[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      MISSION CRITICAL: RESTORING
                     NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE FOCUS
                         OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
                        REAUTHORIZATION, PART II

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                          ILLICIT FINANCE, AND
                  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS


                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 8, 2024

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                           Serial No. 118-91
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
56-463 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

               PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma             MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas                     Member
BILL POSEY, Florida                  NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri         BRAD SHERMAN, California
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                AL GREEN, Texas
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Vice          EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
    Chairman                         JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut
TOM EMMER, Minnesota                 BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia   JUAN VARGAS, California
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
JOHN ROSE, Tennessee                 VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin               SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina      AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina         STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin          RITCHIE TORRES, New York
ANDREW GARBARINO, New York           SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California                NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BYRON DONALDS, Florida               WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska                 BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MIKE LAWLER, New York
ZACH NUNN, Iowa
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee

                     Matt Hoffmann, Staff Director
          Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, 
                and International Financial Institutions

                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri, Chairman

ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio, Ranking Member
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
YOUNG KIM, California, Vice          BILL FOSTER, Illinois
    Chairwoman                       JUAN VARGAS, California
ZACH NUNN, Iowa                      JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on:
    May 8, 2024..................................................     1
Appendix:
    May 8, 2024..................................................    29

                               WITNESSES
                         Wednesday, May 8, 2024

Rozman-Kendler, Thea D., Assistant Secretary of Export 
  Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. 
  Department of Commerce.........................................     6
Spishak, Cynthia, Associate Administrator, Federal Emergency 
  Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.     7
Taylor-Kale, Laura, Assistant Secretary for Industrial Base 
  Policy, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).......................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
    Rozman-Kendler, Thea D.......................................    30
    Spishak, Cynthia.............................................    43
    Taylor-Kale, Laura...........................................    49

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Luetkemeyer, Hon. Blaine:
    Written statement of Dr. Jeffrey ``Jeb'' Nadaner, Senior Vice 
      President, Govini, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
      Defense for Industrial Policy..............................    55
Rozman-Kendler, Thea D.:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Barr........................................    59
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Ogles.......................................    60
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    61
Spishak, Cynthia:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Nunn........................................    62
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    65
Taylor-Kale, Laura:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Nunn........................................    72
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Ogles.......................................    74
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    77

 
                      MISSION CRITICAL: RESTORING
                     NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE FOCUS
                       OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
                        REAUTHORIZATION, PART II

                              ----------                              


                         Wednesday, May 8, 2024

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on National Security,
                               Illicit Finance, and
              International Financial Institutions,
                           Committee on Financial Services,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Blaine 
Luetkemeyer [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Luetkemeyer, Barr, 
Williams of Texas, Loudermilk, Meuser, Kim, Nunn, De La Cruz; 
Beatty, Gonzalez, Pettersen, and Foster.
    Ex officio present: Representative Waters.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The Subcommittee on National 
Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial 
Institutions will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any time.
    Today's hearing is entitled, ``Mission Critical: Restoring 
National Security as the Focus of Defense Production Act 
Reauthorization, Part II.''
    And I think it is important to note that this is an area 
that this subcommittee doesn't normally get into, but I think 
it is very important because it is within our purview, and 
because we get into it a lot, we need to have a lot of, I 
think, hearings on it to be able to understand the issue, to be 
able to get all the information that we can to make a good 
judgment and understand what we need to do, what we are doing 
right, what we are doing wrong, and what needs to be taken care 
of. So, we appreciate the witnesses being here today and being 
able to do that.
    With that, I recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an 
opening statement. On March 12th of this year, this 
subcommittee held the first part of this hearing to learn more 
about the history, the current landscape, and what the future 
might hold for the Defense Production Act of 1950, or the DPA. 
During that hearing, we heard testimony from the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and other expert witnesses about the 
important role the DPA plays in maintaining our national 
defense posture as the envy of the world, as well as the 
dangerous state of our current defense industrial base. Today, 
we will continue that conversation as we welcome witnesses who 
represent the key agencies which execute the DPA: the Commerce 
Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Defense. We don't often see these agencies here 
at the Committee on Financial Services, but we hold the great 
responsibility of having the sole jurisdiction over the DPA.
    DPA is set to expire in September 2025. In light of the 
increased use of DPA by both the current and previous 
Administrations, and the need to restore our defense industry 
for our great power competition with China, we have started to 
examine and consider this legislation in its entirety. DPA, 
which Congress passed in response to the Korean War, affords 
the President a broad set of authorities to ensure that 
American industry has the capability and the capacity to meet 
our nation's national security needs.
    Our hearing in March highlighted some key areas where 
Congress may wish to consider improvements to meet the current 
moment. Since the DPA was reauthorized in 2018, the Federal 
Government has utilized the financial tools of the DPA at a 
pace far exceeding previous years and in more creative ways. In 
March, we heard the Director of the Ronald Reagan Institute, 
Dr. Roger Zakheim, discuss some of the urgent needs to address 
military shortfalls in ammunitions and weapons, naval 
shipbuilding and maintenance, and supply chain and strategic 
materials shortfalls.
    In the meantime, Congress acted to address the ongoing 
conflicts in Ukraine and Israel, which further exercise and 
stretch our defense production industries, and all the while, 
the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) military continues to 
build up its capabilities to threaten its neighbors and 
challenge our own military. These are all stark reminders of 
how critical a strong national industrial base is to the 
national security of the United States.
    I was encouraged to see in December of 2023, the Department 
of Defense, through the leadership of our witness today, 
Assistant Secretary Taylor-Kale, introduce the first-ever 
National Defense Industrial Strategy. This strategy does a 
great job of outlining the priority areas that are critical to 
a modern defense-focused industrial ecosystem. Today, I hope 
Dr. Taylor-Kale will tell us more about the report and how 
Congress can act moving forward. It will also benefit our 
members to hear how the DPA has been helpful in its past and 
current implementations as well as the areas where the DPA 
might be underutilized.
    One other area of concern that I share with Dr. Zakheim and 
another witness, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Dr. Jeb Nadaner, is that many of these expanded authorities for 
which the DPA is being used seem to have little to do with what 
the legislation was originally intended to accomplish.
    In one of his earliest Executive Orders, President Biden 
invoked DPA authorities to strengthen U.S. supply chain 
resilience. He followed it up by using DPA Title I authorities 
to require suppliers to provide key inputs to infant formula 
manufacturers ahead of other customers.
    In June of 2022, the President began using DPA to 
accelerate domestic production of energy technologies like 
solar panels, insulation, heat pumps, biofuels, and power grid 
infrastructure. The heat pump case remains particularly 
controversial, not least because the dependence is primarily on 
allied manufacturers and seems to have little do with national 
security.
    Some of these actions, unfortunately, have reinforced the 
narrative that Presidents could exercise powerful DPA 
authorities for reasons unrelated to national security. This 
undermines the support for a critical tool, that, when used 
properly, is essential to building and maintaining our nation's 
ability to defend itself and our allies.
    To be clear, I don't want to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. The DPA is an essential mechanism that deserves 
reauthorization before the end of the next fiscal year, but it 
also needs a thorough review and a careful adjustment, not just 
a rubber-stamp approval from Congress. Today's hearing should 
give us critical insight into the factual applications of the 
DPA. I think it is critical that our members be informed and 
up-to-speed on all of the applications of the DPA.
    I want to thank our witnesses today for being here and for 
their ongoing engagement with the members and staff. I look 
forward to their testimony.
    With that, I recognize the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, Mrs. Beatty from Ohio, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Beatty. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
for holding this hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for 
appearing here today for part two of our discussion on the 
Defense Production Act (DPA), which is set, as you have heard, 
to expire in September of next year.
    The DPA gives the President the authority to take various 
actions to ensure the supply of materials and services 
necessary for national defense. For example, the President has 
the power to prioritize government contracts, waive 
international trade requirements, and offer incentives within 
the domestic market to enhance the production of critical 
materials and technologies if deemed necessary for national 
defense. As was discussed at our previous hearing on this 
topic, Congress has amended the definition of, ``national 
defense,'' over the years to include emergency preparedness, 
critical infrastructure protection and restoration, homeland 
security, and more.
    Let's be clear. The DPA does not give the President a blank 
check to spend taxpayers' money. It is subject to the annual 
appropriations process, with limits on how many funds can be 
rolled over to future years. In addition, the authority must be 
renewed periodically, and we are here today to continue our 
discussion on reauthorization. There is no doubt that the DPA 
grants broad powers that must be applied in a careful and 
prudent manner. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we assess 
national defense through a wider lens, and leverage tools like 
the DPA wisely to bolster domestic supply chains, support our 
allies, enhance U.S. competition, and preserve the United 
States' energy independence.
    In recent years, we have faced novel challenges that have 
threatened our national security in some shape or form, from 
the COVID-19 pandemic to the increasingly-disastrous effects of 
climate change. To tackle these issues, the Executive Branch 
has appropriately invoked the DPA to produce ventilators and 
vaccinations as well as to accelerate domestic manufacturing of 
clean energy technologies. While some of my colleagues may 
claim that these threats are beyond the scope of the DPA, I 
would argue that preparation, prevention, and deterrence are 
key components of national defense. In fact, the Department of 
Defense itself has listed some climate change threats to 
national security since 2008, stating that it must be a part of 
every strategic decision the Department makes.
    The DPA is a critical tool to ensure that we are prepared 
for anything, and it is imperative that we continue to use it 
in an intelligent way to bolster the United States' strength 
and stability. I look forward to working with my Republican 
colleagues in a bipartisan manner to reauthorize this essential 
legislation in the coming year because I believe hearing from 
our witnesses today, and if we work together on the same page 
for the same goal, we will get there. Thank you once again to 
our witnesses. And I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady yields back.
    We now welcome the testimony of our witnesses today: Dr. 
Laura Taylor-Kale, Assistant Secretary for Industrial Base 
Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense; Ms. Thea Rozman-
Kendler, Assistant Secretary of Export Administration at the 
Bureau of Industry and Security at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce; and Ms. Cynthia Spishak, Associate Administrator of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We thank each of you 
for taking the time to be with us here today.
    Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an 
oral presentation of your testimony. And without objection, 
each of your written statements will be made a part of the 
record. I have the gavel, so be concise, and we look forward to 
your remarks.
    With that, Dr. Taylor-Kale, you are recognized for 5 
minutes for your oral testimony.

