[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                 


 
 AUKUS IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS
                      CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 14, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-83

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 55-921PDF              WASHINGTON : 2024             
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California             GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California                COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa                   SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas                      Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey         JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida                  JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas               BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan                 GABRIEL AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas

                  
                                     

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Jenkins, Hon. Bonnie D., Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
  International Security, U.S. Department of State...............     7

                   MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Newsweek article, "Israel Implemented More Measures to Prevent 
  Civiliam Casualties Than Any Other Nation in History.".........    34
CNN article, ``Option: I'm an expert in urban warfare, Israel is 
  upholding the laws of war."....................................    46

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    74
Hearing Minutes..................................................    75
Hearing Attendance...............................................    76

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    77


AUKUS IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS 
                      CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY

                      Wednesday, February 14, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come 
to order.
    I want to welcome everybody to our restored hearing room 
and I--a point of personal privilege. I took the opportunity to 
put our first chairman's portrait up underneath the Great Seal 
of the United States in front of us.
    In fact, in the Continental Congress on April 19th, 1775, 
the Committee on Correspondence was formed, which eventually 
became the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and so I just put that 
as a historical reference as to why this committee is, in fact, 
so important and I want to thank the Secretary for being here 
this morning.
    Now, the purpose of this hearing is to discuss 
implementation of the AUKUS trilateral partnership and broader 
challenges facing international security and arms control. I 
now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    One of America's most effective tools has been deterrence, 
leveraging our arsenal of democracy for global stability. 
However, since the deadly and chaotic withdrawal from 
Afghanistan this Administration has failed to project strength 
on the world stage and we're witnessing the development of a 
deadly and unholy alliance among our adversaries.
    They are working together to undermine Western values, 
attempting to change the global balance of power. The world has 
seen Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, an emboldened 
Chairman Xi threatening Taiwan, and the Iranian regime 
continuing to fund its terror proxies.
    Iran is at the center of destabilization in the Middle East 
greenlighting unrelenting attacks on Israel as I speak, on 
commercial shipping, and our own troops in the region including 
several deaths recently, including our troops and dozens more 
injured.
    Russia is now getting component parts from China, ballistic 
missiles from North Korea, manufactures Iranian drones in 
country.
    China is expanding its nuclear arsenal while its military-
civil fusion strategy uses our technology and investments 
against us to advance and strengthen the CCP, and North Korea 
continues to buildup its nuclear and ballistic missile program 
despite U.N. sanctions.
    As the world burns America is being tested. We must 
modernize our approach to security to advance our strategic 
goals and that includes working with our allies in new and 
innovative ways. AUKUS is a prime example of how we should be 
partnering with our closest allies.
    I agree with the Administration that to counter CCP 
aggression we must work with our closest allies and, 
importantly, here are the U.K. and Australia and that's why I 
led the bipartisan AUKUS implementation legislation which 
passed into law this past December on the National Defense 
Authorization bill.
    This legislation grants the Administration the authority to 
issue ITAR exemptions so we can deploy cutting-edge technology 
with our closest partners.
    This April a Presidential determination to finally grant 
these exemptions will allow the AUKUS pact to move forward and 
it will show the world that we will not be intimidated by 
Chairman Xi.
    Alongside AUKUS we need to rebuild our Defense Industrial 
Base. The Defense Industrial Base is strained to maintain our 
own military readiness while meeting the critical needs of our 
partners.
    We must make investments to support the Defense Industrial 
Base and include innovative companies that are producing 
cutting-edge technology but struggle to secure a government 
contract.
    We must cut through the red tape and streamline the process 
to make Federal contracts obtainable and trust the private 
sector to do what it does best and that's innovate. These 
innovative companies are eager to collaborate on research and 
development of advanced capabilities like artificial 
intelligence, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and 
hypersonic systems, and as we grow the AUKUS collaboration we 
can expand to space systems and other cutting-edge technology.
    Bureaucracy should not get in the way of American 
innovation. Additionally, to successfully move forward we must 
reform our foreign military sales process. When I travel 
overseas I hear the same thing over and over from our allies. 
They want our equipment and our weapon systems but they cannot 
afford the delays.
    Since 2019 I have approved 19 sales totaling over $22 
billion to Taiwan that have yet to be delivered and when I was 
in country last April President Tsai asked me, ``Where are my 
weapons? I paid for them.'' I did not really have a good 
answer.
    Seeing these challenges firsthand I convened a task force 
led by Representative Waltz which last week published its 
report highlighting desperately needed improvements to our FMS 
process and it's called the Foreign Military Sales Tiger Task 
Force report recently released.
    It'll be the first time we have had FMS reform--the first 
time in a generation--and we're not done. We're going to look 
at outdated arms control and nonproliferation policies like the 
missile technology control regime and whether the department's 
structural organization needs updating to combat the challenges 
we face today.
    Xi is not slowing down his malign agenda and neither should 
we slow down in the face of that. However, with AUKUS we have 
an opportunity to build on American innovation and partner with 
our closest allies to deter and defend against the CCP.
    At the same time we need to protect the U.S. and our allies 
with a credible nuclear deterrent. Outdated cold war nuclear 
systems are no longer adequate to face the dual nuclear threat 
we face from Putin and Xi.
    Only from a position of strength can we negotiate. We are 
at risk of losing that strength as we let our deterrent age--
deterrence age and desperately grasp at negotiations with the 
Russians and Chinese.
    The United States does not seek conflict but only through 
strength can we provide the deterrence necessary to secure 
peace in the region and around the globe.
    And with that the chair now recognizes the ranking member 
Mr. Meeks for an opening statement.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's good to be in 
our renovated home. You know, it's been a while, you know, but 
it's beautiful and I'm glad to be back home. We do not have to 
make that long trek anymore.
    But it's good to be home, and I want to thank you, Mr. 
McCaul, for calling this hearing and let me also start by 
thanking Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, the Under Secretary of 
State for arms control and international security for being 
here today for helping us understand the critical work that the 
Biden Administration has been engaged in with our allies and 
partners to strengthen our collective security.
    You know, in a little over a week we will mark 2 years--two 
years--since Russia's renewed full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
The human cost of Russia's war has been devastating and the 
consequences for global security and stability will reverberate 
for decades to come.
    The Administration's commitment to supporting the people of 
Ukraine in this fight is ironclad and proven. In addition to 
providing billions of dollars in security assistance, as a 
direct result of President Biden's leadership the United States 
of America forged a coalition of allies and partners around the 
world that stands together against Moscow's unprovoked war of 
aggression.
    And as we look forward I want to commend our colleagues on 
the other side of the building, the U.S. Senate--I'm surprised 
I'm doing that. But they did its job earlier this week to pass 
an overwhelmingly bipartisan bill--critical assistance for 
Ukraine, critical assistance for Israel, critical for the Indo-
Pacific.
    And the question that now presents itself is what will this 
body do. Will this body show similar leadership? Will this body 
see it, put this bill on the floor so that we can get Ukraine 
what it needs? It is time for this body to stand up.
    So I hope our colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
find their way to meet this moment. We need the United States 
of America in a bipartisan way to meet this moment.
    In addition to the war in Europe the United States and our 
allies in the Indo-Pacific are facing an unprecedented military 
buildup and aggression from the People's Republic of China in 
the East and South China Seas as well as in the Taiwan Strait.
    Under Xi Jinping Beijing has become a more repressive--has 
become more repressive at home and more coercive and ambitious 
abroad. America's military presence in the region, our 
alliances, our diplomatic engagement, are all key to keeping 
the region peaceful, free, and open and the United States 
commitment to the defense of our allies and to maintaining open 
seas and skies has never been greater.
    The Administration's record approval of arms cases for 
Taiwan, a modernized alliance with Japan, and a historic AUKUS 
trilateral security framework are just some of the examples of 
how the Biden Administration has used strength to keep the 
peace in the Indo-Pacific.
    President Biden's historic AUKUS initiative with the U.K. 
and Australia will strengthen defense cooperation and 
interoperability in the region and allow us to enhance regional 
security.
    I am a strong supporter of this vital agreement and was 
proud to advance critical legislation to implement AUKUS. Even 
with our looming competition with China and efforts to counter 
Russian aggression in Europe, we must always remember that a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. That is why 
arms control, despite what its opponents may say, is so 
critical to our national security.
    It not only reduces the prevalence of nuclear weapons and 
reduces the risk of miscalculation between the United States, 
our adversaries, our competitors, but it helps us to keep them 
in check.
    Simply put, reducing the number of deployed Russian nuclear 
weapons keeps Americans safer. Preventing Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear weapon keeps America safer.
    Working together to denuclearize North Korea keeps America 
safer. Stemming China's rapid conventional and nuclear military 
buildup keeps America safer, and sound and effective arms 
control policies like those this Administration has advanced 
are the one--is one of the best tools to help achieve those 
goals.
    And, yet, the State of arms control is more perilous now 
than it has been in decades. So I hope our witness can help us 
understand today what the Administration is doing to change 
this picture and put all of these issues into a broader 
strategic context.
    And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman McCaul. The ranking member yields back.
    I just want to thank the ranking member for his hard work 
in a bipartisan fashion with myself and our teams working 
together on the AUKUS legislation and, obviously, with the 
Senate as well with the four corners of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It 
was one of the finer moments in Congress. We have had a few but 
few and far between lately, I'd say.
    Also other members of the committee are reminded that 
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
    We're pleased today to have Hon. Bonnie Jenkins.
    Mr. Meeks. Mr. Chairman? One thing I left out.
    Chairman McCaul. The ranking member is recognized.
    Mr. Meeks. I just want to ask--he's not here yet but I want 
to ask unanimous consent that Rep. Courtney who worked very 
hard on the AUKUS agreement participate at today's hearing 
after all committee members have had their opportunity to 
participate and question the witness.
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
    We're pleased to have Hon. Bonnie Jenkins, the under 
secretary for arms control and international security at the 
State Department, before us today. Her bio is very lengthy and 
impressive and I told her her academic record--you must have 
spent, you know, a long part of your lifetime in school and it 
was extremely impressive and so long that I do not have time to 
read all the credentials.
    But let me just say thank you for being here. Your full 
statement will be made part of the record. And with that, I now 
recognize Under Secretary Jenkins for her opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BONNIE D. JENKINS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS 
  CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Ms. Jenkins. Good morning.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the 
committee, and congratulations to being back here in this hall.
    I appreciate the opportunity to speak to all of you today 
about the work that I oversee at the Department of State as 
under secretary for arms control and international security.
    Let me give you a broad overview of the challenges and 
opportunities we face and the tools we employ to ensure that 
United States is leading from a position of innovation during 
this inflection point in history.
    I oversee the Arms Control Deterrence and Stability Bureau, 
ADS; the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, 
ISN; and the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, PM. I also lead 
the coordination for the trilateral partnership between 
Australia, United Kingdom, and United States known as AUKUS.
    We find ourselves at a time where we are certainly 
challenged. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to 
begin its third year. The People's Republic of China continues 
to pressure Taiwan across a spectrum of diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic measures.
    The Middle East is on a knife's edge as Israel defends 
itself from Hamas terrorism amid a deepening humanitarian 
crisis, and Houthi extremists engage in illegal and reckless 
attacks on commercial vessels exercising their navigational 
rights and freedom.
    The deepening cooperation among Russia, the DPRK, and Iran 
is a cause of concern. However, it is precisely during these 
moments where we must be innovative to maintain international 
norms and institutions, providing foundations for global 
security.
    This includes our work to advance the full scope of arms 
control measures on weapons of mass destruction and 
conventional arms to strengthen deterrence and strategic 
stability.
    This Administration has secured allied unity to suspend the 
treaty on armed conventional forces in Europe in response to 
Russian withdrawal. We have proposed and passed United Nations 
resolutions calling on countries to not conduct destructive 
direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests and to not use 
radiological weapons.
    We led states to endorse responsible practices regarding 
artificial intelligence for military applications and we 
completed the destruction of U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, 
eliminating an entire category of declared weapons of mass 
destruction.
    We are strengthening nuclear safeguards, safety and 
security, especially as we assist nations partnering in nuclear 
energy and peaceful nuclear cooperation, building capacity to 
mitigate proliferation threats, sanctioning actors engaged in 
illicit activities, enhancing interdiction measures, and 
protective sensitive U.S. technologies from exploitation.
    Thanks to the strong bipartisan support of the CHIPS and 
Science Act of 2022 and the International Technical Security 
Innovation fund this Administration has made profound 
contributions to protect semiconductor and other emerging 
technologies.
    We continue to advance deeper security cooperation with our 
allies and partners around the world. We have provided over $44 
billion in security assistance to strengthen the international 
coalition helping Ukraine to defend itself and assist our 
allies and partners to transition off Russian-origin equipment.
    We are working to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense 
capabilities, implementing new security assistance authorities 
and improving the highest single year number of foreign 
military sale notifications to Taiwan to maintain peace and 
stability across the Taiwan Strait.
    We are helping Israel defend itself while continuing to 
press for a two-State solution that puts Palestinian voices at 
the center of a post-crisis governance in Gaza.
    Standing shoulder to shoulder with our closest allies is 
one of the hallmarks of American diplomacy. A prime model is 
AUKUS, a generational opportunity that deepens cooperation with 
our closest allies, strengthens our long-term defense and 
security partnerships, provides us a clear pathway to continue 
advancing our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, 
and sends a very strong signal of deterrence and commitment to 
the highest nonproliferation standards in the region and around 
the world.
    With your passage of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense 
Authorization Act we are making great strides within AUKUS on 
export controls, fostering an Indo-Pacific ecosystem and 
supporting operational readiness and interoperability of U.S. 
allies for generations to come.
    We have a historic responsibility to get this right and 
with everyone in this room working together we are on the right 
path.
    So let us continue to work together. This new security 
landscape requires innovation and creativity. It requires 
resilience and modernization.
    This Administration has been making the tough choices and 
laying the groundwork for long-term prosperity both at home and 
abroad. We are clear eyed about where our adversaries or our 
competitors are making inroads and how our actions will 
determine the safety and security of future generations.
    I thank you and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]

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    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Under Secretary Jenkins, and I 
agree with you. We have a historic opportunity before us.
    Pursuant to the legislation--AUKUS legislation--the 
President has until mid-April to decide whether the British and 
Australians have a, quote/unquote, ``comparable defense export 
control system with the U.S.'' and whether to exempt them from 
the international traffic in arms regulations, otherwise known 
as ITAR.
