[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-46]
                         

                        CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION

                        ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE

                          OF THE UNITED STATES

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                           NOVEMBER 15, 2023


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
56-378                      WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    Chair                            RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska                  MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               SARA JACOBS, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 PATRICK RYAN, New York
PAT FALLON, Texas                    JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota                  Pennsylvania
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
NICK LaLOTA, New York                TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK ALFORD, Missouri                JIMMY PANETTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida                  MARC VEASEY, Texas
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
Vacancy

                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                    Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Chair, Congressional Commission on the 
  Strategic Posture of the United States.........................     3
Kyl, Hon. Jon L., Vice Chair, Congressional Commission on the 
  Strategic Posture of the United States.........................     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., joint with Hon. Jon L. Kyl.........    33
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking 
      Member, Committee on Armed Services........................    31

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Senator Dianne Feinstein Op-ed...............................    67

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Sbmitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mrs. McClain.................................................    75
    Mr. Rogers...................................................    71
    Ms. Sewell...................................................    75
    Mr. Turner...................................................    71
    Mr. Waltz....................................................    72
 
. 
 CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                      Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 15, 2023.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
        ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today we 
are joined by the chairs of the Strategic Posture Review 
Commission. The Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] established the commission to assess the 
long-term strategic posture of the United States, and to 
provide Congress with recommendations to improve our nuclear 
deterrent.
    We did this because for the first time since the dawn of 
the atomic era, the United States must deter two nuclear peer 
adversaries simultaneously. China is rapidly expanding its 
nuclear forces in what Admiral Richard, the former STRATCOM 
[U.S. Strategic Command] commander, described as a breathtaking 
strategic breakout. According to the Department of Defense's 
most recent report on China's military power, the pace of its 
rapid nuclear build-up will only accelerate in the coming 
years.
    Meanwhile Russia possesses the largest and most diverse 
nuclear arsenal in the world. It maintains a nuclear weapons 
production complex capable of producing hundreds of warheads 
per year, and its arsenal continues to expand. Most alarming, 
its stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a category of 
nuclear arms not limited by any treaty, reportedly holds at 
least a 10-to-1 advantage over the U.S.
    Both China and Russia are also developing new highly 
destabilizing nuclear capabilities designed to avoid U.S. early 
warning systems and give both nations the ability to launch 
surprise nuclear attacks. China is also developing a fractional 
orbital bombardment system armed with nuclear hypersonic glide 
body. And Russia is on the cusp of fielding a suite of new 
capabilities including nuclear-armed cruise missiles powered by 
nuclear reactors, and a megaton class long-range underwater 
nuclear system.
    Meanwhile, North Korea's nuclear arsenal is rapidly 
expanding and growing in sophistication, and Iran is within a 
few days from having enough enriched uranium to build a bomb. 
The United States on the other hand, has allowed its nuclear 
enterprise to wither away. As of today, we cannot produce a 
nuclear weapon. We are the only nuclear power unable to do so.
    Years of complacency have caused significant delays in our 
efforts to resolve this capability. And while I was pleased to 
see the successful first flight of the B-21 this weekend, 
programs to build modern replacements for our Cold War-era 
nuclear triad have suffered from repeated delays. And finally, 
the Biden Administration's efforts to end development of a 
nuclear capable sea launched cruise missile and retire other 
nuclear weapons before their replacements arrive further 
undermines our strategic deterrent.
    We need to reverse course. We need an enhanced level of 
innovation and investment in our nuclear modernization, that's 
what this commission, on a bipartisan basis, is asking us to 
do. As the commission notes, maintaining a credible strategic 
deterrent will be expensive, but failing to do so will result 
in a war that is far more expensive in both lives and 
resources.
    I applaud the commission for their great work, and I 
strongly support their recommendations, I look forward to 
working with my colleagues on ways to implement them.
    And with that, I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. 
Moulton.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
           MASSACHUSETTS, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask for unanimous 
consent for Ranking Member Smith's opening statement to be 
entered into the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The opening statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the 
Appendix on page ?.]
    Mr. Moulton. As the chairman has said, we clearly have a 
lot of work to do, and not a lot of time to do it. And that 
means we need to move quickly, but it also means we need to be 
wise, we need to be smart about the investments that we make. I 
want to highlight some of the points in Ranking Member Smith's 
statement before we hear from our witnesses.
    ``I have often said that the world would be safer without 
nuclear weapons, and we should all continue to strive for that 
someday. But we also need to be realistic, as we face today's 
more challenging strategic environment, we must ensure that our 
nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable. And as we do 
that, we'll need to ensure that any changes to our nuclear 
force posture don't draw us into a massive nuclear arms race.''
    As the ranking member's statement acknowledges, maintaining 
strategic deterrents in such a complex threat environment 
requires a whole-of-government approach. The Department of 
Defense alone cannot be successful at deterring or prevailing 
in strategic conflict without leveraging our diplomatic and 
economic tools. His statement also highlights the fact that the 
report does not call for any immediate changes to our nuclear 
deterrent.
    I agree that the DOD [Department of Defense] should focus 
on increasing conventional capabilities, a strong 
recommendation of the report, with a particular emphasis on 
innovation in the defense industrial base, and improving 
resilience across our existing space and nuclear command and 
control architectures. Lastly, I want to associate myself with 
the ranking member's comments regarding the lack of 
prioritization or costs associated with the recommendations.
    It makes it difficult for us to determine how to move 
forward without those and lends itself to those who say we 
should just do everything everywhere all at once. That of 
course is not possible, but it also could be dangerous. So, 
we've got to be wise about how we move forward, but we also 
have a lot of work to. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank Mr. Moulton. Now I'd like to 
introduce our witnesses, the Honorable Madelyn Creedon is the 
Chair of the commission. She is the former Principal Deputy 
Administrator of NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration], and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 
Strategic Affairs. And of course we have the Honorable John 
Kyl, he is the commission's Vice Chair, he spent 26 years 
representing Arizona in the U.S. House and Senate, and remains 
a tremendous leader on national security issues.
    Welcome, and Ms. Creedon, we'll start with you, you're 
recognized.

  STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL 
    COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

    Ms. Creedon. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 
Member Smith, Congressman Moulton, and distinguished members of 
the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this 
morning on the report of the Congressional Commission on the 
Strategic Posture of the United States. Senator Kyl, the Vice 
Chair of the commission and I are pleased to appear here today 
to discuss the commission's bipartisan consensus report.
    Our report and the 81 recommendations contained therein is 
consistent with our statutory charge, which was to conduct a 
review of the strategic posture of the United States. Including 
a strategic threat assessment and a detailed review of nuclear 
weapons policy, strategy, and force structure, and factors 
affecting the stability of new peer competitors of the United 
States, and peer, and near peer nuclear power competition.
    Although the report is hard hitting, it is also fairly 
subtle, and requires a careful reading. This subtlety has led 
to some confusion about what the report does and does not 
recommend. We are not recommending substantial increases in 
U.S. nuclear force posture. We want to avoid a new nuclear arms 
race, and most importantly, we want to avoid a nuclear 
conflict, and thus we need a credible, conventional, and 
nuclear deterrent.
    We do recommend that we plan and be prepared for a more 
challenging future, while fully supporting diplomatic and whole 
of government operations to reduce tensions and ensure 
strategic stability. The commission's report is threat 
informed, forward looking, bipartisan consensus. The report 
provides high level guidance to shape and ensure future 
decision makers have real options while generally refraining 
from choosing specific systems.
    We provide characteristics of recommended capabilities but 
do not pick the winners and losers. The time frame for the 
report is 2027 and beyond, looking at least to 2035. The 
commission concluded that U.S. defense strategy and posture 
must change to properly defend its vital interests and improve 
strategic stability with Russia and China. Given the current 
threat trajectories, in the coming years the U.S. will face a 
world with two nations that possess nuclear weapons, nuclear 
arsenals on par with our own.
    Facing, deterring two nuclear weapons is unprecedented. I 
would also note that this is the second nuclear posture 
commission, the first one issued its report in 2009 and hoped 
for a much better world. To quote, they said they rejected the 
vision of a world defined over the next decade or two by a 
renewal of competition for nuclear advantage among the major 
powers.
    Unfortunately, that's not the path the world chose to go 
down. Today, the U.S. is on the cusp of a fundamentally 
different global setting that we did not want, and for which we 
did not plan, and are not well prepared. Our commission was 
very focused on being prepared, and laying the foundation now 
for decisions that might be needed in the future. We want to 
ensure that decision makers can make decisions, and that they 
actually have options to implement.
    As prospects for agreements on nuclear arms control now 
appear bleak, we must consider that we may be in a situation 
where there is no strategic arms control treaty. That said, 
diplomacy must be strengthened, as there is no reason to stop 
pursuing broader risk reduction efforts when achievable, and in 
the U.S. national security interest. If there are opportunities 
for arms control or other strategic stability talks, military-
to-military talks, confidence building measures, or other 
opportunities they should all be explored.
    There are five assumptions that underpin our report. First, 
Russia and China will continue their respective adversarial 
paths, each growing the quality and quantity of their nuclear 
arsenals. China will continue to grow its conventional forces, 
including its space and cyber capabilities. Russia will grow 
its space and cyber capabilities, and each will continue their 
aggressive foreign policies, and seek to supplement the U.S. 
global leadership role.
    Second, today's one major war strategy construct is no 
longer viable, particularly given China's current trajectory. 
The six foundational longstanding tenets of U.S. nuclear 
strategy remain valid. Four, strong allies and partners are 
essential, and make us all stronger together, but we need 
greater cooperation, coordination, and integration. The U.S. 
deterrent must be credible and seen that way by our adversaries 
as well as our allies and partners.
    From a force structure perspective, the U.S. Nuclear 
Modernization Program of record must be fully implemented as 
rapidly as possible to deter Russia and China. The program of 
record is necessary but not sufficient to address the projected 
threat. And finally, I would like to highlight the report's 
reduction on infrastructure and the industrial base both at DOD 
and the National Security Administration, which are out of 
date, unusable, and in some cases literally falling down.