    STATEMENT OF LAURA TAYLOR-KALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
    INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman 
Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Beatty, and distinguished members 
of the subcommittee. I am absolutely delighted to have this 
opportunity to testify before you today alongside my colleagues 
from FEMA and Commerce.
    In addition to timely, consistent appropriations and 
multiyear procurement, reauthorizing the Defense Production Act 
may be one of the most important actions that the Congress can 
do to ensure that the U.S. industrial base is ready to support 
defense needs and the war fighter. DOD's primary aim in the use 
of the Defense Production Act is to increase the readiness and 
resilience of the defense industrial base in support of defense 
critical needs and the war fighter. As such, the DPA is an 
essential tool for national defense, and the successful 
implementation of the National Security Strategy, the National 
Defense Strategy, and the recently-released National Defense 
Industrial Strategy.
    Since Congress enacted the DPA in 1950, the Executive 
Branch has invoked DPA authorities to manage the nation's 
defense-related production capacity, defense critical supply 
chains, and to protect and strengthen the U.S. industrial base 
in war, peace, and during national emergencies.
    At this time, I would like to thank Congress for adding the 
United Kingdom and Australia to the definition of, ``domestic 
sources,'' in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense 
Authorization Act. Allowing DOD to enter agreements with 
companies from the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Australia 
reinforces important alliances like AUKUS and supports the 
short- and long-term development of secure defense critical 
supply chains. Going forward, the DPA will remain an essential 
national defense tool for mitigating supply chain 
vulnerabilities in our key weapons and defense systems.
    Defense production is a deterrent, especially when 
undergirded by a strong and innovative industrial ecosystem. 
Fully executing DPA authorities in support of domestic 
industrial production remains a priority for this 
Administration's defense industrial policy. Our adversaries 
attempt to use supply chain vulnerabilities to weaken the U.S. 
military and economy. Through our role on the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), we see how 
adversarial capital investments in the U.S. industrial base 
further attempt to weaken the United States by robbing our 
industrial base of technological innovation, and the DOD 
remains vigilant against adversaries using adversarial capital 
to weaken the U.S. defense industrial base.
    As you noted, Mr. Chairman, in January of this year the 
Department published the first-ever National Defense Industrial 
Strategy, where we highlight four key strategic priorities for 
building a modernized, resilient industrial ecosystem: 
resilient supply chains; workforce readiness; flexible 
acquisition strategies; and economic deterrence. As such, the 
reauthorization of the DPA and the full use of the authorities 
are absolutely essential for implementation.
    We use the Defense Production Act to, of course, prioritize 
defense needs within industrial supply chains, along with the 
Department of Commerce, and to allocate scarce components. We 
also use it to alleviate pain points in supply chains and 
expand domestic manufacturing of critical technologies and 
processing and production of critical minerals and strategic 
materials that are vital for our defense capabilities and for 
the war fighter.
    So, what has DOD achieved in the numbers? Since the last 
DPA reauthorization in 2018, appropriations have increased 
dramatically for Title III from an average of about $70 million 
a year to about a billion dollars. As the first Senate-
confirmed Assistant Secretary for Industrial Base Policy, my 
top priority is overseeing the effective management and 
execution of DPA authorities and appropriations in support of 
our military and the war fighter.
    In Fiscal Year 2023, we executed a total of $733 million in 
DPA Title III awards. This helped strengthen defense critical 
supply chains in microelectronics, strategic materials, and 
kinetic capabilities in energy storage and batteries. Demand 
for DPA assistance is at an all-time high, and I predict that 
it will remain so going forward as we continue to work on 
alleviating these pain points in the supply chain.
    In my written testimony, I noted a couple of key areas 
where Congress can consider adjustments to the DPA. I look 
forward to continuing to work with this Congress in a 
bipartisan manner and I am honored to represent the Department 
of Defense today. Thank you, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Taylor-Kale 
can be found on page 49 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you. Ms. Rozman-Kendler, you 
are recognized for 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF THEA D. ROZMAN-KENDLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY (BIS), 
                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member 
Beatty, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify alongside my colleagues before the 
subcommittee on the critical role the Defense Production Act 
(DPA) plays in supporting our national defense. The Department 
of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has several 
responsibilities in implementing DPA authorities under our 
national security mission, and I will use this opportunity to 
highlight two of them. The rest is reflected in my written 
statement for the record.
    First, DPA Title I authorities authorize the President to 
require acceptance and priority performance of contracts and 
orders to promote the national defense. The Commerce Department 
has held this authority under Title I since 1950 when the DPA 
was first enacted. Today, we implement these authorities 
through the Defense Priorities and Allocations System 
regulation (DPAS), which is used regularly to support the 
purchase of industrial resources needed for U.S. national 
defense requirements. We work closely with interagency partners 
to ensure the timely delivery of industrial resources needed to 
ensure our national security goals.
    The Defense Department is the largest user of the DPAS. 
Under a delegation from Commerce, DOD places an estimated 
300,000 DPAS priority-rated contracts and orders each year. The 
DPAS is a vital part of the Defense Department's procurement 
system, and we, at Commerce, are proud of the role we play in 
supporting our servicemembers.
    Commerce also may authorize priority ratings on a case-by-
case basis. For example, in coordination with our colleagues at 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we granted the 
General Services Administration and the Architect of the 
Capitol DPAS priority rating authority for items needed to 
support the safety of U.S. Government buildings, including 
congressional facilities. Commerce has also provided DPAS 
rating authority in support of the Wildland Fire Protection 
Program, National Airspace Operations, and land port of entry 
construction. These activities demonstrate the role of the DPAS 
as a force multiplier for our national defense.
    In recent years, we have witnessed unprecedented supply 
chain challenges for the U.S. industrial base. Commerce, in 
coordination with interagency partners, has responded to a 
significant increase in DPAS requests for assistance. Last 
calendar year, we took 59 actions, the highest by the 
Department in the last 34 years. If the DPA's Title I authority 
were to lapse, Commerce would no longer have statutory 
authority to support procurement on behalf of any entity other 
than the U.S. Armed Forces. Without Title I, we would have 
available only the limited authority provided by the Selective 
Service Act. This occurred during Operation Desert Storm. We 
would not be able to place ratings for wildland fire equipment, 
aviation network equipment, or weather satellites, all of which 
we have undertaken with our interagency partners in the last 12 
months.
    Shifting gears, Commerce also acts under Title VII of the 
DPA. Title VII authorizes the President to obtain information 
to assess the capabilities of the U.S. industrial base to 
support the national defense. Under this authority, for 
national security purposes, we use industry-specific surveys to 
obtain essential information from U.S. industry. This is 
information unavailable from any other source, for example, 
production, research and development, export control, and 
employment. Commerce develops custom surveys that focus on that 
key information, and our assessments provide findings and 
recommendations for government policymakers and industry 
leaders to ensure our national defense.
    Over the last 38 years, the Commerce Department has 
conducted industrial base assessments and surveys on a wide 
range of topics from healthcare products to rocket propulsion. 
Survey information that we collect supports data-driven 
policies and actions in areas critical to our long-term 
economic and national security.
    We are currently in the middle of six surveys and 
assessments related to various longstanding and emerging 
industries. When completed, information from these surveys and 
assessments will provide the U.S. Government with insights 
needed to understand the health and viability of the assessed 
industry sectors. In particular, in January of this year, we 
issued a survey to determine how U.S. artificial intelligence 
(AI) developers are developing frontier AI models and what they 
are doing to keep those models safe and secure. Data collected 
from this survey will inform the development of safety and 
security standards for frontier AI models and help spur AI 
innovation.
    If our DPA Title VII authority expires, we will lose a 
critical tool that helps to ensure our national defense. We 
will be unable to collect the unique data that enables 
assessment of the health of our industrial base, depriving 
policymakers of important data to support decisions. The 
Department of Commerce is eager to work with Congress to 
reauthorize the non-permanent provisions of the DPA. Thank you 
for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Rozman-
Kendler can be found on page 30 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you. Ms. Spishak, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA SPISHAK, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                            SECURITY

