[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      THE DESPOTIC DUO: RUSSO-IRANIAN 
                              COOPERATION
                      AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH 
                           AFRICA, AND CENTRAL ASIA

                               joint with

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 17, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-98

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                        

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     	GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               	Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	 	BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California		GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida			DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado			AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee		DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky			TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas			SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California			DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida		COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan			ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN,   	SARA JACOBS, California
  American Samoa			KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas			SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio			 	Florida	
JIM BAIRD, Indiana			GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida			MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey		JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York		JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida			SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia			JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas			JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan			BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas  			   

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                                 ------                                

  The Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia

                           JOE WILSON, Chair
BRIAN MAST, Florida             DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota, 
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee           Ranking Member 
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		BRAD SHERMAN, California
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia

                     Gabriella Zach, Staff Director

                       The Subcommittee on Europe

                 THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman

JOE WILSON, North Carolina      WILLIAM KEATING, 
DARRELL ISSA, California          Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas

                       Katie Earle, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Taleblu, Behnam Ben, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of 
  Democracies....................................................    10
Noronha, Gabriel, Fellow, Jewish Institute for National Security 
  of America.....................................................    33
Stroul, Dana L., Research Director, The Washington Institute for 
  Near East Policy...............................................    52

            ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Additional information submitted for the record..................    21

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    87
Hearing Minutes..................................................    89
Hearing Attendance...............................................    90

 
              THE DESPOTIC DUO: RUSSO-IRANIAN COOPERATION
                     AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS

                                        Wednesday, April 17, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on Middle East, North
                          Africa, and Central Asia,
                                 joint with
                            Subcommittee on Europe,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson 
[chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and 
Central Asia] presiding.
    Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia and 
the Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to discuss Iran's and 
Russia's cooperation to enhance their shared malign intent, 
including Iran's sale of drones and other weapons to War 
Criminal Putin; Russia's use of its U.N. Security Council veto 
to benefit Iran; sanctions evasion schemes to benefit both 
countries, and nuclear collaboration--a danger to the whole 
world.
    I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Murphy, be allowed to sit at the dais and 
participate following all other members in today's hearing. 
Without objection, so ordered.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    And as I do, I would like to remind the audience members 
that disruption of committee proceedings is against the law. 
Holding up of signs or making verbal outbursts during the 
proceedings is disruptive and will not be tolerated, in the 
interest of free speech for everyone. Any disruptions will 
result in a suspension of the proceedings until the Capitol 
Police can restore order.
    I am grateful to co-chair this joint committee hearing with 
the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, the very capable Tom 
Kean of New Jersey.
    Thank you for being here for what is, sadly, a critical and 
timely hearing to examine the partnership of evil opportunity 
between War Criminal Putin and the regime in Tehran.
    This weekend, the world watched in horror as the Iranian 
regime, directly and with puppets, attacked Israel with over 
300 drones and missiles, including ballistic missiles. The same 
long-range Shahed drones launched by the Iranian regime to 
attack Israel are used every day by War Criminal Putin to 
murder innocent civilians. And we saw another attack today, 
which was inconceivable, on an apartment complex--clearly, a 
civilian target in Ukraine.
    And then, we will see, too, sadly--Dr. McCormick notices--
we will see a later attack on the EMS personnel and the first 
responders, police, fire. And so, the Putin strategy is clear--
to kill civilians, to intimidate civilians, and then, 
intimidate first responders.
    Russia and Iran will soon be jointly producing deadly 
suicide drones in Moscow. Iranian regime officials are on the 
ground in Belarus and occupied Ukraine, at the request of War 
Criminal Putin.
    This murderous partnership of opportunity was cemented 
following Russian and Iranian intervention murderously in 
Syria, supporting the campaign of mass murderer Bashir al-Assad 
against the Syrian people's revolution against the criminal 
Assad regime.
    The unholy alliance between War Criminal Putin and the 
terrorist regime in Tehran has flourished in Syria with War 
Criminal Putin establishing a footprint on the Mediterranean 
through his puppet, Bashir al-Assad. Iranian terrorist puppets 
and Putin's thugs in Syria are free to use Syria as a weapons 
depot and staging area to launch missiles and drones, including 
against our own servicemembers.
    The dictators in Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing have conducted 
joint maritime exercises for years. Our adversaries are playing 
a long game. War Criminal Putin has already signed an agreement 
to purchase Iranian ballistic missiles--in violation of the 
sanctions, including those in the Countering America's 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
    Disturbingly and sadly, the Biden Administration renewed 
waivers to allow for Russia-Iranian collaboration to facilitate 
the expansion of Iranian regime nuclear aspirations with 
technical support for Putin through the Russian-owned Rosatom--
potentially, yielding a $10 billion windfall for Putin as he 
carries out war crimes in Syria and Ukraine with the backing 
from the Iranian regime.
    I'm grateful to support the strong efforts and effective 
efforts of Chairman Tom Kean to stop this insanity. As we know, 
sanctions are only as strong as their enforcement, and 
diplomacy is only possible where leverage exists. Sadly, this 
Administration seems intent on ceding our leverage, as 
adversaries strengthen cooperation to undermine American 
interests.
    Collaboration between the two regimes extends far beyond 
weapons. They work together to evade sanctions and are actively 
building supply routes to facilitate transfer of weapons and 
solidify their commitment to integrate energy projects to 
undermine democracies.
    Both carry water for each other at the United Nations, 
where the dictators run the show and Russia weaponizes its veto 
at the United Nations Security Council to provide cover for 
other dictators. Both Iran and Russia abuse financial systems 
to evade our sanctions.
    The No. 1 goal of the Iranian regime is, ultimately, a 
nuclear weapon to fulfill its stated goal. In English, they are 
very clear to tell the world: ``Death to America. Death to 
Israel.''
    War Criminal Putin is more than happy to help the mullahs 
reach this goal. Russian has launched Iranian satellites into 
orbit and actively provides technical support to the Iranian 
regime, quote, ``Space Program,'' and it extends its reach into 
Ukraine.
    The partnership between War Criminal Putin and the regime 
in Tehran extends to, and is aided by, support from the Chinese 
Communist Party, Kim Jong Un in North Korea, and mass murderer 
Bashir al-Assad.
    The defense of American interests against our adversaries 
is not a partisan issue. Sadly, the Biden Administration 
repeatedly fails to enforce sanctions and makes concessions, 
replacing real deterrence with diplomacy, out of fear of 
escalation.
    History has consistently shown that escalation occurs when 
America operates from a position of weakness. Following the 
full-scale invasion of Ukraine by War Criminal Putin, Ukraine, 
effectively, mobilized and has done what many said could not be 
done. They have resisted. They have imposed massive costs on 
the Putin regime. They have liberated thousands of square miles 
of their country.
    War Criminal Putin's ability to murder innocent Ukrainians 
and threaten our allies with invasion is directly supported and 
aided by the Iranian regime. War Criminal Putin's first trip 
abroad following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was to 
Tehran. In March 2023, prior to the horrific murderous attack 
of October 7th in Israel, War Criminal Putin welcomed Hamas 
leaders to Moscow and has since welcomed them back. It would 
not be a stretch to say that the Iranian regime is now a full 
participant in War Criminal Putin's delusional attempt to 
recreate the Soviet Empire, as they, too, have an expansionist 
goal.
    Both Putin and the Ayatollah, like Xi, seek a new 
multipolar world order at the expense of freedom and democracy. 
Iranian regime officials are on the ground to temporarily 
occupy regions of Ukraine, and there is full information-
sharing with Moscow.
    Those who support Israel and its right to self-defense 
should all support the right of Ukraine to do the same thing. 
The adversary is the same. We should be consistent supporting 
the borders of Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and America. We are in 
a conflict we did not choose of dictators with rule of gun 
invading democracies with rule of law.
    I appreciate our esteemed witnesses, including Behnam Ben 
Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies. And we also have Gabriel Noronha, a fellow at the 
Jewish Institute for National Security of America. And finally, 
we have Dana Stroul, the research director of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy.
    I now gladly yield to the ranking member, Bill Keating, for 
his opening statement.
    Again, I would like to state it is substantially, almost 
universally, bipartisan, particularly as I look at and I see 
our members of the other party from North Carolina and a remote 
area called Rhode Island.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Wilson, Chairman 
Kean, and our witnesses, for being here today to discuss the 
deepening Russian-Iranian relationship and how the United 
States and our allies can work together to counter this 
authoritarian alliance.
    While we face many threats and much instability around the 
world today, Russian and Iran sit at the heart of resistance 
against the United States, the West, and the tenets of 
democracy and the rule of law.
    Just this weekend, Iran launched an unprecedented drone and 
missile attack against the State of Israel. Israel is America's 
closest ally in the Middle East and the only democracy in the 
region. The devastating October 7th terrorist attack against 
Israel perpetrated by Hamas, an Iranian-backed terrorist group, 
and the most recent Iranian attack seek to undermine Israel's 
very existence. This must not stand, and I commend the Biden 
Administration, the United Kingdom, France, Jordan, and our 
allies and partners for coming together to Israel's defense.
    Threats from Iran are not just limited to Israel. On 
January 28th, Iranian-backed Iraq Shia militia groups attacked 
Tower 22, a U.S. base in Jordan, one of the 170 such attacks, 
killing three U.S. servicemembers.
    At the same time, Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have 
launched over 70 attacks on U.S. and commercial vessels in the 
Red Sea, threatening global shipping and freedom of navigation.
    While Iran undermines U.S. interests and regional 
stability, Russia continues its brutal war of aggression 
against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has further tightened their 
authoritarian grip on power by imprisoning opposition figures, 
targeting innocent Americans in Russia, among them Paul Whelan 
and Evan Gershkovich, and expanding their economic and military 
relationship with other U.S. adversaries, like China and North 
Korea.
    In the Middle East, Russia has historically aimed to have a 
multifaceted foreign policy, carefully seeking to balance a 
relationship with Iran, the Gulf, and Israel. However, to 
support its war in Ukraine, Russia has turned resolutely toward 
Tehran, purchasing thousands of Iranian drones to be used 
against Ukrainian targets and working with Iran to evade 
sanctions in response to its invasion. Iranian drones used by 
Russia in Ukraine provide Tehran with important battlefield 
testing for its weapons, likely informing Iran's own usage of 
these drones.
    To counter Iran's malign influence, Russia's authoritarian 
ambitions in Ukraine, and the expanding Russian-Iranian 
relationship, the Biden Administration has taken action 
marshaling the support of 51 allies and partners for our ally 
Ukraine, creating a coalition of partners to ensure freedom of 
navigation in the Red Sea, striking Houthi rebels who attack 
U.S. interests, and imposing comprehensive sanctions in 
response to Russian-Iranian military cooperation in Ukraine, as 
well as new sanctions announced yesterday in response to Iran's 
attack against Israel.
    In Congress, I have introduced legislation on this very 
issue with Chairman Wilson, the Block the Use of Transatlantic 
Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act, which has been reported 
out of this committee favorably. It still requires the 
Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense to develop 
strategies to counter the use of Western and U.S. technology in 
Iranian drones. I am hopeful this legislation will be voted on 
on the floor as soon as possible.
    The most urgent measure we, as Congress, can take is to 
vote on the Senate-passed national security supplemental bill, 
which passed by a vote of 70-to-29, a strong, bipartisan vote. 
This legislation will ensure Ukraine has the necessary 
military, financial, and humanitarian support to defeat Russia 
on the battlefield and ensure its economy remains solvent.
    The bill provides urgent military assistance to Israel, as 
well as humanitarian support for Palestinian civilians, many of 
whom are on the brink of famine.
    Put simply, this bill addresses threats to the United 
States national security across the world, bolsters our allies' 
defenses, hurts our adversaries' ability to spread malign 
influence, and even creates jobs and investments right here at 
home.
    Finally, the supplemental package sends an unmistakable 
message to allies and partners around the world that an 
investment in America is an investment in global stability. It 
is a signal to Russia and Iran, as well as China and North 
Korea, that their malfeasance and aggression on the world 
stage, as well as their burgeoning partnerships, will not be 
left unaddressed.
    If Russia sees its attacks on Ukraine go unanswered, and if 
Iran believes its proxies can act unchallenged in the Middle 
East without a U.S. response, the Russian-Iranian partnership 
will grow and it will strengthen.
    In closing, as many of my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle have said, we must pass the supplemental package 
immediately. Breaking up this package from what has been passed 
by the Senate creates unnecessary delay and uncertainty over 
whether the United States will answer the call for a 
Churchillian response for the defense of democracy or a 
Chamberlain response of appeasement.
    While we should work for any successful resolution, if this 
legislation stalls or is ineffective, we should sign the 
discharge petition and bring forth the Senate bipartisan bill 
to the floor as soon as possible. This is a moment; this is a 
historical moment, and it is a moment of urgency. And I hope 
that we can act on this bipartisan package coming from the 
Senate.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bill 
Keating. And I particularly want to thank you for referencing 
January 28th. The three young Americans who were reservists, 
Army Reservists from Georgia, were killed by Hezbollah as 
puppets of Iran. And this should never be forgotten. And I just 
appreciate so much your referencing that.
    And with this, I would like to now proceed to the chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Europe, Congressman Tom Kean, for his 
opening statement.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank you for your extraordinary leadership and 
longstanding leadership on this issue and the importance of 
pulling both committees together on this important day on this 
important topic.
    I also want to thank Ranking Member Keating for his strong 
partnership over the last year and a half on issues of strong 
importance on European growth and making sure we defend Ukraine 
against Russian aggression.
    Unlike any other time in recent memory, our world is on 
fire. With multiple conflicts in different regions, the enemies 
of freedom are emboldened like never before. At the helm of 
this chaos are two fierce enemies of freedom and democracy, the 
Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
    But this vile alliance did not happen overnight. Building 
upon years of coordination in Syria, Russia has leveraged the 
military and political exchanges with Tehran during the Syrian 
Civil War to its benefit, which has now emerged in a full-
fledged, mutually beneficial defense partnership, made more 
complete by Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
    Since the first year of the war, Iranian Shahed drones have 
been procured and used by the Russian Federation to kill 
civilians and to target critical infrastructure. Last month, 
our subcommittee's hearing on Rosatom highlighted the role that 
Russia's nuclear energy sector plays in building Iran's nuclear 
program.
    David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science 
and International Security, testified that Rosatom, Russia's 
nuclear energy monopoly, is involved in providing carbon fiber 
used for making these heat drones and that manufacturing is 
occurring in Russia.
    In Belarus and occupied Crimea, Tehran was more than 
willing to send military advisors to help train Russian forces 
on how to operate the Shahed drone. They have also been more 
than willing to lend expertise and to develop clandestine 
financial systems to help Russia evade sanctions--something 
that Iran, unfortunately, has much experience in.
    In return, Russia has committed to sell Iran advanced 
weapon systems, such as the Su-35 fighter jet and the S-400 air 
defense system. Through Rosatom, Russia is actively supporting 
the expansion of Iran's nuclear program, including its 
secretive underground enrichment facility, the Fordow Fuel 
Enrichment Plant.
    Of course, Rosatom's activities in Iran would not be 
possible without the Biden Administration's use of sanctions 
waivers under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act. 
It is this foolish approach over the last 3 years that has 
enabled and emboldened closer cooperation between both 
countries.
    Iran is openly threatening to sell advanced ballistic 
missiles to Russia. In fact, Iran has already reportedly 
provided Russia with approximately 400 ballistic missiles. The 
same ballistic missiles used to rain hellfire on the people of 
Israel over the weekend can and will be used to threaten NATO 
and to kill Ukrainian civilians.
    Last week's attacks also highlight Iran's willingness to 
use strike packages modeled on those the Russians repeatedly 
use against Ukraine. They are sharing battlefield lessons with 
each other to better threaten America and our allies.
    Emboldened like never before, Iran and its proxies, 
clearly, want to wipe Israel from the face of the Earth, while 
Russian forces try to do this on a daily basis in Ukraine. The 
threats posed by Russia and Iran are interconnected. They are 
working toward the same goal--the destruction of American 
allies and the demise of transatlantic leadership and 
deterrence.
    Let me be clear, deterrence failed because the Biden 
Administration failed to project strength. President Biden will 
fail to effectively counter this threat if he tries to dictate 
to Ukraine how they are to fight Russia and if he continues 
down the path of undermining the U.S.-Israel alliance.
    The Biden Administration must lead by example and coalesce 
our Transatlantic allies to meaningfully address this 
interconnected threat. The sooner that this Administration and 
our friends in Europe see the Russia-Iran threat as one and the 
same, the closer we will be to finally turning the tide against 
this vile alliance.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Tom Kean, and 
thank you for your insight and your success on raising these 
issues.
    We are pleased to have with us the distinguished witnesses. 
Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu, the senior fellow of the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies; Mr. Gabriel Noronha, the fellow with 
the Jewish Institute for the National Security of America, and 
Dana L. Stroul, the research director with The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy.
    We thank all of you for being here today. Your full 
statement will be made part of the record, and I will ask you 
to keep spoken remarks to 5 minutes, so that we can allow time 
for member questions. And Alexis is going to be the monitor of 
the 5 minutes. So, watch her hand signals.
    And I now recognize Ben Taleblu for an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF BEHNAM BEN TALEBLU, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR 
                     DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

