[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                      A LOOK AT U.S. POLICY IN GEORGIA
                         AND MOLDOVA AHEAD OF THEIR
                              2024 ELECTIONS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________


                             JULY 23, 2024

                               __________


                           Serial No. 118-108

                               __________


        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs






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                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56-570PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024















                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	     BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California	     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida		     AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	     TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California		     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 	     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa		     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas		         Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		     GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida		     JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey	     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		     JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia		     JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan		     GABE AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas		     KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RYAN ZINKE, Montana
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                      Sajit Gandhi, Staff Director

                         Subcommittee on Europe

                 THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman

JOE WILSON, North Carolina           WILLIAM KEATING, 
DARRELL ISSA, California                 Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas

                    Michael Callesen, Staff Director









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Huck, Joshua, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 
  Eurasian Affairs, Department of State..........................     7
Smith, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
  European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State.............    12
Sokolowski, Alexander, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 
  Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development..    19

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    43
Hearing Minutes..................................................    45
Hearing Attendance...............................................    46

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    47

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    48









 
                      A LOOK AT U.S. POLICY IN GEORGIA
                         AND MOLDOVA AHEAD OF THEIR
                              2024 ELECTIONS

                         Tuesday, July 23, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                             Subcommittee on Europe
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr. 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Kean. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to examine U.S. policy 
toward Georgia and Moldova in advance of their upcoming 
elections later this year.
    I would also like to welcome the gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Connolly, who is joining us today. He will participate 
following all other members in today's you know.
    I ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady from North 
Carolina, Ms. Ross, be allowed to sit on the dais and 
participate following all other members in today's hearing.
    Without objection. So ordered. I now recognize myself for 
an opening statement.
    On Christmas Day nearly 33 years ago the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist as a sovereign State. The Iron Curtain had 
fallen, and with it millions of people were freed from Soviet 
oppression. Within a span of 2 years the 15 new republics of 
the Soviet Union were independent, free to decide their own 
fate. Old adversaries became new partners responding to the 
hand of friendship offered by the United States and by our 
allies.
    Today we examine two of these former Soviet states: Georgia 
and the Republic of Moldova. Both are proceeding down very 
different paths. Moldova is on track to be a post-Soviet 
success story. With help from the United States and the 
European Union Moldova has made significant process rooting out 
corruption and malign Russian influence. It has worked to 
reform its system of justice, de-monopolize its energy sector, 
and curtailed the influence of the oligarchs who held back 
Moldova's progress and prosperity for far too long. With the EU 
accession talks commencing last month and the World Bank 
projecting Moldova's GDP to increase by 2.2 percent this year 
Moldova's future is bright.
    Moldova holds its next Presidential election in October 
alongside a referendum on its integration with the European 
Union. This is an important moment for Moldova. Will it 
continue down its pro-Western path or will it revert back to 
the Kremlin's sphere of influence? In the past Moscow has not 
shied away from using covert and overt methods to try to coerce 
its former subjects to bend to its will again.
    Congress will be watching this election in Moldova closely 
and we are eager to hear from the Administration what it is 
doing to prepare Moldova for the potential Russian 
interference.
    Across the Black Sea Georgia has sadly followed a very 
different path than Moldova in recent years. Since Georgia 
gained its independence from the Soviet Union the Georgian 
people have shown a fierce determination to root out 
corruption, to throw off the country's Soviet past, and to 
pursue a closer relationship with the United States and Europe. 
Georgians have fought and spilled blood not just to defend 
their own country against Russia's war of aggression in 2008, 
but also along U.S.--alongside U.S. service members. Georgia 
was the first of the largest non-NATO troop contributors to the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. That is 
why the recent actions of the current Georgian government led 
by the Georgian Dream Party are so disappointing.
    Over the past several years Georgian Dream has allowed 
itself to be infiltrated by malign elements openly attacking 
its Western partners and pursued a closer relationship with 
Russia and with China. In May the Georgian government passed 
the so-called foreign agents law despite multiple warnings from 
Georgia's Western partners including a letter led by Chairman 
McCaul and Ranking Member Meeks, which I and many of my 
colleagues here signed. Make no mistake, Georgia's foreign 
agents law has ruptured Georgia's relationship with the West.
    These actions threaten to reverse Georgia's decades-long 
hard-fought progress and spit in the face of the Georgian 
people, and overwhelming majority of which support joining the 
European Union. Many Georgian citizens bravely and peacefully 
took to the streets in opposition to the malign actions of 
their government. Sadly they were met with violent repression 
and arrests. In the midst of the debate over the foreign agent 
bill Georgian Dreams leader threatened fierce vengeance against 
his political opponents in a speech that would be well-suited 
to a tin pot dictator, not a close partner of the United 
States. I am eager to see how the people of Georgia respond to 
these actions by their government during the critical 
parliamentary elections in October.
    In closing, I would note that there is both room for hope 
in Georgia and Moldova this October. I believe that the vast 
majority of the citizens in both countries are eager for a 
closer partnership with the United States and do not want to 
see their countries once again subjugated to the Kremlin's 
will.
    I am eager to hear from our witnesses today in their 
assessment of the political situation in both countries and in 
what we can do to protect and promote American interests in 
both.
    I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement that he may have.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I thank our witnesses.
    And actually thank the Moldovan ambassador to the United 
States, Ambassador Ursu, who has joined us in the back of the 
room here today, too, as well.
    Thank you, Chairman Kean, for holding this hearing.
    The Black Sea is a region of critical importance to the 
United States' foreign policy and I am glad that today we are 
taking an in-depth look at Georgia and Moldova ahead of the 
upcoming elections in both countries that will occur this fall. 
With both the Georgian and Moldovan people making their Europe-
Atlantic intentions clear for decades I have confidence that 
they will continue to make their voices heard at the ballot box 
later this year.
    Unfortunately, and despite public support and 
constitutional obligations to pursue EU and NATO membership, 
the ruling Georgian Dream Party has strayed from the country's 
Euro-Atlantic path.
    Just last month Georgian Dream pushed through a Kremlin-
inspired foreign agent bill to crack down on civil society and 
freedom of expression in the country. Today I have two messages 
for the Georgian government and the Georgian people.
    First, to the Georgian government, your actions have not 
and will not go unanswered. In May the State Department 
implemented an initial tranche of visa restrictions on 
officials, and importantly family members. So long as the 
Georgian government continues to trample on democracy and the 
rule of law, I have no doubt that this Administration will 
continue to impose visa restrictions as well as financial 
sanctions as necessary.
    Furthermore, while the Georgian Dream touts a trade deal 
and visa liberalization regime with China it is important to 
remember that Beijing is actively supporting Russia's war of 
aggression Ukraine even as the Kremlin continues to occupy 20 
percent of Georgian's territory in this illegal war.
    Put simply, the Georgian Dream government is making deals 
with those supporting Georgia's occupier. There are fewer 
examples than that in the ruling party's betrayal of the 
Georgian people, people still haunted by the memories of their 
own war with Russia not too long ago.
    Second, to the Georgian people, your ambitions for a future 
in the EU and NATO are well known and this Congress and 
Administration will continue as we have for the last three 
decades to support you in these efforts. The Georgian Peoples 
Act which I introduced last month and the MEGOBARI Act with my 
friend Representative Joe Wilson exemplify our determination to 
support your democratic future even as your government breaks 
its constitutionally obligated promises to pave the way for EU 
and NATO accession.
    While Georgian Dream's actions run counter to the will of 
the Georgian people, President Sandu of Moldova has fortified 
Moldova's Euro-Atlantic future with impressive reform efforts 
despite the numerous challenges thrown her way. She has 
transversed a pandemic, the outbreak of a Russian war on her 
border, Ukraine, and gas prices, as well as strengthening 
Moldova's relationship with the United States and the European 
Union. This includes beginning accession negotiations with the 
EU in late June.
    I congratulate Moldova on this important step forward for 
EU integration and look forward to the day they formally join 
the alliance.
    At the same time Russia has a long-sought-after effort to 
undermine Moldovan politics and democratic reform. In late 2022 
I wrote a letter to Secretaries Yellen and Blinken to call 
attention to Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian Moldovan business man's 
responsibility for stealing more than $1 billion from Moldovan 
banks. I am glad to see that the Administration has sanctioned 
Shor and his cronies who have worked against the interests of 
the Moldovan people. It is also reassuring that the sanctions 
on Shor and his cronies were not a one-off and have been 
followed up with additional sanctions as appropriate.
    As we look to the future, the U.S.-Moldova strategic dialog 
has greatly strengthened our bilateral relationship. The most 
recent dialog in April of this year reaffirmed our joint 
commitment to advance defense and security cooperation, 
Moldova's EU integration, and important justice and anti-
corruption reforms. Furthermore, U.S. financial support has 
been critical to serving Moldova from complete dependence on 
Russian gas as Moldova now meets 100 percent of its gas needs 
with non-Russian supplies, an amazing achievement in such a 
short period of time.
    Georgia and Moldova comprise a fraction of the Black Sea 
countries, but are demonstrative of how U.S. engagement can 
positively reenforce the security, economic prosperity, and 
democratic resilience in the entire Black Sea region. As we 
address the existing and future challenges in the Black Sea it 
is critical that we are prepared and critical we address 
existing and future challenges there.
    I worked with Chairman Mike Turner and Senator Shaheen on a 
Black Sea Security Act to draft an interagency strategy toward 
the Black Sea region. I look forward to receiving this report 
from the National Security Council as soon as it is complete 
and I hope it will further U.S. leadership and influence in the 
region for the years to come.
    I again want to thank Chairman Kean for holding this 
hearing and for our witnesses being here and I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    We are pleased to have a panel of distinguished witnesses 
before us today on this important topic.
    From the Department of State Mr. Joshua Huck and Mr. 
Christopher Smith are deputy assistant secretaries in the 
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. And from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development Dr. Alexander Sokolowski 
is a deputy assistant administrator in the Bureau for Europe 
and Eurasia.
    Thank you for being here today. Your full statement will be 
made part of the record and I will ask each of you to keep your 
verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for member 
questions.
    I now recognize Mr. Huck for his opening statement. Thank 
you for being here.

