[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    THE HIGH NORTH: HOW U.S. ARCTIC STRATEGY 
                             IMPACTS HOMELAND SECURITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 29, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-40

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________


                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
56-517 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
 
                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Mark E. Green, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     9
  Prepared Statement.............................................    17

                               Witnesses

The Honorable Dan Sullivan, A Senator in Congress From the State 
  of Alaska:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 
  U.S. Coast Guard:
  Oral Statement.................................................    19
  Prepared Statement.............................................    20
Ms. Christa Brzozowski, Acting Assistant Secretary, Trade and 
  Economic Security, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    24
  Prepared Statement.............................................    26
Ms. Chelsa Kenney, Director, International Affairs and Trade, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office:
  Oral Statement.................................................    28
  Prepared Statement.............................................    31

                             For the Record

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Statement of Abbie Tingstad, The RAND Corporation..............    10

                                Appendix

The Honorable Lisa Murkowski, A Senator in Congress From the 
  State of Alaska:
  Prepared Statement.............................................    75

 
   THE HIGH NORTH: HOW U.S. ARCTIC STRATEGY IMPACTS HOMELAND SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                      Wednesday, November 29, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                                            Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mark Green 
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Green, Higgins, Gimenez, Pfluger, 
Gonzales, Ezell, D'Esposito, Strong, Brecheen, Crane, Thompson, 
Correa, Carter, Thanedar, Ivey, Goldman, Garcia, Menendez, 
Clarke, and Titus.
    Chairman Green. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the 
committee in recess at any point. The purpose of this hearing 
is to receive testimony on the present and future challenges in 
the Arctic region and evaluate the United States Coast Guard's 
unique role in maintaining freedom of movement, defending vital 
U.S. national interests, and protecting U.S. sovereignty in the 
region. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    The United States faces a world fraught with peril. We have 
an unprecedented crisis at our Southwest Border. Israel, our 
closest ally in the Middle East, endured the deadliest attack 
on Jews since the Holocaust. Russia's on-going and unprovoked 
invasion of Ukraine is the largest armed conflict in Europe 
since World War II. East Asia is on a hair trigger because of 
the expansionist tendencies of the Chinese Communist Party in 
the South China Sea.
    So, you might be asking, why is the Committee on Homeland 
Security having a hearing about the Arctic? In Congress, our 
daily business is often dictated by the latest disaster or most 
recent crisis, and to be sure, there are plenty of those. 
However, during my time in the military and beginning at West 
Point, of course, I was taught to view the battlefield through 
a strategic lens and step back from the tactical situation to 
examine the whole of the operating environment. In this spirit, 
I believe it is time for the committee to examine the strategic 
and critical role of the Arctic region.
    The story of how the United States became an Arctic nation 
explains why the Arctic matters so much to us. In 1867, 
Secretary of State William Seward secured a treaty with the 
Russian Tsar Alexander II for the purchase of Alaska from the 
Russian empire for a modest $7.2 million. Many U.S. Senators 
were skeptical of Seward's vision when the treaty arrived in 
the Senate for ratification. However, the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Charles Sumner, 
ushered the treaty through his committee, helping to secure its 
ratification. In his research, Sumner realized both the 
economic potential of Alaska's bountiful natural resources and 
the territory's strategic geographic position to the shipping 
routes of Asia.
    Nearly seven decades later, the founding father of the 
United States Air Force, Billy Mitchell, declared in testimony 
to Congress, and I quote, ``I believe that in the future, 
whoever controls Alaska controls the world. I think it is the 
most strategic place in the world.'' Mitchell's vision for the 
eventual 49th State proved shrewd.
    The United States Air Force based early warning radar 
stations, long-range bombers, and missile defense capabilities 
in Alaska during the Cold War due to its proximity to the 
Soviet Union. Passenger airlines also utilized Alaska as the 
global hub, so planes from Western Europe, East Asia, and North 
America could avoid traveling through restricted Soviet 
airspace.
    Today, nearly 150 years since the purchase of Alaska, the 
world has changed dramatically. Not surprisingly, though, the 
Alaskan Arctic remains strategically vital to the United 
States. The airspace in Alaska is the United States' first line 
of defense against intrusions by aircraft or missiles, as was 
brazenly reminded earlier this year with a surveillance 
balloon. U.S. military forces based in Alaska stand ready to 
deploy quickly to any theater of operations in the world, from 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Western Pacific.
    As the sea ice recedes and the waters of the Arctic Ocean 
become traversable for longer stretches of the year, civilian 
and military maritime traffic has increased. This trend will 
only make Alaska even more strategically important to the 
United States as Alaska lies at the confluence of the two major 
shipping routes through the Arctic to East Asia the Northern 
Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Our geopolitical 
adversaries recognize that control of the Arctic region is 
essential.
    Russia, which has the most territory and largest Arctic 
population, maintains a robust military presence in the region. 
Russia has six icebreakers. The United States currently has 
two. Russia's proximity to Alaska makes its concentration of 
forces appear even more menacing. The Russian mainland lies 
less than 60 miles away from the west coast of Alaska. 
Additionally, just 2.4 miles separate the Russian island of 
Diomede and the American island of Little Diomede in the Bering 
Strait. To make matters worse, the People's Republic of China 
has absurdly claimed itself to be ``a near-Arctic State'' and 
is attempting to impose its will through diplomatic pressure 
and increasing maritime transits by PRC vessels in Arctic 
waters. The PRC is also actively building out its own 
icebreaker fleet, and its two existing icebreakers have 
operated in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
    Therefore, the United States must prioritize the Arctic as 
a region of National importance and one that is vital to our 
homeland security, and this committee has a crucial role to 
play in securing our strategic interest in the Arctic. The 
United States Coast Guard has operated in Alaska since the 
United States purchased the State. Today, with its iceberg 
breaker fleet and assets based around Alaska, the Coast Guard 
is a critical component of the U.S. National security posture 
in the Arctic, performing search-and-rescue operations in 
austere environments, and enforcing U.S. laws in our waters off 
the coasts of Alaska.
    As maritime traffic increases, we must ensure that the 
Coast Guard maintains the ability to protect our coastline, 
enforce our laws, and save lives at sea. The Department of 
Homeland Security has a responsibility to protect our 
transportation sector and critical infrastructure from physical 
and cyber threats. Alaska hosts a multitude of important 
military bases and critical infrastructure sites, sites such as 
the Trans Alaska Pipeline, the Port of Alaska, and Ted Stevens 
International Airport, in addition to several military 
installations in Alaska and critical undersea cables connecting 
Alaska to the continental United States.
    It is vital that the Department of Homeland Security work 
to deter potential attacks or attempts by adversaries to 
degrade or disrupt the operations of this critical 
infrastructure. Secretary Seward, Senator Sumner, and Colonel 
Mitchell recognized the enormous potential of Alaska in their 
time. We must not lose sight of their prescient vision in our 
time.
    [The statement of Chairman Green follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman Mark E. Green
    The United States faces a world fraught with peril.
    We have an unprecedented crisis at our Southwest Border with 
illegal immigrants crossing at an average pace of 8,000 per day, 
overwhelming our border security apparatus and inflicting a severe toll 
on the U.S. economy.
    Israel--our closest ally in the Middle East--endured the deadliest 
attack on Jews since the Holocaust, and its on-going war against 
Iranian-backed terrorists is threatening to send the entire region into 
a conflict.
    Russia's on-going and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is the largest 
armed conflict in Europe since World War II.
    East Asia is on a hair-trigger because of the expansionist 
tendencies of the Chinese Communist Party in the South China Sea and 
throughout the region.
    So, you might be asking, why is the Committee on Homeland Security 
having a hearing about the Arctic?
    In Congress, our daily business is often dictated by the latest 
disaster or most recent crisis--and to be sure, there are plenty of 
crises.
    However, during my time at West Point, I was taught to view the 
battlefield through a strategic lens and step back from the tactical 
situation to examine the whole operating environment.
    In this spirit, I believe it is time for the committee to examine 
the strategic and critical role of the Arctic region.
    The story of how the United States became an Arctic nation explains 
why the Arctic matters so much.
    In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward secured a treaty with 
Russian Tsar Alexander the Second for the purchase of Alaska from the 
Russian Empire for a modest $7.2 million.
    Many U.S. Senators were skeptical of Seward's vision when the 
Treaty arrived in the Senate for ratification.
    However, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Charles Sumner, ushered the Treaty through his committee, 
helping to secure ratification.
    In his research, Sumner realized both the economic potential of 
Alaska's bountiful natural resources and the territory's strategic 
geographic position to the shipping routes of Asia.
    Nearly seven decades later, the founding father of the U.S. Air 
Force, Billy Mitchell, declared in testimony to Congress, ``I believe 
that in the future, whoever controls Alaska controls the world. I think 
it is the most strategic place in the world.''
    Mitchell's vision for the eventual 49th State proved shrewd.
    The U.S. Air Force based early warning radar stations, long-range 
bombers, and missile defense capabilities in Alaska during the Cold War 
due to its proximity to the Soviet Union.
    Passenger airlines also utilized Alaska as a global hub so planes 
from Western Europe, East Asia, and North America could avoid traveling 
through restricted Soviet airspace.
    Today, nearly 150 years since the purchase of Alaska, the world has 
changed dramatically.
    Not surprisingly, though, the Alaskan Arctic remains strategically 
vital to the United States.
    The airspace in Alaska is the United States' first line of defense 
against intrusions by aircraft or missiles, as we were brazenly 
reminded earlier this year with the Chinese aerial surveillance 
balloon.
    U.S. military forces based in Alaska stand ready to deploy quickly 
to any theater of operations in the world, from Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East to the Western Pacific.
    As the sea ice recedes and the waters of the Arctic Ocean become 
traversable for longer stretches of the year, civilian and military 
maritime traffic has increased significantly in the region.
    This trend will only make Alaska more strategically important to 
the United States, as Alaska lies at the confluence of the two major 
shipping routes through the Arctic to East Asia--the Northern Sea Route 
and the Northwest Passage.
    Our geopolitical adversaries recognize that control of the Arctic 
region is essential.
    Russia, which has the most territory and largest Arctic population, 
maintains a robust military presence in the region. Russia has 6 
icebreakers whereas the United States currently has 2.
    Russia's proximity to Alaska makes its concentration of forces 
appear even more menacing.
    The Russian mainland lies less than 60 miles away from the west 
coast of Alaska.
    Additionally, just 2.4 miles separate the Russian island of Big 
Diomede and the American island of Little Diomede in the Bering Strait.
    To make matters worse, the People's Republic of China has absurdly 
claimed itself to be a ``near-Arctic State,'' and is attempting to 
impose its will through diplomatic pressure and increasing maritime 
transits by PRC vessels in Arctic waters.
    The PRC is also actively building out its own icebreaker fleet, and 
its two existing icebreakers have operated in both the Arctic and 
Antarctic regions.
    Therefore, the United States must prioritize the Arctic as a region 
of National importance and one that is vital to our homeland security.
    And this committee has a crucial role to play in securing our 
strategic interests in the Arctic.
    The United States Coast Guard has operated in Alaska since the the 
United States purchased the State.
    Today, with its icebreaker fleet and assets based around Alaska, 
the Coast Guard is a critical component of the U.S. national security 
posture in the Arctic, performing search-and-rescue operations in 
austere environments and enforcing U.S. laws in our waters off the 
coast of Alaska.
    As maritime traffic increases, we must ensure that the Coast Guard 
maintains the ability to protect our coastline, enforce our laws, and 
save lives at sea.
    The Department of Homeland Security has a responsibility to protect 
our transportation sector and critical infrastructure from physical or 
cyber threats.
    Alaska hosts a multitude of important military bases and critical 
infrastructure sites. Sites such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the Port 
of Alaska, and Ted Stevens International Airport--in addition to 
several military installations in Alaska and critical undersea cables 
connecting Alaska to the continental United States--are crucial to our 
economy.
    It is vital that the Department of Homeland Security works to deter 
potential attacks or attempts by adversaries to degrade or disrupt the 
operation of this critical infrastructure.
    Secretary Seward, Senator Sumner, and Colonel Mitchell recognized 
the enormous potential of Alaska in their time.
    We must not lose sight of their prescient vision in our time.
    I thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee today, and 
I look forward to their testimonies.

    Chairman Green. I thank our witnesses for appearing before 
the committee today, and I look forward to their testimonies.
    The purpose, of course, our hearing today, as I said, is to 
address the issues of opportunity and threat that the Arctic 
region poses. I am going to defer the Ranking Member's 
statements until he arrives.
    I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel of 
witnesses. Questions by Members on the dais will be reserved 
for the witnesses on the second panel after the opening 
statement from our first panel. Senator Dan Sullivan has 
represented the State of Alaska since 2015. Senator, thank you 
for being here today, and I now recognize you for 5 minutes of 
an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, A SENATOR IN CONGRESS FROM THE 
                        STATE OF ALASKA

    Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman Green and Ranking Member 
Thompson. I am very honored to be able to testify on this 
important hearing on the Arctic and Arctic strategy. I commend 
the committee. To your point, Mr. Chairman, there is a lot 
going on in the world, but we got to keep our eye on all 
strategic areas of the globe and America's interests. So, I 
commend the committee for undertaking this hearing to 
understand the complexities of Arctic security and providing me 
an opportunity to talk about the increasing significance of the 
Arctic region to our Nation's security.
    The Arctic, as you mentioned in your excellent opening 
statement, and by the way, you are going to hear some 
repetition here, because I think it was so good, but the Arctic 
is undergoing monumental changes. Sea ice is receding, opening 
an entire ocean that was previously unreachable. This allows 
access to a wealth of natural resources and makes available 
maritime trade routes that are thousands of nautical miles 
shorter than transits using the Suez Canal or Panama Canal. The 
strategic importance of this region, the Arctic, is 
unquestionable.
    Arctic security is American security. Despite that, we as a 
country are not properly postured to secure our vital National 
interests in this region. America is an Arctic nation because 
of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, I appreciated a little bit of the 
history on my great State. By the way, $7.2 million, probably 
the best real estate deal in the history of America. Maybe the 
Louisiana Purchase, but they are both close. Two cents an acre.
    My State is at the forefront of Arctic competition and 
guards the United States against threats from our competitors. 
We all know, and you mentioned it, Mr. Chairman, we are in a 
new era of authoritarian aggression led by the dictators 
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. They are running hostile regimes 
that seek to control access to the Arctic region and 
importantly and dangerously, are increasingly working together 
in the Arctic. Alaska's proximity to both Russia and China 
requires that my State play a vital role in securing America's 
interests in the Arctic.
    You mentioned Billy Mitchell. I never tire, my colleagues 
on the Armed Services Committee get a little bit tired of the 
quote, but I'll say it again since you already said it. Billy 
Mitchell referred to in a hearing in the Congress as Alaska is 
the most strategic place in the world. Fortunately, we have 
undertaken a military build-up there that needs to continue. 
Right now, Alaska constitutes three pillars of America's 
military might. We are the cornerstone of missile defense for 
the entire country. All the radar systems and all the ground-
based missile interceptors are based in Alaska, protecting 
every city in the United States. We are the hub of air combat 
power for the Arctic in the INDOPACOM region, for example, we 
have over 100 5th-generation fighters located in Alaska, F-22s 
and F-35s. There is no place on the planet Earth that has over 
100 combat-coded 5th-gen fighters.
    To your point, Mr. Chairman, we are the platform for 
expeditionary forces, including the Army's new 11th Airborne 
Division, that can deploy on a moment's notice anywhere in the 
entire Northern Hemisphere. But we need to make sure that 
Alaska becomes the logistical hub for the Arctic, for our power 
projection in the Arctic. In recent years, the Russian Navy has 
stepped up the scale of its exercises near Alaska. It is doing 
all kinds of bare bomber runs at our State. They are so common 
that they don't even make the news anymore. Several already 
this year. Last year, Russia and China, for the first time 
deployed a joint naval task force, 7 ships to Alaska's waters. 
We responded. I love the Coast Guard, but we responded with one 
small Coast Guard cutter. I called some of our senior military 
and Coast Guard leaders saying, look, this is going to 
continue. If it happens again, we need to show a much stronger, 
robust approach. You may have read this summer, it happened 
again. This time, 11 Russian and Chinese ships operating off 
the coast of Alaska. To our military NORTHCOM and INDOPACOM's 
credit, they sent four destroyers and P-8s to track this very 
significant joint Russian-Chinese naval task force.
    But we must make sure that this is a sign of things to 
come. We not only need more Coast Guard assets, but also a Navy 
presence back in Alaska. We will need to be able to respond 
more rapidly in the future to these kind of incursions. 
Unfortunately, and I love our Department of Defense, the DoD 
has been asleep at the switch on the Arctic. The leaders on 
these issues have been the House and the Senate. We have been 
pressing for provisions in the NDAA, in the Coast Guard bill 
year after year to get our Pentagon and, quite frankly, our 
Coast Guard to focus more on the Arctic.
    As a matter of fact, right now, the NDAA is being marked 
up. I am going to hustle back over to the Senate side. It is 
our conference with the House and the Senate. We have my 
provision, the Arctic Security Initiative in this year's NDAA 
to make sure that we focus on the Arctic. To your point, Mr. 
Chairman, the United States has not invested in Arctic 
infrastructure. The number, actually, of Russian icebreakers is 
54, many of which are nuclear-powered. They are weaponized. We 
have two icebreakers, and one is broken. That is what we have. 
We are building more. We are looking to purchase off the shelf 
some. But we need to make sure that we are trying to close this 
very, very significant icebreaker gap. Even China's icebreaking 
capacity is on pace to surpass ours in 2025. As you mentioned, 
Mr. Chairman, they are not even an Arctic nation.
    We recognize the importance of freedom of navigation 
transits through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, but 
we need to do the same for the Northern Sea route from Europe 
to the Bering Strait. Putin has called this region the new Suez 
Canal that he will control. We can't let them do that. So, I 
commend the Coast Guard on working to get more icebreakers, 
commend the Coast Guard cutter Healy that transited near the 
Northern Sea route, near the Russian EEZ for making this 
difficult and challenging transit.
    But icebreakers, Mr. Chairman, are only the beginning. The 
level of infrastructure, domain awareness, reliable comms that 
are sufficient to support America's security needs in the 
Arctic are lacking. As I mentioned, Congress has made important 
progress. We have begun work on a deepwater port in Nome, 
Alaska, that is western Alaska, in the Arctic region that can 
handle icebreakers. It can handle Navy destroyers. But right 
now, we have no infrastructure anywhere near the Arctic that 
can even handle Navy ships and American icebreakers.
    So, we need infrastructure. We need a whole-of-Government 
effort. We must respond to bolster our presence, both military 
and civilian, to make sure that we can protect our National 
security interests, economic security interests, energy 
security interests, and environmental security interests that 
are so critical to our National security.
    I do want to mention one final thing. We need to do this in 
conjunction with all Federal agencies and Arctic communities, 
especially the very patriotic Alaska Native communities, our 
Indigenous communities that have been living in the Arctic for 
literally thousands of years and are some of the most patriotic 
Americans anywhere.
    So, again, Mr. Chairman, this is a critical issue for the 
21st Century. It is a key area of great power competition 
against Russia and China. I really want to commend you and the 
committee Members to taking the time for this important hearing 
and just very appreciative.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Sullivan follows:]
                   Statement of Senator Dan Sullivan
                           November 29, 2023
    Thank you Mr. Chairman. I commend the committee's dedication to 
understanding the complexities of Arctic security and providing me the 
opportunity to speak about the increasing significance of the Arctic 
region to our Nation's security.
    The Arctic is undergoing monumental changes. Sea ice is receding, 
opening up an entire ocean that was previously unreachable. This allows 
access to a wealth of natural resources and makes available maritime 
trade routes that are thousands of nautical miles shorter than transits 
using the Suez or Panama Canals. The strategic importance of this 
region is unquestionable. Arctic security is American security.
    Despite that, we as a country are not properly postured to secure 
our interests in the region.
    America is an Arctic nation because of Alaska. My State is at the 
forefront of Arctic competition and guards the United States against 
threats from our competitors. We are in a new era of authoritarian 
aggression. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are both running hostile 
regimes that seek to control access to the Arctic region. Alaska's 
proximity to both Russia and China requires that the State play a vital 
role in securing America's interests in the Arctic and Indo-Pacific. 
Alaska is the only place on earth with 100 5th generation fighters, 
long-range discrimination radar, missile defense silos, and other 
strategic assets that are vital to the defense of our Nation. Because 
of this, since I came into office in 2015, I have been pressing 
officials in Washington, DC relentlessly on the need to prioritize our 
capabilities in the Arctic. We need new and secure infrastructure like 
icebreakers and deepwater ports; we needed them yesterday.
    In recent years, the Russian navy has stepped up the scale of its 
exercises near Alaska, including in the US Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). In 2022, a joint Russian and Chinese naval patrol was sighted 
near Alaska. That patrol was intercepted and monitored by a Coast Guard 
cutter to ensure the sovereignty of our territorial waters and the 
safety of our mariners. In August of this year, a group of 11 Russian 
and Chinese warships were operating together off the coast of Alaska in 
the Aleutian Islands. This time, we stepped up our response and sent 4 
destroyers from the Lower 48 to intercept this joint Chinese-Russian 
flotilla. We must take this as a sign of things to come. We not only 
need more Coast Guard assets, but also a Navy presence back in Alaska. 
We will need to be able to respond more rapidly in the future. That 
means places for Navy ships to refuel and refit in the Aleutian Islands 
and on Alaska's west coast near the Bering Strait.
    Unfortunately, the bureaucracy within the Executive branch has been 
slow to act on the growing threats in the Arctic. Thankfully, through 
countless hearings and legislative action, Congress has led the charge 
in growing America's presence in the Arctic. In the fiscal year 2022 
NDAA, I authored a provision that required the USNORTHCOM Commander to 
complete an independent assessment of the resources needed to implement 
the National Defense Strategy and the service-specific Arctic 
strategies. This year, I'm working through the NDAA conference process 
to pass the Arctic Security Initiative, which would require the Defense 
Department to enhance security in the Arctic region based on the 
results of that assessment.
    The United States has not invested in Arctic infrastructure. Russia 
has over 50 icebreakers, many of which are nuclear-powered. They have 
built ports and ice-hardened vessels. Even China's icebreaking capacity 
is on pace to surpass ours by 2025, despite them having no sovereignty 
over any Arctic waters.
    The United States only has one operational heavy and one medium 
polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard Cutter HEALY recently transited near 
the Northern Sea Route outside of the Russian EEZ. I applaud the crew 
of the HEALY for making this transit. But we need to be able to do this 
consistently. We recognize the importance of freedom of navigation 
transits through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. We need to 
do the same for the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Bering 
Strait.
    The Coast Guard is working to get more icebreakers. The Polar 
Security Cutter acquisition is under way but is not moving fast enough. 
The program has been continually delayed. This is why I have pushed for 
the Coast Guard to acquire a commercially-built icebreaker that is 
available today. Because of a provision in last year's NDAA, the Coast 
Guard has the authority to procure a commercially-available icebreaker 
and I am hopeful that we will secure the funding this year.
    Icebreakers are only the beginning. The level of infrastructure 
development, domain awareness, and reliable communications are far from 
sufficient to support America's security needs in the region.
    Congress has made progress. We have begun work on a deepwater port 
in Nome on Alaska's west coast, which will be critical component for 
Arctic maritime transportation, and serve as a staging area for search 
and rescue, pollution response, and security operations. This is a 
major step forward, but it cannot be the only step. We need a series of 
secure, strategic ports in the Arctic.
    As infrastructure is built out in the Arctic, it will need to be 
protected from attack, both in the physical and cyber dimensions. Much 
of the Alaskan Arctic has limited cyber infrastructure, creating single 
points of failure that leave our systems vulnerable to outages. For 
example, just this summer a Quintillion fiber optic cable was severed 
by shifting ice, causing internet and cellphone outages in much of 
northern and western Alaska. The repair took months.
    Arctic security necessitates a whole-of-Government effort. We must 
bolster our presence, both military and civilian, to effectively 
respond to emergencies and enforce regulations. We must rely on 
partnerships between DHS and DOD to keep our Nation safe. We must also 
work with nongovernmental partners and consult with Arctic communities 
as we expand our Arctic presence.
    The Arctic is a key arena for 21st Century security challenges. I 
urge the committee to support initiatives that bolster our Arctic 
capabilities and safeguard our National interests in the region.
    Thank you for your time.