    Mr. Taleblu. Chairmen, Ranking Members, distinguished 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Middle East, 
North Africa, and Central Asia Subcommittee and Europe 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
    It is a privilege to present my analysis alongside Gabriel 
Noronha and Dana Stroul, both of whom have served in the U.S. 
Government and have since contributed to bettering our public 
national security debate.
    Ladies and Gentlemen, it's high time to connect the dots. 
America's authoritarian adversaries like Russia and Iran are 
drawing closer together, constituting the new revisionist axis 
capable of supporting one another's foreign and security 
policies while undermining ours and those of our allies.
    There may be no cruder example of this than the praise 
Russian President Putin just offered Iranian President Raisi 
for Iran's missile and drone attack on Israel, calling it, 
quote, ``the best way to punish the aggressor and a 
manifestation of the tact and rationality of Iran's leaders.'' 
End quote.
    But Iran and Russia are not natural allies. In fact, they 
have centuries of historic enmity. In my written testimony, I 
trace in-depth the turbulence, then transactional and now 
transformational phases of their relationship, the latter of 
which we are now in.
    This has been evidenced by Iran's provision of one-way 
attack drones, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, artillery 
shells, and even body army to Russia since 2022 to support 
Putin's war in Ukraine. In return, the Islamic Republic has 
received gold, cash, Russian diplomatic cover, captured Western 
weapons, and contracts for advanced Russian platforms, like the 
Su-35.
    Washington has warned that Tehran may also provide Moscow 
with short-range ballistic missiles. Last year, in a historic 
first, Iran participated in Russia's Army 2023 Military 
Expedition in August, showcasing a mockup of the Ababil close-
range ballistic missile. Please see image 1.
    One month later in September, Russia's Defense Minister 
visited an IRGC Aerospace Force exhibition in Tehran, where he 
inspected, among other things, the full Ababil missile. Please 
see image 2.
    Iranian ballistic missiles would significantly alter the 
threat landscape in Ukraine by helping Russia conserve its own 
ballistic missiles and offer more opportunities for layered 
attacks. Ukraine also has, comparatively, less in the way of 
expensive ballistic missile defenses than it does air defenses.
    Looking ahead, Iran and Russia could easily deepen their 
relationships, be it in nuclear matters, sanctions busting, the 
cyber domain, or evicting the United States from Syria. In my 
testimony, I outline several such areas, but here today I am 
choosing to ring the alarm bell over space and satellite 
cooperation. There is significant concern that Russia may be 
helping Iran launch spy satellites for military purposes that 
could make Iranian ballistic missiles more accurate.
    Late last year, in fact, a video emerged from summer 2019 
showing a IRGC Aerospace Force commander and his Russian 
counterpart in Tehran shaking hands after Iran proposed to 
Russia to create a drone command if Russia helped Iran create a 
space command. Please see image 3.
    Congress can help offset this deepening cooperation by 
weakening each party.
    For example, one, through legislation, Congress has already 
set the stage for a better Iran policy that provides more 
options to deal with Iran's domestic suppression and foreign 
aggression. The MAHSA Act, the SHIP Act, and the Fight CRIME 
Act are good examples.
    Two, through oversight, Congress should inquire about the 
status and implementation of the DEFEND Act, which calls for 
establishing the Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
Architecture in the Middle East. It should also inquire about 
the status of the task force the Biden Administration claimed 
to create last year to combat Iran's acquisition of Western 
components for Iranian drones which have ended up in Ukraine.
    Three, through creativity, by considering the applicability 
of Iran sanctions and even terrorism sanctions to Russian 
targets, as well as the exposure of Iranian entities to 
existing Russian sanctions. A priority for Washington will be 
how best to target Russia's and Iran's Caspian-Sea-based 
sanctions-busting.
    Four, through the bully pulpit, Congress should ring the 
alarm bell on both Russia's and Iran's deepening ties with 
another party, China, as well as their repression of dissidents 
and protestors at home.
    Five, through pressure, Congress should press the 
Administration to work with the E3 to snap back and restore 
U.N. sanctions on Iran before this option expires in 2025, 
October. Should this lapse, the West will not be able to use 
the U.N. Security Council to bring diplomatic pressure against 
Iran again, as Russia is poised to play the role of Iran's 
lawyer for the foreseeable future at international 
organizations.
    And six, through financing. By passing the supplemental, 
Congress can make sure that all partners which have been 
subject to attacks and predation by Putin's Russia and 
Khamenei's Iran have the means to defend themselves.
    In my written testimony, I have offered additional policy 
recommendations aimed at tackling this rising relationship.
    Thank you for your time, attention, and the opportunity to 
testify. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Taleblu follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ben Taleblu.
    And we now recognize Mr. Noronha for his opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF GABRIEL NORONHA, FELLOW, JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR 
                  NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA

    Mr. Noronha. Thank you, Chairmen, Ranking Members, and 
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for having me 
testify today.
    The West is under a joint assault from Iranian and Russian 
drones, missiles, and nuclear threats. And I think it is 
important to note that the same weapons fired at Israel this 
past weekend have been hurled at Ukraine for over 2 years now. 
We cannot hope to counter one threat and ignore the other.
    And I want to compliment this committee, in particular, for 
already working on some of those solutions. I will offer a few 
new ones right here that haven't been legislated on yet.
    One of the most immediate developments that we must disrupt 
is increased Russian and Iranian weapons and munitions 
production that today will help Russia overwhelm Ukraine, but 
tomorrow could help Iran overwhelm Israel.
    Iran has built a joint drone production facility east of 
Moscow. Ninety percent of those electrical and computer 
components are planned to be sourced from the United States, 
according to their own documents--90 percent. A few solutions.
    First, Congress should require the manufacturers, the U.S. 
manufacturers of those components to verify their end 
destination if they are going to be exporting from the United 
States. We should outright prohibit all sales of these 
components to Turkey, the UAE, China, and Hong Kong, since they 
are major proliferation hubs to Russia and Iran.
    Second, we need all our allies to match our counter-
proliferation sanctions. It is an inconvenience to be blocked 
from just the United States, but if you and your family are 
going to be banned from entering Europe or any of our Asian 
allied countries, you are going to think twice about getting 
involved in this kind of trade.
    Third, we should punish the companies moving weapons from 
Iran to Russia. Iranian State airlines ferry many of the 
suicide drones, the military personnel, and other weapons to 
Russia. These terror airlines are already on the brink of 
bankruptcy, and we can push them over the edge.
    According to my research, these airlines are still today 
landing in over a dozen airports in NATO countries, even though 
they are sanctioned by the United States for terrorism and WMD 
proliferation. The airlines get hundreds of millions of dollars 
for these commercial flights to Europe. European governments 
are aware of this and they have chosen not to crack down. I 
would like to submit my report on this issue for the record, if 
I may.
    We must be willing to enforce our sanctions----
    Mr. Wilson. It shall be admitted.
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    Mr. Noronha. We must be willing to enforce our sanctions on 
any airport that hosts these terror airlines or the sanctions 
we have on the books already do not mean anything at all.
    Europe also hosts 15 Iranian state-owned banks sanctioned 
by the United States for terrorism and WMD proliferation. Those 
could be shut down tomorrow and their assets sent to Ukraine 
for war reparations. Europe has refused to do this as well.
    If I may be frank, Congress needs to deal with the painful 
truth, which is that our European allies have thwarted nearly 
every effort to hold the Iranian regime accountable for their 
deadly work in Ukraine. In fact, senior European leaders often 
even embolden Iranian actions. This behavior is untenable, 
especially as Europe keeps asking Americans to help thwart an 
invasion powered by Iranian weapons.
    What is good for Russia is good for Iran. What is good for 
Iran is good for Russia. Europe likes to ignore that latter 
point. Europe and the Biden Administration must also snap back 
the U.N. sanctions that, until they let expire last October, 
blocked under international law Iranian shipments of 
ammunition, drones, and ballistic missiles to Russia.
    As my colleague Behnam mentioned, we can restore these 
sanctions in under 30 days without the approval of Russia or 
China. And especially in light of Iran's brazen attack on 
Israel, this should be our minimum response. And we have to use 
this snapback soon. The tool will expire exactly 18 months from 
this evening. At that point, realistically, we are never 
getting U.N. sanctions back on Iran.
    On the nuclear file, Iranian and Russian nuclear 
cooperation is deeper than most people realize. My written 
testimony documents that there are now around 5,000 Russian 
nuclear personnel working inside Iran. The regime has also been 
asking Russia for help acquiring additional nuclear materials 
that could shorten its nuclear breakout time.
    Yet, the State Department has been rewarding this 
cooperation with sanctions waivers. And I want to agree fully 
with the letter signed by Chairmen Kean and Wilson today. Those 
waivers helped Russia through its state-owned nuclear company, 
Rosatom, on their ongoing construction of two new nuclear 
reactors for Iran. Without those waivers, Rosatom could not 
receive payment for their work in Iran. And Rosatom's future 
work in Iran could earn them upwards of $50 billion this 
decade.
    Rosatom is instrumental to Russia's assault on Ukraine. As 
this committee has heard recently, we need to bankrupt Rosatom. 
I offer my thoughts on how to do this, how to bankrupt some of 
their oil sales, and several more specific ideas of how to 
weaken the two regimes, in my full written testimony.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Noronha follows:]

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    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Noronha, thank you so much.
    And I want to give you some good news, and that is that 
everyone here voted yesterday for legislation called No 
Technology for Terror, right in line with the concerns you 
expressed. And it was presciently offered by Congressman 
Nathaniel Moran of Texas. And so, with good suggestions and I'm 
really grateful that we have Members of Congress who the vast 
majority will be very happy to work with the three of you.
    And, Ms. Stroul, for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DANA L. STROUL, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON 
                 INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

