[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                    ADDRESSING OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY 
                     CONCERNS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                     DEFENSE'S V-22 OSPREY PROGRAM 

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                    THE BORDER, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                                 of the

                         COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                           AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JUNE 12, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-115

                               __________

  Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability








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               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman

Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking 
Mike Turner, Ohio                        Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of 
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas                Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas                    Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida               Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina      Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan               Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina          Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York            Ayanna Pressley, Massachesetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida

                                 ------                                
                       Mark Marin, Staff Director
       Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
             Kaity Wolfe, Senior Professional Staff Member
         Grayson Westmoreland, Senior Professional Staff Member
        Ellie McGowan, Staff Assistant and Administrative Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5074

                  Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051
                                 ------                                

   Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs

                  Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Chairman
Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Robert Garcia, California, Ranking 
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Minority Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Pete Sessions, Texas                 Dan Goldman, New York
Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas                Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas                    Maxwell Frost, Florida
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Vacancy
Vacancy                              Vacancy



























                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Hearing held on June 12, 2024....................................     1

                               Witnesses

                              ----------                              



Mr. Peter Belk, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary 
  of Defense for Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement...................................................     5

Vice Admiral Carl Chebi, Commander, U.S. Naval Air Systems 
  Command, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement...................................................     6

Mr. Gary Kurtz, Program Executive Officer, Air Anti-Submarine 
  Warfare and Special Missions Programs, U.S. Department of 
  Defense
Oral Statement...................................................     9

Written opening statements and the written statements of the 
  witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives 
  Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              

  * List, Fallen Marines, National Security V-22 Osprey Program; 
  submitted by Rep. Garcia.

  * Email, Class A Mishap Investigation Email Redacted; submitted 
  by Rep. Grothman.

  * Testimony, SWIFT 11 MV-22B Testimony; submitted by Rep. 
  Grothman.

  * Questions for the Record: to Mr. Belk; submitted by Rep. 
  Grothman.

  * Questions for the Record: to Mr. Chebi; submitted by Rep. 
  Grothman.

     Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.

 
                    ADDRESSING OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY 
                     CONCERNS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                     DEFENSE'S V-22 OSPREY PROGRAM 

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, June 12, 2024

                     U.S. House of Representatives

               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

   Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs

                                           Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:39 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn Grothman 
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Grothman, Sessions, Biggs, Fallon, 
Perry, Garcia, Lynch, Porter, and Frost.
    Mr. Grothman. This hearing of the Subcommittee on National 
Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs will come to order. 
Welcome, everyone.
    Without objection, I may declare a recess at any time, and 
I will recognize myself now for the purpose of making an 
opening statement. Thank you. You can sit down.
    Good morning and welcome. The goal of today's hearing is to 
examine the Department of Defense V-22 Osprey Program. We are 
all familiar because it seems to pop up in the news 
intermittently for the last 20 years. As an American deeply 
committed to the safety of our service members and the 
responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayer funds, I believe it is 
imperative that we examine the challenges associated with this 
program.
    The V-22 Osprey, a revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft, was 
designed to combine the vertical takeoff and landing 
capabilities of a helicopter with the long-range, fuel-
efficient performance of a turboprop plane. Its promise was 
significant, enhancing the operational reach and flexibility of 
our armed services. However, as with any ambitious defense 
program, it has encountered substantial hurdles and tragically 
has been linked to dozens of fatalities. Since the V-22 became 
operational, it has been involved in multiple crashes during 
training exercises, resulting in the loss of over 50 service 
members' lives. These incidences have earned the Osprey the 
troubled nickname, ``Widow Maker,'' highlighting the grave 
concerns revolving its safety and reliability. Most recently, 
last November, its failure led to the deaths of eight Air Force 
crew members, prompting the Department of Defense to ground the 
entire fleet for several months.
    There have been several known issues throughout its 
history. The hard clutch engagement issue is a major mechanical 
flaw that has plagued the V-22. This program has been known 
since at least 2010, and has caused catastrophic losses of 
control, contributing to several fatal crashes. The Department 
of Defense has publicly claimed that the risk of a hard clutch 
engagement issue has been reduced 99 percent. However, the 
recent fatal crash and ongoing investigation suggest that more 
transparency and rigorous testing is needed to verify these 
claims, first, to understand whether all mechanical and 
operational issues are thoroughly investigated, and second, to 
demand transparency and accountability from the Department of 
Defense.
    We have had hearings about the Department of Defense before 
on this Subcommittee, and it always seems to me like, you know, 
transparency, they view it as an enemy. Since the Committee's 
initial request last year, the Department has produced a very 
few responsive documents. The Department needs to produce the 
outstanding documents and information as soon as possible.
    Finally, I want to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being 
spent wisely and efficiently in ways that do not subject the 
lives of our service members to unnecessary risk over and above 
what they already face. Every year the Department of Defense's 
budget continues to climb with no proper assessment of 
priorities, so we are not only losing people maybe by 
continuing this program, there are other more important 
programs that are being squashed. I have concerns that despite 
the monumental investment the taxpayers made in the Osprey 
Program, the Department has not prioritized long-term 
sustainability and operability of the program and has even cut 
operations and maintenance budgets.
    This is not the first time the House Oversight Committee 
examined the Osprey. The Committee held a hearing in 2009. It 
is a shame that here we are over a decade later, and I am sure 
some of the questions will be the same questions that were 
asked 15 years ago, trying to understand these issues in light 
of even more crashes and loss of life. As we proceed with this 
hearing, let us remember our responsibility to the brave men 
and women who serve our Nation. Their safety and well-being 
must be at the forefront of our discussions and decisions.
    To that end, I would like to enter into the official 
hearing record a written statement, which is really an 
incredible document, from surviving families, most of which are 
here today, of an MV-22B Osprey crash that occurred on June 8, 
2022, during routine flight operations.
    Mr. Grothman. I would like to read one quote from Ms. Amber 
Sax of California, wife of Captain John Sax, who lost his life 
in that crash. ``We seek accountability, answers, and change. 
Our goal is not to see this platform removed. It is to know 
that someday we will be able to save their lives, enable others 
to live, knowing what happened to them will not ever be 
repeated.'' I look forward to hearing from our witnesses from 
the Department of Defense today as we continue to work together 
to address these critical issues. I thank you for being here.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Garcia for the purpose of 
his opening statement.
    Mr. Garcia. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 
thank all of our witnesses, and thank you for your service. And 
to all the family members that are here also, we share your 
obviously incredible grief, and thank you all for being here 
and for your advocacy work on this important topic. Like the 
chairman, I think this is an important bipartisan hearing, and 
I think it is important that our Nation is always secure and 
that we have the best military readiness and capabilities 
possible.
    Now, we know that the V-22 Osprey has been very important 
for the Air Force, Navy, and our Marine Corps, and has allowed 
our military to complete important missions in the past. With 
this unique capability to hover and land vertically without 
needing a runway, like a helicopter, we know the fast speed and 
long distance range that it carries. We really have a unique 
aircraft that has also had some challenges that we are going to 
talk about today. Now, the V-22 gives our troops important 
flexibility. This has been pretty made clear by our military. 
And if you look at the Osprey's major accident rate, which is 
the actual data that the military uses to judge safety, we know 
that per-flight hour over the past 10 years has been comparable 
to similar aircrafts. We know that the aircraft has some unique 
capabilities that it provides to our military. We also know 
that the Osprey has some really unique challenges.
    It is not surprising, given how actually remarkable the 
tiltrotor technology is, which has been obviously the 
centerpiece of the capabilities of this aircraft, we know that 
when something goes wrong, the Osprey actually requires even 
greater pilot skill and experience to land safely. We also know 
that it has incredible speed, lift, and range, and when you 
think about delivering supplies to an aircraft carrier, we know 
how critical that work is and the important situation that can 
arise in all of our theaters.
    We know that the Osprey's complicated technology creates 
unique procurement and development challenges as well. The 
Osprey requires tens of thousands of parts for completion made 
by many contractors and subcontractors. The Osprey has been 
delivered late and over budget. This is an all too familiar 
story, of course, when we talk oftentimes about the defense 
appropriation and acquisitions process, and we know that the 
concerns about the Osprey are real and they are not new. In its 
lifetime, we know that 16 Ospreys have actually been damaged 
beyond repair in accidents and 62 service members have 
tragically lost their lives.
    Now, it is our responsibility to protect every person that 
serves our country. Congress has to hold both the Pentagon and 
our defense industry accountable, and so we look forward to the 
critical challenges that we can discuss. And I know that our 
witnesses are also very much interested in solutions and having 
honest and important conversations.
    Investigations into a June 2022 crash showed a so-called 
``hard clutch engagement'' that caused a catastrophic failure 
and crash, which killed all five marines aboard the aircraft. 
In 2023, two more Ospreys crashed last August in Australia, 
killing three marines, and most recently, last November, a 
crash killed eight airmen off the coast of Japan. These 
crashes, we know, are still under investigation and each one, 
of course, is incredibly tragic. And we know that following the 
November crash, the Air Force, Marines, and Navy actually 
grounded their entire Osprey fleets. This was an appropriate 
decision to protect our service members, and by March that 
order, of course, has been lifted and the Osprey is, of course, 
flying again, but it is required to stay close to a landing 
zone.
    Now, I understand the military has put in place maintenance 
and design upgrades to address some of the issues. We know that 
more are needed, and that is part of what the hearing is about. 
Given this aircraft's history and ongoing safety issues, I do 
believe we need to hear more about why the DOD concluded that 
the Osprey can return to service and how we will keep our 
people safe in the future. I appreciate Chairman Grothman 
calling this hearing and hope we can work in a bipartisan way 
to ensure the highest degree of protection for our armed 
forces. Only through continued congressional oversight, can we 
protect the men and women who have chosen to serve our country.
    Finally, I just want to remind everyone why we are here 
today, to honor the service and sacrifice of the men and women 
in uniform who put themselves in harm's way to protect our 
Nation, and specifically, the three marines lost in the 
Australia crash, the eight airmen lost in the Japan crash, and 
the many other service members that we have lost over the 
course of the last few years.
    Now, Chairman Grothman, I ask for unanimous consent to 
enter each of those names into the record today. I have 
provided a list.
    Mr. Grothman. Yes, so ordered.
    Mr. Garcia. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 
yield back.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. I am pleased to introduce our witnesses 
here today from left to right. Mr. Peter Belk, performing the 
duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, come 
over from the Pentagon. In this capacity, he is the principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Next, we have Vice Admiral 
Carl Chebi, the Commander of Naval Air Systems Command. He is a 
skilled fighter pilot and has served in several operational 
capacities. He has also had an array of program management 
experience on various air platforms. And finally, Mr. Gary 
Kurtz is the Program Executive Director for Air Anti-Submarine 
Warfare, Assault, and Special Mission Programs. He oversees the 
acquisition and the total lifecycle support for a diverse range 
of programs, including the V-22 Joint Program Office. Thank you 
for all participating in today's hearing.
    Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please 
stand and raise your right hand.
    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you 
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God?
    [A chorus of ayes.]
    Mr. Grothman. Let the record show that all the witnesses 
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and you may sit down. 
We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your 
testimony.
    I will remind the witnesses we have read your testimony and 
will appear in full in the hearing record, but please limit 
your testimony to 5 or 6 minutes. As a reminder, please press 
the button on the microphone in front of you, so that it is on 
and the members can hear you. When you begin to speak, the 
light in front of you will turn green. After 4 minutes, the 
light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, the 5 
minutes is up. I would like you to wrap up as soon as 
convenient.
    I now recognize Mr. Belk for his opening statement.