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HUCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 
       EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Huck. Good afternoon. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member 
Keating, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Subcommittee on Europe. Thank you for your invitation 
to speak today about the U.S.-Georgia bilateral relationship in 
advance of parliamentary elections this October.
    I want to thank the members of this committee for their 
continued support of strong U.S.-Georgia relations. That 
support has never been more critical than it is today. This 
hearing comes at an extremely important time in both our 
bilateral relationship and for the future democracy in Georgia.
    The Georgian government has been deviating sharply from the 
country's past democratic trajectory putting its Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations and its relationship with the United States at 
risk. It has passed undemocratic legislation, demonized civil 
society, and issued disinformation and rhetorical attacks 
against the United States and European partners who have 
supported Georgia for decades.
    The foreign influence law passed by the ruling Georgia 
Dream Party on May 28 symbolizes this anti-democratic shift. 
This law, which mirrors a law put into force in Russia, is 
designed to silence critical voices, smear independent NGO 
activists and journalists, and cow Georgia's vibrant civil 
society. The Georgian Dream government passed this law despite 
mass protests by its citizens, U.S. objections, and a clear 
finding from the Council of Europe's Venice Commission that the 
law was not compatible with European norms.
    Over the past many months the State Department has engaged 
at all levels to make clear to the Georgian people that we 
continue to support their democratic Euro-Atlantic aspirations 
while at the same time making clear to the Georgian government 
that it is headed in the wrong direction.
    During a visit to Tbilisi, in May, Assistant Secretary Jim 
O'Brien and I underscored U.S. objections to the Georgian 
government's undemocratic actions warning of consequences if 
the ruling party did not change course. Similarly, 
Undersecretary of State Uzra Zeya and Undersecretary John Bass 
recently reiterated to Georgian officials that the government's 
actions are incompatible with the democratic values that 
underpin membership in the EU and NATO.
    As a result of Georgia's ruling party's decisions, on May 
23 Secretary Blinken announced visa--a new visa restriction 
policy to promote accountability for those undermining 
democracy in Georgia. He also announced a comprehensive review 
of our bilateral relationship including our assistance to 
Georgia.
    On June 6, we took steps to impose visa restrictions on 
Georgian ruling party officials, parliamentarians, and law 
enforcement personnel responsible for or complicit in 
undermining democracy in Georgia. These steps built on our 
previous actions such as visa restrictions on corrupt judges 
and financial sanctions on FSB-linked Georgian-Russian oligarch 
Otar Partskhaladze.
    We are also working closely with interagency colleagues on 
additional steps including potential redirection or suspension 
of assistance programs and the cancellation of policy 
engagements. DoD recently announced the indefinite postponement 
of a military exercise in Georgia.
    It remains our hope that Georgian leaders will reconsider 
their actions and return to Georgia's long-stated Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations. We have made clear to the government of Georgia 
that the best way to do this is to repeal the foreign influence 
law, cease spreading disinformation about the United States, 
stop progress of other undemocratic legislation, and ensure the 
pre-election period and the October parliamentary elections are 
conducted freely and fairly.
    2024 is a crucial year for Georgia's future and its 
democratic progress. We have underscored to the government the 
importance of ensuring free and fair elections and noted that 
we are watching the conduct of the electoral processes very 
closely. We have supported Georgia's request for an election 
observation mission from the OSCE and we have called on the 
government to ensure unimpeded access for international and 
domestic election observers.
    We remain steadfast in our support to Georgian civil 
society in the face of pressure from the government and even 
harassment and physical attacks. We engage with civil society 
representatives regularly and are actively supporting their 
efforts to ensure the October elections are free and fair.
    The Georgian people must decide the future of Georgia so we 
must remain mindful of the threats to Georgia from Russia which 
still occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory.
    In closing, I want to reaffirm that despite these difficult 
times the United States' commitment to the Georgian people 
remains steadfast and unchanged. Americans and Georgians share 
a special friendship grounded on our shared values of the love 
of liberty and independence. We will continue to support the 
further development of a vibrant, secure, and democratic 
Georgia.
    Thank you for allowing me to speak here with you today and 
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Huck follows:]


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    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Huck.
    I now recognize Mr. Smith for his opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SMITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
  BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Smith. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, and 
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to speak 
with you today about our policy on the Republic of Moldova.
    Under the constant threat of Russian aggression, 
interference, and disinformation, and with the prospect of EU 
membership hanging in the balance, there is much at stake for 
our partners in Moldova and for the United States in a region 
that is critical to our national interests. I am happy to 
report that thanks to our close cooperation to help Moldova 
meet this moment of opportunity and challenge our bilateral 
ties with Moldova have never been stronger than they are today.
    As we have implemented our strategy for Moldova Congress 
has been a powerful partner every step of the way from the 
funding appropriated for critical assistance to the high-level 
engagement and policy advocacy from members, including members 
of this subcommittee, to advance our common objective for a 
Moldova that is free, whole, democratic, and secure.
    Moldova's October 20th Presidential election and 
simultaneous national referendum on EU accession represent a 
historic opportunity for the people of Moldova. Amidst the 
devastating impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine 
President Sandu's government and the Moldovan people have taken 
bold steps to build a more democratic, secure, prosperous 
future firmly anchored in the West.
    A core objective of our strategy is to ensure that 
Moldova's course toward EU integration is irreversible. It 
won't be easy to reach this goal, but with continued strong 
support from the United States and our European partners and 
allies we are confident Moldova can succeed.
    Our strategy rests on three main lines of effort: high-
level engagement with Moldova's leaders and its people to 
signal our strong political support; assistance to help Moldova 
bolster its security and territorial integrity, achieve energy 
independence, and integrate its economy with the West; and 
finally, sanctions and other measures to meet and help Moldova 
meet and master the challenge of Russian malign influence 
designed to knock the country of its rightful European course.
    When President Sandu was elected in December, 2020 she ran 
on a bold vision of fighting corruption and bringing her 
country closer to Europe. During the past 4 years Moldova has 
made remarkable progress toward the European Union. It's open 
formal accession talks just last month.
    U.S. assistance, including approximately $824 million 
committed since February 2022 has played a significant role in 
advancing Moldova's rule of law, anti-corruption, energy and 
economic progress that helped unlock this historic achievement.
    There is still work to be done to advance Moldova's 
integration with Europe and we must continue to support these 
reform efforts. Fortunately, we are not acting alone. European 
and G7 partners have also provided billions of dollars to 
support Moldova and help them accomplish these goals. For 
example, since 2021 the European Union has given approximately 
2.4 billion euros to support socioeconomic development, 
security assistance, and reforms in Moldova.
    The Moldovan people have made a courageous choice to seek 
integration with Europe, particularly in the face of the 
Kremlin's intensified hybrid threats and ongoing efforts to 
keep Moldova in its purported sphere of influence. The Russian 
government has invested significant time, energy, and money to 
thwart Moldovans' sovereign choice to build closer ties with 
the West. They have done this using a variety of tactics 
including disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, 
and efforts to funnel illicit funds into the country in an 
attempt to undermine democratic processes, especially 
elections.
    We have taken and will continue to take concrete measures 
to help Moldova resist this Russian malign influence. Just this 
year we sanctioned Marina Tauber and Evgenia Gutul who engaged 
in blatant interference activities in recent elections in 
Moldova at the direct behest of Moscow. These sanctions sent a 
strong signal that the United States will not tolerate threats 
to free and fair elections in Moldova.
    We recently cooperated with the governments of Canada, the 
United Kingdom, to release downgraded information that showed 
Russia's current plans to illicitly sway the upcoming 
Presidential elections and foment unrest if a pro-Kremlin 
candidate is not elected. And we are working to strengthen 
Moldova's security in all spheres from elections to border 
protection to energy to cyber.
    Finally, the unresolved status of the Transnistria remains 
a challenge. We support a results-oriented OSCE process to 
resolve the conflict and uphold Moldova's territorial integrity 
and its sovereignty.
    We thank all of you on this committee for your strong 
backing of Moldova during this critical period. The people
    of Moldova have shown remarkable resilience in the face of 
un-relenting Russian pressure. They now face a critical 
decision on EU integration that will determine their future as 
a sovereign, independent country. Together with our European 
partners we will continue to provide the engagement and support 
Moldova needs to achieve our strategic interest in a Europe 
free, whole, and at peace.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you 
today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