    Both departments are struggling with supply chain issues, 
and neither have enough capacity to meet future requirements on 
a timely basis. So, we need investment in the DOD, and in NNSA 
infrastructure. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon can be found in the 
Appendix on page ?.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Creedon.
    Senator Kyl, you're recognized.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JON L. KYL, VICE CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL 
    COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank 
you and the ranking member for setting the stage with opening 
statements that really highlight the fact that we are entering 
into an unprecedented time, when for the first time the United 
States faces potential adversaries, both of whom would be 
nuclear peers with the United States. And that really was the 
beginning of our understanding of what we needed to recommend 
to the commission.
    I'd like to reiterate a point that Madelyn made, that this 
was a consensus report. All 12 commissioners signed this 
document, and since you are aware that the commissioners were 
appointed by the leadership of the House, and Senate, and the 
Armed Services committees, you can appreciate the fact that we 
started out as a rather disparate group of people with 
differing points of view.
    The reason I mention that is that knowing the commissioners 
and knowing that we provided a document that is a consensus, 
unanimous document, should give you some confidence that we 
would not be recommending that the United States start a new 
arms race, that is not something this commission would do, as 
Madelyn said. What are the facts? I'm a little sensitive to 
that critique because it reveals to me that-- a 
misunderstanding of the facts that exist today.
    After the Cold War the United States allowed our nuclear 
enterprise to atrophy, both the weapons and the delivery 
systems. Not long after that, Russia began a program of 
modernizing its forces, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, to 
the point that today Russia is about 90 percent through its 
program of modernization, and has resulted in a wide array of 
both weapons and delivery systems.
    In the meantime, China decided to build up its military in 
a way unseen since the Cold War, and it is quite a ways down 
the road toward achieving its goal, which is parity with the 
United States and Russia, especially with regard to the nuclear 
forces. And where is the United States in the meantime? Well, 
we're out of the starting blocks, but as you pointed out, we're 
going to have a very difficult time even meeting the goals that 
we've set forward to try to achieve our existing program of 
record by the year 2035.
    We will be fortunate if we can do that. So, that's where we 
are, we're obviously not starting anything, we're playing catch 
up, and it's going to be a pretty tough job to catch up. The 
other thing that I'll mention relates to a point that 
Representative Moulton made. Your remit to our commission was 
not to develop a cost analysis, and we did not do that, as you 
point out.
    I think it would have been too difficult to do in any 
event, because much of what needs to be done in the future has 
yet to be decided. The commission can see very clearly what 
kind of requirements we need to meet, what kind of capabilities 
we need to have, but precisely what weapon systems comprise 
that suite will remain to be seen, and therefore it's very 
difficult to put a cost to it.
    But I would make this point, when Representative Moulton, 
you say we may need to set some priorities within the overall 
budget, I would push back on that with this foundation. Every 
recent Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs Chairman has said 
that the strategic posture, the strategic deterrent, and in 
particular our nuclear deterrent is the number one priority of 
the Defense Department.
    And if that's the case, then we have to act like it's the 
number one priority. That means that when you set priorities, 
this has the top priority. And we shouldn't be fighting within 
the deterrent program, our strategic deterrent program for the 
dollars that are needed to achieve the deterrent that we need. 
What are we all about here? We're trying to prevent war.
    What is more important to the American people than 
deterring a would be opponent from being tempted to think that 
they could attack the United States in some way and be better 
off for it? Our deterrent must persuade them that that cannot 
be. So, in mentioning this consensus report, I hope that there 
is some acknowledgment that these twelve very different people 
up here would not be recommending something foolish.
    We put a lot of thought into this. And the specifics with 
regard to various weapon systems in the future, as Madelyn 
said, will have to be deferred until the people at the Defense 
Department R&D programs and others decide what the best way to 
satisfy the requirements is, our job was to set forth the 
requirements.
    Final point, we recommend that the leadership of the 
Congress and the Administration must take the case to the 
American people of what the threat is, what the stakes are, and 
what the solutions to the problems are, and what those costs 
are. If you're going to be able to sustain the budget that will 
be required to meet these requirements, you're going to have to 
have the support of the American people.
    And that means you need to take the case to the American 
people. And as a result, our recommendation is very firm that 
the leadership of this committee, and the other people in 
Congress who have the expertise such as yourselves need to take 
the lead in discussing these important subjects with the people 
who ultimately have to make the decisions to approve them. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Kyl can be found in the 
Appendix on page ?.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, I completely agree. I do 
want to make sure everybody is aware, we're going to have votes 
called in about an hour, so I want us to move quickly, so I 
will limit myself to one question. I love the report, I am 
curious though, and I share your sentiment, Senator, that this 
committee, as well as our counterpart on the Senate side is 
going to have to really be vocal about this.
    Do y'all have a plan to get in front of Secretary Austin, 
DEPSEC [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Hicks, Chairman Brown, and 
NSA [U.S. National Security Advisor] Director Sullivan with 
your results so that the administration can be exposed to what 
your unanimous recommendations are?
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. So, we don't yet, 
we have requested. Obviously they're a little bit busy these 
days.
    The Chairman. We all are, but this is very, very important.
    Ms. Creedon. It is. We did have the opportunity before we 
released the report to pre-brief the NSC [National Security 
Council], the Nuclear Weapons Council, and NNSA, and subsequent 
to the release of the report we were able to brief the 
commander of U.S. Strategic Command. So, we are making 
progress, and I hope that we are able to have some more in 
depth meetings with both Secretary Austin, and Deputy Secretary 
Hicks in the near future.
    The Chairman. Excellent, thank you.
    I will Yield to Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'll keep my 
questions quick and short as well. You talked about the need to 
increase investment in conventional forces. This is maybe not 
what people expected to come out of your report as one of 
several recommendations. Can you explain why that's important, 
and where that fits into nuclear deterrents?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Moulton, yes. The 
commission came to the conclusion that the best way to deter a 
nuclear conflict is to deter a conventional conflict with the 
nuclear powers. Because it is most likely that we would 
escalate to a nuclear conflict as a result of being in a 
conventional war with another nuclear power. And that's why we 
emphasized the need to first of all create the deterrent with 
our conventional forces.
    And that's where the bulk of the spending, by the way, that 
we recommend would occur in the early years, building up our 
conventional forces. Most of the expenditures on the nuclear 
side would come after that.
    Mr. Moulton. So, I've been in, seen some of these war games 
where exactly what you described becomes a problem, and a 
conventional conflict can essentially run out of conventional 
responses, and so it becomes nuclear. Can you just explain that 
for the American people? Both how a conventional conflict could 
become nuclear, but also separately how simply having 
conventional forces could deter a conflict in the first place?
    Senator Kyl. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 
Moulton, it's a great question. And the short answer is that if 
you look at a case like Ukraine for example, where at a point 
the Russians were being beaten back and were in a mode of 
retreat. And there was a lot of speculation at that time that 
because they didn't have the conventional means to prevent the 
rout, that they may have to use nuclear weapons, tactical or 
non-strategic nuclear weapons, to cover their rear in this 
case, to cover their retreat so that they wouldn't be defeated.
    And that's just one example of how in a conventional 
conflict a party could conclude that the best way forward for 
that party is to use the tactical nuclear weapons that they 
have. Well, it's a pretty short step, and as you know, there's 
really no clear definition between a strategic and non-
strategic, or tactical nuclear weapon, but it's an escalatory 
ladder that you can climb pretty quickly between a lower yield 
tactical type weapon and using higher yield almost strategic 
level weapons.
    Where this could come into play with the United States for 
example is if there were an attack on a NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] country, and we had an obligation to be 
involved, and the conventional deterrent wasn't adequate to 
prevent this nuclear escalation, we could find ourselves in 
that situation relatively quickly, that's what we don't want to 
do.
    So, if we can have a conventional deterrent that would 
dissuade any potential adversary from concluding that they 
could defeat us conventionally, we would have the best chance 
of also being able to avoid a nuclear conflict.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, thank you very much. I mean, I think we 
can all agree that we don't want a nuclear conflict, and 
explaining this is really important because people often ask 
why are we investing so much in nuclear weapons, why are we 
investing so much in conventional forces, in the DOD every 
year. And ultimately of course, we all agree that we want to 
deter war, and specifically we want to deter nuclear war.
    I'll also just add very quickly that you were quick to 
criticize my discussion of prioritization, but you've just 
described something that we need to invest in, which is 
separate from our just simply strategic deterrent. If we only 
had one priority then I would agree with you, that we would 
only invest in nuclear forces. But when I talk about 
prioritization, it's figuring out this balance.
    If you say we have to improve our conventional forces, then 
we have to figure out how much we put into that versus our 
nuclear forces, and the right balance is going to be difficult 
to find. But that's exactly why we have your commission, and 
it's been very helpful, and thank you very much.
    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 
Moulton, might I respond just very briefly? We conclude that 
the strategic deterrent is not just a nuclear deterrent, it is 
a combination of conventional and nuclear. And so, when I say 
that we shouldn't have to prioritize to build our strategic 
deterrent, what I'm really saying is that we shouldn't have to 
choose between conventional and nuclear.
    They are one and the same effort to provide a deterrent 
against any enemy attack. So, if you view the conventional side 
of the equation as part of the strategic deterrent, we 
shouldn't have to make those tough choices between one or the 
other, we can do both.
    Mr. Moulton. That's very helpful, thank you for that 
clarification.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South 
Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you 
for being here today, and how important it is, and I think it's 
really important too, to see that there is such bipartisan 
support for your recommendations, and what should be done for 
deterrents. Chairwoman Creedon, with that, I appreciate that 
the communities of South Carolina and Georgia are extremely 
supportive of the plutonium pit production mission at the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
    I am grateful that I'm the only member of Congress who has 
actually worked at the Savannah River Site, so I have a special 
appreciation. Maintaining enacted levels of funding for the 
Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility is necessary to 
ensure that our Nation can reach our nuclear modernization 
needs and maintain an effective nuclear deterrent.
    In describing the pit production challenge, the previous 
administration's Nuclear Posture Review stated that failing to 
achieve a production capacity of 80 pits per year by 2030 quote 
``Would result in the need for a higher rate pit production at 
a higher cost'' end of quote. The commission recommends 
Congress fund the full range of NNSA's recapitalization effort 
such as pit productions, and all operations related to critical 
materials.