    Ms. Stroul. Chairmen Wilson and Kean, Ranking Member 
Keating, and honorable members of the subcommittees, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify today on this critical issue.
    Two observations upfront.
    Policymakers and analysts have long insisted that the 
relationship between Moscow and Tehran would never rise beyond 
the tactical, due to longstanding historical animosity and 
ideological differences. Today, that view no longer holds 
water. The geopolitical landscape incentivizes both governments 
to strengthen a strategic alliance.
    Second, there has long been an assumption that Russia is 
the dominant player in this bilateral relationship and can be 
relied upon to moderate Iran's actions. Today, the balance of 
leverage has shifted. Russia's reliance on Iranian weapons to 
sustain its war in Ukraine means that Iran has the upper hand.
    This cooperation has implications in the following areas:
    Military coordination. Citizens in Ukraine and citizens in 
the Middle East are suffering from the same Iranian weapons. 
Russia's willingness to provide Iran advanced fighter aircraft, 
upgraded air defense capabilities, and other military 
technology poses a serious risk to the balance of power in the 
Middle East.
    Russia and Iran are using Ukraine and the Middle East as a 
battlefield lab to improve their weapons and develop techniques 
to overcome U.S. and allied capabilities. This has implications 
for the security of U.S.-origin defense equipment, and as they 
learn lessons about U.S. and NATO air defenses, those 
vulnerabilities will be transferred to other adversaries 
developing their own plans for future wars. It means our 
military planners need to update war plans and that we need to 
reassess our own defense sales and arms sales, so that the 
balance of power remains in our favor.
    Nuclear nonproliferation. We should expect that Russia will 
block U.S. and European efforts to constrain and walk back 
Iran's steps toward its own nuclear threshold status.
    Sanctions. As the two most sanctioned countries in the 
world, Tehran and Moscow are actively engaged in activities to 
circumvent, evade, and weaken the potency of our sanctions.
    Diplomacy. Russia is using its seat at the U.N. Security 
Council and other international bodies like the IAEA to shield 
Iran from accountability for its actions.
    And domestic suppression. Iran and Russia are exchanging 
best practices to crush protests, undermine citizen 
organization efforts, and maintain mass surveillance programs 
against their own people. This cooperation challenges values 
that we have long held as critical for global stability, human 
rights, representative governance, and transparency. Moreover, 
they are working to undermine democratic processes through 
election interference and disinformation, including here in the 
United States.
    Iran's complex state-on-State attack against Israel on 
April 13th bears the hallmarks of Russian attacks on Ukraine. 
Iran enables Russia to continue its war, including the 
deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilians.
    Iran is extracting from Russia lessons and combined strike 
packages; how to improve the lethality of their weapons, and 
how to overcome Western air defenses. While there is debate 
here about security assistance to Ukraine, there is no 
hesitation by Tehran to continue supporting Russia.
    Though Iran's attack against Israel failed this weekend, we 
should expect that Moscow and Tehran will improve military 
operations against Ukraine, Israel, and others in the Middle 
East going forward. Future attacks will be more lethal.
    To counter this cooperation, we can take the following 
steps:
    Continue sanctions enforcement and expand sanctions. Russia 
will not be able to maintain payment schedules and provide 
Tehran and other owners of Russian-origin military equipment 
with spare parts. Now, we need to expand it and coordinate with 
European partners.
    Engage the private sector. U.S. and Western parts are 
ending up in Iranian-manufactured attack drones. We need more 
education and outreach to help ensure compliance with sanctions 
and raise awareness of customers seeking to acquire off-the-
shelf, commercial, dual-use products for lethal purposes.
    Continue downgrading intelligence to expose this malign 
Iranian-Russian cooperation. It underscores America's value as 
a reliable actor committed to defending the sovereignty and 
security of our partners.
    Increase public diplomacy to counter Iranian and Russian 
misinformation, and maintain programs that seek to reach civil 
society in Iran and Russia, drawing a distinction between the 
regimes and the leadership and the people of these countries.
    And emphasize the benefits of U.S. partnership and 
coalitions. The performance of European and Arab partners 
working together to disrupt Iran's attack this weekend is the 
clearest proof of concept that we should be the partner of 
choice for countries who benefit from the current international 
order. We are the only military capable of operationally 
integrating our partners, informed by unparalleled intelligence 
and unmatched technology.
    One final remark. The most immediate action we can take is 
to pass the national security supplemental. This will allow 
critical security funding and defense equipment to flow to 
Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan--the partners most at risk from 
adversary actions. But it also supports our military, 
diplomats, and assistance specialists working 24/7.
    We cannot underestimate the strategic significance of 
passing the supplemental. It will immediately be understood in 
the hallways of Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, and will provide 
reassurance not only to our partners in the most need, but to 
other skeptical partners questioning U.S. staying power.
    The funding for defense industry expansion in the 
supplemental will make the United States a more reliable 
partner. This is not only about Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan; it 
is about the ecosystem of allies and partners that we want to 
work with and are looking to us for leadership, as well as to 
our defense industry and our cutting-edge technology and 
innovation. This is about our reliability as a guarantor of the 
current international order and that we are ready to walk, and 
not only talk, in standing up for the defense of our partners.
    Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]