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    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
    I now recognize Dr. Sokolowski for his opening statement. 
Thank you for joining us.

      STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER SOKOLOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
 ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 
                   INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

    Mr. Sokolowski. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you 
for your invitation to speak today about USAID's efforts to 
support democratic development in Georgia and Moldova. I 
welcome the opportunity to share the agency's work to 
strengthen the foundations of freedom in the region.
    Georgia and Moldova have been important U.S. partners 
seeking closer ties with the West for decades. Since 
independence and despite being in an increasingly threatened 
and turbulent neighborhood they have made remarkable progress 
and enacted major reforms. As a result of these efforts, in 
partnership with the United States last December, we saw the 
opening of European Union accession talks with Moldova and 
achievement of EU candidate status for Georgia.
    Yet in Georgia we are now facing a moment of profound 
concern for the country's future. Tens of thousands of 
patriotic Georgians have spoken out on repeated occasions and 
protested the foreign influence law in order to protect and 
defend Georgia's democracy and its hopes for European 
integration.
    The recent passage of the foreign agent--foreign influence 
law is an unnecessary step in the wrong direction which is 
threatening civil society and polarizing Georgia. The action 
has frozen progress toward and could derail Georgia's hopes for 
EU membership and is causing grave concerns about the 
trajectory of Georgia's democracy.
    The law causes alarm among so many not just because it was 
based on a Russian law, but because the model of governance 
that it represents, one of increasing stigmatization and 
distrust toward civil society and restriction of its 
activities.
    U.S. support for Georgian democracy and Georgia's 
impressive past accomplishments on this road were built on 
shared values of individual and societal freedoms, human 
rights, and a common vision of democratic governance, embracing 
a strong, active, and vibrant society and dialog with 
government. Now as an aside, I have been traveling to Georgia 
for two decades and this is the Georgia that we had known until 
recently. We want to see Georgia adhere to these values and 
realize this vision.
    Given the gravity of the current situation we are 
conducting a comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation 
between the United States and Georgia and we at USAID are 
working closely with our State Department colleagues on this 
effort.
    Since 1992 USAID has provided approximately $1.9 billion in 
assistance to Georgia to strengthen democratic institutions, 
improve health and education, and promote broad-based economic 
development. Today U.S. assistance to those institutions and 
organizations that are working toward a democratic Georgia and 
a Euro-Atlantic path has become all the more important.
    Georgians will head to the polls in October to determine 
their country's future and the course of their democracy. USAID 
is supporting a robust multifaceted set of programs to foster 
free and fair elections. This includes preelection assessment 
missions, long-term and short-term international domestic 
observation, support for transparent accountable election 
Administration, and independent media's coverage of the 
elections. More than ever we believe that comprehensive 
oversight from multiple sources will be crucial for ensuring 
the integrity of the electoral process and instilling public 
trust.
    Turning to Moldova, that country has suffered greatly as a 
result of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine starting 
in 2022. And despite this, I recall witnessing the great 
generosity and hospitality of the people and the government of 
Moldova as they welcomed Ukrainian refugees when I traveled to 
the border with USAID's administrator in April of that year. 
USAID has stepped up and pivoted programming in the aftermath 
of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to help address the 
resulting challenges in Moldova.
    USAID is supporting diversification of Moldova's energy 
sources that have enabled Moldova to break away from its 30-
year dependence on Russian supply. We also continue to foster 
increased trade with the European market.
    Moldova has also been a focus of USAID's Democracy Delivers 
initiative which works to surge support and resources to 
democratic countries to help them take advantage of windows of 
opportunity to implement reforms for their citizens. As part of 
this we have increased our efforts to combat corruption by 
enhancing the capacity of the National Anti-Corruption Center 
and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office while also 
supporting civil society transparency and accountability 
initiatives.
    Moldovans have made their intentions clear in seeking 
greater integration with Europe. This year's Presidential 
election and vote for a referendum on EU accession in Moldova 
will be critical tests of those intentions and for the 
country's democracy and sovereignty. USAID assistance has 
improved access to voting for all Moldovans and continues to 
strengthen transparency in the electoral process.
    USAID supports civil society to increase awareness about 
election processes, to monitor elections, to inform judges on 
electoral legislation, and to advocate for improved electoral 
code.
    We have helped modernize the Central Election Commission's 
information technology system and strengthened oversight of 
political financing and promoted electoral education and 
aligned electoral legislation with international standards.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolowski follows:]

