
relations between the U.S. and Freely Associated States? And do 
PRC influence operations in the Pacific Islands region threaten 
renegotiations of the compacts?
    Mr. Hart. Well, I would leave the compact negotiations 
aspect to my State colleague. I think in terms of what I have 
seen and what I have heard from our Pacific neighbors is that 
they need us there. They need our presence. They need us to be 
able to engage on the issues that are affecting them most, and 
those are the issues that I have outlined in terms of climate, 
economic growth, the basic issues that they are dealing with in 
this time. Where they really need us to be able to engage, that 
is where we are focused.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you. My time has expired. I will let 
Ms. Bocklage perhaps respond in writing, and I will yield back 
to the chairwoman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Very good. Thank you very much. I 
now recognize Representative Radewagen for her questions.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Talofa. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and 
Ranking Member Bera. I, too, wish to welcome the panel. Thank 
you for being here today.
    I am both--I am for both sound ocean resource conservation 
and national security. But yesterday President Biden proposed 
eliminating U.S. and American Samoan fishing grounds larger 
than Alaska and Colorado combined according to the President. 
While I think he took some bad advice on his ocean conservation 
proposal that may hand PRC a win in the Pacific by initiating 
this national marine sanctuary designation process without 
consultation or requiring mitigation of expected economic 
hardship on American Samoa's cannery workers, small businesses, 
and family enterprises, the President treated our territory 
less favorably than PRC treats Pacific Islands that are aligned 
with Beijing or that are at risk of surrendering to PRC 
domination.
    Our compact partner nations whose security and well-being 
we are here to consider today must wonder if the U.S. is 
prepared to out-compete PRC. And with the chairman's--
chairwoman's permission, I will submit for the Record my letter 
to the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Interior, opposing 
the new Administration's marine sanctuary proposal, unless and 
until its potential adverse impact on American Samoa is 
addressed and some allowance for fishing is made.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]
    Mrs. Radewagen. Ms. Haverstick, I have got a question for 
you. In August 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Oliver Henry 
was on an illegal fisheries patrol and could not obtain entry 
to refuel in the Solomon Islands. Then all the U.S. naval ships 
were blocked from the Solomon Islands except for the hospital 
ship, USNS Mercy.
    On January 26, 2023, Vanuatu failed to issue timely 
clearance for U.S. Coast Guard cutter Juniper to enter Port 
Vila to commence a planned ship rider illegal fishing 
operations patrol. Has it or the U.S. State Department lodged 
any complaints with the Solomons or Vanuatu governments for 
impeding illegal fisheries patrols?
    Ms. Haverstick. Thank you, Madam. No. As far as I know, the 
State Department did not lodge any complaints. I do understand 
it was a clerical error on the case of the Solomon Islands.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Well, I have long advocated, Ms. 
Haverstick, for additional Coast Guard presence in the Pacific 
Islands region. Can you briefly go over what additional 
resources you need in the Pacific to meet the mission set that 
has been assigned to you and to counter the PRC in the region?
    Ms. Haverstick. Yes. We have a Fiscal Year 2023 budget. We 
do have an Indo-Pacific support cutter, the Harriet Lane, which 
will be relocating from the Atlantic side over to Pacific. So 
that will be a cutter that can go around all of the different 
islands and provide some support to our partners. In addition, 
the Fiscal Year 2023 also allows for some additional national 
security cutter presence in the region.
    We have TACLEDs and--sorry, it's Tactical Law Enforcement 
Detachments that also have increased and additional mobile 
training teams to help with the partnership in the region. In 
the Fiscal Year 2024 budget, that will sustain our current 
activity. However, if we have some unfunded priority requests 
for additional fast response cutters, if that were funded, that 
would provide us some additional capability to increase.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Well, I am out of time, but I also have a 
question for Secretary Nakoa as well as Ms. Bocklage, but I 
will submit that for the Record.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I now recognize Representative Barr 
for questions you may have.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for holding this 
hearing. This is a region of tremendous strategic importance to 
the United States, and obviously to the island nations that are 
part of the Freely Associated States.
    My first question is about DFC. Since the Compacts of Free 
Association were last negotiated 20 years ago, the tools for 
U.S. foreign policy have changed. Particularly, OPIC and the 
USAID Development Credit Authority were combined to create, 
obviously, the Development Finance Corporation, DFC.
    We have heard that the products DFC offers are sometimes 
difficult for projects in the Pacific Islands to take advantage 
of since they are in communities with small populations and 
economies.
