[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







                  MISSION CRITICAL: RESTORING NATIONAL  
                     SECURITY AS THE FOCUS OF DEFENSE 
                     PRODUCTION ACT REAUTHORIZATION 

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                          ILLICIT FINANCE, AND
                  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS


                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 12, 2024

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                           Serial No. 118-80







    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]









                                   _______
                                   
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
56-350 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024 



































                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

               PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma             MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas                     Member
BILL POSEY, Florida                  NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri         BRAD SHERMAN, California
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                AL GREEN, Texas
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Vice          EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
    Chairman                         JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut
TOM EMMER, Minnesota                 BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia   JUAN VARGAS, California
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
JOHN ROSE, Tennessee                 VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin               SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina      AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina         STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin          RITCHIE TORRES, New York
ANDREW GARBARINO, New York           SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California                NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BYRON DONALDS, Florida               WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska                 BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MIKE LAWLER, New York
ZACH NUNN, Iowa
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee

                     Matt Hoffmann, Staff Director
          Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, 
                and International Financial Institutions

                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri, Chairman

ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio, Ranking Member
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
YOUNG KIM, California, Vice          BILL FOSTER, Illinois
    Chairwoman                       JUAN VARGAS, California
ZACH NUNN, Iowa                      JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee    



































                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on:
    March 12, 2024...............................................     1
Appendix:
    March 12, 2024...............................................    27

                               WITNESSES
                        Tuesday, March 12, 2024

Nadaner, Jeffrey, Senior Vice President, Govini; and former 
  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy...........     4
Nicastro, Luke A., Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy, 
  Congressional Research Service (CRS)...........................     6
Tucker, Todd N., Director, Industrial Policy and Trade, Roosevelt 
  Institute......................................................     9
Zakheim, Roger, Director, Ronald Reagan Institute................     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
    Nadaner, Jeffrey.............................................    28
    Nicastro, Luke A.............................................    33
    Tucker, Todd N...............................................    47
    Zakheim, Roger...............................................    53

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Luetkemeyer, Hon. Blaine:
    Written statement of the Americans for Prosperity (AFP) 
      Foundation.................................................    67
Waters, Hon. Maxine:
    Written statement of the Baroni Center for Government 
      Contracting, George Mason University (GMU) Costello College 
      of Business................................................    69
Nadaner, Jeffrey:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Ogles.......................................    80
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    82
Nicastro, Luke A.:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Ogles.......................................    85
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    87
Tucker, Todd N.:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    90
Zakheim, Roger:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    95

 
                  MISSION CRITICAL: RESTORING NATIONAL 
                    SECURITY AS THE FOCUS OF DEFENSE 
                     PRODUCTION ACT REAUTHORIZATION 

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 12, 2024

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on National Security,
                               Illicit Finance, and
              International Financial Institutions,
                           Committee on Financial Services,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Blaine 
Luetkemeyer [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Luetkemeyer, Barr, Meuser, 
Kim, Nunn, Ogles; Beatty, Gonzalez, Nickel, Foster, Vargas, and 
Gottheimer.
    Ex officio present: Representative Waters.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The Subcommittee on National 
Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial 
Institutions will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any time.
    Today's hearing is entitled, ``Mission Critical: Restoring 
National Security as the Focus of Defense Production Act 
Reauthorization.''
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an opening 
statement.
    In response to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, my 
fellow Missourian, President Harry Truman, signed a law 
intended to ensure that our nation would have sufficient 
industrial resources to meet our national security needs. Among 
the key authorities that the Defense Production Act, or DPA, 
gave the President was the authority to prioritize the 
production and delivery of items critical to our national 
security.
    It also provided a series of financial tools to incentivize 
the creation or growth of our domestic capacity, and to 
manufacture those items, particularly those that otherwise 
might not be made in the United States, and it now forms the 
basis for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) to ensure that foreign adversaries aren't able 
to use the fruits of our free market innovation against the 
United States.
    For almost three-quarters of a century, the DPA smoothly 
and quietly functioned with annual appropriations for 
industrial incentives generally in the range of $50 million, 
modest by Department of Defense (DOD) standards today. This 
committee checked in on DPA from time to time in recent years, 
mostly focused on CFIUS. The last time this committee held a 
general hearing on DPA was more than a decade ago, in May of 
2013.
    I decided to call today's hearing because over the past few 
years, the Federal Government has rapidly increased its use of 
DPA's financial tools to address a variety of challenges. For 
example, in March 2020, Congress appropriated $1 billion to the 
DPA account through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act, to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
the coronavirus.
    Then, in 2022, Congress appropriated another roughly $1.25 
billion to DPA, $750 million of which went in the Ukraine 
supplemental for weapons production, and another $500 million 
in the Inflation Reduction Act, half for domestic mining and 
mineral processing, and half for clean energy programs.
    Over the last 6-plus years, the White House has also 
referenced DPA in a series of Executive Orders and other 
actions, beginning with former President Trump's prescient 2017 
order for the Defense Department to analyze our defense and 
manufacturing industrial base and assess supply chains for 
their resilience to potential shocks. DOD's recommendation in a 
subsequent report to rely on DPA Title III arguably kicked off 
a DPA revival.
    A few short years later, in 2020, COVID delivered a 
dramatic shock to our supply chains, and then-President Trump, 
in addition to deploying funds through Title III, invoked DPA 
Title I so that the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) could prioritize contracts for health and medical 
resources, such as personal protective equipment. HHS also used 
DPA to prioritize the production of ventilators, which were 
badly needed and in short supply at that time.
    While taking the oath, President Biden also embraced DPA, 
beginning with one of his earliest Executive Orders to 
strengthen the U.S. supply chain's resilience. In May of 2022, 
President Biden invoked the DPA to require suppliers to provide 
key inputs to infant formula manufacturers before any other 
customers.
    A month later, he again leaned on DPA, this time to 
accelerate domestic production of energy technologies, 
including solar panel parts, insulation, heat pumps, biofuels, 
and power grid infrastructure.
    Finally, last fall, the Biden Administration deployed DPA 
twice more: first, to foster investment in domestic 
manufacturing of essential medicines; and second, and more 
controversially, to compel private companies to provide 
information to the government about their work on artificial 
intelligence (AI).
    The level of support for these various applications of DPA 
has varied across party lines, and we welcome that debate. But 
I hope we can all agree as a starting point that the United 
States must have a strong defense industrial base, if only to 
ensure success in our global competition with China. This is a 
fundamental rationale for the DPA today.
    The DPA has generally been reauthorized in 5-year 
increments, and the current reauthorization expires at the end 
of Fiscal Year 2025, about 18 months from now. In previous 
renewals, Congress stripped out provisions that were no longer 
relevant and added new provisions to address contemporary 
challenges. In my view, our current situation requires that the 
DPA, as job one, deploy its limited resources to ensure that 
the United States has the industrial capacity to defend our 
nation against the generational challenge posed by China.
    Today, our panel of witnesses will help the committee 
identify appropriate solutions that Congress could implement in 
the next reauthorization by discussing the history and 
mechanics of that DPA, how it has been deployed, and how it can 
be focused, modernized, and improved.
    With that, the Chair now recognizes the ranking member of 
the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Ohio, Mrs. Beatty, for 4 
minutes for an opening statement.
    Mrs. Beatty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing. And good morning to our witnesses,
    The Defense Production Act is what we are here to discuss 
today, as you have heard from our chairman. This is our first 
dedicated DPA hearing in over a decade. The DPA, which many may 
be surprised to learn is under the jurisdiction of the House 
Financial Services Committee, this committee, gives the 
President the authority to take various actions to ensure the 
supply of materials and services necessary for national 
defense. The powers granted to the Executive Branch under the 
DPA are not to be taken lightly. They enable the President to 
prioritize government contracts, waive international trade 
requirements, and offer incentives within the domestic market 
to enhance the production of critical materials and 
technologies if deemed necessary for national defense.
    Since the law's inception during the Korean War, Congress 
has amended the definition of, ``national defense,'' to include 
emergency preparedness, critical infrastructure protection and 
restoration, homeland security, and certainly much more. Given 
these broad powers, we must take a prudent approach to DPA 
application as we consider widening the lens through which we 
look at national security in a rapidly-evolving world.
    To be clear, national defense looks different today than it 
did 70 years ago. Today, it means being energy-independent and 
client-resilient, fortifying our supply chains, supporting our 
allies abroad, and bolstering United States' competition.
    In recent years, the Executive Branch has appropriately 
used the DPA to address crises outside of the traditional 
national defense. During the horrific COVID-19 pandemic, 
invocation of the DPA quite literally saved lives by 
facilitating the production of ventilators, respirators, 
vaccinations, and coronavirus tests to help Americans weather 
the storm.
    With the increase in frequency of extreme weather events 
that cost us billions of dollars in damage and results in 
thousands of deaths per year, there is no doubt that climate 
change is a national security risk. Accordingly, President 
Biden justifiably issued presidential determinations, and 
certainly we have heard the list of things that President Biden 
used it for, as stated by our chairman. Accordingly, President 
Biden also used presidential determinations to accelerate 
domestic manufacturing of clean energy technologies. As we look 
ahead to what the next crisis might be, whether it is climate 
change, a pandemic, or war, we must continue to use DPA wisely 
and reinforce our readiness to tackle major challenges.
    During the Korean War, American industry turned on a dime 
to ensure that we would win the war effort, and we did it again 
in the 21st Century to combat the horrific virus that took more 
than 1.1 million American lives. United States' competitors are 
looking ahead at the challenges of the future. We must do the 
same, leveraging tools like the DPA to boost U.S. strength and 
stability. As we prepare to reauthorize this essential 
legislation in the coming year, I look forward to working with 
my Republican colleagues once again on this historical 
bipartisan effort. And again, I would like to thank our 
witnesses for being here, and I look forward to your testimony. 
I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Very good. Thank you for that, Mrs. 
Beatty.
    Today, we welcome the testimony of our four witnesses, Mr. 
Luke Nicastro, Dr. Jeffrey Nadaner, Mr. Roger Zakheim, and Dr. 
Todd Tucker. We thank each of you for taking the time to be 
here. You will each be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral 
presentation of your testimony. And without objection, each of 
your written statements will be made a part of the record.
    This is a little housekeeping note. The gentleman on the 
end is transcribing all that takes place today, so sometimes, 
the microphones need to be pulled very close to you. They are 
pretty good. They have improved them in the meetings since I 
have been hearing them over the years, but those boxes in front 
of you do move forward. If you would just pull them toward you 
so that you get close to it, straighten out the microphone to 
make sure you can almost take a bite out of it so the gentleman 
can hear what is being said and be able to transcribe that, 
okay?
    Other than that, you each will have 5 minutes. Whenever you 
see the little yellow button go on your screen there on your 
box, that means you have a minute to wrap up. When it hits red, 
I have the gavel.
    With that, Mr. Nadaner, you are now recognized for 5 
minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF JEFFREY NADANER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GOVINI; 
AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY

    Mr. Nadaner. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking 
Member Beatty, and members of the subcommittee. I testify 
before you today in firm support of the reauthorization of the 
Defense Production Act, contingent on certain revisions and 
reforms.
    The DPA, as you know, confers upon the President 
authorities to shape the domestic industrial base so that when 
called upon, it can provide essential materials and goods 
needed for the national defense. Through more than 50 
authorizations, Congress has expanded that definition to 
include domestic preparedness in response to natural hazards, 
terrorist attacks, and even to encompass renewable energy 
sources such as solar, geothermal, wind, and biomass. This 
promiscuous growth in the definition of national defense is a 
concern I share.
    Nonetheless, as I saw firsthand as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, the DPA, if properly employed, remains an important 
tool to fill gaps in supply chains. And those gaps can stop the 
production of crucial military systems, they can fix weaknesses 
in defense infrastructure, and they can mobilize the country in 
the face of a broader national crisis as was the case with 
COVID-19.
    Now, the broader global risk context is essential. The 
correlation of military and economic force is deteriorating for 
the United States of America around the world. Look at the 
return of industrial scale land warfare in Europe, look at 
Iran's proxy offenses across the Middle East, and, most of all, 
look at an aggressive China, which has a defense and 
manufacturing industrial base that dwarfs our own.
    Indeed, the emerging China threat is on par with the Axis 
during World War II and the Soviet Union thereafter, and 
America confronts these challenges with a defense industrial 
base that is much withered and denuded since the Cold War. So 
with this fragile industrial infrastructure, it is all the more 
necessary to have special rapid authorities at the ready when 
an acute need arrives for scarce parts and materials.
    The most compelling and pure use of this authority in 
recent memory came in the summer of 2007 when Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates, invoked the DPA to secure supplies for 
reinforced steel to build mine resistant ambush protected 
vehicles (MRAPs) to blunt the improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) that were killing our troops daily in Iraq.
    And today, we are focused on DPA Title III awards. These 
awards can support military supply chains, national defense 
mobilization, and critical civil infrastructure. These 
categories could encompass shipyards' materials, mineral 
refining, large water pumps, electrical generators, wiring, and 
agricultural equipment, as well as transportation and computing 
infrastructure.
    Having worked at senior executive levels at the Defense 
Department and in industry, I hold that the DPA should be 
reauthorized to focus more effectively on national defense and 
indispensable public systems that enjoy uncontroversial, 
widespread, bipartisan support. A reformed authority would make 
the DPA a ready tool to: first, rescue and fix the very serious 
gaps in America's defense industrial base and buttress the 
related commercial supply chains; and second, enable a defense 
mobilization, provided that the Congress and a future President 
determines one is necessary.
    The U.S. defense industrial base cannot be relied on to 
meet the nation's needs today. DPA Title III could provide a 
crucial part in reviving that base, and we are going to need 
significantly more output if the international situation 
continues to deteriorate in defense supplies like ships, 
autonomous vehicles, aircraft, and most of all, longer-range 
munitions. The skillful and systematic use of DPA could fill 
these holes and, I wish to stress, enable the entry of new 
defense tech companies, which, as we have seen with space 
launches and drones enabled by artificial intelligence, can do 
things more quickly and cheaply and with more competition given 
the proper opportunity and incentives.
    The country should have the option, as Congress and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) created before World War II, to tap 
commercial entrepreneurs to bring innovation, competition, and 
economies of scale to military production, and here, the key 
word is, ``before.''
    As you will note in my prepared statement, I propose seven 
reforms to the DPA, including more expanded use of loans and 
how that can happen, and also the kind of expertise and the 
executive agent relationships that the DPA office will need. I 
would also note that DPA Title III could benefit from Fixing 
America's Surface Transportation Act Title 41 (FAST-41) 
authorities for permitting. It is no good to get a DPA grant if 
one does not get the permitting and cannot train the workforce 
to make that happen.
    With that, I hope that the Congress will reauthorize the 
DPA and do it now so it is at the ready should the nation need 
it. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Nadaner can be found on page 
28 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Dr. Nadaner. I forgot to 
introduce each one of you with regards to your backgrounds. Dr. 
Nadaner is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy, and is currently Senior Vice President of 
Government Affairs at Govini.
    Mr. Nicastro is next up, and Mr. Nicastro is an Analyst in 
U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy at the Congressional 
Research Service. Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF LUKE A. NICASTRO, ANALYST IN U.S. DEFENSE 
  INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS)