    Chairman Green. Thank you for being here. We deeply 
appreciate it. I know you have got to rush off to the 
conference, so----
    Mr. Sullivan. Got to make sure I get that Arctic security 
provision in the bill.
    Chairman Green. Totally get it. Thank you again, sir, for 
being here. The committee will stand in brief recess while the 
clerks arrange for the second panel of witnesses.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Green. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 
morning. I appreciate the committee holding today's hearing on 
Arctic security and its implication for the homeland. When I 
served as Chairman, the Homeland Security Committee held 
multiple hearings and briefings on Arctic security, and I am 
glad to see the current Majority continuing to conduct 
oversight on this critical topic. As I have said previously, it 
is imperative that the committee carry out its oversight 
responsibilities on the many varied threats facing the 
homeland.
    To be certain, the Arctic is a region of increasing 
importance to homeland security, and it is one area where I 
believe there is an opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. 
Time is of the essence. With climate change, Arctic waters are 
increasingly open to maritime activity like shipping, energy 
exploration, fishing, and tourism. Adversaries like Russia and 
China are trying to gain strategic advantage, and the United 
States must be ready to assert and protect its interests in the 
region.
    The Coast Guard is central to the United States' efforts 
and activities in the Arctic, but its capacity is severely 
limited by a lack of icebreakers. Currently, it has only one 
heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star, which was commissioned 
in 1976 and is well past its expected service life. The vessel 
is focused on work related to our research station in 
Antarctica, making it difficult for the Coast Guard to maintain 
a presence in the Arctic. Meanwhile, Russia has more than 50 
icebreakers and has been building more, increasing its military 
presence in the region by opening new bases, reopening old 
ones, and enhancing its communications capabilities.
    In response to the dire need for more icebreakers and 
maritime assets built for the Arctic, Congress appropriated 
historic funding to begin construction of new polar security 
cutters, or PSCs. The Coast Guard awarded contracts for the 
first two of these PSCs in 2019, with delivery originally 
expected late next year. Unfortunately, construction has not 
yet begun due to a variety of factors, and delivery will be 
delayed. I hope to hear from the Coast Guard today about the 
plan going forward and a new time line and cost estimates for 
the Polar Security Cutters.
    This acquisition program will be a long-term effort, so 
Congress must help ensure shipbuilding stays on budget and 
meets critical deadlines. In addition to addressing the 
icebreaker shortage, the United States has to strategize for 
the long term, since conditions in the Arctic will continue to 
change and nations like Russia and China will try to leverage 
those changes to their advantage. Indeed, China has already 
declared itself a near-Arctic state despite having no 
geographic connection to the Arctic and will undoubtedly 
continue to exert its influence in the region.
    In recognition of the need for a whole-of-Government 
strategy, the Biden-Harris administration published a National 
strategy for the Arctic region just over a year ago, an 
important step toward ensuring U.S. interests are protected. 
The strategy includes four pillars, the first of which is 
security, stating, ``We will deter threats to the U.S. homeland 
and our allies by enhancing the capabilities to defend our 
interests in the Arctic and will exercise U.S. Government 
presence in the Arctic region as required to protect the 
American people and defend our sovereign territory.'' The 
strategy also rightly focused on addressing climate change and 
environmental protection. We must follow the science on climate 
change and plan accordingly for the effects of warming 
temperatures and reduced sea ice in the region.
    Additionally, the strategy highlights the importance of 
engaging with Indigenous communities in the Arctic. The Coast 
Guard has established relationships with Alaskan Native 
communities, and we must broaden and deepen those relationships 
going forward.
    Finally, the strategy recognizes that the United States 
must engage our international allies and partners on Arctic 
issues to strengthen our position in the region. Engaging like-
minded countries and working together on areas of common 
interest will be critical going forward. In recognition of the 
important work to be done, in August 2022, the Biden-Harris 
administration announced the establishment of an ambassador-at-
large for the Arctic region. The ambassador-at-large is charged 
with advancing U.S. policy in the Arctic, engaging with 
counterparts in Arctic and non-Arctic nations, as well as 
Indigenous groups, and working closely with domestic 
stakeholders. President Biden's nomination has been pending in 
the Senate since February 2023.
    This fall, the Government Accountability Office reported 
that the new ambassador-at-large position could help advance 
U.S. priorities in the Arctic region. I hope this position will 
be confirmed without further delay.
    Today, I look forward to the witnesses sharing their 
expertise about homeland security priorities in the Arctic and 
what Congress can do to support them and their priorities. 
Before I close, I want to express particular appreciation to 
the Government Accountability Office for their work on Arctic 
issues and to our witness, Ms. Kenney, for her willingness to 
testify on extremely short notice just after the Thanksgiving 
holiday. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into 
the record a statement from Abbie Tingstad of the Rand 
Corporation.
    Chairman Green. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]
       Statement of Abbie Tingstad \1\, The RAND Corporation \2\
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    \1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are 
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those 
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
    \2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops 
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities 
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more 
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public 
interest. RAND's mission is enabled through its core values of quality 
and objectivity and its commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. 
RAND subjects its research publications to a robust and exacting 
quality-assurance process; avoids financial and other conflicts of 
interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of 
mandatory disclosure; and pursues transparency through the open 
publication of research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the 
source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure 
intellectual independence. This testimony is not a research 
publication, but witnesses affiliated with RAND routinely draw on 
relevant research conducted in the organization.
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                           November 29, 2023
    Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members 
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this 
testimony. As is increasingly customary when discussing matters related 
to the Arctic, I begin by acknowledging the diverse Indigenous peoples 
of the region, including the many Alaska Native groups.
    This statement also serves to center my testimony on the idea that 
Arctic security--in all of its connotations--is fundamentally about 
people. A rapidly-changing climate is triggering important shifts, 
generating new risks and opportunities, and bringing forward various 
weaknesses and strengths. In this testimony, I summarize the series of 
key transitions under way and revisit the question of whether the 
United States faces an Arctic security gap and why. I will finish with 
findings and recommendations based on a recently-published RAND 
Corporation report,\3\ mandated by the National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2021,\4\ that pertains to the Arctic capabilities 
of the U.S. armed forces, which are central to U.S. security in the 
Arctic and globally. This report examines potential issues related to 
U.S. access in the Arctic region, particularly in comparison with 
Russian and Chinese access, and was sponsored by the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG). We find in general that additional investments in capacity for 
presence in the Arctic region will enhance homeland security in the Far 
North.
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    \3\ Abbie Tingstad, Scott Savitz, Benjamin J. Sacks, Yuliya Shokh, 
Irina A. Chindea, Scott R. Stephenson, Michael T. Wilson, James G. 
Kallimani, Kristin Van Abel, Stephanie Pezard, Isabelle Winston, Inez 
Khan, Dan Abel, Clay Mckinney, Yvonne K. Crane, Katheryn Giglio, 
Sherrill Lingel, and Lyle J. Morris, Report on the Arctic Capabilities 
of the U.S. Armed Forces, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center 
operated by the RAND Corporation, RR-A1638-1, 2023, https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1638-1.html.
    \4\ Public Law 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, January 1, 2021.
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     the arctic region faces security transitions along many fronts
    Outside interest in the Arctic is growing for many reasons. 
Increasing temperatures, which the Arctic is experiencing at nearly 
four times the global average, create new concerns related to several 
types of security. In the past, the Far North was often described as 
``high north, low tension,'' and even appeared to some extent during 
the Cold War as a notable exception to chilly geopolitical 
relationships. Yet a warming climate, now with increasingly 
demonstrable effects, has raised the question of whether a historical 
ability to cooperate regionally under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council, among other regional organizations, can be maintained as the 
Arctic attracts more international attention. And most concerning is 
the fact that Russia and China are cooperating in the Arctic--that is, 
at the doorstep of the U.S. homeland.
    Furthermore, the migration northward of certain fish and other 
marine species, as well as the presence of freshwater reserves in the 
Arctic, make the region increasingly attractive to many countries 
concerned about food and water security. The Arctic's well-known 
undersea oil and natural gas reserves will become easier to extract and 
bring to global markets over time as thick multi-year sea ice continues 
to diminish in many areas of the Arctic Ocean. Meanwhile, the current 
land-based extraction sites will become more difficult to exploit as 
permafrost melts and ice roads become muddier and unnavigable. Sea 
routes across the Arctic, once the domain of only the most adventurous, 
could continue becoming somewhat more accessible for part of the year, 
particularly along Russia's coast. Renewable energy--wind, geothermal, 
hydroelectric, and solar (for part of the year)--can also be generated 
in the Arctic, which holds reserves of the minerals needed to support 
new battery and other green energy technologies. The technology and 
tourism industries are also growing in parts of the Arctic.
    Arctic environmental change also creates new challenges for human 
security, including for local and Indigenous communities. There are 
concerns about access to traditional and other food sources, 
contamination of water, respiratory and heat stress problems, and the 
collapse of coastal communities, as well as seasonal and permanent 
infrastructure stability, among others. These changes are occurring as 
permafrost and glaciers melt, sea level rises, summer heat waves and 
wildfires intensify, and large storms become more frequent.
     three issues related to arctic change are often misunderstood
    Recognizing the security issues laid out above is imperative. 
However, to enhance U.S. security in the Arctic, it is also imperative 
for U.S. policy makers to be aware of what is not happening in the 
region. In this vein, I next highlight three factors related to changes 
under way in the Arctic that are often misunderstood, misrepresented, 
and/or misinterpreted: (1) How climate change is affecting physical 
accessibility, (2) the imminence of conflict for contested resources, 
and (3) the ability of global geopolitical issues to spill over to 
regional security matters.
    First, regarding physical accessibility, physical changes are not 
uniformly easing mobility challenges for those living in the Arctic and 
for people coming in from lower latitudes. In many cases, the opposite 
is actually true: The rapid diminishment of multi-year sea ice in most 
areas is increasing the ability of non-icebreaking vessels to operate 
in the Arctic Ocean during some times of the year. However, this ice 
loss is uneven across the region; some areas near Russia and Alaska are 
more accessible than others. Loss of multi-year ice also does not imply 
safe conditions for transit and other economic activities (e.g., 
resource extraction, fishing); in fact, the unpredictability of sea ice 
could make some journeys more hazardous, especially to vessels without 
the appropriate fortifications and experienced crews. Furthermore, the 
same drivers of more ocean accessibility are also causing many coastal 
and inland areas to become less accessible due to permafrost melt, the 
shortening of ice road seasons, and erosion, among other factors.
    Second, no evidence yet exists of a resource race or of impending 
resource wars. All Arctic land falls clearly under the jurisdiction of 
one of the eight Arctic states, and there are increasingly fewer land-
based territorial disputes. Claims for extended continental shelf 
rights, which the United States cannot submit due to the fact that it 
did not ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
follow internationally agreed-on processes. Although the legal status 
of both the Northwest Passage along the Canadian coast and the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) or Northeast Passage along the Russian coast are 
certainly disputed in a legal sense, the volume of any international 
shipping through such routes over the coming years is likely to be at a 
degree much, much smaller than elsewhere in the world--if it exists--
leaving the legal status of these routes as important in principle but 
not practically relevant from an economic standpoint for decades to 
come. This being said, the NSR will remain critical for the shipping of 
Russian resources to global markets, especially to Asia, which is a 
different matter economically (though not legally) than using the route 
as a shortcut from Europe to Asia and vice versa.
    Moving from international to regional focus, there are continuing 
important discussions about the early integration of rights-holders 
such as Alaska Native groups into the decision-making process, along 
with such concepts as shared benefits and risks and free, prior, and 
informed consent regarding resource-extraction projects. Although the 
U.S. Government took an important and high-impact step with the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act,\5\ for example, work on inclusion and 
securing futures for local communities continues to be important across 
the Arctic region. The work is not yet done.
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    \5\ Public Law 92-203, An Act to Provide for the Settlement of 
Certain Land Claims of Alaska Natives, and for Other Purposes, December 
18, 1971.
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    Third, with respect to the possibility of global geopolitical 
issues spilling over to regional security matters, it is true that 
dialog between Russia, China, the United States, and other Western 
countries has deteriorated as a result of the war in Ukraine and 
tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan. Yet my experience 
suggests that these tensions have not directly affected Arctic 
security, other than the associated difficulties in maintaining dialog 
across the board. Overall, the Arctic region has remained relatively 
stable in this uncertain global security environment. Regarding Arctic 
dialog and cooperation between Russia and the other seven Arctic 
states, I do not foresee a return to the ``business as usual'' model 
that pre-dated the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, among 
other things, with the restarting of Arctic Council activities and in 
the context of the day-to-day stewardship of border areas, I observe 
evidence that there has not been a systemic breakdown in regional 
security. This makes me cautiously optimistic that Arctic stakeholders 
can continue to seek opportunities for constructive, collective dialog 
about the region's future.
          does the united states face an arctic security gap?
    These security transitions, among others, are all good reasons to 
revisit the question of whether the United States faces an Arctic 
security gap. Research on Arctic security that my RAND colleagues and I 
have conducted over recent years suggests that there is no immediate, 
imminent security threat to the United States stemming from the Arctic. 
However, we have identified several risks that could ultimately lead to 
a future gap in security if U.S. access to and presence in the region 
do not improve to account for some of the key transitions that I have 
outlined above. The main risks that we identified are as follows:\6\
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    \6\ See Tingstad et al., 2023.
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    1. declining populations across much of the Arctic region
    2. limited readiness by the United States to fulfill 
        responsibilities across all plausible contingency scenarios in 
        the Arctic (e.g., for search-and-rescue [SAR] missions)
    3. loss of life, property, economic potential, and environmental 
        integrity due to a lack of readiness
    4. limited U.S. ability to operate with (and rely on) partners
    5. loss of opportunities to counter and diplomatically engage (when 
        tenable) with Russia
    6. possibility of the accidental escalation of tensions between 
        Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    7. perception of U.S. absence and a security void, inviting more 
        Chinese or another country's presence
    8. possible growth in Chinese influence and ability to conduct 
        covert activities. I discuss these risks in detail below.
    I first raise the key issue of declining populations across much of 
the Arctic, including in Alaska. Generally speaking, Arctic citizens 
have been moving in recent decades from smaller northern villages to 
larger towns and cities in the region, or out of the region altogether. 
There are many factors that are driving this shift in demographics, 
including the limited or lack of access to education and livelihoods 
and to basic services, such as utilities and transportation. It is 
difficult to imagine preserving the security of the U.S. Arctic without 
a robust contingent of local partners that often serves as the eyes and 
ears of the broader U.S. Government and as first responders in many 
instances. It is equally difficult to accept the often-degraded access 
to basic necessities that local Alaskan and many Arctic communities 
face, which do and could inhibit outside homeland security 
representatives from conducting their presence and response roles in 
the region as well.
    The second risk is related to the United States' limited ability to 
fulfill responsibilities in the Arctic. Due to limited and primarily 
seasonal presence in Arctic areas of Alaska, the USCG and other U.S. 
Federal entities lack the typical infrastructure, capabilities, and 
capacity found in other areas of the United States that permit the 
regular and extensive execution of such missions as search and rescue, 
law enforcement, environmental response, and disaster response. From an 
international perspective, the United States and other Arctic countries 
have signed key agreements, including the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011),\7\ 
the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (2013),\8\ and the Agreement on Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).\9\ Yet it is not 
clear whether the United States and the other Arctic signatory 
countries have the capabilities and capacities to fulfill the 
responsibilities and needs that are outlined in these agreements under 
varying scenarios. However, many of the other Arctic countries, 
including Russia, yield more-extensive Arctic-based and--focused 
capabilities, such as in icebreaking and transportation logistics, for 
response compared with the United States.
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    \7\ Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the Arctic, signed at Nuuk, Greenland, May 12, 2011.
    \8\ Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic, signed at Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013.
    \9\ Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific 
Cooperation, signed at Fairbanks, Alaska, May 11, 2017.
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    From a U.S. perspective, this disparity in capabilities is an 
important risk to heed because there is a substantial difference 
between conducting SAR missions immediately off the coast of a location 
such as the North Slope Borough in Alaska, where local responders may 
be able to quickly carry out an active response, and in an area such as 
eastern Greenland, where the Ocean Explorer ran aground in September 
2023. During this incident--in which there were fortunately no 
casualties--it took multiple days for a vessel navigating relatively 
nearby to pull the cruise ship free.
    Additional consideration must also be given to the ability of the 
United States and other Arctic countries to enforce existing 
agreements. A recent milestone in Arctic governance was the development 
of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar 
Code),\10\ through the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and which entered into force in 2017. This code lays 
out important guidelines and needs for ships operating in specified 
areas at high northern and southern latitudes. Still, in September 
2023, Russia permitted oil tankers without the required hull 
engineering to transit the NSR for the first time. It has not been 
immediately clear what, if anything, can be done about such code 
violations in the near term.
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    \10\ See International Maritime Organization, ``International Code 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),'' webpage, undated, 
https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/polar-code.aspx.
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    A third risk is that the lack of the United States' and other 
Arctic states' ability to respond to various possible contingencies in 
the Arctic can result in loss of life, property, economic potential, 
and environmental integrity. These tragedies can occur anywhere in the 
world, but the Arctic is one region where U.S. readiness to prevent, 
mitigate, and respond to life-threatening incidents and other types of 
threats is very low due to a combination of limited U.S. capacity and 
capabilities in areas relevant to Arctic emergencies, vast distances, 
and a harsh environment.
    Historically low levels of human activity and presence in the 
region have limited the occurrence of such consequences. Yet, there is 
much concern surrounding the potential for increased risks to human 
life (e.g., through increasing cruise ship traffic, slow response to 
storm damage), the environment (e.g., via fuel spills), and 
infrastructure (e.g., through storm damage). For instance, in 2022, 
Typhoon Merbok severely destroyed infrastructure and had impacts on 
many displaced families and livelihoods in western coastal Alaska, 
serving as a sobering reminder of the power that one storm can have.
    The fourth risk focuses on partnering as a way of reducing a 
country's risk, especially in a region such as the Arctic where all 
Arctic states have fairly limited infrastructure and capabilities. 
However, without having adequate access and presence, as well as 
sufficient capabilities, to bring to the table, the United States will 
be able to participate only in a limited fashion in exercises relevant 
to contingency preparedness, readiness, and response. The United States 
has tremendous capabilities across air, ground, maritime, space, and 
other areas, some of which are located in Alaska or in other U.S. 
States, such as Washington, Maine, and New York, which are 
geographically proximal to the Arctic. The vast majority of these 
assets, though not all, are primarily dedicated to such strategic needs 
as deterrence and global power projection.
    The United States must also be able to offer more Arctic-specific 
or at least Arctic-relevant capabilities in order to best position 
itself to take advantage of what other Arctic partners have to offer. 
For example, any theoretical plans to formally network fuel and connect 
logistics points across North American high northern latitudes to 
enable contingency response would necessitate the inclusion of 
locations in Alaska and perhaps Maine and New York to provide the best 
value domestically and for potential partners, such as Canada, 
Greenland, and Denmark.
    The fifth risk concerns the impact that Russia's full-scale war on 
Ukraine has on preventing the United States and its like-minded allies 
and partners in the region from engaging in Arctic ``business as 
usual.'' The reality is that the United States shares a maritime border 
with Russia, and Russia will continue to be an important player in the 
Far North for years to come as the region's largest country with great 
economic aspirations for the Arctic and a substantial military presence 
there. Thus, managing an Arctic relationship with Russia is a necessity 
and requires that the United States improve its access to and presence 
in the Arctic to successfully do so. This will facilitate engagement 
when needed to conduct responsibilities and improve the United States' 
ability to balance Russia's presence around strategic areas, such as 
the Bering Strait. More regional activity runs the risk of escalating 
tensions or causing accidents, which further emphasizes the importance 
of a U.S. presence that can facilitate domain awareness and strong 
communications.
    The sixth risk concerns the potential for accidental escalation of 
NATO-Russia tensions. The United States' limited access to and presence 
in the Arctic can also prevent the U.S. Government from having the 
appropriate domain awareness, communications, and other capabilities 
necessary to prevent military accidents and escalation. This escalatory 
potential is particularly relevant in the context of Sweden's imminent 
accession to NATO, which would mean that 7 of 8 Arctic countries will 
be NATO members. In this context, Russia may increasingly perceive NATO 
encroachment in the Arctic, which could potentially result in further 
increasing tensions in the region.
    The last two risks that we identified relate to China's presence in 
the Arctic. China is not an Arctic state, although it has been involved 
in regional scientific research and relevant intergovernmental 
organizations for years, among a group of other countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and South Korea. China has participated 
in the existing Arctic governance structures as an observer within the 
Arctic Council, a participant in Polar Code development through the 
IMO, and a signatory of the International Agreement to Prevent 
Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean,\11\ 
for example. At the same time, China has been particularly vocal among 
non-Arctic states about its presence in the region and in regional 
decision making--famously calling itself a ``near-Arctic state.''\12\ 
Its willingness to partner with Russia post-full-scale invasion of 
Ukraine and its status as a U.S. competitor are also cause for 
watchfulness.
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    \11\ International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the 
High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean, signed at Reykjavik, Iceland, 
May 20, 2021.
    \12\ People's Republic of China, State Council, China's Arctic 
Policy, January 26, 2018.
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    One concern for Arctic state sovereignty is the possibility that 
China (or another non-Arctic state) would potentially step in to fill a 
real or potential regional security void, challenging sovereignty or, 
even more likely, justifying an incremental increase of its own 
presence. A plausible scenario under which this could occur is if a 
Chinese maritime vessel were challenged (wrongfully, according to 
Beijing) on illicit or hybrid activity, or if a SAR response to such a 
vessel under distress were viewed as ineffective. These situations 
could, in theory, garner a response that Arctic states are overreaching 
or conducting ineffective operations, respectively, potentially opening 
the door for Beijing to justify China's stronger presence to protect 
its assets and interests. The recently-signed maritime law enforcement 
agreement between Moscow and Beijing,\13\ though not Arctic-specific, 
was signed in Murmansk, Russia's largest Arctic city and adjacent to 
its Northern Fleet headquarters. This agreement could be an early type 
of indicator that China sees a need for an expanded role for itself in 
the region.
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    \13\ ``China, Russia Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime 
Law Enforcement,'' ed. by Himani Sarkar, Reuters, April 26, 2023.
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    Another type of risk is that through increasing access and 
presence, China might be able to leverage locations, technologies, and 
other means to secure information and other advantages. Despite the 
lack of firm evidence of this to date, this risk may be particularly 
acute in the Arctic, given the difficulties in surveilling many 
regional activities across vast distances and with a severe lack of 
infrastructure to do so. Furthermore, these same challenges might 
provide the conditions under which covert activities can be pursued. 
U.S. presence in the region could certainly help maintain awareness and 
provide courses of action to counter questionable activities if 
necessary.
improving u.s. arctic access and presence will enhance the security of 
                           the united states
    The Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces 
contains several findings and recommendations for improving U.S. 
presence in and access to the Arctic region to maintain security and 
avoid the risks detailed above. The report's five key findings are as 
follows:\14\
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    \14\ Tingstad et al., 2023.
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    First, the USCG, even when working with joint partners, lacks the 
capacity to meet the Nation's strategic aims in the Arctic. Although 
the United States has substantial strategic capabilities for operating 
from or through the Arctic, its capacity and capability for conducting 
operations to secure its Arctic interests are more limited than those 
of other Arctic countries, based on scale. This includes key needs in 
access (surface maritime, land, and air at tactical and operational--
rather that strategic--scales), domain awareness (e.g., sensors), 
communications (satellites, fiber-optic cables, etc.), and logistics 
(transportation and energy). Generally speaking, other Arctic countries 
have scaled their capabilities and capacity proportionally to their 
respective Arctic needs and to reflect the natural hazards and military 
threats they are facing, as well as the sizes of their populations and 
economies. Similarly, China's polar investments mirror its scientific 
and economic ambitions and lack of Arctic territory.
    Second, the U.S. armed services will be challenged in the Arctic by 
foreign military and commercial activities. The Arctic has become 
increasingly visible globally through climate change and expectations 
of regional economic potential, which may also make the region more 
vulnerable to the spillover of geopolitical tensions or even armed 
conflict. U.S. armed forces will likely increasingly contend with 
strategic competition in this region to promote U.S. interests and 
support allies and partners. However, we did not assess that the Arctic 
would see an independent conflict caused by tensions arising over 
regional economic or other issues.
    In addition, U.S. armed forces--especially the USCG, because of its 
particular statutory missions that include law-enforcement roles--will 
need to monitor the growth in regional commercial activities, both 
licit and illicit. The most pressing area will be in continuing to 
monitor and manage fisheries, especially anticipated growth in illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing as global demand for protein 
increases, fisheries respond to a warming climate, and Indigenous 
groups in some areas gain more political and economic autonomy. Growth 
in tourism, especially ecotourism, will increase demand for SAR and 
environmental response, as well as for customs and border protection.
    Third, potential security risks to USCG forces are largely driven 
by U.S. capacity and capability issues. Limitations on U.S. capacity 
and capability to scale up for enduring regional presence contribute to 
three types of issues:
   First, there are scenarios in which the USCG, more 
        generally, would find it difficult to perform self-protection 
        and self-rescue regardless of the reason (e.g., military 
        threat, law enforcement problem, natural hazard) for the need.
   Second, these limitations set the conditions for developing 
        a security void in parts of the North American Arctic. Limited 
        domain awareness, the inability to quickly communicate relevant 
        information, and a lack of presence to proactively manage 
        problems place USCG forces at a starting disadvantage before a 
        bad actor ever makes a move.
   Third, these same challenges affect the ability of the USCG 
        and other U.S. armed forces to respond to emerging situations 
        (including NATO defense) elsewhere in the Far North.
    The United States has been fortunate that the overall security 
risks in the Arctic region have historically been limited. In the 
future, these risks will be likely to remain less severe than those in 
other parts of the United States and the world in which the USCG and 
other armed forces operate. In other words, the so-called pacing threat 
in the Arctic is not an external set of bad actors like it is 
elsewhere. The United States itself is placing the USCG and its armed 
forces in a difficult position in the Arctic by necessitating presence 
through overarching strategies and plans without providing the 
appropriate capabilities in sufficient capacities to perform these 
missions to the same level of success as they would be if performed 
elsewhere in the United States and in the world.
    Fourth, U.S. presence cannot be scaled up without trained 
personnel, domain awareness, communications, and logistics. For many, 
the concept of armed forces' presence denotes physical and 
technological capabilities: ships, submarines, aircraft, ground 
vehicles, and similar platforms. There is no doubt that investment in 
such platforms would greatly promote U.S. Arctic access and presence. 
Yet, our study emphasized four other types of essential capabilities 
without which next-generation or recapitalized platforms would not be 
effective or even operational: trained personnel, domain awareness, 
communications, and logistics. Personnel need to be acclimated to 
operating in the extreme Arctic environment, where even basic 
operational tasks can be difficult. Domain awareness remains limited 
owing to the use of a single Arctic-dedicated icebreaker (USCGC Healy), 
few overflights, and relatively few early warning stations. Polar 
conditions and poor infrastructure hamper communications, while 
logistics suffer from few roads and viable airstrips.
    Fifth, the Arctic physical environment will continue to be a 
formidable adversary.
    Protecting the armed forces during their missions to secure the 
United States' interests in the Arctic region is of utmost importance. 
Although there are various military threats, such as anti-ship and 
anti-aircraft missiles, our research suggests that the likeliest and 
most-consequential threats will come from the Arctic's physical 
environment and the present lack of capability, capacity, and 
preparedness for dealing with these challenges. The dangers of 
navigating through vast, poorly-charted areas with extreme weather 
conditions; operating in a data vacuum with limited communications; and 
lacking personnel trained and ready to persist in a harsh, logistics-
poor environment are--and will continue to be--formidable.
    In response to the five findings presented above, our 
recommendations are as follows:\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Tingstad et al., 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Bolster momentum in implementing national, U.S. Department 
        of Homeland Security, USCG, U.S. Department of Defense, and 
        military service Arctic strategies. Funding and the need to 
        attend to other priorities can make it challenging to bridge 
        the gap between Arctic strategies and action. It is merely a 
        fact that, if the Arctic is not clearly promoted in priority-
        setting national strategies, it will continue to be difficult 
        to invest in the capabilities, people, partnerships, and 
        training and exercises that Arctic strategies suggest are 
        needed for securing National interests in the region.
   Continue efforts to expand funding for priority USCG and 
        U.S. Department of Homeland Security needs. While there are no 
        silver bullets and no single investment will resolve the 
        multitude of problems, some initial priorities include 
        continuing funding for new icebreakers and the deepwater port 
        at Nome, Alaska, and making investments in ``low-hanging 
        fruit'' for domain awareness and communications.
   Seek opportunities to benefit from commercial investments, 
        including efforts to engage in research and development with 
        commercial partners. We recommend considering expanding support 
        for selected fiber communications, maritime and aviation 
        logistics (including for mobile infrastructure), and 
        autonomous-vehicle projects if viable and useful.
   Strengthen research partnerships, including those across the 
        interagency and with local, Tribal, and university partners.
   Strengthen international partnerships, expanding them when 
        possible, including intelligence- and other information-sharing 
        more widely and sooner when possible.
    To conclude, security requires continuous effort to maintain, 
particularly in periods of transition along the many dimensions that 
the Arctic is experiencing--from climate change to demographic shifts 
to economic opportunities and risks to geopolitical dynamics. As an 
Arctic nation, it is the United States' responsibility to take steps 
toward enhancing regional security. The recently-released 
Implementation Plan for the United States' National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region and the USCG's Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation 
Plan,\16\ and the funding provided for the first new icebreakers, for 
example, are important initial steps. The United States must now 
continue this momentum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ White House, ``Fact Sheet: Implementation Plan for the United 
States' National Strategy for the Arctic Region,'' Briefing Room, 
October 23, 2023; U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan, October 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I thank the committee for the opportunity to submit this testimony 
and look forward to addressing any questions.