    Ms. Bocklage or Mr. Hart, is State looking at the unique 
tools DFC offers when crafting these new negotiations? And what 
steps are you all taking to ensure that the COFA countries are 
aware of all of these tools available with DFC in addition to 
USAID?
    Mr. Hart. Thank you for the question, sir. The----
    Mr. Barr. And, by the way, Go Big Blue. I know you have got 
a connection to the University of Kentucky. Early exit in the 
tournament, though. Thank you.
    Mr. Hart. So with DFC and USAID, since some of the DFC's 
tools are our previous tools, we are very much collaborating 
with them very closely across the board. I think what you are 
pointing out is an excellent point when it comes to economies 
of scale, and that is why I mentioned the Pacific community.
    We have to be able to work with regional organizations, so 
that we get some of those more economies of scale going and 
have those types of investment potentials. That is not just on 
a country-by-country basis but looking at the larger market.
    And so I think that is one of the areas where we have 
reached into SPCs or the Pacific communities' talents to be 
able to say help us break down some of these barriers between 
the real needs on the ground when it comes to climate financing 
or others, looking with--and working with DFC very much so on a 
couple of projects right now in the pipeline where we are 
actively trying to work with DFC to identify upstream, what are 
the potentials, sifting through those potential projects, and 
providing DFC with some of the best potentials they can 
possibly have on their radar.
    So we are working very closely with the DFC because the 
private sector has to be part of the solution set.
    Mr. Barr. Well, that is--as I have spoken with Scott Nathan 
about this, I think that private capital potential in the 
island nations is--with DFC is very important as we encounter 
Belt and Road.
    Let me ask Ms. Bocklage a question, and you can comment on 
DFC as well if you want. In the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA passed 
last year, we included my legislation, the Pacific Islands 
Embassies Act, that establishes physical U.S. embassies on the 
Pacific Islands nations of the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, 
Tonga, and authorized expanded physical presence on Vanuatu to 
reinforce American leadership in the Pacific region.
    Can you provide an update as to the status of these 
embassies? What has been the reception from these countries to 
seeing an increased U.S. presence on their island? And I note 
in particular the Solomon Islands where the Chinese are really 
making an aggressive push.
    Ms. Bocklage. So I can provide an overall update in that 
the process for all of these is moving forward. Unfortunately, 
my role at the State Department is focused on the three compact 
countries, and so I don't have the details of where each one of 
those resides. If you would, I would like to take that back as 
a question for the Record and provide you a fulsome answer.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you. We are excited about the prospect of 
having additional U.S. diplomatic presence in the region, and 
we know how important it is. So please encourage State 
Department to move that process forward as quickly as possible.
    And, finally, with China's building on reefs in the South 
China Sea, and agreements like its pact with the Solomon 
Islands assembly, the China strategy in the Pacific is to mimic 
Japan's island strategy during World War II.
    Can any of you go into detail about how Belt and Road 
investments by China in the Pacific Islands Oceania can turn 
into economic relationships--can turn economic relationships 
into security relationships that may have eventually pose a 
threat to United States naval access to the region? Any of you 
care to comment?
    Ms. Bocklage. I can comment in relation to the compact 
countries, and the compacts do give us full defense authority 
and responsibility in those countries and provide our ability 
to strategically deny third country military access.
    However, as you have noted, China's ability to convert 
economic to military is something that we are watching very 
closely and very concerned about. One of the main reasons why 
we do not want to open up--we want to get this economic 
assistance passed as expeditiously as possible, so that we 
don't leave those countries open to predatory economic 
practices by the Chinese in the region.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    And, Madam Chair, with your indulgence, one final question. 
I had a very productive and nice meeting with the ambassador 
from the Marshall Islands last week, and he brought up the 
legacy nuclear fallout issue. Can you address how those 
negotiations are going?
    Ms. Bocklage. Certainly. We have heard from the Marshall 
Islands, and we understand how important these issues are to 
the Marshall Islands. We certainly have not forgotten the 
legacy of the U.S. testing program.
    The United States is concerned about addressing the RMI's 
public health, environment, and other needs that they have 
identified, regardless of cause, nuclear or otherwise. And so 
we are working closely with the RMI government for the economic 
assistance package to help them address the needs of the entire 
country of the Marshall Islands.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you. I sense that is an important issue for 
our friends in the Marshall Islands.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Sherman for any question he may have.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We are beginning to see the passing 
of the last remaining veterans of the Pacific in World War II. 
We have fought for these strategic islands before. Now we are 
fighting again, hopefully in a non-lethal battle, and we need 
to pay attention. And this battle will be far less expensive 
than other battles if we handle it at the aid and diplomacy 
level.