    What can Congress do to help meet the goal of producing 
plutonium pits at Savannah River Site as close to 2030 as 
possible?
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you very much for that question. It is 
important, and as you mentioned, the infrastructure at the 
National Nuclear Security Administration needs a considerable 
amount of work. There is a lot of work that has been done on 
the science side, and that's important, and it has to continue 
to allow us to continue to develop and modify as necessary new 
nuclear weapons.
    But the actual production infrastructure, as you mentioned, 
is the one that needs the most attention. So, for your 
question, among other things, I think the NNSA, obviously they 
need the money to do these things. They need the money on a 
regularized basis, they need enough money so that they can 
implement on a practical basis.
    In other words, as you know, the NNSA is incrementally 
funded, but having more money in the right years so that they 
can plan and execute appropriately is important. And I have to 
mention that not having CRs [continuing resolutions] is also 
important, so that they have assured funding coming in. The 
other thing is people, there is a significant shortage of the 
right people to do all these things.
    Not only as we think of the scientists and engineers, but 
also in the crafts, electricians, welders, everything down the 
road. So, they need support, they need money, and they need 
people.
    Mr. Wilson. And I'm grateful that the technical college 
systems of South Carolina are addressing the critical needs of 
employees. And Senator Kyl, your report recommends the U.S. 
quote ``Urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and 
adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive 
elements to ensure U.S. access to, and operations in space'' 
end of quote.
    You just happen to have hit on a topic that we have a 
visionary, Chairman Mike Rogers, who has been saying this since 
the time of Abraham Lincoln. So, with that put in place, can 
you talk more about the need for this, and why an approach that 
focuses on defensive resilience must include a space domain?
    Senator Kyl. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 
Moulton. The threat briefings that we received leave no 
question that both China and Russia, but particularly China see 
space as a war fighting domain, and both of them view the 
United States' current array of satellites and reliance on 
those satellites as the soft underbelly of the United States 
posture.
    So, they are very aggressively pursuing both defense and 
offensive weapons to deal with our space capabilities. The 
United States has to respond to that. In addition to that, we 
know that space can be the place where our other assets can be 
magnified in capability. For example, missile defense for the 
homeland to deal with a coercive kind of attack might be best 
dealt with by the array of space assets that we can bring to 
bear upon that kind of an attack.
    And one of our recommendations is that the Defense 
Department explore that, and if it's feasible, to develop a 
system, both offense and defense, which could deal with a 
coercive attack. There is no question that in the next 
conflict, if there be one, space will be a critical aspect of 
that conflict.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, 
Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin I'd 
like to request permission to enter into the record, an op-ed 
by the late Senator Dianne Feinstein, ``There's No Such Thing 
as a Limited Nuclear War'', without objection. Thank you. We 
often hear that the term strategic, I know that we on this 
committee often think of capabilities, particularly our nuclear 
assets and their global impact.
    But another definition of strategic comes to mind for me, 
the idea of a grand strategy, or aligning potentially unlimited 
aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities. I know that 
we're going to have to make hard decisions to ensure that we 
provide reasonable oversight, avoid unchecked and rampant 
spending on wasteful or unnecessary programs, and also to 
ensure that our spending truly, truly provides for our national 
defense.
    So, I want to thank the committee for its work, and I'm 
thankful for your highlighting arms control and international 
partnerships in your report. I'm also worried that our 
strategic posture is missing strategic, or strategy. We all 
know that we face competition from Russia and China. We also 
know there's a growing risk of confrontation, and that we need 
to find ways to de-escalate.
    For example, how often do we allocate our resources to have 
the most efficient way to achieve peace and stability? My 
questions today really go to this report, and how you set it up 
to win a war, but instead how do we prioritize our efforts to 
prevent a conflict from ever emerging? How do we achieve that? 
You argue that because of the rising threats, the United 
States, and its allies and partners must be ready to defer and 
defeat both our adversaries, you said China and Russia.
    My question is what would it mean to defeat them? Is it a 
nuclear war against two nuclear armed adversaries that somehow 
we could defeat them and win? I think not. But my question to 
both of you, is it necessary to defeat our competitors to 
provide security for the American people? For example, wouldn't 
arms control and de-escalation be preferable to a new arms 
race? My question.
    Ms. Creedon. So, thank you very much, Representative 
Garamendi. So, of course, the answer is yes to your last 
question. It would be better to have effective strategic arms 
control that was both trilateral, and that was consistently 
applied and consistently complied with. So, obviously that is 
appropriate.
    But right now, we are actually facing a situation where we 
may not have any strategic arms control agreements in place. 
And this is a very different world, we have both Russia and 
China are on the cusp of really having a three-peer competitor 
environment. So, we need to have a strategy that deters. To be 
effective, deterrents must be credible, it must be believable, 
and not only, as I mentioned, not only to our adversaries, but 
also to our allies.
    And our allies have to be part of this because together we 
are all much stronger if we are integrated in this. But when 
you talk about strategy, part of the strategy is to deter 
conflict in the first place. And to deter conflict in the first 
place, that deterrent has to be credible. And to be credible, 
an adversary has to believe that if they start a conflict we 
have to be able to defeat them.
    Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me for interrupting, but then your 
argument indicates that our current nuclear systems are not 
credible, is that what you're arguing?
    Ms. Creedon. No, not at all, sir. Remember, our commission 
report is very much forward looking. So, we look into the 
future, 2027 and beyond, and we see a threat trajectory that's 
going in a certain direction. Assuming that threat trajectory 
continues, we have to make some changes in our strategy, and 
it's those changes, primarily conventional, some nuclear, but 
primarily conventional, are going to be needed.
    Tankers is a good example, to keep us out of that conflict 
to begin with. And we have to worry about not only one 
conflict, we have to worry about two conflicts, either 
sequential or simultaneous. It's a new environment, we have to 
be prepared for this, and plan to be prepared for this.
    Mr. Garamendi. Senator?
    Senator Kyl. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I subscribe to the 
comments that Madelyn has just made to you. Obviously, 
deterrence is in the mind of the person you're trying to deter, 
and they have to believe that you're serious enough about 
trying to prevent conflict that you'll do whatever is necessary 
to defeat them should they be tempted to try to attack you.
    And therefore we have to have the kind of forces in place, 
both conventional and nuclear, that provide that kind of 
deterrent.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired, I will admit 
into the record the opinion piece by Senator Feinstein that he 
requested.
    With that, we will move to Mr. Lamborn from Colorado for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you both 
for your contributions to our country. For either of you, I 
applaud the commission's recommendation that the U.S. must 
field sufficient conventional forces to effectively deter and 
defeat simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe 
and Asia. Hypersonic weapons are said to be a conventional 
weapon with strategic implications.
    Our two biggest adversaries are well ahead of us in 
developing offensive hypersonic weapons, for which we have very 
little defense by the way. Can you elaborate on the deterrent 
value of offensive hypersonic weapons against coercive attacks 
by our adversaries?
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you very much for that question. So, we 
looked at a range of conventional capabilities that we need to 
develop, among them is the hypersonic systems. But it isn't 
just the hypersonic systems, this is one of the things that we 
need as a nation to get much better at, and it's incorporating 
new technologies, including hypersonics.
    And as we think about new technologies, and think about how 
to deploy new technologies, we also need to think about our 
industrial base, and how to get new players into this. If we 
are going to be truly innovative, we have to figure out ways to 
be able to bring these new innovators, the smaller companies, 
the smaller businesses, the ones who are really thinking about 
how to do things more effectively, how to do things in a less 
expensive way.
    How to take greater advantage of the capabilities that we 
have, and the hypersonics are simply one of them. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, I'll add that this is one of the 
areas in which we focused on defense, because clearly the 
possibility of an attack coming from one of these hypersonic 
weapons would be a preemptive, or out of the blue kind of 
attack, it could be decapitating. And therefore, retaliation is 
not the only, or the best solution to it.
    Therefore, one of our recommendations is to strongly try to 
improve our air and missile defense systems, both against 
hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles, improved ballistic 
missiles. The Russians have devised a whole new suite of 
platforms with which to deliver their nuclear weapons, and this 
is why we stress the need for more research and development of 
defensive capability against these new weapons.
    Mr. Lamborn. Very good, thank you. For either one of you, 
Russia and China are increasingly working together to 
accomplish strategic goals. Did the commission contemplate the 
possibility that Russia and China could coordinate their 
nuclear threats in such a way that the numbers we adhere to 
under New START [New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] are 
inadequate?
    Ms. Creedon. So, we certainly spent a lot of time looking 
at the possibility of collusion between Russia and China. It's 
one of the reasons that we made the recommendation that we did, 
that we have to look at a two-war strategy, and that two war 
strategy could be simultaneous, or it could be conventional. 
So, whether there is overt collusion in some sort of an 
aggressive behavior, we did feel strongly that the possibility 
of opportunistic aggression was also really there.
    But it's really more, I think, on the conventional side. 
Although we do have to look broadly at our nuclear capabilities 
vis a vis two nuclear peers. So, it's one of the reasons why 
the report concluded that China is no longer a lesser included 
case in how we think about our planning and doctrine. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Senator Kyl?
    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the key here 
is that we don't need to decide whether an attack is 
necessarily going to be coordinated between these two 
adversaries. It's enough that it's opportunistic. In other 
words, we're in a conflict with one, and the other sees that 
this is an opportunity for us to do what we've always wanted to 
do, and the United States is otherwise occupied, so we'll try 
our aggression.
    Either way we have to be prepared to deal with both of them 
simultaneously. And that's why we're going to have some new 
challenges to deal with this entirely new environment from that 
which we previously planned, which only dealt with the Russian 
nuclear side of the equation.
    Mr. Lamborn. You were there when the Senate passed the New 
START Treaty, are those numbers adequate now that China is in 
the picture?
    Senator Kyl. Well, Mr. Chairman, that's the real question. 
Our current program of record for our nuclear enterprise is 
sized to the Russian threat. And under the New Start Treaty we, 
both sides had the requisite forces that we thought were 
necessary. You're now adding another component, and the Chinese 
goal is to have parity with both Russia and the United States.
