[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 
                    ADDRESSING THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                           COUNTERTERRORISM,
                          LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
                              INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-31

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                                      

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
                               __________        
        
        
                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
54-955 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------         

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
                 
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

  SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE

                    August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island, 
Tony Gonzales, Texas                     Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona                Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Dina Titus, Nevada
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8

                               Witnesses

Mr. J. Peter Pham, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council:
  Oral Statement.................................................    10
  Prepared Statement.............................................    12
Mr. Joshua Meservey, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute:
  Oral Statement.................................................    15
  Prepared Statement.............................................    16
Mr. Aaron Y. Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute 
  for Near East Policy:
  Oral Statement.................................................    22
  Prepared Statement.............................................    24
Ms. Donna O. Charles, Director of West Africa and the Sahel, 
  United States Institute of Peace:
  Oral Statement.................................................    28
  Prepared Statement.............................................    30

                                Appendix

Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for J. Peter Pham.........    51
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Joshua Meservey.......    52
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Aaron Y. Zelin........    53
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Donna O. Charles......    54

 
 THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ADDRESSING THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN 
                                 AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                     Wednesday, September 27, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                         Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
                         Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Pfluger, Bishop, D'Esposito, 
Magaziner, Correa, and Titus.
    Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
    Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee 
in recess at any point.
    The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from a 
non-governmental panel of expert witnesses to examine the 
terrorism threats posed by jihadist groups in Africa and their 
implications on U.S. homeland security and our interest.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Intelligence. We are holding 
this important hearing to examine and discuss the rising 
threats posed by terrorist groups in Africa and its impact on 
the security of our homeland and Americans abroad. This is a 
topic of critical importance not only to this committee and 
this subcommittee, but also, I think, to our entire country. In 
fact, it was this subcommittee that held the very first 
Congressional hearing about Boko Haram, who refers to itself as 
the Nigerian Taliban and has been designated a foreign 
terrorist organization for its terrorist attacks.
    Why are we here? Over 30 years ago terrorists who were 
trained at an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan carried out 
a car bombing at the World Trade Center. The bombing resulted 
in the deaths of 6 people and injured thousands of Americans. 
Eight years later, 19 terrorists that were motivated by the 
same radical ideological beliefs, hijacked 4 commercial 
airliners and carried out the largest terrorist attacks on 
American soil on September 11. Just a short while ago, Homeland 
Security Committee Members, led by Subcommittee Chairman 
Anthony D'Esposito, commemorated the 22nd anniversary of those 
attacks on 9/11 at the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in Lower 
Manhattan. Members honored the memory of the victims and thank 
the first responders for their dedicated services.
    During the period between the first attack on the World 
Trade Center and 9/11, our Nation did not fully comprehend the 
threats posed by the Salafi-jihadist movement or identify the 
warning signs or threat indicators that could have helped 
degrade al-Qaeda's operational capacities and capabilities. We 
must learn from these past gaps--some would call them 
failures--and have proactive conversations to not only identify 
these threats, but appropriately confront them before they 
metastasize.
    Political instability, dire economic conditions, sectarian 
violence, mass migration, and an anti-Western sentiment are 
just some of the main factors that contribute to individuals 
radicalizing and joining jihadist movements to commit violence. 
The unfortunate reality is that many African nations share 
these underlying factors that contribute to the rise of 
extremism. These conditions are not new and have been present 
on the continent for decades.
    Two notable events have especially defined today's 
terrorism threat landscape throughout Africa. First, on October 
3, 1993, American forces helping with U.S. peacekeeping 
operations in Mogadishu were attacked by Somali National 
Alliance, whose fighters were trained and equipped by al-Qaeda. 
Eighteen Americans died and 73 others were injured. To this 
day, the Battle of Mogadishu is still one of the deadliest days 
in the history of the U.S. Special Force Operations. American 
forces were again attacked by jihadists on October 4, 2017 in 
Niger, now known as the Tongo Tongo ambush. U.S. Army Special 
Operators and Nigerian troops were ambushed by Islamic State 
militants while out conducting an operation to capture Islamic 
State in the Greater Sahel, Commander Doundou Chefou. Four 
Americans and 4 Nigerians were killed that day and 8 Nigerians 
and 2 Americans were wounded. Both the Battle of Mogadishu and 
the Tongo Tongo ambush were galvanizing inflection points for 
the jihadist movements in Africa and helped contribute to the 
rise of the terror networks across the continent.
    Regional instability has also fueled the terror threat 
landscape across Africa. After the collapse of ISIS Caliphate 
in Syria and Iraq, many of the jihadists escaped to various 
countries throughout Africa. These insurgents have wreaked 
havoc across the continent, forcing governments to develop and 
enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. Our Nation has 
helped lead these efforts. In fact, we have kept 2 bases in 
Nigeria with about 1,000 men and women of our military deployed 
there with counterterrorism and intelligence mission across the 
broader region. However, near-peer competitors, both China and 
Russia have also rushed to help fill this power vacuum. Russia 
has exploited corrupt African governments with checkered human 
rights records into allowing their Nation's 
``counterterrorism'' efforts to be supported by Russian 
paramilitary groups. Most notably Russia's Wagner Group, a 
private military company, have not only provided 
counterterrorism capabilities, but have also been used to prop 
up ruthless authoritarian figures. In return, Russian PMCs gain 
access to gold, to diamonds, critical mineral mines, and many 
other resources and these resources have helped keep the 
Russian economy afloat and has helped fuel their unjust and 
provocative war in Ukraine.
    The nefarious actions and human rights abuses by foreign 
maligned nation-states have turned local populations toward 
jihadist groups for protection. The United States cannot 
continue to allow Russian PMCs or CCP groups to fill this power 
vacuum. We must provide viable alternatives to these 
arrangements and encourage our African partners to work with us 
and embrace our shared democratic values to stop the spread of 
the jihadi movement.
    This hearing today is an important subject that I am 
personally familiar with, having served myself in the Middle 
East, having served in operations against ISIS throughout Iraq 
and Syria. I know first-hand just how deadly these periods of 
time can be when you have the ability for these groups to grow 
unchecked and to not have the appropriate partnerships abroad. 
Our African partners must not fall victim to the sheer 
brutality of these jihadist groups or allow anywhere on the 
continent to become a new breeding ground for extremism.
    I hope today that we can have an open and honest dialog on 
this issue. This is not a partisan issue. This has nothing to 
do with Republican versus Democrat politics, this is all about 
the security of the United States, it is all about the security 
of our partners who value freedom, who value the Western 
mentality of pushing back on groups that would harm not only 
our partners, but the innocent lives of so many people 
throughout the world.
    We are absolutely delighted to have a distinguished panel 
with plenty of experience to give us your thoughts and your 
recommendations as to where we should go.
    Last, I will say, when thinking about these hearings and 
what they mean to our country, and even though some of these 
don't get the press or the publicity, they are vitally 
important for my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to hear 
the facts. We cannot allow these interim periods of time in 
between conflicts like what 9/11 brought to this country, to 
have a breeding ground where extremism wins out. We must remain 
vigilant. That is why we are holding this hearing.
    What keeps me up at night is the thought that these groups 
who do have a track record and have the absolute motivation to 
harm Americans, to harm the American way of life, to harm our 
partners, that is what keeps me up at night is thinking about 
those places on Earth that we are not thinking about, that we 
don't have visibility into. What can we be doing alongside our 
partners, and especially in Africa to help prevent those things 
from metastasizing.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning, 
and I look forward to a good, robust discussion.
    [The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
                           September 27, 2023
    Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence.
    We are holding this important hearing to examine and discuss the 
rising threats posed by terrorist groups in Africa and its impact on 
the security of our homeland and Americans abroad.
    This is a topic of critical importance to the committee and this 
subcommittee, in particular.
    In fact, it was this subcommittee that held the FIRST Congressional 
hearing about Boko Haram, who refers to itself as the ``Nigerian 
Taliban'' and has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization for 
its terrorist attacks.
    Why are we here?
    Over 30 years ago, terrorists trained at an al-Qaeda training camp 
in Afghanistan carried out a car bombing on the World Trade Center. The 
bombing resulted in the deaths of 6 people and injured thousands of 
Americans.
    Eight years later, 19 terrorists that were motivated by the same 
radical ideological beliefs, highjacked 4 commercial airliners and 
carried out the largest terrorist attacks in our Nation's history on 
September 11.
    Just a short while ago, Homeland Security Committee Members led by 
Subcommittee Chairman Anthony D'Esposito commemorated the 22nd 
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks at the 9/11 Memorial & Museum in lower 
Manhattan. Members honored the memory of the victims and thanked first 
responders for their dedicated services.
    During the period between the first attack on the World Trade 
Center and 9/11, our Nation did not fully comprehend the threats posed 
by the Salafi-jihadist movement or identify the warning signs or threat 
indicators that could have helped degrade al-Qaeda's operational 
capacities and capabilities.
    We must learn from these past failures and have proactive 
conversations to not only identify these threats, but appropriately 
confront them before they metastasize.
    Political instability, dire economic conditions, sectarian 
violence, mass migration, and anti-Western sentiment are some of the 
main factors that contribute to individuals radicalizing and joining 
jihadist movements to commit violence.
    The unfortunate reality is that many African nations share these 
underlying factors that contribute to the rise of extremism.
    These conditions are not new and have been present on the continent 
for decades.
    Two notable events have especially defined today's terrorism threat 
landscape throughout Africa.
    On October 3, 1993, American forces helping with U.S. peace-keeping 
operations in Mogadishu were attacked by the Somali National Alliance, 
whose fighters were trained and equipped by al-Qaeda.
    Eighteen Americans died and 73 others were injured. To this day, 
the Battle of Mogadishu is still one of the deadliest days in the 
history of the U.S. Special Operations Forces.
    American forces were again attacked by jihadists on October 4, 2017 
in Niger. Now known as the Tongo Tongo ambush, U.S. Army special 
operators and Nigerian troops were ambushed by Islamic State militants, 
while out conducting an operation to capture Islamic State in the 
Greater Sahel commander Doundou Chefou.
    Four Americans and 4 Nigerians were killed that day and 8 
Nigerians, and 2 Americans were wounded.
    Both, the Battle of Mogadishu and the Tongo Tongo ambush, were 
galvanizing inflection points for the jihadist movements in Africa and 
helped contribute to the rise of the terror networks across the 
continent.
    Regional instability has also fueled the terror threat landscape 
across Africa.
    After the collapse of ISIS's caliphate in Syria and Iraq, many of 
the jihadist escaped to various countries throughout Africa.
    These insurgents have wreaked havoc across the continent forcing 
governments to develop and enhance their counterterrorism capabilities.
    Our Nation has helped lead these efforts. In fact, we have kept two 
bases in Niger, with about 1,000 men and women of our military deployed 
there with a counterterrorism and intelligence mission across the 
broader region.
    However, near-peer competitors, China and Russia, have also rushed 
to help fill the power vacuum.
    Russia has exploited corrupt African governments with checkered 
human rights records into allowing their nation's counterterrorism 
operations to be supported by Russian paramilitary groups.
    Most notably Russia's Wagner Group, a private military company 
(PMC), have not only provided counter-terrorism capabilities, but have 
also been used to prop up ruthless authoritarian figures.
    In return, Russian PMCs gain access to gold, diamond, and critical 
mineral mines. These resources have helped keep the Russian economy 
afloat and has helped fuel their unjust and provocative war in Ukraine.
    The nefarious actions and human rights abuses by foreign malign 
nation-states have turned local populations toward jihadist groups for 
protection.
    The United States cannot continue to allow Russian PMCs or China to 
fill this power vacuum. We must provide viable alternatives to these 
arrangements and encourage our African partners to work with us and 
embrace our shared-democratic values to stop the spread of the jihadi 
movement.
    This hearing is an important subject that I am personally familiar 
with, having served abroad in numerous theaters of operations, 
including the Middle East fighting against ISIS.
    Our African partners must not fall victim to the sheer brutality of 
these jihadist groups or allow anywhere on the continent to become a 
new breeding ground for extremism.
    I hope we can have an honest and open dialog today on this issue. 
This shouldn't be a Republican or Democrat issue; it transcends party 
lines.
    I am delighted to have a distinguished panel of expert witnesses to 
discuss this important topic.
    I thank all our witnesses for being with us this morning and I look 
forward to our discussion.