    In essence, ITAR-free zones will allow us to develop and 
build the most cutting-edge military technologies like 
hypersonics together. In my view, these are our closest allies. 
They are members of Five Eyes.
    They bled with us on the battlefield over the last hundred 
years and we shared our crown jewel, the nuclear propulsion 
technology, with the British for generations and just 
authorized sharing our most advanced conventionally armed 
nuclear-powered submarines with the Australians.
    I believe it would be a diplomatic concern if the President 
does not exempt them from ITAR, and I do not want to put you on 
the spot but since I have you here and we have to make this 
decision--the President does--by April my question is very 
simple.
    Does the Administration believe that we should give this 
exemption to our two closest allies in April?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for that question and I totally 
agree with you. The U.S.--the U.K. and Australia are our 
closest allies. We have a long history of working with them and 
I can tell you that we are working around the clock to do what 
we need to make sure that we can get the ITAR exemption that 
all of you have voted with the NDAA to help put forward.
    I can tell you that I've made several trips myself to the 
U.K., going to Australia. My experts are working with our 
colleagues on a regular basis. We're having trilateral meetings 
and it's going--actually it's going very well.
    The U.K. has passed the National Security Act. Australia 
has two bills which are going forward. So they are doing what 
they need and we're doing what we need to put in place all the 
steps that have to happen so that we can certify.
    I feel very confident that we will certify. We're just 
actually in the process of making this happen. Something that 
normally takes about six to 12 months we are doing it in a 
much, much faster period.
    Chairman McCaul. I appreciate that, your candor and 
honesty, and I really hope the Administration does certify. If 
you need anything from us in the committee please let us know. 
You know, we're working as Americans here with our allies 
against a very, very strong threat coming from China.
    Shifting to that, Taiwan arms sales--I know you're aware of 
this issue. When I saw President Tsai she asked me, ``Where are 
my weapons?'' There are 19 weapon systems, $22 billion, that 
have not reached the island.
    What I'm concerned about is if we cannot get these weapons 
into Taiwan what deterrence does the island have as the clock 
is ticking, and I think after the Presidential elections in 
Taiwan it's even more foreseeable.
    They know they cannot take it by election so maybe they're 
going to look at other ways to unify, in their words, Taiwan 
through a blockade of some sort.
    Do you know why this has taken so long and when do you 
anticipate that the weapons that Mr. Meeks and I signed off on 
and the chair and ranking member in the Senate--do you 
anticipate when they will be delivered?
    Ms. Jenkins. First of all, I totally agree with you in 
terms of our--the important work that we're doing with Taiwan. 
I want to thank everyone for all the effort that's gone in for 
work we have been doing to allow us to do things like have 
foreign military financing with them that we hadn't had before, 
to have our international military education training with them 
now.
    We have been able to use your--use the Taiwan Enhanced 
Resilience Act to authorize up to $10 billion in security 
assistance.
    So first of all, I just want to say that we recognize very, 
very much how important this is. Also, I want to note that many 
times there are problems or delays. We are able within the 
State Department to go through these processes in 48 hours or 
so.
    But the problem really is getting it through the industrial 
base, getting the equipment on time. A lot of times after in 
these cases after the signature is done that's when things 
start to happen in terms of getting the equipment.
    So the delay is not related to anything in terms of our 
commitment. Our commitment is certainly there. It's really the 
industrial base and this is something that we know is in the 
supplemental and something that we know is an issue and we're 
working very closely with our partners and industry to try to 
move that faster.
    I do not have a specific timeframe that I can give you 
right now but I just want you to understand a little of the 
background.
    Chairman McCaul. I want to thank you. As we examine the 
supplemental--we just received it--with respect to Taiwan and 
countering China we obviously--any input--it's not a final 
draft by any stretch and any input you may have to help this 
situation would be very much appreciated.
    In fact, I know there's $3.3 billion for AUKUS itself which 
I think is a very strong argument to defending the Pacific. So 
thanks for your candor.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
    Ambassador Jenkins, I've got some serious concerns right 
now dealing with Ukraine assistance. For more than a year the 
U.S. Congress demonstrated its steadfast support for Ukraine.
    We called out Russia's brutal invasion and many of us, Mr. 
McCaul and myself, visited Ukraine to show our support. Went to 
Poland to show our support.
    In this Congress this committee held hearings on the 
comprehensive oversight and mechanisms linked to our support 
and we heard from returned kidnapped children and women and the 
terror that Russia represents in Ukraine.
    We passed legislation standing with the people of Ukraine 
and fielded calls from our constituents who generously offered 
to open up their homes to Ukrainian children and other 
civilians fleeing this horrific war.
    To this day we still receive those calls. But we also 
receive calls from constituents. Quite frankly, I've received a 
few just a couple days ago who are now angry, angry that after 
standing shoulder to shoulder with the people of Ukraine for so 
long that this Congress is now failing to act. Angry that--and 
I'm sorry to say that it seems as though those in the House 
majority is buckling under the pressure of MAGA Republicans who 
are acting on the whims of the former president to help his 
election campaign.
    I hope my Republican colleagues in this body are not 
putting politics over our national security--our national 
security. And early yesterday morning the Senate did do its 
part and I applaud Senator Schumer and Senator McConnell for 
putting politics aside and passing one of the most 
consequential national security packages in years.
    I know the Democrats in the House are ready to act and act 
now and I would hope that Speaker Johnson will put the bill on 
the floor so that we have an opportunity in this House to vote 
on it because I truly believe if he puts it on the floor we 
will pass it in a bipartisan way. But we need the bill on the 
floor so that we can pass it.
    So let me just ask you first, Madam Ambassador, just want a 
yes or no for--in the beginning. Do you believe Ukraine is a 
regional conflict that will not have impacts beyond Russia and 
Ukraine?
    Ms. Jenkins. No. The impact will be much more than beyond 
Russia and Ukraine.
    Mr. Meeks. And would it be beyond Europe?
    Ms. Jenkins. It will be beyond Europe.
    Mr. Meeks. And do you believe that what happens in Ukraine 
matters for the national security of the United States of 
America?
    Ms. Jenkins. It very much matters to our national security.
    Mr. Meeks. Can you tell us why?
    Ms. Jenkins. It matters to the United States because, one, 
we are a leader and we have to be continued to be seen as a 
leader around the world. We have made a commitment to Ukraine 
and we need to show that we could--we stick to our commitments.
    Other countries are watching what we're doing and taking 
lessons, and we also have to promote democracy and help 
countries defend themselves.
    Mr. Meeks. And do you believe that President Xi is watching 
closely what we do to support Ukraine?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Meeks. And do you believe whether or not we continue 
supporting Ukraine will have an impact on his calculus or 
future plans against Taiwan?
    Ms. Jenkins. It certainly will.
    Mr. Meeks. And will passing this critical national security 
package help our readiness?
    Ms. Jenkins. It will certainly help our readiness.
    Mr. Meeks. And how would it do that?
    Ms. Jenkins. It will help our readiness because, first of 
all, we're providing--we're able to provide more equipment to 
Ukraine. But once again, as I was saying in the last question, 
it also helps us strengthen our industrial base.
    Mr. Meeks. And let me turn to AUKUS for a second because as 
you have testified China is also watching very closely how we 
choose to act or not act, and at this pivotal moment in history 
we know the State Department has been closely engaged with both 
Australia and the United Kingdom to make sure important reforms 
to protect sensitive defense technology are completed in order 
to meet requirements in place to allow sensitive defense 
cooperation.
    So what is the status of the changes we requested of 
Australia and the U.K. in the NDAA?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thanks for the question.
    As I mentioned earlier, the status is we are moving 
forward. As I had mentioned, we have already--the U.K. has 
already a new act. Australia has a couple of bills that they're 
getting through their processes.
    We are having regular meetings with them both in the U.S. 
and outside the U.S. in Australia and U.K. We have several 
groups that are meeting--several working groups that are 
meeting. There's a lot of activity that's taking place to make 
sure that we can in fact certify.
    Mr. Meeks. And why does the department believe defense and 
regulatory reforms in our partners' regimes are so important?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's important because we have to make sure 
that, you know, we protect our intellectual property. We know 
that there's countries like China who want to steal information 
and AUKUS, because it's going to be a very strong interoperable 
process not only just in submarines but emerging technologies 
and it is going to be a very interesting place for countries 
like China to try to steal our technology.
    Mr. Meeks. My time has expired. I wanted to get into arms 
control with Russia and China but I do not have that time. So 
thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    I now recognize Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here 
today and we appreciate your service, and congratulations to 
Chairman Mike McCaul and Ranking Member Greg Meeks for the 
renovation of Room 2172 Rayburn Building to be back with 
adequate lighting, too. And so this is--this is very 
impressive. Thank you.
    And, hey, sadly--and this should be bipartisan--all of us 
should be facing--we're in a war we did not choose between 
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of 
law, and America, I believe, sadly, today with the open borders 
too--you add that in--is at greater risk of attack--of imminent 
attack than ever before, as the FBI has indicated.
    With that in mind, with the axis of evil war criminal Putin 
and North Korea have just had unprecedented ballistic missile 
cooperation with war criminal Putin firing indiscriminately 
North Korean missiles against civilians of Ukraine.
    What's being done to try to address this? Because it also--
it's a direct threat to our great allies of South Korea and 
Japan.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you for that question and I totally 
agree. Any relationship that we're seeing, you know, between 
Russia and North Korea is very concerning and one of the things 
that we started doing already is last month we have already 
started doing sanctions as a result of this, and we are being 
very, very vocal.
    We are working with partners in multilateral settings to 
also see how we all can work together to address this issue 
because so much of this is multilateral, working together with 
sanctions, and that's what we're doing to this date and we're 
going to continue to focus on this issue.
    Mr. Wilson. And additionally bipartisan--I'm really 
grateful to see our leadership here so concerned, correctly, 
about the providing of equipment to deter the People's 
Republic--the Chinese Communist Party from attacking Taiwan. 
That needs to be done immediately and so please look into that.
    Additionally, there's been a request and provision has been 
signed off by our leadership in the House and Senate for rifles 
to be provided to Israel.
    What's the status to providing--this has been held up and 
to me it's just inconceivable at a time of war that we would 
delay and the rifle should be provided. And when can we expect 
that to be approved?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your question.
    Once again I want to reiterate how important we see the 
situation in Taiwan and our efforts to really move as fast as 
we can on that.
    On the rifles we are still deliberating that within the 
Administration so we there's nothing that I can report on that 
to date. But that's an issue we're still working on.
    Mr. Wilson. And, indeed, they lost rifle capability when we 
had the Hamas puppets of Iran invade and there's just no reason 
for delay of something as basic as rifles and so I hope that's 
advanced.
    And then also bipartisan should be interested in small 
modular reactors and that is that how critical they can be with 
technology to promote work with our partners.
    I know that Romania has taken a real lead on trying to 
develop small modular reactors. What is your department doing 
and working with our allies to promote small modular reactors 
and, hey, for immediate manufacture? I even have a location, 
Savannah River Nuclear Laboratory.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we're doing quite a bit and thanks for 
recognizing the work that we're doing in Romania. We are 
pressing forward very hard on small modular reactors around the 
world and we are working very closely with our allies. We're 
working with the G-7.
    Recently at the COP-28 we had 22 countries agree to triple 
nuclear technology by 2050. We have a number of countries who 
are working to promote more funding in this issue.
    So, yes, we take it very seriously. We'll work with allies, 
G-7 partners as well, to promote small modular reactors around 
the world.
    Mr. Wilson. And the benefit of that would be the security 
for a territory such as Guam which is so critical--three hours 
from Shanghai, 3 hours from Tokyo, 3 hours from Manila. Again, 
a floating aircraft carrier that needs energy independence.
    And so it's just so clear, and then you also have examples 
of, hey, resort areas like Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. 
We would like to have in the event of a hurricane, again, small 
modular reactors and, hey, we have had small modular reactors 
on aircraft carriers and submarines. This just need to be 
advanced and the production should be approved and should be 
accelerated.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam 
Secretary, for being here and thank you for your efforts 
strengthening the values of freedom and democracy we have 
around the world and strengthening particularly with our allies 
that share these beliefs and particularly those allies that are 
in very difficult threatened regions around the world.
    I believe in many senses, and many experts agree, that 
we're in the greatest threat globally that we have been in 
since World War II in this regard. I had an uncle who was 
killed in action defending us in Europe.
    So many other Americans lost loved ones, family members. 
Many individuals had lifetime injuries, hidden wounds, families 
that were under strain, all for that sacrifice to bring us to 
the foundation we have right now where post World War II we 
have the greatest chance of peace and prosperity that modern 
times have ever shed upon any generation.
    And I'm worried. I'm worried that this will be whittled 
away with indifference and I cannot fail to comment on the 
bigger picture when you're here in front of us that we are at a 
critical place right now with this package for Ukraine, Israel, 
Indo-Pacific, Taiwan--that package that passed the Senate.
    Time is passing very quickly. Those of us that have been 
briefed know that there's an exigency of time here and an 
urgency to move, and I must say the place where this will be 
met is not in your office, with all due respect.
    The place where this will be met is not in the Secretary's 
office. The place where this will be met is not even in the 
White House. Right now at this time that place is right here in 
this U.S. House.
    Just 5 months ago we passed the support package for Ukraine 
and it was 311-217. Pretty tough to get numbers like that in 
this Congress at all. But we must be able to put it on the 
floor right now for a democratic vote.
    If we do not have democracy in the U.S. House right now we 
cannot expect to be the leader of democracy worldwide globally 
when we cannot even do that.
    Anything we say, anything we utter, will be nothing but 
hollow words. So in this context too I want to ask you 
something else that concerns me that surrounds particularly 
what's going on in Ukraine, what's going on in China, what's 
going on in Iran, and that's the importance of recognizing I 
think that there's--we have NATO that brings, you know, post 
World War II allies together that gives leadership to so many 
others.
    We have 50 countries participating in our effort to help 
Ukraine. Fifty--no small task. But I'm very concerned if you 
have any remarks on this on how it might affect 
nonproliferation, how it might affect arms use, how it might 
affect U.S. influence.
    We're seeing, I think, and it's really at stake now a new 
axis, if you will, an axis with Russia and North Korea who is 
supplying them with missiles, with Iran who is supplying them 
with drones, some of them with U.S. and Western parts, by the 
way, and China who's bolstering up domestically and we're 
watching very closely what they're doing in any dual purpose 
products they're having.