    Obviously that adds a new challenge that we've got to plan 
for. And our report in several different places notes the fact 
that whether this is increased size of our weaponry, or 
composition, or how we deploy them, or all of the above, all of 
that has to be considered in deciding exactly what our new 
force structure has to look like.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington 
State, Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I apologize 
for being late, I had a previous meeting that I had to be at 
until 10:00. Two areas of questions, one, in terms of the 
resiliency and survivability, regardless of how many nuclear 
weapons or what platforms they are, our command and control 
structures, and the ability to make them less vulnerable, 
talking about space command and control, the vulnerability of 
an attack that could render our ability to operate regardless 
of how many weapons we have, to eliminate that.
    What's most important for us to do make sure that those 
systems can be protected so that our infrastructure can work in 
a crisis?
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you very much, because that is an 
important area, it's also an area that doesn't get talked about 
much. Notably, because so much of it is classified. But we did 
recommend that a lot of focus and attention be placed on the 
modernization of the nuclear command and control system. And 
this also includes how to make all of these various systems 
more resilient.
    So, with a space system, maybe it's multiple system, maybe 
it's protection protecting those systems. But part of it is 
also the early warning part of the nuclear command and control 
system, and making sure that that doesn't look like a very 
large target at the outset so that we lose our eyes, if you 
will. So, looking at how to keep early warning systems very 
accurate, very resilient is a large part of this.
    The other piece of making sure that the President always 
has time and options to consider, and the nuclear command and 
control system has to be the system that provides him that 
time. So, it's incredibly important, and we have to really 
focus this, and it's hard because it's hard to talk about.
    Mr. Smith. Understood. The big thing that was missing from 
this report in my view was an analysis of the cost involved, 
and that's really what we are facing on this committee. Because 
every major system that we're talking about upgrading right now 
is significantly above budget. Whether it's the Sentinel GBSD 
[Ground Based Strategic Deterrent], I guess the B-21 is kind of 
hanging in there, but there are a variety of systems.
    Looking a pit production it is overwhelming, and when you 
lay out all of those options, do you have any ideas for us 
where, okay here is a more cost effective way to make sure that 
we have an adequate deterrent? And obviously I said this in my 
written opening statement, the ground based system, that is a 
heck of a lot of money to stick things in a fixed place in the 
ground that are incredibly vulnerable, and have all manner of 
different problems.
    Now in an ideal world, would you like to have it all? Sure. 
But if you have to make choices in terms of the budget, keeping 
in mind the questions we've already heard about conventional 
needs that are there as well, the commission really didn't look 
at it and say gosh, for [$]100 billion less we could do this, 
we'd meet our needs, and that would really free up money 
elsewhere. Is there anything you could say to us about that?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, we spent a 
lot of time considering that question. Of course, our writ did 
not include the development of cost estimates for all of these 
things, we did not do that, as you point out. But just to give 
you one illustration of the kind of question that we tried to 
answer here, the ground-based interceptor system that we have 
today, I'm not sure if that's what you were referring to by our 
ground-based missiles, but our current----
    Mr. Smith. I was referring to the ICBM [intercontinental 
ballistic missile] replacement.
    Senator Kyl. Well, if I could just stay on the ground 
based----
    Mr. Smith. That's fine, yeah.
    Senator Kyl. Defensive system, because to some extent 
they're related. This is primarily to deter North Korea today. 
And it makes sense because the kind of system that we have is 
adequate today to deter North Korea. North Korea is not 
standing still, however. We recognize that over time we're 
going to have to have better and more capable GBI [ground-based 
interceptor] kind of systems to deal with North Korea.
    The question is do we just continue up that ladder, or 
might there be a more cost-effective way to deal with that 
threat? Certainly if you're dealing with a coercive threat from 
China or Russia, you're going to have to have a more cost 
effective way to do that. And that's why we say with regard to 
the GBI kind of program, it may have a limit, and we may need 
to turn to more of a space-based component which has much 
greater potential capability against the larger kind of threat.
    Especially coming from Russia or China, and with the 
technological developments today in reducing launch costs and 
other expenses in putting satellites in space, we think the 
time might well have come that this is the place where we could 
invest more money economically to deal with the problem rather 
than just continuing to build our GBI system up.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Kyl, Ms. 
Creedon, thank you all so much for your work on the commission, 
and thanks for the commission's report. I want to go to one 
section of the commission report that speaks about the 
development and deployment of theater based nuclear systems.
    And the report describes that this system should exhibit 
the ability to be forward deployable, survivable against a 
preemptive attack, has a low yield option, is prompt and can 
penetrate very sophisticated air and missile defense systems. 
And I'm only aware of one system that is deployable in the near 
term, is cost effective, and is there before us today, and it's 
the nuclear armed sea launched cruise missile better known as 
SLCM-N.
    And I know your report doesn't advocate for a particular 
platform, but is it your view that the development of a SLCM-N 
capability would help us address the deterrents challenges that 
you so eloquently point out in your report?
    Ms. Creedon. So, thank you very much. So, we spent, as you 
might imagine, we spent a lot of time discussing theater 
nuclear systems. And we also spent a lot of time looking at the 
threat, particularly in the Asia Pacific, and also the 
capabilities that we do have already, the B-61s in Europe. And 
when we looked at that, and we looked at the threat 
trajectories, there were a number of things that we itemized 
that would be potential capabilities, potential 
characteristics, as you highlight, they're mostly laid out on 
pages 47 and 48.
    And so, we go through these characteristics, these 
capabilities that we want. We intentionally did not pick 
winners and losers in any given system. But that said, I mean I 
think there was agreement, however one felt about the SLCM-N, 
that the SLCM-N certainly would address some of these 
capabilities. But I just want to reiterate that the commission 
itself did not intentionally pick specific winners or losers.
    Mostly because we were so forward looking our report. We 
want the Defense Department to determine what they really need.
    Mr. Wittman. Got you, very good. Senator Kyl?
    Senator Kyl. Yes, the answer to your question is yes, SLCM-
N would achieve the objective that we set out. Whether there 
are other systems that would, would be left to the decision 
makers in the future, including all of you.
    Mr. Wittman. From your perspective, how important is time 
in this? I think what we're seeing is an accelerated effort by 
China across the nuclear spectrum in the threat that is 
developing at orders of magnitude against the United States. 
How important is time in this deterrent effect on a low yield 
option as a deterrent to China?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, if I could just speak generally 
rather than to the specific requirement, you put your finger on 
probably the key point here. We don't have any more time. As 
one of the witnesses said, we've used up all of our work 
around, and the schedules, both for the refurbishment of the 
nuclear warheads, and the development of the new platforms is a 
tight schedule.
    And while the operatives say that they're going to do their 
best to meet the schedules, the reality is we've found delays 
here and there, and it's very difficult to imagine that we 
could meet the schedule. As a result, there are a couple of 
charts in our report which show the potential for a deterrents 
gap. Which in effect say here's where we are today, we're going 
to decline in deterrents because certain systems have to be 
retired.
    They simply won't work anymore. And by the time we get the 
new systems online to replace them, we will have spent time in 
an area without an adequate deterrent. That's the threat that 
we have, and that's the thing that we most have to try to 
avoid.
    Mr. Wittman. To both of you, is it your view that an 80 
percent solution available in the next 18 to 24 months would be 
preferable to the 100 percent solution available in the late 
2030s?
    Ms. Creedon. So, thank you for that question. I think, and 
I'm going to go back to there's a lot of analysis that this 
report lays on the doorstep of the Defense Department, the 
Administration, Congress, and what is actually the right system 
is part of what the analysis needs to be. So, yes, the SLCM-N 
would have the advantage probably of being sooner. But the 
actual analysis has yet to be done by the Department.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Senator, any closing thoughts?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Wittman, of 
course there is no good answer to your question. I just go back 
to the point I made earlier, which is that if this is, if our 
strategic deterrent is the number one priority for our military 
as our Defense Secretaries and Joint Chiefs Chairman have all 
said, and which I think our commission certainly agreed with.
    Then we have a lot of other things which we can prioritize, 
but this has to be number one priority. And going back to your 
previous question, it's not just a matter of what we ultimately 
develop, we have to be very cognizant of short run gaps in 
deterrents which will result from the fact that we are 
replacing whole systems in a just in time manner, and we may 
not be just in time.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you for that.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses here today. I am gravely concerned about nuclear 
proliferation, and sincerely hope my colleagues share that 
concern. It is in the best interest of all human life to pursue 
global disarmament. I do understand the need to maintain our 
triad in order to deter adversaries.
    But we hope we can strike a balance of effective deterrents 
with costs, and more importantly, protecting human life. In the 
report you mentioned that most commissioners believe it is 
inevitable that the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and the 
number of delivery systems should increase. Ms. Creedon, in 
your opinion, at what point does building a bigger stockpile 
become redundant?
    Does it matter if we have, let's say for the sake of this 
example, one thousand more or one thousand less nuclear weapons 
than our peer adversaries if we all have enough to wipe out 
life as we know it?
    Ms. Creedon. So, thank you very much for that question. And 
first, I want to very much support your initial comment about 
non-proliferation. This is a very important aspect of this, 
this is non-proliferation, proliferation prevention is very 
much the flip side of deterrence. And one of the things that we 
did mention briefly in this is that even though we are looking 
at a world without a bilateral arms control treaty for the 
first time in a very long time, we do have to continue to work 
and be prepared for the time when we have the ability, 
hopefully, possibly, to get another arms control agreement in 
place.
    Assuming it's in our U.S. national interest. To make sure 
that if there is one, it's viable, it's verifiable, and we have 
the technology to be able to do all the things needed in a 
treaty. The research and development that goes on at the 
National Nuclear Security Administration is very important, 
making sure that we are looking at these capabilities now.
    So, again, planning for the future, and having these 
capabilities in the future. But to the rest of your question, 
numbers are important, but they really are not the full 
discussion here. And sometimes I think we get a little 
distracted by the conversation on numbers. Because what we 
really talked about is we could need more, we could need 
different, we could need both.