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    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Sokolowski. I appreciate 
your opening statement.
    And I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
    In May the Georgian government led by the Georgian Dream 
Political Party passed the so-called foreign agents law. 
Georgian Dream claims that this law is harmless and is similar 
to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA, here in the 
United States.
    Mr. Huck, what is your response to this? How are the 
Georgian foreign agents law and FARA different?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question.
    And I appreciate it because we've heard this, this 
allegation or this statement, from Georgian Dream in the past. 
And it is patently not true. The two laws are very different 
and I can lay out a few specifics. But, in addition, for a full 
rundown on this, I would direct you to the Venice Commission 
has written a detailed report analyzing this I would be happy 
to share as well.
    But, in the nutshell, four quick items:
    First, FARA legislation does not differentiate between a 
profit entity or a not-for-profit entity. It's all treated the 
same.
    The Georgian law targets only civil society and media 
organizations. That's the first problem.
    Second, the U.S. FARA law exempts media organizations so 
long as 80 percent or more of the ownership is U.S., right? So, 
American. In Georgia, they do not make that distinction. In 
fact, media is specifically targeted, which has a serious 
impact on independent media there.
    In addition, the FARA law is based on your actions. Are 
you, in fact, acting at the direct control of a foreign entity? 
The Georgian law does not make that distinction. Again, it only 
looks at where your foreign funding comes from. So, if you're 
an NGO working on early childhood education, or something of 
that nature, and you receive a grant from Finland--or pick any 
other country--you are irrefutably, irrebuttably labeled an 
agent of foreign influence of Finland, regardless of what the 
actions of your given civil society organization is.
    None of this stands to reason. And so, all of this is why 
both we and our European partners have analyzed the bill 
closely and assessed it does not align with transatlantic 
norms.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. So, you are, basically, saying--and you agree--
that their law is very similar to the Russia law and actually 
much closer to what President Putin is pushing within Russia 
and his allies-states?
    Mr. Huck. I would agree with that, as a Russian-inspired 
law, we often say, and it is quite worrisome that, while 
Georgia's long-time partners and allies, like the United States 
and Europe, have warned and urged Georgia not to move forward 
with this legislation, Russia, the country that occupies 20 
percent of Georgia, has praised the law.
    And we've made the case to Georgian Dream and to the people 
of Georgia that, when your friends are urging you to not do it, 
and your occupier is urging you to do it, it really ought to 
make you think.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Huck.
    Mr. Sokolowski, the clear pretext of Geogia's foreign 
agents law is to impose control on the organizations that have 
worked for years to bring Georgia closer to the Euro-Atlantic 
community. Many of these organizations are implementing 
partners of the State Department and USAID. Once the foreign 
agents law comes into effect in September, what impacts will it 
have on State and USAID's implementing partners in Georgia, and 
what guidance are you providing to them about this new 
operating environment?
    Mr. Sokolowski. Thank you very much for that question, 
Chairman Kean.
    On one level, we are facing a situation that has some 
degree of uncertainty. We are waiting for implementing 
guidelines to come out with regard to the legislation, and we 
anticipate those coming out in August.
    At the same time, we are not sitting and waiting. Our 
mission in Tbilisi has been working with our partners on what 
we're calling a lean-in strategy with civil society, as we help 
them to weather this transition in the environment and to offer 
them sets of services that to this point they have not needed.
    And these are the kind of services that they may need in a 
more challenging and less conducive environment for their work. 
And in that, we're talking about legal assistance; assistance 
to help them understand how they can comply with the law; 
security for their staff, and so forth.
    So, there's a number of different things that we're working 
on. We have set a goal to make sure that we are focusing and 
orienting our assistance to help NGO's as they enter this 
difficult period.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    Mr. Smith, Moldova has been slipping out of Russia's orbit 
for several years, and based on consistent public pollings, it 
seems like it will continue to do so. Is the State Department 
concerned about more overt and direct Russian interference and 
intervention in Moldova as we get closer to the October 
Presidential election and EU referendum?
    Mr. Smith. We see very clear--first of all, thank you so 
much for the question, Mr. Chairman--we see very clear action 
by the Russians to undermine this upcoming election and the 
referendum. They are engaging networks of interference financed 
by the Russian State and also by oligarchs and criminal 
organizations, designed to deprive the Moldovan people of their 
right to choose and their right to make a decision about their 
country's future. And we are working through sanctions to 
target those organizations and disrupt their operations, but 
also to support reforms necessary to ensure this election is 
protected from that type of influence.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Keating for any questions 
that he may have.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to followup with Mr. Smith because I see great 
benefit, even to the United States, in understanding the 
disinformation tactics employed by Russia in Moldova.
    We have seen their actions in France recently. We have seen 
their actions in Slovakia and in the Baltic countries for 
years, but it is becoming more and more pronounced. And in 
Moldova, you indicated how illicit funds are getting into the 
country for this. If you could give us some more detail on 
that? And plus, you mentioned that the United States and Canada 
have seen a plan, actually, a detailed plan, of what they are 
doing. Could you give us more details, if that is possible in 
an unsecure setting, about what they are doing? It is really 
important for Moldova that they are able to combat this and 
have done a great job, I think, to the extent they can.
    But this is something that will affect, with our own 
elections coming here, Russian disinformation tactics. So, the 
more we can learn about what is going on in the rest of the 
world, the better it is all the way around.
    So, if you could, take a few minutes.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    I would describe the Russian campaign in Moldova as 
consisting of three critical elements.
    One is that they use illicit funding in order to try to get 
people to come out and protest.
    Mr. Keating. Now, where do the funds emanate from?
    Mr. Smith. The funds emanate from Russian-backed oligarchs, 
including Mr. Shor, who you mentioned in your opening 
statement, somebody that the United States has designated----
    Mr. Keating. This is the person that stole a billion 
dollars from Moldova.
    Mr. Smith. Exactly sir, and somebody who is operating a 
network of influence and using his financial connections to try 
to push illicit money into the country.
    Additionally, he is promoting false narratives about the 
outcome of the referendum; for example, promoting the idea 
that, if Moldovans were to support a referendum on EU 
integration, that that would result in Russia suddenly 
attacking the country, and that that would bring Moldova closer 
to----
    Mr. Keating. How is this information being transmitted?
    Mr. Smith. They use social media and they also use 
programming on Russian-controlled television and Russian-
controlled media that is broadcast from Russia.
    Mr. Keating. That is true. Because when I was there not too 
long ago, I learned that, in Moldova, because it is one of the 
poorer countries in Europe, and some of the production--that 
the television, including children's television, family 
television, all television, is Russian-originated, and within 
that, they have great influence.
    So, go ahead.
    Mr. Smith. That's correct, sir.
    And then, the third method that they use is backing 
particular candidates. And they have backed particular 
candidates who are running in this election. They have ties to 
those candidates. They are encouraging them and they are trying 
to drive a consensus among certain candidates to support a pro-
Kremlin position that is counter to the will of the Moldovan--
--
    Mr. Keating. And they are trying to really inhibit turnout 
in voting as well.
    Mr. Smith. They are trying to undermine turnout by, again, 
spreading false information that somehow Moldova will be 
dragged into the war in Ukraine if Moldovans were to support 
the EU referendum.
    And they are also trying to drive an agenda that undermines 
the accomplishments of President Sandu in meeting the 
aspirations of the Moldovan people to fight corruption, to 
strengthen their democratic and economic institutions.
    Mr. Keating. And when I was there, too--and if you could 
tell me if this is still in play or if it has even expanded--
they were using domestic issues. They do not come out with pro-
Russian statements. They come out with disinformation 
regarding, for instance, the economic conditions in the country 
and others. Could you give us some examples of that?
    Mr. Smith. Yes. One of the narratives that they try to 
foster is that Moldova is turning away from a reliance on 
energy emanating from Russia that gas resources, for example, 
has caused a raise in prices for Moldovans. It's actually quite 
the opposite. In most cases, now that Moldova is buying gas on 
the open market, according to EU norms and rules, most of the 
prices are cheaper than what Gazprom was offering them earlier.
    Mr. Keating. So, they are able to use that influence even 
to distort the truth to their advantage?
    Mr. Smith. That's correct, sir.
    Mr. Keating. And they are using these domestic issues 
because the group behind it, the ultimate goal is to create a 
government that is pro-Russian. So, they are not using 
propaganda as we might remember from the cold war. They are 
much more sophisticated in attacking domestic issues, trying to 
make the government look weaker, even when those are lies?
    Mr. Smith. The goals that we have seen them articulate, and 
that we shared in the declassified information that we 
announced publicly together with the governments of Canada and 
the U.K., make clear that they are doing this in order to get a 
pro-Kremlin candidate in office.
    Mr. Keating. And my concerns about Georgia that I addressed 
in my opening statement are extremely important, but I wanted 
to drill down as we have on this while we have the opportunity. 
Because this is important in Moldova. It is important with all 
the elections in Europe, but it is also important here in the 