    But this axis of North Korea, of Iran, of Russia, of China 
is very dangerous and it's coming together, and I think it's 
going to be one of the byproducts of us not acting to support 
Ukraine right now. Can you comment on that burgeoning threat?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you. I cannot agree with you more. 
First of all, the importance of getting the supplemental passed 
because of the funding that it will allow to help us combat 
these threats but also the concern that we have in terms of 
these countries working together and it really--as you said 
this is a changing moment in terms of international security.
    And so we have to think about things that we have done in 
the past that have been successful that we have to adjust to 
deal with this new not just the individual challenges but the 
challenges that are being faced by having, you know, three very 
challenging countries working together.
    So the judicial tools that we have in sanctions and export 
controls and working multilaterally with countries, working in 
different forums, you know, exchanging information, best 
practices, these have to be adjusted and strengthened because 
we have to deal with a different type of challenge that's 
growing. So I totally agree with everything you say.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, and I think it's going to affect 
generations to come. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, thanks for being here. You're the under 
secretary for arms control and international security. To that 
end, has Iran's uranium enrichment well beyond what is needed 
for nuclear energy production continued during the last 3 
years?
    Ms. Jenkins. Iran has--most recently they have been 
increasing their production to about 60 percent.
    Mr. Perry. Is that what's needed for peaceful nuclear power 
production, 60 percent enrichment?
    Ms. Jenkins. What I can say is their activities are not 
ones that make us understand that what they're doing is 
peaceful.
    Mr. Perry. I'm sorry. So that last part?
    Ms. Jenkins. Our assessment is that what they're doing is 
not considered peaceful.
    Mr. Perry. Right. Obviously, 60 percent has nothing to do 
with peaceful power production. It has to do with weapons 
production. Are you personally involved in any active 
discussions with Iran on nonproliferation?
    Ms. Jenkins. We are not involved in these activities right 
now on nonproliferation.
    Mr. Perry. So what is the plan? If you can, generally 
speaking--not asking for any classified information--but how 
can we assure the American people of some plan, any plan, to 
stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon that they will deliver 
via ballistic capability?
    Ms. Jenkins. Right. Well, first, I want to--thanks for the 
question--just to highlight, first of all, that, you know, we 
are always looking for a diplomatic solution and that's always 
the first thing.
    Of course, we're having a problem with that right now 
because there really is no good solution on the table. We 
continue to work with the IAEA--International Atomic Energy 
Agency--in their efforts to try to assess what's happening in 
Iran and we know that their challenge----
    Mr. Perry. We know what's happening. I'm asking what the 
plan is because they're moving forward. They're doing it as we 
speak.
    Ms. Jenkins. The plan--yes, the plan is to continue to seek 
diplomatic resolution on it.
    Mr. Perry. OK. All right. So they're going to continue and 
we're going to keep talking and they're going to continue. I 
got it. I just wanted to see if there was something new here 
that I wasn't aware of.
    I want to switch subjects here a little bit. New reporting 
from Michael Shellenberger, Matt Taibbi, and Alex Gutentag cite 
sources in the intelligence community that say that the IC 
asked Five Eyes' intelligence agencies including the U.K. and 
Australia to spy on 26 of the previous Administration's 
associates.
    Did you know if a warrant existed to authorize the spying 
on these American citizens at the behest of our intelligence 
community?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not have any information on that.
    Mr. Perry. You do not have any information? Well, OK. Do 
you and the President support the requirement of a warrant to 
have Five Eyes intelligence agencies spy on American citizens 
on America's behalf? Do you and the President agree that a 
warrant would be required?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm hesitant to respond to that because I do 
not feel like I have enough of the background information that 
you're----
    Mr. Perry. OK. Well, if I do not include the President, if 
I just include you, do you believe in warrantless spying at the 
behest of the intelligence community on American citizens?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not quite sure how to respond to that. I 
mean, we do want warrants if there's going to be spying done, 
but I'm not sure I can answer that question. I want to be 
honest with you, I do not feel I can----
    Mr. Perry. OK. Would you--would you like the intelligence 
community to be authorized to spy on you without a warrant?
    Ms. Jenkins. No, I would not.
    Mr. Perry. So then would you be able to transpose that 
desire of yours for yourself to other American citizens who 
would like the same constitutional protections that you 
apparently want for yourself?
    Ms. Jenkins. I can--I assume that others would want that. 
But I'm not sure that I can really say what the U.S. position 
is because I'm not sure----
    Mr. Perry. I'm not asking for the U.S. position. I just 
asked for yours and if you know what the President's is.
    So yours for yourself is you want the protection of the 
warrant----
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do. Yes.
    Mr. Perry [continuing]. But you cannot say for other 
American citizens?
    Ms. Jenkins. I would imagine yes. Yes.
    Mr. Perry. OK. I'll take yes as an answer.
    Let me--let me just posit one other thought to you. I look 
at your testimony here and we proposed, as you said, and passed 
the United Nations resolutions calling on countries to not 
conduct destructive direct sent satellite/anti-satellite 
missile tests. Did China agree with that?
    Ms. Jenkins. China--we have approached China with that.
    Mr. Perry. I know.
    Ms. Jenkins. We have not had a real in-depth discussion 
with them on that.
    Mr. Perry. You haven't had what?
    Ms. Jenkins. We haven't had an in-depth discussion with 
them on that but we have approached them about that and we're 
open to them being a part of that.
    Mr. Perry. Oh, I'm sure we're open to it. I'm sure they're 
not open to it, which concerns me because further in your 
testimony you talk about the United States destroying the 
stockpile of the entire category of declared weapons of mass 
destruction.
    So we're leading just by destroying our defensive 
capabilities and offensive capabilities while hoping that China 
will come along and discontinue their offensive capabilities.
    I will tell you, ma'am, what we're doing is unilaterally 
disarming hoping that China is going to play along. They're not 
going to play along.
    I yield the balance.
    Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Thank you very much, Congressman 
Perry, I think it's very appropriate, your questioning, as 
we're looking at the portrait of Benjamin Franklin of 
Pennsylvania and Congressman Perry continues the tradition of 
the--being outspoken as part of the delegation from 
Pennsylvania. So congratulations, Congressman Perry.
    We now proceed all the way to Texas with Congressman 
Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, it's great to see you. Thank you 
so much for your service in the Biden Administration and also 
for your testimony today.
    I'm glad the Biden Administration has recently revised the 
conventional arms transfer policy to ensure defense sales and 
weapons transfers are consistent with our values and our 
strategic goals.
    I have a few questions regarding these policies. The 
conventional arms transfer policy states that the United States 
will not transfer arms to a country if the United States 
assesses that, quote, ``it is more likely than not that the 
arms to be transferred will be used by the recipient,'' 
unquote, to violate international, humanitarian, or human 
rights law.
    Prior to an arms sale does the U.S. Government make an 
affirmative assessment on whether those arms would meet the 
standard and who in the Administration is responsible for 
making these assessments?
    Ms. Jenkins. That is an assessment that's made--we start 
within the State Department to look at that and we have 
discussions within the State Department. But, you know, these 
are looked at within the interagency. So----
    Mr. Castro. But the assessment is made before the transfer 
of these arms?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes.
    Mr. Castro. OK. And last week the White House released 
National Security Memorandum 20 which aims to ensure that U.S. 
security assistance is used in line with U.S. law and 
international humanitarian law.
    Specifically, the memo creates an enforcement mechanism to 
hold countries accountable if they're found to have violated 
provisions such as Section 6201 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
which states that the U.S. shall assess if a country is denied 
or restricted the delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid to a 
country.
    So I wanted to ask you are there any countries that are 
provided exceptions to the transparency requirements under last 
week's National Security Memorandum or will it be applied to 
all countries equally?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's going to be applied to all countries----
    Mr. Castro. And has----
    Ms. Jenkins [continuing]. That fit within the definitions 
of the act, yes.
    Mr. Castro. And has the State Department received credible 
and reliable written assurances from Israel that they will not 
impede the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance?
    Ms. Jenkins. We have talked to Israel about the NSM and 
they are aware of it and agree to it.
    Mr. Castro. Have they provided us any kind of assurances?
    Ms. Jenkins. We are in the process of--as I said, if you 
look at the NSM it provides a timeframe if a country is at war 
to provide those assurances.
    Mr. Castro. Will we demand assurances from them?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's part--yes, it's part of the NSM.
    Mr. Castro. OK. And just this morning the Wall Street 
Journal reported that the Department of State is investigating 
whether the bombs used in an Israeli attack on the Jabalia 
refugee camp were provided by the United States.
    How does the State Department plan to conclude if the bombs 
used in this air strike were provided by the United States, and 
if the State Department concludes that the U.S. provided the 
bombs what steps will the State Department take in response?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, one of the things that I think that the 
NSM was trying to do is try to help us--help the public 
understand the way in which we address these issues.
    So if it turns out that that is the case we will take it 
back and we will deliberate and consider what the next steps 
will be and we will incorporate that into our considerations 
for next steps.
    I cannot say specifically what we're going to do but I can 
certainly say that we are very focused on the issue. We 
understand the importance of the issue to the American people 
and we will take that back and assess what we should do next 
steps.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you.
    And switching subjects but also within your purview--and 
you may have to take this one for the record--Ambassador 
Jenkins, the family of bureaus you lead has a responsibility 
over U.S. engagement with the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex.
    There's a proposal in front of this Congress to add 
fentanyl and fentanyl--related substances to Schedule II and 
III of the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex and I have serious 
concerns about this proposal and I understand that the State 
Department does as well.
    In response to a previous inquiry of mine the State 
Department stated that, quote, ``The department assesses that 
adding fentanyl to the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules 
would not enhance our ability to identify fentanyl traffickers 
or address chemical weapons risks related to fentanyl.''
    I also understand that adding fentanyl to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Annex would imperil the DOD's access to 
fentanyl for pain management of battlefield injuries and 
prevent legitimate shipments of fentanyl to Taiwan and Israel, 
who are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
devastating their health care systems.
    So I wanted to ask you do you believe that adding fentanyl 
and fentanyl-related substances to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention's Annex is appropriate and what do you see as the 
impacts of doing so?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. First of all, I just want to acknowledge 
stat I recognize the impact of fentanyl and so I definitely 
understand the importance of these issues.
    But as you said, we do not see that as a--we do not see the 
CWC and the OPCW as the way in which to do this. As you 
mentioned, fentanyl also has a medical--other medical purposes 
and by putting this on the CWC/OPCW schedules it will impact 
and disrupt individuals who need some of that for medical 
purposes from using it and it's also not going to really, as 
you said, focus and really do what it needs. What we are 
looking for interdiction issues.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Secretary. I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Castro.
    We now recognize Congresswoman and Ambassador Ann Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman and the under secretary 
for her time and service.
    China represents an urgent threat to the United States and 
its partners. We have an important advantage, however--a range 
of partnerships and alliances that are unshakable and battle 
tested including AUKUS, a critical security partnership between 
the U.S., Australia, and the U.K.
    The fact that the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, finds 
AUKUS so terrifying is a clear sign that the partnership is the 
right path forward for the United States as we seek to defend 
Indo-Pacific partners from China's predatory and bullying 
influence.
    But we need to devote real time and energy to address 
remaining pitfalls and ensure AUKUS' success, whether by 
cutting red tape for our trusted allies or correcting China's 
attempts to sow anti-AUKUS propaganda while it massively 
expands its own nuclear stockpile.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, the 2024 NDAA instructed the 
Secretary of State to create streamlined procedures and 
anticipatory release policy for the transfer of advanced 
weapons technologies like submarines and hypersonics, cyber 
capabilities, artificial intelligence, and undersea 
capabilities to Australia, the U.K., and Canada.
    When do you anticipate the release of that policy and what 
concrete steps are you and your bureaus taking to prepare those 
policies?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, and once again it's an opportunity 
for me to talk about AUKUS which I agree with everyone here 
about the importance of that, and as I had mentioned earlier we 
are working around the clock with both the U.K. and Australia 
to make sure that we have what we need and all three countries 
have what they need so that we can move and certify as required 
under the NDAA.
    Our experts are meeting on a regular basis. We just met 
last week. All three countries have met on experts. I'm meeting 
with my colleagues on a regular basis. We have questions that 
are being answered----
    Mrs. Wagner. Excuse me. Time line wise are you on track 
here? When do you anticipate the release?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's hard to anticipate the release right now 
because we are actually working to get these things. There's 
certain things that have to happen but they're happening at a 
rapid pace.
    Mrs. Wagner. OK. Well, I hope so.
    Ms. Jenkins. I can say, for example, as I said earlier the 
U.K. just passed legislation. The same thing with Australia. 
They have to go through processes within their own countries 
for this to happen. So I can say we're working as fast as we 
can but there are steps that have to happen in all three of our 
countries.
    Mrs. Wagner. China has disseminated propaganda across the 
Indo-Pacific falsely claiming that AUKUS undermines 
nonproliferation goals and I'd like to note the astounding 
hypocrisy of these claims as China itself embarks on an 
unprecedented nuclear buildup.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, is the department effectively 
countering Chinese misinformation surrounding AUKUS like the 
misinformation surrounding the transfer of conventionally armed 
nuclear capable submarines?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for the question. We are 
regularly countering disinformation. We see it on a regular 
basis. As was mentioned, China often raises AUKUS at the IAEA 
in a general--in the Board of Governors.
    We have been very successful constantly pushing back to the 
point that they've actually started looking at some other 
issues in addition.
    So we have been working on this. We understand the Chinese 
buildup of nuclear weapons and we continue to----
    Mrs. Wagner. Where do you think that China's misinformation 
campaign against AUKUS gained the most traction and 
specifically are we are working with regional partners to 
correct the record?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I think originally it was starting for 
some countries to gain traction. I think that that has been 
reversed because a lot of what was being claimed countries are 
understanding is not true, particularly what they were saying 
about submarines--that they were saying that submarines were 
nuclear weapons.
    They're not. They're conventional weapon submarines and 
people are seeing that. We're working very closely with the 
IAEA. DG Grossi is making reports talking about the great 
relationship we have with them. So I think it's that active 
work that we're doing is helping.
    Mrs. Wagner. In my limited time--and you may have to answer 
for the record--China is expected to increase its nuclear 
arsenal many times over by 2030.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, do you think China's unprecedented 
buildup of nuclear weapons requires a new approach to how we 
control the trade of nuclear material, considering the civil-
military fusion that China relies on for their military 
modernization?