    But it really depends on how the Department of Defense, how 
the U.S. Strategic Command, how U.S. policy puts in place those 
things that the nuclear weapons need to hold at risk. And 
that's the discussion, again, that has to happen. So, when I 
said we left a lot of analysis at DOD's doorstep, we did, and 
this is part of it. How many do we need, and what do we need 
them for?
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Talking about numbers further, 
Senator Kyl, we don't have an endless budget, and the cost of 
these modernization programs continue to grow, and schedules 
are delayed further and further. Interestingly the report did 
not include any cost estimates, because I guess they shouldn't 
matter.
    Do you think including information regarding the cost of 
these programs would have better informed Congress? And if you 
had included a cost analysis, would it have impacted any of 
your recommendations?
    Senator Kyl. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Representative, I 
don't think it would have changed any of our recommendations, 
to answer your last question. In our writ, there's a statutory 
writ that we were given, and we were not asked to provide cost 
estimates, but you could consider that a bit of a cop out, but 
the reality is it would be very hard for us to do that in any 
event.
    And the reason is because a lot of the things that have to 
be decided, as Madelyn pointed out, are to be decided in the 
future based upon the situation that exists at the time. What 
we primarily say here is we have to make decisions now to make 
sure that we have the capacity to build whatever we're going to 
need to build. We're not sure right now what all of that is.
    But if we don't make decisions now to enable us to have the 
capacity, then when we finally do decide it's going to be too 
late if we haven't provided for sufficient capacity. And that's 
why we say that has to be decided now. Just to put this in 
context, our current program of record, which we say has to be 
completed first, is about $75 billion a year, it's about 7.5 
percent of the defense budget.
    That's a very small amount of a budget which today, is 
about 3 percent of overall GDP [gross domestic product] of the 
United States, as compared to twice that much during the 1980s. 
So, our current program of record I think is pretty hard to 
criticize as being too costly, and what has to be spent beyond 
that will have to be determined by you in later years to reach 
the capabilities that we say are necessary, and that we 
recommend in our report.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Gallagher.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you both for 
being here today. In your recommendations, the commission cites 
the need to prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-
nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need, 
and in greater quantities than currently planned.
    Senator Kyl, you stated in your Senate testimony that the 
first thing, and I'm quoting ``The first thing we've got to do 
is have a conventional capability which is so dominant that no 
party would ever consider a nuclear attack against the United 
States.'' In your opinion, are U.S. stockpiles of long-range 
precision fires, in your estimation, currently inadequate to 
contend with adversary capabilities in the security environment 
we face?
    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 
Gallagher. I think that's one of the recommendations we make, 
that one of the shortages that we've got to deal with is 
precisely this shortage, to have the conventional capability to 
deter an adversary. So, the answer is yes, it's inadequate 
today.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, just to put a finer point on it, when it 
comes to long range precision fires, particularly long-range 
anti-ship missile JASSM [Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile], JATM [Joint Advanced Tactical Missile], you would 
agree that it's absolutely essential, and has key impacts on 
our nuclear security to surge production and stockpile key long 
range precision fires?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Gallagher, we 
don't specifically talk about surging production or 
stockpiling, but the answer to your question is yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Help me, and I don't know who is 
best to answer this question, one thing I'm struggling with is 
to understand the scale of the PLAs' [People's Liberation 
Army's], not just conventional build up, but its nuclear build 
up in particular in a way that makes sense with some frame of 
reference. Could you help me, sort of in a way that I could 
communicate to my constituents that would make them care about 
it and communicate why it matters.
    Sort of put what we're seeing in China in the appropriate 
context, historical or otherwise.
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you. So, in our report, in the threat 
section of our report we detail the rapid growth on both 
conventional and nuclear systems that the intelligence 
community has seen in China. Also looking at some of the stated 
goals that President Xi has announced, and other activities 
that are going on, not only on the land based conventional, but 
they're developing a real triad on the nuclear side.
    They're rapidly developing space capabilities. So, if you 
look forward, and that's what our whole report is trying to do, 
look forward into 2027 and beyond, somewhere in the '30s, if 
they keep on their current trajectory, maybe a little bit 
sooner, we are looking at a true peer, both on a nuclear and a 
conventional perspective. And this is an area that we've never 
been in before, where we have two nuclear peers.
    And also a regional power in China who is looking to be a 
global power, to really challenge the U.S.'s global leadership, 
and break up our alliances. So, it's a very different world, 
but hopefully in our report we captured a little bit of the 
essence of this threat, and why it's so concerning.
    Mr. Gallagher. Would it overstate the case to say that 
their nuclear and conventional build-up, I guess just focus on 
the nuclear, is unprecedented, or unprecedented in modern 
times?
    Ms. Creedon. So, certainly the rate at which they're 
building up has been very surprising. And I should probably 
leave it at that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay.
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Gallagher, the 
only thing I would add to that is that one of the witnesses 
came before us and said one thing about the Chinese is that 
they're always ahead of schedule. Whenever they say they're 
going to achieve a certain system by a certain time, they beat 
that schedule. So, I think Madelyn is exactly right in 
characterizing it the way she did.
    Mr. Gallagher. Is there anything about, and forgive me, I 
do conventional, not strategic, their nuclear doctrine in the 
way that we tend to sort of obsess over Russia's escalate to 
de-escalate. Is there anything in particular we should know 
about the PLA's nuclear doctrine that you think is important 
for us to understand? Microphone please.
    Ms. Creedon. They do have a lot of writings that we should 
certainly pay attention to. But one of our recommendations sort 
of buried deep in the report is that we need more capabilities 
within our intelligence community, within our policy community, 
to really understand how their conventional and nuclear policy 
doctrines are evolving. So, we need to put a lot of focus and 
attention in building these capabilities so we understand just 
that.
    Mr. Gallagher. My time is expired, thank you.
    The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
California, Ms. Jacobs, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for 
being here today. You know, I think it's important we consider 
the implications of expanding our nuclear arsenal as the report 
suggests. And I know we've talked a little bit about how that 
could be contributing to a global arms race, and if so what are 
the consequences of this.
    Given recent GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] 
reporting on DOD weapons acquisition programs and NNSA 
infrastructure efforts, it's kind of difficult to find a bright 
spot in the modernization of strategic forces. All indications 
point to substantial schedule slippages and cost overruns. And 
Senator Kyl, I know you said that it's our responsibility to 
educate the American people about the situation.
    But I wanted to follow up on my colleague Mr. Carbajal's 
question. The commission seems to make very significant 
investments that would cost several billions of dollars in this 
environment, and with competing national and international 
concerns. How do you reconcile the recommendations of the 
report with budget constraints generally?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Jacobs, no, we 
did not attempt to develop a cost estimate because most of our 
recommendations relate to capabilities rather than specific 
systems, so we can't do that yet.
    Ms. Jacobs. Sure, I understand that you can't give us a 
cost estimate, but everything in the report is going to cost a 
lot of money. So, did you take the constraint of generally the 
fact that there's not an unlimited budget into account when you 
were working on the report?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Jacobs, we took 
into account the fact that our military leaders have said 
routinely that this strategic deterrent is the number one 
priority for them. And if that is the case, then we decided we 
would recommend what we felt was necessary, and leave it up to 
you, and the President, the executive branch, to determine 
precisely what the programs are and how they're to be funded.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I also wanted to ask, you mentioned 
in your testimony that this was a consensus report, that all 
the commissioners signed on, could you talk about what some of 
the points of contention were in the debate, or where there 
were disagreements?
    Ms. Creedon. Well, thank you very much. But as you might 
imagine, we had lots of robust discussions, and we wrestled 
with every word in this report, that's why it is a consensus 
report. But in the end, because of our commitment to consensus, 
we were able to get there, and everybody wanted to get there. 
But on the specifics, no, that's within the four corners of our 
robust debate and discussion.
    Ms. Jacobs. Got it, thank you. And lastly, the U.S. land-
based ICBM fields are often referred to as a sponge to soak up 
an opponent's nuclear forces. If that's the case, can you talk 
about why you think it's important that we modernize that arm 
of the triad? As long as we have enough Minutemen missiles and 
silos, why do we need to spend so much more money on the 
Sentinel program?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Jacobs, the fact 
is that our current system has deteriorated and aged to the 
point that we wouldn't be confident in the deterrent value of 
it on out into the future. When you see the photographs of 
these silos that house one of the most sophisticated weapons 
ever devised by man, you wonder.
    The walls are bulging, there's rust, there's wires that are 
no longer functioning properly. These silos have to be 
refurbished, and new missiles put in them, because the current 
system is rapidly aging out.
    Ms. Jacobs. Sure, I understand that, if the purpose was to 
use them as a deterrent, to use them. But the idea is that the 
land-based part of the triad being referred to as the sponge is 
mostly so that our opponents would use their weapons to attack 
those instead of the other parts of our triad.
    Senator Kyl. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Representative Jacobs, the 
whole point is if the adversary believes that our system no 
longer functions, then they don't need to try to wipe it out at 
the beginning of a conflict. They have to believe that this is 
a fully functioning, and very dynamic, and vibrant system in 
order to be deterred.
    Ms. Jacobs. Got it, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, is 
recognized.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for bringing 
your experience to bear to advise on how to maintain the 
strategic deterrent. I focus a lot on hypersonics here, and so 
I was wondering what your perspective was on how our current 
hypersonic capabilities compared with these two near peer 
adversaries was contributing to that sense of deterrence.
    Ms. Creedon. Well, sort of simply put, we're a little 
behind in terms of the development of our hypersonics 
capabilities. There are clearly some extraordinary programs. 
The other piece of the hypersonics that we should also look at 
is some of the new systems of China. One of the systems that we 
talk about in our report is the FOB, the fractional orbital 
bombardment system.
    And that's one of the areas where we also have introduced 
the concept of some possible arms control, that's a suggestion 
for that, or for confidence building measures along those 
lines.
    Mr. Gaetz. I just don't know, in sort of a normative 
geopolitical atmosphere whether or not arms control is all that 
likely on hypersonics when, as you say, we're behind, our 
adversaries are ahead. It seems though they might not have an 
incentive to engage in that arms control. Senator, you've got 
vast experience on these issues.