    Mr. Nicastro. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking 
Member Beatty, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
inviting the Congressional Research Service to testify today. 
This morning, I will summarize my written statement on the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, or DPA, starting with a brief 
overview of the statute itself, followed by a sketch of its 
historical development and recent uses. I will conclude by 
offering a few issues facing Congress.
    The DPA provides the President with an array of authorities 
to, ``shape national defense preparedness programs and maintain 
and enhance the domestic industrial base.'' Over the past 74 
years, successive Administrations have used the DPA as a tool 
to manage the nation's defense-related productive capacity, 
invoking its authorities to increase the domestic supply of 
goods and materials.
    These authorities are grouped into titles, of which three 
are extant today: Title I, which allows the President to 
require industry to accept and prioritize contracts and orders 
to promote the national defense; Title III, which allows the 
President to provide loan guarantees, loans, purchase 
commitments, grants, and other financial assistance to 
businesses to expand productive capacity and supply; and Title 
VII, which provides the President with a variety of 
authorities, including the power to obtain information from 
businesses, form agreements with industry, and block certain 
corporate transactions. Title VII also defines key terms, 
notably, ``national defense,'' and provides for the Act's 
termination.
    The DPA was originally enacted in 1950 at the beginning of 
the Korean War. In addition to the three current titles, it 
included four addressing broader management of the economy, 
that have since lapsed. From its inception, the DPA has 
contained a sunset clause requiring periodic reauthorization to 
retain effect. Congress has reauthorized the Act dozens of 
times and has also amended many of its provisions. Some of 
these amendments have broadened the definition of, ``national 
defense,'' and thus, the purposes for which the DPA may be used 
expanded who is eligible for Title III assistance, and changed 
how Title III activities are funded. Congress has also altered 
reporting requirements and used Title VII to codify other 
industrial-base-related authorities.
    The Executive Branch's use of the DPA has also changed. 
After extensive application during the Korean War, for 
instance, employment of Title III declined, reaching a nadir 
between the late 1960s and early 1980s, before rising again 
starting in 1985. The use of Title I has been more consistent, 
although the contracts it supports have varied. In terms of its 
authorities, Title VII has historically been the least-used 
title.
    The number, variety, and value of DPA activities increased 
dramatically beginning in 2020. This was initially driven by 
the use of its authorities, particularly Title I and Title III, 
by the Trump and Biden Administrations to support COVID-19 
response efforts, including through prioritizing pandemic-
related contracts and expanding production of vaccines and 
medical supplies. However, since 2020, the Biden Administration 
has also used the DPA for policy priorities, such as increasing 
production capacity to support Ukraine and strengthening clean 
energy supply chains.
    Turning now to the role of Congress, I wanted to highlight 
three potential issues this committee may face. First, Congress 
pays for DPA activities. It does this mainly by making 
appropriations to the DPA Fund, which pays for Title III 
projects. Since 2020, Congress has provided approximately $3.1 
billion for the DPA Fund, along with $10 billion made available 
for COVID-related DPA uses outside of the structure of this 
Fund. Congress may consider what level of funding is 
appropriate for DPA activities and whether or not to change how 
it provides this funding.
    Second, Congress oversees the President's use of DPA 
authorities and funds. If Congress assesses that these are not 
being used in appropriate or effective ways, Congress has a 
variety of options, including developing and considering 
legislative provisions to, for instance, direct the use of the 
DPA for certain purposes or to modify notification or 
authorization requirements. Congress may also consider whether 
or not to amend provisions of the DPA itself to change how the 
President may use its authorities.
    Third, and finally, most of the DPA's provisions will 
expire on September 30, 2025, unless they are reauthorized. 
Historically, reauthorization has supplied Congress with an 
occasion to consider other changes. So, Congress may assess the 
overall efficacy of the statute as currently written, 
particularly its alignment with the requirements of great power 
competition and national strategy, and consider whether or not 
to make changes.
    This concludes my remarks. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nicastro can be found on 
page 33 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Mr. Nicastro. We now go to 
Mr. Zakheim. He is the Washington Director of the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Foundation Institute. Mr. Zakheim, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you.

 STATEMENT OF ROGER ZAKHEIM, DIRECTOR, RONALD REAGAN INSTITUTE

    Mr. Zakheim. Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Beatty, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me today to testify on restoring national security as 
the focus of the Defense Production Act.
    As this committee considers the 54th reauthorization of the 
DPA, it is prudent to consider that the United States faces the 
most dangerous international security environment since 1980, 
at a time where the U.S. military has lost or is losing its 
military superiority over our adversaries, and during a moment 
where the size of the force is declining with every passing 
year.
    Perennial continuing resolutions and flat or declining 
budgets have left the Pentagon unable to maintain its defense 
program, let alone grow the force to meet its national defense 
commitments. These factors, plus persistent combat and 
peacetime operations, have resulted in a military that has not 
been able to recapitalize its industrial base since the Reagan 
Administration held office.
    During the same period, China has engaged in the largest 
military buildup since the Soviet Union in the 1960s. A few 
data points. Just this week, we learned China has increased its 
defense budget by 7.2 percent, continuing a 20-year run of 
continuous growth. China has the largest navy in the world. And 
most relevant to the DPA, China's shipbuilding industry fields 
232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States.
    These realities make this the most consequential 
reauthorization of the DPA since its enactment in 1950. As was 
mentioned, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have 
revealed that the United States may not be able to restore 
deterrence or, if necessary, prevail in a protracted conflict, 
absent a concerted effort to increase America's defense 
production. As Under Secretary of Defense, William LaPlante, 
recently said, ``Production itself is deterrence.''
    While a full inventory of the military's capacity 
shortfalls is beyond the scope of this testimony, three areas 
of urgent need are the following: one, munition and weapons; 
two, naval shipbuilding and maintenance; and three, supply 
chains and strategic materials shortfalls. My written testimony 
outlines the scope of the challenge in each of these categories 
and ways the DPA can help. The objective in all of these cases 
should be investment in extra capacity, stockpiling inventory, 
funding emerging technologies, and last, of course, expanding 
domestic production.
    In recent years, the DPA has drifted from its original 
focus on national defense to addressing nondefense national 
emergencies. While the use of the DPA for a national emergency 
like COVID-19 proved essential, it should be the exception and 
not the rule. The DPA, as originally enacted, defines national 
defense as the operations and activities of the armed forces 
that are, ``substantially concerned with the national 
defense.'' It is essential that we return to the national 
defense definition as originally enacted with an annual 
appropriation supporting DPA projects via grants and loan 
guarantees.
    We must remember that capital invested in the DPA offers 
the taxpayer a trifecta: it helps the economy; it helps the 
American worker; and it strengthens our military. As this 
committee embarks on reauthorizing the DPA, it should consider 
upgrading the authority to address four essential elements of 
the defense production value chain: one, capital loan 
guarantees to drive increased production capacity; two, 
incentives to build and sustain the defense industrial base 
workforce; three, fast track permitting, as was mentioned, for 
DPA-supported projects; and four, supporting and sustaining 
single points of failure in the defense industrial base supply 
chain. Without a conservative focus across these four lines of 
effort, use of the DPA authority will produce suboptimal or 
uneven outcomes, risking failure.
    The United States should take advantage of this moment and 
recapitalize our military and expand America's industrial 
capacity. This would help build a military that can restore 
deterrence, uphold the peace, and avoid the wartime 
mobilization that the DPA was originally designed to address. 
It is time to put the, ``D,'' back in the DPA, and to re-
dedicate its funding and unique authorities to national defense 
priorities that catalyze defense production for the 21st 
Century. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Zakheim can be found on page 
53 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Mr. Zakheim. Dr. Tucker is 
next. Dr. Tucker is the Director for Industrial Policy and 
Trade at the Roosevelt Institute. You are recognized for 5 
minutes, sir.

 STATEMENT OF TODD N. TUCKER, DIRECTOR, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND 
                   TRADE, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE

    Mr. Tucker. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member 
Beatty, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank 
you for the opportunity to testify today on the DPA.
    As a political scientist who has studied the history and 
evolution of the DPA, I wish to make three major points. First, 
the DPA promotes the health of the economy as a whole, both 
military and civilian. Neither the DPA nor its predecessor laws 
from the Franklin Roosevelt Administration are narrowly focused 
on military issues or military procurement. From the beginning, 
the health of the civilian economy and, in particular, energy 
production has been a central emanating concern.
    After all, we do not have two economies. Industries produce 
for both military and civilian sectors. The dual mandate is 
well reflected through the referral of jurisdiction of the law 
to this committee, which can take a broader view of the economy 
than your armed services counterparts. Moreover, Executive 
Order 13603, codifying the responsibilities for the DPA, gives 
major responsibilities to a wide range of agencies beyond just 
the Defense Department.
    Looking at the DPA text itself, you can see why this dual 
mandate exists. It speaks to the importance of the health of 
the domestic industrial base as a whole, not simply the defense 
industrial base. It points out that the domestic industrial 
base needs support to have continuing improvements in its 
efficiency and responsiveness. Moreover, the DPA goes further 
and states that independently of any particular military need, 
to the maximum extent possible, domestic energy supply should 
be augmented through reliance on renewable energy resources. 
And the text also points to the importance of the 
competitiveness of the industrial economy of the U.S. as a 
whole.
    Second point. The DPA is a diverse toolkit with diverse 
applications, some at low to no cost to the taxpayer. Title I's 
priorities and allocations are used hundreds of thousands of 
times a year. This helps resolve supply chain problems by 
making sure that materials go to the most urgent and important 
uses.
    FDR used the DPA's predecessor powers to ensure that steel 
and other materials were directed towards their highest-value 
uses in both the civilian and military economy. President Trump 
used DPA authorities to get vaccine manufacturers the inputs 
they need and to go after price gouging in the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) industry. And responding to demands 
from members of this committee and others, President Biden's 
use of the DPA prioritized baby formula manufacturers' orders 
of key ingredients, helping to ensure that parents across the 
country could feed their infants.
    Second, Title III, as has already been discussed, provides 
useful incentives to promote the industrial base of the country 
and energy production. FDR, President Trump, and President 
Biden used these for a variety of uses, including critical 
minerals, producing more aluminum, and also responding to the 
COVID-19 crisis.
    Third, Title VII gives the government the power to obtain 
information and encourage cooperation among private sector 
entities. Presidents Trump and Biden have used this to promote 
cooperation among vaccine manufacturers and distributors. Both 
have also used the possibility of soliciting mandatory 
information under Title VII to get more voluntary agreements 
with private industry.
    Third point. The DPA can boost American competitiveness and 
preparedness in a volatile world. There are a number of serious 
threats that the DPA can help address. First, China and, to a 
lesser extent, other trading partners are aggressively pursuing 
industrial policies to capture market share at the expense of 
U.S. companies. In recent decades, we have seen this in steel, 
solar, and now electric vehicles.
    To put this in comparison, the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) controls 40 percent of 
global petroleum production, a fact which has focused the minds 
of policymakers on this committee and elsewhere for half a 
century at least. Today, a single country, China, controls 
upwards of 90 percent of some of the supply chains that are 
critical to future energy resilience and independence. 
Moreover, European allies are advancing beyond the U.S. in 
critical sectors like wind and green steel.
    Second, and relatedly, U.S. economic, military, and 
intelligence agencies deem climate change one of the top risks 
to economic and national security. Until recent years, it was 
rare for the United States to experience an extreme weather 
event that caused more than a billion dollars in damage. Today, 
these are happening, on average, once a month. In 2021, nearly 
1,000 people died from these events. These events have lasting 
impacts on economic growth and financial security. Americans 
are affected by this in still other ways, such as where DOD is 
incurring billions of dollars a year in damages to base camps 
from extreme events.
    Each of these dynamics will interact with the previously-
noted industrial policy trends to create both challenges and 
opportunities for the U.S. industrial base and its efficiency, 
responsiveness, competitiveness, and access to energy. In the 
face of all of these challenges, the DPA can serve as a patch 
and a complement to other laws enacted by Congress. Thank you 
for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Tucker can be found on page 
47 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Dr. Tucker.
    We will now turn to Member questions. The Chair recognizes 
himself for 5 minutes to begin the questioning.
    Mr. Nicastro, the Defense Production Act has been 
reauthorized many, many times, as you mentioned. As you think 
about the next reauthorization, what lessons can this committee 
draw from previous experiences, and what are the best practices 
that have emerged from your review of its history?
    Mr. Nicastro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think to the 
extent that Congress can take a forward-thinking approach and 
incorporate its priorities as these relate to national strategy 
generally, and industrial policy more specifically, that has, I 
believe, tended to be looked back upon by Congresses as an 
element of successful reauthorization of the DPA.
    As an example, one could look to how the DPA was 
reauthorized in the aftermath of the Korean War and see that 
the Congress at that period was looking forward to potential 
future crises and trying to alter the legislation such that the 
authorities that were necessary when the U.S. was actively 
engaged in hostilities in Korea were eliminated or were allowed 
to lapse, while those that were more suitable to a peacetime 
environment were retained and potentially expanded.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Each of you in your testimony talk 
about the importance of this Act, and I certainly agree with 
that. I think it is very important that we are able to protect 
our country and find ways to move forward with supply chain 
problems and be able to prioritize our defense needs or some of 
the others from time to time. One of you made the comment with 
regards to a deterrent, about having stockpiles. I think Mr. 
Zakheim made the comment with regards to having a stockpile of 
the stuff actually, even if we never have to use it, as a 
deterrent to other people, other countries around the world to 
be less aggressive, so I think there is a need for all of this.
    I am kind of concerned about the expansion of this, and Mr. 
Nadaner and Mr. Zakheim, you have both commented quite 
extensively on concerns about it. And when we see some of the 
things that we have used it for, for instance, to solve the 
baby formula problem--trust me, I am not against children. I 
realize that was a national problem at that time, but is 
implementing the Defense Production Act a way to solve that, or 
can the President, by Executive Order, do that? Would each of 
you like to comment on some of the things that we were using it 
for now, and are there other alternatives, such as an Executive 
Order, or other ways to address this rather than use the 
Defense Production Act?
    Mr. Nadaner. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree with you more. 
One way is to go to Congress and to seek an appropriation, and 
on something like baby formula, Congress will act very quickly. 
At least that is my experience. The Defense Production Act 
covers everything from national defense to the weather. 
National defense in itself is a very substantial undertaking, 
so I believe if it is outside national defense, it has to be 
something on which basic societal functioning depends, like the 
electricity may go out or the water may go out. And we may face 
scenarios like that in the future, or if there is a terrible 
disease.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Do we need a definition in law then 
to codify this in a way that kind of narrows it a little bit, 
or is there something else that is in here that already does 
that?
    Mr. Nadaner. No, I think there could be some narrowing in 
the law. Maybe a good place to start--in the Obama era, the 
national preparedness Executive Order even expands upon the 
law. I would trim that down to these two core areas: basic 
societal functioning; and military systems.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Mr. Zakheim?
    Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Chairman, I would only add that we ought 
to tailor the use of the DPA and the funding to the national 
defense strategy. It is quite clear what the priority is in the 
national defense strategy. China is labeled as the pacing 
threat. It is the first. There are distant seconds, thirds, and 
fourths, and that should be reflected in the allocation use of 
this very unique authority, and I think that would help the 
execution of the law.
    And certainly, if you are in a national emergency, there is 
flexibility. It is why it is so unique. But day to day, it 
should be guided by our national defense strategy and, of 
course, China. Whether you are looking at the Biden national 
defense strategy or the Trump national defense strategy, it 
starts with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay. Mr. Nadaner, very quickly here; 
my time is running out. With regards to oversight over this, 
there are a number of different agencies that wind up utilizing 
the DPA. Do you see a need for an Inspector General over just 
this program, or are they adequate where they are at? Should we 
have the agencies compile themselves into one so there is 
actually some oversight over everything? How do you see it, 
because now we are at billions of dollars rather than a few 
million dollars that are invested in this program. How do you 
see that?
    Mr. Nadaner. I think I would require more transparency from 
the office on a regular basis. However, an Inspector General 
who is going to be dedicated to this program, I think it is 
going to have a chilling effect. One of the problems that we 