    Chairman Pfluger. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Magaziner. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman 
Pfluger for calling this important hearing and thank our 
witnesses for coming today.
    Terrorism is increasing across the continent of Africa, 
making this a critical and timely oversight topic for this 
committee. Last month marked the 25th anniversary of the 
bombing of U.S embassies in East Africa, where 224 people were 
killed, including 12 Americans, and more than 4,500 people were 
wounded. The embassy bombings were orchestrated by Osama bin 
Laden, who would later direct the most heinous, most deadly 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.
    While the United States was reeling from the 9/11 attacks 
and focusing our counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East 
and Central Asia, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were looking toward 
Somalia and Yemen. Today, terrorist groups have established 
themselves in those countries and are focused on further 
expanding their reach through brutal violence in the Sahel in 
West Africa.
    The reality is that 22 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-
Qaeda and ISIS affiliates are still active, especially in 
Africa, and newer terrorist organizations have emerged to 
spread to the African continent as well. Al-Qaeda's richest and 
most successful affiliate, al-Shabaab, today controls large 
territories in Somalia, despite more than 15 years of military 
operations and air strikes, and has also killed U.S. citizens, 
soldiers and contractors in Kenya. Ten years ago last week 
marked the anniversary of the Westgate shopping mall attack, 
where 64 people died at the hands of al-Shabaab terrorists. Al-
Shabaab has launched an incursion of as many as 2,000 terrorist 
fighters deep into Ethiopia, and it has killed thousands of 
people in attacks across Somalia.
    Another al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, operates in West Africa 
and particularly in the nations of Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM 
has attacked French, United Nations, and local security force 
personnel, has brutally murdered civilians accused of 
collaborating with the state, and has encircled the capital of 
Mali while spreading deeper into the Sahel and southward into 
coastal West Africa.
    Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only terrorist 
organizations in Africa that conspire to attack Americans. Over 
the past 7 years, ISIS has spread its influence throughout the 
Sahel region. ISIS Sahel has predominantly focused on local 
targets in the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, 
but the group has claimed credit for killing four U.S. soldiers 
and kidnapping at least one U.S. citizen. In Nigeria, the most 
populous country in Africa, Islamic State, West Africa has 
established itself as a leading extremist group in the region.
    Now, these threats may seem far away from the U.S. 
homeland, but we must be clear-eyed that what is happening in 
Africa affects our security here at home. Though the 
intelligence community assesses that Africa-based violent 
extremist groups are primarily threats to the regions in which 
they operate, these terrorist organizations seek to target 
Americans and no doubt would take advantage of any opportunity 
to bring their reign of terror to our homeland as well.
    In addition to working with friendly governments in Africa 
to crack down on terrorism, we must redouble our efforts to 
combat terrorist groups' ability to radicalize individuals in 
the United States and through the internet as well. We know 
that al-Shabaab and ISIS have recruited American citizens and 
citizens of other Western countries to engage in terrorism 
domestically, using social media to encourage sympathetic or 
troubled individuals to attack targets here in the United 
States. Furthermore, we know that these terrorist groups often 
rely on Americans and other Westerners to help fund their 
operations.
    I hope that we take the opportunity during today's hearing 
to discuss this, how we can counter foreign terrorist groups' 
unprecedented virtual access to people in the United States in 
furtherance of inspiring and enabling attacks on the homeland. 
I am thankful that the Biden administration is taking the 
threat from the rise in terrorism across Africa seriously. 
Today, we have around 450 military personnel on the ground, 
advising Somali forces and African Union troops to beat back 
al-Shabaab and bring stability to the Horn of Africa. We also 
have approximately 1,100 military personnel in Niger conducting 
drone operations to combat terrorism.
    The United States continues to launch airstrikes against 
al-Shabaab when necessary, and we are advising, assisting, 
accompanying, training, and equipping regional forces to carry 
out counterterrorism operations that protect the security of 
African nations and prevent the spread of terrorism to the 
United States and our allies.
    While military options are necessary to counter terrorism 
in Africa, the United States must also help African nations 
build their democratic institutions and improve the lives of 
their citizens in order to foster stability. If we do not 
continue to engage with robust foreign aid, adversaries like 
Russia and China will continue to fill that void, and terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS will continue to gain 
strength. It is in America's national security interest to be a 
good partner to those nations in Africa who are aligned with 
our values.
    Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of 
this subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a 
bipartisan effort to defend the American people, protect the 
homeland, and ensure the security of African nations from 
terrorist threats.
    I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I 
yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
    Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Pfluger for calling this 
important hearing and thank our witnesses for coming today. Terrorist 
attacks are increasing across the continent of Africa, making this a 
critical and timely oversight topic for this committee.
    Last month marked the 25th anniversary of the bombing of U.S. 
embassies in East Africa where 224 people were killed--including 12 
Americans--and more than 4,500 people were wounded.
    The embassy bombings were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, who 
would later direct the most heinous, most deadly terrorist attack on 
U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.
    While the United States was reeling from the 9/11 attacks and 
focusing our counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Central 
Asia, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were looking toward Somalia and 
Yemen. Today, terrorist groups have established themselves in those 
countries and are focused on further expanding their reach through 
brutal violence in the Sahel and West Africa.
    The reality is that 22 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda and 
ISIS affiliates are still active--especially in Africa--and newer 
terrorist organizations have emerged and spread to the African 
continent.
    Al-Qaeda's richest and most successful affiliate, al-Shabaab, today 
controls large territories in Somalia, despite more than 15 years of 
military operations and airstrikes, and has also killed U.S. citizens, 
U.S. soldiers, and U.S. contractors in Kenya.
    Ten years ago, last week, marked the anniversary of the Westgate 
Shopping mall attack where 64 people died at the hands of al-Shabaab 
terrorists. Al-Shabaab has launched an incursion of as many as 2,000 
terrorist fighters deep into Ethiopia. It has killed thousands of 
people in attacks across Somalia.
    Another al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, operates in West Africa, and 
particularly the nations of Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM has attacked 
French, United Nations, and local security force personnel. It has 
brutally murdered civilians accused of collaborating with the State or 
foreign forces. And JNIM now has encircled the capital of Mali while 
spreading deeper into the Sahel and southward into coastal West Africa.
    And, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only terrorist 
organizations in Africa that aspire to attack Americans abroad.
    Over the past 7 years, ISIS has spread its influence throughout the 
Sahel region. ISIS-Sahel has predominantly focused on local targets in 
the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but the group has 
also claimed credit for killing 4 U.S. soldiers and kidnapping at least 
1 U.S. citizen. And in Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, 
Islamic State-West Africa has established itself as a leading extremist 
group in the region.
    These threats may seem far away from the U.S. homeland, but we must 
be clear-eyed that what is happening in Africa affects our security 
here at home.
    Though the intelligence community assesses that Africa-based 
violent extremist groups are primarily threats to the regions in which 
they operate, these terrorist organizations seek to target Americans 
and no doubt would take advantage of any opportunity to bring their 
reign of terror to our homeland as well.
    In addition to working with friendly governments in Africa to crack 
down on terrorism, we must redouble our efforts to combat terrorist 
groups' ability to radicalize individuals here in the United States 
through the internet.
    As we know, al-Shabaab and ISIS have recruited American citizens 
and citizens of other Western countries to engage in terrorism, using 
social media to encourage sympathetic or troubled individuals to attack 
targets here in the United States.
    Furthermore, we know these terrorist groups often rely on Americans 
and other Westerners to help fund terrorist operations.
    I hope that we take the opportunity during today's hearing to 
discuss this--how we counter foreign terrorist groups' unprecedented, 
virtual access to people living in the United States in furtherance of 
inspiring and enabling attacks in the Homeland.
    I am thankful that the Biden administration is taking the threat 
from the rise in terrorism across Africa seriously.
    Today, we have around 450 military personnel on the ground advising 
Somali forces and African Union troops to beat back al-Shabaab and 
bring stability to the Horn of Africa. We also have approximately 1,100 
military personnel in Niger conducting drone operations to combat 
terrorism.
    The United States continues to launch airstrikes against al-
Shabaab, when necessary. And, under President Biden, we are advising, 
assisting, accompanying, training, and equipping regional forces to 
carry out counterterrorism operations that protect the security of 
African nations and prevent the spread of terrorism to the United 
States and our allies.
    While military options are necessary to counter terrorism in 
Africa, the United States must also help African nations build their 
democratic institutions and improve the lives of their citizens--in 
order to foster stability and safety.
    If we do not continue to engage with robust foreign aid, 
adversaries like Russia and China will fill that void, and terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS will continue to gain strength.
    It is in America's national security interest to be a good partner 
to those nations in Africa who are aligned with our values.
    Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of this 
subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a bipartisan effort 
to defend the American people, protect the homeland, and ensure the 
security of African nations from terrorist--and all security--threats.
    I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I yield back.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you. Ranking Member Magaziner.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                           September 27, 2023
    Terrorism in Africa has increased markedly, with violence in at 
least 22 countries on the continent, including several that had no 
history of extremism prior to 2001, such as Mozambique and Burkina 
Faso. While terrorist activity fell during the early 2000's, over the 
past decade, fatalities caused by terrorist groups in Africa have 
increased almost three-fold.
    The U.S. Defense Department's Africa Center for Strategic Studies 
assesses that total fatalities in Africa linked to terrorist groups 
surged by nearly 50 percent from 2021 to 2022, with over 19,000 deaths 
reported. Africa has also seen the greatest growth in the number of 
ISIS affiliates. National security experts have called the continent 
``the new epicenter for international terrorism.'' My hope is that in 
today's hearing, we explore why.
    After decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures, 
it is troubling that groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates 
continue to pop up in African countries. I also hope we begin to re-
examine our approach to combatting international terrorist groups in 
Africa and across the globe, since it is clear that the perverse 
ideology espoused by ISIS and al-Qaeda and their commitment to violence 
and murder persists.
    Although the groups operating in Africa threaten mostly local or 
regional targets--no matter where these terrorist groups are focused, 
we must remain vigilant in guarding against their ability to cause 
devastation to our allies and our interests both at home and abroad. 
And while currently there is no credible, imminent threat to the U.S. 
homeland from Africa--we all know ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their offshoots 
desire to attack the United States.
    In the 22 years since 9/11, our homeland security, intelligence, 
law enforcement, and military personnel have worked tirelessly to 
degrade these groups and destroy their networks. The fact that 
September 11, 2001, was the last complex foreign terrorist attack on 
U.S. soil is a testament to this work--and it is essential that we 
resource and empower our national security personnel to keep the 
pressure on, especially in Africa. To that point, I would be remiss if 
I did not address the elephant in the room--the impending Government 
shutdown.
    Today, we will be receiving testimony urging Congress to support 
Federal agencies' critical work to track evolving threats in Africa and 
collaborate with partner nations to build layered defenses. That cannot 
happen if the Government goes unfunded. Today's hearing is important, 
but words must be backed up with action--and necessary funding.
    I hope that after we receive this testimony, extreme MAGA 
Republicans will end their destructive attempt to shut down the 
Government. Only then can we assure the American people that Congress 
is dedicated to countering terrorism threats wherever they arise and 
keeping such threats far away from our shores.

    Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important 
topic, and I ask that at this time, the witnesses please rise 
and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn]
    Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Dr. 
John Peter Pham previously served as the United States Special 
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and as the Special 
Envoy of the Sahel Region of Africa from 2018 to 2020. During 
this time, Ambassador Pham was responsible for coordinating and 
executing the United States strategy in the region to advance 
peace, stability, and our Nation's interest in the region. 
Prior to being confirmed as Ambassador, Ambassador Pham served 
as vice president for Research and Regional Initiatives at the 
Atlantic Council, where he currently serves as a distinguished 
fellow. He has also served as vice president for the National 
Committee on American Foreign Policy Interest and is a senior 
advisor to U.S. AFRICOM. Last, he is a tenured professor at 
James Madison University where he taught courses related to 
Justice Studies, Political Science, Africana Studies, and led 
the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
    Welcome.
    Mr. Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at the Hudson 
Institute where he focuses his research on great power 
competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and 
counterterrorism. He has also served as a research fellow for 
Africa at the Heritage Foundation and has worked at the 
Atlantic Council's Africa Center and U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command. He has also served in the Peace Corps, 
where he was stationed in Zambia.
    Welcome.
    Dr. Aaron Zelin serves as the Richard Borrow Fellow at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy where he also directs 
the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map Project. He is a 
visiting research scholar at Brandeis University. Dr. Zelin is 
a published author and has written extensively on the jihadist 
threat landscape. He earned his Ph.D. in war studies from the 
King's College in London in December 2017, and his dissertation 
on the history of the Tunisian jihadi movement was nominated 
for King's College London Graduate School Prize for the 
outstanding Ph.D. thesis. I may also mention that we were 
colleagues at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
while I was a visiting fellow there. I would like to thank 
Robert Satloff and Michael Singh for their efforts as well.
    Welcome.
    Our fourth witness today is Ms. Donna Charles, who serves 
as the director of the West Africa and Sahel programs for the 
United States Institute of Peace. Prior to joining the United 
States Institute of Peace, Ms. Charles served as a professional 
staff member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee where she 
handled issues pertaining to Africa and U.N. peacekeeping 
efforts. In addition, she has spent nearly a decade with the 
State Department in various roles pertaining to African 
affairs, counterterrorism policy, and sanctions. Ms. Charles is 
also a veteran, and we appreciate your service through the 
United States Air Force. Thank you for being here.
    I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here. 
You have submitted great written testimonies, however, I would 
ask you to please summarize those in a 5-minute period, which I 
know is very difficult at times.
    But I would like to now recognize Dr. Pham for your 5 
minutes opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, ATLANTIC 
                            COUNCIL