    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                           November 29, 2023
    I appreciate the committee holding today's hearing on Arctic 
security and its implications for the homeland. When I served as 
Chairman, the Homeland Security Committee held multiple hearings and 
briefings on Arctic security, and I am glad to see the current Majority 
continuing to conduct oversight on this critical topic.
    As I have said previously, it is imperative that the committee 
carry out its oversight responsibilities on the many, varied threats 
facing the homeland. To be certain, the Arctic is a region of 
increasing importance to homeland security, and it is one area where I 
believe there is opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. Time is of the 
essence. With climate change, Arctic waters are increasingly open to 
maritime activity like shipping, energy exploration, fishing, and 
tourism. Adversaries like Russia and China are trying to gain strategic 
advantage, and the United States must be ready to assert and protect 
its interests in the region.
    The Coast Guard is central to the United States' efforts and 
activities in the Arctic, but its capacity is severely limited by a 
lack of icebreakers. Currently, it has only one heavy polar icebreaker, 
the Polar Star, which was commissioned in 1976 and is well past its 
expected service life. The vessel is focused on work related to our 
research station in Antarctica, making it difficult for the Coast Guard 
to maintain a presence in the Arctic. Meanwhile, Russia has more than 
50 icebreakers and has been building more, increasing its military 
presence in the region by opening new bases, reopening old ones, and 
enhancing its communications capabilities.
    In response to the dire need for more icebreakers and maritime 
assets built for the Arctic, Congress appropriated historic funding to 
begin construction of new Polar Security Cutters or ``PSCs.'' The Coast 
Guard awarded contracts for the first two of these PSCs in 2019, with 
delivery originally expected late next year. Unfortunately, 
construction has not yet begun due to a variety of factors and delivery 
will be delayed. I hope to hear from the Coast Guard today about the 
plan going forward and the new time line and cost estimate for the 
Polar Security Cutters. This acquisition program will be a long-term 
effort, so Congress must help ensure shipbuilding stays on budget and 
meets critical deadlines.
    In addition to addressing the icebreaker shortage, the United 
States has to strategize for the long term, since conditions in the 
Arctic will continue to change and nations like Russia and China will 
try to leverage those changes to their advantage. Indeed, China has 
already declared itself a ``Near-Arctic state''--despite having no 
geographic connection to the Arctic--and will undoubtedly continue to 
try to continue to exert its influence in the region.
    In recognition of the need for a whole-of-Government strategy, the 
Biden-Harris administration published the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region just over a year ago--an important step toward ensuring 
U.S. interests are protected. The Strategy includes four pillars, the 
first of which is security, stating ``we will deter threats to the U.S. 
homeland and our allies by enhancing the capabilities to defend our 
interests in the Arctic . . . '' and ``will exercise U.S. Government 
presence in the Arctic region as required to protect the American 
people and defend our sovereign territory''.
    The Strategy also rightly focuses on addressing climate change and 
environmental protection. We must follow the science on climate change 
and plan accordingly for the effects of warming temperatures and 
reduced sea ice in the region.
    Additionally, the Strategy highlights the importance of engaging 
with indigenous communities in the Arctic. The Coast Guard has 
established relationships with Alaska Native communities, and we must 
broaden and deepen those relationships going forward.
    Finally, the Strategy recognizes that the United States must engage 
our international allies and partners on Arctic issues to strengthen 
our position in the region. Engaging like-minded countries and working 
together on areas of common interest will be critical going forward.
    In recognition of the important work to be done, in August 2022 the 
Biden-Harris administration announced the establishment of an 
ambassador-at-large for the Arctic Region. The ambassador-at-large is 
charged with advancing U.S. policy in the Arctic, engaging with 
counterparts in Arctic and non-Arctic nations as well as Indigenous 
groups, and working closely with domestic stakeholders. President 
Biden's nomination has been pending in the Senate since February 2023. 
This fall, the Government Accountability Office reported that the new 
ambassador-at-large position could help advance U.S. priorities in the 
Arctic region. I hope this position will be confirmed without further 
delay.
    Today, I look forward to the witnesses sharing their expertise 
about homeland security priorities in the Arctic and what Congress can 
do to support those priorities and your efforts to protect them.
    Before I close, I want to express particular appreciation to the 
Government Accountability Office for their work on Arctic issues and to 
our witness, Ms. Kenney, for her willingness to testify on extremely 
short notice just after the Thanksgiving holiday.