    What does it mean that the United States of America is 
behind in hypersonics relative to our adversaries? How does 
that impact decision making?
    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Representative 
Gaetz. What is shows first of all, that it's kind of the 
microcosm for the macrocosm. We went to sleep for several years 
after the Cold War. The peace dividend is here, we don't need 
to worry about these things anymore. Well, not everybody went 
to sleep, and the Chinese and the Russians both have developed 
some very sophisticated systems that we did not work on until 
very recently.
    So, Madelyn is right, we're behind both countries with 
regard to the hypersonic issue. We've had tests, and I won't 
get into the details, but bottom line is that we are behind 
where our two opponents are. And what this means is that they 
have some capabilities with which they can threaten us. It 
isn't necessarily the case that we have to catch up with their 
offensive capability.
    Perhaps with defensive capabilities we can parry this 
thrust in effect, a good missile defense program, for example, 
might be at least part of a deterrent to deal with these 
weapons, at least until the United States is able to catch up 
offensively. But it makes our planning much more difficult.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, I appreciate that distinction between the 
offensive and defensive capabilities. But in a world in which 
China and Russia can hit a moving target with hypersonic 
delivery systems and we can't hit a moving target with 
hypersonic delivery systems, I'm worried that that impacts a 
lot of the strategic decision making that we've been discussing 
today.
    And just to draw a finer point on it, Senator, when you say 
we are behind both countries in hypersonics, you are referring 
to China and Russia, right?
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative Gaetz, that's 
correct.
    Mr. Gaetz. It's remarkable, because you all have great 
experience, you look at these things, you have no ulterior 
motives. But when we bring DOD personnel, they're real sheepish 
on that. We can't get those clear admissions that we're behind 
to inform how we fund these things. Instead, they talk about 
the next upcoming test, but increasingly the Army has failed 
time and again to have these tests in a position to field our 
hypersonic systems. What level of trust do you have that the 
Army is going to get this right?
    Senator Kyl. Well, Mr. Chairman, Representative Gaetz, I'm 
not going to answer that question because I don't know. Our 
responsibility is to be straightforward with you all. You're 
the ones that appointed us, you're the ones that we answer to. 
It's very hard, I think a lot of times, for military people to 
explain everything and answer to questions from you all, you 
understand the reasons why.
    One of the things that we noticed in this endeavor is there 
is a great attitude among the military, among the Defense 
Department generally in being able to succeed at a mission. 
It's a great thing about Americans, you give us a job to do, 
and we'll try to figure out a way to do it. The problem with 
that is that sometimes it can appear to be a little 
unrealistic.
    And what we are concerned about is that in a multitude of 
areas here, the attitude of well, somehow or other we'll get 
there isn't necessarily the best information for the members of 
Congress to get.
    Mr. Gaetz. I got you. I get that the scientific method 
includes testing hypotheses, and they don't always work out. 
But I just don't think we should view it as unrealistic that we 
should be able to have the basic capabilities on hypersonics 
that our adversaries do, particularly the ability to hit a 
moving target. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I would like to make 
the announcement that you've heard the bells ringing, votes 
have been called. Our witnesses have another meeting at noon, 
so we will not be able to come back after votes, because votes 
won't end until noon. So, we will do Mr. Horsford for 
questions, and then Mr. Bacon, and then we will adjourn.
    So, Mr. Horsford, you're recognized.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to the 
ranking member for this important hearing. My district in 
Nevada includes the Nevada National Security Site, an 
enterprise of multimission, high hazard, experimentation 
facilities delivering technical and service solutions in 
support of our Nation's national security.
    The world class work that's being done at NNSS [Nevada 
National Security Site] would not be possible without the hard-
working individuals who come from all over the state of Nevada. 
The primary mission of NNSS is to help ensure the Nation's 
nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, reliable, secure from 
our adversaries, and hosts all three NNSS--NNSA laboratories.
    Chair Creedon, given your previous positions at NNSA, can 
you talk about the importance of the facilities across 
development, production, sustainment, and dismantlement in 
ensuring that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and reliable 
nuclear deterrent?
    Ms. Creedon. Yes, thank you very much for that question. 
The National Nuclear Security Site at Nevada, the Nevada Test 
Site, as we often refer to it historically, is really where so 
much of the experimental work at NNSA is done. So, one of the 
key new projects that's underway right now is called ECSE, it's 
the expanding capabilities for subcritical experiments.
    And that doesn't really say much on its face, but what this 
does, is this is a whole laboratory underground with an 
accelerator to help the United States more fully understand the 
functioning of nuclear weapons so that we can not only maintain 
them, but that we understand them so that we can do more things 
in the future. Whether that's pit re-use, whether it's 
developing new pits based on the heritage of the tests at 
Nevada, it's the whole ramification.
    So much work is done out there. There's also, and I 
mentioned earlier, some of the verification work that NNSA also 
does, there is a tremendous amount of that work out there. They 
just recently conducted an experiment with conventional high 
explosives to try and improve the capability for detection of 
others who might be trying to conduct nuclear tests 
underground.
    There's a threshold beyond which it's quite difficult to 
detect. And it's also a host for a number of other government 
agencies who can bring their experiments to Nevada because of 
the size, the space, the complexity, and frankly the work 
force. But like all the sites, Nevada also has a challenge with 
respect to the work force. As you know, it's a very remote 
site, takes a long time to get out there. So, really focusing 
on the workforce out there is also hugely, hugely important.
    Mr. Horsford. Yeah, I was just speaking to a group of 
workers over the weekend in fact, based on a contract issue 
that we're trying to get addressed, so I agree. What findings 
and recommendations specific to sites such as NNSS did the 
commission make to address any current shortfalls, and or 
improve management going forward?
    Ms. Creedon. So, what we looked at primarily was, as I 
mentioned, the state of the infrastructure. Nevada is huge, I 
mean the Nevada site is huge, I don't think it's often 
recognized how big it really is. So, it has hundreds of miles 
of roads that need maintaining. In many respects it's a small 
state. And so, the infrastructure out there, both the 
experimental infrastructure, all of the work force, all of this 
needs to be updated, it needs to be maintained.
    One of the things that we talk about with respect to the 
infrastructure is on the NNSA side, other than some of the 
scientific infrastructure, like some of the work that was done 
historically on the subcritical experiments, we didn't do much 
in terms for quite a while, and so now we're kind of playing 
catch up on this infrastructure.
    And so, it's important that this get funded, and that it 
get funded consistently, as I mentioned without CRs, hopefully, 
and that there are adequate funds to do the planning, and 
people to implement it. But it's a big infrastructure problem. 
We talk about maintaining infrastructure in perpetuity so that 
we don't take these breaks in the past where we lost the 
ability to do things.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you for underscoring the points on 
infrastructure and sustainable funding. Thank you both for your 
service.
    And I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate you all 
being here today. I was stationed at Davis-Monthan in Tucson, 
so I had a great Senator in Senator Kyl. And I see General 
Chambers, I worked with him as a colonel at Ramstein, great 
fan. So, I appreciate your recommendations, I support 
modernizing the triad obviously. The one area that I'm 
concerned with is nuclear C3 [command, control, and 
communications].
    And in particular, with the newer weapons that reduce our 
warning times with current technology to 15 minutes, future 
technology to no warning times, I think we need to go back to 
where we used to have 24/7 airborne backup capabilities for our 
command and control, the Looking Glass. We did it for 29 years, 
and we stopped in 1990. What's your alls' position on that?
    I think we need to have an emergency 24/7 backup capability 
that can't be taken out by surprise, but I'd love to hear your 
thoughts.
    Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Bacon. 
One of our recommendations concerns ways that we could 
potentially mitigate the risk of a deterrence gap and prepare 
for a future situation where we're in the process of 
transitioning from the legacy systems to the modernized 
systems. And that would include, for example, different 
policies with respect to the alert status of our bomber force.
    There are specific recommendations in the report that go 
directly to that. There are some other related recommendations, 
but I think that's the specific one that you're talking about.
    Mr. Bacon. You're talking about the bombers, and I would 
agree with you. I think we need a command-and-control 
survivability analysis here. Because with minimal warning 
times, the White House, the Pentagon, STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic 
Command] could be hit, and then you're headless, and we've got 
to find ways to have survivability.
    Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, Representative bacon, you're 
exactly right. One of our commissioners, retired General John 
Hyten, was the STRATCOM Commander, and he was a great asset for 
the committee to understand exactly what you're talking about. 
He accompanied us when we went out to STRATCOM in Omaha, or 
Bellevue, I guess to be precise.
    And a large part of our conversation there dealt with how 
we could make sure that our command and control kept up with 
the developments that are occurring, just as you point out. So, 
our recommendation for our nuclear enterprise is for the 
personnel, the enterprise, for the facilities, for the nuclear 
warheads themselves, and for the command and control. All of 
those are part of the existing program of record which must be 
completed.
    Mr. Bacon. They've tried to present to me to how they feel 
it's survivable, I have not been convinced. I used to fly on 
the Looking Glass too, when I was a one star. With 15-minute 
warning times going to zero in the future, I just think we've 
got to have some kind of--it's not for us, it's so the Russians 
and the Chinese know they can't catch us by surprise.
    I'd just like to push this further, how do we assure that 
even with zero warning time we have command authorities not at 
the positions that are targeted? We've got to find a way to do 
that, and I'm going to be pushing this until we get resolution 
within DOD. And I just, I really appreciate, I support all your 
findings. I just think I'd like to add one, and build on it.
    And with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses, 
this is a great report, I would ask that a copy of the full 
report be put into the record, and I would let you know that 
I'm sure that given that we had to abbreviate this because of 
votes, there's going to be some questions for the record that I 
would ask that you respond to. And with that, thank you, and we 
are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
    
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

    Mr. Rogers. Last month, the Department of Defense announced that it 
would begin pursuing a B61-13 gravity bomb. This new variant would 
leverage the existing B61-12 production line, and produce a new bomb 
that combines the accuracy of the B61-12 with the higher yield of B61-
7, and will be done at minimal cost. It seems to me that this is the 
kind of thinking we should be encouraging DOD and NNSA to be pursuing? 