    Mr. Pham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, permit me to begin 
by thanking you not only for the opportunity to testify before 
you today on the subject of the rise of terrorism in Africa and 
its impact on the security of our American homeland, but also 
for the sustained attention which the U.S. House of 
Representatives has given to this challenge over the years.
    As the title of this hearing correctly suggests, there is 
indeed a rise in terrorist activity in Africa, and it does 
impact the future security of our homeland. Let me address both 
of these in turn.
    First, while thankfully, the number of deaths caused by 
terrorism around the globe has been on the decline the last 
several years, although, of course, even one death is too many, 
the progress is uneven. In Africa, the trend has been, sadly, 
of increased violence, with the Sahel region in particular 
witnessing a significant deterioration last year according to 
the data set of the Global Terrorism Index. In fact, just two 
Sahelian countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, alone accounted for 
one-third of all deaths from terrorism around the world. It's 
not just the sheer number of deaths has increased from the year 
before, but the terrorist attacks themselves have become more 
lethal. There is one counterterrorism good news story from 
Africa in 2022, and that was Niger, which saw a 79 percent 
decrease in deaths from terrorism. Alas, the coup in that 
country exactly 2 months ago risked undoing that progress.
    Second, while the Sahel appears remotely remote 
superficially to America, it's worth remembering that the 
centuries-old trade routes leading across the Sahara Desert to 
the Mediterranean and beyond to Europe run across this region. 
Today, those ancient paths are used both for human trafficking 
and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband to Europe, and 
thus represent a vulnerability to a number of U.S. allies. In 
addition, in the wake of the pivot from their dependence on 
Russian oil and gas, many of our European allies have come to 
rely on energy exported from West African producers via 
pipelines that traverse the Sahel region.
    For these and other strategic reasons, the United States 
has maintained two bases in Niger, with approximately a 
thousand men and women of our armed forces deployed there, with 
a mission of both intelligence gathering and counterterrorism 
across the wider region that has become invaluable, and will 
prove even more so in the weeks and months ahead, given French 
President Macron's announcement this past weekend of a pullout 
of his country's military forces in Niger by the end of the 
year.
    While the regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State constitute much of the infrastructure for terrorism and 
violent extremism in the Sahel and across Africa do not 
presently appear to have the capability to attack our American 
homeland, that doesn't mean they would not if somehow, God 
forbid, they come into those means. Moreover, there are U.S. 
citizens well within their reach, as the long ordeal of aid 
worker Jeff Woodke held captive for over 6 years after he is 
kidnapped from Niamey, Niger underscored, as well as 
significant American economic and other interests across the 
African continent, including in countries where terrorist 
groups have been stepping up attacks in recent years.
    If you may, let me pivot to offering several considerations 
about the U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the possible 
threat this phenomena poses to American citizens and interests, 
as well as to our homeland.
    First, time and again, the mistake has been made to 
underestimate, if not entirely discount, the threat face. Part 
of this is attributable to an analytical bias to limit future 
possibilities to extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical 
choice that ignores the dynamic potential of many of these 
terrorist organizations. Another part of the explanation is 
much more basic the sheer lack of resources for Africa-related 
intelligence and analysis across the whole of the U.S. 
Government. Given the geopolitical, economic, and security 
stakes, the failure to invest more in institutions and 
personnel and training and strategic focus is incredibly short-
sighted.
    Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense, 
across the U.S. Government, there's an artificial division of 
the continent that, frankly, is rejected by not only Africans, 
but it's also unhelpful. In reality, there are few compelling 
geopolitical, economic, or strategic reasons to separate the 
North African countries from the rest of the African continent.
    Third, bureaucratic structures are only of value insofar as 
the positions therein are filled by qualified individuals. 
Without getting polemics about decision making in the current 
administration or political dynamics in the Senate, permit me 
to simply observe that it doesn't serve America's interest to 
leave key positions unfilled.
    Fourth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by 
the lack of effective sovereignty that bedevils many African 
governments. Often the challenge manifests itself in 
criminality. Other times, it's the lack of capacity to provide 
citizens with basic goods and services.
    Fifth, as America's relationships, diplomatic, security, 
economic, and cultural with Africa as a whole and with 
individual countries expands and deepens, a positive 
development to be sure, an unfortunate downside is the 
potential risks to U.S. persons and interests, as well as the 
homeland, necessarily increase. Quite simply, the threats 
exist, and more engagement, by its very nature, increases 
exposure and vulnerability.
    Just two more points.
    No. 6, with supply chains for critical minerals needed both 
for energy transition and new technologies running across 
Africa, I'd invite this distinguished panel to consider a 
broader vision of security, not just protecting American people 
and homeland from attacks, but protecting our access to the 
strategic materials which are essential for our defense systems 
and our civilian economy.
    Finally, the challenge of terrorism in Africa and any 
derivative threat to the United States cannot be addressed 
except, as the Ranking Member rightly pointed out, in an 
integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader 
notion of human security writ large, encompassing social, 
economic, and political development, which often enough must 
transcend national and other boundaries. I repeatedly 
emphasized during my service as envoy to the Sahel, the crisis 
in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy, a perception by 
citizens that their governments are valid, equitable, and able 
and willing to meet their needs. Absent states' commitment to 
meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international 
engagement is likely to succeed. This obviously is not a task 
for the United States alone. Nonetheless, it's one which 
America has a strategic interest in embracing----
    Chairman Pfluger. Ambassador, I am sorry to interrupt. We 
are going to have to keep moving, OK?
    Mr. Pham [continuing]. And leading. That was my final.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of J. Peter Pham
                     Wednesday, September 27, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence, permit me to begin by thanking you, not only for the 
opportunity to testify before you today on the subject of the rise of 
terrorism in Africa and its impact on the security of our American 
homeland, but also for the sustained attention which the U.S. House of 
Representatives has given to this challenge. In its oversight capacity, 
the people's House--and, especially, the Committee on Homeland 
Security--has been very much ahead of the curve over the course of the 
last 2 decades and it has been my singular privilege to have 
contributed, however modestly, to that effort over that time.
    In fact, if I may cite just one example, it was this esteemed 
panel's predecessor, the Subcommittee on Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism, that 12 years ago convened the very first 
Congressional hearing on Boko Haram, at which I also had the privilege 
of testifying. At that time, Boko Haram was considered so obscure that 
the all the participants at the event, held in conjunction with the 
release of a bipartisan report on the threat posed by the militant 
group, might have been able to convene in the proverbial broom closet. 
Sadly, our analysis proved prescient and, rather than fading away as 
some dismissively suggested at the time that it would, Boko Haram went 
on to pose an even greater menace, not only to Nigeria and its people, 
but to their neighbors in West Africa as well as to international 
security writ large as it metastasized into the West Africa Province of 
the so-called Islamic State.
                          the current reality
    As the title of this hearing correctly suggests, there is indeed a 
rise in terrorist activity in Africa and it does impact the future 
security of our homeland. Let me address both of these aspects in turn.
    First, while thankfully the number of deaths caused by terrorism 
around the globe has been on the decline the last several years--
although, of course, even one death is one too many--the progress has 
been uneven. In Africa, the trend has been, sadly, that of increased 
violence, with the Sahel region in particular witnessing a significant 
deterioration with Burkina Faso and Mali recording 1,135 and 944 
deaths, respectively, last year according to the data set of the Global 
Terrorism Index. In fact, just these two Sahelian countries alone 
accounted for one-third of all deaths from terrorism around the world 
in 2022. Burkina Faso even edged out Afghanistan for the dubious 
distinction of being the deadliest country in the world for terrorism. 
It is not just that the sheer number of deaths has increased from the 
year before, but the terrorist attacks themselves have become more 
lethal: the latter has ticked up 38 percent, but the former has gone up 
50 percent. Overall, the Sahel region represented 43 percent of global 
terrorism deaths in 2022, an increase of 7 percent over 2021. If 
current trends continue, the Sahel region may well account for slightly 
more than half of the fatalities this year. Africa as a whole 
represented just under 50 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2022 
and so, barring an attack elsewhere in the world that might result in 
mass casualties skewing the data, will easily account for a majority of 
global deaths from terrorism in 2023, with attacks increasingly 
impacting West African littoral states which had previously experienced 
few, if any, attacks.
    One counterterrorism good news story from Africa in 2022 was Niger, 
which saw a 79 percent decrease in deaths from terrorism. Alas, the 
coup in that country exactly 2 months ago risks undoing that progress.
    Second, while the Sahel appears superficially remote to America, it 
is worth remembering that centuries-old trade routes leading across the 
Sahara Desert to the Mediterranean and beyond to Europe run across the 
region. Today those ancient paths are used for both human trafficking 
and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband to Europe and thus 
represent a vulnerability to a number of U.S. allies. In addition, in 
the wake of the pivot from their dependence on Russian oil and gas, 
many of our European allies have come to rely on energy exported from 
West African producers via pipelines that traverse the Sahel region. 
For these and other strategic reasons, the United States has maintained 
two bases in Niger, with approximately 1,000 men and women of our Armed 
Forces deployed there, with a mission of both intelligence gathering 
and counterterrorism across the wider region that has been invaluable--
and will prove even more so in the weeks and months ahead given French 
President Emmanuel Macron's announcement this past weekend of a pullout 
of his country's military forces in Niger by the end of this year.
    While the regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
that constitute much of the infrastructure for terrorism and violent 
extremism in the Sahel and across Africa do not presently appear to 
have the capability to attack the American homeland, that does not mean 
that they would not if they were somehow, God forbid, to come into 
those means. Moreover, there are U.S. citizens well within their reach 
as the long ordeal of aid worker Jeff Woodke, held captive for over 6 
years after he was kidnapped from Niamey, Niger, underscored, as well 
as significant American economic and other interests across the African 
continent, including in countries where terrorist groups have been 
stepping up attacks in recent years, including to Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Mozambique, and the West African countries along the Gulf 
of Guinea.
    To cite just one example, the administration has rightly won 
plaudits for its investment, alongside G7 partners and, more recently, 
the European Union, in strategic corridors like the one stretching from 
the Angolan port of Lobito to the DRC and on to Zambia (with the 
possibility of a future extension to the Indian Ocean). These are not 
just transportation infrastructures that will bring critical minerals 
to market, but corridors for energy and communications to flow. But one 
also has to recognize as an al-Qaeda strategist opined nearly two 
decades ago that, ``This is a continent with many potential advantages 
and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad.''
                           the u.s. response
    Let me now pivot to offer several considerations about the U.S. 
response to the rise of terrorism in Africa and the possible threat 
this phenomenon poses to American citizens and interests abroad as well 
as to the American homeland.
    First, time and again, the mistake has been made to underestimate--
if not to discount entirely--the threat faced. Part of this is 
attributable to an analytical bias to limit future possibilities to 
extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical choice which ignores the 
dynamic potential which many terrorist organizations have exhibited. 
Another part of the explanation is even more basic: The sheer lack of 
resources for Africa-related intelligence and analysis across the whole 
of the U.S. Government. Given the geopolitical, economic, and security 
stakes, the failure to invest more in institutions, personnel, 
training, and strategic focus is incredibly shortsighted.
    Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense with the 
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), across the U.S. Government there is an 
artificial division of the continent that, quite frankly, is rejected 
not only by Africans, but is also unhelpful--witness the criticism of 
the Biden administration by many African leaders for the decision to 
label its Africa strategy document as one for Sub-Saharan Africa only. 
In reality, there are few compelling geopolitical, economic, or 
strategic reasons to do so except possibly for Egypt. In point of fact, 
the overwhelming majority of the regional political, security, and 
commercial links extending to and from the other four North African 
countries go north-south across the Sahara, not east-west toward the 
Levant. While I was able to bridge the divide during my tenure as 
Special Envoy for the Sahel Region with explicit authority from 
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to work with both the Bureau of 
African Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, I have had no 
successor and, in any event, a longer-term, rather than ad hoc, 
solution is needed.
    Third, bureaucratic structures are only of value insofar as the 
positions therein are filled by qualified individuals. Without getting 
polemics about decision making in the current administration or 
political dynamics in the Senate, permit me simply to observe that it 
does not serve America's interests that key positions go unfilled for 
months, if not years, including that of U.S. Ambassador to the African 
Union. Or in the Sahel where, in Niger, the administration waited 8 
months after the retirement of Ambassador Eric Whitaker in December 
2021 before nominating his successor, Kathleen FitzGibbon. Ambassador 
FitzGibbon waited a full year before receiving unanimous confirmation 
by the Senate, ironically, the day after a coup overthrew the 
government she was to have been accredited to, her nomination being 
held up all that time for reasons having little or nothing to do with 
her qualifications.
    Fourth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by lack of 
effective sovereignty that bedevils many African governments. Often the 
challenge first manifests itself in criminality, whether in the form of 
piracy and other brigandage or in that of trafficking, human or 
material. For the United States, all this means that increasing 
vigilance against terrorism in Africa also requires greater investments 
in law enforcement capabilities focused on the continent, including 
enhanced analytical resources at home, more liaison personnel posted 
abroad, and stepping up efforts to build the capacity of our partners 
on the continent. Abroad, this requires a more pragmatic attitude that 
prioritizes maintaining the progress that has been achieved in regions 
like the Sahel and realistic perspective that privileges effective 
partners who have proven their value over those that have failed time 
and again--a good candidate for review is our failure to more 
strategically engage in the Horn of Africa with the Republic of 
Somaliland, a functional state, while pouring billions into the 
perennial failed state of rump Somalia, which has as a government 
minister a terrorist who just a few years ago had a $5 million bounty 
on his head from our own Rewards for Justice program.
    Fifth, as America's relationships--diplomatic, security, economic, 
and cultural--with Africa as a whole and with the individual countries 
on the continent expands and deepens (a positive development to be 
sure!), an unfortunate downside is that the potential risk to U.S. 
persons and interests as well as to the homeland necessarily increases. 
Quite simply, threats exist and more engagement, by its very nature, 
increases exposure and vulnerability to them. The answer is not to 
curtail engagement since there are clear strategic imperatives for 
seeking to build these links, but to ensure that adequate resources are 
mustered to cope with the meet the rising demand across a whole range 
of sectors from civil aviation to ports to customs and immigration, 
etc., for more intelligence on and security against threats originating 
in Africa.
    Sixth, with many supply chains for the critical minerals needed for 
both the energy transition and new technologies running through Africa, 
I would invite this distinguished panel to consider a broader vision of 
security, not just in protecting the American people and homeland from 
attacks, but also protecting their access to the strategic materials 
which are essential for our defense systems and civilian economy.
    Seventh, the challenge of terrorism in Africa and any derivative 
threat to the United States cannot be addressed except in an integrated 
fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader notion of human security 
writ large--encompassing social, economic, and political development--
which, often enough, also must transcend national and other boundaries. 
As I repeatedly emphasize during my service as envoy to the Sahel: 
``The heart of the crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy--a 
perception by citizens that their government is valid, equitable, and 
able and willing to meet their needs . . . Absent states' commitments 
to meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international engagement 
is likely to succeed.'' This obviously is not a task for the United 
States alone. Nevertheless, it is one which America has a strategic 
interest in embracing and leading. This is especially true given the 
forced retreat of our ally France and increasing activity of 
geopolitical rivals like China and Russia (as well as the latter's 
proxies like the Wagner Group criminal network set up by the late and 
unlamented Yevgeny Prigozhin).
                               conclusion
    Successive administrations, both Democrat and Republican, and the 
Congress deserve credit for efforts in recent years to shift the 
narrative on Africa toward a greater focus on the extraordinary 
potential of the continent and its strategic importance. However, if 
this momentum is to be maintained and the opportunities identified 
grasped, the United States needs to redouble its own efforts and also 
work closely with its African and other partners to manage the 
challenges, overcoming terrorism and other threats to security which 
stand in the way to an incredibly promising future.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    I now recognize Joshua Meservey for your 5-minute opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