    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I want to thank the 
Ranking Member for his opening comments. I am pleased to 
welcome our second panel of witnesses. I ask the witnesses to 
please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Green. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and you may be 
seated.
    I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses. Vice 
Admiral Peter Gautier. Did I pronounce that correctly, sir?
    Mr. Gautier. It's Gautier, sir, unless you're in 
Mississippi, and that's Gautier.
    Chairman Green. OK. Well, I am from Mississippi, so, that 
works. Assumed the duties of Coast Guard deputy commandant for 
operations in June 2022. In this capacity, he is responsible 
for the development of operational strategy, policy, guidance, 
and resources that address National priorities. Ms. Christa 
Brzozowski serves as the acting assistant secretary of trade 
and economic security at the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. In this capacity, Ms. Brzozowski oversees a team 
focused on a wide range of National trade and economic security 
policy issues. Thank you. Ms. Chelsa Kenney serves as the 
director for the International Affairs and Trade Team for the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. I thank the witnesses 
for being here today, and I now recognize Vice Admiral Gautier 
for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
                  OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Mr. Gautier. Thank you very much. Good morning, Chairman 
Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and the distinguished Members 
of the committee. The Coast Guard is deeply appreciative for 
your interest in the Arctic and the crucial role that the Coast 
Guard plays in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity, and 
cooperation across the Arctic region through our operations, 
engagements, partnerships, and influence. I ask that my written 
testimony be entered into the record.
    So, Chairman Green, Ranking Member, your statements, in 
addition to Senator Sullivan's statements, very eloquently 
summarize the types of threats that we're facing in the Arctic 
at large and the Coast Guard's critical role in the Arctic 
region. I'd just like to maybe reinforce some of the key points 
that you had made.
    We are witnessing a dramatic transformation in the Arctic's 
physical, operational, and geostrategic environment. We're 
witnessing first-hand the increasing impacts of climate change 
and how it's opening up new access to Arctic waters. This 
drives greater activity in the Arctic region and with it, 
increased risk across the maritime sector. The Coast Guard is 
deeply concerned about the rising strategic risk to our Nation 
as Russia and China compete for diplomatic, economic, and 
strategic advantage, and influence in the Arctic.
    While the mission of the high latitudes have evolved since 
the Coast Guard started operating there 150 years ago, our 
commitment to the region has remained constant. We're operating 
forward to address the safety and security of our Arctic 
residents and mariners who make their living there homeporting 
new cutters, investing in infrastructure and capabilities, 
prioritizing our operations in the region, and strengthening 
our international partnerships. Changing conditions in the 
Arctic are driving increased demand for Coast Guard services, 
and we have a sense of urgency to make sure we can deliver 
those services now and well into the future.
    Despite the geographical remoteness and logistical 
challenges inherent in all operations in the Arctic, the Coast 
Guard is meeting demands through our flexible and expeditionary 
approach. This year in Operation Arctic Shield, we increased 
seasonal presence in the U.S. Arctic by deploying cutters, 
aircraft, and shore forces to respond to search-and-rescue 
cases, inspect bulk oil facilities, complete commercial fishing 
vessel exams, conduct oil spill and mass rescue exercises, and 
training and outreach events across 91 Arctic communities.
    Coast Guard cutters provide persistent presence along the 
U.S.-Russia maritime boundary line. Each summer now, as you've 
heard, the Coast Guard cutters intercept Russian and Chinese 
military vessels sailing through the U.S. exclusive economic 
zone. Both nations have declared the Arctic a strategic 
priority, and they continue to make significant investments to 
advance their own interests.
    We, the Coast Guard, need to make significant investments 
too. The Coast Guard appreciates the continued support from 
Congress to build the next generation of Coast Guard capability 
for the Arctic. A top acquisition priority is the Polar 
Security cutter, and we're working with Bollinger, Mississippi 
shipyard to advance that effort. We've asked for the funding in 
this year's budget request to increase near-term presence in 
the Arctic through acquisition of a commercially-available 
medium polar icebreaker. With Congress's help, we're moving 
forward to build the shoreside infrastructure necessary to 
support a fleet to enable it to operate in the harshest 
conditions on Earth to advance our U.S. interests.
    The Coast Guard strategic influence extends well beyond 
just the U.S. Arctic to the region at large. Through the Arctic 
Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, we continue to work 
with like-minded nations to advance shared interests. This 
year, we exercised with partners off Greenland and the Beaufort 
Sea to expand search-and-rescue and pollution response 
interoperability across the international community. The Coast 
Guard's polar icebreaker Healy, working with the scientific 
community, service polar research buoys just north of Russia's 
exclusive economic zone, and continued sailing to Europe for 
engagements with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, as just a few 
examples.
    Never has the Coast Guard leadership been more important in 
the Arctic than it is right now. As captured in a host of 
national security and Arctic-related strategies, the Coast 
Guard is in a unique position within Government to confront 
historic maritime challenges and keep the Arctic peaceful, 
stable, prosperous, and cooperative. The Coast Guard is 
committed to assert all efforts to meet these challenges. Thank 
you again, Chairman and Ranking Member, for this opportunity. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Gautier follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Peter Gautier
                            29 November 2023
                              introduction
    Good morning, Chair Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and 
distinguished Members of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here 
today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's role in advancing our U.S. 
National interests across the Arctic. The United States is 1 of only 8 
Arctic states with both sovereign rights and sovereign responsibilities 
to safeguard our respective interests. In a region where presence means 
not only influence, but also security, the U.S. Coast Guard has been a 
key leader and interagency partner in shaping the Arctic security 
environment for over 150 years.
    The Arctic is undergoing a dramatic transformation of its physical, 
operational, and geostrategic environment. We're witnessing first-hand 
the increasing impacts of climate change and how it is opening up new 
access to Arctic waters. Arctic activity is increasing and evolving at 
a rapid pace, from a surge in oil and gas exploration a decade ago to 
growth in types and locations of vessel transits, including an 
expansion of environmental tourism. The dynamic and accelerated changes 
in the Arctic environment make Arctic waters more accessible, creating 
new opportunities and challenges.
    At the same time, the Arctic is a region of increasing strategic 
competition with the potential for elevating geopolitical tensions. In 
the U.S. Arctic, the U.S. Coast Guard is engaging more often with a 
growing number of strategic partners and competitors. Among the 
competitors, the Service is observing an increased presence by the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, involved in both 
individual and combined military activities.
    A significant level of investment is needed to advance our Nation's 
interests in the Arctic, and I embrace the trust Congress and the 
American people have placed in the U.S. Coast Guard. The Service will 
continue to prioritize actions that safeguard U.S. interests while 
promoting safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime 
activity in the Arctic.
             national security priorities across the arctic
    In 2022, the administration released updates to both the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region 
(NSAR). The NSS emphasizes constraining Russia and out-competing the 
PRC. The 2022 NSAR establishes priorities within the Arctic, addressing 
the climate crisis with greater urgency, expanding scientific research, 
recognizing the need to advance U.S. leadership at home and abroad, and 
directing new capability investments. The NSAR emphasizes both National 
defense and homeland security, and states our highest priority is to 
protect the American people and our sovereign territory and rights. The 
administration recently released the Implementation Plan for the NSAR 
that serves as a blueprint for the Nation's approach to implementing 
actions within these national strategies. These documents provide clear 
strategic direction and messaging both domestically and to 
international allies, partners, and competitors alike, and the U.S. 
Coast Guard is important to their success.
    The U.S. Coast Guard contributed to developing both the NSS and 
NSAR, and continues to be at the forefront of Arctic strategic 
leadership. We published the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic Strategic 
Outlook Implementation Plan last month. The Implementation Plan 
underscores the U.S. Coast Guard's commitment to promoting safety, 
sovereignty, and stewardship in the region, describing actions the 
Service will take over the next decade, including continuing our 
efforts to increase Arctic communications capabilities, expanding 
Arctic surface capabilities, strengthening the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
(ACGF) and Arctic Council, and modernizing the U.S. Arctic Marine 
Transportation System (MTS). The Implementation Plan was developed by 
the U.S. Coast Guard's newly-established Polar Coordination Office, 
which serves as the linkage between U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Area 
Commands, and external partners to efficiently and effectively 
coordinate polar policy, planning, and resourcing Arctic strategies and 
operations. These collective actions, together with broader diplomatic, 
economic, and strategic engagement activities, are crucial for U.S. 
Arctic security.
                           strategy to action
    A peaceful, stable, prosperous Arctic region that is increasingly 
open to human activity requires responsible behavior in accordance with 
international norms and strong governance. In the maritime domain, the 
United States needs to be present, collaborate with others, and model 
professional behavior at sea. With our unique combination of 
authorities as an armed force, a law enforcement agency, a regulatory 
agency, and a humanitarian service, the U.S. Coast Guard is an ideal 
instrument for the Nation to responsibly govern the U.S. Arctic 
maritime environment. The U.S. Coast Guard continues to excel in all of 
these elements, to include setting an example of responsible governance 
and reinforcing the rule of law through operational presence and 
strategic leadership.
    The U.S. Coast Guard acts at all regional scales to support U.S. 
strategic objectives, and to assert international leadership to advance 
cooperation and uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards 
for Arctic coastal states and other non-Arctic flag states whose ships 
sail in Arctic waters. The U.S. Coast Guard consistently provides 
guidance and direction through preeminent multilateral forums such as 
the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
The 2022 NSAR emphasizes the importance of both institutions, as well 
as the ACGF, to enhancing national security for the United States and 
our like-minded allies and partners.
    The ACGF acts as a bridge between diplomacy and operations by 
serving as an independent, complementary body to the Arctic Council, 
with an operational focus on safe and environmentally-responsible 
Arctic maritime activity. Since 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard has 
conducted exercises with partner Arctic states through the ACGF and the 
Arctic Council to enhance interoperability and provide a platform for 
direct dialog among Arctic agencies fulfilling Coast Guard-like 
functions.
    In 2021, the Arctic Council and the ACGF issued a joint statement 
of cooperation to enhance collaboration on both search-and-rescue and 
oil spill preparedness and response. Since then, the U.S. Coast Guard 
has assumed the chair of the Combined Operations Working Group (COWG) 
under Norway's chairmanship of the ACGF. In October, the ACGF re-
established live, in-person meetings to address critical issues and to 
commence planning of a 2024 tabletop exercise (TTX) and 2025 live 
exercise (LIVEX). These meetings were key in sustaining alignment 
between critical partners. In COWG sessions, participants discussed 
critical issues facing all states, with emphasis on increases in the 
number and size of cruise ships anticipated to visit the Arctic in the 
immediate future, as well as respective capabilities for responding to 
environmental disasters in the region. These discussions serve as a 
foundation for developing exercises to re-enforce critical partnerships 
and ultimately achieve the coordination and interoperability necessary 
to successfully respond to incidents in the region.
                  security, presence, and preparedness
    The geopolitical environment in the Arctic continues to evolve as 
state and non-state actors seek to advance their interests in the 
region. Allies, partners, and competitors increasingly contend for 
diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and influence. Russia and 
the PRC exemplify this competition. Both have declared the Arctic a 
strategic priority; both have made significant investments in new or 
refurbished capabilities; and both are attempting to exert direct or 
indirect influence across the region using all of their instruments of 
national power.
    The U.S. Coast Guard is directly observing increased strategic 
competition in the U.S. Arctic. Through the operations of the U.S. 
Coast Guard Pacific Area Command and its Seventeenth District (D17), 
which is responsible for U.S. Coast Guard activities for an over 
3,853,500-square-mile area including Alaska and the Arctic, the U.S. 
Coast Guard meets presence with presence, through Operation Frontier 
Sentinel, both to counter competition and positively influence 
behavior. Over the past 2 years, the U.S. Coast Guard has provided 
operational presence and monitored a Chinese military Surface Action 
Group, as well as a combined Russian-Chinese Task Group, operated in 
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. The U.S. Coast Guard also redirected 
a National Security Cutter to ensure the safety of U.S. fishing vessels 
in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone while Russian ships conducted 
missile exercises. In these instances, the U.S. Coast Guard's visible 
forward presence ensured that Russia and China operated in accordance 
with international law.
    In the Atlantic segment of the Arctic, the U.S. Coast Guard's 
Atlantic Area Command actively participates in opportunities to 
reinforce the Service's role as a trusted, reliable partner in the 
region, including engagements with U.S. Navy, Canadian, Danish, French, 
and other allies. In June 2023, the U.S. Coast Guard participated in 
Exercise ARGUS 2023, the sixth exercise in a series of annual non-
military exercises in the Arctic.
    The exercise included ships and aircraft from Denmark, Greenland, 
France, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Also in June 2023, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, the Danish Joint Arctic Command, the French Atlantic Command, 
and local Greenlandic authorities executed a Combined Joint Disaster 
Relief and Search and Rescue (SAR) exercise. The exercise spanned 5 
days, and included force integration training, navigation exercises, 
towing exercises, damage control exercises, SAR searches, air drops, 
and hoist exercises. In August 2023, U.S. Coast Guard participated in 
Operation NANOOK along with Denmark, France, and Canada. This exercise 
deployed forces in a Combined Task Group to demonstrate capabilities 
and integration with multinational defense allies and exchanged best 
practices during fleet integration training. Collectively, these 
exercises improved our capacity to respond to maritime threats and 
advanced the U.S. Coast Guard and broader U.S. Government's standing 
and influence with key Arctic partners.
    The U.S. Coast Guard will continue to exhibit model governance 
grounded in international law, rules, norms, and standards, including 
freedom of navigation in the U.S. Arctic and to empower like-minded 
partners and allies to do the same in their Arctic waters. This year, 
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy completed an around-the-world voyage from 
the high Arctic above Asia and Europe to the U.S. East Coast before 
returning to its homeport. While under way, operations supported a 
blend of national priorities across the Arctic, including supporting 
scientific activities in partnership with the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) along the edge of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone. 
Healy exercised U.S. presence in the Chukchi, East Siberian, and Laptev 
Seas, in accordance with international law, and experienced numerous 
professional encounters with Russian vessels and aircraft.
    Healy then continued transiting east to conduct at-sea engagements 
and port calls in Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. These engagements 
reinforced both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Nation's enduring 
commitment to deepening our cooperation with the international 
community, promoting access in accordance with international law, and 
supporting scientific research on the impacts of climate change to 
better enable operational and strategic decisions.
    Consistent with the whole-of-Government approach highlighted in the 
NSAR, the U.S. Coast Guard has long provided Arctic access by including 
interagency and international scientists aboard Healy to conduct 
critical scientific research as Healy operates throughout the region. 
Robust partnerships with institutions like the NSF, U.S. Arctic 
Research Commission, the Woodrow Wilson Polar Institute, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Navy, and U.S. 
National Ice Center enables the U.S. Coast Guard, along with our 
National and international partners, to access remote Arctic Ocean 
locations, conduct hydrographic surveys, implement elements of the 
Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, protect the maritime 
environment, build community resilience, and shape international 
security norms. Research also informs decision making to reduce 
potential operational and strategic consequences.
    Since 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard has influenced Arctic governance 
and sustainable development through Operation Arctic Shield. This 
operation demonstrates the U.S. Coast Guard's operational capability, 
asserts leadership, and models responsible international governance in 
a region of key geostrategic importance. Operation Arctic Shield 
delivers a full suite of U.S. Coast Guard services to residents and 
waterway users across Alaska and the U.S. Arctic region.
    This work strengthens the MTS, protects the environment, and 
supports the resilience of remote communities. This year, U.S. Coast 
Guard personnel conducted extensive marine safety-oriented regulatory 
activities in 91 villages, inspecting bulk oil facilities and 
commercial vessels, and issuing commercial fishing safety decals. Each 
village deployment saw U.S. Coast Guard members integrating with the 
local communities and governments to enhance relationships, build 
partnerships, and provide training in areas such as boating safety and 
ice rescue. U.S. Coast Guard presence in the region is by far the 
largest of any Federal agency. The U.S. Coast Guard is also well aware 
of serious challenges facing many communities in Western Alaska 
stemming from the declines of certain fisheries in the Bering Sea. 
Through mechanisms such as the Task Force on the Northern Bering Sea 
Climate Resilience Area, the Coast Guard is participating with a broad 
range of Federal departments and agencies in an effort to address these 
challenges, in partnership with representatives of affected 
communities.
    Preparing for complex contingencies in the U.S. Arctic is a 
National priority. This year, D17 completed a Bering Strait pollution 
response exercise to advance the region's preparations for a large 
transboundary oil spill. The exercise included a full-scale exercise in 
the Bering Strait, and a Spill of National Significance briefing and 
seminar. D17 also conducted a combined mass rescue operation (MRO) 
exercise with the Canadian Armed Forces, the Canadian Coast Guard, and 
Parks Canada to test our ability to respond to an Arctic cruise ship 
incident. This event occurred in the Beaufort Sea near the border 
between Canada and the United States and included the French expedition 
cruise ship Le Commandant Charcot, which tested their ability to meet 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) 
requirements. The exercise involved evacuating 71 passengers and crew 
from the vessel to a Canadian island. Canadian and U.S. Coast Guard 
aircraft deployed to the location and delivered sustainment packages 
and simulated hoisting survivors. This exercise highlighted the 
logistical and operational opportunities and challenges faced when 
deploying U.S. Coast Guard HC-130's and MH-60's to remote Arctic 
locations.
    To better prepare the region for the future, U.S. Coast Guard 
members also met with local partners to assess plans for a mass search-
and-rescue response, engaged on a government-to-government basis with 
Federally-recognized Tribes throughout the Arctic and Western Alaska, 
and implemented layered cybersecurity measures throughout the maritime 
domain and shoreside infrastructure. Through these consistent 
engagements focused on developing and implementing contingency, safety, 
and security plans, the U.S. Coast Guard further illustrates why the 
Service is a valued instrument to protect and enhance community and 
port resilience in the U.S. Arctic region.
                        building arctic capacity
    The ability for the United States to protect U.S. National 
sovereignty, safeguard our homeland, and meet the Nation's strategic 
priorities in the Arctic hinges on physical presence and access. U.S. 
operational presence and influence in the Arctic are founded on U.S. 
Coast Guard polar icebreakers. These ships provide assured, year-round 
access to the Polar Regions not only for U.S. Coast Guard missions, but 
also in support of critical activities of other agencies and Tribal 
Nations that protect key economic, environmental, and National security 
interests in the high latitudes.
    The Polar Security Cutter (PSC) is a top acquisition priority for 
the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy and is vital for the United States to 
continue to project sovereignty and protect National security interests 
in the Polar Regions. The PSC is the capability the Nation needs to 
ensure persistent presence and robust domain awareness in the Arctic 
and Antarctic regions. The integrated U.S. Coast Guard-Navy Program 
Office continues to work actively with the prime contractor to deliver 
this critical capability. Continued investment is key to meeting our 
Nation's growing needs in the rapidly-evolving and dynamic Polar 
Regions.
    The fiscal year 2024 President's budget also requests $150 million 
to support the acquisition of a commercially-available polar 
icebreaker, including initial modifications, crewing, and integrated 
logistics support required to reach initial operating capability. The 
United States has vital National interests in the Polar Regions and the 
purchase of a commercially-available polar icebreaker will accelerate 
U.S. presence in the polar regions in the near-term and increase 
capacity in the long-term.
    In addition to recapitalization of our icebreakers, investment in 
Arctic-capable U.S. Coast Guard surface and aviation assets, properly-
trained and -equipped personnel, enhanced communication and domain 
awareness capabilities, and logistics resources are crucial to 
delivering U.S. Coast Guard services and advancing our security and 
sovereign interests in the Arctic. As outlined in the U.S. Coast 
Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, closing gaps in these areas 
requires a whole-of-Government approach, such as our partnerships with 
scientific research agencies, coupled with consistent investment to 
meet not only the challenges the Arctic presents, but also the 
opportunities.
                               conclusion
    The physical, operational, and geopolitical environment in the 
Arctic continues to change rapidly, driving demand for U.S. Coast Guard 
presence, influence, and services. The U.S. Coast Guard has served and 
shaped National security in the Arctic for more than 150 years and is 
central to a U.S. whole-of-Government approach together with partners 
to secure National interests in the Polar Regions.
    The continued support of the administration and Congress for a 
modernized and capable polar fleet and increased U.S. Coast Guard 
Arctic capacity and capabilities will fortify the Nation's position in 
this age of Arctic prominence. U.S. Coast Guard leadership is essential 
in maintaining a coalition of like-minded partners to shape the Arctic 
domain as a region of strategic cooperation. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today and for your actions to support 
the members of the U.S. Coast Guard.

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Admiral Gautier. I now recognize 
Ms. Brzozowski for her 5 minutes to summarize her opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTA BRZOZOWSKI, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
 TRADE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND 
          PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you so much and good morning, 
Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished 
Members of the committee. I very much appreciate and I'm 
honored by the opportunity today to discuss the Department of 
Homeland Security's on-going efforts in the Arctic. All nations 
recognize the importance of the Arctic. Both our allies and our 
strategic competitors jockey for diplomatic, economic, and 
military advantages in a region with immense natural resources, 
trade, and geopolitical importance. Despite this competition, 
however, the Arctic is a space where the world can cooperate 
and work together to advance scientific research and ensure 
public safety.
    As an Arctic nation, the United States must protect and 
safeguard the Arctic for the benefit of all. At DHS, we view 
Arctic security as homeland security, and we're dedicated to 
safeguarding the space. The brave men and women of the 
Department work tirelessly to secure Arctic lands and waters. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, for example, protect 15 
ports of entry and 1,500 miles of land border working alongside 
U.S. Coast Guard and 33,000 miles of maritime border throughout 
Alaska.
    We also have the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, or CISA, who work closely with communities to protect 
critical infrastructure and resources in the region. When 
disaster does strike, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
or FEMA, under the Department of Homeland Security, stands 
ready to help communities in need. Homeland Security 
investigations, or HSI personnel, protect Arctic communities 
against malicious actors such as transnational criminal 
organizations and nation-state actors. Of course, across air, 
roads, and railways, the Transportation Security 
Administration, or TSA, ensures safe travel throughout the 
Arctic.
    To achieve this diverse mission, DHS works in close 
partnership with key allies to enhance our work across the 
region. For example, Secretary Mayorkas established the first-
ever Tribal Homeland Security Advisory Council last year to 
strengthen our partnerships with the Tribal Nations. Moreover, 
earlier this year, the Department began work to establish a new 
Center of Excellence for Homeland Security in the Arctic to 
leverage the intellectual power of the U.S. academic community.
    DHS continues to be a leader in developing and advancing 
the President's Arctic agenda, which, as we've heard, seeks to 
pursue an Arctic that is cooperative, stable, peaceful, and 
prosperous. The Department was a key contributor to the 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic 
region and continues to work to enact these goals. This plan, 
established last month, highlights the importance of homeland 
security priorities in the Arctic agenda.
    DHS has been a strong advocate for this holistic approach 
to Arctic security to highlight the need to safeguard Arctic 
communities from all hazards and to promote economic security. 
In this vein, I'm honored to echo President Biden and Secretary 
Mayorkas' announcement just this last Monday regarding the 
establishment of a DHS supply chain resilience center. The new 
center will enhance the Department's position to minimize 
disruptions from all hazards that threaten critical trade 
infrastructures and the supply of key goods and services to 
U.S. citizens in Alaska and across the country. Moving forward, 
DHS will continue to innovate and adapt to meet the evolving 
challenges that we see in the Arctic. We will continue building 
on our successes and partnership to advance Arctic homeland 
security.
    To that end, I'm also proud to announce the Department will 
release our 2024 DHS Arctic Action Plan early next year in line 
with the administration's goals for the Arctic. The plan will 
build on the implementation plan just released by announcing 
specific DHS milestones that the Department will use to achieve 
our evolving security goals in the region.
    So again, thank you to the committee and its Members for 
the interest in this very important effort and for the 
opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Brzozowski follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Christa Brzozowski
                           November 29, 2023
                              introduction
    Good morning, Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and the 
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity 
to testify today regarding the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS 
or the Department) role, responsibilities, and on-going efforts in the 
Arctic.
    Strategic competitors, allies, and like-minded partners 
increasingly prioritize the Arctic, contending for military, economic, 
and diplomatic advantages and influence in a region that is uniquely 
important due to its potential for resource development, waterway 
access, and global governance concerns. And yet, the Arctic is home to 
Indigenous Peoples and is a critical space for international 
collaboration, a region where the United States and our competitors 
could work together in scientific research and public safety efforts. 
As an Arctic nation, it is vital the United States protect and 
safeguard the Arctic for the benefit of all nations.
    At DHS, we view Arctic security as homeland security and we are 
dedicated to safeguarding this space against all threats, including 
those posed by nation-states. DHS personnel work diligently, every day 
in the Arctic, providing critical physical presence in this remote part 
of the world and U.S. homeland. We also leverage our partnerships with 
allies to exponentially expand the impact of our efforts. We have found 
that by working closely with key partners like Alaska Natives and State 
and local governments, we can do more together than we could accomplish 
alone. DHS will strategically use these partnerships and other tools as 
we face future threats from the great power competition playing out in 
the Arctic.
    As I will discuss in more depth, DHS relies on expertise from 
across its operational component agencies to safeguard the homeland. 
The Department--in concert with partners--plays a critical role to 
protect the Arctic from all hazards, ranging from environmental 
disasters to adversarial threats. Notably, the Department relies upon 
component agency expertise and experience in law enforcement, civilian 
defense and response, and region-specific technologies to advance 
Arctic security.
                      on-going administration work
    As a key leader in enacting U.S. policy throughout the Arctic, DHS 
has been a major contributor to developing the administration's Arctic 
agenda. The Department wholeheartedly supports the President's policy 
goals to pursue an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, 
and cooperative, as articulated in the National Security Strategy.
    In October of last year, the administration published the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region. This strategy establishes an 
affirmative U.S. agenda for the next decade. The Department's input was 
critical in shaping this strategy's perspective on security and in 
advocating for a holistic approach that includes homeland security 
concerns. The Department was also a key leader and contributor to the 
Implementation Plan, published last month, for this National Strategy. 
The Department ensured that the Implementation Plan integrated homeland 
security equities throughout the four pillars to advance U.S. security 
interests, mitigate climate change impacts and protect the environment, 
develop economic interests, and advance international cooperation and 
governance. Specifically, my team co-led, with the Department of 
Defense, the effort to develop the Implementation Plan's security 
pillar. Due in part to DHS leadership and contributions, the 
administration's National Strategy and Implementation Plan both 
prioritize U.S. physical presence in the region, promote sustainable 
economic development, protect the Arctic ecosystem, and safeguard 
Arctic communities from all hazards--especially those hazards posed by 
our competitors.
    The Department is a crucial leader in the administration's 
interagency work to guide and coordinate Federal Arctic policies. My 
office is a member of the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy's Arctic Executive Steering Committee, and we co-chair that 
committee's Bering Task Force, alongside the Department of the Interior 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. We work 
closely with our interagency partners to protect this area that is, 
first and foremost, critical to the livelihoods of coastal communities 
including many Tribes. In years to come, this area will continue to 
grow in geostrategic importance for the United States and other nations 
because of its abundant natural resources, shipping routes, fisheries, 
and other future development opportunities.
       accomplishments and commitments across the dhs enterprise
    DHS achieved several accomplishments in recent years and is deeply 
committed to our whole-of-DHS and whole-of-Government work. The 
Department's resources across the enterprise support multiple lines of 
effort, including: Tribal partnerships, law enforcement, civilian 
defense and preparedness, and innovation in Arctic technology. I would 
like to briefly describe our efforts and accomplishments for these 
commitments.
Tribal Partnerships
    Developing local partnerships and cultivating local security 
capacity are crucial to enhance regional security and resilience. When 
the Department partners with communities and local governments on the 
ground and across our waters, we help build local resilience and 
capacity to all hazards. Under the Biden administration, the Department 
has strengthened one of our most critical partnerships in the Arctic--
our relationship with Alaska Natives. On September 7, 2022, the 
Department established our first-ever Tribal Homeland Security Advisory 
Council that includes two representatives from Tribes from Alaska, 
among the 15 representatives of Tribes Nation-wide. Earlier this year, 
my office hosted our first-ever Tribal consultation sessions in-person 
in Alaska to understand the needs and concerns of Alaska Natives as we 
partner together in securing the region. DHS's component agencies also 
routinely host Tribal consultations, listening sessions, training 
events, and other forums to strengthen our partnerships with these 
important stakeholders.
    We are committed to expanding and deepening our relationships with 
Tribal leaders and Alaska Native communities and value the roles they 
play in our homeland security mission.
Law Enforcement
    As an Arctic sovereign nation, the United States' responsibilities 
are to protect our Arctic territory and interests throughout Alaska and 
ensure the rule of law across the region. The gravity of this role is 
of paramount importance to the Department. We are dedicated to 
protecting Alaska's 15 ports of entry; 33,904 miles of maritime border; 
1,538 miles of land border; and 665,400 square miles of land. The U.S. 
Coast Guard is the lead DHS agency for protecting Arctic waters and 
coasts. The Department leverages its full range of expertise and 
authorities to protect communities throughout Alaska, relying upon 
multiple components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), Homeland Security Investigations, and the Transportation 
Security Administration.
    Promoting lawful trade, travel, and economic security are key roles 
for the Department. Our employees enable safe travel through Alaskan 
land and maritime ports. The Ted Stevens International Airport in 
Anchorage is a key component of global trade. The airport is the 
world's fourth-largest for cargo throughput and second only to Memphis, 
Tennessee, in the United States. At this airport, DHS personnel work to 
protect Americans and our global trade partners against criminal and 
State-sponsored efforts to smuggle dangerous goods, such as illicit 
narcotics, and automatic weapon converters and silencers.
    The Department's law enforcement officers in Alaska act as a force 
multiplier in the region. Given the national security threats posed by 
the People's Republic of China and Russia to the Arctic region, these 
enforcement efforts also support our national security priorities. 
Department law enforcement personnel will often coordinate with State, 
local, and Tribal authorities to identify, assess, and minimize the 
risk posed by foreign adversaries. A notable example is the coordinated 
Department response when two Russian nationals fled their government's 
military reservist draft last year. These Russian nationals claimed 
political asylum in a remote Alaskan island in the Bering Sea. Because 
of the strong partnerships among Tribal, State, and local entities, CBP 
worked with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement to respond in an 
extremely remote area of Alaska.
Civilian Defense and Preparedness
    The Department's role in civilian defense and preparedness is 
unique, given the operational challenges of the Arctic. These 
challenges require proactive planning to enable communities to prepare, 
withstand, and recover from a range of potential hazards, both natural 
and man-made. In the coming years, planning will become even more 
critical as natural hazards are expanded by climate change and as 
regional competition from threat actors increasingly threaten our 
Arctic infrastructure. The Department engages with diverse partners, 
from local ports to academia, to identify and provide resources needed 
to enhance critical infrastructure security and resilience, and to 
identify and minimize damage from anticipated future events.
    Given the harsh conditions of the Arctic, enabling critical 
infrastructure security and resilience is a ``must'' for Alaskan 
communities. Across the U.S. Government, we are working to help local 
communities address threats to infrastructure from climate change. At 
DHS, we are focusing on partnering with Alaskan Tribes to improve the 
cybersecurity of local infrastructure. To help support our partners 
respond to a wide range of emerging cyber threats, the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) announced in September 2023 the $18.2-million 
Tribal Cybersecurity Grant Program. This program will distribute 
funding and a framework to leverage CISA's tools, expertise, and 
technical assistance to secure Tribal cyber networks and infrastructure 
against attacks.
    When disasters strike, the Department is ready to help communities 
in need. In the fall of 2022, the historic Typhoon Merbok hit 1,000 
miles of Alaskan coast, and DHS immediately took action. The U.S. Coast 
Guard coordinated the regional response with numerous Federal, Tribal, 
State, and local entities. Coast Guard teams deployed to remote 
villages to assess the damage to ports and fuel storage facilities and 
partnered with local residents and companies to remove oil debris and 
conduct clean-up operations. Following President Biden's Major Disaster 
Declaration, FEMA responded with more than $8 million in aid for 
Alaskans. DHS is vigilant and stands ready to help Americans in any 
crisis across the homeland.
Innovating for Arctic Technology
    Meeting the increasing and evolving challenges in the Arctic 
requires that the U.S. Government invest in and develop technologies 
for this unique environment. The Department's Science and Technology 
Directorate is creating a new Center of Excellence for Homeland 
Security in the Arctic to conduct research and develop new tools and 
technologies to enhance DHS situational awareness, improve communities' 
resilience, expand collaboration across the Arctic-homeland security 
mission space, and provide key training opportunities for the next 
generation of Arctic homeland security professionals. This investment 
in a 10-year partnership and up to $45 million in funding will enable 
us to harness the intellectual power of cutting-edge U.S. research and 
apply it to the complex issues facing the Department--specific to the 
Arctic.
                             dhs next steps
    Looking to the future, the Department will innovate and adapt to 
meet the evolving challenges throughout the Arctic. We will continue 
building on our successes and partnerships, expanding and augmenting 
our work to advance Arctic home security and implement our Nation's 
Arctic strategy. I am proud to announce that the Department plans to 
release our 2024 DHS Arctic Action Plan early next year, in line with 
the administration's goals for the Arctic. The Plan will include 
specific milestones for both DHS operational and headquarters 
components. The Plan will move the Department through concrete actions 
toward adapting and achieving our evolving homeland security 
priorities.
                               conclusion
    Thank you for your time and attention today as I have described, on 
behalf of the Department, our approach to advancing Arctic homeland 
security. The Department commits to continued focus and action to 
fulfill our homeland security mission through physical presence and 
strong local partnerships. By strengthening community resilience and 
preparedness throughout the region alongside key partners, we multiply 
the impact of our efforts. We will help protect the Arctic against all 
threats, including those posed by nation-state competitors, and meet 
the complex challenges our Nation faces in the region. I look forward 
to your questions.