    And if so do you also believe that we need to ensure that 
the West is not supplying Russia and China with nuclear 
technology and material that can contribute to the expansion of 
our adversaries' nuclear arsenals?
    I would ask you to reply for the record on this question. I 
have--my time has expired, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Ann Wagner 
of Missouri.
    And now we proceed to Congresswoman Dina Titus of Nevada.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, and thank you, Ambassador. 
Your impressive reputation and resume precedes you. We're 
delighted to have you here.
    We have heard a lot this morning about the bill that just 
came out in the Senate and how it's far reaching and how it 
impacts our national security and how our colleagues definitely 
want to do that but just cannot bring themselves to vote for 
that bill for some reason. That may have more to do with 
politics than policy.
    You've said yourself that it impacts our national security 
or would if it passed in a number of ways but would you 
describe a little more specifically how that bill has broader 
implications for the T family, how it impacts arms control, 
arms verification, and nonproliferation?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you.
    You know, the bill, as I said, is going to provide us with 
things we talked about in terms of Ukraine, in terms of Taiwan, 
in terms of foreign military. But we also have funding in there 
for our nonproliferation fund and the work that we do in 
nonproliferation.
    Some of the capacity building work that we do is going to 
be supporting domestic uranium enrichment. We have been talking 
a lot about that today about civil nuke issues, which allow us 
to be independent in terms of our nuclear fuel and that--and 
continuing to help us work with other countries as well and 
that has nonproliferation aspects to it as well.
    And so it's going to be--as I look at all the things that's 
in the bill it's going to be helping quite a number of 
activities within the T family, particularly as we talked a lot 
about today in the PM Bureau.
    Ms. Titus. Could you also talk a little bit more about how 
the programs that you oversee and that we have been discussing 
kind of play out and the relationship that's growing between 
Russia and Iran?
    Ms. Jenkins. Most of the work that we're doing in that 
respect--I mean, there's a lot of things we're doing but I'll 
focus on the Russia-Iran issues.
    You know, we have a number of sanctions, obviously, on 
Iran. We have also started some new sanctions on their UAV 
issues--related issues connected, obviously, with the UAVs that 
they have given Russia.
    We have a lot of sanctions, obviously, on Russia following 
the invasion in 2022. So but we're also seeing them act 
together in many different forums that we are engaged with and 
I will not really have time to go into all the arms control 
forums that we work with and we're seeing them working together 
more often.
    So it's not just in--obviously, we talk about, you know, 
the security assistance side and the sanctions issues but we're 
seeing them work together in other ways. And so we're trying--
as I said, we talk about innovation in this new security 
environment.
    We're looking at new ways we can try to work together with 
our partners and like-minded countries who see the same thing 
and are also very concerned about the growing relationship 
between Russia and Iran and the DPRK.
    Ms. Titus. So when we talk about the Senate bill impacting 
Israel and impacting Ukraine and impacting Taiwan it, indeed, 
also impacts that relationship with Iran, right?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. One way to look at it is as we provide 
funding for us to provide funding for defense for countries, to 
provide funding to support democracy, to provide funding for 
the U.S. being a leader to help our partners, these are all 
areas where we are strengthening our role in the world, 
strengthening national security.
    So as the point that you're making even though it seems--it 
may seem very focused on particular countries it's really about 
strengthening the United States, particularly at a time when 
everyone has been saying here that we have enormous 
international security challenges. So we have to be very 
thoughtful.
    Ms. Titus. Yes. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Dina Titus.
    And we now proceed to Congressman Andy Barr of Kentucky.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And Ambassador Jenkins, welcome to the committee, and 
before I get to my questions I do want to address the issue of 
the supplemental that the Senate is sending over to us. I know 
that's a priority for the Administration.
    There's a lot of members on my side of the aisle who, 
obviously, demonstrably support the assistance to Israel, the 
assistance to the Indo-Pacific, and I'll direct most of my 
questions to you regarding Taiwan.
    But I want to address just as a comment the issue of 
Ukrainian. In the Financial Services Committee just down the 
hall Under Secretary Nelson from Treasury is over there. I'm 
going to ask him or make this point to him as well.
    Many Republicans are fully supportive of the effort to 
assist the Ukrainian resistance. That is not the issue. That 
concern is the mind boggling and perplexing lack of a strategy 
from this Administration in supporting the Ukrainian 
resistance.
    When the Administration is asking Congress to approve over 
$60 billion in additional assistance, which I personally 
support, but at the same time is banning LNG exports to our 
European and NATO allies, when they eight times provide a 
general license to the sanctions on Russian banks in processing 
energy transactions, when the oil price cap strategy is 
failing, our strategy is literally funding Putin.
    And my point to the State Department here with this 
commentary is that the Administration's obsession with climate 
is compromising our national security and our strategy to 
counter Putin.
    If we want to stop Putin, if we want to prevail in the 
fight against Moscow then for goodness sakes stop limiting 
energy exports, stop aiding Putin's energy exports, and stop 
financing Moscow's war machine.
    With that, let me get to my question about Taiwan. 
Regarding Presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan, Section 
5505 of the Fiscal Year 1923 NDAA states that the President may 
direct the drawdown of defense articles from stocks of the 
Department of Defense--defense services of the Department of 
Defense and military education and training of an aggregate 
value of not to exceed $1 billion per Fiscal Year to be 
provided to Taiwan.
    This bill became law in December 2022. What was--Madam 
Ambassador, what was the total amount of Presidential drawdown 
authority used by the Administration in Fiscal Year 2023?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure I have the specific number in 
these--with me at the moment. But I can--I can certainly get 
that to you.
    Mr. Barr. Well, if you could get that to us, and also we 
want to know what has been used thus far in current Fiscal Year 
2024.
    And the reason why we say that is that the Administration 
is rightly asking for Indo-Pacific assistance in the 
supplemental.
    But the Administration has existing authorities that we 
provided through the NDAA in successive years to assist in that 
effort and we would urge the Administration to use that 
Presidential drawdown authority.
    India, real quick, Madam Ambassador. In 2016 Congress 
designated India as a major defense partner and last year 
President Biden and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed this 
partnership twice, here in D.C. and in Delhi.
    Not only are we cooperating more but we're seeing a shift 
in India's defense supply chain away from Russia and toward the 
United States and our orbit.
    However, last week the Biden Administration issued the 
National Security Memorandum on safeguards and accountability 
with respect to transfer of defense articles and defense 
services.
    This memorandum sets up new hurdles and reporting 
requirements for prospective arms sales to partners. Do you see 
this memorandum having any impact on future sales of defense 
articles from India?
    India is over dependent on Russia for defense. We need to 
reduce those barriers.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you.
    First, I know we do not have a lot of time. On the first 
one I just want to just highlight--on the PDA I just want to 
mention that we are--we do want to use that PDA but it has 
taken time, some of it because of industrial industry backlog 
and things like that. So I just want to let you know we are 
very focused on that.
    And on the question, yes, we see India trying to diversify. 
We like India diversifying, particularly diversifying from 
Russia. We want that. We have encouraged that.
    So we are happy to work with them to encourage them to do 
that even more because as you know we want to get countries off 
of relying on equipment from Russia.
    Mr. Barr. And I met with the deputy chief of mission from 
the Indian embassy. They want more defense cooperation with the 
United States so that they can decrease their dependence on 
Russia at this moment. We just need to make sure we do not set 
up any barriers.
    Ms. Jenkins. Right.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you for your service and thanks for hearing 
me out on the strategy on Ukraine. Energy has geopolitical 
consequences and when the Administration asks Congress for 
assistance but is working at cross purposes with energy policy 
it makes it harder for us to support the Administration's 
request.
    With that, I yield.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Andy Harris--
Barr--for your good work--from Kentucky.
    Hey, and we're really grateful. We have a new Member of 
Congress, Congressman Gabe Amo of South Carolina heritage from 
Rhode Island.
    Mr. Amo. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and 
greetings, Ambassador. It's a pleasure to see you. Certainly, I 
want to begin by acknowledging the remarks of several of my 
colleagues on the urgency of getting the Senate legislation to 
provide critical security assistance on the floor so that we 
can vote.
    We need to recommit to these critical, critical obligations 
around the world and I'm hopeful that we will see progress 
there and we'll continue to make that case.
    But turning to home, Rhode Island's First congressional 
District is front and center in supporting AUKUS to support 
security in the Indo-Pacific and is providing an enduring 
foundation for its success.
    This agreement is an opportunity for us to share our Rhode 
Island-based expertise by establishing long lasting research 
collaborations that empowers an expert workforce. The naval 
undersea warfare center division in Newport recently signed a 
cooperative research and development agreement with Australia's 
Flinders University to foster collaborative research on 
undersea technology.
    This partnership is an exciting opportunity to advance 
research coordination between the U.S. and Australia in the 
field of undersea technology.
    These agreements deepen the connection between our two 
nations, the U.S. and Australia, and it builds upon the 
University of Rhode Island's research and education partnership 
that was formalized last year.
    And, of course, you know, Electric Boat along with other 
suppliers are supporting AUKUS Pillar One by manufacturing the 
first rate Virginia-class submarine.
    So AUKUS is a great example of how we can leverage our 
economic relationships to support good-paying jobs at home and 
our diplomatic and security mission abroad. But I understand in 
my short tenure that this process can be cumbersome at times.
    Generally speaking, American companies cannot interface 
directly with their foreign counterparts. So I'm hopeful that 
the Administration is open to considering methods to operate 
more efficiently, to expeditiously advance AUKUS.
    Under secretary Jenkins, what sort of conversations have 
there been with Australia regarding the regulatory reforms that 
they need to take up to obtain the licensing exemptions so that 
we can expand our defense, trade, and cooperation and if so, 
you know, what sort of conversations have yielded progress? 
Where do they stand, et cetera?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for that and, first, I want to 
also highlight the point you made about, you know, universities 
and there's a part of the--of AUKUS which does not often get 
enough attention is the buildup of resources and human capital 
and, you know, our training with the Australians, Australians 
coming here to the U.S. visiting our bases, the main part of 
our schools.
    So I just wanted to take a moment to highlight that aspect 
that was highlighted by all three leaders on AUKUS. As I had 
mentioned earlier, we are having numerous conversations with 
both the U.K. and Australia.
    We have actually looked at the legislation that they have--
that they are working on and trying to get passed and we're 
basing a lot of the questions that we have to allow for 
certification based on the really significant steps that they 
have already taken in terms of developing a new regulatory 
body, you know, as I said, you know, the bills that they're 
going--that they're putting through, the time that it's going 
to take for those bills to get to completion.
    So we are learning from them and they're learning from us. 
We're getting--and a lot of this is--some of it's new for them 
in some respects and so we are having really good conversations 
really getting--going back and forth on real detailed technical 
questions so that we can get there.
    Mr. Amo. Is there anything that we in Congress can do to 
help improve this cooperation in the near term?
    Ms. Jenkins. Just continue--I mean, the bipartisan support 
for AUKUS has been amazing, you know, and I think our partners 
in Australia and the U.K. hear that and they see that.
    Very appreciative of the passing of the NDAA which allowed 
for us to expedite the processes for exchange and extension 
through the ITAR. So I think you're doing what you're doing and 
showing that our partners and the world, quite frankly, your 
support for this is very important and it shows our adversaries 
as well that we are all united on this. So just continue to do 
that as well.
    Mr. Amo. Well, Ambassador, I'm grateful for your insights 
and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Gabe Amo.
    We now proceed to Congresswoman Young Kim of California.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman, and I want to 
thank Under Secretary Jenkins for making herself available 
today.
    You know, earlier this year, as you know I led the Keeping 
Our Allies Leading in Advancement--the AUKUS Act--and I am 
really happy that that legislation provided international 
trafficking in arms regulations exemptions for Australia for 
the purpose of AUKUS implementation and I'm proud that we were 
able to help secure determinations for exemptions in the final 
Fiscal Year 1924 NDAA.
    We also know U.K. and Australia we share our common 
interest in securing the Indo-Pacific and promoting economic 
resilience and they are also Five Eyes partners so we can work 
with them on deterring CCP's aggression.
    As such I know you work very closely and you are engaged 
regularly in dialog with Australians on AUKUS implementation so 
can you tell us during your time as under secretary has there 
been any evidence of Australia violating the U.S. arms export 
laws?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not want to say that I know everything 
but I am not aware of any personally.
    Mrs. Kim of California. You know, since the legislation was 
enacted ITAR--has State Department revised--if there is any 
parts of ITAR--if the State Department revised to reflect the 
AUKUS and what is the impact such revisions has had on 
Australian and U.S. companies to work together on Pillar Two?
    Ms. Jenkins. We are still in the process of talking with 
our industries about Pillar Two. We have yet to provide them. 
Of course, before we can certify we have to get their 
perspectives on everything.
    And so we have had some meetings with industry both here, 
also in the U.K. and Australia, to start getting them aware and 
understanding what's happening. We take industry very, very 
seriously in this. So we are going to continue to do that in 
Asia.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    And also since I chair the Indo-Pacific Subcommittee I'm 
deeply concerned with the recent developments in the North 
Korea and Russia relationship, and the Russians and North 
Koreans have entered into unprecedented ballistic missile 
cooperation. That was exemplified by Russia firing North Korean 
ballistic missiles in the war against Ukraine.
    So what is your department doing to ensure that this 
cooperation ends and is your department concerned with Russia 
sharing the advanced ballistic missile and cruise missile 
technology with North Koreans?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are very concerned. I mean, it's very 
concerning to have North Korea and Russia working together on 
almost anything but particularly on these issues.
    So we are working with regional partners on this. We are 
working with our G-7 partners. We are working in a multilateral 
environment in all--in every way we can to signal our concern 
about this and so that other countries can do so as well and 
that we're also doing the sanctions----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Would you be able to tell us if 
Russian technology or technical know-how contribute to any of 
the recent North Korean missile tests?
    Ms. Jenkins. I cannot say that I'm aware of that.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Has North Korea expanded its 
nuclear and missile programs in the past 3 years and why have 
we seen an increase in missile tests?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's hard to speculate why they're doing 
more--why they're doing more tests. I mean, we do not know. We 
do not have, unfortunately, no real access to understanding 
that. So we can only speculate as to why they're doing it. I 
mean, you can----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Let's then also ask you if DPRK has 
ever used U.S. humanitarian or development aid to fund human 
rights atrocities or their missile or nuclear regime.
    Ms. Jenkins. I am not aware of----
    Mrs. Kim of California. To the best of your knowledge.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. To the best of my knowledge I'm not 
aware.