    Ms. Spishak. Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Beatty, 
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 
to discuss reauthorization of the non-permanent provisions of 
the Defense Production Act and the importance of 
reauthorization to the promotion of the nation's homeland 
security and emergency preparedness needs.
    The Defense Production Act is the primary source of 
presidential authorities to expedite and expand the supply of 
materials and services needed to accomplish national defense 
priorities, including certain civil emergency preparedness and 
response authorities. As was said, enacted back in 1950, the 
DPA was Congress' response to the production shortages the 
nation faced during the Korean War. Specifically, the DPA was 
intended to ensure that the Federal Government could 
efficiently channel industrial resources during times of 
crisis. Since its enactment, Congress has consistently 
acknowledged the evolving importance of the DPA by 
reauthorizing it over 50 times.
    Today, in addition to supporting the Department of Defense 
programs, the DPA also affords critical authorities that FEMA, 
the Department of Homeland Security, and our Federal 
interagency partners leverage in executing the civil defense 
efforts that underpin disaster preparedness response, critical 
infrastructure protection and restoration, and counterterrorism 
enterprises.
    Since its establishment in 1979, FEMA has been at the 
forefront of administering the DPA by ensuring that the Act's 
broad and evolving mandates are effectively managed, from 
military preparedness to comprehensive civil emergency 
response. This responsibility was envisioned by Congress in 
1950 and has been reaffirmed through successive Executive 
Orders and legislative amendments that have expanded the scope 
of national defense beyond strictly military activities.
    FEMA's continued stewardship of the DPA underscores the 
necessity of maintaining a central coordinating body that is 
adept at navigating the complexities of national crises and 
mobilizing the nation's industrial base. As threats to national 
security become increasingly diverse and complex, FEMA's role 
is more vital than ever, ensuring that the DPA's capabilities 
are aligned with contemporary security needs and that the Act 
remains a cornerstone of national resilience and preparedness.
    In addition to our work in administering the DPA, FEMA 
leverages DPA authorities in executing its responsibility for 
coordinating the implementation of policies and programs that 
ensure efficiency and the national mobilization of resources in 
response to national security emergencies. The authorities 
provided in the DPA are critical to FEMA's ability to execute 
this important responsibility.
    Reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the DPA will 
enable FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and other 
Federal agencies to continue efforts vital to the nation's 
homeland security and emergency preparedness. This includes 
prioritizing contracts that provide necessary resources to 
enhance national resilience, emergency preparedness, critical 
infrastructure and protection, and efforts that reduce the 
risks associated with acts of terrorism. Reauthorization is 
also vital to maintaining key abilities to invest in expanding 
the productive capacity of the domestic industrial base to 
ensure national defense needs are met.
    As Congress considers the strategic direction for the 
reauthorization of the DPA, it is crucial that its authorities 
address the evolving landscape of national threats that 
transcend traditional military functions. Congress must ensure 
the maximum flexibility in the DPA authorities to ensure the 
United States can swiftly mobilize and respond to a diverse 
array of threats with efficiency and precision within the 
necessary controls of program administration. FEMA stands ready 
to work with the committee and our interagency partners to 
ensure that the reauthorization of the DPA can meet this 
changing risk environment and advance the nation's homeland 
security.
    Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today, 
and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Associate Administrator Spishak 
can be found on page 43 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you.
    Before I get started with my questions, I just have a quick 
comment here for Ms. Rozman-Kendler. We are disappointed in 
your agency, Ms. Rozman-Kendler. We tried to get ahold of you 
through your staff many times, but they wouldn't answer phone 
calls and wouldn't answer emails. You did not want to appear 
today, and that cannot be tolerated. Our committee has 
jurisdiction over the DPA, and your agency handles the 
execution of it, so we have to work together. For your people 
to drag their feet and not respond to our committee folks is 
unacceptable, and it will not be tolerated again.
    With that, the questioning begins, and I recognize myself 
for 5 minutes.
    Oh, the ranking member of the full Financial Services 
Committee, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters, is here, 
and we will recognize Ms. Waters for one minute for an opening 
statement
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a 
prepared 1-minute statement, but I am really bothered by some 
other problems that I see growing in this country, and as I 
understand it, the Defense Production Act, or DPA, is an 
important tool that ensures our country is prepared for and can 
respond to any security threat that may arise.
    Mr. Chairman and members, there are security threats coming 
from the former President of the United States almost every 
day. He talks about violence if he is not elected. He talks 
about a civil war. He talks about, basically, if he is not 
elected, there will be bloodshed, so I consider that this is a 
serious domestic threat coming from the former President. Is 
that included in the Defense Production Act? It is not fair, 
absolutely, to bring the question up today, but I would like to 
put it on everybody's mind. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
    My first question is for Dr. Taylor-Kale. I sit on the 
China Select Committee, and we have heard testimony from our 
generals and have done tabletop exercises to demonstrate that 
United States lacks the stockpiles of critical munitions for a 
military engagement with the PRC over Taiwan. Looking at the 
current defense stockpiles and considering the capacity and 
production rates of our defense industrial base, from your 
perspective, do you believe we are adequately positioned to 
meet and defeat the global threats facing the United States and 
our allies, including the current wars in the Middle East and 
Ukraine as well as the potential conflict involving China?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question, 
but first, I want to say off the bat again that the Department 
of Defense uses the DPA to increase the readiness and 
resilience of our industrial base, specifically to address the 
threats that you mentioned in support of national defense. I 
think it is important to note that we learned a lot over the 
last few years after COVID and Ukraine and what we have had to 
do to mobilize the industrial base, but our industrial base has 
managed to keep us safe and provided war fighters with the 
tools and capabilities to fight our adversaries in times of 
need. I think that we view the importance of having surge 
capacity and more resilience in the industrial base as very 
important, and we intend to continue to use the Defense 
Production Act for that purpose.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Do you think we are ready? That is 
the question, and here is a good example. Yesterday, one of the 
national papers had a headline, ``China's Satellite Fleet Poses 
Threats to U.S. Troops in Potential Pacific Conflict,'' and 
this comes from the Space Force Intelligence Chief. They have 
200 more satellites in space today than they did just a few 
years ago, and their capacity has increased 550 percent. That 
is a real threat. Are we ready to address that? That is the 
question.
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, the PRC remains our pacing threat, 
and certainly, Taiwan being the pacing scenario. The way that 
we use the Defense Production Act is really to address a lot of 
the pain points in the supply chain for critical technologies 
and capabilities that we need in order to meet the threat.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay. A follow-up question then. 
Because we sometimes misuse the DPA, does that pose a danger 
for these industries, these different companies whenever they 
have to then turn their company around and actually respond to 
a national security threat? Do you understand my question?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Absolutely, sir.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Do they have the capacity to do two 
things at one time? I guess that is the question. And do they 
have the ability to prioritize away from the one that is not 
necessarily a national security issue to the one where our 
lives are hanging in the balance?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. And sir, I would offer that part of the 
way that we use the Title I authorities is to exactly address 
this issue. The prioritization of defense critical needs is one 
that we work within the Department, and with the Department of 
Commerce to do so, so that the industrial resources that we 
need, the critical components that we need for our key systems, 
for our weapons are available at the time that we need them.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay. Ms. Spishak, you talked a while 
ago about different ways that you interact with all of these 
different agencies to deliver services. From that standpoint, 
can you help me see how we can be more targeted with the DPA to 
make sure we do it the right way, that we don't have extraneous 
things that we are doing with it that aren't necessarily 
national security-oriented, but we can target where we need to 
go? Is there a way to do that?
    Ms. Spishak. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. I 
think the most important thing to keep in mind, and several of 
us have alluded to the evolving threat landscape, is trying to 
balance the authorities within the Defense Production Act with 
the checks and balances associated with the program 
administration. So, by continuing to offer that flexibility 
upfront, it allows us to meet those growing needs, but also 
make sure that we are paying attention to those checks and 
balances and evaluating the work.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Dr. Taylor-Kale, I guess you kind of 