What is your opinion?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission agrees that the B61-13 
gravity bomb is an example of the ability to develop innovative ways to 
provide new capabilities. The Commission found in its Report that 
``expanding the infrastructure and supply chain for the nation's 
nuclear complex and its strategic capabilities is part of an overall 
national need to broaden and deepen the American defense industrial 
base. This includes the ability to accelerate the incorporation of 
emerging and innovative weapon and production technologies.'' The 
Commission also noted the NNSA's current infrastructure has limited 
ability to provide flexibility or additional capacity. Comprehensive 
recapitalization of both DOE/NNSA and DoD infrastructure is absolutely 
necessary to support U.S. strategic posture now and into the future. 
This effort has begun but will require decades of funding and 
commitment to ensure success.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. The commission's report indicates that allies and 
partners play a key role in our strategic posture. Can you describe how 
our system of alliances across EUCOM and INDOPACOM currently reinforces 
deterrence, and what Congress can do to strengthen our relationships 
with our allies and partners, specifically with regard to nuclear 
deterrence and strategic defense?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. America's Allies perceive that the 
risk of Russian and Chinese aggression and potential nuclear employment 
has increased, and that strong and credible U.S. nuclear and 
conventional capabilities are critical for extended deterrence. Since 
1949, cooperation and interoperability among NATO nations, and their 
commitment to Article V, have enabled a collective defense of Europe. 
U.S. nuclear forces form the backbone of NATO's nuclear deterrent. In 
addition to the strategic triad, the U.S. maintains forward-deployed 
dual-capable aircraft in support of NATO's deterrent mission. The 
United Kingdom and France also provide important nuclear forces to the 
Alliance. In Asia, U.S. nuclear forces provide extended deterrence for 
Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The AUKUS agreement 
strengthens U.S.-Allied relations by expanding areas of cooperation and 
interoperability, and enhancing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. 
The deepening of U.S. alliances and partnerships has proven critical to 
defending U.S. regional interests. Australia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand facilitate, enable, and assist 
U.S. forces in guaranteeing freedom of navigation, maintaining access 
to markets, and defending the interests and sovereignty of the United 
States, its Allies, and its partners. Congress can ensure that America 
maintains this strategic deterrent posture by continuing to fund 
conventional/non-nuclear forces necessary for the European and Indo-
Pacific theatres as well as the ongoing nuclear force modernization, 
supporting the expansion of security cooperation and technology 
transfer, and funding the expansion of the defense industrial base and 
related infrastructure. Expanding security cooperation with our Allies 
should include improved processes to increase our Allies' and partners' 
ability to purchase fully capable U.S. weapon systems, to secure 
training, and to jointly develop capabilities with the United States. 
Congress should remove existing statutory limitations and prohibitions 
to such cooperation and should also reassure America's Allies and 
strategic partners that the United States will honor its security 
commitments, no matter which political party holds power. The 
Commission found that alliance relationships strengthen American 
security and that withdrawing from these relationships and partnerships 
would directly benefit U.S. adversaries. Congress should help ensure 
that Russia and China understand that America is committed to 
sustaining the existing international order and that it will stand by 
its Allies and partners.
    Mr. Turner. The commission's report notes that ``Russia and China 
are deploying missile defense systems designed to protect critical 
assets against U.S. offensive strikes; to date the United States has 
chosen to not build homeland missile defenses against major powers.'' 
Given the long-standing U.S. position to not develop missile defense 
capabilities to deter a near-peer strategic missile attacks, can you 
elaborate on the commission's recommendation that ``The United States 
develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive 
attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to 
stay ahead of the North Korean threat''? I would also note that North 
Korea unveiled its first tactical nuclear submarine in September of 
this year. Can you also address if you envision those capabilities to 
be kinetic, non-kinetic, or a mix of both?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. Over the next decade, the United 
States will face escalating challenges to defending the homeland. 
China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran continue to increase their 
regional and intercontinental conventional and nuclear missile 
capabilities. In particular, China's and Russia's strike systems will 
give them capabilities that will allow them to successfully threaten 
the U.S. homeland below the nuclear threshold. The Commission noted 
that while homeland defense has traditionally focused on 
intercontinental range ballistic missile threats, new types of sea and 
air-based systems pose new threats to the homeland. A major gap is the 
need for improved warning and defensive capabilities to protect 
critical U.S. infrastructure from conventional or nuclear attack from 
our adversaries' evolving cruise missiles and other standoff 
capabilities. The Commission's recommendation on homeland IAMD stems 
from the Commission's desire to dissuade and deter any adversary that 
might contemplate a ``coercive attack'' consisting of limited 
conventional or nuclear strikes intended to convince U.S. leadership 
that the costs of intervening or persevering in a conflict involving 
the attacker are too high. To address these coercive threats, we 
recommend the Secretary of Defense look at using the full range of 
technical capabilities for theatre, area, and point defenses, such as 
THAAD, Patriot and Aegis to defend against these threats. In addition, 
the Commission finds that significant improvements must be made to U.S. 
IAMD overall. As threats continue to grow the Commission believes the 
DOD must look at new approaches to achieving U.S. missile defense 
goals, including the use of space-based and directed energy 
capabilities, as simply scaling up current programs is not likely to be 
effective. IAMD capabilities play an important role in U.S. strategy by 
serving as a deterrence by denial component of the broader deterrence 
framework. The United States should also continue to rely on strategic 
deterrence to deal with the intercontinental ballistic missile threat. 
The Commission also recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the 
Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility 
for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 
October 2024, to allow the Missile Defense Agency to focus on research, 
development, prototyping, and testing.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Chairwoman Creedon, you have said ``without conventional 
forces to deter regional wars, the use of nuclear weapons regionally 
becomes more likely . . . and without significant conventional 
increases, the U.S. will need to rely more on nuclear weapons.'' I 
agree with you, but as you know, there are many challenges to 
increasing our conventional forces, to include the operations and 
maintenance (O&M) accounts. Unfortunately, every time we add a new 
system or platform to our defense inventory, O&M tends to be the bill 
payer. As chairman of the Readiness Committee, I am extremely concerned 
about our ability to keep our fighters flying, our ships at sea, and 
our armored vehicles rolling.
    What considerations do you suggest being given to balancing new 
acquisitions, and maintaining what is already in our inventory?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. To mitigate any perceived deterrence 
gaps, we must maintain current nuclear force posture and capabilities 
while simultaneously modernizing and fielding new forces. Modernizing 
conventional forces is equally important as is ensuring that the O&M 
funds are adequate to support new and existing conventional systems 
until they are replaced. Modernization of conventional and nuclear 
systems will require an overhaul and/or an expansion of the defense 
industrial base capacity. As we have seen, sustainment of the legacy 
deterrent force challenges the capacity of the infrastructure and 
industrial base. The Commission recommends Congress promptly and 
consistently fund significant additional new investments in the defense 
industrial base. While we recognize budget realities, we also believe 
the nation must make these fundamental investments and U.S. leaders 
must communicate to U.S. citizens both the need and urgency to rebuild 
the conventional and nuclear infrastructure and modernize the force. 
Investments in the nuclear enterprise are a relatively small portion of 
the overall defense budget but provide the backbone and foundation of 
deterrence and are the nation's highest defense priority. The 
investments the Commission recommends in both nuclear and conventional 
capabilities will provide a safe, secure, reliable, effective, and 
credible deterrent, which is essential to reduce the risk of conflict, 
most importantly nuclear conflict.
    Mr. Waltz. Your report states that our ``strategic posture also 
requires a sizable industrial base to design and produce appropriate 
systems and capabilities. Throughout the Cold War, the size, diversity, 
and production capacity of the U.S. industrial base served to ensure 
that the U.S. strategic posture was ``second to none.''
    Would you agree that our nation must recognize the national crisis 
in shipbuilding capacity, with China now having 200X the shipbuilding 
capacity of the United States.
    Isn't that a strategic posture problem, and shouldn't we be driving 
strategic posture funding into this critical national infrastructure?
    How would the commission recommend using an additional submarine 
shipyard, between competing demands for Virginia, Columbia, and AUKUS 
as well as auxiliary ships like salvage and rescue and other 
auxiliaries?
    Would a 3rd yard have any positive spill-over effects to other 
areas of shipyard capacity for workforce, parts, repair, etc?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission agrees that the 
expansion of the defense infrastructure and supply chains is a 
component of the overall national need to broaden and deepen the 
defense industrial base. The Commission believes that due to years of 
downsizing and deferred maintenance, often driven by budgetary 
constraints, as well as the growing threat environment, the 
infrastructure that enables development and fielding of strategic 
capabilities needs to be overhauled, including replacing capabilities 
that have atrophied or no longer exist. The defense industrial base is 
indeed a critical component of the nation's overall strategic posture. 
The Commission recommends DoD increase shipbuilding capacity, by 
working with industry to establish or renovate a third shipyard 
dedicated to production of nuclear-powered vessels, with particular 
emphasis on nuclear-powered submarines. The Commission did not analyze 
``spill-over'' benefits that might emerge from a third shipyard, but to 
the extent such effects were to exist they should be pursued.
    Mr. Waltz. I note with interest your point in Chapter 3 that China 
should no longer be considered a ``lesser included'' nuclear threat. As 
you know, the Trump Administration negotiated renewal of the New Start 
treaty for over a year in an effort to get China included and make it 
into a tripartite nuclear agreement--negotiated by Marshall 
Billingslea, a member of your commission--before the Biden 
Administration reversed course and renewed it.
    In your view is this something that is necessary for New Start when 
renewal comes up again in a little over two years and for other arms 
control treaties?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. Due to the current state of U.S.-
Russia relations and Russian violations of previous arms control 
agreements, as well as their ``suspension'' of New START, the prospects 
for a bilateral arms agreement in the near future are diminished. Also, 
China's continued intransigence on arms control dialogue does not bode 
well. Although the potential for a return to a more cooperative 
relationship with Russia and China now seems remote, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of change in the 2027-2035 timeframe. We recommend the 
United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities 
with both adversaries and conduct research into potential verification 
technologies in order to support potential future negotiations. When 
evaluating the prospects for arms control treaties in the 2027-2035 
timeframe, which is after the expiration of the New START, the United 
States must establish a strategy and related force requirements before 
it can develop negotiating positions. The Commission also believes that 
the United States should take steps now that will allow inspections and 
verification of any future treaties. Overall, the Commission believes 
risk reduction is an important component of strategic posture and that 
verifiable arms control treaties that serve the U.S. interest should be 
pursued.