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    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
    And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. And Alexis is 
going to be very firm in raising that issue on the 5 minutes.
    And as we begin, I would like to reiterate the 
bipartisanship. Last night, I was grateful to be with Ranking 
Member Keating meeting with the Prime Minister of the Czech 
Republic, a great member of NATO, a former member of the Warsaw 
Pact. How times can change. But we were with Petr Fiala, the 
Prime Minister. And to see their assistance to Ukraine, per 
GDP, they provide more assistance to Ukraine than the United 
States.
    And so, it is just reassuring to see bipartisanship and see 
our allies and see NATO more unified than ever with--hey, who 
would have ever imagined Sweden, 200 years of neutrality given 
up? And now, Putin has what he said he did not want to have--an 
830-mile border with NATO and Finland.
    With that in mind, I want to thank Mr. Taleblu so much for 
connecting the dots. An organization, the AEI, has provided 
connecting the dots, and I hope people see the interconnection, 
which is so clear, between the American Enterprise Institute--
so clear between the axis of evil of War Criminal Putin, the 
Chinese Communist Party, and the regime in Tehran. And it just 
cannot be missed.
    And then, the pictures you showed of the delegations with 
the weaponry, we have seen that over and over again. Our 
enemies are very happy to show how well they work together. I 
still remember the pictures of the Iranians with the Houthis 
showing off their phenomenal capability of UAVs and drones. And 
so, we need to understand that.
    Mr. Taleblu, in your monograph, which everyone should read, 
you detail the expansion of Iran's ballistic missile program. 
And earlier this year, the CIA Director warned about Russian 
assistance to the regime in Tehran with the space and missile 
program and, also, now we see the nuclear program, of course.
    And so, what might this look like and how can we address 
this?
    Mr. Taleblu. Thank you, sir, and also, thank you for your 
leadership in connecting the dots legislatively on another 
partner in that axis, which is the Syrian regime. So, thank you 
for your leadership on countering that threat was well. That 
was really the laboratory for Iran and Russia pre-Ukraine.
    To your question about the cooperation on Iran and Russia 
in the missile and space world, I think there are three we have 
to be aware of: satellites, space launch vehicles, and 
potentially, GPS.
    Satellites. Russia actually helped Iran launch its first 
satellite ever in 2005. They put it into a Russian carrier 
rocket and the Russians launched it, allegedly, into low earth 
orbit.
    Since then, the Russians have been actively involved in 
helping the Iranians actively place smaller satellites--
telecommunication, imagery, messaging--back and forth into low 
earth orbit, allegedly. The fear here is that, the more you 
have a series of Iranian satellites operating there, the better 
the targeting can be for Iranian weapons, which, even at least 
prior to the strike on Israel, had been improving.
    The second is space launch vehicles. In this sense, Iran is 
walking and chewing gum at the same time. It is developing 
active solid and liquid propellant, two-stage and three-stage 
carrier rockets that could potentially become the bedrock for a 
future ICBM program. This also allows Iran to claim to adhere 
to a self-imposed 2,000-kilometer cap, while working on 
developing something that can threaten Europe, and then, 
threaten us.
    Iran has not perfected this. And the fear here is, out of 
the CIA Director, that the Russians could help them with 
staging thrust, and perhaps most importantly, going from SLV to 
ICBM, their reentry vehicle technology.
    Last is the satellites--sorry--is the GPS, essentially. 
Russia has its own version of GPS called GLONASS. Iran, since 
2014, has been trying to create a more localized version, not 
global, but local positioning system called Huda. It is unclear 
how successful this is, but this is a sign that both of our 
adversaries are trying to hedge away from technologies that we 
can control, to be in full charge of their own precision strike 
capability.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you for raising that. Because they have 
already got the ballistic missile capability to strike Greece, 
Bulgaria, India. And so, this is so serious; it must be 
addressed.
    And, Mr. Noronha, the illegal aggression of Putin in 
Ukraine, how has that affected their ability to help Bashir al-
Assad?
    Mr. Noronha. Massively, because it has taken so much of the 
allied effort off the Bashir al-Assad regime. Our Middle East 
partners are also lifting their prohibitions against dealing 
with Assad for a number of reasons, but, partly, again, the 
West has taken its eye off of Syria. We aren't putting pressure 
on.
    And one thing that I have noticed, particularly recently, 
is there is this focus on saying, you know, the deaths of 
Palestinians, oh, which are tragic, in complete ignorance of 
the fact that Assad was brutally massacring 5-10 thousand 
Palestinians, even more, in Syria, and has gotten really no 
approbation for that.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you for raising that to our attention.
    Now, Ranking Member Bill Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    While in the period where this hearing started and the 
present, I received news that President Biden has announced his 
official support for the House bills and called for their 
passage.
    In this extraordinary effort of bipartisanship by the 
President, I hope that, if we do have delays here in the House, 
and as the terrain hardens and the mud season ends in Ukraine, 
and the threat of greater attack on the ground by Russia 
becomes graver, I hope that, if there is a delay in this, that 
my Republican colleagues will move on a discharge and sign the 
discharge petition, if, indeed, there are dilatory attempts to 
stop this type of funding--funding that we now have the House 
leadership and the President and the Senate all in accord with.
    So, I hope there are efforts to do that because this moment 
is a perilous moment for Ukraine right now and soldiers are 
dying unnecessarily because they do not have the basic 
munitions to go forward and defend themselves.
    With that being said, I just want to ask a question in that 
regard. Some supplemental funding package requests strengthen 
our alliances, not just in Europe and not just with European 
countries, but also strengthens our posture in the Middle East 
as well.
    So, if, indeed, you know, this Congress does not act, this 
House does not act, or delays in acting during this period of 
this week, what vital and lifesaving assistance, you know, 
being denied by Ukraine--what message does that send to the 
Middle East and what is going on there, let alone China? Anyone 
can jump forward, if they want.
    Mr. Noronha. If I may, one lesson that we learned is 
Russian involved itself in Syria and got massive bases, 105 
bases in Syria as a result. Iran has now supplied massive 
weapons to Russia. It is not inconceivable that, should Ukraine 
be forced into surrender, that we will see Iranian military 
bases on the European continent. Those bases would be 2,000 
kilometers closer to New York City and Washington, DC, if they 
ever choose to launch nuclear armed missiles at us. That is 
something that the House should take into serious 
consideration.
    Mr. Keating. Yes. I just want to shift quickly to another 
important issue that Ms. Stroul brought forward. It has not 
been given enough attention, although the Senate Intelligence 
Committee is about to move forward with further hearings, I 
believe, on this issue. And that is something they worked with 
in 2020 in terms of election interference and disinformation.
    Ms. Stroul, how important and what a great threat that 
presents going forward to this period of time during an 
election year. Can you expand on your comments and your 
concerns on that kind of election interference as well?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question.
    Russia and Iran are, clearly, working together on a 
playbook to undermine democracies and representative 
governments. They learned valuable lessons about how to stoke 
political discourse and spread lies and information in 2020. We 
know that they have continued to do it here in the United 
States and that they are gearing up to do more of it.
    Two, Iran has been successful in undermining electoral 
processes in other countries. A good example is Iraq, where 
Iranian influence, meddling, payment to political parties, 
pressuring of politicians absolutely shifted the political 
discourse and parties during the government formation period 
that resulted in the longest government formation period in the 
history of Iraq.
    There is no question that they are exchanging information 
about these tactics and techniques and preparing to foment 
discord and division, because they see a weak and divided 
America as better for their alliance and to be deflecting from 
what they are doing in both Europe and the Middle East.
    Mr. Keating. Yes, it is an important point that you brought 
forward. Because, you know, you look at so many factors. You 
look at the Wagner Group, for instance, reports that they were 
giving weapons to Hezbollah as well. So, you see this kind of 
military coordination that is occurring.
    But I think your point in terms of the hybrid warfare that 
Russia uses is also being used by Iran during this period. And 
as we gather for this hearing and look at that kind of 
coordination between Moscow and Tehran, we cannot forget all 
the aspects of hybrid warfare that they are doing. I really 
appreciate you bringing that point.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bill 
Keating.
    We now proceed to Chairman Tom Kean of New Jersey.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In the coming days, the EU will propose new sanctions 
against Iran after the regime launched over 200 drones and 
ballistic missiles toward Israel. The EU is looking to expand 
sanctions imposed on Iran for supplying Russia with drones and 
missiles, to possibly include components. Would you consider--
this is for Mr. Noronha--would you consider this a significant 
consequence, given Iran's actions before and after October 7, 
2023?
    Mr. Noronha. It entirely depends on the nature of these 
sanctions. My guess is that, no, they will not be very serious. 
The regime in Iran will not take this as a significant 
escalation--unless they do the U.N. snapback of sanctions. That 
is significant. That would impose real costs. Anything short of 
that is a little window dressing, in my view.
    Mr. Kean. So, do you agree with that, Mr. Taleblu?
    Mr. Taleblu. Partially. Here's why: on October 18, 2023, 
the EU and the U.K., basically, committed their first-ever 
JCPOA violation in plain sight. We have to build on this to 
bridge the transatlantic gap.
    The EU retained over 200 missile, military, and nuclear 
entities that it had promised to give away. And as you know, 
during the Trump period, the Europeans had no problem drawing a 
sharp contrast with us and rewarding Iran and chastising us.
    What we have to do now to work up to the snapback and both 
Gabe and I want, and both Gabe and I have called for, is an 
incremental approach. The problem is I would love the snapback, 
but I know the Europeans; they are probably not going to go for 
it.
    So, what we have to do is build on what they have retained 
and share the targeting information of every single missile, 
military, and nuclear entity that we have sanctioned since 
leaving the deal in 2018 to bridge that gap and serve as an 
architecture to get the snapback.
    Mr. Kean. If I may, what glaring gaps exist in the current 
EU sanctions regime against Iran, and how do these gaps allow 
Russian aggression and assist their geopolitical goals? Either 
one of you two.
    Mr. Noronha. The big three to me are oil. Europe does not 
have sanctions on Iran's oil export or their gas exports.
    The second one, a very easy one to do, is banks. That is 
hard, if they are still in the JCPOA, to sanction all of Iran's 
banks. They need to get out of the JCPOA to do so.
    And then, what I would say is airlines, which I mentioned 
in my testimony, and then, finally, financial networks. 
Currently, you can conduct financial transactions within the EU 
to Iran. Again, that is protected by the JCPOA currently.
    Mr. Kean. So, to followup on that point, how has the 
continuation of the Administration's JCPOA sanction grant 
strategy toward Iran benefited Russia? And in your opinion, 
does it provide cover for some EU member-states to impose 
effective sanctions on Iran?
    Mr. Noronha. So, what I have seen from Europeans over 
several years, over 5 years really, is this posture, which I 
always hear is, if we take certain action, that will imperil 
the deal, and therefore, we cannot impose punitive measures on 
Iran for fear of escalation.
    To me, this is the classic evidence of deterrence. Iran has 
deterred Europe from taking these actions. Again, if you can 
get Europe to leave the JCPOA--the JCPOA is a figment of 
everyone's imagination at this point. No one is abiding by it 
except the Europeans. They are now giving unilateral sanctions 
relief to Iran. Iran is not giving them any nuclear concessions 
or anything back in return.
    And I think my colleague Dana might have some comments 
there.
    Mr. Kean. Yes?
    Ms. Stroul. So, I would simply observe, No. 1, we have a 
diplomatic moment right now. Not only are Europeans, if you go 
talk to members of European governments, extremely concerned 
about Iran's creep toward nuclear threshold status, and its 
very alarming steps, and are actually thinking through the 
steps to get to snapback, but you do not wake up 1 day and do 
it. There is a lot of preparatory steps. There is an openness 
to having that conversation with our E3 counterparts at this 
point in time.
    No. 2 is, after this weekend's attack, all of the focus is 
on Iranian aggression. We have an opportunity to work with 
Europe, and I would agree with my fellow witnesses earlier that 
U.S. unilateral sanctions are not nearly as potent or effective 
as multilateral sanctions coordinated with our European and 
Asian colleagues.
    Mr. Kean. And what----
    Ms. Stroul. So, we should take U.S. interests at this point 
in time, work with them incrementally to continue to ratchet up 
those sanctions.
    Mr. Kean. And what is the role of the Lukashenko regime in 
Belarus in facilitating military cooperation between Iran, 
Russia, and China? Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. Iran has used the IRGC trainers in Belarus to 
launch drones at Ukraine. Iran and Belarus signed a military 
cooperation agreement back in 2023. They are hoping that Iran 
will help them supply ammunition as well.
    So, I think of Belarus as sort of the little vassal State 
of Russia. All the problems that we are seeing with the 
Russian-Iranian relationship, to a minor degree, are the same 
ones that we are seeing in Belarus at this time.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Tom Kean.
    And golly, how clear is this? An agreement between Iran and 
Belarus--even Dr. McCormick is surprised.
    We now proceed to Congressman Gabe Amo of Rhode Island.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Good afternoon to our witnesses.
    I just want to start out by stating the outrage that I 
have, and that we collectively have, by Iran's attacks against 
Israel this weekend. I'm heartened that President Biden 
directed our military to help stop Iranian drones before they 
reached their targets in Israel. And we must de-escalate 
violence in the region and prevent any future attacks from 
Iran.
    This attack is the latest reminder why the House must pass 
the Senate's bipartisan national security package as soon as 
possible. We cannot continue to delay passing a comprehensive 
package that supports Israel and Ukraine, as well as 
humanitarian aid for civilians in Gaza, and resources for the 
Indo-Pacific.
    Some colleagues, mistakenly, believe we should abandon our 
ally Ukraine and only provide aid to Israel. This could not be 
more misguided. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Iran's attacks 
on Israel do not occur in isolation. The strong and growing 
ties between Putin and Ayatollah Khamenei demand that we 
support our democratic allies.
    Russia has been purchasing drones from Iran in its illegal 
invasion in Ukraine. These are the same types of drones that 
Iran used in its recent attack on Israel. In exchange, Russia 
provides Israel (sic) with digital surveillance technology and 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems captured in Ukraine. These 
are advanced systems that Iran would not otherwise have because 
of U.S. sanctions.
    Recently, leadership at the U.S. Central Command expressed 
worry that Russia may soon provide Iran with Russian Su-35 
fighter aircraft in exchange for more drones and military 
weapons. Iran's recent drone attack remains a dangerous and 
serious escalation of violence in the region. But just imagine 
what an attack using advanced fighters would have looked like.
    There is no doubt that Iran is gaining access to 
sophisticated defense technology from Russia. This threatens 
our safety and security and our allies in the region. I can 
really only wonder why those who are willing to let Russia 
continue their war with Ukraine with so much at stake.
    So, you know, I wanted to ask here now Ms. Stroul if you 
could describe how Russia's assault on Ukraine impacts the 
likelihood that Russia will provide Iran with additional 
advanced technology, like the Su-35 fighter aircraft.
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
    Russia cannot continue its war in Ukraine without a steady 
supply of Iranian military equipment, and it is not getting it 
for nothing. It has purportedly offered to upgrade Iran's air 
defenses to sell the Su-35, as my colleagues here and you have 
mentioned, as well as other surveillance capabilities, et 
cetera.
    So, the challenge here is that the United States has 
pursued foreign military sales and defense equipment across the 