                        STATEMENT OF PETER BELK

                        PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF

                       THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

                         DEFENSE FOR READINESS

                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Belk. Chairman Grothman, Ranking Member Garcia, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this 
opportunity to testify today about the Department of Defense's 
safety oversight and our ongoing work to ensure the safety of 
the V-22 Osprey Aircraft.
    I am proud to be here today to discuss how we are 
inculcating a culture of safety across the Department and 
specifically how our actions are driving the safe return of the 
V-22 Osprey to flight. Our partnerships across the Department 
are key to maintaining that culture of safety, and I am pleased 
to be here today with Vice Admiral Carl Chebi and Mr. Gary 
Kurtz to describe the Department's efforts to ensure the safety 
of the V-22 Osprey and our service members.
    I also want to thank personally the family members of those 
who have suffered losses and tell them directly, you have my 
commitment on behalf of the Department to continue to drive the 
safest outcomes possible so we never have to and try to work to 
reduce any mishaps in the future. Thank you.
    As a Department, it is our solemn duty to protect our 
greatest resource: our people. We continuously underscore the 
importance of safety at every level in the Department, from our 
newest recruit to our most senior commander, to ensure an 
environment where safety and risk management remain a core 
value ingrained as an essential and integrated part of our 
operations. The Department continues to proactively promote a 
culture of safety where there is a shared commitment, emphasis, 
and urgency placed on deliberate communications, consistent 
resourcing, and elevated ownership of risk decisions.
    I am in the position of performing the duties of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Readiness in the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. One of my 
office's primary responsibilities is in establishing and 
overseeing safety policies, plans, and programs to support all 
the Department's components in managing risk and preventing 
accidents and injuries to our military and civilian personnel.
    We execute our safety mission through the Defense Safety 
Oversight Council, which is the Department's senior safety 
forum that provides governance on Department-wide safety 
efforts and addresses the most significant challenges facing 
the safety and health of our people. The Defense Safety 
Oversight Council brings together senior leaders from across 
the Department to elevate safety decisions and guide our 
comprehensive and crosscutting efforts to drive behavioral 
change, review safety trends, improve awareness, share lessons 
learned, and confirm priorities, ensuring we are taking 
deliberate actions to reduce safety risk, enhance readiness, 
and protect our most valuable resource: our people.
    The Defense Safety Oversight Council reports to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, who receives regular updates on safety 
and occupational health through the Deputy's Workforce Council. 
The Joint Safety Council is a key component of our departmental 
safety governance structure and it serves an essential 
institutional role in developing a common understanding of 
operational mishaps involving joint programs. It is also a key 
venue for collaborating to synchronize communications and share 
mishap lessons learned and best practices for mitigating risk.
    From the moment the most recent Osprey mishap occurred, the 
Department's senior safety leaders, in partnership with the 
Defense Safety Oversight Council, the Joint Safety Council, and 
the military departments, were actively collaborating on all 
aspects of the V-22's return to flight. The Department will 
continue to collectively leverage our robust safety governance 
processes to maximize our collaborative approach for improving 
safety-focused outcomes. As a Department, we are working 
relentlessly and prioritizing solutions that minimize risks and 
other hazards to the well-being of our service members by 
understanding causal mishap factors, identifying mitigations, 
addressing exposures, strengthening policy, and incorporating 
actions to prevent both on and off-duty accidents.
    The Department is committed to instituting an effective and 
enduring Department-wide culture of safety that yields safer 
workplaces, fewer mishaps, enhanced readiness, and that 
supports one of Secretary Austin's keen priorities, taking care 
of people. The Defense Safety Oversight Council and the Joint 
Safety Council are essential to our collaborative mishap 
reduction efforts to proactively identify trends and 
indicators, share best practice and lessons learned, and 
mitigate risks to ensure the safest possible operational 
training environments for our service members. We will continue 
to advocate for enhanced synergy, emphasis, and urgency on 
delivered communications, consistent resourcing, and elevated 
ownership of the risk decisions to preserve operational 
capabilities and protect our most vital assets, the service 
members, who defend our Nation and the civilian employees who 
support them.
    We appreciate the opportunity to share with you how 
seriously we take our safety oversight responsibilities and how 
we are consistently and proactively striving to detect and 
mitigate risks before mishaps occur. Thank you for your 
continued support, and we look forward to your questions.
    Mr. Grothman. Admiral Chebi?