    Mrs. Kim of California. OK. Well, thank you. I want to 
thank you so much for everything that you're doing and I'm 
really looking forward to full implementation of AUKUS.
    Mr. Connolly. Would my colleague yield just for a quick----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Sure.
    Mr. Connolly. So to your line of questioning about North 
Korea and Russia, Mr. Wilson and I have a bill that would 
expand sanctions for anyone facilitating those weapons 
transfers and you might want to take a look at that bill. Would 
love to have you as a co-sponsor.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Happy to review. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    Ms. Jenkins. And we also have sanctioned already for that 
so as well.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. With that, Chairman, I 
yield back.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Young Kim, 
for your leadership.
    We now proceed to Congressman Brad Schneider of Illinois 
who next week will be serving on the Helsinki delegation to 
Vienna. Congressman Schneider?
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And just to correct the record, I just will happen to be in 
Vienna on vacation and will visit you. But I'm not a part of 
the delegation. Thank you.
    Ambassador, thank you for your testimony today and for the 
work that you do. You have a long track record in this area, 
you know, just pulling out two things from your biography--an 
emphasis on peace and security and an emphasis on arms control 
and nonproliferation.
    And I wish I had all day to talk to you about these things 
because we're at a moment. But broadly--a broad question.
    I look at the world and see great dangers. You touched on 
your testimony some of the challenges we face from Ukraine to 
the conflict in the Middle East to Iran to Indo-Pacific to 
North Korea. These are major threats.
    From your experience where would you rank the current 
moment as far as the national security risks the United States 
faces?
    Ms. Jenkins. Rank it in terms of other----
    Mr. Schneider. Just other periods in time. Are we at a 
perilous moment like anything we have seen certainly in my 
lifetime?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, this is--you know, people have said this 
is, you know, the most challenging since World War II. You 
know, we have had the Soviet Union fall apart and we have had 
9/11, for example, and we obviously got through those periods 
and I know we'll get through this one as well.
    But for me looking at all the challenges, and we're talking 
not just Ukraine and the challenges in the Middle East and the 
relationship between the DPRK and Russia and Iran.
    But we have new challenges coming--you know, emerging 
technologies. We do not know how that's going to--what's going 
to happen with that. In many ways we're trying to figure that 
out.
    So the challenges are just also different. They're 
different.
    Mr. Schneider. Different and growing and expanding, and I 
want to ask a leading question. I mean, to me--I say this all 
the time--we are safer, the world is safer, when the United 
States is leading, when we lean in and take the role that so 
many other countries around the world, maybe all the world, 
looks to us.
    I put three stars as I was reviewing your testimony last 
night. Standing shoulder to shoulder with our closest allies is 
one of the hallmarks of American diplomacy--your words--and I 
thought that was really important.
    And you go on to describe, I think, the alliances we have 
as a game changer. Could you touch just very briefly on how 
important our alliances are and the risk, and very specifically 
the one I think there's so much concern about?
    We're here talking about AUKUS which is a game changer, 
looking forward, but we have others talking about exiting NATO 
which, as you noted, the most perilous moment since World War 
II. NATO has kept us safe and the world stronger or us stronger 
and the world safer since World War II.
    If you could touch on that.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. So, I mean, with the challenges we have 
today we--multilateralism is key to so much of what we need to 
do.
    When we think about when Russia invaded Ukraine we had--we 
worked with a number of countries on important export controls 
that really deprived Russia, you know, funding and a lot of 
other things that they would like to--they would need for their 
war and that was done, you know, with a lot of collaboration.
    When we talk about North Korea, when we talk about DPRK, I 
mean, Russia and Iran the ways in which we can combat is by 
working with countries--you know, what can we do together in 
terms of sanctions, what can we do together to deter, to deny, 
to interdict.
    We cannot do these by ourself. We have to work with other 
countries. When we talk about NATO--I mean, NATO has been 
amazing in these last few years dealing with so many issues and 
even that, you know, new countries who are part of NATO.
    You know, there's so much we need to do and we need to do 
it to different forums whether it's NATO, whether it's the 
United Nations, particularly the U.N. First Committee, which is 
what I'm more familiar with.
    You know, whether it's the OSCE, whether it's, you know, 
the OPCW that implements the CWC, all of these are multilateral 
forums and we need to work this way to combat these issues.
    Same with emergent technologies as we figure out how we 
deal with that. So these are all--we are in a time where we 
need to work with partners.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And one of the joys of being on 
this committee is Ambassadors from around the world come to 
visit us and talk, and a question I'm consistently getting is 
can we count on the United States to stay--are they going to be 
there? Are they going to do what they promised to do and are 
they going to see it to the end?
    And so my last question for you in the few seconds we have, 
when there is rhetoric talking about pulling out of NATO or 
there is a debate in Congress or unwillingness to stand by 
Ukraine as the heroic fighters in Ukraine are fighting for 
their independence but also for what is dear to us what is the 
impact of that?
    Ms. Jenkins. We have to remain a leader and, as you said, 
you know, we--you know, we can travel around the world and do 
diplomatic engagements.
    You know, they're always looking for--you know, our 
partners and allies look to the U.S. to be a leader and as you 
said they want to know that we're there and we're not going to 
leave and we're not going to abandon.
    And we hear that all the time and all of the supplemental, 
the funding, will help us to continue to do that and be the 
leader at this very challenging time.
    Mr. Schneider. And I know it's supplemental by terms of our 
appropriations process but this is essential funding that our 
allies need and our security relies upon.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Brad Schneider.
    We now proceed to Congressman Bill Huizenga of Michigan.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, I appreciate you being here today.
    Last year under Chairman Mr. McCaul's leadership I was one 
of the proud authors of the AUKUS Submarine Transfer 
Authorization Act which ultimately signed was signed into law 
via the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA.
    This legislation authorized the sale and transfer of 
conventionally armed--important part, as we'll get into it 
later--nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarines to Australia 
with conditions to ensure that national security considerations 
are made to protect our undersea warfare advantage.
    How are you ensuring--there's kind of two sides to this--
one, what kind of vetting is being done of our allies, both 
British and Australian personnel, required to make this program 
work and what are you doing to ensure then on the other side of 
that that these folks have the proper access needed to and 
around U.S. submarine yards and are you taking advantage of the 
ITAR exemption language for shipyards in my bill as it was 
enacted into law? How are you actually doing that?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. We are actually in the process now of 
developing for both of these in terms of access, in terms of 
vetting.
    We are in the process now of putting together these lists 
of personnel and we are working this with--within the 
interagency and then we want to, you know, work with our 
partners as well.
    But we need to have a list of personnel so that--we're 
actually working on it now.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. We'd love to have an update on how that 
is going and whether there's issues on either the vetting side 
or the access side.
    One provision of the bill discussed at length during the 
markup process was the imperative that submarine production 
targets for the U.S. must be met to ensure that then the 
Australians are able to buy their submarines on time and our 
national security interests are accounted for.
    With that comes necessary signals from industry that 
they're able to bolster production in addition to purchases 
from the U.S. Navy. Do you anticipate the Administration will 
ramp up purchasing in the Fiscal Year 1925 budget request to 
allow this transfer to move forward?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, we are--we have in the budget in 
the supplemental funding to allow for enhancements of submarine 
bases in support of AUKUS. So we are hoping that this will help 
and we will look in the future to see if we need to ramp up 
these----
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. I'll just note, you know, we have--we 
have put significant resources into this Fiscal Year 1918 to 
1922.
    Congress invested nearly a billion in developing suppliers, 
training workforce, and shoring up critical supply chains. 
Fiscal year 1923 the Administration initiated a 5-year 
investment in submarine industrial base totaling $2.4 billion, 
and I'm glad to see--actually on a personal note I'm glad to 
see the Navy and others getting back to those I think what are 
inspiring commercials to young people about getting back in and 
literally welding these behemoths together because they are 
roaming the seas, making sure that not just our country but 
free trade and freedom are being protected.
    So notably----
    Ms. Jenkins. And I just want to--on that I had an 
opportunity to go to the shipyards in Norfolk and so it was 
really--it was really, really good to be there and see that 
happening.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. And I'm anticipating both Norfolk as well 
as Connecticut and some other places that we need to be paying 
attention to.
    Notably, China is not a huge fan--shocker--about us 
bolstering Indo-Pacific partners to deter their unmatched 
regional expansion and aggression.
    They've gone so far as to push misinformation on AUKUS in 
order to further its means. For example, in 2021 at an 
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting, 
the Chinese Ambassador, Ambassador Qian, declared that AUKUS 
was, quote, ``an explicit violation of the object and purpose 
of the nonproliferation treaty--the NPT--and to the detriment 
of the international nonproliferation regime,'' close quote.
    Obviously, that's false. That is not what the NPT regime 
allows. It very clearly distinguishes between propulsion 
systems and weapon systems. What is your department doing, 
though, to counter that misinformation about the transfer?
    You know it. I know it. People in your agency might know 
it. But not only here domestically but internationally what are 
you doing to make sure that these--this misinformation being 
spewed by China is being countermanded?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thanks for the question.
    Actually, we're very active in that. You mentioned the 
IAEA. Our mission in Vienna has done an excellent job of 
combating China every time that they've come to the IAEA with 
that--with those statements and misinformation and they've been 
getting pretty successful in that and more and more countries--
as I said earlier, more and more countries are falling away 
from that and showing any signs of believing that.
    We mention this in all of our international engagements, 
whether it's at the Nuclear NonProliferation Review 
Conference--I mean PrepCom--whether we--you know, we do side 
events during meetings to educate people about what's really 
going on.
    Our colleagues in U.K. and Australia are very much engaged. 
In fact, Australia was a leader in promoting the correct 
information in Southeast Asia and was very helpful in reducing 
a lot of the comments there.
    So we have actually noticed--we had conversation about this 
yesterday that the rhetoric is certainly not winning in the 
IAEA.
    It's not winning because it's falling on--people are 
hearing it but they're not starting to believe it because 
they're seeing the IAEA, the Director General, the reports, and 
he talks about the conversations he's having with Australia and 
the transparency that we're doing.
    So we are combating in all the different forms that we 
have.
    Mr. Huizenga. My time is long gone. Keep it up. Intensify 
that and let us know how we can help. I yield back.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Bill Huizenga.
    We now proceed to Congressman Brad Sherman of California.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    I'd like to comment on some of the comments that have been 
made so far. Our colleague Mr. Castro questions whether Israel 
is following the rules of law, the law of war and the law of 
armed conflict.
    Without objection I'd like to put in the record two 
articles by John Spencer, the chair of the Modern War Institute 
at West Point's Urban Warfare Studies program. He concludes 
that Israel has done the best job in history of complying with 
those--with the laws of war.
    Mr. Wilson. Without objection it shall be happily included.
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    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. The big foreign policy issue that 
we face is the Senate bill so in a way my question is for my 
Republican colleagues rather than--I know where you stand on 
the Senate bill, and this is just a rhetorical question but 
will Republicans be willing to sign a discharge petition so we 
can get a vote on the Senate bill or so that we can at least 
demonstrate to the Speaker that he should bring a version of 
that bill to the floor of the House, perhaps with the border 
provisions, perhaps without the border provisions.
    But if we cannot aid Ukraine and Israel and Taiwan at this 
critical time then we are no longer a world power. The chair, I 
believe, has commented about our industrial base and I've been 
very disappointed in our industrial base.
    Ukraine is carrying on a small war compared to one that 
America would carry out. We have fought wars against Iraq and 
Afghanistan but we maintain a military capable of fighting 
Russia and China simultaneously.
    How many artillery shells is that compared to what we can 
actually produce? How long before we'd run out of ordnance if 
we fought the war for which we built our military?
    And I'll address our witness for just a second. You have 
tough decisions to make--allow an export, not allow an export--
and it's--and I just want you to point out that the worst 
possible answer you could give is wait because that means they 
go somewhere else, perhaps with a contract that would have been 
good for you to approve and that, second, saying no may protect 
our national security. You do not want to export what we should 
not export.
    But it may also hurt our national security because that's 
less money going into the American industrial base and more 
money going in to the industrial base of Russia, China, France, 
or wherever.
    So my question will focus on Taiwan. Taiwan's chief 
representative in Australia said that Taiwan is open to deeper 
collaboration with the U.S., U.K., and Australia under the 
AUKUS framework and in particular joining Pillar Two.
    This would address key issues for Taiwan such as cyber 
capacities, information sharing. Given the existential threats 
to Taiwan do you see potential collaboration of Taiwan in the 
AUKUS framework?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question.
    Just very briefly I want to remark on NSM-20. One thing I 
did not make clear is that this is based on things that we were 
already expecting countries to do in terms of laws of war and 
in terms of humanitarian. So I just want to----
    Mr. Sherman. And I might add people say that there should 
be conditions on our aid to Israel. We already have them. We 
have statutes that require everyone that receives our arms to 
comply with the law of armed conflict.
    I'll turn it back to our witness.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. And on AUKUS, yes, Pillar Two we have 
already made it clear that that's--unlike Pillar One, Pillar 
Two is when we will be looking for partners. We are in the 
process now internally looking at the--what we're going to--you 
know, what the criteria is going to be, which areas of emerging 
technology they may be involved in.
    So these are things that we are looking at right now to see 
which countries will be a part of it, which ones we want to 
invite.
    But, yes, we will be asking more countries to join us on 
that.
    Mr. Sherman. And our hearing here is on AUKUS. There's $8 
billion in this Senate bill for Taiwan. If we fail to provide 
that money does that degrade our national security in the South 
Pacific?
    Ms. Jenkins. What it does is it makes--we have been very 
clear about our support for Taiwan. We're very happy that we 
have this--we have gotten--what we have been able to do with 
the funding.
    We want to get more funding. And it's a signal. It 
certainly will be a signal that we're not as committed as we 
have said we are. So it's very important that we get the 
supplemental.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brad Sherman.
    I now proceed to Congressman Brian Mast of Florida.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ma'am, up here. Per your opening comments you're here 
representing the idea that you support a Palestinian State, 
correct?
    Ms. Jenkins. We support a two-State solution.
    Mr. Mast. OK. Have you looked at that objectively?
    Ms. Jenkins. What do you mean have I looked at it 
objectively?
    Mr. Mast. Have you analyzed that objectively?
    Ms. Jenkins. This is--this is something that we do support, 
yes.