region to maintain a certain balance of power. No U.S. partner 
in the region except Israel has fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft, and our war plans have been developed based on 
certain assessments of air defenses and the capabilities of our 
partners.
    So, the more sophisticated defense technology Russia sells 
to Iran, it is not only a problem for the United States and how 
we think of our own war plans and contingency scenarios in the 
Middle East, nor is it only a problem for Israel. It is 
actually a partner for all Arab--it is a problem for all of our 
Arab partners who have certain assumptions and certain plans 
and certain investments and capabilities.
    And the question for them is, are they going to look to us 
for leadership and our own defense industry to make sure they 
have what they need to defend themselves? Are they going to 
look to us for commitment that we are going to show up for 
them, like we just did for Israel over the weekend? Or are they 
going to hedge and say, ``Well, if Russia is giving Iran all of 
the sophisticated equipment, I'd better make sure I'm really 
good with Tehran and Beijing.''?
    Mr. Amo. So, you know, by extension there--and I think you 
have answered this, but I want to ask it to punctuate here--
would supporting Ukraine in their fight against Russia's 
unlawful invasion reduce the chance that Russia provides 
advance technology to Iran?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes. Adversaries in Europe and the Middle East 
are looking at each other and looking at our actions and 
whether or not we can pull together a coalition to support 
Ukraine and Europe, and to support our partners, both Arab and 
Israel, in the Middle East. And Beijing is watching what we are 
doing in both of these theaters.
    If the war in Ukraine ends, Russia no longer needs that 
Iranian supply of weapons and we would have opportunities to 
shift that mutual defense exchange.
    Mr. Amo. Well, thank you for that.
    And I hope that my colleagues in the House know that these 
efforts are linked and it is imperative that we take up our 
responsibility to act in the coming days to pass meaningful 
legislation for our national security and global stability.
    With that, I yield back my time.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman, and we 
appreciate the freshman from Rhode Island.
    We will now proceed to Ambassador Ann Wagner of Missouri.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank both 
our Europe and Middle Eastern subcommittees for organizing this 
incredibly timely and important hearing.
    In every corner of the globe, America's adversaries are 
lined up to attack our interests and our allies. Iran's 
unprecedented direct attack on Israel is a clear warning; 
Russia, China, and Iran are dangerously emboldened. This crisis 
demands strong American leadership to disrupt the new axis of 
evil.
    Mr. Taleblu, The Washington Post published extensive 
reporting on Monday on the deepening Russian-Iranian security 
partnership, including its ramifications for Iran's drone and 
fighter jet and air defense programs. How will these concerning 
new partnerships improve Iranian capabilities and embolden Iran 
to further destabilize the region? And how should the United 
States be working with Israel and other regional partners to 
better counter this rapidly changing threat?
    Mr. Taleblu. It actually stands to significantly deepen the 
cooperation that we have already seen well underway. The test 
run in Syria, the growing use in Ukraine, and the potential to 
translate that into a third theater, if there is, again, 
Russian-Iranian strategic convergence that is based on opposing 
us and our partners.
    It has been very interesting to hear over the past decade, 
decade and a half, in nearly every jurisdiction where U.S. 
policymakers, and even U.S. lawmakers, say there is no military 
solution, the likes of Russia, Iran, and the rest of the axis 
have actually found a military solution. So, this is the 
imperative of countering their deepening mil-to-mil ties. We 
have to actually think creatively, and even sometimes on the 
military side, about how to offset this.
    A couple of concerning areas. Iran learned from Russia, 
actually, in the Ukrainian theater, how to shadow drones. 
Russians have lots of manned aircraft, jets, fighters. Just 
like jets go behind one another--this was reported by 
Bloomberg--and hide behind the other jet, drones can go behind 
one another and hide behind each other.
    And that is precisely how, in January of this year, using a 
Shahed 101 drone, Iran killed three U.S. service persons in 
Jordan by mirroring, allegedly, another American drone that was 
coming in, going up right behind it, and then, exploding. So, 
this is lethal.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, and they have it.
    And according to a Reuters article in February, Iran 
transferred approximately 400 missiles to Moscow, including 
short-range ballistic missiles. The Administration has yet to 
confirm the transfer of ballistic missile systems, yes, even 
with Tehran threatening further transfers.
    And so, Mr. Taleblu, why won't the Administration 
acknowledge the transfer of these weapon systems? And what 
added capabilities does this give the Russian Federation in 
Ukraine?
    Mr. Taleblu. To date, to be honest, we haven't seen the 
appearance of Iranian ballistic missiles on the battlefield of 
Ukraine, but it is more a question of when, not if, these 
systems will come.
    Mrs. Wagner. When? If they transferred 400 missiles--so, 
it's when, not if.
    Mr. Taleblu. Exactly.
    Mrs. Wagner. And what added capability do they have?
    Mr. Taleblu. The added capability is it allows Russia to 
conserve more of its own stockpile, use up these foreign 
weapons. By the way, the North Koreans have even ballistic 
missiles. And when you marry up, just like we saw in the strike 
over the weekend, ballistic missiles which fly high and fast, 
cruise missiles which fly low and slow, and drones which fly 
even lower and slower, you have a robust strike package that 
can overwhelm even the most advanced and integrated air and 
missile defenses. So, that is exactly what Russia is trying to 
do to Ukraine, and they are doing it on the cheap by using the 
weapons of the other members of the axis.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. It is very, very disturbing. Very 
disturbing.
    Mr. Noronha, what role is Western technology playing in 
sustaining Iran's ability to produce lethal weapons like the 
Shahed-136 drone? And what more can be done to cutoff Iran's 
procurement of the parts and the technologies they use for 
drone production?
    Mr. Noronha. Well, thank you.
    As I noted in my testimony, 90 percent right now is the 
estimate of how many--90 percent of their most advanced 
components are all coming from Western, and mostly American, 
companies--companies in Massachusetts, Texas, Virginia.
    So, the issue is some of these you can go buy on Amazon, 
but some of these are more specialized. And we need to--it is 
going to be a tough regulatory issue, but we need to crack down 
and say, in the same way that we have ITAR regulations, apply 
those things to any of the components which are being used in 
those drones. It is going to be cumbersome, but it is, 
unfortunately, necessary.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, it absolutely is. The world is on fire 
and we can bury our heads in the sand, and we cannot allow U.S. 
technology to be used in this kind of nefarious fashion, nor 
can we allow this axis of evil to move forward.
    So, my time has expired. I thank you for the work that you 
are doing. We have to triple down on it, as a Congress and as 
those that are working in the Administration.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, and former 
Ambassador Ann Wagner of Missouri.
    We now proceed to Congressman Dina Titus of Nevada.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 
hearing.
    We have been hearing how Moscow and Tehran have 
historically been close partners. It has mostly been driven by 
shared hostility toward the U.S., but nonetheless despite after 
the fall of the Soviet Union we had better relations with 
Russia, but they still kept cordial relations with Iran.
    Now, we have heard a lot about Iran supplying the drones, 
or unmanned vehicles, to Russia. Even they have built a factory 
on the outskirts of Moscow, I understand. But I would like to 
talk more about how Russia is aiding Iran.
    You mentioned, Ms. Stroul, about the M16 35s and I think 
the Su-35s. Could you talk a little bit more about that 
relationship and how it is upsetting the balance in the Middle 
East as opposed to the other direction that it is going?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question. Russia in the 
Middle East has been the second most significant arms supplier 
to countries, second to the United States up until now, but 
what we are seeing is a decision by Russia to transfer 
increasingly sophisticated defense technology to Iran. It has 
the potential to have--to enable Iran to have more advanced 
fighter aircraft than some of our long-standing air partners in 
the region.
    There is potential for Iran to have more upgraded and 
advanced air defense radars which will require updating our own 
war plans should there be a need to go to war with Iran, should 
they take certain steps. President Biden has always said 
military options are on the table.
    There are a range of other capabilities. And I also heard 
from my colleagues about space launch vehicles, et cetera. All 
of this changes the balance of power.
    And the question for us is what actions can we take to 
undermine and degrade that transfer to change the geopolitical 
and strategic environment around this so that this is not such 
a potent and mutually reliant partnership and at the same time 
to reassure our allies and partners, in particular our Arab 
partners and Israel and the Middle East. And part of how we 
would do that is through refreshing how we look at foreign 
military sales, how we look at security assistance funding, how 
we look at military exercises, and also the diplomacy and 
public messaging we can do to make it clear that we are 
committed to the Middle East and a partner of choice.
    Ms. Titus. So you do not see this as just a temporary 
matter of convenience because of certain circumstances in 
Ukraine? You see this as part of the big picture long term?
    Ms. Stroul. I think at this point in time the regimes in 
Moscow and Tehran are ideologically oriented to undermine the 
United States, western interests, and our unmatched network of 
allies and partners. And they are doing this not only the--in 
the defense and military sector, but across a range of civilian 
areas as well. And Beijing is looking at it, Pyongyang is 
looking at it, Venezuela, Damascus, et cetera. And we have to 
think about what the convergence of all of these adversary, 
disruptive, revisionist leaders working to undermine the 
international order from which we benefit today. And that is 
going to require doubling down on shoring up our own alliances 
and partnerships as well as maintaining a variety of coercive 
measures to degrade this emerging alliance.
    Ms. Titus. You see any of this going on in Turkey?
    Ms. Stroul. Which specific thing in Turkey?
    Ms. Titus. Well, just this undermining of relationships and 
strengthening of coziness with Russia.
    Oh, maybe you want to address that?
    Mr. Taleblu. There is one that immediately comes to mind, 
which is Turkey, as you know, is a member of NATO but also has 
the S-400. That is the most advanced Russian surface-to-air 
missile system and it is a historic first for Russia to be able 
to puncture the NATO alliance system with more--with Russian 
weapons.
    Now, let's actually contrast that with Iran. Iran is not in 
NATO. And Iran has the S-300, so Iran has an even lesser 
advanced version of the Russian air defense system that the 
Russians are willing to sell a NATO country. So in this sense 
to a NATO country Russia can sell exceptionally advanced 
technology hoping to create a spoiler.
    If you know, during the cold war Turkey's western alliance 
was essential for a lot of our intelligence and military 
successes in that area. Now with a country outside of NATO, 
like the Islamic Republic, you can give significantly more 
advanced but not all the way up advanced surface-to-air missile 
technology to make any potential American or Israeli strike on 
Iranian territory even harder. So it is a layered approach. 
They know how to take advantage of the existing alliance 
structures while keeping themselves at a distance.
    Ms. Stroul. Turkey is a good example of where we took 
action where we warned. So recalling the CAATSA legislation 
there was a very significant piece of that legislation: if you 
make a significant defense purchase from Russia, there will be 
consequences. And despite the fact that Washington twisted 
itself in knots for a very long time about this issue Turkey 
was written out of the F-35 Program and led to a lot of 
challenges between Ankara and Washington and had a lot of 
challenges for the NATO alliance. We are at an interesting 
moment in time with Turkey. This is a prime example of how 
skilled patient diplomacy can both address very de-stabilizing 
actions and the same time shore up an important member of NATO.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Titus.
    And we now proceed to Congressman Dr. Rich McCormick of 
Georgia.
    Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    It is my opinion that the Iranian government is perhaps the 
most notorious government we have to deal with foreign affairs, 
sponsoring terror all over world right now, not just in the 
Middle East, but all over the world, literally supplying our 
enemies with weapons than can hurt both United States citizens 
abroad as well as our allies all over the world.
    And yet our sanctions--pastor, you mentioned I think 
recently just during your testimony today the JCPOA and its 
ineffectiveness. The United Nations sanctions that--or sorry, 
the United States sanctions that we had through Obama giving 
billions of dollars to basically get rid of a nuclear program I 
believe is--is it expired already?
    Mr. Noronha. Large parts of the JCPOA have all expired and 
90 percent of the U.N. sanctions have expired.
    Mr. McCormick. Yes, I saw that, too. 2020 and 2025 the rest 
will expire. And ironically through all this holding them 
back--I think they still have procured enough uranium to 
basically make three nuclear weapons within a couple day to a 
couple weeks essentially. So it really did not do what it was 
supposed to do even though we paid them to do that.
    They continue to have the money to fund terrorist 
organizations and weaponize them all. And meanwhile they have 
built all this technology for cyber weapons, obviously drones, 
other weaponry that they are producing all the--and they have 
killed Americans essentially. Producing weapons that have been 
used against us directly. We lost three Georgians recently. And 
you mentioned that also in your testimony.
    So how does it make any sense that new sanctions are going 
to help us when the old sanctions did not help us to begin 
with? In other words, cheaters cheat. I am concerned that we 
are not doing enough and that we are not using our 
cybersecurity or even our cyber weapons, our ability to 
undercut their energy production and their funding of this and 
as well as literally destroy the weapon producing facilities 
that are killing Americans and our allies. We are at war as far 
as I am concerned.
    Why would we rely on sanctions? I will let both of you 
answer this in a second because I think this is really 
important. This is the bottom line: Why not do something 
effective while we have the ability? We need to talk about a 
commensurate response. We keep in waiting for somebody to get 
hurt or killed before we respond with like kindness. We are the 
biggest, baddest players on the planet and, yes, we want to 
wait until they are strong enough to harm us before we have a 
commensurate response.
    Anybody who has been to war fighting college, anybody who 
has been to command staff, anybody who has anything in the 
military, who has marched up the ladder understands you do not 
respond with like kinded-ness. You respond with overwhelming 
force and people get that. Reagan did it in Libya. They 
understood. You can even say that Bill Clinton did it in 
Somalia and they understood. When you respond with strength 
people understand. Why are we wasting our time with sanctions 
when we can actually do something about it?
    I will let both of you respond.
    Mr. Taleblu. Thank you, Congressman. I think at this point 
in time sanctions are a necessary but not sufficient element of 
the equation, particularly when you look at the growing Russia-
Iran partnership.
    One example: the drones, right? We need sanctions to go 
after the defense industrial base of Russia, the defense 
industrial base of Iran. You need good regulatory measures and 
tough export controls to go after the technology that goes into 
those weapons that feed into the foreign and domestic supply 
chains.
    Then on the back end you need good local intelligence in 
places that the Iranians and Russians are using the drones to 
figure out the battle tactics, to figure out how they are used. 
You need to make sure that your partners in those local 
jurisdictions have good air and missile defenses to shoot them 
down. And talk about punishment, you want to make sure that 
your partners who are forward-deployed in that area have the 
capability to respond in kind.
    So if it is a place like Ukraine, for example, you know, 
the Russians get Iranian drones. The Ukrainians should get 
ATACMS. And they have. And there is the U.K. Storm Shadow as 
well. So you want to be able to go tit for tat. This is like a 
cocktail-kind of approach. And not any one of these will be 
enough to deter the Iranian or Russian use.
    What will be enough to deter the Russian or Iranian use is 
throwing this cocktail at them and ratchetting it up over time. 
It is not punishment. It is punishment over time that gets an 
adversary to back down.
    Mr. Noronha. Well, I associate myself with his remarks. 
What I would say is we have escalation dominance, but we need 
to be able to maintain escalation dominance. We cannot take 