have to go back to help me understand the process here of how 
an industry or an individual company can access the system, 
because apparently what goes on is you will send out a request 
for a proposal, and they will send you their information, but 
they never hear from you again. The Defense Department doesn't 
respond in a timely fashion and say, hey, we didn't actually 
want something for this particular piece of military equipment 
or hardware. We were looking for something else. Instead, they 
get something back saying, well, there are no funds available, 
or they don't answer at all. Can you talk about that issue?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Absolutely, sir. First and foremost, there 
are a couple of different ways to submit White Papers into the 
Department of Defense. We have the newly-stood-up Defense 
Industrial Base Consortium. But I will note that it has been my 
priority as Assistant Secretary to speed up our execution 
times, including our response to industry.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay. I will send you a question and 
ask for a written response on that because we have some 
specific examples of people who are not being responded to. 
Thank you very much, and I yield back.
    I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, the 
gentlelady from Ohio, Mrs. Beatty, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Beatty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me continue with 
you, Madam Assistant Secretary. The diversity and the value of 
the DPA Title III projects administered by the Department of 
Defense have expanded in response to the emergencies that our 
nation and the world have faced over, let's say, the past 4 
years. For example, the Biden Administration chose 
appropriately to employ Title III authorities to assist 
munitions and critical minerals producers in response to the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Biden Administration has 
also invested in clean energy.
    So my question is, in what ways do these DPA uses address 
national defense and improve national security, followed up by, 
what is the Department doing to ensure adequate oversight of 
this DPA-related work?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Thank you, Madam Ranking Member. I will 
note that using the Defense Production--I think you are 
referring a lot to the Title III projects that we manage--
indeed has increased pretty substantially over the last several 
years. Five years ago, we had $70 million and a handful of 
projects, and now, we have a much more robust portfolio.
    In prioritizing how we use Title III funds, the Department 
of Defense, and my office really works very closely with our 
military services to understand their needs and pairing that 
with the industry proposals and White Papers that we receive 
and also ones that we solicit as well, getting at and making 
sure that defense supply chains have the critical components, 
have the critical minerals. As you mentioned, Russia holds a 
lot of those, as well as the PRC. Making sure that we can bring 
some of that processing onshore and have them available at will 
for our defense supply chains has been absolutely critical and 
important for the Department and, frankly, a really key use of 
the DPA for national defense.
    As far as oversight, my office oversees particularly the 
Title III awards. As I mentioned earlier, part of my work here 
has been to really expand and make sure that we are moving and 
executing in a timely fashion. We have increased the capacity 
to be able to execute awards over the past year and less than 
that even. We have reduced the amount of time that it takes for 
industry to get a response for our proposals. All of this is 
really in service of making sure that our military services and 
the war fighters have what they need at the time that they need 
them and that there are no delays in our weapon systems as a 
result. Thank you.
    Mrs. Beatty. Thank you for that. I am going to address this 
to all of the witnesses, but we will start with you, Ms. 
Rozman-Kendler. The President can author a presidential 
determination for Title III projects without congressional 
notification, with potentially significant implications for 
national security, supply chains, and the U.S. economy. 
Understanding that this would differ by specifics, what might 
be the positive or negative effects of imposing additional 
congressional notification or authorization requirements for 
Title III activities?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Congresswoman, I appreciate the 
question, and certainly also, to the chairman's point earlier, 
we are eager to collaborate with Congress, of course, and 
especially with this subcommittee. The Commerce Department does 
not maintain authorities under Title III, so I think I need to 
defer that to my colleagues. Thank you.
    Mrs. Beatty. We will go next to you, Ms. Spishak.
    Ms. Spishak. Thank you, Ranking Member Beatty. While DHS 
does have the authorization to have a Title III program, we 
currently don't have it appropriated and aren't utilizing it, 
so I don't have any further comments.
    Mrs. Beatty. Okay. Then, Ms. Spishak, let me ask you this. 
As we have seen, especially over the past 4 years, the DPA can 
shape how businesses in the United States operate and how the 
economy functions. Does the DPA fit in with other tools the 
Executive Branch has to shape the U.S. industrial base, 
including supplies or services or labor?
    Ms. Spishak. Yes, I think it plays a critical role. It is 
one of many instruments, as you highlighted, and, I think one 
that is important to always recognize is, ``always available.'' 
It is not a requirement to have something like a public health 
emergency or a national emergency to be able to be utilized.
    Mrs. Beatty. Okay. Unfortunately, my time has expired.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady's time is up. With 
that, we go to the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr, who is 
also the Chair of our Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just kind of 
curious, because I am a member of the bipartisan House Military 
Depot and Industrial Facilities Caucus. I represent the Blue 
Grass Army Depot in Madison County, Kentucky, and we just 
completed, actually, demilitarization of the last remaining 
legacy chemical weapons there as part of our chemical weapons 
treaty obligations. But in terms of our arsenal depots, are we 
utilizing those facilities to enhance the industrial base 
sufficiently, and is there any interface between the 
authorities of the DPA with those depots and arsenals to surge 
our supply chain resiliency and defense industrial base?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Thank you. It is a great question. First, 
I will note that the DPA does allow us to do Title III 
investments in the organic industrial base, and we continue to 
look forward in working closely with the services in order to 
do so. The organic industrial bases and depots are very 
important components for our overall industrial ecosystem and 
making sure that we have the components and capabilities that 
our war fighter needs at speed and at scale. I will note that 
in the Fiscal Year 2025 budget that was recently released, 
modernizing the organic industrial basis is a key aspect of it. 
The Army is preparing to invest over $4.5 billion over the next 
15 years just in that area. I completely agree with you, sir, 
and I understand the importance of them.
    Mr. Barr. Yes. We have a great relationship with the Army 
Materiel Command, and I just think that some of these depots, 
the one I represent included, are underutilized and can really 
be an asset in this mission.
    Dr. Taylor-Kale, another question for you. The U.S. 
currently has 250 billion tons of coal, coal waste, and coal 
ash in reserve which are rich in rare earth elements and other 
critical minerals. How is DOD utilizing the DPA and the United 
States' rich domestic resources to ensure our critical minerals 
and rare earth stockpile can compete with foreign adversaries 
such as China?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, the critical minerals and strategic 
materials are an absolute key component to many of our weapon 
systems, including ones that we have used for support for 
Ukraine. And certainly, we have used the Defense Production Act 
to really get at some of the pain points and alleviate those 
pain points in the supply chain. For instance, since 2020, the 
Department of Defense, through DPA, has invested over a billion 
dollars in critical minerals and strategic materials using 
actually DPA as well as the industrial base fund. We continue 
to prioritize the use of DPA for critical minerals and 
strategic materials, as well as processing, as well as in 
production as well. So, I completely agree with you on the 
importance of it and certainly the importance for our key 
weapons systems.
    Mr. Barr. Let me follow up also, because the Biden 
Administration's environmental laws have made U.S. mining one 
of the most comprehensively regulated industries in the world, 
leading to a permitting process that can take years or even 
decades for each project, and the Administration's posture on 
mining, I think will only lead to more roadblocks. So, despite 
America being blessed with some of the largest mineral reserves 
in the world, instead of producing for ourselves, we depend on 
other countries, often adversaries like China and Russia, for 
all or most supplies of many of these critical minerals. Could 
you discuss the role our long and arduous domestic permitting 
process plays in our inability to mine the minerals that we 
need for our defense and energy requirements? This could be a 
win-win-win. Coal is not being combusted as much anymore 
because of environmental laws, but there are a lot of 
unreclaimed coal mines in this country. There is a lot of coal 
refuse out there. There are hazardous sites. We could harvest 
critical minerals, not for combustion out of coal, but critical 
minerals, and remediate a lot of environmental problems in our 
country all at the same time, a win-win-win, but we need 
permitting and we don't need roadblocks. So, can you speak to 
that?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sure. I know we are running out of time, 
but I want to underline that domestic production and increasing 
capacity is an absolute priority for the Department of Defense. 
A key objective of the Administration has been to make sure 
that we can meet current and future demand. We use the Defense 
Production Act Title III authorities to work on the domestic 