    Mr. Meservey. Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on this important topic.
    My name is Joshua Meservey. I'm a senior fellow at Hudson 
Institute. The views I express in this testimony are my own and 
do not represent an official position at Hudson.
    African terrorism is amid an extraordinary expansion. 
According to the latest Global Terrorism Index, in 2022 the 
Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism deaths world-
wide, up from 1 percent in 2007, while Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last 
year. There are also now deadly and active Islamist terrorists 
operating in parts of Africa, such as northern Mozambique and 
eastern DRC, that have little history of Islamist terrorism. 
These trends challenge the United States' ability to protect 
the American homeland as Islamist terrorist Salafi-jihadi 
theology requires them to fight the United States. African 
Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates are largely autonomous, 
and not all members subscribe to Salafi-jihadi theology, but 
the core leadership behaves as though they do. American policy 
makers should assume that an African terrorist organization 
would attack the United States if given the chance.
    Furthermore, as Chairman Pfluger noted in his opening 
remarks, there are now vast spaces in Mali and Burkina Faso 
that can serve as the type of safe havens where terrorists have 
the time and space to plot more ambitious attacks.
    The relatively good news is that the direct threat of 
Afghan terrorism to the homeland is, for now, limited for 
various reasons. The risk of American complacency and 
distraction is real, however. Lone-wolf terror attacks likely 
remain the most direct danger from African terrorism to the 
homeland. Fortunately, there does not appear to be any African 
terrorist organization with significant appeal within the 
United States right now.
    While African terrorism's most potent threats to the United 
States are more indirect than an attack on the homeland, they 
are still worrisome. They include, No. 1, attacking Americans 
and American interests on the continent, something terrorist 
groups have done for decades; No. 2, providing military leaders 
with a pretext for launching coups--the putschists in Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and Niger all invoked their country's worsening 
terrorism fueled insecurity as justification for taking power; 
No. 3, creating the type of instability that provides 
opportunities for American competitors like Russia through its 
Wagner Group; No. 4, undermining important economic projects 
such as how ASWJ in northern Mozambique shut down operations 
around a massive natural gas field in the area.
    Unfortunately, current trends in Africa suggest that these 
dangers will likely grow. The dismal state of governance on the 
continent, of which the recent rash of coups is both symptom 
and cause, enhances the appeal of terrorist messaging. 
Furthermore, the Wagner Group, to which some governments have 
turned, operates in ways that exacerbates the governance 
deficiencies that contribute to terrorism in the first place. 
Meanwhile, this is happening against a backdrop of the rapid 
growth of Salafism in Africa that has widened the pool of 
Muslims who share some core theological beliefs with Salafi-
jihadis.
    Bearing in mind that the most effective interventions will 
enhance what viable and committed governments, militaries, 
civil society, and ordinary citizens are already trying to 
achieve on the ground in terrorism-affected areas, the United 
States should, No. 1, coordinate the fight against terrorism 
with partners and allies. The problem with African terrorism is 
far too large for the U.S. alone. No. 2 cooperate with the 
remaining relatively stable West African countries to build a 
terrorism firebreak. No. 3, hold Middle Eastern countries to 
their promises to stop funding extremism, including the 
proselytization of fundamentalist Islam. This appears to be 
less of a problem now than it was a decade ago, but it requires 
continued attention. No. 4, ensure adequate religious literacy 
among U.S. diplomats and military personnel, as the United 
States has a recent poor track record in understanding 
religiously-motivated actors, like Salafi-jihadi terrorists. 
No. 5, continue and enhance efforts to bolster trade and 
investment between the United States and Africa, which would 
help ameliorate one element of the enabling environment for 
terrorism, which is the lack of economic opportunity many 
Africans face. No. 6, continue, improve, and expand support for 
Afghan civil society organizations. These groups are often 
among the few that are capable and committed enough to push 
their governments to perform better.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Joshua Meservey
                           September 27, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important 
topic.
    My name is Joshua Meservey, and I am a senior fellow at Hudson 
Institute. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should 
not be construed as representing an official position of Hudson 
Institute.
                 the rise and rise of african terrorism
    African terrorism is amid an extraordinary expansion. According to 
the Institute for Economics & Peace's latest Global Terrorism Index, in 
2022 the Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism deaths 
worldwide, up from 1 percent in 2007. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last year.\1\ The 
Africa Center for Strategic Studies documented a nearly 50 percent 
increase in 2022 in the number of deaths due to Islamist terrorism in 
Africa, a growth rate around 2.5 times what it was 10 years ago.\2\ The 
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project recorded increases in 
political violence of 77 percent and 150 percent from 2021 to 2022 in 
Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, though those rates include more 
than just terrorist violence.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023, 
March 2023, https://www.visiono.humanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/
03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf.
    \2\ The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, African Militant 
Islamist Group-Linked Fatalities at All-Time High, July 31, 2023, 
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-militant-islamist-group-
linked-fatalities-at-all-time-high/.
    \3\ ACLED, The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an 
Ever-Worsening Crisis, February 8, 2023, https://acleddata.com/
con.lict-watchlist-2023/sahel/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are also now effective and committed Islamist terrorists 
operating in parts of Africa with little history of Islamist terrorism. 
In northern Mozambique, for instance, a group known as Ansar al-Sunna 
Wa Jamma (ASWJ) in 2017 began rapidly expanding in Cabo Delgado 
province, eventually rooting itself in 6 districts, killing thousands 
of Mozambicans, and displacing many more. It became an affiliate of the 
so-called Islamic State in 2021, which marked its peak when it may have 
had as many as 5,000 fighters and associates. A Rwandan military 
intervention that year finally pushed the group back and stabilized 
much of the province. ASWJ is not defeated, however, as it took refuge 
in the dense Catupa Forest from where it continues to launch attacks 
that increasingly feature improvised explosive devices and suicide 
bombers.
    A group with a longer history than the ASWJ, called the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), is another example of the recent, rapid growth 
of African terrorism. The ADF has existed for decades, but was such a 
relatively minor player in the welter of eastern DRC's armed groups 
that it was nearly defunct by 2017.\4\ However, around that time it 
began receiving funding from the Islamic State that eventually 
propelled it to its status today as one of eastern DRC's most potent 
armed groups that recruits foreign fighters and performs operations in 
multiple countries.\5\ A Ugandan military operation against the ADF--
officially known as Islamic State Central Africa Province following its 
affiliation with the Islamic State--that began in 2021 has degraded the 
group, but it continues to launch costly and brutal attacks, and 
maintains ties to other terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The ADF formed in northern Uganda but was driven from there in 
the 1990's. It has primarily operated in eastern DRC ever since.
    \5\ These include a November 2021 triple suicide bombing in 
Kampala, Uganda, and an increased tempo of attacks that killed nearly 
triple the number of people in 2021 than they did in 2019. See Caleb 
Weiss, Ryan O'Farrell, Tara Candland, and Laren Poole, ``Fatal 
Transaction: The Funding Behind the Islamic State's Central Africa 
Province,'' Program on Extremism at George Washington, June 2023, 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/fatal-
transaction-final_0.pdf and Tara Candland, Ryan O'Farrell, Laren Poole, 
and Caleb Weiss, ``The Rising Threat to Central Africa: The 
Transformation of the Islamic State's Congolese Branch.'' CTC Sentinel 
15, no. 6 (June 2022) https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-
central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-
branch/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The spread of Islamist terrorism in Africa challenges the United 
States' ability to protect the American homeland as hatred of the 
United States is baked into Islamist terrorists' beliefs and 
operations.\6\ Every significant African terrorist group subscribes to 
Salafi-jihadism, a sub-sect of the Salafi wing of Sunni Islam. Salafis 
believe that the only authentic practice of Islam is to live as did the 
Salaf--the initial generations of Muslims, including the prophet 
Mohammed and his companions--and according to a literal interpretation 
of certain Islamic holy texts. Salafi-jihadis go further by claiming 
that authentic Islamic practice requires Muslims to violently impose 
``pure'' Islamic living on everyone, including on fellow Muslims who do 
not interpret their faith in the precise way that Salafi-jihadis do. 
Salafi-jihadis, then, believe that they are required to fight the West, 
especially its leader, the United States. Salafi-jihadis especially 
revile the West because of its tolerance of various religions, its 
secular laws, its supposed subjugation and humiliation of Muslim lands, 
and its societies that they believe are decadent and immoral.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Anti-Western, and specifically anti-American, screeds are 
staples of Salafi-jihadi propaganda. For instance, in 1998, Osama bin 
Laden issued a ruling declaring that it was the individual duty of 
Muslims to kill Americans and Jews wherever they were found. One of the 
Islamic State's on-line publications, the now-defunct Dabiq, is replete 
with diatribes against the United States, while al-Shabaab's most 
recent major propaganda release rails against America as well. For an 
excerpt of the al-Shabaab video, see Live From Somalia 
(@Live_F_Somalia), ``UPDATE: Al Shabab group's deputy leader Mahad 
Karate said in a new video that they have seized vehicles, weapons, 
munitions and other military gears worth $23 million following the 
group's recent suicide and gun attack on SNA camp in Osweine area of 
Galgadud region, X, September 15, 2023, 11:07 AM, https://twitter.com/
Live_F_Somalia/status/1702700694459851171. For bin Laden's fatwa, see 
Federation of American Scientists, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: 
World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 2998, https://irp.fas.org/
world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
    \7\ For example, see ``The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near 
Extinction of the Western Woman,'' Dabiq, Vol. 15, https://
web.archive.org/web/20170421153001/https://clarionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-
cross.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    African Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates are largely 
autonomous from their core organizations, and not all members of 
terrorist organizations subscribe to the Salafi-jihadi theology. People 
join such groups for a wide variety of reasons, including for money, 