have had with DPA is that the action is too slow, and that is 
partially because of risk aversion.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay.
    Mr. Nadaner. If there is a problem, Inspectors General can 
be appointed. There is the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), and there are certainly congressional hearings.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Okay. My time is up. I appreciate 
that. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Nadaner. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. With that, the gentleman from Texas, 
Mr. Gonzalez, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nicastro, nearly 
all Defense Production Act authorities will terminate on 
September 30, 2025, with a few exceptions, such as the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
and antitrust protections for certain voluntary industry 
agreements. As the primary committee of jurisdiction in the 
House, we are responsible for the reauthorization. Could you 
give us examples of what would happen if this authorization 
were to lapse?
    Mr. Nicastro. Thank you, Congressman. The biggest impact of 
a lapse of this authorization would be the loss of tools for 
the Executive Branch, and these tools have been used off and on 
for over 7 decades. With Title I, you would be talking about a 
change to the way that DOD does its contracting, because the 
priorities and allocation system is very deeply ingrained. DOD 
reports placing an average of 300,000 to 350,000 of what they 
call rated orders through that system.
    With respect to Title III, DOD reports at least 56 active 
projects that are ongoing. So presumably, if that authority 
were to lapse, those projects could not be executed. And, 
again, that is a fairly substantial tool to which the Executive 
Branch would lose access.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. This is to all of the witnesses. 
Traditionally, the Defense Production Act has been a bipartisan 
law with broad support from both parties. Together, Members of 
Congress have supported the Defense Production Act being used 
through wars and pandemics, among other crises. Why is it 
important to keep the law and the reauthorization as a 
bipartisan endeavor, and why should members reject partisan 
rhetoric and actions when it comes to national defense?
    Mr. Zakheim. I am happy to begin, sir. If you look at every 
President of any political party, this is a tool they rely on. 
And, of course, whether it is the United States engaged in 
armed conflict or, as I have outlined, to try and prevent one 
through deterrence, or a national emergency like COVID-19, you 
don't wear your party suit for that one. You are American, and 
this is an essential tool, which is why we have the opportunity 
to testify before you as you consider the 54th authorization.
    I don't have to tell members of this committee how unusual 
perhaps it is to have one law see that many authorizations, and 
it is a reflection of its importance. What I think we are 
talking about here, and then I will turn over to my colleagues, 
is the prioritization, because the challenges before us are 
great on the national defense front. They run deep, and this is 
an essential tool with limited resources, and they should be 
allocated to our national defense priorities.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. I couldn't agree with you more, 
and this is also to all witnesses. In a Defense One article, 
two experts on the Defense Production Act and government 
contracting note that the Defense Production Act is governed by 
a mishmash of old and overlapping Executive Orders spanning 
numerous Administrations. Should the Biden Administration 
consider how to refresh and simplify these decades of orders, 
perhaps issuing a new Executive Order that clearly outlines and 
aligns the Defense Production Act and other authorities, 
policies, and responsibilities to better position the 
government to address future national emergencies, and if so, 
what do you suggest?
    Mr. Nadaner. If I may, sir, I have been the administrator 
of the Defense Production Act. I did not find the collection of 
Executive Orders that date back sometimes a few decades, but 
most of them are fairly recent--I didn't find it an impediment. 
I do think there are structural changes in the opposite 
administrators' DPA that could be useful and that could be 
written into law. I think one is, currently, the law requires 
that office to use an executive agent from the Air Force. That 
is performed out of Dayton, Ohio, which made sense in the days 
when the total office for industrial base, all the functions, 
way beyond DPA, had around 10 people. Today, there are several 
hundred people, so I think the distance from decision-makers is 
a problem. It is creating a principal agent issue, so I would 
end the executive agent.
    And then, I think there is a need for real, not just 
bodies, but subject matter experts. We are talking about areas 
like energetics, welding, machining, and advanced 
manufacturing, so I think there are roughly 10 sort of 
master's- and Ph.D.-level experts that are required, and I 
believe that the law should allow that office to pay for that 
as a percentage of the grant.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. The 
gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr, who is also the Chair of our 
Financial Institutions Subcommittee, is now recognized.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Zakheim, I was 
very impressed and alarmed with your testimony that the DPA has 
drifted from its original focus on national defense to 
addressing non-defense national emergencies, and no example is 
more alarming than your testimony that none, zero, of the DPA 
funding appropriated in the Inflation Reduction Act has gone to 
core national defense needs. Mr. Zakheim, what is the specific 
and pressing danger of allowing the DPA to lose its focus on 
national defense?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for the question. It is what I 
outlined in my testimony. If you look at our core national 
defense needs, they are suffering from insufficient funds to 
get after the recapitalization and increase their capacity, and 
that runs, as I outlined, in three core areas. If you look at 
the funding outlook on an annual basis in defense 
appropriations that the Department of Defense relies upon, it 
is declining year-over-year in terms of what they have planned 
in the program for the DPA.
    In other words, these increasing needs, whether it be 
munitions, ship building, or ship maintenance, there is going 
to be, based on the Biden Administration's funding program, 
fewer and fewer dollars available to address those critical 
national defense needs. As a result, we need to prioritize. If 
you just look in the coming years, we have $949 million in 
Fiscal Year 2024. It is going to go down by nearly half in the 
next 2 fiscal years.
    Mr. Barr. One of the things that I have said a lot, not 
only in this subcommittee, but also as a member of the China 
Select Committee, is that we should not try to counter China by 
becoming more like China. We should not think that we can 
counter China or deter China or defend ourselves against 
Chinese aggression by imitating Chinese industrial policy, so 
the DPA does serve a narrow and unique purpose. But non-
defense-related matters should not be the target of the DPA, 
and I think you make a good point for prioritization.
    Dr. Nadaner, accelerating Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to 
Taiwan is critical to maintaining deterrence across the Taiwan 
Strait, but there is currently, as you well know, a $19-billion 
backlog of weapons that the U.S. has sold but not delivered to 
Taiwan. How can the DPA be used to accelerate those deliveries 
to establish the deterrence necessary?
    Mr. Nadaner. The Title I authorities can be used to give 
prioritization to those orders, but the creaky defense 
industrial base is going to need a lot of injections of DPA 
Title III grants or loan guarantees. It just simply cannot 
produce very much. If you notice, sir, around the world, our 
adversaries--China, Iran, North Korea--do not have a problem 
producing large numbers of weapons. We, on the other hand, the 
collection of countries--the U.S., Europe, our allies in Asia--
do have trouble, and that tells you a lot about the correlation 
of forces.
    Mr. Barr. I think that is why we need to focus the DPA on 
national security only because we do have a prioritization 
need, and that is why DPA should be squarely focused on cross-
strait deterrence and FMS deliveries to Taiwan and our own 
industrial base, defense industrial base.
    Let me ask you about critical minerals, because I am very 
concerned about our overreliance on China for critical minerals 
and how the DPA could help decrease that dependence. The PRC 
has already weaponized their holdings of these minerals and 
their dominance of not only the supply and production of 
critical minerals, but also the processing. And they have 
temporarily cut off exports of gallium, germanium, and graphite 
in 2023, weaponizing the supply chain. Last year, the total 
value of minerals in the U.S. national defense stockpile was 
only $1.3 billion, which was 8.8 percent of DOD's 2023 
stockpile requirements, a shortfall of $13.5 billion. What can 
Congress do, through the Defense Production Act, Dr. Nadaner, 
to close this rather significant gap in our stockpile?
    Mr. Nadaner. Critical minerals and rare earths are needed 
in every weapons system, and indeed, all of the electronics 
that we use every day. The fundamental reason how China has 
grabbed the processing market for minerals--they don't have 
that much minerals and rare earths; they import a lot of them, 
but they own the processing--is largely through subsidies. If 
we want to have processing in the U.S., we are going to have to 
alleviate the capital expenditures (CapEx) cost. DPA Title III, 
particularly the loan guarantees, could make a big difference 
in enabling Americans to get back in the processing business.
    Mr. Barr. My time has expired. Thanks for the 
recommendation, but also, I think we need to look at permitting 
reform. We can mine critical minerals in the United States if 
the Administration would stop its war on mining in America, and 
we can become national security-independent of China on this 
issue. With that, I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. The 
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Nickel, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nickel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for our 
witnesses for being here today. The Defense Production Act is 
an essential tool for our national defense. Not only can we use 
it to ensure military readiness in times of crisis, but we can 
also protect the health and safety of everyone in the U.S., 
including members of our armed forces.
    At the beginning of the COVID pandemic, the U.S. Government 
deployed the Defense Production Act to help America respond to 