                  STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CARL CHEBI

                               COMMANDER

                     U.S. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND

                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Chebi. Chairman Grothman, Ranking Member Garcia, and 
distinguished members of the House Committee on Oversight and 
Accountability, Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, 
and Foreign Affairs, thank you for the opportunity to address 
the status of the V-22 Osprey Program with you today. I am Vice 
Admiral Carl Chebi, and I currently serve as the commander of 
Naval Air Systems Command, a position I have held since 
September 2021. With me today to my left is Mr. Gary Kurtz, the 
Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, 
Assault, and Special Mission Programs. The V-22 Program is part 
of his portfolio, and he, along with the V-22 Program Manager, 
are responsible for the overall acquisition lifecycle and risk 
management of the V-22 Program.
    I, along with my team, am responsible for the development, 
integration, testing, fielding, and sustaining of naval 
aviation capabilities. Our focus is ensuring we deliver the 
warfighting capability that the fleet, that our sons and 
daughters need to execute their missions successfully and 
return home safely. This has been and continues to be our North 
Star for myself as the NAVAIR Commander, along with my 
teammates, Vice Admiral Dan Cheever, the Commander of Naval Air 
Forces; Lieutenant General Bradford Gering, the Deputy 
Commandant for Marine Aviation; and Lieutenant General Tony 
Bauernfeind, the Air Force Special Operations Commander.
    Currently at NAVAIR, I have oversight of just over 4,000 
aircraft across 40 different types. This includes the V-22 
Program, which today operates as a joint program of 434 
aircraft across the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air 
Force, and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. I am committed 
to ensuring the safety of the V-22 to perform its mission, just 
like the 40 other aircraft types that I am responsible for. As 
the Commander of NAVAIR, I serve as the airworthiness authority 
for naval aviation, somewhat akin to the role of FAA in a 
commercial parallel. I am responsible for implementing and 
maintaining the technical standards required to establish and 
maintain safe flight operations. If cases arise in which we can 
no longer maintain that standard, I will take the appropriate 
action, including grounding of aircraft until deemed safe for 
flight.
    Since I arrived at NAVAIR in September 2021, we have 
grounded the F-18, the F-35, the T-45, the V-22, the P-3, and 
the H-53 aircraft due to safety concerns. The decision to 
ground these aircraft were not made lightly due to operational 
impacts. Our ability and responsibility to ensure continued 
safe flight operations is at the forefront of every decision we 
make.
    Naval aviation is an inherently dangerous profession. Our 
objective is to provide aircraft that are safe to execute their 
mission while proactively managing every platform so as to 
prevent mishaps from ever occurring. Throughout the life of a 
program, we continuously assess program risks based on 
engineering and test data, quality reports, manufacturing data, 
fleet feedback, and mishap investigations. This process of 
reviewing our risks is continuous and considers manning, 
training, and equipment aspects of safety across the spectrum 
of how our platforms are designed, built, operated, and 
maintained.
    In the event that a mishap does occur, which can range from 
a relatively minor ground incident to a catastrophic loss of 
life or aircraft, a safety investigation board is established 
to investigate the mishap, determine the root cause, and make 
recommendations to prevent future incidents. The safety board 
is comprised of experts across all required technical 
competencies so that we reach a full understanding of what 
happened, how it happened, and what we can do to prevent the 
event from ever occurring again.
    In the past 2 1/2 years, we have experienced four mishaps 
with the V-22 Program that have resulted in a loss of 20 of our 
service members and four aircraft. This has the full attention 
and support of USN, USMC, and U.S. Air Force leadership. I 
would like to take a couple minutes to walk you through what we 
have done to address this issue with a clear understanding 
there is still much work to be done. While I will address the 
most recent mishap, this same process is used for every mishap 
for all of our platforms.
    On 29 November 2023, a CV-22 was involved in a crash that 
resulted in a loss of eight airmen and the aircraft. As a 
result, the AFSOC Commander immediately established a safety 
investigation board to investigate the mishap that included 
experts from the Navy, the Air Force, and industry. On 6 
December 2023, data was presented to myself that indicated that 
the platform had experienced a catastrophic material failure 
that we have never seen before in the V-22 Program. Based on 
that data, I made the decision to ground all V-22s until we 
understood the failure mode and we could safely return the 
aircraft to flight.
    Over the next couple months, service aviation leadership 
engaged with the Safety Board presidents to review the mishap 
investigation findings. The Safety Board was able to determine 
the sequence of events that occurred and we are confident we 
know the material root cause of the November mishap. Based on 
the Safety Board's findings, service aviation leadership 
developed a path to allow for a return to restricted flight 
operations through implementation of specific controls.
    On March 8, 2024, the V-22 was returned to a flying status 
and has safely flown over 7,000 hours since then. Today, we are 
methodically looking at material and nonmaterial changes that 
we can make to allow for a full mission set without controls in 
place. I will not certify the V-22 to return to unrestricted 
flight operations until I am satisfied that we have 
sufficiently addressed the issues that may affect the safety of 
the aircraft. Based on the data that I have today, I am 
expecting that this will not occur before mid-2025.
    In parallel, I have launched a comprehensive review of the 
V-22 Program. This effort is ongoing and will ensure we are 
holistically looking at all aspects of the program across 
manning, training and equipment, and proactively identifying 
additional actions outside of mishap reviews that enable safe, 
reliable, and affordable flight operations. As we have findings 
from the comprehensive review, I will take the necessary 
actions to ensure continued safe flight operations. This is an 
ongoing process, and my expectation is the full comprehensive 
review will take another 6 to 9 months.
    The NAVAIR and V-22 joint program teams are committed to 
ensuring the safety, reliability, and operational effectiveness 
of these critical platforms. By the ongoing comprehensive 
review of the V-22 Program, we will continue to pursue safety 
improvements where needed. As a NAVAIR commander, I have a 
vested interest in the safety of this platform and all aircraft 
for which I am responsible, and I will not certify an aircraft 
to perform a mission unless confident in the ability of that 
aircraft to do so safely. Thank you. Both Mr. Kurtz and myself 
look forward to answering any of your questions.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Kurtz, it is my understanding 
you do not have an opening statement, but I would like to give 
you the opportunity to make any opening remarks you want to.