United States, because we will see these same tactics here.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
    I now recognize Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want 
to thank Chairman Tom Kean and, also, Ranking Member Bill 
Keating in this regard: you can see bipartisan appreciation and 
support of the people of Georgia and Moldova. And we want the 
best for both of the countries.
    And with that in mind, I have had wonderful visits to 
Tbilisi, to the Nation of Georgia. What a beautiful city. 
Tbilisi is just amazing.
    And then, I had the opportunity to go to a joint parachute 
jump that was really interesting. It was troops from the Nation 
of Georgia with the troops from the State of Georgia, and there 
is a State partnership program. And the professionalism of the 
Georgian military--two of my sons served in Iraq and, also, 
Afghanistan with Georgians. And they knew, if Georgians were 
there, they were safe. And so, we want to build on that 
relationship.
    And I have also seen the negative. I have been to Gori, 
incredibly, the birthplace of Joseph Stalin. But I have been 
there to see the fence where the encroachment occupation of 
South Ossetia, of Caucasus, have taken place, and the violation 
of territorial integrity of the people of Georgia.
    So, sadly, Putin is just trying to recreate the Soviet 
Union. Georgia and Moldova, sadly, have remained in War 
Criminal Putin's territorial line of fire since declaring their 
independence from the failed Soviet empire. It has really 
become clear, sadly, that War Criminal Putin is trying to 
recreate the failed Soviet Union empire to benefit the 
oligarchs.
    And he is, first, oppressing the people of Russia. Then, he 
now is threatening every former Soviet republic at risk, as he 
seeks to provide for the recreation of the failed empire.
    The brave and courageous people of Georgia and Moldova have 
inspired the world in pursuit of freedom and democracy. That is 
why I was grateful to introduce the bipartisan MEGOBARI Act to 
hold the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party accountable for its 
assault on the will of the Georgian people, while also offering 
a path to restore Georgia's Euro-Atlantic trajectory.
    As we proceed, I want to thank all the witnesses. And I 
have seen firsthand Mr. Smith and his service overseas and how 
fortunate we are to have State Department personnel do so well.
    Mr. Huck and Dr. Sokolowski, Secretary Blinken has stated 
that a review of all assistance to the Georgian government is 
on the table following the decision to proceed with the foreign 
agents law. And I appreciate the visa sanctions that have been 
applied, at least for those who came up with the law. And 
people need to know the foreign agents law means the ability of 
a government to arrest people for disagreement.
    In 2010, that was the law initiated by the Duma to stamp 
out all opposition in the Russian Federation, a country that 
should be a great country. It is not.
    And also, they followed through in Venezuela with a foreign 
agents law. And so, dictators see this as a way to expand.
    With this, here is the question that I have: given that 
more than a month has passed and the foreign agents law will 
come into force in September, can you outline what the 
Administration plans to take substantive action in response? 
What action or actions are being considered? And then, what is 
being done to help the people of the Nation of Georgia to have 
free and fair elections?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question. I will give 
a few comments, and then, turn to Dr. Sokolowski for some 
additional.
    First, I would like to outline U.S. actions across four 
lines of effort.
    First, clear, high-level, direct messaging to the 
government of Georgia they are headed in the wrong direction; 
to make clear what they need to do to return to the path of a 
Euro-Atlantic trajectory and greater Euro-Atlantic integration, 
which is what the people of Georgia have so clearly said for so 
long that they want.
    But, in addition to clear messaging and discussions with 
the Georgian government, we have taken actions as well. On May 
23d, Secretary Blinken announced this full review of all of our 
bilateral relationship, including assistance. The assistance 
review is ongoing as well.
    We have taken steps to issue visa restrictions on dozens of 
Georgian ruling party officials, parliamentarians, law 
enforcement, and family members.
    We are continuing to look at all the tools available to us 
for additional steps. I'm not able to preview today what 
exactly those are because we do not preview sanctions or 
punitive actions, but we are reviewing the full set of tools at 
our disposal, whether that is for violations of human rights, 
corruption, or undermining democracy. Everything is on the 
table and being reviewed.
    In addition, we are continuing to message loud and clear to 
civil society, to the Georgian people, that any actions that we 
take are targeted and deliberate and focused on the Georgian 
Dream ruling party or the individuals responsible, and not to 
the people of Georgia. The United States for decades has been 
the clearest, loudest advocate for Georgia's territorial 
independence, their sovereignty, and their democracy, and we 
will continue to do that.
    I would like to pass to my colleague for a couple of 
additional thoughts on civil society.
    Mr. Sokolowski. Sure. Thank you very much, Josh.
    And thank you very much for the question.
    We agree that this is a critical moment for Georgia and we 
need to really focus on this electoral process to help Georgia 
move in the right direction. There are a number of components 
to what we are trying to do there. There are some that are 
already in place.
    So, there has been a pre-election assessment mission by NDI 
that was out in February. It was actually right after I was 
just there. And then, they are going to do another one this 
summer.
    I talked about observation of multiple organizations 
already in my statement, but, overall, there are going to be 
about 100 long-term observers and about 2100 short-term 
observers.
    Finally, two quick things. Get-out-the-vote efforts. We are 
going to try to make sure that a lot of people get out and vote 
and take advantage of their democratic rights. And then, also, 
support of the Central Election Commission.
    Mr. Wilson. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    The chair will now recognize Madeleine Dean from 
Pennsylvania, 5 minutes for questions.
    Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman Kean and Ranking Member 
Keating, for having this hearing.
    I thank you for your testimony, all of you, and more 
importantly, for your work with the State Department, with 
USAID. It is extraordinarily important work that you are doing 
in part of the world that extraordinarily important.
    I wanted to focus on what we talked about with the foreign 
agent law. As we have heard from you, our witnesses, the 
recently passed foreign influence law, foreign agent law, in 
Georgia has raised significant concerns--and with good reason. 
The law, which was previously withdrawn from consideration, in 
large part due to significant public outcry, as you detailed, 
is reported to mirror the Russian law that has been used in 
practice to stifle dissent.
    In response to the enactment of this law, it has been 
swift, including the EU halting Georgia's accession and 
freezing 30 million euros in financial support.
    Mr. Huck, thank you for your testimony.
    How does the foreign influence law compare to the 
equivalent legislation in Russia? We talked about what does it 
look like in comparison to American law. What does it look like 
as compared with the Russian law?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question.
    And unfortunately, we do see strong similarities to the 
Russian law, both in the nature of the law, but also on the 
intent. What is so worrisome about this law is not just the 
actual terms of it that we discussed earlier, but it is the 
intent. It is the fact that the Georgian Dream government has 
publicly and specifically said it is targeting civil society 
and independent media with this law, and that it intends to use 
it to punish critics or those that it sees as threatening its 
rule--it has said that publicly--which is quite concerning. So, 
this is, also, how we have seen that law be used in Russia, and 
we have seen, of course, with devastating impact the way that 
Moscow has wielded these kinds of tools.
    So, these are all the reasons that we are particularly 
concerned about this, especially given this moment as we head 
into the election. It is precisely at this moment where Georgia 
needs a powerful, empowered civil society to perform functions 
like election observation or policing and oversight of 
government institutions, to ensure that they are meeting the 
needs of the Georgian people.
    Ms. Dean. What does that punishment look like? How are they 
going to use the law and how will they punish folks?
    Mr. Huck. Yes. So, as Dr. Sokolowski mentioned, in 
October--I'm sorry--in August, the implementing regulations 
will come out. So, when that comes out, we will have a little 
more information about the nitty-gritty details of what the 
registration requirements are and how it will be carried out.
    But we already know that the government is threatening 
steep penalties for non-compliance. And we also know that, 
under the terms of the law, individual members of that 
organization--not just the ownership, but the members of any 
given organization--could be held responsible and could also 
face fines, penalties, or even additional repercussions.
    Ms. Dean. And connected to that, Dr. Sokolowski, you stated 
in your testimony that, ``USAID is supporting a robust, 
multifaceted set of programs to try to foster free and fair 
election. This includes pre-election assessment missions; long-
term and short-term international and domestic observation; 
support for transparent accountable elections Administration; 
independent media coverage of elections, and efforts.'' End 
quote.
    Again, the implementation of this law, how will the foreign 
agent law impact what USAID, what you, will be able to 
accomplish in protecting free and fair elections?
    Mr. Sokolowski. Thank you for the question.
    I will just echo what we said before. This is a moment of 
great uncertainty because we do not exactly know the 
implementing regulations and what they will look like. So, 
there is great concern about how this will affect the elections 
themselves, because, also, the time line for implementation of 
the law is running up right before the elections themselves.
    However, I can say that there is one bit of possibly 
encouraging news, which is that the International Republican 
Institute, who we support, has recently met with the prime 
minister, who at least gave lip service and said that he was 
interested in seeing free and fair elections.
    Our partners are planning to work to provide this 
oversight. However, I do not want to say that with certainty we 
know that they will be able to operate in the runup to the 
elections. That is the plan and we are going to do everything 
we can at USAID to work flexibly to help them to do that.
    Ms. Dean. Perfect.
    And thank you. I see my time is expiring.