aspect of processing, but we're also working with key partners 
and allies like the U.K., Australia, and Canada. And I think 
that we can continue to discuss how we can better make sure 
that the Department of Defense has the supply of critical 
minerals that it needs for its weapon systems, and I am happy 
to follow up further with you.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The ranking member of the Full 
Committee, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. While I 
understand thoroughly what DPA means and what it can do for us 
in many ways to, basically protect, to deal with the supply 
chain, on and on and on, and I understand what we were able to 
do during COVID, I am not focused on that today. But I 
appreciate our witnesses who are here today to talk about 
climate change and other things that certainly need to be 
addressed as we look at DPA. So with that, I yield back the 
balance of my time. I am focused on other domestic terrorism.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. I appreciate the comments from the 
ranking member, and she yields back her time. With that, we 
will go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Williams, who is also 
the Chair of the House Small Business Committee.
    Mr. Williams of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you, witnesses, for being here today. Current conflicts in the 
Middle East and Ukraine have decreased our domestic defense 
industrial stockpiles, and with the strongest military in the 
world, it is imperative that we prioritize rebuilding our 
defense industry and stockpiles to ensure our readiness in the 
face of any emerging threats. We cannot afford to let our guard 
down, especially as adversaries like China seek to expand their 
influence and undermine global stability. It is essential for 
our national security that we maintain a robust defense 
capability to safeguard our interests and deter any potential 
threats to our sovereignty.
    So, Dr. Taylor-Kale, with the number of conflicts happening 
around the world and the ever-growing threat of the Chinese 
Communist Party, do you believe that our defense industrial 
base is sufficiently equipped? And additionally, how can we 
enhance our base and production to optimize our national 
security capacity?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the 
question. I want to reiterate that as much as we have had to 
rely on the defense industrial base, particularly over the last 
5 years, to bring the capabilities that our war fighters need 
and that our allies and partners need and, frankly, the 
American people during COVID, it has really stepped up and it 
continues to do so. We use the Defense Production Act every day 
to help prioritize and build more capabilities in our 
industrial base.
    I also want to highlight the point that you make about 
stockpiling and very much the importance of it. In the National 
Defense Industrial Strategy, we highlight the importance of 
stockpiling and using it to create more-resilient supply chains 
and ensure that we have defense critical components at the time 
that we need them. My office, my team, we work very closely 
with the National Defense Stockpile manager to ensure that in 
implementing and executing the Defense Production Act, we are 
working closely with stockpile needs. So again, I completely 
agree with you on the importance of the stockpile for our own 
overarching posture and for our own security and using the 
Defense Production Act.
    Mr. Williams of Texas. Okay. Main Street has stepped up to 
help defend our country since World War II, and continues to 
provide for our national defense today. As of 2021, nearly 
60,000 companies and over 1.1 million employees have 
contributed to the U.S. defense industry. These contractors 
range from the smallest businesses to large corporations who 
help to meet supply chain needs and work to develop the latest 
innovative systems and capabilities.
    It is crucial that we ensure that there are opportunities 
for small businesses. I chair the House Small Business 
Committee, and most businesses are small, so it is imperative 
that we make sure they have opportunities to enter this space 
and give them a chance to compete. So again, could you 
elaborate on the key relationships small businesses have with 
the defense industrial base and the necessity to increase the 
opportunities for small businesses in the space and create more 
competition?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, I completely agree with you that 
small businesses are an important part of our defense 
industrial base. I will also note that in terms of DPA Title 
III awards that the Department issues, about 40 percent of 
those awards tend to be to small businesses. We use the Title 
III awards, again, for the needs and the services and also to 
alleviate pressure points in the supply chain, but we are also 
using them oftentimes to create more competition and make sure 
that we eliminate sole sources of supplies of key material. 
Small businesses are a very important aspect of this. So, we 
will continue to support small businesses through our Office of 
Small Business Programs and our various programs for small 
businesses as well as through the Defense Production Act.
    Mr. Williams of Texas. Since the 1990s, the defense 
industry has seen a 90-percent decrease in the prime 
contracting space, from 51 contractors to 5 contractors. It is 
important to recognize the increase in the number of 
contractors leads to more reliable supply chains, scaled 
efficiency, less backlogs, and this increases competition. 
Again, the key word, ``competition,'' helps to ensure that our 
national defense is ready and strong. So, we continue to allow 
the free market to work to keep our nation secure. In the small 
amount of time I have left, could you elaborate on how 
increasing competition in the defense industry could lead to 
greater innovation and cost-effectiveness for the development 
and acquisition of military equipment technology, increasing 
our bases' capabilities? Could competition drive prices down?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, I completely agree with you. We, 
again, think of the work that we do through our programs in 
small business as well as through Defense Production Act Title 
III as part and parcel to helping to create more resilience in 
the defense industrial base, and create more competition in the 
system. Again, oftentimes what we are trying to do is address 
critical supplies and material where there is sole sourcing. 
And again, using the authorities that we have through DPA and 
the others that Congress has given us is really part of how we 
are trying to build more competition in the industrial base so 
that we have more cost-efficiency and are able to provide more 
capabilities to the war fighter.
    Mr. Williams of Texas. And my time is up. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. With that, 
we will go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzalez, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 
Ranking Member Beatty, and I would like to thank all of the 
panelists for showing up here today to talk to us.
    I would like to begin by discussing voluntary agreements 
under the DPA, and this will be to the panel, whomever wants to 
chime in on this. I believe that there is only one currently in 
effect tied to public-private collaboration at the height of 
the pandemic, which is still very near and dear to all of us. 
This collaboration brought together the best minds on a 
volunteer basis to collaborate and coordinate what was needed 
to get the United States and our people and our economy through 
COVID-19. The group wraps up its work next summer.
    When the 5-year period of this agreement expires, are there 
ways to leverage these voluntary agreements to plan ahead for 
future pandemics or other crisis, to build and stand by an 
industrial capacity for a period for a potential surge of use 
during a conflict? It has been suggested that these voluntary 
agreements under DPA could be the ideal way to prepare for 
these kinds of contingencies. I would like to hear your 
thoughts.
    Ms. Spishak. Thank you for your question. I am happy to 
start. Well, you started with the pandemic, the voluntary 
agreement that was established, and you are correct, it was 
established for 5 years. So, it will come to a close towards 
the end of next year, provided we don't see any changes in the 
current conditions. Under this voluntary agreement, we did 
learn a lot, and I think a couple of those things we learned 
will be really helpful for future voluntary agreements.
    To your point, I think it is a great opportunity for us to 
figure out better ways to integrate the civilian, military, and 
the private sector in terms of collaborating in a space that 
will not violate any antitrust laws. In particular, it took 
longer than we would have anticipated to get the voluntary 
agreement stood up for a variety of reasons, including that 
this is really the first one that has gone through 
implementation to that level. And I think that now that we know 
what those mechanisms are, we are looking at ways that we can 
think about that in the future so they are in place in advance 
of something that we would want to be ready for that engagement 
around.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. Any recommendations you would make 
to the committee today as we look forward?
    Ms. Spishak. I am happy to take that back for the record 
and reflect on some of the things we learned through COVID as 
we bring this current voluntary agreement to a close.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Very well. Thank you.
    Also, as we have seen, especially over the past 4 years, 
the DPA can show how business in the United States operates and 
how the economy functions. How does DPA fit in with other tools 
the Executive Branch has to shape the U.S. industrial base, 
including supplies and services and labor, and do you see any 
gaps in coverage that should be a concern to folks in Congress?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I will start off there. Again, for the 
Department of Defense, our main goal is to use the Defense 
Production Act, all the titles, to build resiliency in the 
industrial base for defense critical needs, so I will defer to 
other agencies on the broader economic concerns. Sometimes, we 
use Title I, Title III, and the information that we get out of 
Title VII in order to create a more robust response in certain 
critical sectors of need, and I am happy to get back to you 
with more information for the record as well.
    Mr. Gonzalez. I would appreciate that. Thank you. And I 
yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. With that, 