                        STATEMENT OF GARY KURTZ

                       PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER

                     AIR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND

                       SPECIAL MISSIONS PROGRAMS

                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. 
Chairman, and as well, Ranking Member Garcia. It is truly my 
honor to be here today to testify. I associate my comments with 
Vice Admiral Chebi as a joint statement, and I look forward to 
your comments today.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Fallon, we will go a little bit out 
of order today.
    Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, very 
gracious of you to do so.
    In this room today, it looks like we have some Gold Star 
families and your presence here is recognized, and I am deeply 
sorry for your loss. I am a member of the Armed Services 
Committee and also a veteran myself, and I think it is 
incumbent upon us as Members of Congress to do everything we 
can to ensure that the military maintains the highest degrees 
and focus and prioritizes safety. Everybody says they do, but 
sometimes it is words, and we need actions to back that up.
    I have had a fight with one of the branches on rollovers 
with Humvees and we are losing military members. And we have 
authorized the money, we have appropriated the money, and then 
we have to take them kicking and screaming to actually spend 
the money on safety, so I am very acutely sensitive to what we 
are talking about here. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding 
this hearing.
    Equipment sometimes fails, and it is oftentimes when 
equipment fails, tragedy is the result. As an Air Force 
veteran, I recall the T-37, which was a trainer they used to 
use, and it had an incredible safety record. I think when I was 
in the service, it was like 30 years plus where there had been 
no fatalities because of it, and that is a standard that needs 
to be followed so it is possible to operate equipment that goes 
very fast and do it in a safe manner.
    Admiral, has the DOD been actively using information from 
the safety investigations in the Osprey crashes to determine 
modifications to improve the system?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. As I mentioned 
in my statement, we use data continuously through the life of a 
program to identify the risks that are for that platform, more 
importantly, to make sure we identify the controls and the 
mitigations that we can put in place to minimize or to 
eliminate that risk from ever occurring with the aircraft. So, 
yes, we use all sources of information, including the safety 
investigations, to determine the root cause and to address the 
root cause through mitigations and controls.
    Mr. Fallon. Two questions, Admiral. The first one is, have 
you collected data on whether or not these failures have 
increased or decreased since these modifications have been 
made, and second question is, will you commit to providing this 
data to the committee if it exists?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, can you clarify your first question? I just 
want to make sure I answer it correctly.
    Mr. Fallon. Sure. Have you collected data on whether the 
Osprey failures have increased or decreased since the 
modifications have been made, and if there is data that you 
have collected, will you share it with the committee?
    Mr. Chebi. OK. Since the modifications have been made, I 
just want to make sure I am addressing yours.
    Mr. Fallon. OK.
    Mr. Chebi. So, we take all the information on. If there are 
repeat issues that are causing risk to our platform or to our 
aircrew, we take the appropriate actions to put the controls in 
place to minimize or to remove that risk from the platform.
    Mr. Fallon. But there is no data? I am talking about just 
simply measures. You take actions, but we want to make sure 
those actions are effective, and I apologize because I only 
have a limited amount of time here. Admiral, how many deaths 
have occurred from accidents on the Osprey?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will answer it in two different ways. 
Since I have been in the seat in the last 2 1/2 years, we have 
lost four aircraft and 20 of our service members. Many of the 
service members' families are right behind me right now.
    Mr. Fallon. Do you know the total number?
    Mr. Chebi. The total number of the platform before it was 
IOC and after IOC, the total number that I am tracking is 64 
service members.
    Mr. Fallon. OK. And then I am guessing injuries as well. 
Have people survived these crashes?
    Mr. Chebi. The total number of fatalities that I am 
tracking is 64 fatalities total and 93 injuries.
    Mr. Fallon. OK. I have one more question. The hard clutch 
engagement, which apparently is a fleetwide program that we 
have known about for years, the pilot shifts the gears and the 
clutch engages. And sometimes when this happens in this HCE, it 
causes complete loss of control in the aircraft, and apparently 
there is nothing the pilot can do about it. And on June 8th of 
2022, Gold Star families were told that this was modified and 
this risk was limited, 99 percent chance that this would not 
happen. Where does that number come from, Admiral?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for the question. For hard 
clutches, you know, through the life of the program, we have 
had 19 hard clutch events. In 2022, we had a sharp increase in 
the number of hard clutches. Based on the data that I had at 
that time, the first control that we put in place was we 
modified our air crew procedures, so that they would be in a 
safe environment should a hard clutch event did occur. 
Subsequent to that, there was additional hard clutch events, 
and we received data back from the Glamis mishap that indicated 
that the controls that we had in place were insufficient.
    The team executed a statistical analysis on all the mishaps 
that did occur with hard clutches and determined that the 
failure mode that we have seen, even though we have never been 
able to repeat the failure in test, the failure mode that we 
are seeing is called a wear-out mode. Over time, the clutch 
wears out and has a higher susceptibility to slipping, which 
will cause a hard clutch event. Based on that data, in March 
2023, I grounded the fleet and mandated that all aircraft will 
remove clutches that have over 800 hours. That has been 
completed, and we have flown numerous hours since then without 
a hard clutch event.
    I want to make this point clear though. That has not 
eliminated the risk, and I will let the PEO kind of talk about 
this. We are currently in testing of a follow-on design for the 
clutch not only to minimize the exposure, but to eliminate this 
risk from occurring again. I will let Mr. Kurtz kind of take 
over from there.
    Mr. Fallon. So, there has never been an HCE prior to the 
800 hours?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, there have been no hard clutch events since 
we implemented the 800-hour time limit on the input cool 
assemblies.
    Mr. Fallon. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to 
our witnesses. Admiral, just to make sure that we are on the 
same page, what is a Class A accident, and what is the current 
Marines' Class A accident rate per 100,000 flight hours?
    Mr. Chebi. A Class A mishap is determined loss of aircraft, 
loss of life, or a certain dollar amount to repair the aircraft 
is how it is defined. I do not have the dollar amount in front 
of me, but I can get that back to you.
    Mr. Garcia. And what is the accident rate per 100,000 
flight hours?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I just want to make sure that I am 
answering your specific question. For the V-22 for Marine 
Corps? For the overall aviation for Marine Corps? Which one 
would you like?
    Mr. Garcia. For the V-22.
    Mr. Chebi. The V-22 overall mishap rate across all three 
services is 4.1 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. For the U.S. 
Marine Corps, it is 3.29 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.
    Mr. Garcia. And if you separate the current Marines' Class 
A accident rate and the current Air Force Class A accident rate 
per 100,000 flight hours, including the November 2023 crash, 
there is a difference. Is that correct?
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. There is a difference between the 
Class A mishap rate between the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. 
Air Force.
    Mr. Garcia. And do you get a sense of why there is a 
discrepancy there or why that exists?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, when we do mishap investigations, we look 
at all aspects across manning, training, and equipment to 
identify the root cause and put the corrective actions in place 
to minimize or to eliminate that risk from ever occurring 
again. With the specifics on why the U.S. Air Force V-22 mishap 
rate is higher than the U.S. Marine Corps, I think that is a 
question the U.S. Air Force needs to take on.
    Mr. Garcia. Well, I just want to note, I think this is an 
important discrepancy, and I think it is one that should be 
investigated and discussed more openly. And there is clearly a 
difference in discrepancy between both the Air Force and the 
Marines, and so I understand. I appreciate your answer. But 
just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I think that that is 
something that needs to be addressed, and certainly I think I 
look forward to more answers on. Thank you for that.
    Admiral, is there any reason to believe tiltrotor 
technology is any less safe than traditional fixed-wing or 
rotor aircraft?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. I will answer 
it from my capacity as airworthiness. More safe or less safe, 
my objective is to do an analysis of the data throughout the 
entire lifecycle of a program to make it as safe as you 
possibly can. So, whether or not one is more or less safe, it 
is interesting, but what I am focused on is increasing the 
safety posture across all of our platforms and eliminate 
mishaps to the max extent possible by proactively managing each 
one of our aircraft.
    Mr. Garcia. I appreciate that, and obviously, I am not an 
expert on the aircraft safety, but certainly I slightly maybe 
have a different perspective. I think that if there is a 
difference and something is more safe or less, if I actually 
think that matters, it should be taken into consideration as we 
are making these assessments.
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garcia. Admiral, are you confident that the current 
restrictions on aircraft operations are adequate?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. Yes. It was a 
very deliberate, methodical, data-driven process that we went 
through. We fully vetted. We understood exactly what occurred 
on the most recent mishap. We fully vetted the controls that we 
put in place. I went and personally briefed all the Air Force, 
the Navy, as well as the Japanese crews so they had a full 
understanding of what happened in this mishap. We need to build 
trust with the air crews, and the Marine Corps did that on 
their side as well. I am confident that the controls that are 
put in place, based on the data I have today, allow for return 
to flight in a restricted flight envelope only.
    Mr. Garcia. OK, and I am just going back. Are you, like 
myself, concerned about the difference between the Air Force 
and the Marine discrepancy that exists? Is that a concern?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I have had direct conversations with the 
AFSOC commander, Lieutenant General Bauernfeind. He is 
addressing the issue and the discrepancy between the mishap 
rates between his V-22 fleet and the other V-22 fleets. From my 
perspective, I am trying to lower the overall V-22 mishap rate 
holistically.
    Mr. Garcia. OK. Thank you. Do you think that as it relates 
to the timeline for redesigning, testing, and deploying the new 
gearboxes, and to replace the current clutch system, how would 
you describe that process and where are we at?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will start and I will hand it over to Mr. 
Kurtz to kind of followup. I mentioned the hard clutch. I 
mentioned the controls that we put in place to remove them at a 
certain time limit to minimize the exposure of that risk. We 
modified procedures as well from the air crew perspective to 
give them good procedures to execute should that incident occur 
again, but we have not eliminated that risk. We will not 
eliminate that risk until we have a redesigned clutch. That is 
in testing right now, and I am pushing, from my seat as the 
airworthiness, the safety advocate, to get that out to the 