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you for 
being here. I now recognize Ms. Kenney for 5 minutes for her 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF CHELSA KENNEY, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND 
          TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Kenney. Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and 
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be 
here today to discuss GAO's work on U.S. priorities and 
diplomacy in the Arctic. My testimony focuses on key factors 
that affect the advancement of U.S. Arctic priorities.
    Arctic-related issues have increasingly become global 
issues. In recent years, the effect of climate change, 
technological advancements, and economic opportunities have 
driven increasing interest and activity in the Arctic region. 
Escalation of great power competition between the United 
States, Russia, and China has also heightened tensions in the 
Arctic's geopolitical environment. Russia's full-scale invasion 
of Ukraine in February 2022 has further affected coordination 
among Arctic states and changed the security landscape, 
including seeing additional Arctic states join NATO.
    The United States has articulated its Arctic priorities 
through a series of strategies since the 1970's. The most 
recent strategy was published in October 2022, and serves as a 
framework for addressing emerging challenges and opportunities 
in the Arctic. The strategy identifies four pillars spanning 
domestic and international issues from security to 
international cooperation and governance. Over 40 Federal 
entities inform the strategy, which illustrates the breadth of 
Federal entities with Arctic roles and responsibilities.
    Our September 2023 report identified areas in which the 
Federal Government's management of U.S. priorities in the 
Arctic has been successful and what might limit future efforts. 
We spoke with Arctic experts and officials from Federal 
agencies, the State of Alaska, Alaska Native organizations, and 
other Arctic countries. Here's what we heard. First, what's 
working well? We heard White House-led coordination and Arctic 
Council engagement are providing important mechanisms for 
interagency coordination and global influence on Arctic issues. 
Notably, we heard that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee 
provides a mechanism for information sharing on interagency 
Arctic projects and strategy efforts. Further, other Arctic 
countries said the United States provides important expertise 
to the region on things like wildfire management, search and 
rescue, climate change, and sustainable development through its 
involvement in the Arctic Council.
    Second, what's not working as well? Stakeholders said 
Federal agencies weren't meaningfully coordinating with the 
State of Alaska or Alaska Natives. Specifically, we heard that 
coordination was often irregular and last-minute, and input was 
repeatedly provided and not addressed. Inconsistent Alaskan 
input is an even greater issue, given another concern we heard, 
the limited awareness among Americans about Arctic issues and 
related U.S. activities. Stakeholders suggested that an 
increasing understanding of Arctic issues and their importance 
to the overall U.S. goals would be important to successfully 
implement the new Arctic strategy. They also questioned the 
depth of Federal agencies' understanding of the region, given 
that some agencies cover broad geographic areas from offices 
located far outside of Alaska.
    Third, an area of opportunity. Stakeholders were supportive 
of the creation of the Arctic ambassador-at-large position in 
August 2022. They said it signaled the continued importance the 
U.S. places on Arctic issues and would provide a single voice 
for communicating about Arctic issues around the world. This 
position would be responsible for coordinating across the State 
Department and with the interagency and would be able to speak 
with foreign partners on security issues, which is particularly 
important since security issues are excluded from the scope of 
the Arctic Council.
    However, stakeholders also identified features they saw as 
critical to the ambassador position's success. These include 
developing a consistent position and formal office that would 
span administrations and provide greater institutional 
knowledge. They further suggested that ensuring the ambassador 
position had clear roles, concrete objectives, and the 
convening authority necessary to bring key parties together.
    In closing, the Arctic region is of immense geopolitical 
significance to the United States, its allies, and to its 
strategic adversaries. Advancing U.S. priorities will require 
strengthened leadership and coordination across the Federal 
Government and with other Arctic countries. State as the 
Federal lead for Arctic diplomacy will play a key role in 
managing heightened security tensions in the region. In 
developing the ambassador position, it will be important to 
ensure it has the features needed to effectively lead State's 
coordination on U.S. diplomacy in the Arctic. Chairman Green, 
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee. This 
concludes my statement, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Kenney follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Ms. Kenney. Members will be 
recognized in order of seniority for their 5 minutes of 
questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called 
after all Members have been recognized. I now recognize myself 
for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Admiral Gautier, you said, I think in your testimony you 
mentioned some of the port calls of the Healy: Iceland, and 
some of the other places. This question is really for both you 
and Ms. Brzozowski. In the context of the Arctic and the 
Antarctic, could you guys describe how soft power, how both the 
Coast Guard and DHS are involved in projecting the soft power 
of the country?
    Mr. Gautier. Mr. Chairman, soft power in the Arctic and 
elsewhere is absolutely critical to advance the international 
rules-based order that we all enjoy. When you look at what our 
adversaries are doing to directly undermine those very norms, 
it's through alliances, partnerships, and the use of soft power 
in the Arctic and around the world that helps in best way in 
order to counter that.
    So, for us, soft power includes things like the port calls 
that you explained. Whenever the Coast Guard cutter Healy gets 
under way in the Arctic, it's for science. It's for enforcing 
our own National interests and sovereign interests. It's also 
the soft power where we actually carry crew members from other 
countries on board. Then it's the port calls that we did in 
Tromso, Norway, and then Reykjavik, Iceland, and then 
elsewhere. It reinforces these relationships with the 
international community, with the values that we share, to 
directly counter the sorts of forces that are undermining those 
values.
    Chairman Green. Please.
    Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, thank you for the question. As I'm 
looking across the expertise of our various components outside 
of the Coast Guard, what comes to mind first is the very vital 
and necessary relationships with the Tribal communities as 
sort-of, in essence, of maintaining that soft power. Some of 
the recent activity in that work or in that area has been the 
establishment of, as I said in my statement, a Tribal Homeland 
Security Advisory Committee. That is indispensable in getting 
the perspective of the local community where we might not have 
as robust of a physical presence in the areas where they are. 
Two Alaskan Natives are part of that community or of that 
advisory committee and lend their particular expertise and 
perspective.
    I also think looking across to what our Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, or FEMA, does not only in the area post a 
disaster or helping to respond to something that has happened, 
but have a very robust presence with the allocation of grants 
and engagement with communities in a very proactive way to use 
their authorities, use their grants, and use their expertise to 
work with communities that may have been impacted by climate 
change, erosion, or their communities are needing to shift. So 
very robust grant programs in that area that can assist with 
the development of some of the soft power in the region.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. Thank you. Admiral Gautier, if I 
were to ask you what is your No. 1 most-needed thing that 
Congress can help with, what would it be?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, we need your continued support to 
build out our polar security cutters and rapidly accelerate us 
into the future where we can have greater capacity for 
icebreakers.
    Chairman Green. So, another cutter. Tell me, what is the, 
let's say 10 years from now, what is the total number needed 10 
years from now?
    Mr. Gautier. As a result of a Congressional requirement, 
the Coast Guard recently did an analysis and completed a report 
and submitted it to Congress on the fleet mix that we think we 
need, to answer your question. The answer that we have is 8 to 
9 icebreakers. That's a mix of heavy icebreakers like the Polar 
Star and the polar security cutters that we're building now and 
medium icebreakers like the Healy that have shallower draughts 
and can get into tighter spaces and shallower areas.
    Chairman Green. I have been fortunate enough in my 
Congressional delegation travel to be on a Norwegian icebreaker 
and to be on a Finnish icebreaker. They seem to be able to 
build those pretty inexpensively. What are your thoughts on 
leasing versus owning?
    Mr. Gautier. We've been considering leasing for actually a 
number of years and we are really, really challenged in order 
to do that for a couple of different reasons. The first is that 
an icebreaker, a security cutter, is essentially a U.S. 
sovereign warship. It's a military vessel. When we lease a 
vessel, we're really challenged to have the kinds of presence 
and authorities capabilities that we would like to have on a 
leased vessel.
    Chairman Green. That makes complete sense.
    Mr. Gautier. The other is that there's some rules for 
scoring that just on the budget that make it really 
impractical.
    Chairman Green. Well, thank you for sharing that. I now 
recognize the Ranking Member for his 5 minutes' questions.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Admiral, the 
Congressional Research Service has noted that commercial 
fishing, shipping, oil and gas development, and tourism in the 
Arctic is on the rise as the ice decreases. One of the things 
we see is in other parts of the world, China and Russia, kind-
of exploits certain opportunities. Do you see that as those 
areas as potential for exploitation on the part of Russia and 
China?
    Mr. Gautier. I do, Ranking Member, and that is because 
Russia and China have said so. If you read the Chinese Arctic 
strategy, they describe, as we have here, that an opening 
Arctic region provides opportunities for resource exploitation, 
minerals, oil, fishing that they are interested in. Russia 
views the Arctic as absolutely essential to its own vital 
interests for maritime trade. They've declared that just 
recently that they intend on operating shipping in the Northern 
Sea route year-round. So, we do expect that there will be 
increased activities from Russia and China in that area. We aim 
with the international community to ensure that that's in 
accordance with international rules and norms and lawful.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Ms. Kenney, you talked a little 
bit about the ambassador-at-large's job and the fact that it is 
at this point lacks confirmation. Do we have, to your 
knowledge, someone who is filling that role on a temporary 
basis, or how is it operating at this point?
    Ms. Kenney. Thank you for the question. The ambassador-at-
large position is, according to the State Department, something 
that would elevate the prior U.S. arctic coordinator position, 
which is currently vacant. But this vacancy, inconsistent 
staffing at this particular position, has been a problem for a 
long term. Before, the U.S. coordinator served for 2 years, but 
recently vacated this summer. Prior to that, there was a 
several-year lapse, and then there was a special representative 
that served in the same function.
    Basically, there has been different positions with 
different levels of seniority, different responsibilities 
within the State Department that have intermittently provided 
this kind of leadership. However, we heard again from 
stakeholders that it was really important that we were able to 
find consistent leadership for this particular role within the 
State and, of course, across the interagency and with our 
Arctic partners that had the right convening authority, the 
right line of effort, line of coordination to the Secretary of 
State, and a deep bench, really developing the institutional 
knowledge to be able to provide that kind of broad arctic 
leadership over a period of time.
    Mr. Thompson. So, I hate to butcher your name, but Ms. 
Brzozowski.
    Ms. Brzozowski. I have a feeling you're talking about me.
    Mr. Thompson. Yes.
    Ms. Brzozowski. You got it. You got it.
    Mr. Thompson. I got it?
    Ms. Brzozowski. You got it.
    Mr. Thompson. OK. I have that Mississippi challenge, too.
    Ms. Brzozowski. There's a----
    Mr. Thompson. Yes, right.
    Ms. Brzozowski. There's a silent ZO.
    Mr. Thompson. Well, based on what Ms. Kenney just said, is 
that pretty much your assessment of how things are working 
right now?
    Ms. Brzozowski. I really would have to defer to my 
Department of State colleagues, but I can say that the 
nomination of the new position is something DHS certainly 
supports. DHS, is--I'm sorry, and State Department's role in 
just providing that convening capability, the diplomatic role 
that is played by that position is absolutely indispensable.
    Mr. Thompson. Yes. Well, you talked a little bit about 
coordinating with people in that region. From your perspective, 
tell us a little bit about how that works.
    Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, absolutely. You know, as you look 
across the mission of DHS, you're seeing as you know, a wide 
scope of responsibilities. So, we have, I think, the most 
obvious presence in the region is going to be the U.S. Coast 
Guard. A very visible presence with, I believe, over 2,500 
individuals in that region. This is something where you see 
them in the maritime ports of entry, but also in the community. 
In addition, we have Customs and Border Protection and other 
types of law enforcement present. So, these are going to be 
entities and Transportation Security Administration entities 
that you're seeing at airports or at other ports of entry.
    Then, I guess, another sort-of very visible way of engaging 
with the communities and having these partnerships is through 
our Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA. 
These are the entities that are responsible for working with 
State, local, Tribal, territorial, as well as Federal 
stakeholders and Tribal communities to understand the 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures in the region. So, 
pipelines or cables of these maritime and other types of ports 
of entry. So, any kind of critical infrastructure and working 
with those communities that is really their bread and butter to 
understand the capabilities and to develop actions to 
strengthen the resiliency of those critical infrastructures and 
prepare for what mitigations and responses could be, should 
there be either a physical or cyber challenge.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you much. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Higgins [presiding]. The gentleman yields. I now 
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Admiral 
Gautier, I had the great honor of sitting next to the legendary 
Representative Don Young for 6 years in Congress. For some 
reason, Don liked me and took me under his wing, literally on 
my first day in Congress. I sat next to him for 6 years. He was 
my friend. Every year we had an opportunity, and any of you 
that knew Don Young, he was quite passionate about the State of 
Alaska and the significance of the Arctic region. Every year, 
during NDAA debates and appropriations discussions, we would 
talk about the need to grow and enhance and strengthen our 
response capabilities and patrol capabilities in the Arctic and 
the need for icebreakers.
    Don shared a wealth of knowledge with me that he had 
garnered over the course of over 4 decades of service in 
Congress. I came to understand that he was completely accurate 
with his assessment. We must have American-built and American-
owned, American-flagged and -piloted icebreaker vessels.
    Don also clarified that there is a place for leasing as 
well. That in the enhancement of our ability to respond, 
especially for the Coast Guard, but to include the Navy, there 
is a place for leasing, but we must have ownership. I have 
never quite had it explained with such clarity as you stated, 
Admiral, regarding the response capabilities and the authority 
of an actual Coast Guard-owned or U.S. Government-owned vessel 
and in international waters, what that means and signifies, 
should we face threat, which we face increasing threat from the 
Chinese and the Russian presence in the Arctic.
    To focus on the polar security cutters, if I may for a 
moment, Admiral, I would like to ask you, you are aware that 
the shipyards of America play a significant role with 
developing our fleets for the Coast Guard and the Navy. 
Bollinger Shipyard is a Louisiana-based shipyard. They work 
with the Coast Guard on many contracts, and they recently took 
over the PSC, the Polar Security Cutter contract. They took 
great risk assuming that contract, a massive amount of risk 
from Halter Marine in 2022. The contract was awarded in 2019 
and in my opinion, it has many challenges. Not only does the 
contract include production of a vessel that has not been built 
in 50 years, but inflation over the last 2 years has caused an 
incredible rise in production costs.
    So, how is the Coast Guard working with a United States 
shipbuilder like Bollinger to help them perform within the 
parameters of the reality of inflation to produce a much-needed 
icebreaking vessel, a polar security cutter? How is the Coast 
Guard working with the shipbuilder?
    Mr. Gautier. First Congressman, there's a lot of affection 
for Congressman Young in the United States Coast Guard. We 
would not be who we are in Alaska today without his enduring 
support. In terms of shipbuilding in Bollinger, very closely 
with Bollinger, we knew that we would have challenges with this 
particular acquisition. We haven't built a heavy icebreaker in 
the United States for 50 years. This is the most complex Coast 
Guard cutter that we will have ever built, and we knew there 
would be risks and challenges in the process.
    With Bollinger taking over or taking ownership of the 
shipyard, we're encouraged at the progress now and the 
acceleration that they're providing in that particular 
contract. I was just down there with some of our senior 
acquisition professionals in October to look at what's going 
on. They're making progress on the detailed design, and we hope 
and we believe that construction will be able to begin in 2024.
    Mr. Higgins. You have a high level of confidence that it 
would be able to move forward effectively without delay?
    Mr. Gautier. I don't want to in any way gloss over the 
really substantial challenges in this very unique vessel type, 
but we really do believe that we're building a ship and we're 
building a shipyard at same time.
    Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. Thank you, Admiral, for your 
response. You can look forward to a great cooperative effort 
with my office and this Congress. I now recognize my colleague, 
Mr. Correa, for questioning for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 
witnesses for being here today, your good testimony. Admiral 
Gautier, I just want to say over the years, I come to 
appreciate the good work the Coast Guard does. I don't think 
people realize that not only are you in the Arctic, you are in 
the Antarctic as well. You are as far out as North Korea 
enforcing the laws in that area when it comes to trade. You are 
in the Caribbean doing some anti-narco interdiction. You are 
all over the place.
    We talk today about the Arctic. We talk about the fact that 
we are trying to build another cutter icebreaker. In my 
opinion, we are never going to equal the assets Russia or China 
have or can produce. What are the multipliers out there we can 
rely on? Ms. Brzozowski, you talked about soft power. Let's 
think about playing not checkers, but chess here. The 
Antarctic, the Arctic, the Americas, we have two wars going on 
right now, possibly a third, and we have got to take care of 
the home base, the Americas. I think this is what really we are 
talking about here.
    I keep hearing the echoes here of we haven't invested 
enough to protect our Northern Border. We haven't done enough 
to protect the resources. Frankly, given every bet we got to 
cover around the world, it is going to be challenging to do all 
the above. But you know what? I think the American public 
expects us to do our job, and that is to make sure we protect 
Alaskan territory, American water rights, resources in that 
area, as well as all the way to Antarctica.
    General question to you, Admiral, what is the resource 
multiplier here? How do we get it done today, not tomorrow? And 
tomorrow as well?
    Mr. Gautier. Thank you for your kind remarks about the 
Coast Guard, Congressman. The Polar Star is en route from 
Hawaii to Sydney, Australia, for a quick port call before going 
into Antarctica. So, that's happening as we speak.
    So, you know, a lot of this is being driven by this number 
54, 55 Russian icebreakers. To put that in context, they're 
employing those icebreakers differently than we might think. 
Many of those icebreakers are local, and they are there just to 
break out their harbors, break ice in their harbors to manage 
their own maritime trade. We actually have a fleet of Coast 
Guard cutters, small Coast Guard cutters, in our Eastern and 
Great Lakes ports that do that very thing too.
    Mr. Correa. So, we can't compare apples to apples, so to 
speak, in general terms. But again, how do we make sure we are 
doing our job in terms of the resources, the multipliers? We 
have other assets they don't have. Please continue.
    Mr. Gautier. So, we don't need parity, sir, with Russians. 
We do need more. We do this by aggressively managing our risk 
portfolio. Eleven statutory missions in the Coast Guard, we 
operate globally. But the homeland is our most important place 
that we operate here, which is why we have a razor-sharp focus 
on our key missions that save lives, like search and rescue, 
like law enforcement, like boating safety. Keeping our maritime 
transportation system open is absolutely critical.
    That's why when we talk Arctic, there's a much broader 
portfolio of Coast Guard needs that we have in terms of 
building our offshore patrol cutters. We just launched the 
first offshore patrol cutter in Florida a couple of weeks ago, 
making sure that that acquisition moves forward smartly.
    But, Congressman, I'll share with you our major challenge 
and benefit here is people. The men and women of the Coast 
Guard are absolutely extraordinary.
    Mr. Correa. Yes, they are.
    Mr. Gautier. We are challenged with a historic recruiting 
problem that's similar to at the other services are happening.
    Mr. Correa. I am going to ask a written question. I am 
going to submit a written question to you on this area. Ms. 
Brzozowski, I am going to do the same, but I am going to ask it 
here, which is what are the soft power multipliers as we really 
look at the Americas here as kind-of not our, you know, not 
sovereign territory, but our backyard? How do we take care of 
this?
    Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, I mean, it really is a fantastic 
question. I'll answer briefly here and happy to respond for the 
record. But, you know, I think the best force multipliers are 
going to be to, yes, build on the presence that we have with 
both personnel and assets in the region, with partnerships. So, 
the partnerships I had mentioned before with the Tribal, but 
also with State, local, the array of actors.
    Then the second would be I really am hopeful that our new 
Supply Chain Resiliency Center is going to allow us in the 
Arctic but elsewhere, to just work smarter to identify supply 
chain challenges, risks, vulnerabilities that can get consumers 
and American citizens the goods that they want through supply 
chains that we trust, that align with our values, and that 
sort-of support our domestic industry. DHS has vast authorities 
in that regard. So that center is really going to be the hub 
for how we can take very much a closer look at the supply 
chains that feed every critical infrastructure and make sure 
that they're working efficiently and that they're promoting 
U.S. jobs and livelihoods.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields. The gentleman from 
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, is recognized for 5 minutes for 
questions.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms 
of the Arctic, I look at it as Russia and China maybe versus 
the United States and Canada. Can you tell us about our 
Canadian assets and our friends, what kind of assets they have 
in the Arctic?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, our Canadian friends are also in 
a major shipbuilding phase that's both the Canadian Coast 
Guard, which is a civilian force, and the Canadian Navy. They, 
through their shipyards, are building ice-capable sort-of 
frigate/corvette-sized vessels. One actually accompanied the 
Coast Guard Cutter Healy during circumnavigating North America 
last year. They are very much invested.
    But, Congressman, I'd also extend that effort to our 
partners in Scandinavia and in the other Arctic Council 
nations. We are all feeling the same pressure to keep the 
Arctic safe and secure, and they're all making investments with 
us.
    Mr. Gimenez. Are the investments made by our friends also, 
do you think that they are sufficient? Do they need to be 
stepped up? Obviously, our efforts need to be stepped up too. 
We have two icebreakers, and one you said is broken right now, 
not operating, or?
    Mr. Gautier. The Healy had had some steering issues. Those 
are fixed and it's on its way to the Panama Canal. So, we have 
two operational.
    Mr. Gimenez. How many do you think the United States is 
going to need in order to protect our interests in the Arctic 
region?
    Mr. Gautier. We're going to need 8 to 9, sir. A combination 
of polar security cutters, heavy, and then a medium icebreaker, 
in order to provide us persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic, 
off Alaska, on the Atlantic Arctic. Then that also includes a 
presence for Antarctica to recapitalize so we can continue to 
provide our presence and our missions down there.
    Mr. Gimenez. Are there plans to build these ships or this 
is a wish for?
    Mr. Gautier. We're planning on it, sir. We have asked in 
the fiscal year 2024 budget for money to advance polar security 
cutter No. 3. We're in the preacquisition phase for the medium 
cutters, the Arctic security cutter. But in the mean time, we 
know we need to field capability more quickly. So, in the 2024 
budget, we've asked for money to purchase a commercial 
icebreaker, which is a medium icebreaker. So, in the near-term 
we can have immediate presence and in the longer term, we can 
do the sorts of missions that we need to do in the Arctic.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, the Chinese have shown a willingness and 
a proclivity actually to operate large fishing fleets around 
the world. Are they starting to do the same up in the Arctic 
region where we should be?
    Mr. Gautier. Not yet, sir. There is an international 
agreement that prohibits fishing in the central Arctic region 
that's north of the Bering in international waters. But we know 
there's interest. Fish stocks are moving north and there have 
been some discussions within that body that governs that on 
doing some test fisheries to understand how that might be 
regulated. But China as well as other countries are going to be 
interested in fishing there when that's permitted.
    Mr. Gimenez. Oil exploration, are there any treaties that 
govern oil exploration in the Arctic region?
    Mr. Gautier. I think there's some mention. So, there is no 
treaty that governs the overall Arctic region other than 
UNCLOS, the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea. It is a 
basin ocean, essentially. I think there is some mention of oil 
exploration in UNCLOS. I don't know that off the top of my 
head, though.
    Mr. Gimenez. Because that would concern me. That would be a 
place where Russia obviously is a big oil, but any country can 
go into the Arctic and just plop down a rig and start drilling 
if they want?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, there are already lines that are 
drawn under the U.N. Convention for extended continental 
shelves for that sort of resource exploitation. There's some 
disagreements in those and there's some friction there. But I 
think if there were oil exploration production, it would be 
done on already-sanctioned international outer continental 
shelf that are related to nation-states, if that makes sense.
    Mr. Gimenez. Who are those nation-states?
    Mr. Gautier. The United States, through--all the Arctic 
states, sir. Russia, Canada, the United States through our 
extended continental shelf.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. I yield my time.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Yesterday, I had the 
pleasure of hosting a field hearing in my home State of 
Louisiana. I would like to personally thank the Chairman of the 
subcommittee, Mr. D'Esposito, and Ranking Member Thompson, for 
joining me in Louisiana for what proved to be a very successful 
field hearing. Climate change is being felt world-wide with 
several and severe natural disasters like hurricanes, droughts, 
and wildfires. Admiral Gautier is the part of the world where I 
am from.
    Mr. Gautier. I was a captain in the Port of New Orleans. 
Gautier sounds great to me.
    Mr. Carter. Gautier sounds good, fantastic. How does the 
Coast Guard actively incorporate climate change considerations 
into its operational strategies? What specific measures or 
initiatives are in place to address the anticipated impacts on 
maritime and coastal security, sir?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, recognizing that climate change 
was just going to change the way the Coast Guard had to do 
business, we drew up a strategic plan for that that covers 
three different efforts. The first is we need to be able to 
respond to more and more frequent natural disasters. Typhoon 
Merbok. A typhoon hit Alaska last year, right, in southwest 
Alaska, and did quite a bit of damage there. We need to be 
prepared for that at greater capacity.
    The other is that we need to build more resilience into the 
United States Coast Guard in terms of our shore infrastructure, 
our piers, our facilities ashore. We have plans to do that. The 
third one is that we're a regulator, and actually we lead the 
delegation to the International Maritime Organization that 
negotiated in the international community carbon caps on 
international shipping by 2050. So, as a result of that, 
through U.S. efforts with the Coast Guard delegation, we 
negotiated that by 2050, international shipping needs to be 
zero carbon.
    Mr. Carter. Excellent. How is the Coast Guard collaborating 
with other agencies to adapt to the changing climate and ensure 
effective responses? One of the things that we talked about in 
New Orleans yesterday was making sure that these interagencies 
were working together and not duplicating efforts and making 
sure that we're complementing each other in our effort to 
counteract climate change and bring the greatest results.
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, through a lot of different ways. You 
know, in terms of what our goals are going to be 
internationally, we work through the State Department as their 
lead in those efforts. Here domestically, I mean, we look at 
FEMA as being the preeminent Federal organization in terms of 
building National resilience, and so we follow, you know, we 
take the FEMA recommendations when we're building our own, our 
new facilities and so on.
    National Weather Service and NOAA is absolutely critical in 
their advancing in the science and forecasting and helping us 
understand what storms in the future and what Coast Guard 
impacts might be.
    Mr. Carter. Not on this matter of climate change, but I do 
want to give a particular shout-out to the Coast Guard and the 
Corps of Engineers for working with my office in Louisiana. As 
you may or may not be aware, there was a tragic accident a year 
or so ago where several children found themselves finding an 
attractive nuisance to cool themselves off in the river. The 
report was recently completed, and we will be working on 
remedial measures to protect young people or anyone from the 
allures of the Mississippi River and the danger that it poses. 
So, I just want to say thank you to you guys for being very 
diligent and moving forward on that.
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Carter. Ms. Kenney, how does these agencies coordinate 