    Mr. Waltz. In chapter four you discuss the need to develop and 
deploy new systems that would enhance U.S. theater nuclear forces. You 
also refer to the need for low-yield weapons, including to deter threat 
from China deploying its own low-yield weapons: ``China will also for 
the first time have survivable (mobile) theater nuclear forces capable 
of conducting low-yield precision strikes on U.S. and allied forces and 
infrastructure across East Asia . . . [These] may reduce China's 
threshold for using nuclear weapons.'' In response you recommend new 
weapons: ``These [U.S.] additional theater capabilities will need to be 
deployable, survivable, and variable in their available yield 
options.''
    This would be a major doctrinal shift--I assume you're talking 
about tactical nuclear weapons, right? Does the whole committee endorse 
that, and can you elaborate a bit more about the threats and 
capabilities that informed your recommendation?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission unanimously supports 
all the recommendations made in its Report. The Commission's 
recommendations are based firmly in deterrence. Russia maintains a 
large tactical/non-treaty accountable nuclear arsenal and the People's 
Republic of China, as you note, is also developing similar nuclear 
capabilities for regional application. In a regional conflict, either 
adversary may perceive that even though the United States has low-yield 
nuclear weapons, it has a military or coercive advantage in conducting 
a limited, presumably, low-yield nuclear strike if they believe the 
United States lacks a capability to respond in kind or would not 
respond with strategic nuclear forces. Russian strategy and doctrine 
envision limited first use of nuclear weapons to coerce war termination 
on terms acceptable to Russia, and a larger scale use of nuclear 
weapons to defeat NATO if Russia is decisively losing a war with NATO. 
President Putin's nuclear threats against Ukraine are an example of 
such a danger. The Commission notes that China appears to have expanded 
the theater nuclear war-fighting role in anticipation of a conflict 
over Taiwan and perhaps in pursuit of its broader national security 
objectives. U.S. nuclear force posture should provide the President a 
range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter Chinese 
or Russian limited nuclear use.
    Mr. Waltz. In chapter seven, you discuss the importance of 
alliances and partnerships is vital to deter threats.
    Can you speak more about the burden-sharing these partners should 
shoulder in a theater nuclear environment?
    The AUKUS agreement has been a step forward in this, but of course 
does not directly relate to nuclear posture. What else is needed, 
particularly with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. In the USEUCOM theater, the 
cooperation and interoperability between NATO nations have enabled the 
collective defense of Europe and eased the burden on U.S. forces. 
Although U.S. nuclear forces form the backbone of NATO's nuclear 
deterrent, the United Kingdom and France provide important nuclear 
forces to the Alliance. In the Indo-Pacific region, our alliances and 
strategic partnerships are critical to defending our collective 
interests in the region. Our Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
region, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan, need to 
continue to collaborate and train with U.S. forces. This includes 
providing access, basing, and overflight; safe harbor for U.S. ships; 
hosting U.S. ground, air, maritime, and space forces; participating in 
military exercises to improve interoperability; and demonstrating their 
commitments to strengthen extended deterrence consultations. All these 
activities could be expanded and strengthened. U.S. extended deterrence 
guarantees are critical to maintaining these alliances and regional 
stability. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have thus far foregone 
indigenous nuclear weapons programs because of U.S. security 
assurances. This demonstrates the confidence our Allies and strategic 
partners place in the United States.
    Mr. Waltz. The Commission notes that the United States will face 
two nuclear peer adversaries for the first time, and the new 
partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new 
threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future 
cooperative two-theater aggression. China is pursuing a nuclear force 
build-up on a scale and pace unseen since the U.S.- Soviet nuclear arms 
race that ended in the late 1980s.
    Did the commission look at how many current American bomb designers 
have actually built a bomb, and if so, how does that number compare to 
the Cold War era?
    Did the commission look at how many pits we can currently produce 
annually, and if so, can you compare that capacity to the Cold War era?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission did not specifically 
compare the numbers of current weapon designers with those of the Cold 
War, although there were many more given the size of the Cold War 
nuclear arsenal. The Commission did not specifically compare how many 
pits we can currently produce to the Cold War-era capacity. The 
Commission notes, however, that the facility that manufactured pits 
during the Cold War was seen as surplus and thus was shut down by 
President H. W. Bush. The U.S. ability to manufacture pits is now being 
reestablished at Los Alamos National Laboratory, for the first time 
since the Rocky Flats facility was shuttered. During our visit to Los 
Alamos and engagements with NNSA leaders, we discussed the anticipated 
schedule and plans to produce 30 pits per year (ppy) by 2026 at Los 
Alamos and another 50 ppy by 2030 at the Savannah River Plutonium 
Processing Facility.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. The findings of the commission make clear that the US 
strategic posture must be able to adapt to an increasing threat 
environment. Are our material sourcing strategies aligned to support 
procurement of additional strategic assets if required? For example, I 
understand that the production plan is five lots of LRSO cruise 
missiles, which depends on early lifetime material buys for exactly the 
number planned, plus spares. How can we hedge to ensure a capacity to 
build more, if required?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission did not examine 
specific plans for the material sourcing necessary for the production 
of modernized systems like the LRSO. However, each weapon system 
program is held to an operational requirement set by USSTRATCOM. The 
planned acquisition for each weapon system considers material sourcing 
requirements in their initial buy. The Commission recommends the United 
States plan to increase production capacity beyond the current POR, to 
meet the needs of the two-peer threat. Consequently, we must plan to 
increase the corresponding material procurement. To try and shorten 
material sourcing timelines, the Commission urges the DOD and DOE/NNSA 
industrial bases to prioritize areas where capabilities are no longer 
available. The Commission recommends incentivizing private industry 
bidding on government RFPs, offering multi-year contracts, and 
implementing ways to create a steady demand signal to the private 
sector to hedge sufficient capacity building. Stable and on-time 
congressional funding would also help to ensure a reliable industrial 
base.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SEWELL
    Ms. Sewell. The Commission highlighted integrated air and missile 
defense (IAMD) systems as one of the non-nuclear capabilities that is 
key to deterring and defeating incoming attacks. Can you share the 
Commission's most important and actionable recommendations to enhance 
IAMD capabilities?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission's most actionable 
recommendation to enhance IAMD capabilities is to have the Secretary of 
Defense address the needs of US Northern Command to improve warning and 
defensive capabilities to protect critical U.S. infrastructure from 
conventional or nuclear attack from air- and sea- launched cruise 
missiles--systems that ground based interceptors (GBIs) are not 
designed to counter. The Commission recommends the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with the CDRUSNORTHCOM, identify 
existing or new sensor or interceptor capabilities necessary to defend 
critical infrastructure assets. The Commission also recommends the 
Department pursue deployment of these capabilities with urgency. 
Concurrently, the Commission recommends Congress immediately and 
consistently fund significant new investments in the defense industrial 
base, cooperation with the private sector, and expansion of the 
technical talent pipeline to conduct IAMD research and development, 
explore the application of emerging technologies, and develop advanced 
IAMD systems. An additional important recommendation is to have the 
Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation 
into advanced IAMD capabilities, leveraging all domains, including 
land, sea, air, and space.
    Ms. Sewell. The Commission found that we need to modernize and 
expand our global mobility capabilities, especially our fleet of air 
refueling tankers, to be prepared for the chance of a two-theatre 
conflict. Can you elaborate on the air refueling tanker needs that the 
Commission found?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. The Commission discussed how current 
plans to modernize and expand the nation's global mobility 
capabilities, particularly air refueling tankers, are inadequate for a 
simultaneous two-war conflict. The U.S. ability to rapidly project 
airpower in two theaters with conventional strike aircraft and dual-
capable bombers will fall short in the 2027-2035 timeframe. We found 
that funding needs to be prioritized and air refueling tanker programs 
must be accelerated to meet the operational needs of a two-theater 
conflict. In addition, the Commission has also called for a planned 
increase in air delivery platforms such as the B-21 and the tankers 
such an expanded force would require. The Commission assessed the 
availability and expansion of the tanker fleet as critical to 
maintaining the deterrent capabilities U.S. strategic posture requires.
    Ms. Sewell. Russia has the largest nuclear force of any state, and 
since the beginning of its invasion into Ukraine, Putin has threatened 
its nuclear capabilities to both compel Ukraine to surrender and halt 
NATO countries from intervening. The Commission found that 
``withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly 
benefit U.S. adversaries, invite aggression that the U.S. might later 
have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American security and economic 
propensity.'' If the U.S. stopped supporting Ukraine at this point in 
Russia's unprovoked war, what message would that send to Russia? How 
would that decision embolden U.S. adversaries and hurt American 
security?
    Ms. Creedon and Senator Kyl. It is in the United States' national 
interest to maintain, strengthen, and expand its network of alliances 
and partnerships. These relationships, inter alia, strengthen U.S. 
security by deterring aggression regionally before it can reach the 
U.S. homeland. U.S. Allies communicated to the Commission their 
concerns with the renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine and 
Russian attempts at nuclear coercion to keep Allies from assisting 
Ukraine. Those Allies emphasized that nuclear coercion must be 
resisted. The Allies also expressed concern that acquiescing to these 
nuclear threats may embolden America's nuclear adversaries, which may 
lead to a miscalculation of U.S. and Allied determination. 
Consequently, the Commission recommended the Director of National 
Intelligence direct the development of dynamic assessments to assess 
the decision calculus of nuclear-armed U.S. adversaries and examine 
their perceptions of the costs and benefits of nuclear coercion. 
America's Allies rely on the U.S. strategic posture because it forms an 
integral component of their defense strategy. As a result, many U.S. 
Allies perceive no need to develop their own nuclear weapons 
capabilities, which is in the U.S. national security interest and 
reduces the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Any significant changes to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or 
capabilities will have great effect on America's Allies' perceptions 
and their deterrence and assurance requirements.

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