power, protection, or because of political beliefs. Yet the core 
leadership of Salafi-jihadi organizations behave as if they have a 
sincere commitment to the ideology, even if there are some esoteric 
theological or tactical differences among and within the groups. 
American policy makers should assume that, if given the chance, an 
African terrorist organization would attack the United States.
    Furthermore, there are now vast spaces in places like Mali and 
Burkina Faso controlled or influenced by terrorist groups. These are 
the types of safe havens where terrorists, if left unpressured, have 
the time and space to plot more ambitious attacks, including against 
the United States. America has painful experience of this reality after 
Osama bin Laden spent undisturbed years in Sudan where he planned the 
9/11 terrorist attacks.
    The relatively good news is that the direct threat of African 
terrorism to the American homeland is, for now, limited. African 
terrorists are today focused on fighting their local governments or 
other rivals, and they generally lack many of the advanced capabilities 
necessary to strike within the United States. The requisite 
coordination and planning for such an attack are especially difficult 
in the African context, and the agencies tasked with protecting the 
United States now have had decades of experience detecting and 
disrupting terror plots.
    The risk of complacency and distraction is real, however, and the 
increased flow of illegal immigration across the Southern Border has 
heightened the risk of an attack. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
recently reported an increase in the number of people on the FBI's 
terror watch list trying to illegally cross the border.\8\ As the 
number of illegal immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere has already 
more than doubled this fiscal year from last, Africa likely accounts 
for part of the increase in individuals on the FBI's watch list that 
CBP has encountered at the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Julia Ainsley, ``Number of People on Terrorist Watchlist 
Stopped at Southern U.S. Border has Risen,'' NBC News, September 14, 
2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/number-people-
terror-watchlist-stopped-mexico-us-border-risen-rcna105095.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nonetheless, lone-wolf attacks--attacks conducted by terrorists 
inspired by but with no formal connection to an established terrorist 
group--likely remains the most direct danger from African terrorist 
groups to the U.S. homeland. Fortunately, there does not appear to be 
any African terrorist organization with significant appeal within the 
United States. Al-Shabaab once attracted support from dozens of 
Americans and U.S. permanent residents, including by inspiring them to 
travel to Somalia to fight,\9\ but that support has either largely 
dried up or sympathizers no longer dare to act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Joshua Meservey, ``Travelling for an Idea: The Appeal of Al-
Shabaab to Diaspora in the West,'' in War and Peace in Somalia: 
National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, edited by Michael 
Keating and Matt Waldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    the threat to the united states
    While African terrorism's most potent threats to the United States 
are more indirect than an attack on the homeland, they are still 
worrisome. They include:
    (1) Attacking Americans and American interests on the continent. 
        African Islamist terrorist groups have attacked American 
        targets on the continent for decades. The deadliest such attack 
        was the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
        Tanzania; one of the most recent was the 2020 strike on a joint 
        U.S.-Kenya military base in Manda Bay that killed 3 
        Americans.\10\ In the Sahel, al-Qaeda in 2015 and twice in 2016 
        attacked targets frequented by foreigners in Mali, Burkina 
        Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire, respectively, killing dozens, 
        including Americans.\11\ African terrorist groups will continue 
        looking for those types of opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Joshua Meservey, ``A Growing Challenge for America's Somalia 
Policy,'' The Daily Signal, January 9, 2020, https://
www.dailysignal.com/2020/01/09/a-growing-challenge-for-americas-
somalia-policy/.
    \11\ ``Mali Hotel Attack: U.S. Citizen Among 21 Dead, American 
Govt. Looking for Others,'' ABC News, November 21, 2015, https://
abcnews.go.com/international/americans-hostages-rescued-mali-hotel/
story?id=35319879; ``Burkina Faso Attack: Foreigners Killed at Luxury 
Hotel,'' BBC, January 16, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
35332792; Aislinn Laing and Henry Samuel, ``Al Qaeda Claims 
Responsibility for Ivory Coast Hotel Shooting in which 16 `Including 
Four Europeans' Killed at Resort,'' The Telegraph, March 14, 2016, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
cotedivoire/12192667/Ivory-Coast-hotel-shooting-Gunmen-open-fire-and-
kill-11-in-beach-resort-Grand-Bassam-latest.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Providing military leaders with a pretext for launching coups. 
        Putschists in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger invoked their 
        country's worsening insecurity as justification for taking 
        power. When a junta takes over, the United States' ability to 
        work with the affected government is circumscribed, both by 
        American law and because of the mismatch in governing systems 
        that promotes distrust and friction. Achieving U.S. national 
        interests in the country and its surrounding region becomes 
        more difficult in those scenarios.
    (3) Creating the type of instability that provides opportunities 
        for American competitors. Russia's Wagner Group that is now 
        embedded in strategic areas of Libya entered the country during 
        the wide-spread instability brought on in part by terrorist 
        groups. Wagner also now has a major operation in Mali, Niger's 
        coup government contacted the group for help,\12\ and there are 
        rumors that the mercenaries may be in Burkina Faso, though that 
        is disputed.\13\ Wagner's activities contributed to the 
        European Union and some European countries suspending certain 
        types of assistance, including their provision of combat 
        training missions, in the Central African Republic and 
        Mali.\14\ The result is that the security situations in those 
        countries deteriorated, and the United States has fewer close 
        partners with which to cooperate on the problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Sam Mednick, ``Niger's Junta Asks for Help from Russian Group 
Wagner as it Faces Military Intervention Threat,'' AP, August 5, 2023, 
https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-
e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0.
    \13\ Lalla Sy, ``Wagner Group: Burkina Faso Anger over Russian 
Mercenary Link,'' BBC, December 16, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-63998458.
    \14\ ``Germany to End EU training Mission in Mali,'' Reuters, May 
5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-ready-continue-
un-mission-mali-defmin-2022-05-04/; ``France Suspends Aid, Military 
Support for Central African Republic,'' Reuters, June 9, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-suspends-aid-military-support-
central-african-republic-2021-06-08/; ``EU Suspends Military Training 
in Central Africa over Russian Mercenaries,'' Reuters, December 15, 
2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-centralafrica-security-
idAFL8N2T0586.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) Undermining important economic projects. This is a less 
        pronounced threat than the others listed, but still meaningful. 
        Terrorism-related insecurity harms local and even national 
        economies, deepening poverty. It can also directly threaten 
        U.S. economic interests. For instance, ASWJ in northern 
        Mozambique shut down operations around a massive natural gas 
        field in the area, an operation supported by American companies 
        and the U.S. Government through the U.S. Development Finance 
        Corporation (USDFC) and EXIM.
                  the two pillars of african terrorism
    Unfortunately, the situation in Africa suggests that these dangers 
will remain potent and will likely grow. One pillar of the terrorism 
problem in Africa is the dismal state of governance that creates an 
enabling environment for terrorist appeals. In the latest Ibrahim Index 
of African Governance, African countries average a 49 out of 100 
score.\15\ Unaccountable, abusive, and incompetent governments 
strengthen the appeal of terrorist groups who claim to have the 
solution to problems governments cause or cannot solve. A government's 
inability to protect its people also increases the chances that they 
will acquiesce or support a terrorist group simply out of self-
preservation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Calculations by author. The data can be found at Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation, https://iiag.online/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The recent rash of coups highlights the weak and insufficient 
governance on the continent and suggests that the problem is going to 
worsen. Coup governments rarely deliver the type of transparent, 
effective, and responsive governance that is necessary to ameliorate 
the enabling environment for terrorism. Burkina Faso and Mali are 
illustrative examples. Terrorism-related deaths in the former grew by 
376 percent in 2022,\16\ which followed the January coup that year that 
ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kabore.\17\ In the latter, violent 
terrorist incidents have increased three-fold since the country's first 
coup in 2020.\18\ While the security situations in both countries were 
extremely poor before the coups, it is highly probable that the new 
military governments are even more incompetent at containing the spread 
of terrorism than were the civilian governments they replaced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023.
    \17\ The leader of the January 2022 coup, Paul-Henri Sandaogo 
Damiba, was himself unseated in September 2022 by a coup led by Captain 
Ibrahim Traore, the current ruler of Burkina Faso.
    \18\ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mali Catastrophe 
Accelerating under Junta Rule, July 10, 2023, https://africacenter.org/
spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-junta-rule/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the Wagner Group to which some coup governments have 
turned operates in ways that exacerbates the governance deficiencies 
that contribute to terrorism in the first place. Wagner's habitual 
brutality alienates communities whose support is needed to effectively 
fight terrorism, and its parasitic nature leaches away the scant 
governing capacity its partner regimes have.
    The other key element of the African terrorism problem is the 
Salafi-jihadi ideology that motivates the core of many of these groups. 
Most Muslims in Africa traditionally practiced their faith according to 
Sufi rites, the syncretism and mysticism of which repels Salafis. Over 
the last several decades, however, Salafism has grown throughout the 
continent, and even become the dominant practice in some countries like 
Somalia. While only a small minority of Salafis are violent, and other 
sects--including Sufiism--have produced Islamist terrorists, the rapid 
growth of Salafism in Africa has widened the pool of Muslims who share 
some core theological beliefs with Salafi-jihadis.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Joshua Meservey, ``Sahelian Islam's Shift Toward Salafism and 
Its Implications For Regional Terrorism,'' Hoover Institution, 
September 21, 2021, https://www.hoover.org/research/sahelian-islams-
shift-towards-salafiism-and-its-implications-regional-terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A more recent global development may have negative consequences for 
the fight against African terrorism as well. The poorly planned and 