the crisis, speeding up the production and access to critical 
materials like masks, vaccines, and ventilators. DOD, for 
example, awarded O&M Halyard a $29-million contract under the 
DPA to expand its production of N95 masks, including at a 
facility in Lexington, North Carolina.
    Additionally, DOD awarded a North Carolina company, 
Burlington Industries, a $6.8-million contract to sustain and 
strengthen the domestic clothing and textile industrial base. 
This company has provided uniform fabric to the U.S. military 
for over 70 years. This vital funding came at a time when North 
Carolinians were struggling with the virus and to make ends 
meet.
    Unemployment and economic distress were rising as the 
country coalesced to tackle this significant public health 
challenge. Without DPA funding, our health, troops, and 
national defense all would have suffered. Additionally, if we 
are reliant on countries like China for crucial medical 
devices, we are jeopardizing our national security. Investments 
in public health are investments in our national defense.
    My first question is for you, Dr. Tucker. Does dependency 
on foreign production for critical health supplies, like 
ventilators, create vulnerabilities for our national defense?
    Mr. Tucker. Yes, absolutely. The DPA defines the national 
defense broadly to include about a dozen different 
considerations, all of which speak to the ability of domestic 
industry and the domestic industrial base to supply not only 
military but also civilian needs. And it has been that way 
since the predecessor legislation of the First and Second War 
Powers Acts during the Roosevelt years. So, absolutely, that 
resilience against sort of overdependence on foreign supply has 
always been a key mandate.
    Mr. Nickel. Thanks. Dr. Tucker, as Congress has expanded 
the definition of, ``national defense,'' in what ways do novel 
uses of the DPA, like in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
improve our national security?
    Mr. Tucker. Public health is a key contributor to our 
ability to be resilient as a country, and that affects both our 
citizens that are in the military as well as elsewhere. 
Certainly, within hours of sort of COVID hitting the United 
States, members of this committee and others made clear that we 
needed to use this exceptional authority to be able to address 
an exceptional challenge.
    Mr. Nickel. Thanks. You presented a persuasive argument in 
your opening statement for why renewables and clean energy are 
appropriate for DPA activity for our national defense. I am 
sure you would agree that there are boundaries with that. We 
can't solve the climate crisis entirely with the DPA. Can you 
please provide some examples of where DPA use would be 
appropriate? For example, how do we ensure that Seymour Johnson 
Air Force Base, in my district in North Carolina, can continue 
to function without a reliable source of power?
    Mr. Tucker. Absolutely. There is a reason that energy 
production has always been, and very explicitly in the last 
several decades, a key part of the DPA. It is because of the 
recognition that the rest of the economy runs on energy. So, 
there has been an emphasis on both renewable and nonrenewable 
sources of energy to be able to keep Air Force bases and Army 
bases running, as well as the rest of the civilian economy, 
because the ability of the domestic industrial base to meet any 
of the needs that Congress has outlined in terms of definition 
of, ``national security,'' and, ``national defense,'' is 
crucial on the supply of energy.
    Mr. Nickel. Thanks so much, and I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. The 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meuser, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Meuser. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 
you all for being here. It is an interesting situation. I 
appreciate all of your insights thus far and your opening 
statements. I particularly like the statement that we need to 
put the, ``D,'' back in, ``DPA,'' and it sounds like that needs 
to be done, and that needs to be taken very, very seriously.
    The White House has many regulatory loopholes to subsidize 
and has been doing the green energy projects instead of fossil 
fuels and such and nuclear and all, and one could make an 
argument, as some of you are, that that is at the expense of 
our national security when we don't have an all-of-the-above 
and all-of-the-below as well approach. We purchase from Russia, 
China, Venezuela, and Iran, and allow them to fulfill the 
needs, and all kinds of other countries as well, so that is 
just backwards thinking.
    The Inflation Reduction Act appropriated $500 million for 
the DPA activities just through this September, as you all 
know. Now, $250 million of it was used not for mining, but for 
purchasing of critical minerals from the countries I just 
named, from Venezuela and elsewhere. And another $250 million 
out of, I believe, a billion-dollar budget was used for 
electric heat pumps. And what creates electricity? Coal, in 
many cases, so, it is not working. Usually, when ideology is 
put in front of realistic planning and results, foolish things 
happen, so the level of discretion is too broad for the 
ideologies of this Administration. They are not following what 
the intent of the DPA is, and I think this discussion makes 
that pretty clear.
    Mr. Zakheim, in your view, is the White House exploiting 
the broad authority in Section 303 and picking winners and 
losers and which company to buy electric heating pumps from and 
such, and is it outside of the intended use of the funds within 
the DPA?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for the question, and I think it was 
a missed opportunity, certainly, the allocation of the $250 
million in the Inflation Reduction Act. And as we have been 
discussing, going forward, what does the Department of Defense 
and what does Congress intend to do? As I noted, if you look at 
the Biden Administration budget, the funds that they are 
planning to put against DPA are declining significantly, 
roughly half of what was authorized and appropriated in the 
previous fiscal year.
    At the same time, this Congress passed a law in last year's 
National Defense Authorization Act requiring that any, 
especially, minerals and materials that are sourced from China, 
need to be sourced elsewhere, primarily by the United States, 
by 2028. And what I would think this committee would want to do 
as it reauthorizes DPA is say, well, how are we going to ensure 
that that mandate passed by this Congress for 2028--how is the 
DPA going to support that? And that, I think, leads to the 
prioritization, sir, that you seem to be emphasizing, with 
which I agree.
    Mr. Meuser. Okay. Thank you.
    Dr. Nadaner, can you discuss the role of the U.S.'s 
domestic permitting process? As we spend this money on mining, 
which is really purchasing these minerals from elsewhere, how 
that plays into this, and should that be considered part of the 
DPA mandate or within the DPA so we can utilize our own natural 
resources?
    Mr. Nadaner. Yes. Mining and mineral processing has an 
inextricable link to the DPA, particularly when we are so 
dependent. The fact is that to do almost anything significant 
in terms of infrastructure in this country, we have a 
permitting process that is double the time of Canada and Norway 
and Australia. These are countries that have environmental laws 
that are at least as good as ours, if not superior--double the 
time. So, if it is 7 years to get the permitting and the 
litigation done in Canada, it is 14 years here.
    Mr. Meuser. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman's time has expired. 
With that, we go to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Foster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses. I am going to start off by saying I am a big fan of 
how the flexibility of these authorities have been used. In the 
last Congress, I was on the COVID Select Committee, and I 
collaborated with Representative Mark Green in initiating and 
observing the GAO oversight of Operation Warp Speed, and I have 
to say I was impressed. This was an emergency. The standard was 
not zero waste. The standard was maximum haste, and that was a 
good decision. There were many lessons learned from that, and 
the GAO is a really valuable tool in this. But I think that is 
an example where something completely unanticipated turned out 
to be crucial, so I am a fan of keeping these flexible. 
However, there are a bunch of issues.
    Mr. Nicastro, what fraction of all of our military spending 
goes through the DPA?
    Mr. Nicastro. Thank you, Congressman. The answer will 
depend on the timeframe that we look at, but if we look at DPA 
spending since Fiscal Year 2020, say, inclusive, that is about 
$13.1 billion. Compare that against the total defense budgets 
for the past 3 or 4 fiscal years, and it is a fairly small 
fraction, it's safe to say.
    Mr. Foster. Like, percent level. What is the total defense 
budget?
    Mr. Nicastro. So, $13.1 billion, sir, and if you had an 
annual defense budget around $800 billion, it is----
    Mr. Foster. Annual? Okay. So, probably, it sounds like a 
sub-percent level.
    Mr. Nicastro. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Foster. Yes. Mr. Zakheim, you mentioned our inability 
to build ships at the same scale, so the money that we spend 
through the DPA is not going to rebuild the shipbuilding 
industry. That has to be handled at a much higher level. And 
would you agree that these are very targeted, small things, not 
big ticket items?
    Mr. Zakheim. Yes. And as you know, there are shipbuilding 
accounts with authorization, appropriation, but this is such a 
unique authority that can have outsized impact. And that is 
what I am trying to emphasize today, that if we allocate this 
against some of these capital projects, and I would also 
advocate increased appropriations for the DPA, you could have 
outsized impacts. Dr. Nadaner has referenced these loan 
guarantees. For example, a loan program, if it is revitalized, 
could have a significant impact on ship maintenance facilities 
and shipbuilding of the capital nature where the current 
industry is unable to accomplish.
    Mr. Nadaner. Sir, if I may add?
    Mr. Foster. Yes.
    Mr. Nadaner. It is conceivable that a future Congress and a 
President faced with a national emergency coming from abroad 
may say we need to produce a lot more. And in that case, given 
the holes in the defense industrial base, and how slow 
production is going, you could see $50 billion a year. It would 
make a huge difference in the industrial base and allow 
production.
    Mr. Foster. Okay. And how should we deal with the problems 
with political allocation of capital, fighting the last war, 
Senators preserving shipyards that happen to be in their States 
for things that really have limited military value? You 
mentioned China's electric vehicle (EV) subsidies. There are 