to make sure that you leverage each other's work and not 
duplicate efforts?
    Ms. Kenney. Thank you for the question. So, there are a 
number of domestic- and internationally-focused coordination 
efforts that exist across the Government. It's really important 
because for the development of the National strategy, we saw 
over 40 Federal entities actually contributed to that. So, 
there really is a whole Government approach. There really is 
every agency is really an Arctic agency when you think about 
the support that they're providing to Alaska.
    So, we found a couple of things, you know, we heard 
positive feedback from the Arctic Executive Steering Committee 
and their role in coordinating the domestic agencies and 
interagency projects and their development of the strategy. We 
again heard positive feedback about the U.S. participation in 
the Arctic Council in terms of working with our other Arctic 
states.
    Mr. Carter. Fantastic. In 20 seconds, I need each of you, 
if you can, just tell us you are here with us now, we are very 
grateful for your presentations. Tell us, what can we do as a 
committee to improve interagency coordination with the Arctic? 
Is there some silver bullet, if you will, that sitting before 
this committee, if there is something we can do to assist each 
of you more, what might that be? A second each.
    Ms. Kenney. One thing we pointed out was continuing to 
monitor the implementation of the National strategy. There are 
some long-term investments that will need to be made and some 
agencies that will need to work together to be able to make 
those kinds of investments. It's important that we're 
monitoring the implementation, ensuring those agencies have the 
resources.
    Ms. Brzozowski. I would have to say the moving forward with 
the ambassador-at-large position. It's not a DHS direct DHS 
equity, but certainly one that I think my colleagues at the 
Department of State would appreciate.
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, not just support for building 
ships, but it's also supporting our incredible people and the 
shore infrastructure that we need to operate those ships.
    Mr. Carter. Very good. Thank you. I yield back, sir.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Pfluger, the gentleman from Texas, for his 5 minutes' 
questions.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing, and 
I thank the witnesses for your service and for being here. I 
will start with the topic on China and just really kind-of 
digging in. I mean, I think it has probably already been 
discussed to some degree, but their presence in the Arctic 
poses obviously a threat and their ambitions throughout the 
world and especially in that region. Just in August of this 
year, 11 Chinese and Russian military vessels were identified 
in the region. In 2022, 3 PLAN ships were found sailing with 4 
Russian vessels. So, this partnership, this alliance, whatever 
you want to call it, is obviously concerning back to 2021. The 
warships, the Chinese warships that were in the U.S. economic 
zones, exclusive economic zones, another example of that.
    So, I will start with Assistant Secretary Brzozowski, 
looking at Xi Jinping and him expressing ambitions to make 
China a polar great power by 2030. Much like space, I kind-of 
look at this domain as a little bit of a new frontier in the 
Arctic, at least. From what DHS can see, at what pace is the 
PRC increasing its military profile in the Arctic?
    Ms. Brzozowski. This is an urgent question and one that 
we're very much focused on at the strategic level at DHS, where 
I am at the Office of Policy. So, we'll bring our full set of 
authorities and resources and expertise of various components 
to bear against this. But I think it's maybe important to 
mention something that hasn't been discussed during this 
hearing yet, and that's the role that we see our authorities 
under Team Telecom as well as the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States. So those authorities and those 
interagency structures that allow us to have a National 
security review of foreign, be it a license application for a 
telecommunication system or telecommunication supply chain, or 
to potentially have an acquisition that could result in a 
proximity of a malicious agent to a military base, or an 
insertion of a particular type of malware into a critical 
component that could then be put into a control system for a 
water treatment plant. So, those are authorities that I think 
are very unique and ones that we exercise with a great amount 
of diligence.
    Mr. Pfluger. If I may just kind-of looking at the pace that 
the PRC has increased their military profile, any response on 
that in the Arctic?
    Ms. Brzozowski. I don't know that I'd comment on sort-of 
the pace of whether we've seen that increase or decrease 
specific to the Arctic, but I think it would be fair to say 
that the pace across the country has increased. So, I would 
imagine that it's the same pace in the Arctic.
    Mr. Pfluger. Admiral Gautier.
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, the PRC military has expanded its 
capability at an absolutely extraordinary rate. So, in the 
surface action groups that you mentioned, this is now a 
routine. This is the third time where we've seen these combined 
China-Russia surface action groups that have patrolled through 
the U.S. EEZ, in the Aleutians. We have not seen Chinese 
military vessels north of the Bering, although they do have two 
icebreakers, civilian as, you know, state-owned icebreakers, 
Xue Long 1 and Xue Long 2 that operate both in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. We know that those plans are going to be expanded. 
They articulate sort-of common values in their operations in 
the Arctic. We know that elsewhere they do not necessarily 
follow those.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you for that. I will quickly go to some 
of the coordination between the Coast Guard and other services, 
including the Air Force and maybe the prioritization, the 
domain awareness, the issues that can you in the last 50 
seconds kind-of speak to the collaboration with other services 
and anything that you may need to continue that cooperation.
    Mr. Gautier. So, Congressman, the response to these sorts 
of threats are meeting presence with presence to make sure that 
these engagements are lawful. We absolutely have a very tight 
relationship with the Department of Defense, the United States 
Navy, in particular. Our District 17 headquarters out of 
Juneau, Alaska, is very tightly integrated with Alaska Command, 
the three-star command under US NORTHCOM. When the Navy 
responded to the Surface Action Group this summer, there was a 
Coast Guard cutter nearby, and that had all been scripted very 
carefully through the joint DoD Coast Guard relationships that 
we have.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you for the service. I will briefly say, 
in my district there are some joint programs that are run under 
DHS, but with Coast Guard involvement. Recently, just a couple 
of days ago, using a MQ-9 drone, they were able to rescue 4 
folks in a vessel in the Gulf of Mexico using that joint 
mentality. So, quite admirable on that. I know that is an 
everyday occurrence because you guys are doing that around the 
world. But thank you for that, and I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Thanedar for his 5 minutes of questions, the gentleman from 
Michigan.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Green, and thank you, 
Ranking Member Thompson, for holding this hearing. I thank all 
the witnesses here for your testimony. I certainly appreciate 
the hard work of the men and women of Coast Guard in keeping us 
safe.
    I know and understand the need for the icebreakers. My 
question to you, Admiral Gautier, as you wait for these 
icebreakers, what are you doing to prepare the Coast Guard in 
terms of infrastructure on the shore, aircrafts, personnel so 
we will be effective as these icebreakers are acquired?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, Congressman, we do talk a lot about 
ships, but there's a whole heck of a lot of other things that 
the Coast Guard is doing in Alaska with Congress's enduring 
support there. We've recently converted our fleet of fixed-wing 
aircraft from C-130 Hs to Js. Much more capable, much longer 
range.
    We're building housing in Kodiak to support and piers in 
Kodiak in advance of homeporting 2 offshore patrol cutters that 
are being built in Florida, homeported in Kodiak. We're home 
porting 6 fast response cutters. We've gotten 3 there now. 
We're going to home port 3 154-foot-long corvettes in Alaska. 
We're building out the shore infrastructure in Seward and Sitka 
and Kodiak and Ketchikan in order to homeport those there. So, 
we're doing a lot. But it is really contingent on the focus of 
Congress and the enduring support because it will continue to 
cost a lot of money in order to do this.
    Mr. Thanedar. Talking about cost, what does a good-sized 
commercial icebreaker cost?
    Mr. Gautier. We've requested $150 million in fiscal year 
2024 budget to build a U.S.-, to buy a U.S.-built commercial 
icebreaker.
    Mr. Thanedar. OK. Going back to my days as running 
businesses, I know there was a talk about leasing as opposed to 
buying. This is something of an on-going need the Coast Guard 
would have to have these icebreakers. Why would you even 
consider leasing them as opposed to owning them and having full 
control over such operation?
    Mr. Gautier. We had examined leasing because there was 
Congressional interest in us leasing. I think two lessons came 
out of that. It's really that again, these are naval vessels. 
They're warships. They need to operate with the full 
sovereignty of the United States of America, which leads us 
toward purchasing. Then there's some rules in terms of leasing 
that require us to front the money for the entire of that lease 
that makes it really impractical.
    Mr. Thanedar. Yes, I agree. I totally agree. What other 
needs besides the icebreakers? What other things Coast Guard 
needs to continue its operate?
    Mr. Gautier. Sir, we intend on homeporting the 4 polar 
security cutters in Seattle, Washington. We've begun a multi-
phased effort in order to dredge, deepen, renew the piers, 
build the shore infrastructure that we need to do there. We 
have asked for money in the fiscal year 2024 budget in order to 
complete the Phase 1 and begin the Phase 2 part of that. So, 
the shore infrastructure actually is just as critical as the 
icebreakers themselves.
    Mr. Thanedar. OK. Last, I keep worrying about concern about 
the morale of the Coast Guard, our ability to retain and 
attract Coast Guard workers, men and women who work so hard 
under some of the toughest work conditions. What is being done 
to ensure that we compensate them well, they have in terms of 
whether it is compensation, money, mental health services, 
other issues? What has been done there?
    Mr. Gautier. Well, thanks for recognizing the great people 
in the United States Coast Guard and for voicing your support 
for that. We are in a full-scale recruiting effort here in 
order to close an almost 10 percent gap in our enlisted work 
force. We've asked money from Congress in the fiscal year 2024 
budget in order to support recruiting, in order to support the 
kind of monetary awards and incentives that we need in order to 
retain people, especially in critical rates, like in the cyber 
rating and other ratings like that. But as you allude to, we 
really need to provide top-notch medical care, and that 
includes mental health for these individuals, child care 
centers, and the kind of workplaces and tools that they need to 
do that. We've presented all of this to Congress in the 2024 
budget, and we'd really appreciate helping that matter.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back,
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Gonzales, the gentleman from Texas, for his 5 minutes' 
questioning.
    Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for all the 
witnesses for being here today. I think it is a very important 
hearing that we don't talk enough about. I actually recently 
got back from Antarctica, and one of the things that I saw 
there, and I would like to tie it into the Arctic region, is I 
visited McMurdo Station and there is a very kind-of a, single 
entry point. There was a Chinese base that essentially every 
aircraft is going to have to fly near. That just highlights the 
fact of the growing Chinese presence throughout the globe, 
Antarctica, certainly.
    But the question I have is for the admiral, is there are 
serious concerns with a growing Chinese presence in the 
Antarctic region capable of monitoring air traffic and 
collecting intelligence. Admiral, are we facing similar 
concerns in the Arctic region?
    Mr. Gautier. I think we're keeping a laser-sharp focus on 
those potential developments in the Arctic region. Not in North 
America, right? Not in the Canadian Arctic, the U.S. Arctic, or 
the Danish Greenland Arctic. But certainly, I think we can 
expect that kind of growing influence as Russia and China have 
operated a lot more closely together.
    Mr. Gonzales. I would like to build off of that. Maybe not 
necessarily the permanent infrastructure, but can you talk to a 
little bit about maybe joint exercises or things that kind-of 
show a force that China or Russia in particular, have done, 
whether it is in the Arctic region, or to highlight their 
ability to fight in an Arctic environment?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, certainly. I think in this environment 
that we're in, where Chairman Xi and Putin have expressed an 
unlimited relationship, right? We are seeing growth in how 
Russian and Chinese militaries are operating together. The 
latest example of this is the flotilla of vessels, the surface 
action group of 11 or so vessels that transited through the 
Aleutian in the U.S. exclusive economic zone. We are now seeing 
that every summer.
    Mr. Gonzales. Excellent. Thank you. My next question also 
for you admiral. The Port of Nome in Alaska recently announced 
its plan for an extensive expansion that would make the port 
the United States' first deepwater Arctic port. While the 
project is being undertaken through a combination of Federal, 
State, local, and private funds, the port has already 
publicized that it will be capable of docking military vessels. 
Does the Coast Guard have a plan to utilize this port for 
operations in the Arctic?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes. Well, as the Army Corps of Engineers did 
the feasibility study, we worked very closely with them to 
provide them things like what the drafts of our icebreakers 
would be and advise them as they completed that study. I think 
as this construction moves out, the Coast Guard absolutely 
values additional infrastructure and the high latitudes that we 
can use. I think in this case, we would absolutely use the Port 
of Nome for refueling stops, doing personnel exchanges, as a 
logistics supply base, and those sorts of things.
    Mr. Gonzales. As we get closer to this being built out and 
completed, I know this committee would certainly be welcome to 
hear any thoughts as far as what resources, whether the Coast 
Guard needs directly or indirectly, in order to be able to 
access that port for all the tools that you need. My next 
question is, does the Coast Guard anticipate needing additional 
deepwater ports in the Arctic region?
    Mr. Gautier. Our intent is to operate the Polar Security 
Cutter fleet out of a home port in Seattle, Washington. We do 
have plans if we do get this commercially-available icebreaker 
for home porting somewhere in Alaska. We view this 
infrastructure as really helping with logistics, right? Not 
home porting, not basing. So, if additional port locations were 
developed, the Coast Guard would certainly use those for our 
operations.
    Mr. Gonzales. I think that is spot-on. Going back to my 
trip that I recently took to Antarctica, the takeaway for me 
was the logistics, the supply chain logistics that are just 
needed. I think the Coast Guard is going to play a critical 
role in that. Once again, whether it is permanent or whether it 
is temporarily helping out this Arctic region, please keep us 
informed on what we can do to make sure that all the 
infrastructure is there, but also the Coast Guard has the 
resources it needs.
    We have talked about icebreakers and some of these things 
for years and years. It seems like we have finally got that 
moved in the right direction. But please keep us posted on what 
other tools you need to be successful.
    Mr. Gautier. Certainly.
    Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for his 5 minutes' 
questions.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for calling this very important hearing. Thank you to our 
witnesses for being here. I believe this area of interest is 
becoming more and more important as we are seeing geopolitical 
issues pop up with the connections between Russia, China, and 
Iran. I want to talk a little bit about the importance of the 
Arctic region in connection to those threats that we are seeing 
more and more of.
    Russia is only 55 miles away from Alaska in the Arctic, and 
we obviously are seeing a tyrant, anti-democratic tyrant, 
Vladimir Putin invade Ukraine. If he is successful in defeating 
a democracy, certainly our understanding in Congress from the 
experts in the administration, is that this will just be the 
first step. So, there is a real National security risk as it 
relates to Alaska. Now that China is also getting involved in 
the Arctic, there are even more threats.
    I think it is not something that has gotten enough 
attention. I guess, Admiral, from your perspective in the Coast 
Guard, what are the additional threats that you are concerned 
about and what additional resources or authorities would be 
helpful to combating those threats?
    Mr. Gautier. So, certainly they are the geostrategic 
threats from Russia and China that you've talked about. We talk 
about climate change as being an incredibly substantial threat. 
Regardless of where people view that, it is certainly opening 
up the waters in the Arctic to more human activity. So, we're 
seeing things like cruise ships, expeditionary cruise ships 
with under a couple of hundred passengers that are routinely 
operating, going all the way up to the North Pole. We're seeing 
more traffic, vessel traffic through the Northern Sea route as 
Russia exploits their mineral resources, liquefied natural gas, 
and that sort of thing. So, with more ships, that means more 
the threat of potential accidents and incidents, even oil 
spills there. The Coast Guard is working with our partners to 
be prepared for those sort of eventualities.
    Mr. Goldman. Have you had discussions with administration 
partners that you can reveal in an unclassified setting about 
the increasing concerns related to Russia's aggression in 
Ukraine and how that might have an impact on the Arctic?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, sir, we are absolutely joined. We're a 
member of the intelligence community, so we get the same 
intelligence everybody else does. We are joined at the hip at 
the Department of Defense and the component services and 
interoperable as a military service with their operations. 
Absolutely, we're communicating.
    Mr. Goldman. What resources or what actions do you think 
would be helpful for Congress to take to support your work in 
the Arctic in both ensuring our national security and also 
making sure that we are taking full advantage of the region?
    Mr. Gautier. We ask for Congress's enduring support in our 
recapitalization, in our shipbuilding, and the shore 
infrastructure that we need in order to have the kind of 
presence to provide that strategic deterrence in those 
locations. So, we know we need to build 8 to 9 polar security 
and medium icebreakers. We know that we need to build out 
Seattle as a home port. We need to purchase a commercially-
available icebreaker, and that's in the fiscal year 2024 budget 
so we can get after this problem set soon.
    You know, as a great Nation, we really need to be able to 
respond at the time and place of our desire, and the Coast 
Guard needs to advance and grow our assets in order to achieve 
that.
    Mr. Goldman. My last topic that I want to address, and I 
don't know if Ms. Brzozowski is the best person to answer this, 
but the Arctic Council was created 25 years ago and has paused 
because of Russia's invasion in Ukraine. I am wondering if you 
could give an update on what the status of the council is and 
whether it is resuming its work without Russia.
    Mr. Gautier. Is it OK if I take that question----
    Mr. Goldman. Yes.
    Mr. Gautier [continuing]. Congressman? So, I say this 
because the Coast Guard supports some of the working groups 
under the Arctic Council, with the State Department leading. 
So, the Arctic Council resumed its convenings and its 
discussions after the chair--Russia had been the chair during 
the invasion--after they stepped down, and Norway took over in 
May. Those discussions in the Arctic Council, absent Russia, 
have continued. Russia has been permitted by the Arctic Council 
to participate below the principal level and only in writing, 
not in meeting attendance.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. Excellent question. I 
now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Ezell.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it has 
been a great conversation today about the Arctic region and the 
Coast Guard strategy to secure the area. We know that the 
Russians and the Chinese are bad actors, and what is going on 
up there is a great concern of ours. To combat this, we must 
roll out the next generation of polar security cutters as soon 
as possible. And I am proud that the most advanced ice breakers 
in the world are being built in South Mississippi.
    Ultimately, these vessels that my constituents are 
constructing will help secure the Arctic region. Admiral 
Gautier, as we say in South Mississippi, the initial contract 
for the polar security cutter program was awarded to VT Halter 
in November 2022. VT Halter Shipyard was acquired by Bollinger, 
and they continued the work on the program.
    Vice Admiral, thank you for visiting there recently. I 
really appreciate you going by my district. Can you tell us a 
little bit about the confidence that you may have in our 
shipyard program down there?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, to start out, we knew that there 
were going to be challenges with this acquisition, given the 
novelty and the complexity of this particular ship. Having just 
been down there, though, with some of our chief--I am not an 
acquisition guy, but we had our chief acquisition folks there. 
I think they're encouraged at the actions that the shipyard has 
taken to accelerate the time line and to move forward on some 
of the key things. So, it's stuff like we really need to have a 
detailed design complete before they can begin construction in 
total. They've made a lot of progress since the shipyard turned 
ownership over.
    In order to accelerate the construction of the vessel, the 
Coast Guard has authorized the construction of some test hull 
sections, and that gives the shipyard some build proficiency 
and build some lessons in how they can build the rest of the 
ship. They built one of those, and they're building the second, 
and I think that's going well. We do have some hurdles. I don't 
want to paint an overly rosy picture. The shipyard has 
indicated issues in the contract in terms of the time delivery, 
which is currently 2025, and the cost, and we're in 
negotiations with them to understand what the courses of action 
forward might be.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good. I understand that the previous 
shipyard was owned by a foreign, was a foreign company which 
owned it, which required some additional oversight in the 
operations. Are you finding it easier to deal with this 
shipyard that is owned by the Americans----
    Mr. Gautier. Well, I----
    Mr. Ezell [continuing]. Versus a foreign company?
    Mr. Gautier. My acquisition colleagues would warn me to be 
very professional because there are rigid rules under the 
Federal acquisition regulations. We treat everybody the same 
and have, you know, have that requisite oversight. That being 
said, we have a long-term relationship with Bollinger. They are 
building our fast-response cutters. They have built almost 
every modern class of patrol boat that we have in the 
inventory, and those are high-quality, well-performing ships.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much. The Coast Guard testified 
earlier this year that its mission in the polar regions will 
require 8 to 9 polar icebreakers, which we have had some 
discussion about this morning already. This is an increase. 
Given the new estimate, could you clarify how this breakdowns 
in terms of class, such as the heavy or medium icebreakers?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, so we're doing further analysis to 
understand just where that breakpoint might be. But I think 
we're thinking 4 to 5 heavies, 4 to 5 mediums, and you know, 
it's going to swing one way or the other, depending on what our 
concept of employment, concept of operation looks like. The 
importance of the mediums is that they get access places where 
the heavies can't go, and we really expect those to be less 
expensive, so it'll be a better deal for the taxpayer.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good. Given the current absence of the 
capable polar cutters, to what extent are the National security 
cutters or the fast response cutters able to operate in the 
polar regions?
    Mr. Gautier. Less so the fast response. Well, I say the 
polar regions, we are homeporting 6 fast response cutters in 
Alaska. Those will operate in the Gulf of Alaska and southeast 
Alaska predominantly. But when we're talking north of Nome, 
north of the Bering Strait, those won't be operating there. 
Although, but the National security cutters, we have actually 
brought through the bearing and operated in the Chukchi Sea. We 
did that on occasion once so we could accompany the Chinese 
icebreaker Xuelong in there to provide presence along the 
maritime boundary line. In the summer months when there's no 
ice, we can operate up there.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Vice Admiral. Thank you all for being 
here today. It has been a great discussion, and we will 
continue to do everything we can to support the Coast Guard and 
your mission. So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Garcia from California for his 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate this 
important hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses. We know 
that our Nation and our National interests face many threats 
and challenges, whether it is from competitors like Russia and 
China, climate change, or changing economic trade, all of which 
have been talked about today in this hearing. We know that in 
the Arctic, all these factors and challenges come together in 
unique ways. President Biden, of course, has adopted a National 
strategy for the Arctic region and establishing an ambassador 
at large for the Arctic as well. All very positive steps and 
moves forward.
    Now, our Coast Guard is critical in our operations and 
presence in the region, and so I look forward to our committee 
working together in a bipartisan way to support their mission. 
I will also add that I served 8 years as mayor of Long Beach 
and the Coast Guard was just a critical piece and partner to us 
in every way at our ports and security, even as an economic 
driver in our city. So, we are very grateful to our Coast Guard 
and our partnerships back home in Long Beach and in California.
    Now, we know that we are quickly falling behind both Russia 
and China who are really trying to dominate the region and 
often in collaboration with each other. As Russia modernizes 
upwards of 50 bases along the Arctic, it continues to build its 
fleet, of course, as we know. The Coast Guard, of course, is 
operating at a reduced level in comparison to clearly these 
what I believe are aggressors in the region. We know that new 
vessels are under construction, but behind schedule and already 
over budget. This is concerning to all of us, but we know it is 
not enough also just to count hulls. Every vessel needs 
complicated infrastructure and trained personnel to support 
deployments.
    Admiral, I just want to just first to you, from various 
reporting, it seems that not only are Russia and China both 
investing heavily to control the region, but their partnership 
and collaboration continues to increase. So, what are we doing 
to try to increase our presence and really focusing on this 
collaboration? Because I think it is a collaboration that is 
especially concerning.
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, you said two keywords Congressman, that's 
presence and collaboration. So, we've been talking about 
fielding more capabilities to provide in that persistent 
presence that we need in order to counter any kind of malicious 
behaviors in that particular region. Our plans in expanding our 
fleet, our plans hopefully to get a medium icebreaker purchased 
here in the 2024 budget are part of that.
    But really key here are the partnerships of like-minded 
nations through the Arctic Council, through the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum, the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum Atlantic. You 
can tell we have a number of venues in the United States Coast 
Guard and both on the policy side and operationally that really 
strengthens the resolve and the relationships between these 
countries against the kind of malicious behaviors that we might 
encounter.
    Mr. Garcia. Can you also just walk us through more broadly 
what the United States stands to lose from like a National 
security perspective if Russia and China consolidate and 
essentially try to box us out of the Arctic?
    Mr. Gautier. Well, a lot. I mean, it's really challenging 
to contemplate. I mean, we are talking Alaska here. We're 
talking Arctic. Our United States is an Arctic state. So, to 
kind-of be boxed out of our own neighborhood is really a scary 
thing to be thinking about. In the broader Arctic, you know, 
similarly, the Arctic historically has just been inaccessible. 
Now that it's becoming more accessible, we absolutely need to 
make sure that it's free, open, peaceful, and, you know, 
benefits everyone.
    Mr. Garcia. Finally, Admiral so again, as former mayor, the 
Long Beach and Los Angeles ports are the largest container 
seaports in the United States, critical ports to the rest of 
the country. There are also ports in the Arctic. So, we know 
that the encroachment is happening, of course, all across the 
Arctic, but especially also nearing ports in the Arctic. So, 
what are the impacts or concerns we have related around ports 
and our interests around trade and having these ports 
operational as far as we see them from both a National security 
perspective and economic perspective?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, thanks. I know that the California port 
complexes well as the operational commander over all Coast 
Guard operations in California. So, port security and assuring 
the maritime transportation system for the Coast Guard, other 
than search and rescue, is absolutely preeminent for us. So, 
when we look at U.S. infrastructure in the area, certainly the 
Port of Anchorage is the preeminent port there. The Coast Guard 
has a sector, western Alaska, headquartered out of there. That 
is their No. 1 job, to preserve that as sort-of the entree into 
the remainder of the State by road or by other means.
    But when we talk about other port infrastructure, it's just 
notable how much investment that Russia is doing along their 
Arctic coast. They've announced their intent, the Northern Sea 
route, the waterway there that brings goods and services 
through the Bering Straits from Russia, they've announced their 
intent to have that operational now year-round. They are going 
to employ icebreakers to help do that. But that tells you what 
the importance is to their economic and national security on 
the Arctic.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito, for his 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good 
morning, everyone. In addition to serving on the House Homeland 
Security Committee, I also have the honor of serving on 
Transportation and Infrastructure. Acting Assistant Secretary 
Brzozowski, Homeland Security plays a vital role in securing 
the transportation sector in the United States of America. This 
includes airports, marine ports, maritime ports, those that 
facilitate the flow of goods and people across this world, as 
well as oil, gas pipelines, and freight rail networks. Can you 
describe the posture of DHS equities in protecting the 
infrastructure that supports life in the American Arctic?
    Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you so much for your question. I was 
chomping at the bit almost to jump in on the last question, 
because that infrastructure, beyond sort-of the very visible 
port infrastructure that we see in sort-of big maritime 
facilities is just so vital. Even just in Alaska, we are 
looking at, of course, big infrastructure and maritime ports 
like the Port of Alaska, but also airports that are also a very 
visible presence. Then the things that you may not see but are 
indispensable to the transportation, but also other types of 