    But, Mr. Smith, thank you, also, for your extraordinary 
work, too.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    I now recognize Mrs. Wagner from Missouri for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman for organizing this very 
important and timely hearing.
    And I want to thank our witnesses for their time and 
service.
    I, too, want to focus on Georgia today, which is, 
obviously, heading into--we have alluded to and discussed 
here--consequential elections in October. I am gravely 
concerned that Russian influence over Georgia's government is 
growing by leaps and bounds in a country, by the way, where 
nearly 80 percent of the population supports NATO and EU 
membership. It is pretty astounding.
    The West must not leave the Georgian people to the mercy of 
a corrupt pro-Putin elite. And it would be extremely 
shortsighted to allow Putin even greater latitude to sow chaos 
and violence in Europe amid--you know, we have all seen it--
mass protests attended by literally hundreds of thousands of 
Georgians.
    The Georgian government kind of rammed through its own 
version of Russian legislation that Putin has used to silence 
opposition groups and the media and attack organizations with 
ties to the West.
    Assistant Secretary Huck, the State Department confirmed--
and then, you have mentioned it here in the hearing--that 
travel bans have been issued for some Georgian officials for 
supporting the Russian law, so to speak, as, frankly, many 
Georgians are calling it that, and for violence against 
peaceful protestors.
    Will the State Department take additional action, including 
imposing potentially financial sanctions, to hold these 
officials accountable, and if so, when?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question, and 
appreciate the concerns, which we definitely share.
    In terms of actions, I have detailed some of what we have 
done already. But I will say that we are actively--this is an 
active process to look at every tool that we have that we can 
make available to hold individuals accountable in Georgia for 
either corruption, violation of human rights, or undermining 
democracy. We are looking at all of those. We will----
    Mrs. Wagner. And what will some of those be, besides the 
travel bans? I'm looking at sanctions----
    Mr. Huck. Yes, sanctions, economic sanctions, which we have 
done in the past, including on Otar Partskhaladze, a Georgian/
Russian oligarch, and visa restrictions on judges as well. We 
are not afraid to use those. We are actively looking at those. 
I do not have something to preview for you today because we do 
not announce them in advance.
    But if I could say one other piece that I think is really 
important that we need to do right now, which is to recognize 
that the Georgia Dream government is trying to have it both 
ways. They want to criticize the United States, criticize 
European partners, and at the same time tell their own people 
that they are still on track for membership in the EU. It is 
unconscionable.
    And I think it is important for us and the international 
community to make clear to the Georgian voters, the Georgian 
people, that there is a clear choice. They have their own 
decision to make, but that the path that Georgian Dream is 
leading them is not toward a transatlantic future that the 
Georgian people have said they want.
    Mrs. Wagner. Let me switch tracks a bit. In May, the 
Georgian government announced that a Chinese consortium had won 
a bid for construction of the deep sea port in the city of 
Anaklia, I think it is called, on Georgia's Black Sea coast. 
Anaklia's strategic location makes this a crucial project for 
Xi Jinping.
    Assistant Secretary Huck, how concerned are you about this 
project? Because I am. And what are the ramifications for 
regional security if China were to gain control over this 
strategic port?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question and 
completely share your concern.
    It is surprising to us that the Georgian Dream government 
has decided that China, the country that is bankrolling 
Russia's ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine, the same country 
that occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory illegally in 
violation of international law at this very moment, is an 
appropriate strategic partner for Georgia. That is surprising 
to us.
    That is something that we have raised very clearly with the 
Georgian government, something that not only is a strategic 
risk, but also, as they look at any perceived economic benefits 
from partnering with China, they need to look at the costs of 
that as well, the risks--risks of dependence on China, and 
thereby, opening themselves up to economic coercion.
    Mrs. Wagner. Yes, and I think we have to urge our EU 
partners to also weigh on this, especially as they look to 
become members of the EU and NATO.
    Given China and Russia's no limits partnership, sir, does 
Chinese control of Anaklia's deep sea port also entrench 
Georgia further with Russia's sphere of influence?
    Mr. Huck. Well, it certainly raises concern and questions. 
Now, Georgia does not have diplomatic relations with Russia. 
The Georgia public has spoken very clearly that they do not 
want Russian troops anywhere near the rest of Georgia. They 
already are bitterly--they have bitter, deep, painful memories 
from the invasion in 2008. And so, they are very clear; the 
Georgian people have spoken. So, the question is, will the 
Georgian Dream government listen?
    Mrs. Wagner. My time has expired. I appreciate the chair's 
indulgence and I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Wagner.
    I now recognize Representative Titus from Nevada for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm very interested in Georgia and Moldova because I'm the 
ranking member of the House Democracy Partnership, and both of 
those countries are partners in that arrangement. And so, we 
are very active working with some of the NGO's, trying to 
buildup their legislatures, in hopes that that is kind of the 
key to moving toward more democratic institutions, 
specifically, and governments, generally. So, I hate to see 
that it is moving in the wrong direction.
    You know, the passage of that foreign agent act just shows 
not only the political influence that Russia is having in 
Georgia, but you also see it in economic influence. You see 
imports increasing, exports increasing. We heard about the 
port. All of these things are happening at the same time, and 
it does not bode very well.
    You know, there are some attempts that we have heard by 
some people about stopping their attempted accession into 
Western organizations. Several EU officials have called for 
that. I think you said, Mr. Huck, that the State Department 
supports freezing those accession talks.
    Would you give us a little more information about that? And 
if we were to do that, couldn't that have the opposite effect 
of what we want and push them more toward Russian influence?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question, and it is 
an important one.
    First, of course, we have to say, related to EU accession, 
this is ultimately a decision for the EU members. But what the 
EU Council has announced is a de facto freeze. The door is not 
closed. Georgia remains an EU candidate country, but the 
process is de facto frozen, based on the actions and rhetoric 
of the Georgian Dream government.
    That is a decision that we certainly understand from the 
perspective of the EU. Because, as I said earlier, you cannot 
have it both ways. You cannot be taking these actions as 
Georgian Dream and making these kinds of really wild 
accusations, if you listen to some of the speeches by Georgian 
Dream leadership, and then, expect no repercussions, or even 
tell your people that everything is on track.
    But I think, you know, there has been some discussion of if 
the EU would take additional steps. I do not want to speculate 
on hypotheticals, but I can certainly say that the steps that 
the EU has taken already should be enough of a wake-up call for 
Georgian Dream to see that they are not moving in the direction 
that their people have so clearly and so regularly said they 
want. Something like 80 to 90 percent of the Georgian people 
support EU membership, and clearly, the Georgian Dream 
government is not heading in that direction. So, the Georgian 
people will have a real decision to make come October.
    Ms. Titus. We have talked about the foreign agents act or 
foreign influence act. They have also passed some pretty 
repressive LGBT rights acts. Are those playing in the 
discussion very much?
    Mr. Huck. Yes. So, you are right, there are a number of 
different pieces of legislation that the Georgian Dream 
government have taken over the past few months that are 
concerning. The law you mentioned is not yet into law, but they 
have introduced it, which is concerning.
    And both we and the European Union have looked at it. The 
Council of Europe's Venice Commission also did a full analysis 
of that, of that law, and raised very serious concerns; that it 
would stigmatize one section of the population; that it could 
promote hate speech; that it would prevent equal protections 
under Georgian law for human rights of all Georgians.
    So, for that reason, it is yet another step that the 
Georgian Dream is taking where its partners and friends are 
saying this does not align with the transatlantic trajectory 
that your people say you want. And so, this is of great concern 
to us.
    Again, that is not yet law, but we will be continuing to 
track it and raise our concerns with the government.
    Ms. Titus. Do you see things like that in Moldova?
    Mr. Smith. I am happy to report that actually in Moldova 
the situation is going in the other direction. And that is 
largely due to the fact that they have done so well in 
implementing the reforms required for opening accession talks 
with the EU.
    Now, as they move forward beyond talks, they are going to 
be opening chapters and really integrating their system not 
only with EU practices, principles, and norms, but functionally 
integrating it and addressing issues that apply to human 
rights, but also practical issues dealing with the economy.
    So, we are quite encouraged by the progress that Moldova 
has made in this space, and we will continue to align our 
engagement and assistance resources to encourage that progress 
further forward.
    Ms. Titus. What we often hear when we talk to legislators 
there is how much they are doing to have an independent 
judiciary and to fight corruption. And that that hopes it will 
propel them into these western alliances.
    And then you go home and then it is not so much.
    Do you see--what do you see on that front?
    Mr. Smith. We see tremendous progress when it comes to 
their commitment. And really, Maia Sandu, when she was elected 
president back in December 2020, she put judicial reform at the 
very front and center of her anti-corruption efforts.
    We have used our assistance in partnership with the 
Europeans to help them put in place vetting processes, to make 
sure that they are recruiting the right people into the 
judicial branch who are going to approach these types of 
questions in a free and fair manner.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Titus.