we will go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Loudermilk, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to 
all of our panelists here today. This is a very interesting 
subject, since I come from about a 30-year career in the IT 
sector, and cybersecurity has always been and will always be a 
great concern of mine.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler, one of the United States' greatest 
defense assets is its cybersecurity workforce. Even though the 
demand for cybersecurity-related talent has far outstripped 
supply, the U.S. still boasts one of the largest pools of 
cybersecurity talent in the world. Unlike our adversaries, most 
of these talented professionals work for private firms outside 
the State, Defense, and Intelligence apparatus.
    In their sobering 2020 report, the Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission highlighted the need to designate responsibilities 
for cybersecurity services under the Defense Production Act. 
More recently, the Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Jen Easterly, suggested 
that the agency is exploring ways that private incident 
response firms could be, ``compelled,'' to assist the U.S. 
Government in response to a large-scale drastic cyberattack 
against the United States. So with all that, the question would 
be, could you briefly explain the benefits of using the Defense 
Production Act to respond to a cyber-related national 
emergency?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Excuse me. I certainly share your 
concern about protecting our cybersecurity workforce and 
ensuring that they have a significant role in our national 
defense. The definition of, ``national defense,'' under the DPA 
is not something that the Commerce Department administers.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. We work with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) particularly in the cyber context. Under our 
delegation, if they were to place a rating order here based on 
their definition of, ``national defense,'' that is what would 
enable that to move forward.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Would anyone else like to tackle the 
question, the benefits of using DPA in a cyber-related national 
emergency? Dr. Taylor-Kale?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sure. Sir, I will make a quick note on 
this. I think, again, the benefit of the Defense Production 
Act, in general, is that it allows the President the authority 
to recognize when there is a national emergency and then apply 
the tools of prioritization allocation as well as direct grants 
or purchase commitments to sort of tackle the problem, and then 
with Title VII, being able to gather information from industry, 
as Commerce does. When you put it all together, it really 
allows for the ability to tackle a problem from many different 
angles. DOD hasn't used the authorities for cyber-related 
issues, but, again, if the President determined that we needed 
to, or if there was such an emergency in place, we would look 
to potentially use the Defense Production Act.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Is there anything that we should keep in 
mind as we move to reinforce or reauthorize DPA next year, 
especially when it comes to cybersecurity? Anyone? Yes?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I will note that, again, in my oversight 
over defense industrial policy and, again, small business, we 
have a Defense Industrial Base cybersecurity strategy that was 
also released this year, just a couple of months ago. 
Cybersecurity is one of the key issues for manufacturing in 
small businesses. We worry about the ways in which small 
businesses will be able to address some of the cybersecurity 
needs that the Defense Department has. I don't believe that 
this would necessarily fall under the purview of the Defense 
Production Act, but it is certainly something the Department is 
addressing and using other authorities, and any other tools.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Ms. Spishak?
    Ms. Spishak. Thank you. I just wanted to reiterate that 
based on the definition that Congress updated in 2003 of, 
``national defense,'' as my colleague was alluding to, it does 
cover the protection and restoration of critical infrastructure 
systems. And I could imagine, several scenarios where the 
preparedness or the response to a cyber incident for critical 
infrastructure would be something that could be covered by the 
Defense Production Act.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Thank you very much. Dr. Taylor-Kale, 
I just have a few seconds left, but could you briefly explain 
standby procurement contracts under Title III of the DPA?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, I believe you are talking about 
purchase commitments, and these are a critical tool. We have 
not used them yet. We have use cases that we believe we will be 
able to use in this coming year, but it allows us to be able to 
essentially buy material or guarantee to buy material in 
advance. It is particularly helpful for strategic materials, 
critical minerals, where we need some sort of an offtake and a 
way for the Defense Logistics Agency, the National Defense 
Stockpile, to be able to use it.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. We will 
now go to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Foster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and witnesses. I think 
the two most significant recent uses of this are the COVID 
epidemic, and also, the recent AI Executive Order, and the 
COVID thing, I think we built into the CARES Act mandatory GAO 
reporting on what went on because you are in this interesting 
box. By definition, it is an emergency, so you have to bypass a 
lot of the paperwork for sending stuff out for bids and so on, 
and that has a huge opportunity for potential corruption or all 
sorts of bad things. And what we came to in that instance was 
combining using the authorities and a very strong GAO 
oversight.
    And I was wondering if you have any comments on whether 
that is an effective thing, just the knowledge that the GAO is 
going to be looking over your work as you are doing all of 
these things on a very tight time scale? Is that a model that 
has worked well? Any comments you have on whether we should 
continue to make that part of a large scale use of the Defense 
Production Act?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I will comment quickly, sir. First, I 
think any time that you have oversight over something as 
powerful as the Defense Production Act, it offers many 
opportunities to learn, and certainly during COVID, we learned 
a lot in the Department about execution and how to execute 
quickly and efficiently as a result of what we learned in 
COVID. And since then, we have taken steps within the 
Department to move to work more quickly with our execution 
agent.
    You will see the sessions that I had for ways to improve 
the DPA law will particularly help the Department of Defense, 
where, right now, we have a sole and exclusive executive agent. 
In times of emergency like in COVID, we really need to be able 
to move much more flexibly, and, frankly, as our DPA Title III 
appropriations increase, having more flexibility with our 
execution offices will continue to be helpful.
    Mr. Foster. Yes. As I recall, one of the main GAO 
conclusions was that HHS, in particular, was not practiced in 
using the Defense Production Act because they traditionally 
hadn't really been an emergency response organization for 
national security emergencies. And I think there is just a lot 
of valuable information. I was on the COVID Select Committee in 
the last session of Congress and worked with now-Chairman, Mark 
Green, on GAO oversight of Operation Warp Speed, where I think 
the DPA was used to very effective use.
    Anyway, now to AI. Last October, President Biden invoked 
the DPA in his Executive Order on AI. And using these 
authorities, they called for AI developers to share safety 
information, including the results of relevant red team testing 
with Federal agencies. I think this is an important approach, 
but I wonder what happens when these reports come back, and is 
there anything you can say about--have you received any of the 
red team reports back? Have you set up a team to interpret what 
they mean, and what is the game plan here?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Thank you for the opportunity to talk 
about this. We are very excited about the opportunity presented 
in the DPA and the Executive Order to survey the very small 
number of frontier AI model developers about exactly what you 
mentioned, the safety and security as they develop frontier 
models. The results of our survey are still coming back. We are 
working very closely----
    Mr. Foster. Have you received at least some information 
back from them----
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. As a normal process here, we have back-
and-forth with the companies that receive surveys to make sure 
they understand what we are looking for and to make sure that 
the results we get are useful to us, so that is a normal part 
of the process. We have started to receive information. That 
is, of course, extremely sensitive. It is unique information--
--
    Mr. Foster. So, you don't intend to make this public? If 
you find something really scary in the red team results, that 
will be communicated back and, hopefully, they will fix it, or 
what happens next if something bad is discovered in the red 
team results that the companies are not addressing?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Absolutely. We use the results of our 
surveys to inform policy decisions. So if there is something 
that we found in that data that we would need to use, or other 
members of the government would need to use in some way, we can 
certainly affect that.
    Mr. Foster. I would be interested in your plans on sharing 
them both with the public and with Congress. If you discover 
something that you think we should know about, I would like to 
know that there is a plan for communicating it back to us.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. It is extremely sensitive data that is 
highly protected, but we certainly want to make sure that we 
can action it as appropriate.
    Mr. Foster. Thank you. My time is up, and I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back, but he 
makes a great point. Again, we need to be working together with 
you and with us to make sure we do the right thing here and 
protect our country. Thank you.