fleet as soon as we possibly can. I will hand it over to Mr. 
Kurtz.
    Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. Just to followup on Vice Admiral 
Chebi's comments, we have understood through cause analysis 
that has allowed us to move forward very aggressively with a 
new design to that clutch. That clutch testing is expected to 
start in the next couple of months, and we anticipate that we 
will have a new design clutch fielding in the mid-2025 
timeframe.
    Mr. Garcia. OK. And then I have other questions, but just 
to conclude, I know my time has run out. Admiral, I know that 
sometimes certain upgrades to craft and to mechanical concerns, 
oftentimes decisions are made about when to make an upgrade to 
a certain craft depending on when we are using certain aircraft 
in certain missions, and obviously safety is always, I know, a 
priority. But frequency of use, pace of use, I think, also 
obviously sometimes has an impact on certain types of 
equipment, vehicles that we may use. And I know that we try to 
be as selective as possible in prioritizing safety and what is 
used.
    But do you have any reason to believe that mechanical, when 
we have tried to upgrade the V-22, or frequency of use has had 
or could possibly be any of the factors that have led to some 
of the concerns that we share about the V-22 and some of the 
accidents that we have seen?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I want to make sure I clearly understand 
your question. Can you just state that one more time? I just 
want to make sure.
    Mr. Garcia. Sure. Let me be more clear. Oftentimes we make 
decisions when we are going to actually make mechanical 
improvements to vehicle or to aircraft dependent on frequency 
of use. Do you think that that issue or those issues could have 
anything to do with any of the accidents or the concerns that 
we share about the V-22?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. Based on the 
data I have today, I would say, no, that has not been a causal 
factor. A key point of the comprehensive review that we are 
executing today is to holistically look across manning, 
training, equipment across all aspects of the program to ensure 
continued safe outcomes for the V-22 platform. That is going to 
take another 6 to 9 months to finish up. That will be very 
thorough, holistic, and it is a proactive measure we are going 
after to implement the necessary controls across manning, 
training, equipment to ensure continued safe flight operations 
of the V-22 Program.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, sir, and I appreciate the chairman 
for the extra time.
    Mr. Grothman. Sure. OK. I am going to call on myself.
    To ensure we are getting fair, accurate, and transparent 
answers from each of you, I am starting off with a simple 
``yes'' or ``no'' question. Has anyone within the Federal 
Government or outside the Federal Government told you not to 
discuss any topic related to the Osprey Program that may come 
up today?
    Mr. Belk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Mr. Chebi. No.
    Mr. Kurtz. No, sir.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Good. Now we are looking forward to 
having this hearing being open and honest discussion.
    Admiral Chebi, can you please explain why Class A aircraft 
mishaps are or what Class A aircraft mishaps are and what 
criteria is involved in determining if an aircraft crash 
qualifies as a Class A mishap?
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. At a high level, a Class A mishap is 
loss of aircraft, loss of life, and there is a certain dollar 
threshold from a damage perspective. I do not have that number. 
I can take that one for the record.
    Mr. Grothman. OK.
    Mr. Grothman. You have testified that there are many more 
mishaps in the Marines, in the Navy, in the Air Force, correct?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I have testified? I am sorry. I just want 
to make sure.
    Mr. Grothman. There have been many more mishaps, you know, 
per whatever, per hours flown in the Marines, in the Navy, or 
in the Air Force, correct?
    Mr. Chebi. Sorry. I just want to clarify I am answering 
your question. Are you asking if we had mishaps across the 
Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force in the V-22?
    Mr. Grothman. You have. You have, correct?
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We have had Class A's 
through D's across the different services with the V-22 
Program.
    Mr. Grothman. Right, and many more in the Marines 
expectation than in the Navy, correct?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I would not characterize as many more. The 
reason we establish a mishap rate, it is per 100,000 flying 
hours.
    Mr. Grothman. Right.
    Mr. Chebi. Marines have many more aircraft, have flown many 
more hours than the Navy has so far. So, I would caution us all 
to make sure we are having apples to apples comparison, and 
that is why we try to normalize it per 100,000 flight hours.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. I would like to enter into record an 
email committee staff received from DOD personnel.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Grothman. The email says, ``As for the command 
investigations, not all Class A mishaps have command 
investigations. Over the past 5 years, there have been two 
command investigations related to a V-22 Class A mishap.'' 
Admiral Chebi, can you explain what a command investigation is?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, if you will allow, I would like to get Mr. 
Belk to kind of answer this question.
    Mr. Grothman. OK.
    Mr. Belk. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. So, a 
command investigation is unduly undertaken in different ways by 
the different military departments, largely to get after a set 
of facts and potentially determine what, if any, additional 
actions need to be taken at that point, whether that has to do 
with matters of accountability or matters of remedy, given a 
particular set of circumstances.
    Mr. Grothman. I am going to jump in here. I am trying to 
understand how the Department can accurately determine issues 
with the Osprey aircraft maintenance or personnel that may have 
caused a mishap if there is not an investigation done with 
every single Class A mishap. Why is an investigation not done 
every time?
    Mr. Chebi. Let me jump in there. So, with that question, 
for every Class A mishap, there is a safety investigation board 
that is conducted where we have full, unfettered access to all 
the data so we can holistically look at the program, what 
caused this issue, and, more importantly, what controls can we 
put in place to minimize or eliminate this risk from ever 
occurring again in the future here. Every Class A has a mishap 
investigation.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Now, you have command investigations and 
safety investigations. Can you give us an example of something 
that would be included in a safety investigation, not included 
in a command investigation?
    Mr. Chebi. Can I give an example of something that would be 
included in a safety investigation or not?
    Mr. Grothman. Right.
    Mr. Chebi. It would be privileged data, so it would be an 
analysis. It would be potentially some statements from 
witnesses. Those would be a couple of examples of things that 
would not be in a command investigation----
    Mr. Grothman. OK.
    Mr. Chebi [continuing]. But that we want access to during 
the safety investigation because we need to understand.
    Mr. Grothman. Right.
    Mr. Chebi. OK.
    Mr. Grothman. There is more stuff available in a safety 
investigation, right?
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Grothman. And they are not publicly made available, 
correct?
    Mr. Chebi. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. This is for Mr. Belk. As you know, the 
Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd 
Austin, in December asking for documents and information 
related to all mishap investigations. To date, the Department 
has refused to share the safety investigations with this 
Committee despite numerous offers to review the safety 
investigations in a sanitized manner or in camera as an 
accommodation. Why has the Department refused to provide access 
to these reports?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, thank you for your question. So, the 
Department remains committed to being transparent in sharing 
information related to any of these mishaps, and we do so 
largely at the conclusion of our command investigations, which 
we do provide to the Congress upon request and on 
circumstances.
    With respect to safety investigations, safety 
investigations are designed to maximize the fullest 
transparency possible with those who are participating in the 
investigation so we can maximize our opportunity to understand 
what went right and what went wrong, and how to take remedial 
access to and understanding of those actions by providing those 
participants safety privilege. The content of those safety 
investigations relevant to how to get after the solution to a 
particular mishap event are then informed or provided to 
command investigations and then be able to be acted upon, which 
we then would be in a position to be shared with this 
committee.
    Mr. Grothman. We will come back to that later. I am just 
going to ask one more question. Mr. Chebi, I am curious about 
the rate of Osprey mishaps compared to other aircraft, and I am 
saying just mishaps non-combat related. Are the mishaps of the 
Osprey higher or lower than other military air platforms, 
noncombat?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, we had this discussion yesterday about 
combat versus noncombat. Most of our mishaps occur in noncombat 
mission sets. We train like we fight, and so we train in very 
realistic environments. We want our air crew to train in that 
environment, and so, there is a higher likelihood that we are 
going to have a mishap in a training accident than we are in a 
combat mission.
    With regards to your specific question, the overall mishap 
rate across all the systems, all the platforms of the V-22 is 
4.1. The Marine Corps is slightly higher than their overall 
mishap rate, the Air Force is higher than their mishap rate, 
and the U.S. Navy right now is slightly lower than their mishap 
rate across the other platforms. Again, I just want to 
reiterate----
    Mr. Grothman. I am not getting the answer I want, but we 
are well over my time.
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Grothman. I will go to Mr. Frost.
    Mr. Frost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The V-22 Osprey, like 
all military aircraft, is only as good as it is safe. If 
maintenance issues or, even worse, significant mechanical 
failures endanger the life of our service members, then the 
United States military cannot rely on the Osprey's unique 
capabilities, no matter how unique those capabilities may be. 
In the last 2 years, the V-22s have been involved in four major 
fatal accidents, which have resulted in the deaths of 20 
service members just in the last year. These are catastrophes 
where American service members lost their lives, and it is not 
just a problem with the Osprey. In military aircraft across the 
board, safety and readiness metrics are dropping.
    So far this year, Army aircraft have experienced twice the 
rate of major incidents than any year in the last decade. Air 
Force major incidents hit a 5-year high in the Fiscal Year 
2023, despite us continuing to raise our defense budget almost 
nearing a trillion dollars than the one we are currently 
debating. Mr. Belk, can you explain the reasons underlying this 
troubling trend?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, thank you for your question. With 
respect to some of the specific data you have shared, what I 
would like to do is come back with some additional context and 
response that we can get after some of the more specifics.
    Mr. Belk. Generally speaking, what I would say is that as 
the force continues to transform and shift in the types of 
training and operations that it is doing to mitigate and 
address new and emerging threat contexts, this is placing 
additional stress on the force. Whether or not this translates 
into additional mishaps or not, we are still looking at very 
closely, but we are monitoring that very closely to ensure that 
as we continue to transform as a force, we understand how we do 
so as we operate and train in the safest manner possible.
    Mr. Frost. Recent data suggests that the military is 
relying on aircraft that are not meeting readiness goals. In 
2022, the GAO released a report that studied readiness among 49 
different aircrafts over the span of a decade. GAO found that 