    I now recognize Representative Lawler from New York.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As one of the co-chairs of the Moldova Caucus, along with 
Rep. Ross, it has truly been remarkable to see the Moldovan 
Government's transformation from a pro-Russian kleptocratic 
regime to a pro-democracy, pro-Western government under 
President Sandu. And the work that has been done not only to 
reform the judiciary but to prosecute and apply sanctions with 
the cooperation of the U.S. Government on Russian oligarchs has 
been an important step forward.
    And currently Moldova is seeking EU membership, which I 
think is another important and positive step toward 
strengthening not only their democracy but strengthening their 
economy moving forward. But it does not come without its own 
challenges.
    Mr. Smith or Mr. Huck, what is the U.S. doing to prioritize 
Moldova through programs such as IMET, FMF, and other accounts 
within the International Security Assistance Program at the 
State Department?
    And how much has Moldova received through these programs in 
recent years?
    Mr. Smith. Since--thank you very much for the question, 
Representative Lawler. Since Russia's full-scale invasion our 
FMF budget for Moldova has increased tenfold. We have used that 
funding not only to help them improve their combat capability 
as a military force but also training and education has been a 
cornerstone of our assistance.
    We have focused not only on helping them develop their 
officer corps, but also the non-commissioned officer corps 
which is so essential to a strong and resilient military.
    Our assistance has extended even beyond the military and, 
of course, focused on our close cooperation with the border 
guards to help strengthen their border as they face pressure 
emanating from the Russians. And, also, we have worked closely 
with law enforcement in a deep partnership to help Moldova meet 
the challenge to their security emanating from what the 
Russians are trying to sponsor inside the country as well.
    Mr. Lawler. Putin and many within his Government have made 
it clear that certainly if Ukraine were to fall, Moldova would 
be in their sights. How concerned is the Administration about 
that?
    Mr. Smith. As President Sandu has stated herself, the 
defenders of Ukraine are not just defending Ukraine. They are 
defending Moldova and they are defending Europe.
    We take very seriously the threats emanating from Russia 
both in terms of its illegal invasion of Ukraine, but also the 
threats it poses for the wider region. And that is why we have 
aligned our assistance in support of Ukraine to ensure they 
prevail on the battlefield and can deter future Russian 
aggression.
    Mr. Lawler. And, given that, has the Administration 
directed any Europe funding toward Moldova, and are you 
planning to in this upcoming fiscal year?
    Mr. Smith. We have directed funding from the supplementals 
for Ukraine to Moldova. Some of that funding has delivered 
instrumental transformations in Moldova, one of which we talked 
about a little earlier, which is the energy transformation. 
Moldova went from being 100 percent reliant on Russian gas, for 
example, now to buying it on the open market according to EU 
norms and EU practices.
    Our assistance was essential in meeting that objective. And 
it has had positive results even at a practical level for the 
United States. Just last April, for the first time ever in 
history, Moldova bought LNG exported from the United States.
    These are the type of achievements we have been able to 
reach using those resources.
    Mr. Lawler. Given Moldova's plan and focus on EU ascension, 
do you see a future where Moldova applies for NATO membership, 
especially given their relationship with our NATO ally Romania?
    Mr. Smith. It is an interesting question, sir. Thank you.
    They are constitutionally, as you know, a neutral country. 
But they have been a member of the Partnership for Peace for 30 
years. And they have actively participated in NATO training, 
and in some peacekeeping operations as well, including 
contributing forces to the NATO peacekeeping operation in 
Kosovo.
    This will be a decision for the Moldovan people. But just 
as with EU accession, if the United States is partnering with 
Moldova, we will support them on their Euro-Atlantic path 
should they choose that course. For now, we are focused on the 
EU.
    Mr. Lawler. The Administration describes corruption in 
Moldova as endemic. But I do not think that is something that 
we should accept.
    Can you describe why the Administration feels Moldova has 
endemic corruption?
    And what are we doing to help change this narrative?
    Mr. Smith. We assess the situation in terms of corruption 
in Moldova has improved significantly since Maia Sandu came 
into office in 2020. But we still face legacy corruption that 
Russia uses to try to manipulate decisionmaking inside the 
Moldovan Government and advance its narrative, particularly 
when it looks to target elections and the upcoming EU 
referendum.
    We see corruption that remains in the rule of law sector 
and in the judicial sector. And we are working closely to use 
our assistance and engagement to help the Moldovans tackle it.
    Mr. Lawler. Well, to that end it would be critical to be 
engaged in election monitoring to ensure that the Russians do 
not interfere in Moldova's elections.
    Mr. Smith. I fully concur, sir.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Costa from 
California for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Costa. I thank the chairman and members of the 
subcommittee here.
    This is, I think, an important topic as it looks at the 
Eastern Europe and the challenges we see, not only in Ukraine 
but the ripple effect that is taking place.
    I think the conversation, I am told this afternoon, is 
reflected in part with the backsliding that is taking place in 
Georgia, and how we can do our best to reverse this trend, but, 
also, the pattern of that backsliding affecting Moldova and 
Armenia.
    Armenia is a small country that has been impacted by the 
actions of Azerbaijan. And, frankly, you know, that trend with 
Russia in the lead. And I begin referring to my colleagues and 
to my friends in Europe as Russia today being a syndicate 
masquerading as a country with a mob boss called Putin, because 
he is a war criminal. That is just the way I see it.
    How can we apply what we have learned in the case of the 
backsliding in Georgia to deal with democratic resilience and 
other efforts in the region that we are involved with?
    And I guess one of you are an expert in Georgia. Josh, is 
that you? And then----
    Mr. Huck. Yes.
    Mr. Costa [continuing]. Christopher, you are the Moldova 
guy?
    Mr. Huck. That is it, yes. Thank you for the question and 
happy to address.
    Dr. Sokolowski may have something to add from the civil 
society----
    Mr. Costa. Quickly, because I have another question.
    Mr. Huck. OK, sure.
    So, so briefly, we remain very concerned about Russia's 
broader malign intentions to the whole South Caucasus region. 
Clearly it sees this region as an area that it should have 
preeminence over. And it would like to see weak, divided, 
isolated countries on its border that it can take advantage of.
    And so, for that reason----
    Mr. Costa. And Russia is the original imperialistic country 
going back 400 years. I mean, I think Putin sees himself as a 
reincarnation of Peter the Great. I did not think he was so 
great.
    Mr. Huck. Yes. And so, what, you mentioned Armenia. Two 
things that we are doing in the Administration: first, strongly 
supporting every, through every way we can the achievement of a 
just and durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
    Secretary Blinken just met with the foreign ministers of 
the two countries earlier this, this month. There is no single 
thing we could do to improve the lives of the people in the 
South Caucasus region more than achievement of a just and 
durable peace. So, we are making that effort.
    Mr. Costa. A hundred and 20 thousand Armenians part of 
Nagorno-Karabakh now in Armenia. The USAID is helpful but we 
need to do more?
    Mr. Huck. Thank you. On the specifics for those who have 
fled, I think I can also turn to Dr. Sokolowski, who may have 
some more.
    I just wanted to stress the extensive efforts that the U.S. 
Government is now taking on behalf of our support to increase 
Armenia's resilience writ large. We just had a strategic dialog 
capstone event at which we decided, we announced that we are 
upgrading the relationship to a strategic partnership.
    Mr. Costa. It is important.
    Mr. Huck. And we are also increasing assistance levels.
    I will turn to Dr. Sokolowski for perhaps a little bit more 
on that.
    Mr. Costa. Quickly.
    Mr. Sokolowski. Yes, sure.
    Just would note that our Administrator Samantha Power was 
out in Armenia earlier this month with Assistant Administrator 
Erin McKee.
    And then, also, over the last 3 years we have effectively 
doubled our assistance for Armenia. So, we definitely 
understand the importance and are working closely with our 
European colleagues to answer the call on Armenia's needs.
    Mr. Costa. Christopher, you might comment with relationship 
to Moldova and Georgia. What are our partners doing, our 
allies, to help us support the effort with bolstering democracy 
in civil society both in Georgia and Moldova and Eastern 
Europe?
    And I think Poland is an important leader in this effort. 
And Radek Sikorski is now the foreign minister. He has a keen 
view on, frankly, what Poland's focus and response should be.
    Mr. Smith. European allies and partners--thank you for the 
question, sir--European allies and partners have been 
absolutely essential into maintaining the progress that Moldova 
has made on its course toward the European Union and the 
strengthening of its democratic and economic institutions 
through the provision of assistance, through technical and 
advisory support, they have helped achieve reforms that have 
unlocked doors that were previously closed to Moldova on its 
European path.
    We are also working closely with them to sanction and take 
other measures to disrupt and dismantle the networks of 
corruption Russia backs to try to hold Moldova back and 
undermine its progress.
    Poland has been an absolutely essential partner in this 
space. I would also cite the U.K., Canada, France, the European 
Union itself. Moldova has a lot of partners and friends and 
they are stepping up to the plate to ensure this progress moves 
ahead.
    Mr. Costa. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has 
expired, obviously.
    But, I mean, Russia is the modern day version of the 
Sopranos. And we just ought to be clear-eyed about that.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Costa.
    I now recognize Mr. Huizenga for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and 
appreciate your time, as well, to our witnesses.
    To both Assistant Secretary Smith and Sokolowski, since the 
war in Ukraine began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided 
Moldova with $774 million in financial aid, with $300 million 
of that specifically for energy security.
    Can you speak to precisely what that $300 million has been 
used for and sort of the efficiency, effectiveness of what 
those goals and objectives are?
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for the question, 