    It is good to be here with Ed Case, our fearless leader on 
the Pacific Islands Caucus. I think we have got an awful lot of 
members of that caucus here at this hearing.
    I want to address, particularly with Ms. Bocklage, one of 
the most extraordinary letters I have ever seen signed by a 
head of state, signed by David Panuelo of the Federated States 
of Micronesia. Without objection, I would like to see this 
entered into the record.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]

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    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. This is a 13-page letter, and I 
have never seen--this letter needs not just to go to--I know 
you focus on the Pacific Islands. This needs to go to every 
head of state worldwide, so that they knew what they are up 
against.
    I will just quote a few parts. ``We are aware of PRC 
activity in our exclusive economic zone, where they are looking 
for territory for submarine travel paths. When we sent our own 
patrol boats to our own economic exclusive zone to check on the 
PRC research vessel, the PRC sent a warning for us to stay out 
of our own zone.'' To stay away from them, in their own 
economic zone.
    It goes on to say that the Chinese ambassador suggested 
that a foreign minister or ambassador sign a memorandum of 
understanding and not tell the president of the country. Talk 
about actively attempting to interfere in a country's 
governance.
    He talks about how, in a visit to Fiji, he was followed by 
a People's Liberation Army officer and concludes, ``I have had 
direct threats against my personal safety from PRC officials 
acting in an official capacity.'' This is not what we accept as 
diplomacy.
    This is an extraordinary letter. It is surprising to me 
that it has not gotten more coverage, not because I--I 
understand, unfortunately, that the Pacific Islands don't get 
the coverage that they deserve, but China gets a lot of 
coverage.
    And the letter also says, ``What do you call it when an 
elected official is given an envelope filled with money after a 
meeting--after a meal at the PRC embassy or after an 
inauguration? What else do you call it when a senior official 
is discretely given a smartphone after visiting Beijing? What 
else do you call it when a senior official explicitly asks 
Chinese diplomats for televisions and other gifts?'' Bribery, 
intimidation, and what I think might be a Pacific Islands term, 
chutzpah of telling Micronesia to not patrol its own economic 
zone.
    I will ask our State Department representative, what has 
been the reaction to this letter in the Pacific Islands, not 
only in Micronesia but the related countries?
    Ms. Bocklage. So I am not sure I can speak to the reaction 
amongst all of the countries in the Pacific Islands, but I will 
say that we are very much aware of the letter and have--and are 
disturbed by the pattern that it lays out of Chinese behavior.
    The PRC's involvement in the region has grown, and we have 
seen an increase----
    Mr. Sherman. I think this is of interest to citizens in 
Africa who see their countries making deals with China and 
should know what their tactics are. Are we on track to complete 
the Compacts of Free Association by May, which is your target 
date?
    Ms. Bocklage. Yes, we are. We are trying very, very hard to 
get all of those agreements done and complete, so that we can 
get a full package of implementing--draft implementing 
legislation to Congress in time.
    Mr. Sherman. Okay. And we have got six desk officers at 
State exclusively focused on the Pacific Islands, one at USAID. 
We are talking about 14 countries. Are we understaffed?
    Ms. Bocklage. As we have been focused, our team is focused 
on the compact negotiations exclusively. I can't speak to the 
staffing per se, but I would very much like to get a complete 
answer back to you. I know that the Secretary has recently----
    Mr. Sherman. I look forward to an answer for the Record. I 
have exceeded my time. I yield back.
    Ms. Bocklage. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Davidson for any questions he may have.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman. Thank you 
to our witnesses for being here today and for your work to make 
the Pacific region more stable and, frankly, more hospitable 
for U.S.-Asian relations.
    So, you know, my colleagues, virtually everyone who has 
spoken before me, has highlighted the challenges and 
frustrations with China, and kind of the growing influence of 
China and not in a way where, you know, you could be happy for 
them, where it is like, yeah, you know, I am glad your economy 
is doing better, things are going well, you are growing your 
middle class. That is all good.
    But in a way that is exploitive of other countries, and, 
frankly, of the deals that they already made. They made 
commitments when they--going back to the Clinton 
Administration, to be part of the World Trade Organization, 
they said that they would be a market economy.
    Ms. Bocklage, is China a market economy?
    Ms. Bocklage. Again, unfortunately, my role at the State 
Department is to be focused on the compact and the compact 
negotiations.