only one of those aircrafts--one--met their mission readiness 
goals every year, and only four met their readiness goals a 
majority of the years studied, and 26 of those aircraft did not 
meet readiness goals in a single year between 2011 and 2001. 
This trend is both alarming and unacceptable. I understand that 
the V-22 has now been approved to return to limited operation, 
despite there being no clear conclusion of the investigation of 
the most recent crash.
    So, Mr. Belk, what did the DOD learn about the accident and 
its return to flight assessment, and how exactly does that 
differ from the initial crash investigation?
    Mr. Belk. So, Congressman, if I understand the question 
correctly, we learned, and I would say when I say ``we,'' we in 
OSD, we with the military departments, learned rather 
contemporaneously about the incident that we are talking about 
in November. In terms of the approach, we take a, and I will 
defer to Admiral Chebi to speak to some of the specifics on how 
we conduct upon notification of a mishap at a military 
department or service level.
    What I would say is that, from my perspective, we approach 
this particular incident with the same level of rigor and care 
and consideration in terms of how to get after the fundamental 
understanding of the events that transpired and led to the 
incident; and then the mitigation steps that need to be taken 
as we learn information to ensure the continued safest 
environment, operating environment and training environment, 
for our service members; and then what, if any, steps to 
include the stand-down that Admiral Chebi alluded to, to 
continue the safest environment possible.
    Mr. Frost. Lieutenant Colonel Eric Cranford, the squadron 
commander where the most recent crash occurred, stated, ``We 
are looking at 750,000 flight hours of history making data-
driven decisions,'' and so, what we are looking for is more 
transparency in terms of this data. We want to know what you 
all are finding out from it because transparency equals 
heightened scrutiny, and we need the heightened scrutiny right 
now as we have lost 20 service members in 1 year. So, Mr. Belk, 
your job is to ensure the readiness of the total force. So, 
where does the fault lie for the mission readiness failures 
that GAO identified, and will you take responsibility for 
addressing them?
    Mr. Belk. So, Congressman, I can assure you that the 
Department, at every echelon and every level, takes very 
seriously matters of accountability upon understanding the 
facts and circumstances around a particular event and then 
what, if any, steps need to be taken to either hold 
organizations or individuals accountable for errors or actions 
that need to be held accountable for. So, upon understanding 
those circumstances and learning those events, you have my 
commitment that we will continue to do those things that need 
to ensure that accountability is meted out and addressed upon 
learning about the specifics in these instances.
    I think also, as Admiral Chebi alluded to, some of these 
investigations remain open. But what I can assure you is, as 
those close out, we will be in a position to maximize the 
amount of transparency about the information that we learn from 
those investigations to this committee and elsewhere within the 
Congress. Thank you.
    Mr. Frost. Thank you, because the GAO report that found 
that 26 different military aircraft did not meet the readiness 
goals in any of the years that they were studied is of cause of 
great concern. We do not want to be in the same place a few 
years from now with a different aircraft with 20 new service 
members who lost their lives during a training mission. Thank 
you so much, and I yield back.
    Mr. Grothman. Mr. Biggs?
    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this 
committee, and I acknowledge Gold Star families who are here 
today. Thank you for being here. I appreciate you, and I am 
sorry that this is what brings us together. With witnesses, 
this is just a little thing. You do not need to thank me for 
every question. I do not think you mean it, and I think it is 
obsequious, so let us not play that game. So, let us just get 
right to it.
    Mr. Belk, GAO, and I am going to dovetail what Mr. Frost 
said just a second ago, reported in 2022 that only 52 percent 
of Marine V-22s are ready to fly. Fifty-two percent. Why were 
only half of Marine Ospreys mission capable?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, I would defer that question to 
Admiral Chebi, who I believe will have more specific details to 
share.
    Mr. Biggs. Admiral?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, for the readiness of all the platforms 
under NAVAIR, a couple of years ago we started a journey, and 
we started it with the F-18.
    Mr. Biggs. So, we are talking about the Osprey. We are 
talking about 2022. I do not need a long, drawn-out history. We 
only have 5 minutes. Please make your answer brief, concise, 
but accurate.
    Mr. Chebi. There are manning and training aspects and 
readiness aspects with the V-22 that keep the readiness levels 
where it is at the 50 percent that you quoted. There are 
actions in place today, and we are leveraging the learning we 
have had from all of our other platforms to increase the 
readiness levels across all of the type model service across 
naval aviation. We are on a good path. We will get there with 
V-22.
    Mr. Biggs. Mr. Belk, how often has the V-22 been grounded?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, I would defer again to Admiral 
Chebi.
    Mr. Biggs. Admiral?
    Mr. Chebi. Sure. In the last 2 1/2 years I have been here, 
I have grounded the V-22, from my recollection, at least 2 
times. I am sorry, 3 times.
    Mr. Biggs. Three times. For how long? What is the extent to 
the period of being grounded?
    Mr. Chebi. Groundings can go from a day to what happened 
after the November 2023 incident where it was 3 to 4 months 
that they were grounded.
    Mr. Biggs. So, what is the total of the last 2 1/2 years, 3 
times grounded, how long? Four months? Five months?
    Mr. Chebi. Four to five months, yes, sir.
    Mr. Biggs. And you were talking about the safety 
investigation, Mr. Belk and Admiral, that the Chairman was 
asking about. And I did not hear a commitment that you would 
give us access to the safety investigation results, Mr. Belk, 
and I would like to know if you will commit to give that access 
to members of this committee.
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, it remains important to protect the 
safety privilege for those who participate in those safety 
investigations, to protect those investigations and ensure that 
the members who participate in them have the maximum amount of 
opportunity to know that the information that they provide in 
those safety investigations will remain confidential and not 
for further disclosure.
    Mr. Biggs. So, you are telling us you are not going to 
allow members of this committee to have access to the results?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, we will continue to maximize the 
fullest transparency possible on the information contained in 
those investigations.
    Mr. Biggs. So, here is the deal. You do not want to give us 
full transparency. You are going to give us whatever you 
managed transparency, but you want the money from the taxpayer 
to pay for this. You understand that that is ironic, and I do 
not mean to be disrespectful, but that is disrespectful to this 
body. It is our obligation to oversee. That is why you are 
here, and you do not want to give us full access.
    I get it. You think somebody up here is going to leak, but 
the bottom line is you need to be held accountable. We need to 
see because we need to know what is going to happen next with 
the program because we are concerned about mission capability. 
We are concerned about the men and women, the personnel who 
operate, maintain, work on these aircraft. And so, when you 
tell us within range we will let you see some of it, it is 
disrespectful, and it makes me wonder how we are going to get 
the information, how will we make the policies that we need to 
make.
    Admiral, when is the last time a comprehensive review was 
done across this platform?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am not aware of a previous comprehensive 
review on the V-22 Program.
    Mr. Biggs. And is that normal not to do a comprehensive 
review?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, this is the first comprehensive review that 
I have initiated since my 2 years at NAVAIR. Again, the purpose 
and intent is to improve our outcomes across safety, 
affordability, and availability of this platform by 
holistically looking and proactively looking at all aspects of 
the program across manning, training, and equipment, so we can 
improve the outcomes there.
    Mr. Biggs. So, it has never been done before and you are 
doing it now. We understand why you are doing it now because 
there is some apparent real problems. Mr. Belk, can you provide 
us with a breakdown of the $134.5--billion lifecycle cost of 
the V-22 Program?
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, I cannot, but I would be more than 
happy to take that back and get you the answer.
    Mr. Biggs. I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Biggs. I actually have additional questions. My time 
has long expired, but I would, again, Mr. Belk, urge you all to 
give us access to the safety investigations. I think it is 
important for us to be able to make policy that way, and with 
that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Lynch?
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 
witnesses for being here to help the committee with its work. I 
especially want to thank the Gold Star families who are in the 
audience here today. It is really, really important that you 
are here. I hope you realize that it is not only a 
demonstration of loyalty and love for your loved ones, but it 
is also important to others who serve and who may be put in an 
equally risky situation as your loved ones. So, I thank you 
doubly for you being here today.
    Just to make sure we all understand, in March 2022, a 
Marine Corps V-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor 
Squadron 261 crashed during a training flight in Norway, 
killing four Marines. In June 2022, five U.S. Marines from Camp 
Pendleton were killed during a routine flight operation in 
California. In August 2023, three marines from Marine 
Rotational Force Darwin, a force that I traveled to Darwin, 
Australia, and met with them, they were killed in an Osprey 
crash in Australia. And in November 2023, a U.S. Air Force 
Osprey carrying eight airmen assigned to Yokota Air Base in 
Kadena Air Base crashed off the southern coast of Japan during 
a routine training mission, killing all eight service members 
on board.
    Look, I understand the value of this aircraft. I understand 
especially the many CODELs I have done to Africa, the ability 
to what the few landing areas where we have there, few 
airfields that we have here, the ability for a rotor landing, I 
understand that, and the need to move personnel quickly, but 
this repeated drumbeat of fatalities is totally unacceptable.
    And look, the lives of our young men and women that are 
perishing on this aircraft have long passed the level of which 
a comprehensive review should have been instituted. I am 
embarrassed. I am embarrassed as a member of this committee 
that this is the first comprehensive review we have done, given 
the fact that since the year 2000, we have had 54 U.S. service 
members killed and many, many more injured because of the 
structural deficiencies in this aircraft.
    Mr. Kurtz, you mentioned earlier that we have a rework 
being done on the clutch--I think it is the sprag clutch on 
this aircraft--and that it might be ready for deployment by 
mid-2025. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. I said mid-2025, somewhere between the 
mid period of 2025 and the third quarter of that fiscal year. 
Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lynch. Admiral Chebi, let us think about this entire 
program. What do you think the consequences are going to be if 
we have a V-22 go down and we lose more brave Marines or our 
airmen between now and the time when Mr. Kurtz indicates that 
we might have this clutch situation figured out and deployed? 
Your whole program is done. It is done. If another Osprey goes 
down, we are done. This program is done. So, why do we not 
ground this now, do not allow any other brave marine or airmen 
to go down in one of these aircraft? Ground them now. We will 
bite the bullet for the next year or so until we get this 
clutch figured out, but we have already had too much carnage. 