vast junkyards of junk EV vehicles in China because factories 
have been built to capture the subsidies rather than to produce 
cars that will actually be used. Do you have any thoughts on 
how we can try to avoid that? Go ahead?
    Mr. Tucker. Yes. Because the scale of China's subsidies are 
so vast--we just heard from the CRS about the relatively small 
amounts that are going to this in the United States. I think 
what you are hearing actually from all of the testifiers today 
is that there would be value and significantly more resources 
being dedicated than there are today. And I think we are still 
quite a far ways away from the DPA being a source of a lot of 
waste in the U.S. Government spending.
    Mr. Zakheim. I just want to add quickly here, I think the 
problem we face from an industrial base standpoint, from a 
defense industrial base program, is not that we have held on to 
things we don't need because we drew down. Particularly, in the 
early 1990s, we lost the things that we need. Businesses became 
more efficient, and those capabilities went overseas, primarily 
to China, and it is that problem that we are trying to recover 
from right now.
    Mr. Foster. Yes, but if you look into the future, drone 
swarms are going to be much more cost-effective than capital 
ships, and, in fact, a big fraction of China's ships will not 
survive the first few hours of a heavy shooting war.
    Mr. Zakheim. There is no question you need a mix, sir, of 
new tech, but I think as we see from Ukraine and what the 
contingency operations look like in a Taiwan Strait scenario, 
as referenced earlier, you are going to need ships, 
particularly, undersea warfare, of the kind that we have, we 
need more of.
    Mr. Foster. Okay. My time is up, and I yield back.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. The 
gentlelady from California, Mrs. Kim, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer. And I want to 
thank our witnesses for being here with us today.
    The conflicts around the world increased the demand of U.S. 
weapons from our allies, and that demand has also overstretched 
our weapon-making capabilities and revealed the fragility of 
our domestic industrial base. For example, according to one 
report, there is just one factory in the United States that can 
manufacture the black powder for one of the shells most widely 
used by the Ukrainian military. And our shipbuilding capability 
has also diminished in the last few decades. According to a 
U.S. Naval Institute report, we have 7 shipyards that build 
warships for the Navy, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
operates more than 20 shipyards to support their naval 
shipbuilding.
    Mr. Zakheim or Mr. Nadaner--you can both answer this 
question--do you believe that DPA can be utilized as a tool to 
encourage more competition, and if so, are there any changes 
that could be made to do so?
    Mr. Zakheim. I will start, and then turn it over to Dr. 
Nadaner, and thank you for the question. I think with the 
allocation of the DPA, those making the awards, as Dr. Nadaner 
oversaw in his time in the Pentagon, need to make sure that the 
projects not only ensure that the capital is going there and it 
is going to increase capacity, but we are also looking to use 
the DPA against key areas like permitting, as was referenced 
before, and workforce programs, to make sure that if the 
capital goes in, the project can actually be executed based on 
these other things. And Dr. Nadaner has referenced how we are 
way behind in terms of the permitting, but I do think that the 
DPA, because of its unique authorities--we will see the funding 
go up in the future and scale to address some of the strategic 
problems that you have just identified.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
    Mr. Nadaner. This committee has a weighty responsibility to 
create the framework that other committees and the full 
Congress will have the option of implementing. I would note 
that whether it is the more traditional, heavy, big systems, or 
the new systems, like artificially intelligent drones and 
swarms, the percentage of Chinese parts and components in these 
systems is unforgivable. I am not even talking about conflict. 
Let's say there is a trade interruption. All of these factory 
lines that produce these drones are going to stop because they 
have sometimes 10 to 40 percent essential Chinese components in 
their systems.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. In Executive Order 14110, the Biden 
Administration compels private industry to provide information 
on its development of artificial intelligence products. That 
order makes a seemingly novel use of DPA's Title VII, a 
compulsory information-gathering authority applied to an 
industry that has not otherwise been subject to DPA actions 
under either Title I or Title III. Has the DPA been used this 
way before, and if so, how often has it been used? Who wants to 
answer that?
    Mr. Nicastro. I can give it a shot, Congresswoman. Title 
VII has been used historically to inform what are often 
referred to as industrial base assessments, which have been 
conducted under the aegis of the Department of Commerce. You 
are correct that to my knowledge, at least, artificial 
intelligence has not been the subject of the application of 
those authorities. So, this does raise a question as to which 
areas Congress believes to be the most appropriate for the 
application of DPA authorities.
    Mr. Nadaner. There is a monetization issue in terms of how 
the DPA will operate in Title VII--Title VII is basically, the 
government is issuing a survey for how something goes. That is 
a very old way of doing things. Today, in the commercial 
sector, people sit in front of a laptop and they do a few 
keystrokes and they can find out all the capabilities in the 
supply chains, whether it is artificial intelligence software 
or the hardware. They can do that all instantaneously, and 
Congress has provided for that through the commercial 
preference rule. So, I think that an updated DPA would be wise 
to reinforce with the Executive Branch. It is in this regard of 
the commercial preference rule which Congress has thought about 
and has made part of the law.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. One last question. Mr. Zakheim, can 
you explain the importance of surge capacity regarding the 
United States' defense industrial base?
    Mr. Zakheim. As we have seen from the war in Ukraine, I 
know over time it will be quick. We are not able to surge. 
Production lines have been made to be, ``just in time.'' That 
may work for the Walmarts of the world, but for national 
defense, ``just in time,'' means, ``just out of time,'' and we 
can't realize our national defense objectives.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady's time has expired. 
With that, we go to the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you for holding this hearing. I think it has been very 
illuminating. I guess I would start at the beginning by saying 
that no one here is saying we should get rid of the DPA. Is 
that correct? It seems to me that the flexibility it provides 
is something that is good. We are arguing here about what 
should be in it and what should not be in it, which I think is 
important.
    During COVID, I introduced legislation to support the 
President's use of the Defense Production Act authorities to 
further strengthen the production, acquisition, and 
distribution of critical medical supplies across America during 
the public health emergency because I thought it was part of 
national defense. In fact, it is very interesting. Why do we 
call the Spanish flu the, ``Spanish flu?'' Does anybody know 
why? Why don't we pick on somebody here?
    Mr. Zakheim, why do we call the Spanish flu, the, ``Spanish 
flu?''
    Mr. Zakheim. I believe it happened during the war in Spain 
and then, ultimately, World War I.
    Mr. Vargas. Okay. Not exactly. Why don't we try somebody 
else? Go ahead, sir?
    Mr. Nicastro. Sir, I believe it was an effort to avoid a 
panic associated with American troops being overseas in World 
War I, because Spain was not a combatant in that war.
    Mr. Vargas. That is exactly right. In other words, the 
Spanish Flu didn't originate in Madrid or in Spain. In fact, 
because of the war, we were trying to not let people know that 
a lot of our soldiers were getting sick also, and we were able 
to control the media back then a little bit more than we can 
today, and that is why, ultimately, they called it the, 
``Spanish flu.'' But noting that because of our national 
defense, because our troops were in harm's way, that is why we 
didn't want people to know that they were sick. That is 
national defense, so I think it was very well used during the 
pandemic. Once again, the pandemic was, I think, something that 
fit national defense criteria. Would anyone disagree with that?
    Mr. Tucker. I would not disagree with that. I think that 
there is not a clear boundary when it comes to a lot of these 
things between military and civilian production. The Congress 
has rightly recognized over 52 times that these things are 
deeply interconnected, which is why you have had bipartisan and 
often unanimous approvals for exactly those types of uses.
    Mr. Vargas. I agree with that, and I think it gives not 
only us, but the Executive Branch some flexibility that is 
necessary, so I think that is very important.
    Now, one of the things that did concern me--I represent the 
City of San Diego, and I represent the shipbuilding base there. 
And one of the things that they do is try to get work, both 
private work and government work, to keep afloat, but that has 
been a real problem.
    Mr. Zakheim, I think you are the one who gave us that 
startling statistic--232 times the capacity that we have. It 
doesn't seem like the DPA necessarily is the right place to 
create that capacity, but I am very concerned about that. How 
can the DPA work in conjunction with other authorities to help, 
because I do think that this is a problem, especially being on 
the Pacific and understanding the issues of the Pacific Ocean 
out there and how we do need shipbuilding. No matter what 
people think in the modern age, the reality is that you will 
need some ships.
    Mr. Zakheim. Agreed, sir, and the GAO, in a 2023 report, 
said there is a $1.8-billion backlog in ship maintenance in 
addition to the shipbuilding. And as we have referenced 
earlier, the DPA would complement the shipbuilding accounts 
that the Armed Services Committee and the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee authorize and appropriate, so it is 
a key tool that should complement that effort.
    And I think the dynamic that the Department of Defense is 
facing is that it doesn't have the funding available for the 
capital expenditures and then to go directly into the supply 
chain, works, of course, through primes primarily, and, as a 
result, the DPA is an essential tool. And as Dr. Nadaner 
referenced, I think if we are going to get after this problem, 