that for granted.
    To me, when I was imposing sanctions on Iran it was about 
how do you bankrupt their war machine? How do you make them 
have to do their defense sequestration so they have to cut 
their own procurement lines?
    We were doing that. They had to shutter some of their 
centrifuges because they couldn't even buy new centrifuges. 
They couldn't produce certain munition rounds in tanks. We need 
to get back to doing that. We can get back to a posture where 
they are down to maybe half a million barrels of oil per day. 
We can do that. We just have to have the political will to 
sanction certain things. It is quality, not quantity when it 
comes to sanctions as something we should consider.
    Mr. McCormick. I agree with both of you. I think we do more 
both through sanctions and other strong forced willed policy, 
but the main thing is that we just pay attention to which 
Administrations are doing what. And when you want to see who is 
soft on crime, so to speak, it is evident. We need to come 
hard. Thank you. With that, I yield.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much Congressman Dr. Rich 
McCormick.
    And we now proceed to Congresswoman Kathy Manning, who--of 
North Carolina, who is going to be very sorely missed in that 
she has announced as a statesperson not to run for reelection.
    Congresswoman Manning?
    Ms. Manning. Thank you to my friend, Chairman Wilson, my 
friend Chairman Kean, and of course Ranking Member Keating for 
this--holding this hearing.
    And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
    So Russia's illegal invasion and ongoing aggression in 
Ukraine is the most significant threat to our rules-based 
international order in decades and Iran is the world's leading 
sponsor of terrorism. It poses a direct threat to our ally 
Israel. And we saw on Saturday, it attacked Israel with an 
unprecedented drone and missile attack on civilian populations. 
And let's be clear, had it not been for the extraordinary 
defensive measures by the U.S., the U.K., Israel, and others, 
the Iranian attack last Saturday could have resulted in 
devastating loss of life in Israel.
    And you mentioned in your remarks, Ms. Stroul, Iran's next 
attack on Israel could be much more lethal. So we should be 
doing everything possible to disrupt this growing diabolical 
relationship between Iran and Russia to protect our own 
interests and to protect the interests of the free world.
    I want to followup, Ms. Stroul, on Representative Amo's 
questions about the SU fighter aircraft. As you mentioned in 
your testimony if Iran were to provide ballistic missiles to 
Russia and Russia were to provide the Su-35 fighter aircraft to 
Iran, what should our response be and should there be 
consequences?
    Ms. Stroul. I think there should absolutely be 
consequences. The question is how do we do these, the cocktail 
approach to steadily ratchet up pressure?
    So first of all, we will face a policy question here. And 
your committee will have a serious role in discussing whether 
or not it changes the kinds of weapons and platforms we are 
willing to sell to our partners in the region, No. 1.
    No. 2, the Administration did downgrade intelligence to 
highlight the consideration in Tehran of ballistic missiles to 
Russia. Referring to earlier questions, there is no evidence 
that that transfer has happened yet, but we should be planning 
as if it is going to happen because Russia is reliant on Iran.
    Ms. Manning. Is there anything we could do to stop that 
transfer?
    Ms. Stroul. Well, there are ways that we could continue to 
make it very difficult for that transfer to happen. The 
airlines that are transporting it, the Caspian Sea trade that 
is happening. There are a range of other options as well.
    Generally, if Iran decides to make that decision to 
transfer ballistic missiles to Russia, it is not only about the 
security and safety of Ukraine. It is about Europe, it is about 
the Middle East, it is about Israel, and of course it is also 
about our allies in other theaters. So what we are seeing 
especially after this weekend is a significant effort to 
coordinate, galvanize, and energize allies and partners. The 
sanctions being contemplated this week I think are a step and 
an important first step, but it cannot stop there. And we are 
going to have to continue this coordination.
    Ms. Manning. And let me just followup on that question 
because Russia and Iran are two of the most sanctioned 
countries in the world. So given that reality we can talk about 
more sanctions, but what is the single most significant thing 
the U.S. or our partners and allies could do to force a change 
of behavior in these regimes?
    Ms. Stroul. I am not sure there is one most significant 
single thing. I do think we have to be smart about sanctions.
    One of the reasons that both of them have not felt the 
pressure as hydrocarbon economies is because they are trading 
lessons on how to do illicit ship-to-ship oil transfer at sea, 
turning off the GPS corresponders of the ships. We have for a 
long time though through how to deny Iran access to Swift, the 
international financial mechanism. They are developing and 
alternative to Swiss--to Swift. They are working on de-
dollarizing their trade.
    If they continue with these very significant economic 
moves, and then you have a Beijing, a Pyongyang, a Caracas join 
in, then we have a serious challenge with the efficacy of our 
sanctions regimes which means we are--we cannot do this alone 
and unilaterally. We have to be working with our allies and 
partners.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    Mr. Noronha, you wanted to jump in.
    Mr. Noronha. To build off of my colleague's comments, I 
think Europe might actually have more leverage than we do on 
this because we have done so many of these things. So Europe 
presents something to Iran and says if you conduct this 
transfer of ballistic missiles, then we snap back or then we 
shut off the airlines. Deterrence is the question and I think 
there should be----
    Ms. Manning. So what if they were to actually designate the 
IRGC as a terrorist organization? Would that be a good place to 
start?
    Mr. Noronha. I think that would. That is something that 
would irritate them immensely.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you. Unfortunately, my time is expired. 
I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Kathy 
Manning of North Carolina.
    We now proceed to Congressman Darrell Issa of California.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ms. Stroul, I am going to continue on where you left off. 
Is it fair to say that in the case of Iran if you do not cutoff 
the oil, you cutoff nothing?
    Ms. Stroul. In the past we have sought to cutoff oil sales 
and dampen that. Their behavior and investment in terrorism did 
not change, so I think it is important but cannot stand on its 
own.
    Mr. Issa. So if what others have said already here today 
that at the end of the last Administration Iran was broke, they 
were having to shut down their investments even in their 
nuclear program, and they were begging for opportunities to 
feed their people, quite frankly, so they could divert some--
what money they had to other things--that is not the case now--
is there any substantial difference between 3 years ago and 
today other than the quantity of oil they are making available 
for profit?
    Ms. Stroul. I think it is also important to recognize that 
they did react to the maximum pressure campaign in the previous 
Administration by using force, first by seeking to mine and 
target tankers in the Arabian Gulf, and second by launching an 
attack on Abqaiq in 2019 against Saudi Arabia. In both cases 
our partners asked for military support and they did not 
receive it from the United States, which shook the confidence 
of our partners. So I think looking at it only in the binary 
way that that argument was presented misses some of the 
context.
    Mr. Issa. I am not saying we shouldn't do more. I just want 
to make sure I understand that if we fail--in my--in this 
member's opinion, if we fail to cutoff the oil which would 
require interdicting at sea ships that are taking on Iranian 
oil directly and indirectly--if we do not do that then we miss 
the opportunity to stop the funding, notwithstanding direct 
funding the United States has provided. I agree with you that 
we also have to defend our neighbors.
    And when I met with the crowned prince in Saudi Arabia, he 
made it very clear he did not choose to go to Iran to cut a 
deal. He was forced to go to Iran to cut a deal because of our 
inaction.
    Let me change course a little bit on this. Mr. Taleblu, do 
you know the current status of the $6 billion that was agreed 
to be released from South Korea?
    Mr. Taleblu. Are you referring to the one that was passed 
through in Qatar and----
    Mr. Issa. Yes.
    Mr. Taleblu [continuing]. Accordingly to the latest reports 
was allegedly designed to be--or was allegedly supposed to be 
frozen after October 7? So based on press reports/what was 
leaked from the Administration to reporters, it is supposed to 
be frozen in Qatar. I seriously think that that should be 
checked in terms of oversight capabilities of the U.S. Congress 
to make sure that that is actually being frozen.
    In a post-October 7 and a post-April 13-14 world we cannot 
be affording to give a dime to the world's foremost State 
sponsor of terrorism particularly when this Administration's 
own Treasury personnel that comes before the U.S. Congress, Mr. 
Adeyemo, and talks about how even in the past when it comes to 
humanitarian sanctions waivers the government of the Islamic 
Republic prioritized funding the IRGC, not feeding the Iranian 
people.
    Mr. Issa. Following up on that, the late Senator McCain 
once called Russia a gas station impersonating a country. Is it 
fair to say Iran is effectively a gas station in that they have 
very few internal resources of true development other than 
the--that which they glean through their export of oil?
    Mr. Taleblu. I would slightly qualify it as a proud Iranian 
American that Iran is indeed a--is home to a glorious 
civilization. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not do justice 
to that civilization. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a poor 
guardian of the Iranian national interest and functions akin to 
a mafia that generates revenue from oil and gas that we have to 
sanction them.
    Mr. Issa. Notwithstanding the Iranian people, I was 
referring to the GDP of the country in this era. And I say so 
for a reason: If not for the weapons production capability, 
which almost exclusively depends on Chinese cooperation, 
technology, and parts, would Iran be in a position effectively 
to export or even to fire the drones they fired over the 
weekend?
    Mr. Taleblu. Partially yes. Not entirely, but partially 
yes. The Islamic Republic has been developing a robust defense 
industrial base which requires us to keep pace with the growth 
of this base, not just based on illicit foreign procurement 
that comes through Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and 
other jurisdictions of weak central authority, potentially with 
technology in Turkey and the UAE and Oman as well, but success 
for us is----
    Mr. Issa. So with the remaining time is it fair to say that 
if we do not cutoff those illicit imports of technology and 
parts, they will eventually have greater and greater internal 
capability to produce weapons of destruction?
    Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, but the money you want to go after 
is oil and petrochemical. Those are the two big financial 
lifelines: oil and petrochemical.
    Mr. Issa. Good closing. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Darrell Issa 
for your incisive questions.
    And we now proceed to Congresswoman Madeleine Dean of 
Pennsylvania.
    Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman Wilson, Chairman Kean, 
Ranking Member Keating, for holding this timely hearing. And 
thank you to our witnesses today for your expertise and 
perspective.
    As broadly discussed in all of our testimony to our 
committee, Iran and Russia are moving toward greater and 
greater cooperation, largely focused on their mutual desire to 
combat the United States and western influences. The growth in 
relations has only accelerated I think we believe and have seen 
since the start of the war in Ukraine.
    The reported expansion of military cooperation is 
particularly disturbing especially considering Russia's 
continuing aggression in Ukraine and Iran's stark unprecedented 
attack on Israel over the weekend with more than 300 missiles 
and drones, just a devastating attack. Fortunately the defense 
was extraordinary and multinational, as you pointed out.
    Ms. Stroul and Mr. Taleblu, you both ended your testimony 
with the point No. 6 and point final, the importance of passing 
the National Security Supplemental. I agree with you. It was 6 
months ago that the Administration--it was late October, 
October 20, the Administration called for the National Security 
Supplemental, notably after the horrific attack in Israel by 
Hamas.
    You both call on that as the very important last item.
    And, Mr. Taleblu, you said in your written statement, 
quote, ``There couldn't be a starker contrast between Russia's 
recent uptick in the use of Iranian drones and stalled debates 
in Washington over supplemental funding to support Ukraine. 
Beside the moral reasons there are strategic ones why the 
Russo-Iranian model of the war must be defeated in Ukraine.''
    What is going on? What are we risking through this long 
stall?
    Mr. Taleblu. While I understand that you have multiple 
other financial, domestic, legal, other prerogatives, the 
longer we do stall the greater this cooperation solidifies in 
trend line. Remember, Syria was the start; Ukraine is the 
present. There could be an even more dangerous future. Again, I 
respect and understand the need to debate over funding and 
priorities, but at this present moment the ability of our 
adversaries to put aside their differences, in fact to be able 
to compartmentalize their differences--Russia and Iran are 
actually competing to sell China discounted sanctioned oil, but 
they are still able to do that and tighten military ties.
    So if our authoritarian adversaries can do it, there is 
absolutely no reason why us and our democratic partners and 
allies should not be doing this. This should be the price floor 
to ramp up our cooperation with Ukraine against Putin in 
Russia.
    Mr. Dean. And your quite courteous to say that there is 
important debate going on. There is sad stalling going on. We 
should have supported our ally Ukraine much earlier. Obviously, 
we were very important in the beginning and continue--we will 
continue to be important to Ukraine.
    There is no reason for this long stall. And of course 
Israel needs us as its friend and ally as it faces its security 
issues.
    Ms. Stroul, I wanted to ask you what you think about this 
pause, this stall. If we fail to pass the National Security 
Supplemental, if we continue to stumble and stall as a result 
of politics, what is at risk? And if you can, layer in the risk 
of election interference.
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question. Since my colleague 
Behnam talked about the implications in Ukraine, I think the 
implications for how the world views United States leadership 
and partnership is at risk. So if they see us after 2 years of 
working to provide Ukraine security assistance, not for us to 
fight Russian aggression, but to enable Ukraine to fight 
Russian aggression and defend their territory, then adversaries 
in other theaters will feel very emboldened. So it is not just 
about Ukraine.
    If the world sees us picking partners, picking Israel and 
not Ukraine, then they will think that they can play off 
differences, sow divisions. And maybe we pick one partner 
another day and somebody else the next day and again our 
partners will question our staying power and commitment to 
their security.
    And of course while we spend a lot of time focusing right 
now on Ukraine and on Israel, there is just no question that 
Beijing is watching this with glee and delight and making sure 
and preparing for how to sow division here so that we have our 
own debates about when and where to support Taiwan or other 
smaller states in the INDOPACOM theater that are under 
intimidation and coercive behavior by Beijing and are preparing 
for that day.
    Ms. Dean. Yes, I couldn't agree with you more.
    I know you signaled you wanted to add one more thing?
    Mr. Taleblu. One very quick thing. Perhaps this might help 
the debate in Congress. Iran's chief terrorist Qasem Soleimani, 
who the Trump Administration killed in January 2020, used to 
have a saying when he travel the Middle East. He used to say 
we're not like the Americans. We do not abandon our friends. 
Let that sink in.
    Ms. Dean. And may all of our colleagues hear that, both 
here and on the Senate side. You do not pick and choose 
friends. You are a friend this week; you are not a friend that 
week. We stand strong with our allies. We must pass the 
National Security Supplemental for the security of Israel, for 
the humanitarian aid that needs to get into Gaza and other 
regions of the world, to the Palestinians and the West Bank as 
well, and of course to continue to support Ukraine. If we fail 
to support Ukraine, we fail ourselves. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Dean.
    We now proceed to Congressman Jim Baird of Indiana.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
    My question deals with the assessment of the expiration of 
the United Nations' missile and long-range drone embargo on 
Iran and how that has impacted Russia's willingness to procure 
missiles. And while you are on that, if Iran follows through on 
the deal to transfer hundreds of missiles to Russia, how would 
it impact Russia's operations in Ukraine? And I would like to 
start in reverse order so that, Ms. Stroul, you get to go 
first.
    Ms. Stroul. First of all, I think public reporting has 
suggested that Iran--that the majority of Iran's ballistic 
missiles in the attack on April 13 that Israel failed in 
flight. So that should cause us to think through how we think 