    The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meuser, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meuser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 
of our witnesses. Clearly, we have some very severely 
escalating global tensions--Israel, Ukraine, Taiwan, Iran, and 
various situations in Africa.
    I guess the main question, Dr. Taylor-Kale is, is our 
industrial base prepared to surge should it be required? Do we 
have a plan for stockpiling? Some of the production sites, are 
they aware that they are production sites that we are counting 
on to surge for perhaps two or three significant conflicts? Are 
they aware that they may be tapped? I will start with those 
questions.
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Absolutely. Thank you, sir. The DOD, 
through the military services, through my office, and through 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & 
Sustainment, has regular ongoing dialogues with industry, 
specifically along the lines of key weapon systems that are 
needed for surge for wherever the conflict may be, whether it 
is the current conflict in Ukraine or Israel, and also to 
address the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific. I will note that 
one of the key issues that we see are long lead times for the 
fielding of certain systems to the war fighter. Part of how we 
use the Defense Production Act, frankly, sir, is to actually 
address some of these long lead times.
    Mr. Meuser. The Navy has expressed some concerns about 
steel production for our ships. I have concerns as well with 
our natural gas. We have a prohibition now on exports. We 
should be, of course, looking after the well-being of the 
European Union, which could use our natural gas, particularly 
if there were multiple severe conflicts throughout the world, 
and I would imagine that is what the Defense Production Act is 
and you folks are engaged in. Can you address the steel 
production, and if you do, in fact, have natural gas concerns 
not just for us domestically but for our allies?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, certainly, the need for energy is a 
key one for us as well as for our allies and partners. Using 
the Defense Production Act, we are not making investments that 
address natural gas or steel per se, but I understand 
completely your concern and how this will affect our allies and 
partners as we address conflicts around the globe.
    Mr. Meuser. Ms. Rozman-Kendler, that might be within your 
role. Do you have concerns about that?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Congressman, if there were an area here 
that we could explore with a survey, we have done that before 
under Title VII of the DPA. To gather information on the 
industrial base, we could certainly engage with----
    Mr. Meuser. Okay. A survey? Come on. If they need natural 
gas, they are going to get it from somewhere, and they are 
getting it from Russia and other places. And that might not be 
a very friendly business partner in the near future.
    Let me ask you about the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SBR) 
situation, where we are about 30 percent, at best, of capacity. 
Is that an example of our preparedness in minerals and other 
items, energy, for instance, and other production capacities 
that are important to our domestic security? I will ask you, 
Ms. Rozman-Kendler.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. That is not something that is within my 
purview, sir, but I do----
    Mr. Meuser. Ms. Taylor-Kale? It has to be within one of 
your purviews.
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I'm sorry. Can I----
    Mr. Meuser. The SBR being at 25 percent to 30 percent of 
its capacity is not a good example of our preparedness for 
defense production, and that is energy, which runs everything. 
Is that an example of our capacity or is that an anomaly?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sir, I understand your concerns around 
energy. What I will say is that the Department of Defense, and 
my office, don't have oversight over the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve. So I would have to defer to, I believe, the Department 
of Energy or the Department of the Interior for that.
    Mr. Meuser. I think it was last year, there was $250 
million spent on heat pumps out of the Defense Production Act, 
and then, curiously, there was another $250 million for 
critical minerals, which were purchased from overseas, in fact, 
many from China. Can somebody explain that?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. You are probably referring to Title III. 
The questions around heat pumps, I will have to defer to the 
Department of Energy, as those were their awards. We received 
$250 million from the Inflation Reduction Act for----
    Mr. Meuser. That is what this money was used for, right?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. ----critical minerals, but we----
    Mr. Meuser. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. If we could 
follow this up later, that would be great. Thank you.
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sure. I am happy to do so.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman's time has expired. We 
will now go to the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nunn, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much 
to the committee members for being here today, particularly 
those speaking on the Defense Production Act.
    The U.S., as we all know, is a strategic leader in the free 
world, in large part due to our arsenal of democracy, and what 
you are helping to provide for this is essential. And with the 
hot conflicts that continue to rage in the Middle East and 
around the world, continuing throughout our area, our strategic 
stockpiles, as we all know, have continued to dwindle, and the 
ability to not only re-support but find new ways into this 
continues to be challenged. The U.S. has the most capable 
innovation and manufacturing capabilities in the world, so I 
think we all collectively want to find ways to do this 
effectively.
    With that, I would like to talk about leveraging the full 
spectrum of the Defense Production Act to allow the U.S. to 
fill our existing gaps in output and harness the full potential 
of our partners, both within the industrial sector, the 
innovative sector, as well as our foreign allies. So, let's get 
started.
    I would like to begin with you, Dr. Taylor-Kale. I 
appreciate you being here today. As we look at what we are 
doing in the Defense Production Act, particularly in Title III, 
we have identified that there are more and more foreign 
partners who have the potential to be with us--the United 
Kingdom, Australia. Would you support DPA Title III awards 
being made available for foreign companies even if they 
potentially spend those funds abroad?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Thank you for the question, and, again, I 
want to underline that the Department really applauds the 
Congress for redefining domestic sources to include Australia 
and the U.K. As it currently stands, we give awards to 
companies that are planning to do projects in the United States 
or in Canada. As of yet, we haven't actually issued a DPA Title 
III award for a company working in Canada, and now that we have 
the new authority for the U.K. and Australia, we will be able 
to do so there. But our priority is domestic sourcing and 
domestic production, and generally that means companies that 
are planning to do work in the U.S., and now also, Canada, the 
U.K., and Australia.
    Mr. Nunn. Which is great. As we expand into that, I guess I 
want to know, are there certain things that would be more 
effectively done with, in this case, our Five Eyes partners, 
minus New Zealand, in a more efficient way, particularly when 
we are talking about submarine development for containment of 
potential adversaries in the South China Sea?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. The way in which we have talked about 
using the Defense Production Act, particularly with these 
expanded domestic partners, is really to use it for our mutual 
benefit to address supply chain concerns. We have defense 
critical supply chains that are a concern for us as well as for 
Canada, the U.K., and Australia. So, the way that we plan to 
use these awards is really to address how we can use mutual 
benefit to address some defense critical supply chain.
    Mr. Nunn. Thank you. Let me ask a more specific question, 
then. Under DPA Title III, do you have the ability to award to 
a foreign entity that would build in a foreign country? Does 
that authority exist?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. My understanding of the law is that we 
have the ability to award to companies that are based in the 
U.S., the U.K., Australia----
    Mr. Nunn. Right, like the joint strike fighters. Obviously, 
we can build components in all of those areas. That would make 
sense, correct? The same can be said for software----
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. As long as the companies are from the 
U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada----
    Mr. Nunn. I got it. Yes.
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. ----and also working in those countries.
    Mr. Nunn. What is the average length of time for receiving 
a DPA Title III request once a final government reply has been 
delivered, let's say, in the last 2 years?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Sure. In the last 2 years, we have 
improved it where now, from the time that we receive a White 
Paper to when we make a determination to the company, it can be 
anywhere from 3 months to more. Where the time has come into 
place and where it has increased time is in the actual 
obligation of the awards. Again, it has been my priority as 
Assistant Secretary to decrease those times. And with the new 
Defense Industrial Base Consortium, as well as working more 
closely with our Air Force partners, we are going to be able to 
reduce those times to 12 to 16 weeks.
    Mr. Nunn. That would be amazing if that is the timeline 
that you are able to do. I think we have all experienced 
collectively the, ``Valley of Death,'' here, particularly for 
folks who want to come into this sector. Right now, we only 
really have five major defense contractors, with so much 
innovation available. I would encourage us to look collectively 
at how we can provide better on-ramps for these folks, and how 
we can lessen that timeline, particularly with our allies, to 
be able to bring on the innovation necessary at the time and 
place of need.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. With that, 