    Mr. Davidson. Yeah. I understand. People are directing a 
lot of questions to you because the State Department didn't 
send the other person who would actually be directly 
responsible for answering these questions.
    Ms. Bocklage. I understand. We will certainly----
    Mr. Davidson. Does anyone think China is a market economy? 
No one does because they are not. They are a command economy. 
They committed to do that. They are violating all kinds of 
principles. They are exploiting the loophole to say they are 
still a developing economy. They are the world's second-largest 
economy. And they are stealing intellectual property with a 
whole-of-government approach to the theft. They are blocking 
market access, and they are exploiting access in other 
countries.
    They are not just doing this to the United States, but it 
has been particularly harmful to the people of my home State of 
Ohio. It has been very bad for manufacturing in particular 
around the world. And if there is one bright spot out of COVID, 
the planet, frankly, has woken up to the supply chain risk that 
we have and the vulnerability we have in China on so many 
issues.
    One of the ways that China works to isolate other 
countries, including ASEAN countries, is by keeping them 
dependent upon China for goods and services. Ms. Bocklage, you 
can surely comment on this. What is the state of the RCEP in 
the ASEAN countries?
    Ms. Bocklage. The state of the PRC in the ASEAN countries, 
in terms of their economic----
    Mr. Davidson. With the RCEP agreement to basically--in the 
absence of the U.S. doing Trans-Pacific Partnership, a lot of 
other countries signed specific trade agreements with China, 
and they are growing their trade relations with China. And, 
frankly, within the ASEAN countries, there is some concern that 
some of the countries are trying to play it both ways.
    Meanwhile, just today, just before this hearing, we voted 
on the floor to treat ASEAN as an international organization, 
all kinds of privileges and immunities. We got nothing in 
exchange for it. I would have loved to have voted for it, but I 
couldn't because I don't feel like we have successfully dealt 
with China's influence in the compact.
    Could you address that?
    Ms. Bocklage. So I can't address that here today, but I 
would take that question back for the Record for you.
    Mr. Davidson. Would anyone else like to take a stab at it?
    Mr. Hart. Sir, if I could just comment. In terms of the 
connectivity aspect that the Pacific Islands are looking for, 
in terms of the Palau cable spur, in terms of the East 
Micronesia cable, those are the inroads to be able to provide 
more economic growth potential, more education, health 
services, et cetera. And so those are some of the areas that we 
are focused on in the Pacific when it comes to addressing most 
directly the challenge that the PRC puts forth, ensuring that 
those cables are actually secure and reliable.
    Mr. Davidson. Yeah. Thank you. And of course, you know, we 
care a lot about the shipping routes as well, but, you know, 
there are four Pacific Islands countries that have established 
diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. The PRC is placing 
extensive pressure on these nations to switch their diplomatic 
allegiance. How is the United States countering those coercion 
efforts by China?
    Ms. Bocklage. So for the three compact countries, two of 
those are countries that recognize Taiwan, and the United 
States is actively engaged in the compact negotiations, not 
only but for one--one of the reasons is to support these 
countries. And we recognize their sovereignty.
    We recognize all three countries' sovereign right to make 
their own decisions for the people, and to have relationships 
with Taiwan, and to push back on China when China puts pressure 
on them.
    In one specific case, Palau has been a direct recipient, I 
suppose, of this Chinese pressure to switch its allegiance and 
suffered economically for it. And one of the reasons that we 
want to have a compact agreement with Palau in Fiscal Year 
2024, instead--in time for Fiscal Year 2024, instead of waiting 
until their current agreement expires, is to support their 
economic stability and their ability to recover from both COVID 
and the economic shocks that the Chinese----
    Mr. Davidson. Thanks for the clarification. My time has 
expired, and I yield.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Case for any questions he may have.
    Mr. Case. Thank you so much, Chair. And I appreciate the 
subcommittee allowing me to join you here today. It is a very 
critical hearing on a very critical region, and I appreciate 
your various comments on our Pacific Islands Caucus, which is 
now 29 members strong, completely bipartisan. In fact, the 
membership of this subcommittee is largely the membership of 
that caucus, including five of the six co-chairs. I just happen 
to be the other one.
    I wanted to--a couple of comments to each of you. To Ms. 
Haverstick, great job in the Pacific on the Coast Guard. 
Question is, and I am not going to ask the question--it is a 
rhetorical question--how to expand--I think you are the only--
my recollection is you are the only U.S. institution that 
actually operates in every one of these jurisdictions, widely--
I liked your characterization of you occupying a space between 
the State's diplomacy and Defense's security. I think that is 
where you operate, and that is where people are comfortable 
with you operating.