about coercion and use of force against Iran in our own plans. 
And I think our partners should be thinking twice about the way 
in which they might be intimidated by Iranian threats of 
aggression.
    No. 2, however, the transfer of ballistic missiles to 
Russia for use in Ukraine is incredibly serious. We would need 
to think through the kinds of air defenses that we are 
supplying Ukraine. We would have to get more, faster, and 
coordination with our allies in Europe. We should think through 
again this cocktail of additional coercive measures at Russia 
and Iran for that supply. I would hope to see more downgraded 
intelligence to shine a light on the risks of what this is, 
more training and offers of support to Ukrainian forces. And we 
should think through ways to sabotage and undermine the actual 
physical transfer of those capabilities.
    Mr. Noronha. Representative, I recently read quotes from an 
anonymous Russian official saying explicitly there's no 
international prohibition against buying Iranian missiles 
anymore, so what's your concern? The arms embargo has expired 
so we're fully within our right to purchase this, slight 
paraphrase.
    The other things that we should be watching is other 
countries also taking advantage of this. Sudan, the Sudanese 
armed forces is reportedly looking to buy Iranian drones. China 
is looking to supply both Iran and Russia with ammonium 
perchlorate, which is used in missile fuel. So this is not 
hypothetical. There are a lot of countries saying, hey, the 
international embargo has expired. We have full legal rights to 
now executive on these things. So that is why I am harping 
quite a bit on this snapback.
    Mr. Taleblu. The quote that Gabe just mentioned, sir, about 
the Russians saying that they will not adhere to any 
international legal restrictions because there are no 
international legal restrictions the Russians literally said I 
think a day after those U.N. sanctions expired on October 18, 
2023. So it just goes to you show you the cost of inaction.
    I think a price floor, again a la what Gabe was saying, was 
snapback. Snapback does not just restore these older penalties 
on Iran. It restores a permanent international arms transfer 
prohibition to and from Iran and it restores a permanent 
ballistic missile testing and transfer prohibition on the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. These are permanent and they would be 
diplomatic wins you enshrine in the U.N. Security Council.
    Three other quick things: Totally agree with Dana in terms 
of public diplomacy. More intel sharing about Russo-Iranian 
cooperation can get more people to be concerned about it and 
potentially help to deter that.
    No. 2 is USG messaging. We have significant Persian 
language and Russian language media through the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors. Every single day these media outlets, in my 
view, should be talking about the historic enmity that used to 
exist between Russia and Iran.
    My testimony details the turbulent Russo-Iranian past that 
every Iranian nationalist knows from taking away territory to 
causing famine to trying to sponsor separatist insurrection to 
support for communist parties in Iran. This was a turbulent 
relationship and the less political space the leadership in 
Iran has to maneuver the better it will be for us.
    In 2016, for example, Russia used to stage bombers from 
Iranian bases to go hit Syria. They couldn't do that anymore 
once this story became public. So do not be afraid to put the 
spotlight on the cooperation.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. I appreciate all your answers and I 
yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Jim Baird.
    We now proceed to Congressman Brad Sherman of California.
    Mr. Sherman. Ms. Stroul, did I hear you right that you say 
that half of the 300 missiles and drones aimed at Israel just 
fell from flight without being shot down?
    Ms. Stroul. A good percentage of the ballistic missiles 
fell.
    Mr. Sherman. Oh, well, mostly it was drones though in terms 
of numbers?
    Ms. Stroul. The ballistic missiles.
    Mr. Sherman. Not in terms of the impact, but in terms of 
the numbers? I would point out that I look forward to us 
hopefully developing laser weapons that would be the answers to 
these cheap and fragile drones.
    We start with the idea that both Russia and Iran are evil 
and then we jump to the conclusion that they are infinitely 
evil. And I am not sure that is the case, at least with regard 
to Russia. What has Russia not done that they could have gotten 
away with as far as providing fissile material to Iran? Iran 
does not have enough fissile material for 20 or 30 nuclear 
weapons. Could Russia have easily provided that and could they 
have gotten away with it? I will ask the--yes.
    Mr. Taleblu. There was a period in time, particularly in 
the post-cold war period from the 1990's to about the early 
2000's where the Clinton Administration was able to 
successfully leverage a western-looking Russia to not provide 
Iran with this stuff. So for example, the Russians----
    Mr. Sherman. Yes, I am talking about now. I mean, Putin 
obviously has staked his career on success in Ukraine. He finds 
the drones from Iran useful. But as far as been reported to 
this committee he has not provided nuclear know-know, fissile 
material, or worse yet sold an assembled nuclear weapon to 
Iran. Do we have evidence that he has and what is the risk that 
he will?
    Mr. Taleblu. We do not have evidence that he has, but we 
also have a lot of outstanding questions. For example, Russia 
is still slated to produce a new reactor for Iran in Bushehr. 
Russia's activities per the JCPOA require them to help verify 
things at Fordow. And Russia per the JCPOA was home to Iran's 
excess enriched uranium, which we do not know the status of 
those.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, that was part of the deal.
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes.
    Mr. Sherman. They were supposed to be. I will go to the----
    Mr. Noronha. There was declassified information in 2022 
that Iran sought certain nuclear materials from Russia. We do 
not have declassified information that Russia obliged that. I 
would note----
    Mr. Sherman. I want to go onto another topic, and that is 
we are talking about limiting these drone parts. And obviously 
we should, but just because the majority are made in the United 
States does not mean that other countries do not have the 
capacity. Does China have the capacity to make the very drone 
parts that are our panel has asked us not to export?
    Mr. Noronha. Some of them, but not all of them.
    Mr. Sherman. And how long would it take for them to be able 
to do all of them?
    Mr. Noronha. If they were intent on it, a year or two. 
These are not terribly advanced.
    Mr. Sherman. Got you. Yes.
    Mr. Noronha. They are moderately advanced.
    Mr. Sherman. Drones are for sale at hobby stores. They are 
not the most advanced of military equipment.
    I would point out that many of us on this committee urged 
that we arm Ukraine before February 2022. Had we done that, 
there might not have been a February 24, 2022. And now it is 
critical that we provide weapons to Taiwan because an invasion 
of Taiwan would be an even worse outcome for our national 
security.
    Let's see. If we had snapback and Russia was prohibited 
from buying drones from Iran, would they adhere to that?
    Mr. Noronha. No, they would not, but what does--what 
snapback does do is it grants all U.N. member states both the 
right and obliges to inspect and seize and cargo in their 
airspace or sea territory that may be containing prohibited 
items. So anything from the Black Sea----
    Mr. Sherman. So this prohibits weapons from going from Iran 
to Russia, albeit that does not go through anybody's airspace 
except--well, it goes over Azeri airspace. I do not know if we 
could count on Azerbaijan to force down a Russian plane or an 
Iranian plane. Would it entitle those countries to interrupt 
parts shipments going into Iran?
    Mr. Noronha. Yes.
    Mr. Sherman. So that might be helpful. And it is possible 
that China would adhere to the sanctions.
    Mr. Noronha. And China tends to be pretty--they are not 
perfect by any means, but they do not want to get too far 
afield. And then countries like Sudan might not purchase 
Iranian drones if it is prohibited.
    Mr. Sherman. Don't count on Sudan.
    Mr. Noronha. Might. Might.
    Mr. Sherman. Sudan is more likely to violate the U.N. than 
Russia. And I yield back. I know there at least two governments 
in Sudan right now. I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Sherman.
    And I want to point out the sophistication of drones. At 
truck stops they cost $29.95. And then at Ollie's Outlet you 
can get a very advanced one for 39.95. But a person who does 
not need to buy one, but the most persistent person here paying 
attention the whole time, and he is not the last one, but 
Congressman Brian Mast of Florida.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have thoroughly enjoyed this panel. I thought you have 
been analytical and specific and have enjoyed it from beginning 
to end. I want to get into some specific economic questions and 
I hope that is OK that you all--if you do not know, just say 
you do not know because we are talking about specific numbers. 
I am not trying to nail you down. I am just trying to really 
understand some things.
    What do we understand the GDP of Russia to be? My estimate, 
2 billion? Somebody else in here have something to say----
    Mr. Noronha. Two trillion.
    Mr. Mast. Two trillion? I am sorry. I did not mean to say 
billion. Trillion? Two trillion?
    Mr. Noronha. Two trillion is roughly----
    Mr. Mast. Two trillion, roughly? Right. We have an estimate 
for EU GDP?
    Mr. Noronha. Twenty.
    Mr. Mast. Twenty? That is what I was thinking, 20, 25 
trillion, maybe--or 15 to 20 trillion. I would say 25 trillion 
for the United States, right? We have an estimate for Ukraine 
GDP? In the billions?
    Mr. Noronha. Billions I think. I do not know, but----
    Mr. Mast. Maybe 200 billion? Maybe less?
    Mr. Noronha. Higher than that, I think.
    Mr. Mast. Higher? Five hundred?
    Mr. Noronha. Somewhere around there. I apologize. I do not 
have the----
    Mr. Mast. No, it is OK.
    Mr. Noronha [continuing]. On that.
    Mr. Mast. You were not given these specific questions in 
advance or anything, so you are not expected to actually know 
exactly what they are. But it is important to realize--what to 
your knowledge is Russia having a capability to--or who to your 
knowledge is Russia having a capability to export to right now?
    Mr. Noronha. They export large volumes of oil to--India is 
their primary exporter; China is their secondary exporter. They 
are still doing decently large volumes to European Union 
countries, particularly in gas condensate. And then a 
hodgepodge all over the world. Nickel, aluminum, potash, 
lumber, lots of other exports besides petrochemicals that they 
are still doing across the world including to the United 
States.
    Mr. Mast. And what is your worry as you look at the oil and 
gas exports specifically about those coming back around in a 
circle to European nations, from India, China, Iran, anybody?
    Mr. Noronha. We know that Russia and Iran use each other to 
disguise their own oil shipments. Russia uses Iran as a 
sanctions evasion hub. They do ship-to-ship transfers. They do 
fake invoices. So a very sophisticated system to use and abuse 
any and all financial systems.
    Mr. Mast. No doubt about it. And some of the conversation 
we have had already about snapback sanctions as it relates to 
Iran would specifically help European Union members and others 
from not being able to have Russian energy or something else 
come back and essentially be funding the entity that we are at 
war with. So it is important to look at that as well.
    Do you see the currently in Russia would you assess 
economic growth or economic decline?
    Mr. Noronha. They were slated to grow at 3.5 percent last 
quarter, and over 3 percent this year, much higher than the EU 
or the United--or and about/on par with the United States.
    Mr. Mast. What do you attribute the economic growth to in 
Russia as they are at war committing more to war resource and 
there are sanctions on them? How are they growing?
    Mr. Noronha. It is mostly their petro--their oil and 
petrochemical sales which are higher today than they were 
before the war.
    Mr. Mast. And again, go specifically to where those--where 
do you put the most profit coming in for them from?
    Mr. Noronha. India, and China being second to that. They 
are not under----
    Mr. Mast. Any numbers you could put on that to specifically 
gauge what the numbers on their economic growth?
    Mr. Noronha. They imported--they exported $120 billion in 
oil in 2021. In petrochemicals they exported 180 billion 2022. 
So roughly a quarter of that India, roughly a quarter of that 
China, and then the rest of the world.
    Mr. Mast. OK. Let's go to some specific war numbers. What 
do you assess Russia will be spending on the Ukraine war in 
2024, or what do you assess that they spent in 2023?
    Mr. Noronha. They are spending 6 percent of their defense--
other GDP on defense. They have managed to raise their defense 
spending. They have not increased their debt. Their debt to GDP 
is 18 percent. It has stayed at 18 percent the last 3 years 
while ours has ballooned to 130 percent.
    Mr. Mast. Why do you assess, if you do, that the EU cannot 
foot the bill--given the GDP of the EU versus the GDP of 
Russia, it being substantially more, that the EU cannot foot 
the bill for the war against Ukraine?
    Mr. Noronha. In my view, in my assessment it is a political 
choice. They have chosen to fund social programs and domestic 
priorities, climate initiatives, and they have chosen not to 
defend--to spend certain defense numbers. That is Europe as a 
whole. That is not true for Eastern Europe or Northern Europe.
    Mr. Mast. Quickly, in your estimation you would say that EU 
could foot the bill for Russian deterrence, deterring this 
Russian aggression, helping Ukraine fight the war if they had a 
reappropriation of their resources?
    Mr. Noronha. They certainly have the fiscal space. They do 
not have--they have the fiscal space, they have the debt space, 
they have the ability to raise debt in a way that they can do 
it if they so wished.
    Mr. Mast. That is very important. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brian Mast of 
Florida.
    We now proceed to Congressman Brad Schneider of Illinois.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the witnesses for your time. As was said, 
this has been a very insightful and informative conversation.
    I want to pick up on some things you were saying. It was 
noted that the growing relationship between Iran and Russia is 
a threat to the United States, our interests and our allies, 
and the rules-based international order. Let me ask--go down 
the line, do you agree?
    Mr. Ben Taleblu, do you agree with that?
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, indeed it is a threat.
    Mr. Schneider. Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. Yes, it is a threat.
    Mr. Schneider. Ms. Stroul?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes.
    Mr. Schneider. OK. Mr. Noronha, I am going to quote you, 
and you said with respect to Iran and Russia, quote, ``It is 
unwise and deeply myopic for leaders in the West to believe 
they can ignore one country's threats and still hope to counter 
the threats of the other, that these two things are linked.'' 
So I won't ask you if you agree.
    But, Mr. Ben Taleblu, do you agree with that statement?
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, there is that linkage.
    Mr. Schneider. Ms. Stroul?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes.
    Mr. Schneider. OK. And all of you, and thank you for this, 
and we will hopefully put this to good use, you brought to us a 
number of what I will call wise and good recommendations for 
what we can do, what we can and should do to address the 
growing Russia-Iran partnership. But let me ask the group 
again, is there anything more important or more urgent than 
passing the essential national security-related funding bills 
for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan.
    I will go the other way. Ms. Stroul?
    Ms. Stroul. There is nothing more important.
    Mr. Schneider. Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. There is nothing more important.
    Mr. Schneider. Mr. Ben Taleblu?
    Mr. Taleblu. There are a lot of close seconds, but there is 
nothing more important.
    Mr. Schneider. All right. So I think we have consensus, and 
I agree with you 100 percent, this is the most important thing 
we need to do. We should have done it last year when President 
Biden made the request. We certainly should have passed it in 
the House more than 2 months ago when the Senate passed their 
bill. And I am going to argue we are wasting time now putting a 
different bill that will then have--or set of three bills that 
will have to go through the machinations of Congress back to 
the Senate and then hopefully to the President, with no 
guarantees.
    So let me ask a final question on this line of thought: 
What are the consequences if Speaker Johnson's plans fail and 
the House does not act? I will open that up to anyone who wants 
to jump in. Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. Thinking about the consequences if Ukraine 
loses and we have Russian forces on the border, truly on the 
borders of NATO, it is going to complicate the problem of 
deterring an Iranian nuclear breakout. If U.S. forces have to 
go flood into EUCOM again, if CENTCOM is getting de-
prioritized, it is much harder, and I think my colleague can 
speak to this, to prevent all the issues that we would have to 
deal with to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
    The follow-on effects of losing Ukraine are enormously 
catastrophic for Israel, for our Middle East security goals. It 
is not just limited to this one theater.
    Mr. Schneider. And before I come to you, Ms. Stroul, I want 
to emphasize something. You said so basically if Russia wins in 
Ukraine, it is more likely that Iran breaks out with a nuclear 