    Mr. Mast. That's not an answer. Have you analyzed a second 
Palestinian State objectively? Have you--have you analyzed it 
objectively?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure exactly what you're asking. Have 
I personally analyzed it?
    Mr. Mast. You do not know what it means to objectively 
analyze something?
    Ms. Jenkins. I know what it means subjectively. I do not--
--
    Mr. Mast. OK. So have you done that?
    Ms. Jenkins. No, I have not.
    Mr. Mast. You----
    Ms. Jenkins. If I understand your question.
    Mr. Mast. You might not be because I cannot believe that 
you would answer it in that way. So let me just start over. 
You're here representing support for a Palestinian State, 
correct?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes. Yes.
    Mr. Mast. Have you analyzed that support objectively?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
    Mr. Mast. Well, you just said no. So----
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm trying to understand what you're saying.
    Mr. Mast. I thought I made it pretty simple. But you said 
no but I'll grant you that now you said yes, you have looked at 
it objectively.
    So having looked at it objectively, which I would assume 
somebody in your position does, who would you assess would lead 
that Palestinian state?
    Pick a group. You could name a group but I'm saying Hamas, 
Palestinian Authority, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, some 
other group--who would lead it?
    Ms. Jenkins. I think that has to be something that's 
considered. I do not think I'm in a position to say----
    Mr. Mast. Who did you objectively assess would lead it in 
determining you have support for a Palestinian state?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not--I do not want to--I do not think 
that I can answer that question. I think this has--this is part 
of a larger discussion.
    Mr. Mast. But you objectively assessed that you support a 
Palestinian State.
    Ms. Jenkins. I do support a----
    Mr. Mast. In objectively assessing that who do you assess 
would lead that state? What group that does not receive 
military support from, say, Iran do you assess would lead that 
state?
    Ms. Jenkins. I understand your question but I think I would 
have to have a little--I would--I do not feel comfortable 
saying that without having more understanding.
    Mr. Mast. Have you not assessed what group would lead it? 
Have you or have you not assessed who would become the leader 
of that Palestinian state?
    Ms. Jenkins. This is part--this is part of a larger 
discussion.
    Mr. Mast. But have you or have you not assessed that?
    Ms. Jenkins. I have--this is a part of a larger discussion. 
I do not think----
    Mr. Mast. Yes.
    Ms. Jenkins. I cannot answer that question.
    Mr. Mast. You cannot answer whether you have or have not 
assessed who would be the state?
    Ms. Jenkins. I cannot--I cannot answer a question about me, 
particularly what I think what it should be. I mean, I think 
that's part of----
    Mr. Mast. You came here and said there should be a 
Palestinian State. Have you or have you not assessed who would 
lead that? Just yes or no, have you looked at who would lead it 
or have you not?
    Ms. Jenkins. I support a two-State solution.
    Mr. Mast. I know. You said that numerous times. Have you or 
have you not assessed who would become the leader of that 
state? Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian 
Authority? Somewhere else? Who have you assessed who it would 
be?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not feel comfortable. I'm sorry. I do not 
feel comfortable answering that question and I feel----
    Mr. Mast. You do not feel comfortable saying if you have 
assessed something?
    Ms. Jenkins. No. What I do not feel comfortable with is 
making a statement when I think it's part of a larger 
discussion.
    Mr. Mast. Don't even say who it is. Just answer have you 
assessed it? Have you assessed who would lead it?
    Ms. Jenkins. There--put it this way. There will be an 
assessment of this question within the U.S. Government in terms 
of who we think should be----
    Mr. Mast. So you came here supporting something you have 
not assessed?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not in a--I'm not in a position right now 
to say what that is because I think this is part of a larger 
discussion.
    Mr. Mast. This--honestly, it's amazing. I think it goes 
back to your original statement, which was probably the correct 
one, that you have not objectively looked at this and you got 
it right when you said that.
    Ms. Jenkins. It's not a--it's not a personal----
    Mr. Mast. I'm going to move on to another question.
    Ms. Jenkins. It's part of what the U.S. Government wants to 
do. I cannot--I feel like----
    Mr. Mast. You're supposed to be the part of the U.S. 
Government that does that.
    Mr. Sherman. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Mast. So I will not. I have more time.
    Ms. Jenkins. I am part of the U.S. Government but I'm not 
going to say what the government should do.
    Mr. Mast. Sorry. I have more questions. So I apologize. So 
do you assess that a Palestinian State would be more likely to 
be designated as a major non-NATO ally like Israel or Egypt or 
would you assess that they would have to be labeled a State 
sponsor of terror?
    Ms. Jenkins. I cannot answer that question.
    Mr. Mast. Have you assessed that?
    Ms. Jenkins. These are questions that I'm not in a position 
to answer.
    Mr. Mast. I'm asking if--you are in the position to answer 
if you have assessed whether that would be the case. You came 
here sitting before Congress saying you are here representing 
the idea that there should be a Palestinian State.
    You said you looked at it objectively, which you probably 
did not, and I'm asking if you have--if you assessed that. So 
you can answer whether you assessed something or not.
    Ms. Jenkins. What I can answer is this is part of a 
discussion that I do not think that I should be making those 
decisions or answering these questions right now.
    Mr. Mast. Answering what--you do not think you should 
answer whether you assessed something is amazing.
    Let me ask one more question. Why do you think that we 
should make a country out of a people that just conducted a 
Jewish genocide 4 months ago?
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure what you're--what you're asking 
now.
    Mr. Mast. Can I have time to repeat the question for her, 
Mr. Chair----
    Mr. Wilson. Yes.
    Mr. Mast [continuing]. Since she does not understand?
    Mr. Connolly. I object. Mr. Chairman----
    Mr. Mast. She's asking for a clarification.
    Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Chairman, the time limit 
has occurred.
    Mr. Mast. So the question, to repeat it since you said you 
do not understand it was----
    Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I continue to object.
    Mr. Mast. Why do you want to make a country of a people----
    Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Mast [continuing]. That just conducted a Jewish 
genocide? I said it very clearly.
    Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Mast. Please answer.
    Ms. Jenkins. I'm not going to respond to questions about 
that. Sorry. I do not--I do not feel like I--I want to answer 
your question. I really do.
    But I just do not feel like I'm in a position right now 
that I can answer those type of questions. When I--this is a 
question that's going to be just--this is a question for the 
U.S. Government and----
    Mr. Mast. You're the U.S. Government.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I know.
    Mr. Mast. But, undoubtedly, you cannot answer.
    Ms. Jenkins. But we haven't--we're still--we're still 
making----
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me to 
repeat the question that apparently was not clear.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Congressman Brian 
Mast.
    We now proceed to Congressman--former president of the 
NATO-PA Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm sorry for that berating. You know, the chairman began 
this hearing bemoaning the fact that the Biden Administration 
has, you know, been slow in coming to the aid of Taiwan. Is 
there aid to Taiwan in the bipartisan security package----
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, there is.
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. That passed the Senate?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, there is.
    Mr. Connolly. And is that being blocked by Republican 
leadership here in the House?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it is.
    Mr. Connolly. Now, Mr. Perry complained about his concern 
that Iran is marching toward nuclear capability. Could we, 
should we, have had some kind of arms control agreement to 
prevent that from happening?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
    Mr. Connolly. And what was that called?
    Ms. Jenkins. JCPOA. JCPOA.
    Mr. Connolly. And what happened to that?
    Ms. Jenkins. We withdrew from JCPOA.
    Mr. Connolly. Who did that?
    Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
    Mr. Connolly. Is that a Republican or a Democratic 
Administration?
    Ms. Jenkins. Republican.
    Mr. Connolly. Trump?
    Ms. Jenkins. Trump.
    Mr. Connolly. Oh. Well, what about the intermediate range 
nuclear forces treaty, you know, that had been between us and 
the former Soviet Union, now Russia? What happened to that one?
    Ms. Jenkins. We withdrew from that one.
    Mr. Connolly. We withdrew from that. And who withdrew from 
that?
    Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration. President Trump.
    Mr. Connolly. President Trump. And do you think the world 
is more or less secure since 2019 with that decision?
    Ms. Jenkins. The world is more secure if we have valid arms 
control treaties.
    Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry?
    Ms. Jenkins. The world is more secure with valid arms 
control treaties.
    Mr. Connolly. So it's the opposite. We're less secure----
    Ms. Jenkins. Less secure.
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Because we withdrew from that.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
    Mr. Connolly. Otherwise, that sounds like yes, we have no 
bananas.
    OK. What are the Open Skies treaty and New START? What 
about those? What happened to those?
    Ms. Jenkins. Open Skies we are no longer party to that and 
New START treaty right now Russia has suspended.
    Mr. Connolly. But did we withdraw from that treaty?
    Ms. Jenkins. We did not withdraw from New START.
    Mr. Connolly. The Open Skies treaty----
    Ms. Jenkins. Open Skies treaty we did.
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. We did and who did that?
    Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
    Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry.
    Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
    Mr. Connolly. You do not want to name it.
    Ms. Jenkins. President Trump.
    Mr. Connolly. President Trump. And that was a 34-nation 
treaty that contributed to security, from your point of view?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it did.
    Mr. Connolly. So we're by definition less secure. OK. What 
about the Law of the Seas treaty? Now, that one--surely we 
could agree to that one, right?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Well, we--yes, it would be good if we did 
because it hasn't----
    Mr. Connolly. Did we is my question.
    Ms. Jenkins. Oh. We haven't, no.
    Mr. Connolly. We are not a party to the treaty.
    Now, when we're looking at security in the Indo-Pacific who 
benefits from American nonparticipation in the Law of the Sea 
treaty?
    Ms. Jenkins. China.
    Mr. Connolly. China. And is China a member of the treaty? 
Did they sign the treaty?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not recall, honestly.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes. The answer is yes.
    Ms. Jenkins. OK. Good.
    Mr. Connolly. And they participate in every committee and 
subcommittee created by the Law of the Seas authority and we're 
not there. What could go wrong with that, Madam Under 
Secretary?
    Ms. Jenkins. Mm-hmm. Yes, we need to be present.
    Mr. Connolly. Does that contribute to our security in the 
region?
    Ms. Jenkins. No. Us not being present does not contribute 
to our security.
    Mr. Connolly. And with respect finally to President Biden's 
big security package supplemental and the big bipartisan vote 
in the Senate this week do you think that our security would be 
enhanced or damaged with House consideration and passage of 
that bipartisan agreement?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's be strongly enhanced if we had that. 
Strongly enhanced if we have it.
    Mr. Connolly. And do you think we're diminished if we do 
not act on it?
    Ms. Jenkins. We are diminished if we do not.
    Mr. Connolly. In terms of, for example, NATO alliance, 
credibility, reliability?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, Ukraine--I mean, there's so many 
things in this--in the supplemental that really strengthens our 
security and being able to provide and be a leader in these 
issues.
    Mr. Connolly. Well, that's interesting that we're having a 
hearing on security and it's fascinating to actually delve into 
various treaties and agreements, all of which have been damaged 
by the previous Administration.
    Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
    Now we proceed to Congressman Tom Kean of New Jersey.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This committee held a hearing in May 2023 that focused on 
AUKUS and ways to improve U.S. arms exports. Since that hearing 
we successfully negotiated language in the Fiscal Year 1924 
National Defense Authorization Act to a clear pathway forward 
to realize the potential of AUKUS which the President then 
signed into law.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, thank you for being with us here 
today. I look forward to your answers to my questions. The U.K. 
has worked closely with the U.S. in some of the most sensitive 
military technologies including naval nuclear propulsion for 
the British through our mutual defense agreement and the 
Polaris sales agreement. We have fought side by side with them 
in every major conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries.
    Recently we worked with the Australians to combat threats 
posed by Chinese recruiters to ex-military pilots and have 
altered their laws with the National Security Act of 2023 to 
reflect that threat.
    This is precisely the type of cooperation that we would 
expect from our closest allies. Allies as close as this deserve 
an ITAR exemption.
    Under Secretary Jenkins, do you agree with that statement?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Kean. Can you provide examples of recent ITAR 
violations that preclude giving the ITAR exemption to the 
British?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not know of any.
    Mr. Kean. Neither do I. Can you commit that you will 
provide the British the whole nation ITAR exemption that will 
work and not fail as the defense trade control treaties?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and we are working to make that happen.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. Russia--this is on a different area--
Russia's Rosatom has long been a Kremlin tool to influence and 
coerce around the world and evade Western sanctions. Do you 
agree with this?
    Ms. Jenkins. Sorry, I missed the first point. Could you say 
that again?
    Mr. Kean. Russia's Rosatom has long been a Kremlin tool to 
influence and coerce around the world and to evade Western 
sanctions. Do you agree with this sentiment?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
    Mr. Kean. OK. What is the department doing to meaningfully 
develop alternative supply chains in the U.S. and allied 
countries that are not dependent on Rosatom for nuclear fuel?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are very interested in making sure 
that we can help countries move away from relying on Russia and 
Rosatom. We have--there's--once again in the supplemental 
there's funding there to find alternative sources for the 
supply chain.
    We have come to agreements with countries to help countries 
find--we have agreement with a number of NATO countries as 
well. We have--with the G-7 actions. We have statements that 
were made at COP.
    These are multilateral efforts and, in addition, you know, 
of course, a lot of Europe has been trying to move away from 
Russia. So we--this is something we're very serious about it 
and we're working multilaterally with countries and we want to 
get the funding to actually do some more of that.
    Mr. Kean. The few sanctions on Rosatom executives and its 
subsidiaries to date are insufficient.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we have sanctions.
    Mr. Kean. The U.K. as one example has sanctioned more of 
Rosatom executives. Why is the U.S. not moving faster in 
coordination with allies to sanction Rosatom and its 
subsidiaries?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we have sanctioned Rosatom. We, of 
course, can continue to work with our partners to continue to 
sanction them. It's not something that's done. We can continue 
to do that and we will.
    Mr. Kean. Well, I think that it needs to be deeper and more 
truly impactful to people who want to--who are benefiting from 
Rosatom relationships.
    Which European countries work most closely with Rosatom 
right now?
    Ms. Jenkins. I do not know offhand but I can get back to 
you.
    Mr. Kean. Can you please?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I would.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thanks.
    Mr. McCormick [presiding]. With that, the gentleman yields.
    And with that, Hon. Mr. Costa from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you, 
Madam Secretary.
    Obviously, the topic this morning is to try to focus on 
American security and with our allies and AUKUS in particular. 
But as you observed I think this committee is interested in a 
wide range of security issues affecting our country and our 
alliances.