energy and networks in Alaska and basically to the rest of the 
United States. Things like undersea cables, where you see 98 
percent of the world's internet and other types of 
communications are not in that region, but sort-of in those 
undersea cables where you see them running through that region. 
Also, things like the Arctic Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which is an 
800 miles network that provides fuel, gas, other types of 
energy resources, not only to the region, but to the 
continental United States.
    So, our posture in the region is going to be sort-of 
spanning the totality of the DHS mission set. Maybe I'll group 
it best into the authorities that we have for preparing and 
engaging with stakeholders. These are where we have our 
transportation security officials working with State and local 
on putting in place regulatory and non-regulatory regimes for 
security all the way down to the physical presence and the law 
enforcement that you see through Coast Guard and Customs and 
TSA and then spanning into the response and recovery that you 
see through FEMA.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK, thank you. Obviously, I know we have 
discussed and there have been questions asked that Alaska and 
the Arctic, they present a unique operating environment and 
they present unique threats. It is clear that the 
administration has failed to make sure that we have what we 
need to protect our homeland in other places throughout this 
country. Are you confident in the Department that it has what 
it needs to protect the homeland in those regions?
    Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you so much. It is our No. 1 priority 
to ensure that we are protecting not only those regions, but 
the regions throughout the United States. The diversity of, as 
I said, the missions as well as the authorities, and the 
expertise that span DHS, we're constantly working to enhance 
those and improve those. I would say, in the Arctic region, as 
we're looking at these critical infrastructures that you 
mentioned again, that the ports and then some of these 
supporting critical infrastructures that are indispensable to 
energy networks, transportation networks, health and safety 
networks, we're aggressively employing the tools that we have 
in the entity's, both people presence, as well as the 
partnerships and other types of capabilities.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Menendez, the gentleman from New Jersey, for his 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you 
for convening today's hearing on U.S. Arctic strategy. To our 
witnesses, thank you for being here. I want to build on the 
questions my colleagues have asked throughout today's hearing 
on the new polar security cutters that the Coast Guard is 
procuring. While I am concerned about the delays that have 
plagued the process so far, I want to talk about what comes 
next once those vessels are built, keeping them operational.
    In a challenging environment like the Arctic, I want to be 
sure that our polar security cutters are able to receive timely 
service and repairs. Admiral, how is the Coast Guard accounting 
for future maintenance needs in the design process of the new 
polar security cutters?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, we start the program, we 
basically bake that in into the overall cost. We have a life-
cycle cost analysis that we do that includes things like the 
regular operation and maintenance, but also the deep-level 
maintenance in terms of dry dockings and things like that.
    Mr. Menendez. Appreciate that. Just to follow up on that, 
one thing I want to make sure we are all considering is the 
infrastructure afforded by current shipyards. For example, as a 
point of personal pride, in New Jersey's 8th Congressional 
District, we have the Bayonne Dry Dock, the largest dry dock in 
the Nation, which received a small shipyard grant earlier this 
year to improve their technology and infrastructure, allowing 
them to continue providing crucial repair services to vessels 
in the U.S. armed services. Admiral, what is the Coast Guard 
doing to ensure that our current ship repair facilities will be 
able to meet the needs of the new polar security cutters?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, great question. The U.S. defense 
industrial shipyard base is absolutely crucial, not just to the 
Coast Guard, but United States Navy, NOAA, and other 
Governmental entities. So, having the kind of facilities that 
are there in order to conduct not just the shipbuilding, but 
the dry docking and the long-term maintenance is absolutely 
crucial.
    We don't have a heck of a lot of resilience in that regard, 
I have to say. What I'll cite here is that Secretary Del Toro, 
Secretary of Navy, has been very forthright in this, in 
announcing a Government shipbuilding council. That announcement 
was made at U.S. Coast Guard yard in Baltimore, Maryland. So 
that tells you, No. 1, that we are very tightly integrated with 
the Navy in this particular problem set. No. 2, we would 
benefit from more capacity and capability there.
    Mr. Menendez. Absolutely. I had a chance to visit Bayonne 
Dry Dock with the Secretary and so continuing further 
collaboration to ensure that we have that capacity, have the 
resiliency. Just one last question to build off of that. I am 
curious to hear our witnesses' thoughts on how increased 
maritime activity in the Arctic will increase demands on our 
ship repair facilities. This question is open to any of our 
witnesses. How are we incorporating the demands for repairs 
from both defense and commercial vessels operating in the 
Arctic in our strategic planning? Open for any witness.
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, so maybe amplifying the earlier 
answer. There are just a certain number of dry docks that are 
going to be able to handle the polar security cutter. It is an 
extraordinarily heavy vessel. It's the largest ship that the 
Coast Guard will ever have, has had to date in the inventory. 
So, there are just a few shipyards that can handle that. Quite 
frankly, we would be in direct competition with the United 
States Navy on the dry docking of their hulls as well, which is 
why we coordinate with the Navy in order to try to deconflict 
those sorts of maintenance periods. Having more options, having 
more resilience in that shipyard, in the suite of shipyard 
capabilities would only be beneficial.
    Mr. Menendez. I agree. That was just in competition with 
the Navy. You also have increased, you will see increased 
commercial activity there as well, which will be an additional 
burden on our existing dry dock facility. So, look forward 
again to working with you on that.
    In the remaining time, building off my colleague 
Representative Goldman's line of questioning, I want to make 
sure we are prepared for the potential consequences of 
increased Russian and Chinese cooperation. I was particularly 
troubled by reports of Russian tankers without ice 
classification shipping oil through the Arctic to China. This 
question is for any of our witnesses. What actions can the 
United States take to pressure Russia and China to reduce the 
environmental risk they are posing to the Arctic with these 
unprepared tankers?
    Ms. Brzozowski. Maybe I'll start off at a strategic level, 
very briefly. One of the sort-of wide-ranging actions that our 
Secretary has recently taken is to initiate what he called a 
90-day sprint. This is to take a really close look at the 
totality of actions that are arising from this increased 
activity of the PRC in the area. So, the Arctic is 1 of 6 of 
the focus areas for this sprint. We're looking at a variety of 
evolving threats and things like critical infrastructure, 
increased traffic, protecting our critical infrastructure in 
the area, and a host of other things. So, that is one thing 
where we're inspecting current processes and evolving threats, 
and we'll have more information on that early next year about 
some of those specific findings.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that. As we think about that 
increased activities, just making sure that we are prepared to 
hold both nations accountable should a catastrophe happen in 
the Arctic. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thanks so 
much.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Brecheen of the great State of Oklahoma for his 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all 
being here. Probably this is going to be unfair because I am 
going to lay before you the holistic approach of spending for 
our Nation. I am doing that because as we stand before a Nation 
that is facing within the next 10 years insolvency on mandatory 
programming and our discretionary spending, which you all are a 
part of. One hundred percent of our discretionary spending 
right now is borrowed money. We had a $1.7 trillion Gross 
National Deficit as of last year, and that was our total spend 
for discretionary spending.
    So, every dollar we are spending, inclusive of the budget 
for the Coast Guard and so many other things because of 
mismanagement of finances for the last 40 years, probably more 
so than any other time in our Nation's history, we don't ask 
the questions anymore how we pay for this? So, how do we pay 
for $3 billion worth of icebreakers when it is borrowed money 
from our kids and our grandkids? Can you make a strong case 
with what is happening with our Southern Border? I think we 
spent over, under the Trump administration, for 400 miles of 
rehabbing of border wall security, it cost $15 billion.
    So, almost $3 billion for these icebreakers is a 
significant amount of money in comparison to what we could do 
to secure our Southern Border. So, I guess what I am doing is 
help make a case with a Nation that never talks about how do we 
pay for this, how do we pay for this and make the case for why 
is it such a high priority?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, Congressman, I acknowledge the deep 
relevance of your question. My response is that the Coast Guard 
is actually an investment. When we look at only costs, it sort-
of masks the fact that every day, the Coast Guard actually 
saves the Nation money. When I was captain of the Port of New 
Orleans and we had something bad happen on the Mississippi 
River and I closed the river down, it was $270 million in lost 
revenue to business for every day that that river was shut 
down.
    I think as we are going to see more cruise ships operating 
more deep draft cargo vessels, including oil and liquefied 
natural gas vessels operating in the high Arctic, including, 
eventually, the transpolar route over the North Pole, perhaps, 
mitigating those types of accidents is actually going to be a 
cost saver for us. Then when we look at the geostrategic 
impacts of additional presence by Russia, additional presence 
by China, what costs are we deferring that we're then going to 
have to pay in the long term? The Coast Guard has actually been 
advocating for polar capabilities for the past 20 years. These 
costs have been deferred.
    Mr. Brecheen. So if I could just take it further. Is there 
not any way, I know you have the Healy, correct, that is a 
medium-sized icebreaker, and I am not for sure about the other 
total assets. Tell me what happens if within another 5 to 10 
years, after a major investment, things start changing and we 
start seeing these routes are no longer possible any longer? I 
mean, it wasn't so long ago that these routes weren't possible 
just because of--and what happens if a freeze reinitiates there 
and we have this investment and now things go the opposite 
direction? Can we not make do with what we have and without it 
being an impediment to us?
    Mr. Gautier. Wherever there's going to be ice, we're going 
to need an ice-breaking capability to give access to the places 
that we need to go to provide Coast Guard services. You know, 
thinking about your last question, our one heavy icebreaker was 
built in 1976. I think that's pretty darn good value for the 
buck. The Coast Guard is doing a 5-year service life extension 
plan in little chunks during the summer months so that that 
icebreaker can travel down to Antarctica in the winter to do 
its job.
    Mr. Brecheen. I come from a heavy equipment world where 
some of my best machinery was old machinery, if you take good 
care of it. So, you are indicating that there is some means of 
expanding the lifespan. Have you looked at beyond 5 years, 
maybe, taking this equipment and expanding the life span beyond 
that time frame?
    Mr. Gautier. That ship goes into the yard for a period of 
months once a year and will for 5 years. We're 3 years in, and 
that's very successful at this point. That will extend the 
service life of the Coast Guard cutter Polar Star until the 
first Polar security cutter is going to be in service. So, that 
ship will be with us for a while.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Ms. 
Titus from Nevada for her 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses. You know, in Nevada, we have a number of Native 
Tribes who are very much engaged in the culture, the politics, 
the economics. Just recently, they were very involved in having 
Avi Kwa Ame declared a National monument. I know there are a 
number of Tribes in Alaska that you have worked with, Ms. 
Brzozowski. I think within the Department of Homeland Security, 
we have a Tribal Homeland Security Advisory Council. Can you 
tell me how much they have been engaged in setting policy in 
the Arctic and if you think they may become kind of a permanent 
voice in the Arctic Council?
    Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you so much for your question. I have 
to actually give credit to my colleagues. I'm new on the job, 
so all the good work goes to the folks that have been here much 
longer than I have. But you're absolutely right. The 
establishment of the Homeland Security Tribal Advisory Council, 
which does include 2 of the 15 members coming from the Alaskan 
region, is one of many advisory councils that the Department of 
Homeland Security but other Government agencies have. In 
particular, that group was indispensable in providing input and 
insight into the development of the DHS implementation plan 
that we're going to be using to guide our implementation of the 
national strategy for the Arctic region. So, it's not a body in 
name only, but rather really providing key insights into the 
needs of the community, things that need to be prioritized, as 
well as livelihoods and sort of priorities of those 
communities.
    I also did want to note here that with 40 percent of all 
Federally-recognized Tribes, as I understand it, being in 
Alaska, a physical presence in that area is indispensable. My 
team actually travelled, folks from my team had travelled to 
the region earlier this year to get a sense of the community 
needs and requirements as we develop this implementation plan, 
which is in the final stages.
    I want to also give credit to our Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. Not only are they integrated into 
communities around the world, but in Alaska in particular, 
looking down to see, make sure I get their name right, but they 
actually have developed and recently released a National Tribal 
Strategy, which is a strategic roadmap to better help Tribal 
Nations to prepare for and then respond to emergencies. That's 
not specific to Alaska, but again, world-wide.
    Then also last year, President Biden appointed an enrolled 
citizen of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma as FEMA's very first 
National Tribal advocate. So, sort-of incorporating these 
viewpoints from the top down and baking them into the policies 
that will guide our actions is something that we're very 
committed to.
    Ms. Titus. Admiral, do you consult with the Tribes as you 
build out the infrastructure needed?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, ma'am. We consult with Tribes as just an 
everyday course of business, and it is not by exception, it's 
routine. An example of that is we have this standing operation 
called Arctic Shield in Alaska, which is another way of saying 
how we deliver Coast Guard services throughout Alaska. Just in 
this calendar year, we've reached 91 different communities. 
Many of them travel in remote locations in Alaska to do things 
like commercial fishing, vessel safety inspections, training, 
and education on boating safety. We'll inspect oil tanks in 
those communities that they use to run their infrastructure to 
make sure that they're in good shape and they won't leak. Right 
now, actually, we are in the process of looking at shipping 
lanes across the north coast of Alaska, and those are in direct 
consultation with Tribal communities.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. I am glad to hear that involvement. 
Another area where I think you can find needed involvement is 
you mentioned that more and more traffic is in the Arctic. You 
got more tourists, you got more business, you got more defense. 
When people come, they leave trash. What are y'all doing about 
protecting this area from being trashed?
    Mr. Gautier. In terms of international shipping, the Coast 
Guard works very closely through the International Maritime 
Organization. They're actually meeting in London right now to 
set a high standard for vessels to prevent trash, to prevent 
oil discharge. In fact, just a few years ago, under the Coast 
Guard's leadership, we advanced something called the Polar 
Code, which are special shipping regulations which prevent 
things like overboard discharge of grey water to make sure that 
we maintain a pristine Arctic environment.
    Ms. Titus. Plastic? Keep plastic out of there.
    Mr. Gautier. Plastic as well, absolutely.
    Ms. Titus. You want to add to that or?
    Ms. Brzozowski. No, thank you.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady yields and appreciate those 
questions. I now yield to Mr. Crane, the gentleman from 
Arizona, for his 5 minutes questioning.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thank you 
to the panel for showing up today. I appreciate all the 
information that you are bringing to this committee on 
challenges in the Arctic. I want to start with you, Admiral. 
What are your greatest concerns and your observations of the 
activity, the collaboration with Russia and China in the Arctic 
region?
    Mr. Gautier. So, the greatest concern is that we know how 
Russia and China behave outside of the Arctic and that that 
sort of behavior might be imported inside the Arctic. I mean, 
to date, China has access through their icebreakers, and 
they're doing scientific examinations there. But, you know, as 
we see fishing stocks moving forward, as we see it more 
attractive to do resource exploitation there, the challenge 
that we have is that we'll see similar behaviors from China and 
Russia that we see elsewhere in the world, which is directly 
undermining the global norms that we all enjoy.
    Mr. Crane. Yes. Thank you, Admiral. As a former sailor 
myself, I just wanted to acknowledge and say thank you for your 
service. I know you spent a long time serving this country, and 
I think I speak for all of us on the panel when we say we 
appreciate it.
    I do want to go back into something you were talking about 
a second ago. You were not only talking about some of the needs 
that you have for some equipment like these icebreakers that we 
have spent a lot of the time talking about. But I also want to 
talk about something you mentioned, the people that work for 
you and within the Coast Guard, and some of the recruiting 
issues that you guys are having. I want to see if, I want to 
ask your opinion, why do you think you are across the military 
having so many recruiting issues?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes. So, as you said, we share this challenge 
with the other military services. COVID had a huge impact on 
things, and it wasn't really until COVID hit that we saw this 
dip in recruiting and retention for whatever reason. A lot of 
this would just be supposition, so I have to be careful.
    But I think it set us back in terms of individuals wanting 
to get out there, serving their country, do something that's 
really challenging. I think in the Coast Guard, what we suffer 
from most is exposure. People don't necessarily know who we 
are, especially young people who want, you know, a challenging 
and rewarding career in the United States military. We're 
getting after that. We've got a new campaign. We're opening up 
new recruiting offices. We're expanding our recruiting capacity 
by 38 percent. The numbers are starting to come back. So, by 
early indications, we're having some successes.
    Mr. Crane. So, you think that COVID is the main reason that 
the military is having its recruiting issues?
    Mr. Gautier. I'm an optimist, sir. You hear these things 
about the eligibility because of weight and pharmaceuticals and 
stuff is lower in the average young population, that there 
isn't this propensity to serve. I hardly disagree. I think 
there are a lot of great young Americans out there who just 
don't know about the Coast Guard. That if they knew that we are 
law enforcement, that we do we're military, that we clean up 
the environment, that we serve the American people, I think, 
you know, we'll have a lot more folks coming in.
    Mr. Crane. Thanks, Admiral. To follow up on that, do you 
think it might have anything to do with what you regularly hear 
as being described as some of the wokeness within the military, 
like CRT training, DEI training, drag shows on base, things 
like that? Do you think that has anything to do with it? It is 
kind-of a loss of the focus of what the military is supposed to 
be about.
    Mr. Gautier. You know, I just don't see that in the United 
States Coast Guard what you're referring to. Our work force is 
the best work force that I've seen in my 36-year career. The 
people who are in the Coast Guard today are better than ever 
before. A lot of them have college educations. A lot of them 
have had professional careers that want to do something 
different and better and that come to us. So, I don't think so.
    Mr. Crane. You haven't seen any of that?
    Mr. Gautier. No.
    Mr. Crane. You haven't seen a change in the culture of the 
military? How long have you been in, Admiral?
    Mr. Gautier. Thirty-seven years.
    Mr. Crane. With all due respect, I find that hard to 
believe, sir. What about vaccine mandates, sir? You know that 
we lost about 30,000 active-duty service members that refused 
to take the vaccine that are now being asked if they want to 
come back into the service? What do you think about that?
    Mr. Gautier. We welcome them back.
    Mr. Crane. Yes, I know, but do you think that has anything 
to do with recruitment efforts? The military can be a pretty 
dangerous place to work, right, Admiral?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, absolutely.
    Mr. Crane. When I left the military, sir, I was an E6, and 
I went into some of the most dangerous environments in the 
world being in Special Forces. It was very easy for me to go 
into some of those spots knowing that my leadership actually 
cared about my well-being. But when service members, regardless 
of what whether they are in the Marines, Coast Guard, Navy, et 
cetera, when they don't believe that their leadership is 
motivated by their well-being, but they are just, in the case 
of the vaccines, making them take experimental vaccines, 
knowing that the survivability rates were about 99.9 percent 
and they didn't see the need for it, that is a problem. It 
makes some of these young individuals question whether or not 
their welfare is going to be looked after, whether or not they 
are going to start a family and set down roots in a community 
and then be forced out for something like that. Do you think 
that has anything to do with the recruiting problem?
    Mr. Gautier. Congressman, so you've been there, right?
    Mr. Crane. Yes.
    Mr. Gautier. Serving in really difficult situations. You 
know, to your point, I know that Admiral Fagan, Master Chief 
Petty Officer Jones, the senior leadership team, we feel like 
we need to earn the respect of our junior work force every 
single day, and we work hard to earn that respect by supporting 
them in their endeavors.
    Mr. Crane. Do you think it was a mistake to force that many 
service members out because they wouldn't take an experimental 
vaccine?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, I----
    Mr. Crane. I know you got to be careful.
    Mr. Gautier [continuing]. I don't have the luxury of being 
afforded an opinion on that, sir.
    Mr. Crane. I understand. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I want to thank the 
witnesses for being here and want to recognize our Ranking 
Member designee today for her closing comments. So, you are 
going to do the questions too? OK. The gentlelady from New York 
would like to take her 5 minutes of questioning too. So, please 
go ahead.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our 
witnesses for both their service and testimony here today. 
Unfortunately, I had a very conflicting hearing at the same 
time, so I missed some of your testimony, and I hope that my 
questions will not be repetitive. The climate is clearly 
changing in the Arctic, which is driving many of the challenges 
we are seeing today. In order for the Coast Guard to plan 
appropriately for the years and decades ahead, the service must 
maintain an understanding of climate change and what impact it 
will have on ice coverage and sea levels in the Arctic. So, 
Admiral, how does the Coast Guard consider the predicted 
impacts of climate change when developing its plans and 
strategies, including planning for shore infrastructure 
projects, determining asset and personnel requirements, and 
designing cutters?
    Mr. Gautier. Yes, thanks, Congresswoman. So, we think in 
terms of climate change in three different ways. The first, as 
you're alluding to, is we need to build resilience into our own 
Coast Guard assets, not just our cutter operations, but even 
more so on our shore infrastructure resilience. So, you know, 
as we do things like recapitalize piers to homeport a couple of 
offshore patrol cutters in Kodiak, we build those piers to 
resilient standards that incorporate the potential for more and 
severe storms and for raising sea levels.
    The second thing that we do is we need to be prepared to 
respond more frequently to climate-driven disasters. We know 
that coastal erosion is just accelerating at an alarming rate 
in Alaska. Alaska got hit by a typhoon, typhoon Merbok, last 
year, and we were a first responder in that element.
    Then the third thing is we're actually a regulator. So, 
under the leadership of Secretary Kerry and the State 
Department team, the Coast Guard negotiated international 
maritime organization that by 2050, international deep draft 
shipping needs to be at zero carbon emission.
    Ms. Clarke. What sources does the Coast Guard rely on to 
inform its understanding of the predicted impacts of climate 
change?
    Mr. Gautier. Well, we work very closely with the experts. 
Certainly, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration and the National Weather Service give us great 
predictions. FEMA is just, first and foremost in terms of just 
general resiliency against disasters. We're a close partner 
with FEMA and DHS in that regard.
    Ms. Clarke. Very well. Let me again thank you all for all 
of your service, your hard work, your dedication, and your 
testimony here today. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Gentlelady yields. I now recognize the 
gentlelady for her closing remarks.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am making these 
remarks on behalf of our Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. I want 
to thank our witnesses for sharing their expertise with us this 
morning. It has been a productive discussion and it is clear 
there is bipartisan interest in ensuring the Coast Guard, DHS, 
and their partners are empowered and resourced to carry out 
their security missions in the Arctic effectively.
    The climate is changing and its impacts on the Arctic will 
be profound. To those who may question whether climate change 
is real or say it is not necessary to understand what is 
causing climate change to deal with its impacts, I say this, 
follow the facts, follow the science.
    We must understand how the climate will continue to change 
in the Arctic in order to prepare for the opportunities and 
challenges that are hurtling our way. It is clear that Russia 
and China will continue to grow their presence in the Arctic 
and that maritime activity will continue to increase due to 
opportunities for shipping, tourism, fishing, and energy 
exploration. The United States must continue to protect its 
interests in the region by supporting adherence to a rules-
based international order. The State Department's diplomatic 
efforts are critical and I thank the GAO for its work in 
highlighting successes of those efforts and opportunities to 
improve.
    I hope the Senate will act quickly to confirm our first 
ambassador-at-large for the Arctic region, which will represent 
an important milestone in elevating our strategic focus on the 
Arctic. As we advance our work in the region, we must do so in 
close consultation with Native Tribes and communities. They 
experience the effects of changing environment and increased 
activity first-hand and their perspectives are invaluable. 
Enhancing the Coast Guard's operational capabilities is also 
key to protecting U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. I, being him, 
look forward to working with members of both parties to help 
keep the Coast Guard's icebreaker acquisition efforts on track 
and building toward the future. Mr. Chairman, I, being him, am 
glad to see our committee continuing to examine homeland 
security issues in the Arctic, building upon our efforts in 
past Congresses. I thank you for convening today's hearing, and 
I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady yields. I want to thank our 
Members for their participation in today's hearing and of 
course, thank our witnesses for their testimony and for taking 
the answers--and providing answers to the Members' questions. 
One last quick question, Admiral Gautier, and I think you are 
going to be rooting for Navy December 9, is that correct? Or 
are you going to stay out of that one?
    Mr. Gautier. West Point grad, I suspect? So, I guess that 
means Army this time.
    Chairman Green. I should have asked you that at the 
beginning of the hearing. Well, again, thank you all for being 
here. I really appreciate your candor on this issue.
    It is pretty easy to see the issues that are before us. 
Definitively, the United States is an Arctic country. We are an 
Arctic nation. What happens in the Arctic region has a direct 
impact on America's citizens and the overall well-being of our 
country. The Arctic has been a facilitator of commerce for the 
United States for decades, if not centuries. The bountiful 
natural resources in Alaska and the Arctic region, from fish to 
oil to gas remain critical economic drivers in the United 
States and help us not only provide for the needs of our 
population, but also to provide other countries around the 
world a better alternative to doing business with dictatorships 
and tyrannical regimes.
    Also, the Arctic is critical to securing the United States 
homeland, and the Arctic is the first line of defense against 
nation-state threats. I am concerned about the threats from the 
PRC and Russia, two adversarial states that have repeatedly 
attempted to undermine the rules-based international order 
promoted by the United States and our allies abroad. With 
Russia's increased militarization of the Arctic and the PRC's 
increased interest and presence in the Arctic, it is critical 
that we maintain an effective operational presence in the 
Arctic region to protect the U.S. homeland from aggression from 
two of our most significant adversaries.
    The United States and its Arctic partners promote the 
rules-based international order and ensure that other nation-
states respect and adhere to that vision of sovereignty. The 
United States participation in the Arctic Council and the Coast 
Guard's engagement with partner nations in the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum helps our country uphold international maritime 
laws and norms and helps us hold bad actors such as Russia and 
the PRC accountable for breaches to these norms.
    U.S. policy moving forward should be focused on advancing 
our competitive advantages in the region and working with our 
partners and allies to further our shared objectives, while at 
the same time pushing back against the efforts of our greatest 
adversaries to seize another foothold in a key region in 
pursuit of their destabilizing ambitions. This committee, 
therefore, must ensure that our Government appropriately 
prioritizes the Arctic region in carrying out its 
Constitutional duties.
    I want to thank you all again for your participation in 
today's hearing, and I hope we can continue to find ways that 
the committee can uphold the Constitutional values, our 
Constitutional values in the Arctic and support the 
organizations tasked by our Government to do just that.
    The Members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses, and we should ask the witnesses to 
respond to those in writing. Pursuant to a Rule VII(D), the 
hearing record will be held open for 10 days for those if you 
get written questions. Without objection, the committee is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