We have already lost too many good men and women that they have 
joined for all the right reasons to serve their country and 
then we have failed them by not providing them with safe 
aircraft. I do not believe this aircraft is safe.
    Nothing you have told me today leads me to believe that. I 
think it is still very iffy situation. I think you have 
conceded that fact, so it is crazy to put more of our young men 
and women at risk. And I am asking you to ground this aircraft 
until we get the clutch figured out, and we will find 
alternative measures to service the needs that we have that 
this aircraft was serving.
    So, I know my time has expired. I will yield back. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Sessions?
    Mr. Sessions. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 
I want to thank you for having not only this hearing, but our 
colleagues that are engaging, I think, properly and 
professionally in this manner.
    Some conversation today has found itself where we are 
talking about this aircraft, presumptuously one could draw a 
conclusion it is dangerous. I think it is a 10-year average 
because we went back to 1992 a few minutes ago. If we just go 
back 10 years now, the 10-year average for mishaps is fewer 
than F-18s, F-35s, and Stallion CH-53E. Is that correct, 
Admiral?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I do not have that data in front of me.
    Mr. Sessions. OK. That is fair. That is fair. Do you 
believe that it is higher than other averages in aircraft that 
are flown by the United States Military?
    Mr. Chebi. So, the data that I have in front of me, the 
overall mishap rate for the V-22 across the three services in 
Japan is at 4.1 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, which is 
above the average rate of our other platforms across the 
military services on average.
    Mr. Sessions. Is that a 10-year or what figure is that? I 
am sorry, I am referring to a 10-year. Mine shows 3.28 per 
100,000 hours, but----
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Sessions [continuing]. I am going to take your average, 
not mine.
    Mr. Chebi. For the Marine Corps, for the 10-year, the 
mishap rate is 3.29.
    Mr. Sessions. OK.
    Mr. Chebi. Again, from my position and my authorities, my 
objective is to look across all of our platforms and to 
proactively manage those to reduce the risk of all of our 
platforms. So, I understand the characterization or the 
comparison to other platforms. I want all of them to go lower.
    Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir, and my point is there might be 
other aircraft we need to look at also.
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. So, we are----
    Mr. Sessions. That would be my point, and so we tend to, 
whether it is right, wrong, or indifferent, to talk about 
averages. The families that are sitting here are not averages. 
They are reality, and we all do agree with your assessment of 
what your job is and what you are attempting to do. I also look 
at how important the Osprey is. I have been on one downrange in 
Kuwait. I know that it probably is way preferred than other 
types of aircraft that do not have the same ability that it 
does, including in Afghanistan, some other places with quicker 
retrieval of people who might be injured, that it saves lives 
also.
    My point is this, that as we look at this, I think a 
reality check needs to be done, and I am not sure. Have we 
decided it is a clutch problem? Have we decided it is a 
training problem? Something has happened in the last year as 
Congressman Perry has talked about. Something is happening. We 
did not know about the F-35. You remember they were grounded 
because there was some reassessment made. I do not know whether 
it was a light or whether it was a fixture or whether it was 
training, but someone was missing that technical advantage.
    The question that I would ask you now, in your opinion, 
just your opinion, is it the machine or is it training? And I 
am not asking you to out anybody. I am just saying you have the 
facts of the case ahead of you, and I believe that it has been, 
in the past, the training, and that is why I think the numbers 
point to what they do. It is not the Navy's fault. It is not 
the people's fault. It is we are dealing with newer people who 
are operating in our aircraft with the lack of time in the 
aircraft, lack of hours, or is it that, and that fits under the 
training. No, maybe it fits under operational need.
    We need to go, and we have to go, and we got to go with the 
people that we have got, just like what Mr. Perry brought up 
about the aircraft that are available for service today. I 
cannot imagine some crew chief or some commander saying, well, 
we know that is not ready to go, but go anyway. But maybe that 
happens. So, I hope that all of these are some conclusion that 
you are able to draw and at least come back to our young 
Chairman and offer an explanation because, I think it is 
terribly important that we have this hearing today. I think it 
is terribly important that the families that are involved in 
this and who have taken their time for their loved one, but 
also for others that are in the family, and I do not mean their 
family. I mean the Navy family, the military families that are 
here. And I would like to see that you would zero in on and at 
least give this Subcommittee an opportunity to know we have 
zeroed in, we think that here are the contributing factors, if 
not the answer.
    So, I want to thank all three of you for your service 
today. I would like to followup with you and to find out in 
writing, yes, Congressman Sessions, Chairman, here is really 
the answer, we are zeroing in on the following factors that we 
think are important because you have already heard, if there is 
one more crash, someone believes we will quit using this. I 
think it is a workhorse that we need. I would like for us not 
to give up on the Osprey, but we do need to and you have that 
responsibility to give us insight into what you are zeroing in 
on as the conditions by which each are going down.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Ms. Porter?
    Ms. Porter. The DOD plans to buy 2,456 F-35s, and the F-35 
is one of the most egregious boondoggles in the history of the 
Pentagon, but if we are going to buy more of those planes, we 
should at least make sure that they work. Mr. Belk, if an F-35 
engine were to break down at sea on an aircraft carrier, what 
aircraft would the Navy use to transport that F-35 engine 
ashore to be fixed?
    Mr. Belk. So, I genuinely mean thank you for the question 
because I do believe in this Committee's oversight 
responsibilities, and I appreciate the opportunity to thank you 
for that.
    Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk, come on. What plane would the Navy 
use to transport the broken F-35 engine?
    Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I do not know the answer. I am 
happy to take it back and get----
    Ms. Porter. Thank you. Vice Admiral Chebi, do you know the 
answer?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the question of what aircraft the V-22 
was designed is one of the requirements for the CMV-22 to----
    Ms. Porter. OK. So, the CMV-22 would be used. It is 
essentially one of the Navy's two kind of tow trucks. Can the 
C-2, the other kind of tow truck that the Navy flies, can it 
transport an F-35 engine?
    Mr. Chebi. To my knowledge, a C-2 cannot transport F-35 
engine. In that case, we would put additional spares on the 
aircraft carrier, if we have to have it supported with a C-2. 
So, that is the----
    Ms. Porter. OK. You would put additional spares. OK. I am 
going to followup on that. So, the C-2 cannot pick up the F-35 
engine because the engine is too large, so we would use the 
CMV-22. So, the military did not have the common sense to make 
F-35 engines transportable by all of the tow trucks it owns, so 
we are going to use only one of them, the CMV-22. So, Admiral 
Chebi, why did you not see this coming? Why did you buy F-35s 
that your infrastructure cannot handle?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, I am here as the NAVAIR commander from an 
airworthiness perspective to talk about the safety of the V-22. 
I am going to have to direct that question back to the 
appropriate personnel to address the question.
    Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk?
    Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I will have to take that back to 
the Department.
    Ms. Porter. So, you do not know why you bought F-35s for 
billions of dollars, and you do not have any airplanes as we 
are about to see, that can actually pick up the broken engine 
and fix it. So, on the CMV-22, which is the one plane that we 
can use to go get this broken engine, let us say that the F-35 
engine broke down in the South China Sea while F-35s are 
engaged in securing our national interests from an increasingly 
assertive China. Do you know how far it would be to a fully 
capable maintenance depot, Mr. Belk?
    Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I do not.
    Ms. Porter. Vice Admiral Chebi?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, can you clarify your question, please?
    Ms. Porter. An F-35 engine is broken down on an aircraft 
carrier in the South China Sea. How far is it to get that F-35 
engine to a place where we can fix it?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, I am going to have to direct you to the 
F-35 Joint Program Office to kind of answer that question.
    Ms. Porter. OK. It is 7,200 miles to a small facility in 
Australia and 14,500 miles to a full-scale U.S. facility. And I 
am sure the CMV-22 would not fly all that distance, but it 
needs to be able to pick up the engine and get it to the next 
airport where it can then be flown for repair. Admiral Chebi, 
how often is the CMV-22 mission capable?
    Mr. Chebi. The overall mission capable rate, I do not have 
that in front of me. I am not sure. Gary, if you have----
    Ms. Porter. Mr. Kurtz?
    Mr. Kurtz. I do not have that information in front of me.
    Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk?
    Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I do not have that information.
    Ms. Porter. Guys, you are here for a hearing on this very 
aircraft. Now, you have been deferring on the F-35, but the 
CMV-22 is what we are talking about here today. It is the 
Navy's version of the Osprey. So, the data I have seen suggests 
that it can only fly 44 percent of the time. It costs $85 
million per aircraft, and it can fly 44 percent of the time. 
That is absolutely absurd. So, if the military has made fixing 
an F-35 engine that hard for itself surely you have, as you 
mentioned, Admiral Chebi, spare engines that you can swap in 
when something goes wrong. Mr. Belk, has the DOD purchased 
spare F-35 engines?
    Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I do not know the answer.
    Ms. Porter. No, they have not, so it is going to be tough 
to put those on the aircraft carrier, Admiral Chebi, when you 
do not have any. So, the only plan we have when an F-35 engine 
breaks down is to fly it thousands of miles, but to do that, 
the plane only works part of the time. Mr. Belk, how long is 
the CMV-22 allowed to fly from the nearest airport?
    Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I defer that to Admiral Chebi.
    Ms. Porter. Admiral Chebi?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the return to flight criteria was based 
on the data----
    Ms. Porter. All right, Admiral Chebi, 30 minutes. So often 
the CMV-22 does not work more than half the time. If it works, 
it is only allowed to fly 30 minutes from an airport, but these 
failures both leave the F-35 with broken engines stranded on 
aircraft carriers, and get this. We are still buying more of 
these incredibly expensive F-35 jets, and we are doing that 
knowing that we cannot fix those engines because the CMV-22 is 
a disaster. And by the way, you all want to buy more of those, 
too.
    Admiral Chebi, do you stand by this state of affairs? Would 
you like to blame Mr. Belk or Mr. Kurtz?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the F-35 Charlie readiness levels aboard 
aircraft carriers is above 90 percent.
    Ms. Porter. OK. Ten percent of the time it is not ready, 
and the engine might be part of it. I am asking you, should we 
spend billions of dollars on F-35s that you cannot repair?
    Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, my objective as the NAVAIR commander is 
to make sure I deliver the warfighting capability the fleet 
needs to win at a cost we can afford. The service----
    Ms. Porter. OK. Admiral Chebi, my objective as a U.S. 
Congress person is to make sure that our tax dollars are being 