    Could you give me a brief update on where you think AUKUS 
stands in terms of our matrix and our goals to deal with that 
modernization and any clear challenges? Because I want to segue 
as well to some of our other security issues.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, just as--there's a couple of 
things. There's--I mentioned earlier some of the work that 
we're already doing with the U.K. and Australia so that we can 
certify them----
    Mr. Costa. Are you saying we're on schedule?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are actually ahead of----
    Mr. Costa. Time lines--we're ahead of schedule?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes. We are working hard to do the time 
lines and we're actually way before the normal timeframe for 
something like this, which is usually six to 12 months.
    Mr. Costa. OK. Part of our other modernization in terms of 
strengthening our alliances is the effort that the 
Administration has done with regards to the discussions that is 
really, I think, somewhat historical between South Korea and 
Japan.
    I do not know if you've been engaged in that particular 
area. But where do you think the progress is there with Japan 
modernizing their constitution and getting more focused? I 
think this is very important.
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, what I can say on this issue is that we 
have been obviously focusing a lot on both Japan and South 
Korea a lot because of the North Korean threat but also because 
we want to strengthen our relationship with them.
    So, you know, we have had the Washington statement, the 
extended deterrence talks, a lot of engagement that we're 
doing.
    Mr. Costa. And I think the North Korea threat is clearly--I 
mean, we're focused in Ukraine and in the Middle East as we 
should be. But I think that and now with the situation with 
China and Taiwan we do not want to lose sight of the challenges 
we're facing there.
    Ms. Jenkins. No, I agree. Right. I totally agree with you 
and, you know, the whole strategy, whether we're talking about 
Taiwan, whether we're talking about more engagements with Indo-
Pacific overall, all the work we're doing with the Philippines 
and then there's, as I said, the Washington statement that we 
had with the Republic of Korea, all the extended deterrence 
talks that we have had, the visit of the submarine to Korea to 
show strength, there's a lot that we're doing in that region in 
addition to what we're doing in Ukraine.
    Mr. Costa. Right. Which brings me to the question, and you 
noted it and others have mentioned it. And by the way, I want 
to associate myself with the comments with Representative 
Connolly.
    I think our--you know, and the previous Trump 
Administration backing away with various agreements that we had 
has weakened our security, not strengthened our security, and 
to ignore that, I think, is really not to understand the big 
picture in terms of whether we're dealing with security in 
Asia, Southeast Asia with our allies or whether we're dealing 
with it in the Middle East or Europe.
    So that brings me to my frustration. The funding that's in 
the supplemental not only provides our support in terms of 
Ukraine, and Ukraine has really done an incredible job given 
their resources--regaining over half the land that Russia took.
    This unprovoked attack by a war criminal, a war criminal 
named Putin, and anyone who associates with Putin or takes his 
side simply, I think, as the President said is ignoring our 
democratic responsibilities as the leader of the free world.
    But the funding does not just stop there. It provides 
assistance for Israel, one of our most valuable allies, and 
humanitarian assistance and, frankly, that humanitarian 
assistance as the world is watching is critical, do not you 
believe?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it certainly is.
    Mr. Costa. And the humanitarian assistance goes beyond to 
120,000 Armenians that have lost their native homeland in 
Nagorno-Karabakh who are now faced with Azerbaijan and they 
just attacked and killed five soldiers in Armenia yesterday and 
destroying our----
    I mean, the world's watching and our responsibility is 
there. And by the way, does not the supplemental provide $30 
billion to replenish America's own defense capability?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and I just want to make sure before the 
time runs out that--to highlight what I do not think has been 
said enough is about the humanitarian side and the funding does 
go to these issues that we talked about, Taiwan and Ukraine and 
Israel and obviously things related to AUKUS. But we are 
looking at----
    Mr. Costa. And the world's watching. The European Union has 
just in the last week provided $52 billion euro and we're 
sitting here abdicating our own responsibilities and 
undermining our own very security. Our own very security is 
being undermined because of our inability to come together on 
what seems to me common sense.
    And certainly the border security is an issue. We had an 
opportunity to resolve the border security. But I guess we 
found out that the border security by some of our folks is no 
longer important and we can wait to the end of the year.
    My time is expired. But I think that, frankly, we got to 
come together here and we got to come together soon. Our 
security depends on it.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields and I 
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    You cited in a discussion with Mr. Connolly just recently 
that we are now less safe by withdrawing from certain treaties 
that we had. Specifically, Russia has a clear history of 
violations of the INF, Open Skies and New START.
    The question I have for you do these arms agreements 
benefit us if one side is not complying to the agreement and 
the other side is? How does that benefit us and make us safer 
or less safe?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think we have to understand that arms 
control treaties benefit the global community and it benefits 
us.
    For example, let's talk about New START. New START is still 
very much in our national security interests. Currently, while 
the Russians have suspended the treaty they still remain within 
the numerical limits of the treaty and we have done lawful 
countermeasures as a result of this suspension.
    But it's still within our national security interest. We do 
not want a situation where there's no treaty, which means 
Russia can still start developing even more weapons. You know, 
it's the other side of deterrence. It's in our interests to try 
to find ways through arms control to limit arms races.
    Mr. McCormick. So I would make the counterpoint that 
whether it be these agreements or World Trade Organization or 
the Paris Accords or anything, if the United States is the only 
one following the rules, the only one decreasing carbon 
imprint, the only one who's paying the bills, the only one 
who's following the rules and everybody else is cheating that's 
not really putting us at an advantage at all.
    That's not the purpose of a treaty to begin with. And 
before you respond I just want to say that did the Trump 
Administration cite the treaty violations as a reason to 
withdraw from the treaties?
    Ms. Jenkins. Oh, there were conversations, yes, about that 
part of the treaty, yes.
    Mr. McCormick. Of course they did. OK. Thank you. So I just 
want to point out the point, look, whether it be China 
violating the World Trade Organization when we take them to 
court they're wrong every time. They just find other ways to 
cheat.
    China is paying attention to these treaties and if we're 
allowing people to cheat in these treaties it sets us up for 
bigger failures on grander scales where we have a global 
strategic issue at hand and that's why I disagree with your 
point.
    I mean, we're just going to have to have an impasse at that 
because I think if one person is cheating and the other person 
is following the rules it does not put you in an advantage.
    It does not give you whether--and certainly when you're 
talking about a global agreement the rest of the world is 
paying attention to this, too.
    Ms. Jenkins. Could I respond?
    Mr. McCormick. Quickly, please.
    Ms. Jenkins. Just very briefly, just put it in context, I 
understand we're talking about the New START treaty but there 
are other treaties that have over 180 countries that are 
parties to them and these treaties develop norms and help to 
provide some kind of strategic stability within the 
international system.
    So they do have a value and even though I understand that 
in this case with Russia with their suspending the treaty right 
now the treaty still exists and it's in our interest to try to 
keep it going.
    Mr. McCormick. With all due respect, I'm not worried about 
other countries besides Russia, Iran, China, North Korea. I do 
not think the other countries are nefarious. It's unfair to 
judge the other countries based on those countries that are 
cheating and I will not agree with you on that point.
    With that said, when we talk about Pillar Two allies what 
do you think the nations--what nations do you think are most 
important to us including those Pillar Two talks about sharing 
of technologies?
    Obviously, New Zealand wants to be one of those. We have 
Australia right now that we're sharing information with and 
we're going to help them with submarine programs. Who do you 
think the most important Pillar Two future allies are?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and actually that's something we're 
actually looking at. We're looking at this at this very moment. 
As we're speaking we're looking at which countries will be the 
ones that we think will be most beneficial both ways to bring--
--
    Mr. McCormick. And what are they?
    Ms. Jenkins. I cannot say because we haven't made that 
decision yet.
    Mr. McCormick. OK.
    Ms. Jenkins. But we'll--I mean, we'll----
    Mr. McCormick. I hope we're considering New Zealand. I hope 
we're considering India, for that matter. When it comes to 
submarine production and technologies that we're sharing one of 
the problems we have we have a limited number of ports that can 
build these enormous ships and submarines. China has about 50. 
We have about two.
    How are we even going to keep up with our own production 
needs let alone anybody that's agreed in this AUKUS production 
abroad because we are woefully behind right now. What's your 
strategic plan?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I know--right. Well, I notice that the 
supplemental has some funding to do that and this is something 
that we'll just have keep doing. I mean, we'll have to keep 
refining----
    Mr. McCormick. With all due respect, once again, 2027 is 
what China said is our drop dead time to take over Taiwan. We 
do not have time. We should not have vague, opaque ideas of 
what we're going to do. We have to have a plan to move forward 
now.
    The time is now. We're running out of time to protect two 
of the most strategically important things to our future, which 
is AI and a sea lane that controls 70 percent of the world's 
wealth. The time is now.
    Ms. Jenkins. And part of--and part of AUKUS is to start 
developing these--for example, these AI and emerging 
technologies in an interoperable way so we can defend 
ourselves.
    Mr. McCormick. OK. Like I said, I need a specific plan, 
please.
    A final point, if I may take a little liberty with myself 
since I'm in the chair right now, one of the things that just 
recently happened we gave Israel 700 rifles that were promised 
to them from Daniel Defense.
    The other 4,500 were approved by Congress but then have 
been held up by the Biden Administration to be given to Israel 
as part of their defense.
    My question is if we're not going to give low technology 
weaponry to Israel, a fairly defined ally for a long time now, 
in a time of war how can we trust the Biden Administration to 
release even more technologically advanced weapons to allies 
and friends in even more strategically important future 
conflicts including Taiwan and other places? How can we trust 
you to release that if we cannot even give it to a known friend 
during a time of war?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, two things. We are still in the process 
right now of deliberating on that.
    But I would also like to say that, you know, different 
situations have different processes and so I would not 
necessarily say that what we do here in this case is exactly 
the same as Ukraine or exactly the same as any other situation. 
We are----
    Mr. McCormick. You're absolutely right. It's not the exact 
same thing.
    Ms. Jenkins. We're deliberating now on that particular case 
to see where we're going to go.
    Mr. McCormick. So you're deliberating on it during a time 
of war with a close ally on low tech weaponry. We're 
deliberating on giving them the assets they need to defend 
themselves. I just want to point that out.
    Ms. Jenkins. And we're also hoping that we'll get a 
supplemental that will also give them more funding that will 
also help----
    Mr. McCormick. So if we give you the supplemental you're 
going to go ahead and give them the weapons? Is that it? Are we 
being held hostage for that?
    Ms. Jenkins. Oh, we need to continue our deliberations but 
we should also give them funding----
    Mr. McCormick. So I will just note that the deliberations 
are delaying weapons for a known ally during a time of war and 
even if we approve whatever bill you want to put in front of us 
you may do the same thing anyways.
    With that, I yield myself.
    I now recognize Representative Jackson from Illinois for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Acting Chairman 
McCormick. Thank you, Honorable Bonnie Jenkins, for your 
service and your hard work and dedication and your candor and 
the time you've given us today.
    Regarding the AUKUS I'd like to know how will the AUKUS 
agreement secure U.S. interest and promote peace in the Indo-
Pacific? I've had the opportunity with Member Kim to travel 
most recently to many of the countries in the Indo-Pacific 
area. Please answer that for me.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you.
    Actually, the whole--one of the major focus of AUKUS is in 
fact to make the Indo-Pacific open and free and to provide 
security in the Indo-Pacific region and that's one of the major 
points of it.
    So, you know, whereas Two Pillars, as you know--I mean, by 
building the submarines and helping Australia with this 
nuclear-powered submarine we see that as a way to have all 
three countries to work together to strengthen the Indo-Pacific 
region and its security.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. In this trilateral agreement what 
new opportunities has this created for us to strengthen our 
defense and security in the region?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's going to allow us to work with all--with 
both countries in developing a very strong interoperable 
process in terms of our technology, not just with the 
submarines but in terms of our technology.
    It's going to promote integrated deterrence and will help 
develop our industrial base. It will help to develop and 
promote our science and technology--our STEM individuals.
    So there's a huge side of it that's about people and 
developing that aspect of it and it really is going to expand 
our relationship with two countries who are long partners with 
us where we have a history of working with them but also 
eventually to include other countries as well in terms of the 
work that we do in emerging technologies.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Beyond the intelligence efforts 
are there legal reforms or changes under consideration in 
Australia and the U.K. to support investigations and 
prosecutions of crimes?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, that--yes, those are the--those are 
examples of things. We're actually having conversations with 
them right now. I mean, I talked a little bit today about, you 
know, questions we're having based on new bills and legislation 
that they're actually doing in the U.K. and Australia so that 
we can certify them.
    So they are actually stepping up and taking a leading role 
in their countries and making sure that we can do all of this 
and we are working with them in that process to make sure 
everything is in place so that we can certify them.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. I would like to thank you for your 
candor, your spirit of cooperation, and your openness and 
transparency. Was there anything else you'd like to add to the 
record?
    Ms. Jenkins. No. It's just basically what I said earlier. I 
mean, one of the things that's most important to us in addition 
to passing the supplemental is the bipartisan support that we 
have seen on AUKUS and as I said earlier Australia sees it. The 
U.K. sees it.
    So it's a message that we are--that we remain very serious 
about this initiative, this very exciting initiative. So we 
hope that that can continue.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Again, I thank you very much. I 
yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    Mr. McCormick. The gentleman yields.
    And with that we recognize Mr. Baird from Indiana for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Under Secretary 
Jenkins, we appreciate you taking the time to be with us.
    So Madam Secretary, I've heard that ITAR, which is the 
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, compliance can 
be burdensome for many of those involved. Can you explain what 
the process looks like for an ITAR license?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. When the license comes in, you know, we 
always--we look at the cap policy and we measure everything by 
our commission on transfer policy and we base everything on 
that.
    And then there's a process where we go through it with 
about 24 hours. We do not hold on--24 to 48 hours--we do not 
hold on to requests for very long. I know there's been a lot of 
questions about the delays in providing equipment to countries 
and ITAR.
    But we do our deliberations within State very--pretty 
rapidly. And then, you know, we have to get--in some cases it 
goes to Congress for them to look at and review.
    And if everything goes through that's when--unfortunately, 
that's when a lot of the delay occurs because we have delays in 
our industrial base and that's one of the reasons why we are 
not as quick as we could be in terms of providing equipment 
that's being requested.
    But that's something that we want to fix. It's something 
that's in the supplemental and we need to fix that because--not 
only for all countries who are concerned about the delay but 
because we have to continue to support Israel and Ukraine.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. And continuing on in that vein, in 
that process where's your department seeing the most time spent 
on the license and compliance?