you would see increased appropriation and allocation for DPA to 
get to a scale problem like shipbuilding.
    Mr. Vargas. I do think it could be used strategically that 
way, and I do think that we should take a look at that, and, 
again, I thank all of you for being here. I appreciate the 
commentary this morning. I thought it was excellent from all of 
you, and I do think that this is a good authority that we have, 
and we just have to figure out how to use it a little bit 
better. And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for 
bringing it forward. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. Thank you for your questions, and the 
gentleman yields back. With that, we go to the gentleman from 
Iowa, Mr. Nunn, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this 
entire panel for being here. We have talked a lot about the big 
picture aspect of the defense industrial base. I would really 
like to hone in on some of those cutting-edge technologies and 
the smaller elements that help our defense industrial base be 
both fluid and successful.
    For a while, I worked with the Defense Innovation Unit 
(DIU) out in California to really bring in some of the 
technology pieces as a liaison before I took this exciting job. 
But now that I look back in Iowa, I recognize immediately we 
have a ton of small businesses that are helping in the defense 
sector. Army Armaments, Wellman Dynamics, and then, of course, 
some of the bigger ones like Collins Aerospace, all play a 
critical role, and all have a component in our hometowns. So, 
the time is now for the U.S. to gain a competitive advantage, 
Mr. Chairman, in the defense technology manufacturing side of 
this.
    Dr. Nadaner, you have obviously worked at the Department of 
Defense. You have seen this. Do private sector defense tech 
startups have an easy follow-on path to get into government 
procurement and acquisition?
    Mr. Nadaner. Sir, they do not. In the Department of Defense 
15 or 20 years ago, all of the flag officers were saying, why 
can't I have the technology that exists in the commercial 
sector, and I look at my iPhone and why do I have this 
cumbersome equipment here, and there weren't many startups. 
Now, there are a ton of them. American entrepreneurship is very 
strong. A lot of people in the tech sector want to help 
defense, and they can do things sometimes 10 to 20 times 
cheaper. However, the path into the Department of Defense, 
because of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is 
extremely hard, and the Defense Production Act could open up a 
lot of competition if used properly.
    Mr. Nunn. Now, talk to us about some of the things that 
could help a startup company, whether it is something in 
artificial intelligence or whether it is a guy making a better 
armament or a body protective vest, to be able to get on with 
our Department of Defense today?
    Mr. Nadaner. One is, Title I can be used to give them a 
priority allocation for the order. Then, the CapEx is always an 
issue, and defense equipment has hardware, and it is CapEx-
intensive, and CapEx is a very unfavorable thing in the U.S. 
economy compared to Germany, Korea, or Japan. So, the DPA Title 
III grants could enable them to have the infrastructure that 
they need to produce that hardware.
    Mr. Nunn. Thank you. I think it is really important that we 
also look at what the need base is.
    Mr. Zakheim, you have talked with us here today about how 
we have moved from, ``just in time,'' to, ``just out of time.'' 
Let's be judicious about this. Does the Defense Innovation 
Board (DIB) currently have the ability to meet a surge capacity 
if we needed it right now?
    Mr. Zakheim. I can't think of an example where we have a 
surge capacity across the defense requirements.
    Mr. Nunn. And we have ongoing conflicts in Europe and the 
Middle East that have depleted what backfill we already have. 
Would you agree with that?
    Mr. Zakheim. Absolutely. That is why the supplemental is so 
essential.
    Mr. Nunn. If China were to invade Taiwan today, one of the 
questions I have for you, Mr. Zakheim, is, would the U.S. be 
properly positioned to react in a sufficient manner for us to 
be successful in that conflict?
    Mr. Zakheim. We certainly have our defense leadership 
dealing with this and getting ready for it every day. But the 
way I would think about it, particularly as it relates to the 
Defense Production Act, is what happens if it is a protracted 
conflict? That is a question this committee needs to 
internalize. The first week, the first 2 weeks, the first 3 
weeks should be okay, but if it goes on longer, and as we look 
at conflicts, how they have played out in recent years, that is 
where we will feel the strain, and that is where we will regret 
not properly capitalizing this particular authority.
    Mr. Nunn. Like any good military officer, we have 
identified the threat. I want to talk about solutions now. Talk 
to us a little bit about what the DPA might do to mitigate some 
of the shortfalls within the DIB?
    Mr. Zakheim. I have outlined a bunch in my testimony. Dr. 
Nadaner emphasized permitting, which I have in my testimony as 
well. But one that you made me think of is a conversation I 
recently had with a CEO of a new startup, a venture-backed 
entity, the kind that you would have engaged with at the DIU, 
who put in for DPA support, and 18 months later, he is still 
waiting. And this would be a game-changing manufacturing 
technology that would actually remove requirements for tooling 
in manufacturing because of 3D printing capability. That sort 
of timeline doesn't reflect the urgency of the problem.
    Mr. Nunn. I want to thank the panel. I think the key 
takeaway here is that we have so much innate capability here in 
the United States ready to be leveraged, the innovation alone 
to be able to bring to the battlefield to make a time-changing 
success, not only in loss of life, but in the scale of capacity 
to be first shooter successful, and yet, we are making our own 
restrictions on this. Eighteen months is a kind example. I have 
guys who are waiting years to be able to onramp this. DPA is a 
great opportunity for us to be able to leverage this. Thank you 
to the panel. I yield back the remainder of my time.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentleman yields back. With that, 
we go to the ranking member of the Full Committee, the 
gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is to 
Dr. Tucker. In a bipartisan way, this committee has repeatedly 
discussed the issue of the supply of essential rare earth 
elements and critical materials. Most of these are in the 
control of the Chinese Government and Chinese Government-
controlled companies. That is the key reason why so many 
Members on both sides of the aisle applauded President Biden's 
Executive Order and the Executive Order from the previous 
Administration also to expand the DPA to address defense 
industrial base capacity shortfalls in items such as batteries, 
castings and forgings, critical minerals extraction, and rare 
earth processing. Can you speak to the effects of this 
expansion in light of China's dominance in this space and what 
it means for our national defense?
    Mr. Tucker. Absolutely. China, depending on the material in 
question, controls upwards of 90 percent, and even, in some 
cases, has near total monopoly of some of these critical 
minerals and critical rare earth materials. So, the United 
States is very far behind them at this point. DPA is a crucial 
tool in the U.S. Government's toolbox to try to make patches 
where the private markets, where the private financial sector 
is not going. And so, President Biden has used DPA for critical 
minerals. The Trump Administration did as well in terms of 
inputs for batteries. So, this has been a bipartisan priority 
to try to identify those industries of the future that are 
going to be really important to our energy resilience going 
forward.
    Ms. Waters. I think that is a good point to identify what 
the use is going to be for the future, but I am interested in, 
if we are not able to have the minerals that need to be 
extracted, what do we do?
    Mr. Tucker. It is a great question. Several of the 
panelists here have mentioned permitting and other hurdles such 
as that. The DPA has a lot of authorities to allow the 
Executive Branch to get over some of those permitting hurdles 
when those become really tight constraints, so that could be 
used in a variety of ways to have environmentally-sustainable, 
worker-friendly mining in the United States.
    Ms. Waters. I don't know what the relationship is in terms 
of these minerals between China and the United States, but does 
China have the ability or even the thought that they would 
preclude us from having access, not even purchase, in order to 
hurt us?
    Mr. Tucker. We have certainly seen China do that with a 
variety of its trading partners, that, whenever other countries 
start to suggest that China behave more responsibly, they 
weaponize the use of their own supply chains to deny inputs to 
other countries, which is why it is a key, not only national 
security, but energy security and economic security imperative, 
for the United States to diversify away from that single 
source.
    Ms. Waters. This is an unfair question, but how do we 
retaliate?
    Mr. Tucker. By using the DPA effectively and efficiently, 
and by giving it more money so that it can do more of its good 
work.
    Ms. Waters. So, you see this as a real national security 
concern?
    Mr. Tucker. Absolutely, and so have members of this 
committee and Members of Congress going back to at least the 
1970s, if not the 1940s. So absolutely, it is a key national 
security concern.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you for being here with this testimony 
today, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Luetkemeyer. The gentlelady yields back, and with 
that, we are out of questioners today, so we would like to 
thank our witnesses for being here today. You gentlemen did a 
great job, and we appreciate your expertise and you sharing 
your knowledge with us today. You have given us a lot of ideas 
on things we need to do. Hopefully, you will be able to, again, 
help us as we go through the process of trying to find ways to 
improve this. The DPA is an important tool in the toolbox for 
the Defense Department and the President to be able to address 
needs as they come up, as well as to be able to have the 
foresight to understand what the needs may be in the future. 
And so, if you can help us with that, we would certainly 
appreciate it.
    I have a letter here from the AFP Foundation with regards 
to oversight that I would like to enter into the record, 
without objection.
    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in 
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
the record.
    I will ask our witnesses to please respond as promptly as 
you can.
    And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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