                  Statement of Senator Lisa Murkowski
                      Wednesday, November 29, 2023
    Chairman Green and Ranking Member Thompson thank you for convening 
this hearing. As a lifelong Alaskan, I have spent over 20 years in 
Congress working to highlight the importance of the Arctic and Alaska 
to our Nation. Alaska, the second-youngest State, gives the United 
States the privilege, opportunity, and responsibility of being an 
Arctic Nation. Over the years, our Nation's attention and the perceived 
importance of the Arctic has fluctuated, and at times, the Arctic has 
been treated as a buzzword that eventually fades away from the 
forefront of the National conscience and of our policymakers.
    I believe those days are over. The ``Arctic Moment'' has come and 
gone, and we are looking now at what the ``Arctic Century'' looks like. 
Most recently, it took a flotilla of Chinese and Russian warships 
weaving in and out of our territorial waters off Alaska and a Chinese 
spy balloon invading our National airspace through Alaska for our 
military leaders and policymakers in Washington to remember Billy 
Mitchell's prescient words, ``I believe that in the future, whoever 
controls Alaska controls the world. I think it is the most strategic 
place in the world.''
    Yet, there is so much more value to Alaska and the Arctic than just 
controlling it. To realize the National security, diplomatic, and 
economic (critical minerals, fossil fuels) benefits for our country and 
for our allies from the Arctic, this Congress and administration must 
prioritize infrastructure investments both in the commercial and 
National defense spaces.
    Over the last decade, Congress and the Federal bureaucracy have 
produced reams of reports discussing the strategic importance of the 
Arctic. Those reports are full of words about planning and multi-agency 
coordination but rarely, if at all, specifically discuss the 
investments required to realize those plans or ambitions. In fact, in 
the U.S. Coast Guard's recently-released ``Arctic Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan,'' the word ``budgetary'' appears once in 28 pages. 
From my perspective, there cannot be an honest National ``Arctic 
Strategy'' without the commensurate level of operational capacity. That 
requires our agencies to prioritize Arctic-related budgetary requests 
and Congress to prioritize investments in our Coast Guard, Army Corps 
of Engineers, and Arctic DOD capabilities, just to name a few.
    For example, in the maritime context, the Nation's most northern 
deep-water ice-free port near the Bering Sea is in Dutch Harbor, 
Alaska, which has no year-round military presence or Coast Guard cutter 
presence. Dutch Harbor is 763 nautical miles from Coast Guard Base 
Kodiak, which is the largest Coast Guard base in the world. Base Kodiak 
is 1,415 nautical miles away from Nome, Alaska where the Nation's first 
deep draft Arctic port is under development. If there is an incident in 
the Arctic and a U.S. surface asset isn't already in the area, our 
Nation's response time is measured in days, not hours.
    For over a decade, the Alaska Delegation has been working to build 
our Nation's first Arctic Deep Draft Port in Nome, Alaska so that it 
may accommodate Coast Guard vessels and serve as a strategic hub for 
commerce, operational persistence, and emergency response. It is a 
vital project for the future of U.S. Arctic capability. Yet, the 
reality is that the project has only received $250 million dollars in 
Federal funding to date, from the Army Corps Civil Works budget as a 
result of the funding provided in the Infrastructure Investment & Jobs 
Act (IIJA). Completing the Port of Nome will require significant 
additional Federal investment, and I hope I can count on the Members of 
CHS on both sides of the dais to be there.
    Additionally, in the U.S. Arctic, our Nation continues to lean more 
and more on the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard men and 
women in District 17 are part of the fabric of our Alaskan communities, 
and go above and beyond to secure our Nation and provide invaluable 
services such as search and rescue. From a surface asset force 
projection standpoint, it is the Coast Guard that is on the front lines 
in the Arctic and Alaska, protecting our fisheries, facilitating the 
flow of commerce, and upholding the international rules-based order. As 
problems continue to plague the surface acquisitions vital to safety 
and security in the region, namely the Polar Security Cutter and 
Offshore Patrol Cutter programs, ensuring there is a stop-gap solution 
to maintain a consistent U.S. Arctic presence is becoming increasingly 
dire.
    For years, Senator Sullivan and I have pointed to the lack of U.S. 
icebreaking capability as a harbinger of neglect of our Nation's Arctic 
capabilities. That is why I have continued to advocate for an interim 
solution via a Commercially Available Icebreaker (CIB) to bridge the 
gap until the first Polar Security Cutter arrives, hopefully before the 
end of this decade. As a Congress, we are going to need to continue to 
invest in the PSC program but if we want to improve our icebreaking 
capability in the near term, we must preserve the funding for the CIB 
that is in both the fiscal year 2024 House and Senate Homeland Security 
appropriations bills.
    As a Nation, we cannot look at these investments as a one-off or 
zero-sum. New hulls and ports are helpful but mean little if the Coast 
Guard doesn't have the manpower to crew these new assets or a place to 
homeport them. This leads me to mention that investing in the Coast 
Guard's human capital and shoreside infrastructure needs are as equally 
important as new hulls. Without housing, child care, or new piers in 
Alaska, new hulls will be stationed hundreds or thousands of miles away 
from this vital area of responsibility. In 2021, the IIJA provided the 
Coast Guard with $429 million to address what was a decades-long 
backlog in shoreside infrastructure funding needs. Two-hundred twenty-
seven-point-five million dollars of that was allocated for Alaska to 
make sure we are ready to homeport vessels scheduled for delivery. 
Unfortunately, the momentum on this front has stalled, as this year's 
Homeland Security Appropriation bills did not originally fund the Coast 
Guard's request for $42 million to finish the FRC homeporting station 
in Seward. This threatens to delay the availability of an FRC with 
quick access to the Gulf of Alaska. Until we find a way to adequately 
resource the Coast Guard, our country will struggle to meet the 
strategic opportunities and mitigate threats in the U.S. Arctic.
    As policymakers in Washington, we must continue to increase our 
investments in our Nation's Arctic infrastructure. All of the rhetoric 
in the world about the Arctic's importance to the strategic interests 
of the United States must translate into sustained National 
investments.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide a testimony and for the 
committee's interest in this critical area.

                                 [all]