weapon. You also said earlier that if Russia wins, it is also 
more likely Iran has bases in Europe armed with nuclear 
weapons.
    Mr. Noronha. That is my assessment. I think that latter one 
is hopefully a low probability, but it is not zero.
    Mr. Schneider. But it is a real risk.
    Ms. Stroul?
    Ms. Stroul. When we talk about the rules-based 
international order, what we mean is that Putin is seeking to 
change internationally recognized boundaries by force. If he 
succeeds in do that and the world does not hold the line at 
Ukraine, what Iran wants in the Middle East is to be the 
regional hegemon. Iran does not want to stay in its borders. It 
wants to challenge that. Why is it fomenting all of these 
proxies and non-State actors across the Middle East to 
challenge the borders of Israel? And China. What does China 
want? Taiwan.
    So every adversary in every theater will think that there 
is a chance that they will be able to get out of jail free by 
changing internationally recognized borders by force and that 
the United States will not stand with its allies and partners 
in defending those borders.
    Mr. Schneider. I couldn't agree with you more. And at the 
risk of--maybe if the chair would give me another 90 minutes we 
could have a whole history lecture. But Russia is aspiring in 
my view to restore a bygone empire. Iran is struggling to 
restore its bygone empire. China, the same.
    The modern world order, as we talk about it, the rules-
based order is, as you said, where nations respect each other's 
boundaries, where alliances are built, where working together 
in the world countries establish relationships diplomatically, 
trade, economies grow, people live in peace, security, and 
prosperity. That is the world the United States helped create 
after World War II. It is the world that we want to preserve 
and it is the world that is under dire threat both in Ukraine 
because of Russia's attack, and the Middle East because of 
Iran's actions. And in the Pacific--Indo-Pacific, which is why 
it is so important that we pass this supplemental funding bill. 
With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brad Schneider 
of Illinois.
    We now proceed to Congressman Keith Self of Texas.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me help you with the 
GDPs. The United States is roughly 29 trillion. The EU is 
roughly 20 trillion. Russia is 2.5 trillion. Texas, my State 
Texas, Texas alone 1.8 trillion.
    I want to move to something very mundane: logistics. There 
are multiple Iranian airliners that fly through NATO countries 
to Russia. There are sanctions on these airlines. The first 
question is what has the Biden Administration done to enforce 
sanctions on several of the Iranian airlines?
    Mr. Noronha. These sanctions have been on these airlines, 
some since the Obama Administration, others imposed in the 
Trump Administration. There has been no secondary sanctions 
enforcement on those airlines really, period, meaning if 
airports refuel these airliners, no consequences, no 
consequences for the air crew, any of these things. There has 
simply been zero secondary sanctions enforcement.
    Mr. Self. So if I can followup on that, if--and the 
sanctions I believe talk about material support. Is it not true 
that if an airliner lands on an airport, that in and of itself 
is materials support?
    Mr. Noronha. It is.
    Mr. Self. How much on these Iranian airliners--what do they 
transport into Russia? How much? What do you estimate?
    Mr. Noronha. There were 72 flights in the first 2 months of 
the war of Russia's Ukraine--war into Ukraine that according to 
some reports were military flights, again containing--likely 
containing ammunition, suicide drones, personnel. That is an 
intel question. I am not exactly sure, but quite a bit I think 
is the answer. Again, some of this is an intel question.
    Mr. Self. OK. What can you tell us about their activities 
to support the IRGC since October 7?
    Mr. Noronha. Mahan Air and Iran Air were both sanctioned 
for providing support for the IRGC sending even in some cases 
ballistic missile parts into Syria disguised as alternate 
cargo. One of the big issues with these airlines is they lie 
about their cargo manifests to smuggle in weapons and other 
dangerous WMD proliferation materials. That is again another 
reason Europe shouldn't allow them into their airspace at all 
because they lie about their crew. In Latin America they lied 
and had IRGC officers disguised as crew members. They lie about 
everything of their activities.
    Mr. Self. And how would you recommend Congress taking 
action to try to disrupt their supply lines in these airliners, 
because I obviously sanctions are not working?
    Mr. Noronha. I think--I believe you may have let a letter 
to the U.K. asking them to take this seriously.
    Mr. Self. To several countries.
    Mr. Noronha. There is an issue. Those ministries of foreign 
affairs do not necessarily tell the airports they have even 
gotten that letter. If those airports realized that they were 
liable to U.S. sanctions and could get sanctioned or if they 
could realize that, hey, you might not get U.S. airliners to 
your airport for a few months over this issue, they would very 
rapidly in my view and assessment shut off these flights.
    Again, there aren't that many flights from Iran Air and 
Mahan Air into Europe. They are more important for Iran than 
they are for these airports. They can do without them.
    Mr. Self. So what you are saying is we ought to target the 
airports, not the foreign ministers?
    Mr. Noronha. Correct. Is the bankers and executive boards 
and lawyers who are the ones making the call here, not 
politicians.
    Mr. Self. Very good. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Self.
    And I want to point out how modest Congressman Self is. 
There is no question the GDP of Texas is larger than the 
Russian Federation. And any country that lies about cargo 
manifests, those numbers are not correct. OK? And so I cannot 
believe a Texan being modest, but it has occurred.
    Now we go to Congressman Mike Lawler of New York.
    Mr. Lawler. Another bastion of modesty.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After this past 
weekend's attack on Israel, which marked the first direct 
attack on Israeli territory launched from Iranian territory, 
the Biden Administration cannot ignore that their policies of 
appeasement have emboldened the Iranian regime. The President 
has failed to enforce sanction on Iran's illicit oil trade 
allowing the regime to rack up tens of billions of dollars in 
new revenue, over $88 billion.
    This money funds its proxy wars against Israel and our 
troops, no question about it. And the President also continues 
to exercise waiver authority to free up billions of dollars for 
Iran. Further, the Administration has been engaging in informal 
negotiations with Iran on a nuclear deal during its tenure 
giving credibility to Iran's development of these capabilities 
and purposefully withholding any information about it from 
Congress.
    The erratic behavior on the part of the President and his 
continued attempts at bowing down to the Iranian regime must 
stop. And it begins with passing important legislation like the 
SHIP Act and the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act, two bills 
that I introduced that would put in place stronger sanctions on 
the illicit Iranian oil trade.
    Mr. Taleblu, do you agree that the Biden Administration's 
apologetic Iran policies have emboldened their terrorist 
regime?
    Mr. Taleblu. Unfortunately, very much yes, sir. I think the 
first example of even a slight attempt at oil sanctions 
enforcement came 16 months into the Biden Administration's 
term. I think it was May 2022. So that is far too long.
    Mr. Lawler. Do you have other instances to support this 
viewpoint?
    Mr. Taleblu. Broadly there is a whole series of pulled 
punches. The fact that the Administration's even stated aim for 
diplomacy with Iran changed so much over time gave Iran the 
impression that it could get away with a lot more. You may 
remember during the campaign period they talked about longer 
and stronger. Once they started negotiating with the Iranians 
via the Europeans they talked about JCPOA resurrection. Then 
there was talk of all these smaller deals, side deals, and 
particularly a lot of the hostage deals, the waivers that came 
to the Islamic Republic. Basically creating room for the regime 
to breathe under sanctions actually undermined the 
Administration's own stated aim of a diplomatic resolution.
    Mr. Lawler. Just yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee marked up and passed the SHIP Act. And we passed this 
through the House last fall. Seemingly it only took 130 
ballistic missiles for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and Senate Democrats to realize that there was a problem with 
the illicit Iranian oil trade. Do you believe that Senator 
Schumer should immediately put this bill on the floor?
    Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, sir, and I thank you for your 
leadership on pointing out the Iran-China energy nexus. China 
has been the biggest in the past decade, licit and illicit, 
importer of Iranian crude oil. This fact cannot go understated. 
I think your legislation goes a far way toward targeting it.
    Mr. Lawler. I mean, roughly 80 percent of Iranian petroleum 
is purchased by China, $88 billion in increased revenue. Iran 
is the greatest State sponsor or terror funding Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Houthis. Ninety-three percent of Hamas' budget 
comes from Iran. This is a crisis. We must cutoff the funding 
stream at its source, this illicit oil trade. And that is why 
we have put this legislation forward to not only enact 
secondary sanctions on the purchaser, but also on the financial 
institutions which are facilitating the trade.
    Yes, sir?
    Mr. Noronha. When I was at the State Department 5 years ago 
working on this particular problem one of the things that 
really worried me was that China was creating what I called 
sanctions-proof entities. So that you sanction them and they 
say who cares, we are not going connected to the U.S. financial 
system?
    Mr. Lawler. Right.
    Mr. Noronha. The way in my----
    Mr. Lawler. These little teapots.
    Mr. Noronha. The way in my view that the U.S. should solve 
this is we can create leverage in other funds. They care a 
whole lot about semiconductors, about trade, about aluminum, 
things that have nothing to do with the Iran file. We need to--
in my view need to establish leverage on a series of things and 
then lever that on rejections in Iranian oil imports.
    Mr. Lawler. Agree with that. That is an important point to 
make.
    As I am sure you know, in the days before Iran's attack on 
Israel the President and Senate Majority Leader Schumer made 
some troubling statements about Israel's leadership and their 
domestic affairs. No one in our country should be interfering 
in Israeli elections, especially our elected officials. You 
agree with that?
    Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, Congressman. I will go one step 
further. Any daylight between the U.S. and Israel benefits 
directly these Islamic Republic of Iran.
    Mr. Lawler. Agree. I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Lawler. And 
thank you for raising the issue about sale of oil. It is 
heartbreaking to me that the world's largest democracy, India, 
is buying oil from war criminal Putin to help finance the 
invasion and--murderous invasion. I just cannot fathom such a 
country so important as India doing this.
    We are very fortunate--as we conclude we have the 
Congressman Mayor Tim Burchett of Tennessee.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you. I prefer to be called the 435th 
most powerful Member of Congress.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you. This is to all you all. As 
documented by the non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran, since 
the imposition of the price cap 86 tankers in the ghost fleet 
that ships illicit Iranian oil has switched to carrying Russian 
oil instead. Half of these vessels were flagged by Panama. 
Should the U.S. increase pressure on Panama to de-flag these 
vessels? A simple yes or now would be----
    Ms. Stroul. Yes.
    Mr. Burchett. OK.
    Mr. Noronha. Yes, they should.
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes.
    Mr. Burchett. That is sort of a leading question, but I 
appreciate the emphasis on it.
    How important is the ghost fleet to financing Russia and 
Iran's war machines?
    Ma'am, we will start with you. Ladies first.
    Ms. Stroul. I do not have information on the importance of 
the ghost fleet to direct war efforts.
    Mr. Burchett. OK.
    Mr. Noronha. It is indispensable. Iran has a small and very 
rickety fleet of tankers. Russia has very few tankers. Without 
those ghost fleet tankers they cannot export their oil. If you 
take out the ghost fleet tankers, they are out of business.
    Mr. Burchett. OK. Do you agree, sir?
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, and also in general any macroeconomic 
lifeline.
    Mr. Burchett. Say that again? I am sorry.
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, and in general any macroeconomic lifeline 
because the revenues generated will go toward funding the war 
effort.
    Mr. Burchett. All right. Iran sold a million more barrels 
of oil per day in March 2024 than in March 2020. Do you feel 
like this Administration, the Biden Administration is doing 
everything it can to stop the sale of U.S.-sanctioned oil?
    Ms. Stroul. I think it is important to recognize that while 
there is what we can do to stop the sale of oil, there is also 
the fact that Iranians--the Iranian regime is selling the oil 
very cheap and China is willing to buy. So it is not just how 
we think about punishing or targeting Iranian sales, but what 
we can do about the purchasers. And here because of this 
emerging and deepening strategic alliance between Moscow, 
Tehran, and Beijing it is not just about targeting the Iranian 
oil sales.
    And I also think it is important to mention here as we talk 
about oil sales and how it funds Iran or Russia's war machine 
that Iranian terror is extremely cheap. They were able to 
continue to foment chaos, fund, train, and direct their proxies 
throughout the JCPOA and the maximum pressure campaign. So it 
is not simply about cutting off the funding. I think it is very 
important both for executive Branch and legislative branch to 
think about what we can do other than just targeting the 
economic incentives here given how cheap Iranian terror is.
    Mr. Burchett. You all agree with that?
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, partially. Again, to go back to the 
cocktail, and forgive me for this analogy, if it is a martini, 
the macroeconomic pressure is----
    Mr. Burchett. I am Southern Baptist, so I have no idea what 
you are talking about. Please feel free to explain.
    Ms. Stroul. Behnam, is Iranian terror cheap?
    Mr. Taleblu. Iranian terror is cheap. And I will go one 
further----
    Ms. Stroul. No. Thank you.
    Mr. Taleblu. Yes, but ballistic missiles and drone are 
weapons of the weak, but that does not mean they do not kill. 
So we should be in the business of macroeconomic pressure and 
everything else Dana just said. It is not one or the other. And 
here is the quiet part out loud: Iran seldom changes its 
foreign and security policy. Iran has been on this collision 
course for 45 years under the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic. And so long as we treat the symptoms and not the 
cause we are not going to get to the root problem here.
    Mr. Burchett. Iran's putting about what, 2.5 million 
barrels a day? Is that roughly----
    Mr. Taleblu. 2.2 to 2.4, depending in estimates. And then--
--
    Mr. Burchett. Right. And China is buying 80 percent of 
their oil from them? Did I read that statistic right somewhere? 
Roughly. We are good. Yes, I was just trying to get a ballpark.
    These Iranian drones that are mentioned have been used to 
directly attack Israel. Is there a way that the U.S. can 
interrupt the production?
    Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, and a lot of those actions are 
already in place and they should be tightened up. First of all, 
we need to shore up the air defenses of our partners. Israel 
has an exceptional layered air defense.
    Mr. Burchett. I understand.
    Ms. Stroul. We just our partners together operate those air 
defenses.
    No. 2, we have to go after the dual-use components that are 
ending up in Iran's drones.
    No. 3, we have to stop and figure out how to degrade the 
illicit transfer of Iranian drones to the Russian theater.
    No. 4, we need to shore up Ukraine's air defenses and their 
capabilities to down those drones.
    And five, we need to increase information and intelligence 
sharing between Ukraine and others who are at risk from Iranian 
attack drones.
    Mr. Burchett. Didn't we just have something that was 
blocking those drones, the sale of those drones and now that 
they are opening that pipeline back up so to speak? Have I read 
something correctly about that recently?
    Mr. Noronha. There was an U.N. embargo on sales and 
purchases of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles that expired 
on October 2023.
    Mr. Burchett. Right.
    Mr. Noronha. But that is one that can be returned.
    Mr. Burchett. OK. Great. And I am sorry I have gone over, 
Mr. Chairman. I yield nothing back to you.
    Mr. Wilson. And I would like to point out actually with the 
leadership of the 435th member legislation has passed on that 
issue. And so he does not even know how successful he is.
    And with that, pursuant to committee rules, all members 
have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous 
materials for the record. Subject to the length of limitation--
Congressman Burchett, at this time I would like for the 
witnesses to stay in place--and thank goodness Congressman--the 
ranking member has returned. Isn't this amazing? But anyway, I 
wanted to get a picture with the witnesses in place. And I was 
trying to have people from both parties here and he magically 
appeared. So here we are.
    And without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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