    Is it registration? Is it application for temporary 
license? Is it implementing internal compliance programs? Or is 
it something else?
    Ms. Jenkins. The process is pretty--obviously, it's very 
standard and, you know, as I had said earlier we do not run 
into a lot of problems with the process within State 
Department.
    It really is--and the Congress notifications and the cases 
where we have them is not usually cumbersome either. The outcry 
is really after that. That's where the real issue is.
    Mr. Baird. So my last question then deals with--does the 
Administration and your department believe that an exemption to 
either the U.K. or Australia--is that a threat to our national 
security?
    Ms. Jenkins. It's not a threat to our national security and 
that's why we are making sure that we have everything in place. 
First, I want to say these are two countries who have been 
partners for very--obviously, for very many years.
    We have worked together on so many things. So we're 
building on existing relationships and we have a lot of 
experience in some of these issues.
    So we are fine tuning everything and getting the 
legislation that needs to be passed in Australia and the U.K. 
so that we can actually certify and ensure that our information 
is protected.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. I appreciate your response to those 
questions and that's all the questions I have.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    Mr. McCormick. The gentleman yields.
    And with that, we recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Davidson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for being here 
today. I appreciate the work that you're doing to make sure we 
get this really sensitive job right on who do we release 
weapons to, what weapons are released, do we expect people to 
pay us for them.
    We used to sell these things and we have had an unfortunate 
circumstance of giving them away in lots of cases and 
occasionally to people that probably should not have gotten 
them.
    So one of the things that we have debated recently is what 
kind of oversight should Congress have with that and, of 
course, we get some level of notification on this and, you 
know, I just wonder in your experience doing the role do the 
notification requirements to Congress really affect the front 
end of whether you transfer weapons or sell the weapons?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it does, and I--you know, we very much 
value the notification period, very much value the opportunity 
for Congress to weigh in.
    What I would also say is not only is there the notification 
period biannual, my political-military affairs experts and 
colleagues are very often up here on the Hill briefing 
staffers. I think they come up every other week to do briefings 
about what's happening.
    So it's an opportunity for us to hear from you, not just 
with the notifications in between.
    Mr. Davidson. So I think the notifications are really 
important. We do not always have to give approval but we at 
least have awareness of what's going on.
    But I think one of the things I've found common ground with 
a lot of my colleagues across the aisle is the idea of 
structuring. So when you structure payments in the financial 
services world you can run into legal problems if you, say, 
make lots of cash deposits just under $10,000 because then it's 
treated as no, no, no, you deposited $25,000--we see what you 
did there.
    But when it comes to arms transactions we have reporting 
thresholds that some people want to raise. Some want to raise a 
lot. Some want to raise a little. But, you know, can you have 
an endless series of transactions that come in just below the 
threshold?
    And this isn't for approval. This is just for notification. 
Where do you land on this discussion?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I would just say that we--at the State 
Department we are at this point, you know, leaving out the 
industrial base process we're pretty satisfied with our 
engagement.
    But we think--we think, as I said, we have a pretty well-
worn machine particularly after recently with Ukraine and 
Israel where we really had to sharpen up and really get fast at 
these things and it works very well.
    But you know, and we--as I said, we are always on the Hill 
and, you know, letting you know what's going on and then having 
an opportunity to talk.
    But having said that, you know, we always open to having 
conversations about--you know, about the process.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. Just so you know, we are 
working on how to properly address structuring. We want the 
right people to get the weapons, our allies in particular, and 
the legislation we recently considered certainly treats NATO 
differently than non-NATO members, and so close allies probably 
qualify for a different program than others.
    One of the concerns we have had, and I think everyone 
shares a concern about the Iranian approach in the Middle East. 
They are the destabilizing force in the Middle East and, 
clearly, Republicans have looked at Iran differently.
    But, you know, there have been recent claims by senior 
Iranian leaders that the country now possesses all the 
components and nuclear fuel required to produce atomic weapons.
    These claims appear to have increased since the 10/7 
attacks by Hamas, which is armed and financed by the regime in 
Iran, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has been in a 
standoff with Tehran over its refusal to allow inspectors to 
visit multiple sites inside Iran where they believe that there 
are undeclared nuclear materials and equipment.
    In addition, in late December IAEA warned that Iran had 
tripled its monthly production of weapons grade uranium. So as 
I'm sure you know the Biden Administration recently did a 
sanctions waiver that allows Iran to access--that did allow 
Iran to access $10 billion in revenue generated from Iraqi 
electricity sales that were previously held in escrow.
    Do you think that the money could help Iran?
    Ms. Jenkins. That money is not going to Iran. That's being 
used for humanitarian purposes. It's not going to Iran.
    Mr. Davidson. Humanitarian purposes to Hamas then?
    Ms. Jenkins. No. No, it's not going to those purposes at 
all.
    Mr. Davidson. So but in a way how does money--money is 
fungible. So I can tell you if you give my company--I'm back in 
the private sector now. Let's say I'm not in Congress anymore 
and I go back to running my company, and you give me $10 
billion I promise I will not use any of it on executive 
compensation. Do you think it would help my company?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, what I would say on that is I would like 
to offer an opportunity to brief you more on that because----
    Mr. Davidson. I would love to. But of course it would. 
Everyone knows it would. I yield.
    Ms. Jenkins. That's why I think--I do want to give you an 
opportunity to have more information on that. But, I mean, 
that----
    Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields.
    With that I recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. 
Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And at the outset of 
my remarks I just want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking 
Member Meeks, the committee staff, for the opportunity to join 
here today but also for their amazing hard work in the fall to 
get the AUKUS authorities package out of this committee over to 
the House Armed Services Committee so that we were able in 
conference to really get it done in time and President Biden 
signed it into law on December 23d. Again, a historic bill.
    You know, the foreign military sales aspect for the sale of 
nuclear-powered submarines, which has never happened before, 
was included in it, and also the ITAR reforms which, again, 
there has been good colloquy here today about that as well.
    One other aspect which hasn't been mentioned is that the 
government of Australia as part of the Optimal Pathway plan, 
which was released in March 2023, agreed to invest $3 billion 
into the U.S. submarine industrial base.
    That has never happened before and I can say that because 
that's why we had to pass a law to set up a system where, 
again, another country--in this case, obviously, a great ally--
would be able to follow through on that commitment.
    And I mention that because as you have said, Madam 
Secretary, is just--you know, on Tuesday night the Senate 
passed the national security package. Again, Israel, Ukraine, 
you know, obviously the biggest focus of all.
    But one other aspect was $3.3 billion into the submarine 
industrial base of the United States, which is to expand 
capacity so that we can actually meet our own Navy needs as 
well as also making sure that we can be ready to sell that 
first sub by 2032.
    And, you know, again, the ink is barely dry on the AUKUS 
legislation that we just passed but, obviously, we have more 
work to do, and I will just tell my friends here as someone who 
co-chairs the Friends of Australia Caucus in the AUKUS Working 
Group this investment that's in the supplemental is something 
that is being watched like a hawk in terms of, you know, 
whether or not we're really serious about following through, 
you know, on what I think is one of the smartest moves we have 
made in terms of, you know, a deteriorating security 
environment and the Indo-Pacific.
    And, again, I wonder if you could just talk about that. I 
mean, this is really a linchpin to making sure that AUKUS 
succeeds.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you for that. Totally agree with 
you, I mean, and I like that you phrase it as they're watching 
us because, you know, I have interactions with my U.K. and 
Australian colleagues on a regular basis and they are, as you 
said, extremely committed to this.
    They've done new legislation. They've committed a lot of 
money to this. They have, you know, gone through their 
processes to, you know, start sending, you know, people over 
here to learn about our processes in terms of our bases.
    So they are all in. They are all in and we are all in. But 
we have to keep showing that we're all in and, as you said 
people are watching what's happening with the supplemental and 
they know that there is money in the supplemental that's 
related to AUKUS.
    And, you know, this is not just--this is not just money. 
This is policy. This is priorities. This is what the U.S. cares 
about and everyone understands that. So we need to pass the 
supplemental because of all the things in here including AUKUS 
that shows the U.S. wants to continue to be a leader.
    Mr. Courtney. And among those who are watching is China 
because, you know, they, again, will pounce on the failure to 
follow through on this as an example that it's really never 
going to happen or, you know, it's all talk.
    You know, as someone who represents the General Dynamics 
shipyard where--which the general contractor for the Virginia-
class program, first of all, we have just had our first three 
Australian naval officers show up in town as part of a 2023 
authorization that, again, is going to start training them up 
to get that proficiency to operate a nuclear-powered submarine.
    But we also are looking forward to getting shipyard 
workers, to skill them up to make sure that they can take this 
on and that, again, is back in your portfolio. We want to make 
sure that we really do not keep the shipyard sort of carved out 
into places where they can and cannot go. We want to make sure 
they as quickly and comprehensively as possible learn how to--
these skills.
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I totally agree, and as I mentioned 
earlier this is an important part of AUKUS that does not get as 
much attention is the training and the exchange of individuals 
at different shipyards and learning about what's happening.
    I mentioned earlier that I visited a shipyard a few months 
ago and all because of AUKUS to really move this forward.
    So, yes, we're not going to forget that.
    Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields.
    And with that the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burgess, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
ma'am, for being here.
    Do you feel like Iran is closer today to having a nuclear 
bomb than ever before?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, Iran is reaching up to 60 percent and--
yes.
    Mr. Burgess. Why aren't the Biden Administration's policies 
working, in your opinion?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, obviously, as I said earlier, you know, 
one of the things we do want to focus on is diplomacy but you 
also have to have a willing partner on the other side.
    We are supporting the IAEA and its efforts and we're trying 
with the efforts that we can. But nothing's taken traction 
right now with Iran and they're not putting anything on the 
table that's really something that we can negotiate.
    Mr. Burgess. Apparently North Korea has been doing some 
missile tests. How are they funding these tests?
    Ms. Jenkins. I am not particularly sure exactly how they're 
funding this test. I mean, obviously, they're taking things 
from their own domestic sources but they're also, you know, 
violating U.N. Security Council resolutions and countries are--
other countries are doing the same by providing them things.
    Mr. Burgess. All right. Has North Korea ever used any of 
our foreign aid--United States foreign aid to fund their 
nuclear missile program?
    Ms. Jenkins. I am not aware of that.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. What countries in that region do you think 
are helping North Korea?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, now we know that--we know that Russia 
has a relationship with them. I mean, there might be more that 
we could say in a classified----
    Mr. Burgess. Are they funding it or are they just----
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, there is--put it this way. We do not 
know exactly what the relationship is with Iran and Russia. We 
do not know what--I'm sorry, with North Korea aggression----
    Mr. Burgess. North Korea.
    Ms. Jenkins [continuing]. We do not know all the things 
that they're doing. There's more that we could probably go into 
in a classified setting where we can get more in depth. But, 
yes, we do know that there are violations.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. Let me switch gears a little bit. Are you 
aware of the purposes that are not a prohibited section of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and does that section specifically 
mention that the use of chemicals on the annex can be used for 
legitimate pharmaceutical and medical needs?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think the issue with chemical weapons 
is--well, the precursors there's so many of them. There's so 
many dual use items when you're talking about it.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. Are the Biden Administration's efforts to 
require a license to export fentanyl to Russia and Belarus, is 
that because of its potential for application as a chemical 
weapon?
    Ms. Jenkins. Sorry. Are you saying--can you repeat that 
again?
    Mr. Burgess. Yes, ma'am. And I'm asking if you're aware 
that the--that this Administration's efforts through the 
Commerce to require a license to export fentanyl to Russia and 
Belarus is that because of the potential for application as a 
chemical weapon?
    Ms. Jenkins. That would not be for that reason.
    Mr. Burgess. It would not?
    Ms. Jenkins. That--no. My understanding is--yes.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. OK.
    Given the purposes of not prohibited sections of the treaty 
and this Administration's actions why do you think that a 
chemical that Russia used in 2002 to kill over a hundred 
civilians and the State attorney generals and bipartisan 
members endorsed calling it chemical weapon?
    Ms. Jenkins. Why is it called a chemical weapon?
    Mr. Burgess. Well, that--I'm sorry. I did not get the rest 
of it. I paused. I apologize. Of that--that was called a 
chemical weapon. It's killed thousands of Americans.
    Should it not be declared a chemical weapon and controlled 
by the Chemical Weapons Convention given its deadly dual use 
nature?
    Ms. Jenkins. If you're talking about novichoks we have 
included that in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. Let's see. I believe that's the end of my 
questions, ma'am. Thank you.
    Ms. Jenkins. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields. So I 
believe we're to the conclusion remarks right now.
    First of all, thank you, Ms. Under Secretary, for your 
time. I know this has been a long day for you so we will allow 
you to escape at this point.
    I just wanted to kind of conclude as chair today or acting 
chair that I hope we're not naive or idealistic in the way we 
approach these challenges, especially when it comes to our 
friends and allies.
    I think we need to make sure we do not compromise when it 
comes to our mission accomplishment, which is getting the 
technologies and weaponry to our allies to defend themselves to 
accomplish what we know is essential to our world strategy when 
we ally with our friends.
    The concern I have is truly are we doing things to hamper 
that and I think in my case and in many cases what we talk 
about, what allies we choose, what agreements we make, that 
we're not believing that bad actors are going to follow that, 
naively, and that we do not enter these agreements thinking 
that those people just because they misbehave that everybody 
else is going to behave after looking at that happening.
    And I hope that the Biden Administration takes very 
seriously the fact that we need to deliver on time and right 
now I'm not seeing a really good plan for delivering those 
technologies and those weapons that we have promised our allies 
and friends and I hope we do a better job of stepping up to 
that challenge and especially in the regulatory and 
decisionmaking when all we have to do is snap a finger and it 
happens. We should never hold those decisions up.
    With that said, I think maybe the one thing that always 
comes to mind I'll quote Admiral Mullen from over a decade ago 
when we talk about the greatest threat to national security is 
our national debt and that's something we have to take very 
seriously, too, no matter what we're talking about, whether it 
be defense, technologies, or anything else like that. If it 
overcomes us we will not have enough money to help anybody 
anywhere including ourselves.
    I thank you once again for your valuable testimony and 
their members for their questions. The members of the committee 
may have some additional questions for the under secretary and 
we will ask you to respond to those in writing.
    Pursuant to the committee rules all members may have 5 days 
to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for 
the record subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD


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