    I would make the comment that while you are busy sending 
your cutters out into the Pacific, it does stretch things back 
home, in my case Hawaii, and Guam and other places. And so the 
redeployment of the Harriet Lane is really, really critical to 
that. You are a little mismatched in terms of the cutters you 
are sending, because you are sending your smaller cutters right 
out on long deployments, so that presents some issues. So that 
is something we need to work on.
    Mr. Hart, USAID, I think great that you are expanding as 
part of, you know, my view, never should have gotten down to 
that low level of capacity, you know, one or two people--and 
Fiji is an example--but rapid ramp up.
    I was in Fiji at the end of last year meeting with your 
folks and others. And I think for you the question is, do you 
adequately resource for the capacity it is going to take to 
ramp up to your--you know, your ambitions, both your own USAID 
people as well as the local capacity to implement your 
programs, because you are going to--I forget what the figure 
was, but you are going from 0 to 60 million, or something like 
that, inside of 18 months or maybe lower than that.
    And so, you know, I think we all need to just be working 
on, well, how do we actually pull that off? Because I think you 
would all agree that as we look at the Pacific Islands and 
reengaging across the board with the Pacific Islands, they are 
looking at us saying, ``Are you guys in this for real, for the 
long term, this time around?''
    So, for me, the next one year to two years is really, 
really critical for us to all follow through from a budget 
perspective, from a coordination perspective, from an 
implementation perspective, because we are being watched, to 
see whether this is a real reengagement or not.
    Mr. Nakoa, thank you so much for the work on the compacts. 
That is great news that they are coming along.
    Assistant Secretary Cantor two days ago addressed a letter 
to us through the Natural Resources Committee that basically, 
as part of the compacts endorsed from Interior's perspective, 
the Compact Impact Fairness Act.
    And you made reference to this in your testimony, that 
there are many jurisdictions, of which Hawaii is one--only one 
of them, that have borne hundreds of millions of dollars of 
impacts from the compact residents over the last duration of 
the compacts, and that is just not acceptable anymore.
    And so as the Administration sends this--to you, Ms. 
Bocklage, as the Administration sends the compacts to us, I 
want to support them, but I just--I can't do it again on a 
blind basis where the impacts are not taken care of this time 
around, because, you know, 30 million a year spread throughout, 
you know, five or so jurisdictions or more, plus a little bit 
more that Congress adds on, as against hundreds of millions of 
dollars of actual impacts to the jurisdictions, is 
fundamentally unfair.
    And this is not a State initiative. This is a Federal 
Government initiative for all kinds of purposes--defense 
purposes, you know, social development purposes, historical 
relationship purposes, and we should do this. But I think the 
direct question to you is, will State also endorse that bill 
when you send the compacts over to us?
    Ms. Bocklage. So I think the State Department very much 
recognizes the compact impact and is in support--we do think 
that more comprehensive legislation to address the impacts of 
the Freely Associated States citizens that are living in the 
United States is the way to provide relief.
    Mr. Case. Okay. That wasn't exactly an answer. So you can 
take it back, but the direct request is that the federal 
administration, not just the Interior Department, but State, 
because you are going to be running this now, right?
    Ms. Bocklage. Yes.
    Mr. Case. You are taking--you are basically taking over 
much of the administration, both administration as well as 
budgetary authority, if I understand the President's budget 
properly.
    Ms. Bocklage. So the President's budget request is that the 
funding will come to State but will be implemented by the 
Department of Interior, so that we can take full advantage of 
the expertise that Interior has developed over the last 20 
years. But, yes, I will get you a formal answer back. We 
received a copy of the letter this morning, so we haven't had a 
chance to digest it fully, but we will get you a formal 
response back. Thank you.
    Mr. Case. Thank you. And thank you, Chair.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much. I want to 
thank all the witnesses for your valuable testimony today and 
the members for participating and asking questions.
    The members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for your--the witnesses to respond. So with that, I 
would like to ask you to respond to those in writing.
    And the chair now recognizes Ranking Member Bera for any 
closing remarks that you may have.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you. I will keep it brief. I do want to 
thank the witnesses and everyone within the Administration for 
working to get these agreements in place. Obviously, we all, in 
a bipartisan way, understand the importance of cementing this 
relationship, sending a strong signal to our brothers and 
sisters in the Islands about a long-term U.S. commitment with 
our friends and allies. So thank you again.
    And with that, I will yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. And pursuant to 
committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit 
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the Record, 
and subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the committee now stands adjourned. 
Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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