Representative Huizenga.
    I will speak quickly to the policy implications and then 
turn to Alex for the details on the assistance.
    Our goal with that assistance was to help Moldova break its 
decades-long dependence on Russia when it comes to the energy 
assistance. We achieved that and helped the Moldovans achieve 
that. And have now transitioned them from being totally reliant 
on Russian gas to buying gas on the open market, including from 
the United States. The first LNG shipment in history from the 
U.S. was purchased by the Moldovans.
    It has also been important to ensure Moldova was able to 
meet the tremendous humanitarian impact from Russia's war on 
Ukraine. A small country of 2.5 million people, they welcomed a 
million refugees in the early months of the war from Ukraine. 
And our assistance was essential in helping them meet that 
challenge.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. I appreciate that.
    Let's go back to the first part, though. Isn't Moldova 
currently relying on a Russian-controlled and Russian-fueled 
plant in Transnistria?
    Mr. Smith. The Transnistria region continues to rely on 
Russian gas that is basically coming through Ukraine from 
Gazprom. We have been working carefully and closely with both 
the Government of President Sandu in Chisinau, and also the 
authorities in Transnistria to look, as we approach the 
question of a broader political settlement, what will be the 
implications for energy resources.
    Mr. Huizenga. How about Moldovagaz?
    Mr. Smith. Alex, I do not know if there is more you would 
like to add on the specifics of our assistance.
    Mr. Huizenga. Because I am assuming this is to try to 
unbundle and untangle----
    Mr. Sokolowski. Right.
    Mr. Huizenga [continuing]. The necessity of Russian energy. 
Correct?
    Mr. Sokolowski. So, thank you for the question, Rep. 
Huizenga.
    With regard to gas supplies, as my colleague Chris had 
mentioned, there is major progress with regard to the supply 
not coming from Russia anymore. It is electricity which 
continues to be the issue. And depending on the time of the 
year, that's between 70 and 90 percent of the needs for 
electricity are still coming from the MGRES plant that is in 
Transnistria.
    USAID is working to try to help Moldova diversify those 
sources. And it is funding a high voltage electricity 
interconnection line with Romania that would allow Moldova to 
import electricity from European market and other markets.
    Mr. Huizenga. Is this the nuclear electric?
    Mr. Sokolowski. I would have to get back to you to check on 
the specific sources of that. But I know that the key thing 
that we are looking for is that interconnection with Moldova.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK.
    Mr. Sokolowski. As opposed to getting the electricity from 
Transnistria.
    Mr. Huizenga. Can either of you speak to the nuclear 
situation in the region, nuclear energy specifically?
    Mr. Sokolowski. I would have to get back to you with regard 
to nuclear for Moldova. I know a bit more on what is happening 
in the Caucasus, but we can get back to you with details.
    Mr. Huizenga. This is something I have asked in a number of 
hearings and different settings, just, you know, what role does 
nuclear play in the pushing of that.
    So, I appreciate that if we could continue that 
conversation.
    I have got about a minute left.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Huck, I want to get back to one 
of the points that Ms. Wagner had touched on and I am concerned 
about as well. And I am afraid I am probably going to have to 
followup in writing.
    But basically looking at China and their, their influence 
in that area, the Georgian Government announced a Chinese 
consortium won the tender for the construction of a deep 
seaport in Anaklia, if I am pronouncing that right, on 
Georgia's Black Sea coast, granting PRC a 49 percent share in 
the port. A strategic location of this port in the middle 
corridor of the trade route between China and Europe make this 
a crucial project for Xi Jinping, I am assuming.
    And, obviously, we all know that a good 20 percent of the 
territory of Georgia is controlled by the Russians.
    So, talk to me a little bit about that interplay.
    Mr. Huck. Yes. Thank you for the question.
    And we share your concern. And this is something we have 
messaged clearly to the Georgian Government that it is, it 
seems like a questionable decision to be engaging China as an 
economic partner when they are bankrolling Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine, as well as the occupation of 20 percent of Georgia.
    Specifically to the port, we also have concerns about the 
Chinese, some companies involved in that consortium. One of the 
companies involved has been designated by the United States for 
ties to China's basically military industrial complex, as well 
as another of the companies has past concerns with corruption 
and fraud in previous, in previous projects.
    Mr. Huizenga. I know my time has expired, but a followup.
    Beyond this, I am curious if Georgia feels like it has to 
choose between the devil they know and the devil they do not. I 
mean, 20 percent of their land mass is held by Russia. They do 
not like that, clearly, but what is their other option?
    And I would contend, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. has not 
been doing enough to support that and push on that. And do they 
feel like they now have no other place to go but into the open 
arms of China?
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. But I would 
like to continue that conversation offline.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Huizenga.
    I now recognize Representative Ross from North Carolina for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member.
    I am the co-chair of the Moldova Caucus with Representative 
Lawler. And as some of you may know, North Carolina has a 
decades-long relationship with Moldova. Our National Guard has 
been working with the Moldovans doing trainings for more than 
25 years. And then we, of course, are part of the State 
Partnership Program for medical issues, education issues.
    I think every time I go back to my district there is 
another Moldovan delegation that comes to visit, which I think 
is wonderful. And our Secretary of State just received the 
highest civilian honor in Moldova.
    I think that we have touched on a lot of the energy issues. 
And I am thrilled that Moldova is making this transition. I 
think it is important to highlight that Moldova is not alone. I 
mean, Germany is making these transitions, too. And Germany has 
so many fewer resources to call on while they are, you know--so 
many more resources to call on than the Moldovans. And the 
Moldovans have been mighty in what they have done.
    I would like to talk a little bit about additional 
assistance to Moldova in two areas:
    One, Moldova has absorbed more Ukrainian refugees than 
pretty much anybody else. And we hear in Europe, I just got 
back from Germany in a delegation, about, oh, all these 
refugees, you know, in Germany. Well, I love Germany, but 
Germany is very big and has a fair amount of money.
    Moldova is absorbing these refugees that, you know, they, 
and they barely can take care of some of their own financial 
issues.
    So, I would like to know about plans for further support 
for Moldova as they mightily support Ukraine in this, in this 
area.
    And then the second is, and I am sorry that Congressman 
Lawler isn't here, but we have worked on some legislation 
together to help Moldova transition its military equipment away 
from Russian and even Soviet equipment, because that is really 
what they had. And it may be that they are in a situation where 
they need to be ready to go.
    And so, I would like to talk, I know we only have a couple 
minutes, but any additional assistance in both of those areas?
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for the question, 
Representative Ross.
    And thank you so much for the support the State of North 
Carolina has provided to Moldova. It is known in the State 
Department as one of the premier State partnerships. And so, I 
would be remiss if I did not highlight that, including the role 
of the National Guard.
    We are prioritizing both of the areas that you highlighted. 
As you said, it was a heroic effort on behalf of the Moldovan 
people to take in a million Ukrainian refugees in a country 
that is only 2.5 million in its entire population.
    About 100,000 of those refugees remain. And the Moldovans 
have done a great job, with assistance from the United States 
and the European Union, in helping to provide a basic security 
and assurances for those people who are dealing with the tragic 
outcomes of Putin's invasion.
    On the security assistance side, we are focusing together, 
in partnership with Moldova, on helping them develop the key 
capabilities they need to meet the security environment in 
which they are operating. And it is a very challenging 
environment indeed.
    And part of our effort is to not only focus on training and 
tactics that are western model, but also focus on key weapons 
systems and equipment. And it will continue to be a priority as 
we move forward with the Moldovans.
    Maybe, Alex, you would like to offer additional points on 
refugees.
    Mr. Sokolowski. Sure. Thank you very much for that, Chris.
    As I said in my statement, I saw firsthand the generosity 
of the Moldovan people as they welcomed in so many people. I 
was at the Palanca border crossing.
    The one additional point that I wanted to make is that 
USAID has been helping the Government of Moldova track and 
understand the needs of these 100,000 refugees who remain in 
Moldova. Ninety-five percent of them are women and children. 
There are a lot of questions at AID. But we have been helping 
them to understand. There is a program called Data for Impact 
that helps the Government of Moldova, you know, understand what 
those needs are.
    So, I just was going to mention that. Thank you.
    Ms. Ross. And with the 33 seconds I have left, we have 
talked about the great job that Moldova has done meeting the 
requirements for joining the EU.
    Just very briefly, how important is it for Moldova to be 
part of the EU for its future democracy and its security?
    Mr. Smith. It is the absolute critical node on their path 
to sovereignty, security, and sustained democracy. The 
accession process with the EU not only charts a course of 
reforms and changes that they need to make to strengthen their 
democracy and their economy, it provides a rightful place for 
Moldova in the European family of nations.
    That is why we are aligning our assistance and our 
engagement to support it. And we will continue to do so.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    With no further questions from the members, I want to thank 
our witnesses for their valuable testimony, as well as the 
members for their questions.
    Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
written questions for the witnesses. And we will ask you to 
respond to these promptly and in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rules, all members have 5 days to 
submit statements, questions, and extraneous material for the 
record, subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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