spent to actually keep us safe, not line the pockets of defense 
contractors for boondoggles. I yield back.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Perry?
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, it is good 
to see you here. Thank you very much.
    Got some questions for you. I guess I will start with you, 
Admiral Chebi, and I think I understand the limitations of what 
you can answer. However, I am concerned that you do not know 
the OR rate. I would think that anybody in your position would 
know the OR rate of every single aircraft within your command 
purview, but the V-22, as I understand, was added to the Marine 
Helicopter Squadron, HMX-1, to support the Presidential 
operations, heliborne operations, but the aircraft does not 
carry the President. Is there some reason that we do not know 
about or is there something obvious that we should know about 
that we will carry the President's support staff, but not the 
President?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, from my position as airworthiness, the 
aircraft has been return-to-flight with controls in place. The 
decision of who flies on what airplanes is beyond my control.
    Mr. Perry. So, I understand maybe you did not make the 
decision, but do you know why it is? Like, we will fly the 
Presidential support staff, reporters, staff members, equipment 
in a V-22, but we will not fly the President in one, which 
would limit because V-22 is pretty fast compared to what the 
President is in. Who makes that decision, and I am just asking, 
do you know why it is that? Maybe Mr. Belk knows. Does anybody 
know on the panel?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I do not know.
    Mr. Perry. Anybody else? OK.
    Mr. Belk. Congressman, I do not know.
    Mr. Perry. All right. I would love that answer if you can 
get back to us with that.
    Mr. Perry. Now, the gentlelady from California asked a lot 
of questions about the F-35s engines and the V-22. It seems to 
me, I look at the sling load capability, the 22, 15,000, 
internal 20,000, and the F-35, I am going to be generous, I 
think, because it says 3,750 is the weight of the engine, so 
let us say 4,000 pounds. Does it cube out before it grows? OK. 
So, the Admiral said it. What about sling? Do we not sling load 
F-35 engines? Is there some policy not to sling load them?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am not aware. It does cube out, so that 
is----
    Mr. Perry. OK. So, I have got another question for you. You 
know, all of us that flew various aircraft, we all know the CH-
53 is the only heavy lift helicopter in the inventory. Even 
those who flew, like me, the 47, the 53 is it. I get it. 
Admiral, I will give you that, but the sling capacity is 
30,000. The 36,000-pound payload, does it cube out in a 53 
also?
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am going to hand that over to the PEO. I 
am unaware.
    Mr. Kurtz. Sir, I am unaware of the specific cube out, but 
to your point, it does have that lift capacity as you have 
described.
    Mr. Perry. So, why are we not using 53s? You guys own them, 
right? The Army does not have them while the Air Force has some 
payloads, right? So, what is the problem? Is it interservice 
rivalry that we cannot use a 53 in the Navy to move a jet 
engine? What is happening? I am just asking. I do not know.
    Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will just answer. You are asking the 
equivalent of the FAA authority----
    Mr. Perry. Yes.
    Mr. Chebi [continuing]. What the operational commanders are 
doing with their assets. That is beyond the scope of our 
responsibility.
    Mr. Perry. OK. Fair enough. It is beyond your scope. And I 
understand, sir, you take orders. Yours is not to question why. 
I get it. But for the sake of those who have died, and their 
families are sitting here behind you, that signed up, wanted to 
go support and defend their country and everything we believe 
in, and probably looked at the Osprey and said this thing is 
awesome, man, I cannot wait to get in it, but there was a lot 
of us that looked at and said, Holy mother of God, how is this 
thing going to stay together in flight?
    And when those nacelles start rotating after the whole wing 
has been put back to center and all the parts that have to come 
back together, and what Mr. Lynch was talking about, sprag 
clutches that have to let go when one engine quits, so that you 
can get the thing on the ground and stay alive. There are a lot 
of concerns. And for the sake of we got to retire the 46, we 
cannot bring the 22 online before it is ready to go because, 
well, we got to get rid of the 46 and we got a lot of money 
invested in this thing and the train is rolling. People's lives 
are at stake and have been lost.
    I wonder why the Navy just will not buy 47s. Forty-seven 
was a big 46, right? Forty-six is, we call it, a baby Chinook. 
I know you would probably reverse to that, and I understand 
why, but that is what we called it, but the 47 is highly 
capable. It is not as fast as an Osprey, but nothing is as fast 
as an Osprey in the vertical arena because of the mechanics of 
it. But, when you got to get engines on the deck and keep 
people alive, use the damn thing that works, and the V-22 has 
got obvious problems, evidenced by the people sitting behind 
you, which leads me to my next and final question.
    The Army is preparing to launch the V-280 Valor Program, 
and you know, I am talking about the Army program here, to 
replace the Black Hawk fleet. Now, we have learned a lot with 
the V-22, but apparently we have not learned enough. Whether it 
is like my good friend from Texas says, training or whether it 
is the mechanics; service members are dying, which is 
unacceptable. It is bad enough they die in combat, but it is 
unacceptable that they die either due to the lack of training, 
complexity of the aircraft, or the aircraft itself. What 
lessons can any one of you tell us that we have learned on the 
22 that we are not going to replicate on the 280?
    Mr. Kurtz. Sir, certainly, as you referenced, it is an Army 
program. It is not a program that I have insight into with 
regards to my portfolio, so I cannot speak to where we are with 
regards to the V-280 and what the Army is currently doing at 
this time.
    Mr. Perry. What is the 22 going to be replaced with?
    Mr. Kurtz. Sir, I am not aware of at this point----
    Mr. Perry. Admiral?
    Mr. Kurtz [continuing]. At this time the service and plans 
for replacement of the V-22.
    Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. The CMV-22 is halfway through the 
production run, so it is a brand new aircraft. I am not sure 
any plans right now are in place to replace the CMV-22.
    Mr. Perry. Well, I will say this, Mr. Chairman, and then I 
will yield back, and it is expensive halfway through the 
lifecycle, but if we cannot get it right, at some point, we 
have to acknowledge we just cannot get it right. This thing 
should not fly because it is too dangerous. We got the concept, 
we would love to do it, it is awesome to look at. When it is 
working right, it is awesome, but it is not working right 
enough to accept.
    And there are other acceptable alternatives, and oh my god, 
even though we are in the Navy, we will put a different coat of 
paint on this damn thing and call it some kind of Navy term and 
fly this 47 instead, or maybe even better, 53 highly capable in 
the Navy's program. Let us use that and just say, look, we are 
not going to get there quite as fast because we do not have an 
Osprey, but we are going to get there alive, which is really 
damn important to the mission. And it is really important to 
the people that want to serve in the United States uniform 
services do their service, protect their country, but then come 
home safely to their families.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. It looks like we have gone through 
everyone here, so I will now yield to Ranking Member Garcia for 
your closing remarks.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, again. Thank you to our witnesses 
for being here and for your service.
    I think just a couple of things. First, I mean, I think it 
is clear that our witnesses, and again, I think you believe 
that there is use and an important mission for the V-22, and 
obviously, you are working trying to rectify the concerns and 
certainly assess opportunities to make the V-22, the safest 
possible vehicle, is clear from your testimony. And so, I do 
appreciate and I thank you for that.
    It is also obviously a decision that had been made in 
keeping the Osprey in use even during this period of time where 
we are still looking at trying to make it even safer. It is a 
decision that you stand behind and that you have been vocal 
about here today, so I do want to thank you for that.
    But I just want to also just reiterate some of the concern 
that has been shared by my colleagues. I think clearly, those 
of us here on this Subcommittee, I think many of us spoke to 
our concerns about the V-22, about its safety, certainly about 
its use during this time where we are trying to make it even 
safer and certainly, about not being having complete access to 
all the safety information that members of the Subcommittee 
would like to have. And so, I just want to highlight those real 
concerns.
    This is an important function of this body to do this 
oversight and to work with all of you to have the absolute 
safest possible of vehicles and aircraft that we can have. And 
so, I want to urge the DOD and all of our partners to really 
work with us on ensuring that we have all the information that 
we need to make the decision and the oversight that we are 
required to do. I also just want to add as well that I think 
the difference of the rate of discrepancy that exist between 
the Air Force and the Marines, I think is a real problem, and I 
think that is something that we deserve answers on, and I think 
that it would be important to have some followup as to why that 
difference exists in the rate of accidents. And I think that is 
something we discussed earlier and I would like to get more 
answers on that.
    Finally, to the families, I really appreciate you all being 
here. I know how probably hard this is also for all of you to 
sit through. But I also know that not only do you want to honor 
your loved ones, but you also want a strong military that keeps 
every single person that serves safe, and I really appreciate 
that, so thank you all for being here. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Grothman. OK. I would like to thank the families for 
being here again today. You being here is very important 
because I do not even want to drop this thing today. There were 
a surprising number of questions that I felt you guys did not 
have answers to. Mr. Garcia brings up the difference between 
accidents rates in the Marines, in the Air Force, and I do not 
see how we can really adequately address this unless we have a 
look at those safety investigations. So, we are going to do a 
followup in some fashion because I think we have to see that. 
You are not the first military group that has been before us. 
We have had the military before us in the past, and I always 
feel it should be a little more transparent. The Department of 
Defense has not done an audit, which is not your fault, in 
something like 30 years, which is kind of an insult to 
Congress. But in any event, I think we have established that we 
could get some more information.
    I mean, whenever I hear about one of these things going 
down, as have been intermittently over the last 30 years now, I 
guess, it always bothers me because it is one thing to lose 
somebody in combat. But to lose somebody in a non-combat 
situation should be almost inexcusable, and it is something 
that you would never see in the private sector. I realized what 
your guys are doing is a lot more technical, a lot more 
difficult than that, but nevertheless, it always bothers me, 
and I think there is something wrong with it. And it would 
bother me a lot more if I was one of the folks sitting there 
behind you.
    So, I will assure you folks that we are not going to let 
this matter drop. For whatever reason, they are not giving us 
the results of the safety investigations, and staff has 
contacted them before and they always turn them down on things 
that I think we should get. So, the ranking member and I are 
not going to let that drop.
    And with that, I will have to say for this, without 
objection, all members have 5 legislative days within which to 
submit materials and additional written questions for the 
witnesses, which will be forwarded to the witnesses.
    Mr. Grothman. If there is no further business, without 
objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                 [all]