we go to the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. De La Cruz, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. De La Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
witnesses, for being here today.
    As we look forward to reauthorizing the Defense Production 
Act, we are confronting a world that is more and more in 
conflict than it has been in many years, with the wars raging 
in Europe, our ally Israel engaging in a war that keeps 
threatening to spread, and China becoming belligerent towards 
its domestic neighbors. It is critical that this committee 
actually stays focused on what the uses are for the DPA, and 
that the DPA is not used for political controversy or to 
compete against allies and our friends.
    As you know, I am from Texas, so my question has to do with 
critical minerals needed for a wide range of industrial 
purposes, including defense. And what I mean by that is 32 of 
37 critical minerals are either concentrated in China or in 
other countries with strong diplomatic or economic ties to 
China, and only 5 of the 32 are concentrated in the United 
States, Australia, or Canada. This, in my opinion, is a 
strategic weakness, and we need to enhance our capacity to 
build out supplies of these minerals.
    As I mentioned, I am from Texas, and in Texas, we recognize 
this, and we are happy to be on the receiving end of a number 
of DPA-facilitated projects to refine rare earth minerals. The 
previous Administration used its DPA purchasing authority to 
put a floor on the price of rare earth elements refined in the 
United States, including, again, in my home State of Texas.
    Dr. Taylor-Kale, and Ms. Rozman-Kendler, do you believe 
that China would just drop prices to drive U.S. critical 
mineral companies out of business if DPA provisions like this 
were not in place?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Ma'am, I want to underscore the concern 
that you are raising about the PRC's interventions in the 
critical mineral space. This is something that the Department 
has been concerned about and really focusing our DPA Title III 
investments on to address the military services' needs.
    I will give an example. You mentioned using the Defense 
Production Act not just for defense needs. Again, we are very 
concerned and focused on readiness and resilience in defense 
critical supply chains, but there are ways in which our 
investments can also be helpful in the commercial market. For 
instance, lithium batteries is something that we use in defense 
systems and it is key for us. We have made investments using 
Title III there, but obviously, lithium is going to be 
important for batteries that are not defense needs. So 
certainly, focusing on defense critical needs is something that 
can oftentimes be a win-win for even the commercial side as 
well.
    Ms. De La Cruz. Reclaiming my time here, do you believe 
that China would drop prices to drive the United States out of 
business? And that is the main concern there, is how is China 
going to affect the United States if they drop prices?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I will defer to my colleague from Commerce 
on the state of play with trade with China. But I will say that 
from our perspective, any way that we can increase defense 
production, we see as a deterrent. And we believe by making 
these investments in critical aspects of defense supply chains, 
that we are actually making a deterrent mechanism for our 
adversaries.
    Ms. De La Cruz. Okay. Thank you.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Congresswoman, I share your concerns. 
We are deeply concerned about the ability of China to use 
critical mineral resources in a way that is contrary to U.S. 
national security. Take, for example, their controls on gallium 
and germanium that they have put in place in the last year, 
that are of deep concern. I would also note that we have used 
DPA authority under Title VII to look into neodymium iron boron 
permanent magnets and also vanadium. These are two surveys that 
we have conducted, and the results of those surveys are used 
for policy decisions in those spheres, and I imagine that we 
will continue to do that work to support our colleagues making 
national security decisions.
    Ms. De La Cruz. Thank you. My time is up. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady's time has expired. 
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Kim, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer, and Ranking 
Member Beatty, for holding this hearing. And thank you to our 
witnesses for staying this long.
    I want to let you know that I am concerned that we don't 
have the naval capabilities to ensure that we are successfully 
deterring any conflict against the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in the Indo-Pacific. The Office of Naval Intelligence 
recently said that the CCP's shipbuilding industry yields 232 
times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States and it 
represents almost 50 percent of the total global shipbuilding 
supply. And we, the United States, have 7 shipyards that build 
warships for the Navy, whereas the CCP operates more than 20 
shipyards. This is all evidence that we are falling behind in 
our strategic competition with China.
    Dr. Taylor-Kale, how is your office thinking about bridging 
this gap of shipbuilding capacity between the U.S. and the CCP?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. Ma'am, thank you for the question. First, 
I want to say that the Defense Production Act is one of 
multiple tools that the Department of Defense has to strengthen 
the defense industrial base, and the shipbuilding industry in 
particular.
    Mrs. Kim. As Congress is looking to reauthorize the DPA, is 
there anything that you would change in the current statute to 
fast-track and facilitate the shipbuilding projects?
    Ms. Taylor-Kale. I certainly think, ma'am, our ability to 
be able to execute more quickly in order to address the real 
urgency of the threat will be very important. Again, as I 
noted, we use other tools within the Department, so another 
industrial base fund that I have within my office, we work 
closely with the Navy on shipbuilding workforce. The Navy is 
also prioritizing investments and using their authorities. They 
recently passed supplemental offers, over $3 billion, in 
submarine industrial base investments, so we are seeing where 
these investments are going into play. And again, the DPA is 
one of multiple tools that we can use for that.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Ms. Rozman-Kendler, can you discuss 
the Interagency Offset Working Group, what it does, who are the 
members and how often do they meet, and what results have come 
out of those meetings?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Thank you. We do collaborate very 
closely with the Interagency, of course, across our DPA 
authorities. I think I may need to get back to you on specific 
details as that is not something in which I am personally 
engaged. But across-the-board, especially with the State 
Department when it comes to offsets, we are working to engage 
with industry here in the United States and with governments 
overseas. We also take very seriously our reporting requirement 
with respect to offsets to make sure that we are informing 
Congress of what we are observing in that field.
    Mrs. Kim. Okay. We can follow up on that then.
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler, you talked about Title VII, and it has 
historically been used to inform what are commonly referred to 
as the industrial base assessments, and the Department of 
Commerce conducts those assessments. So, what is an industrial 
base assessment, and what is the relevance of those assessments 
in relation to Title VII?
    Ms. Rozman-Kendler. Thank you, Congresswoman. The Title VII 
industrial base assessment and survey authority is very 
important to protecting our national security. We work to 
survey industry in various areas important to our national 
defense to find information that is only available through 
those surveys. It is unique information. I mentioned earlier 
employment data or, as we talked about in the artificial 
intelligence context, safety and security information, that 
those companies do not otherwise make public, and with that 
information, we inform policymakers on how to move forward.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I want to ask Ms. Spishak, the Defense 
Production Act Committee (DPAC) was created during the 2009 
reauthorization. Can you discuss what, if any, impact the DPAC 
has made? And it is my understanding that the FEMA 
Administrator currently sits as the Chair, so can you discuss 
some of the duties that they serve in that role?
    Ms. Spishak. Thank you for the question. The Defense 
Production Act Committee, you are correct, was established in 
2009, and the FEMA Administrator serves as the Chair. It is 
really a body that is intended to have strategic policy 
conversations regarding the Defense Production Act at the 
Secretary, Administrator, or Director level, depending on the 
department or agency.
    I think the most important value that it has offered us so 
far is that it has been kind of the underpinning and the 
organizational structure for us to develop a strong interagency 
working group at the level of the directors who are engaging 
across the various Defense Production Act programs, both with 
the determination departments and with the resource 
departments. So, it has created this network for us to be able 
to be well-coordinated as one of FEMA's major roles is making 
sure that there is coordination against the national 
mobilization.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much. My time is up. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady's time has expired, 
and we have run out of Members to cross-examine you today, so I 
want to thank you all for your participation. You did a great 
job of explaining and answering our questions. If any of our 
Members do have questions, they will submit them through our 
office, and we will submit them to you. I think I mentioned to 
you, Ms. Taylor-Kale, that I have one that I want you to finish 
up answering, and I would appreciate a quick response back on 
that. We do hope that you respond to that very promptly.
    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in 
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
the record.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much 
for your participation.
    [Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X


                              May 8, 2024
                              
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               [all]