executed 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan amid the Taliban's 
reconquest has once again created an entire country that can serve as a 
terrorist haven. The notorious Haqqani Network--an eager supporter of 
Islamist terrorism abroad--has embedded itself in the Taliban 
government.\20\ And according to leaked U.S. Department of Defense 
documents, the Islamic State now uses Afghanistan as a hub from which 
to coordinate its activities and plot attacks against the United 
States,\21\ while the United Nations reports that al-Qaeda recently 
established 5 new training camps in the country.\22\ There is a long 
history of African terrorists training or fighting in Afghanistan and 
returning to the continent to strengthen or even start terrorist 
organizations.\23\ Because of what happened recently in Afghanistan, 
that danger is once again relevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Jeff M. Smith, ``The Haqqani Network: The New Kingmakers in 
Kabul,'' War on the Rocks, November 12, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/11/the-haqqani-network-afghanistans-new-power-
players/.
    \21\ Dan Lamothe and Joby Warrick, ``Afghanistan Has Become a 
Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals,'' Washington Post, April 
22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/
afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/.
    \22\ Some U.S. Government officials dispute the U.N.'s reporting, 
as seen here: Jeff Seldin, ``UN Report Warns Al-Qaida, Islamic State 
Growing in Afghanistan,'' VOA, June 14, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/
a/un-report-warns-al-qaida-islamic-state-growing-in-afghanistan/
7138133.html. However, some counterterrorism scholars have pushed back 
on the U.S. officials' assertions here: Bill Roggio, ``On Eve of 9/11 
Anniversary, U.S. Officials Continue to Downplay Al Qaeda's Presence in 
Afghanistan,'' FDD's Long War Journal, September 11, 2023, https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/09/u-s-officials-continue-to-
downplay-al-qaedas-presence-in-afghanistan.php and here: Kevin Jackson 
(@alleyesonjihad) ``US intelligence claim that Ayman al-Zawahiri was 
the only senior al-Qaeda official in the Taliban's Afghanistan. Not 
everyone agrees though. For @akhbar, I profile Hamza al-Ghamidi, a top 
Saudi al-Qa`ida leader said to be based in Afghanistan:,'' X, September 
15, 2023, 10:39 AM, https://twitter.com/alleyesonjihad/status/
1702693543335035127?t=xbyODorGLXMptHLKoQJYVg&s=03. For the U.N. report, 
see United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to 
Resolution 2665 (2022) Concerning the Taliban and other Associated 
Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability 
and Security of Afghanistan, June 1, 2023, https://docplayer.net/
233358581-Security-council-united-nations-s-2023-370.html.
    \23\ For instance, the Armed Islamic Group (known by its French 
acronym, GIA), an offshoot of which would eventually become al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb, first connected with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. One 
of the Sahel's most notorious terrorists, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, also 
fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, as did many of the founders 
of al-Shabaab.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            recommendations
    While the scale of the problem of African terrorism is daunting, 
the United States is not helpless against it, though it is also not the 
decisive actor in the fight. American interventions will only be 
effective if they enhance what effective and committed governments, 
militaries, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens are 
trying to achieve on the ground in terrorism affected areas.
    The United States should:
    (1) Coordinate the fight against terrorism with partners and 
        allies.--The problem of African terrorism is too large for the 
        United States alone, so it should partner as closely as 
        necessary to achieve the most effect with partners. That 
        includes non-African partners such as Israel and European 
        countries, as well as African States like Rwanda and Uganda. 
        The later two countries highlight a dilemma that faces American 
        policy makers, namely that some of the United States' most 
        effective and accommodating security partners in Africa do not 
        have the level of democracy that Washington wishes. Yet Rwanda 
        is by far the most effective force fighting ASWJ in northern 
        Mozambique. Uganda has been a core element of the anti-al-
        Shabaab fight in Somalia for years, and is also battling the 
        truly vicious Allied Democratic Forces in the Democratic 
        Republic of the Congo. In these cases, American interests 
        require that Washington work closely with those countries, 
        while also seeking opportunities to influence them toward more 
        democratic governance. Such are the difficult tradeoffs and 
        balancing acts that are necessary in the fight against African 
        terrorism.
    (2) Cooperate with West African countries to build a terrorism 
        firebreak.--Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are the epicenter of 
        the explosion in Sahelian terrorism, and the problem is going 
        to worsen. Neighboring those countries are relatively stable 
        states like Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo that are 
        friendly to the United States, but which are threatened by 
        violence spreading from their terrorism-affected neighbors. The 
        United States should focus its efforts in the Sahel on helping 
        those countries protect themselves, which will require helping 
        to coordinate their counterterrorism efforts, sharing 
        intelligence, working with them to enhance their governance 
        capacities, and maintaining a robust counterterrorism presence 
        in the region.
    (3) Hold countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar to their promises to 
        stop funding extremism, including the proselytization of 
        fundamentalist Islam.--Saudi Arabia alone spent tens of 
        billions of dollars spreading Wahhabism, its version of 
        Salafism, throughout places like Africa. Recently, however, the 
        Kingdom appears to be taking steps to make good on its promise 
        to reform,\24\ though judging such things with precision is 
        difficult. The United States should encourage Saudia Arabia's 
        efforts, though it should also monitor them to ensure there is 
        no reversal. The United States should also help countries like 
        Saudi Arabia and Qatar refine their abilities to disrupt the 
        flow of private money from their citizens to extremist causes 
        worldwide. Morocco, meanwhile, has for years run a home-grown 
        effort to debunk Salafi-jihadi theology,\25\ and the United 
        States should do what it can to support that program, and 
        encourage other Muslim-majority countries to do the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ For a few representative examples from the Muslim World 
League, Saudi Arabia's most prominent and semi-official charity that 
once funded extremism around the world, see ``The Vice President of 
Burundi Inaugurates the International Forum of the Muslim World League 
on `Religious and Ethnic Pluralism and Positive Coexistence','' Muslim 
World League, January 21, 2019, https://www.themwl.org/en/node/35919; 
``Muslim World League Head Becomes First Recipient of Award Uniting 
Faiths,'' Jewish News Syndicate, June 9, 2020, https://www.jns.org/
muslim-world-league-head-becomes-first-recipient-of-award-uniting-
faiths/. See also Eldad J. Pardo, Review of Selected Saudi Textbooks 
2020-21, Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in 
School Education, December 2020, https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/
uploads/Review-of-Selected-Saudi-Textbooks-2020-21.pdf; Robert Satloff, 
``A Historic Holocaust Awareness Awakening in Saudi Arabia, of All 
Places,'' The Washington Institute, January 26, 2018, http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-historic-holocaust-
awareness-awakening-in-saudi-arabia-of-all-places.
    \25\ Jean-Marie Lemaire and Sara Doublier, ``Video: Morocco's Anti-
Jihadist Strategy,'' France 24, May 25, 2016, https://www.france24.com/
en/20160325-reporters-morocco-anti-jihad-strategy-counter-terrorism-
intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) Ensure adequate religious literacy among U.S. diplomats and 
        military personnel.--Religion remains the dominant organizing 
        principle in many societies around the world, but the United 
        States has a recent poor track record in understanding 
        religiously-motivated actors like Salafi-jihadi terrorists.\26\ 
        Misunderstanding Salafi-jihadis' core religious convictions 
        makes it impossible to create an effective strategy for 
        fighting them, with potentially profound consequences for 
        American security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Emilie Kao and Joshua Meservey, Minding the ``God Gap'': ISIS' 
Genocide of Religious Minorities and American Statecraft, The Heritage 
Foundation, November 8, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/
report/minding-the-god-gap-isis-genocide-religious-minorities-and-
american.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (5) Continue and enhance efforts to bolster trade and investment 
        between the United States and Africa.--One element of the 
        enabling environment for terrorism in Africa is the lack of 
        economic opportunity many Africans face. Increased U.S. 
        private-sector investment would allow American companies to 
        reap more of the economic opportunities on the continent while 
        also creating jobs for Africans and contributing to economic 
        growth. Understandably, few American companies are interested 
        in operating in the most terrorist-prone areas, yet any 
        contribution they make to growing economies and more jobs 
        elsewhere could help ameliorate some of the appeal of Salafi-
        jihadism in those places. Congress can also ensure that U.S. 
        agencies like the USDFC and Prosper Africa prioritize helping 
        the U.S. private sector in Africa. It should also push State 
        Department to fulfill its obligation created by the Championing 
        American Business Through Diplomacy act to prioritize 
        commercial diplomacy.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ U.S. House of Representatives, 22 USC Ch. 106: Championing 
American Business through Diplomacy, no date, https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter106- &edition=prelim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (6) Continue, improve, and expand support for African civil society 
        organizations.--These groups are often among the few that are 
        capable and committed enough to push their governments to 
        perform better. However, just as the security situation has 
        deteriorated in places despite substantial American military 
        investments, governance and democracy in Africa has also 
        weakened despite significant American support to African civil 
        society organizations. The United States needs to study why in 
        some cases our support for civil society and better governance 
        has failed, and make the necessary reforms.
                               conclusion
    African terrorism is a generational challenge, and current trends 
are running in the wrong direction. The United States must remain 
focused and committed to supporting Africans who are on the front lines 
battling the twin pillars of the problem, poor governance and the 
Salafi-jihadi ideology. Any weariness or complacency about the 
challenge is likely to have damaging consequences to Americans and 
American national interests.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you for your testimony.
    I now recognize Dr. Zelin for your opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF AARON Y. ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, WASHINGTON 
                 INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

    Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger. It's a pleasure to 
see you again. Thank you, Ranking Magaziner and the 
distinguished subcommittee for giving me the opportunity today 
to testify in terrorism threats emanating from parts of the 
African continent, in particular focusing on issues and 
recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in 
Mali, where insecurity is getting worse by the day.
    There are two main jihadi groups now operating there, the 
Islamic State Sahel Province and al-Qaeda's branch, Jama'at 
Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, or just JNIM. You can get more 
specifics on the background of both groups in my written 
testimony. This increased insecurity can be directly linked to 
the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces. At the time of the 
French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or 
defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since the French 
withdrew at the request of the current Malayan government, 
which seized power after a coup in May 2021 and expressed its 
preference for the Russian-backed Wagner Group as a preferred 
counterterrorism partner.
    According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project, 60 percent of Wagner's violent engagements in Mali 
have targeted civilian noncombatants. Rights groups therefore 
argue that such Wagner actions unintentionally drive support 
for both the Islamics in Mali, or ISM, and JNIM, which 
capitalizes on grievances against local governments for 
recruitment purposes, highlighting that Washington and its 
allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and power competition 
as an either/or challenge, since it will only undermine the 
challenge of both. According to a late August 2023 U.N. report 
on ISM and JNIM, in less than a year, the Islamics in Mali has 
almost doubled its area of control in rural eastern Menaka, in 
large parts of the Ansango area in southern Gao. As for JNIM, 
the report states that it controls several gold mining sites 
across northern Mali and villages in at least the Mopti region.
    Making matters even more complicated for Washington, on 
September 16 Mali signed a mutual defense treaty with Burkina 
Faso and Niger, an alternative and competitor to the French-led 
G-Five Sahel alliance, one of the main bulwarks in recent years 
over the challenge of IMS and JNIM in the region.
    From an American security perspective, one area that is 
potentially worrying in the future is that a cohort of regional 
foreign fighters, mainly from surrounding countries, have 
appeared in the ranks of both ISM and JNIM. In past conflict 
zones with jihadis this has led to external operations against 
Western homelands. It should be noted that JNIM and its parent 
organization, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghrib, has been 
uninterested in external operations in Western homelands, 
though it has targeted Westerners and Western interests 
locally. The greater risk for potential external operations 
comes from ISM, even if it remains a low risk at this current 
juncture. History dictates, though, that the longer the group 
possesses a safe haven and the opportunity to expand its rule, 
the more capable be of planning operations, whether directed, 
guided, or inspired, as previously observed by IS's provinces 
in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan.
    The current Malayan preference for Wagner, which 
effectively blocks Western nations from theater, limits U.S. 
options for meaningfully shaping dynamics on the ground. 
Tenuous U.S. ties with the current Nigerian leadership further 
complicate the situation and may hinder the effectiveness of 
the local U.S. drone base, which has been used against both IS 
Sahel province and JNIM militants over the years. Washington 
should therefore prepare for the possibility that Niger could 
ask the United States to leave, as Mali recently did with 
France. Contingency planning for a drone base could include 
engaging countries like Ghana or Senegal along for a back-up 
plan amid the current trajectory.
    The U.S. Treasury Department should consider applying 
broader sanctions against ISM and JNIM leaders and financial 
networks. To date, only 4 senior figures have been designated 
from JNIM and 2 from ISM, with 2 of these 6 figures now dead. 
Furthermore, neither group has seen a designation against them 
since 2021, even as both groups have gotten stronger.
    Likewise, it is also worth confronting the Wagner Group and 
its logistics without hesitation. In late July the United 
States sanctioned 3 Malayan officials for facilitating and 
expanding the Wagner Group's operations in the country since 
December 2021. This is a good start, though it would be 
worthwhile to target with sanctions those within the Wagner 
Group specifically in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, as the United 
States has done previously with its official activities in 
places like the Ukrainian War.
    Finally, there has been a growing perception, whether it is 
true or not in the Sahel region, as well as elsewhere in the 
world, that the United States can be fickle with its allies in 
contrast to Russia. Therefore, before the security situation 
devolves even more and spreads to other countries, it is 
imperative that Washington sticks to its allies regionally and 
make these efforts visible. Otherwise, do not be surprised if 
Moscow tries to find cracks in the foundations of relations and 
leverages insecurity to take advantage and undermine the United 
States' position, as already seen in Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Niger. Remembering that counterterrorism and power competition 
are linked in these conflict zones will also alleviate tactical 
and strategic misunderstandings and deter Russia from taking 
advantage of a warp view by Washington that these issue sets 
are somehow not linked.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Aaron Y. Zelin
                           September 27, 2023
    Thank you Mister Chairman and Members of the committee for giving 
me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from 
parts of the African continent. In particular, focusing on issues and 
recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where 
insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadi 
groups now operating there: the Islamic State's Sahel Province and 
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM).
    This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022 
withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane 
counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the 
Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has 
undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was 
managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political 
tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. As for the 
French, they withdrew at the request of the government of interim 
Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup 
and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as 
a preferred counterterrorism partner.
    Highlighting that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate 
counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts 
counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge 
will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is 
focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first 
occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in 
Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Syria at the Center of Power Competition and 
Counterterrorism,'' Policy Notes 95, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, February 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/syria-center-power-competition-and-counterterrorism; Aaron Y. 
Zelin, ``Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of 
Kabul,'' Policy Watch 3640, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
August 15, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
looking-legitimacy-taliban-diplomacy-fall-kabul.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         current state of play
    According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or 
ACLED, 60 percent of Wagner's violent engagements in Mali have targeted 
civilian noncombatants, as compared to 37 percent of Malian army 
actions.\2\ Furthermore, each Wagner attack--a category that includes 
kidnapping, sexual violence, and torture--kills an average of 7 
noncombatants, twice the average caused by Malian army attacks.\3\ 
Rights groups argue that such Wagner actions unintentionally drive 
support for the Islamic State in Mali (IS-M) and JNIM, which 
capitalizes on grievances against local governments for recruitment 
purposes.\4\ Likewise, on June 30, 2023, the U.N. Security Council 
voted to end the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA) mandate, raising the likelihood of greater impunity 
for all sides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ladd Serwat et al., ``Wagner Group Operations in Africa: 
Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali,'' 
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, August 30, 2022, https://
acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-
targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali.
    \3\ ``Wagner Routinely Targets Civilians in Africa,'' Economist, 
August 31, 2023, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/08/31/
wagner-routinely targets-civilians-in-africa.
    \4\ Sam Mednick, ``Violence Soars in Mali in the Year After 
Russians Arrive,'' Associated Press, January 14, 2023, https://
apnews.com/article/politics-mali-government-russia-violence-
10ba966bceb2dc732cb170b16258e5a6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the late August 2023 U.N. report on IS-M and JNIM, 
``the passage of time appears to favor the terrorist groups Jama'a 
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, 
whose military capacities and community penetration grow each day.''\5\ 
In the same report it states that ``in less than a year, [the] Islamic 
State in [Mali] has almost doubled its areas of control'' in rural 
eastern Menaka and large parts of the Ansongo area in southern Gao.\6\ 
As for JNIM, the report states that it controls several gold mining 
sites across northern Mali and villages in at least the Mopti 
region.\7\ Strikingly, within the month since MINUSMA's withdrawal from 
northern Mali, the prevalence of violence has doubled, portending a 
situation wherein IS-M, JNIM, other non-state actors can exploit a 
growing vacuum unfilled by either the Malian military or Wagner.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ U.N. Security Council, ``Letter Dated 3 August 2023 from the 
Panel of Experts on Mali Established Pursuant to Resolution 2374 (2017) 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council,'' August 3, 2023, 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_578.pdf.
    \6\ Ibid.
    \7\ Ibid.
    \8\ Associated Press, ``Mali's Junta Struggles to Fight Growing 
Violence in a Northern Region as U.N. Peacekeepers Withdraw,'' 
September 22, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/mali-junta-rebels-
jihadi-peacekeeping-coup-insecurity-7af6356feec5ce409501f4- c7e7dc42f8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Making matters even more complicated for Washington, on September 
16, Mali signed a mutual defense treaty, officially named the Alliance 
of Sahel States, with Burkina Faso and Niger--an alternative and 
competitor to the French-led G5 Sahel alliance (originally including 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), one of the main 
bulwarks against IS-M and JNIM in the region.\9\ Therefore, today, as 
IS-M and JNIM exploit Mali's security vacuum, Washington lacks space to 
productively intervene given its soured relationship with Bamako and 
the military regime's preference for working with Wagner. 
Unfortunately, the current trajectory will only benefit the jihadists 
the Malian government claims it wants to defeat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso Sign Sahel Security Pact,'' 
Reuters, September 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-
niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               background
    IS-M and JNIM's presence in Mali can be traced to an unrelated, 
decades-old insurgency in the north focused on Tuareg rights that was 
exploited by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its local allies in 
2011-12. AQIM, which benefited from the Libyan weapons bazaar that 
flourished after the 2011 fall of Muammar Qadhafi, seized territory in 
spring 2012 in a region of northern Mali referred to locally as Azawad. 
Even as France's Operation Serval dismantled this statelet in January 
2013, the AQIM-led insurgency continued, prompting an expansion of the 
jihadist campaign to neighboring countries, especially Burkina Faso. 
Within Mali, the AQIM-led jihadist alliance included more localized 
groups like Ansar al-Din and Katibat al-Macina, alongside AQIM splinter 
groups more regionalized in scope including Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 
fi Gharb Ifriqiya (JTWJ-GI) and Katibat al-Mulathamin.
    AQIM's monopoly on the Malian ``jihadosphere,'' however, was 
interrupted by the baya (allegiance pledge) given by Adnan Abu Walid 
al-Sahrawi to then IS ``caliph'' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on May 13, 2015, 
which the group accepted on October 31, 2016.\10\ Sahrawi, who became 
the first leader of IS-M, had previously cofounded JTWJ-GI and served 
on its shura council. This group, founded in October 2011, merged in 
August 2013 with Katibat al-Mulathamin, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, to 
form al-Murabitun, for which Sahrawi also served as a senior 
leader.\11\ Remnants of al-Murabitun eventually merged back into AQIM 
in December 2015, possibly in response to Sahrawi's announcement, which 
Belmokhtar rejected.\12\ Likewise, the remaining pro-AQIM groups--Ansar 
al-Din and Katibat al-Macina--publicly formalized ties with the al-
Qaeda branch on March 2, 2017, adopting the name Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam 
wal-Muslimin.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, ``Announcing a New Amir and Giving 
Bay'ah to al-Baghdadi,'' Jama'at at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad fi Gharb 
Ifriqiya, May 13, 2015, https://jihadology.net/2015/05/13/new-audio-
message-from-al-murabi%E1%B9%ADuns-adnan-abu-walid-al-%E1%B9%A3a%- 
E1%B8%A5rawi-announcing-a-new-amir-and-giving-bayah-to-al-baghdadi; Abu 
al-Walid Sahrawi, ``Pledge of Allegiance in Northern Mali to Shaykh Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining the Islamic State,'' Wi-Kallat Amaq al-
Ikhbariyah, October 30, 2016, https://jihadology.net/2016/10/30/new-
video-message-from-abu-al-walid-%E1%B9%A3a%E1%B8%A5rawi-pledge-of-
allegiance-in-northern-mali-to-shaykh-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-joining-
the-islamic-state.
    \11\ Caleb Weiss, AQIM's Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa'ida 
in the Islamic Maghreb's Expansion into West Africa (Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/
aqims-imperial-playbook-understanding-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrebs-
expansion-into-west-africa.
    \12\ Abu Mus'ab Abd al-Wadud (Abd al-Malik Drukdil), ``About al-
Murabitun Joining the Base of Jihad Organization, Adopting the Recent 
Mali Operation, and Messages to the West,'' al-Andalus Foundation for 
Media Production, December 3, 2015, https://jihadology.net/2015/12/03/
new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghribs-abu-
mu%E1%B9%A3ab-abd-al-wadud-abd-al-malik-drukdil-about-al-
murabi%E1%B9%ADun-joining-the-ba.
    \13\ Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin, ``Founding Statement,'' 
al-Zallaqah Foundation for Media Production, March 2, 2017, https://
jihadology.net/2017/03/02/new-video-message-from-jamaah-nu%E1%B9%A3rat-
al-islam-wa-l-muslimin-founding-statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the first few years when IS-M and JNIM operated 
simultaneously in Mali, the ``Sahel exception'' prevailed, as described 
by French journalist Wassim Nasr. According to this arrangement, the 
two groups implicitly agreed not to fight each other directly--a 
contrast with the situation in places like Syria, Yemen, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and elsewhere.\14\ But in early 2020, this tacit agreement 
collapsed, and the two groups have engaged in bloody if select clashes 
since due to JNIM's fears of fighter defections to IS-M.\15\ Setting 
aside these clashes, IS and JNIM mostly operate in separate regions of 
Mali. According to JNIM's claims of responsibility in the country, the 
group has operated mostly in the southeastern, central, and far 
northern regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, Koulikoro, Kayes, Segou, and 
Sikasso, while IS-M--as of September 2023--has remained in the far 
eastern regions of Gao and Menaka.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Wassim Nasr, ``ISIS in Africa: The End of the `Sahel 
Exception,' '' Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, June 2, 
2020, https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-africa-the-end-of-the-
sahel-exception.
    \15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Compared with attacks claimed by other IS ``provinces,'' the IS-M 
numbers appear paltry: 3 in 2016; 8 in 2017; 10 in 2018; 16 in 2019; 35 
in 2020; 14 in 2021; 29 in 2022; and 15 as of September 2023. Of 
course, before April 2019, the IS media office simply did not claim 
Mali-based attacks, and it may have purposefully limited its claims 
since.\16\ This approach would cohere with IS practices elsewhere, 
particularly in Syria, where leaked documents show that military 
commanders intentionally prevent publication of claims owing to a lack 
of technology/internet access, security concerns, or mere 
indifference.\17\ Moreover, in a recent issue of the Islamic State's 
Pashto-language Voice of Khurasan magazine, the Khurasan ``province'' 
notes that the seeming decline in Afghanistan-based operations can be 
attributed to a policy of silence, similar to that employed in 
Syria.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Prior to IS officially claiming attacks in April 2019, the 
data from 2016-April 2019 is from data shared with the author by 
Menastream, a risk consultancy led by researcher Heni Nsaibia.
    \17\ Aaron Y. Zelin and Devorah Margolin, ``The Islamic State's 
Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz,'' CTC 
Sentinel 16, no. 9, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-states-
shadow-governance-in-eastern-syria-since-the-fall-of-baghuz.
    \18\ Islamic State's Wilayat Khurasan, ``Voice of Khurasan Magazine 
Issue No. 25,'' al-Aza'im Media Foundation, August 28, 2023, https://
jihadology.net/2023/08/28/new-magazine-issue-from-the-islamic-states-
wilayat-khurasan-voice-of-khurasan-25-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When compared with JNIM's claimed attack data so far in 2023, it 
further illustrates that IS-M is likely not claiming most of its 
attacks, especially considering both groups control territory and 
there's a major discrepancy between the two groups' attack tempo. JNIM 
to date since January 1 has claimed 136 attacks this year, which is on 
pace for 185 attacks.
    From an American security perspective, one area that is potentially 
worrying in the future is that a cohort of regional foreign fighters 
mainly from surrounding countries has appeared in IS-M and JNIM's ranks 
over the years. It is unlikely, however, that we will see a 
mobilization similar to what happened in Syria last decade. One reason 
for low fighter migration to sub-Saharan Africa is the area's lack of 
religious-historical resonance for Muslims relative to the Levant and 
Arabian Peninsula. More practically, transit to Mali is arduous, 
whereas Turkey--a global travel hub--provides an easy gateway to Syria. 
Yet the Mali situation bears watching all the same.
    It should be noted that JNIM and its parent organization AQIM, has 
been uninterested in external operations against the West in the 
homeland. For example, in June 2021 AQIM leader Abu Obaida Yusuf al-
Annabi said that France was ``deceiving'' its citizens by saying that 
the country's operations in Mali were necessary to protect France from 
jihadist attacks at home, because there has never been an attack on 
French soil by a Malian or orchestrated by Mali-based jihadists.\19\ 
However, AQIM/JNIM have had no qualms about attacking Western countries 
or interests regionally in the past: its long-standing kidnapping 
campaign going back 15+ years, the December 2012 In Amenas hostage 
crisis and attack in Algeria, the May 2013 attack on a military 
barracks in Agadez, Niger, and a French-owned and operated uranium mine 
in Arlit, Niger, the November 2015 Radisson Blu hotel attack in Mali, 
the January 2016 Cappuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel attack in 
Burkina Faso, and the March 2016 Grand-Bassam attack in the Ivory 
Coast. Though it appears that since the group became known exclusively 
as JNIM in Mali in 2017, there has been less of that activity 
regionally too.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Sheikh Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi, ``And God Will Surely 
Support Those Who Support Him,'' al-Andalus Foundation for Media 
Production, June 20, 2021, https://jihadology.net/2021/06/20/new-video-
message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghribs-shaykh-abu-ubaydah-
yusuf-al-anabi-and-god-will-surely-support-those-who-support-him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The greater risk for potential external operations comes from IS-M, 
even if it remains a low risk at this juncture. History dictates though 
that the longer the group possesses a safe haven and the opportunity to 
expand its rule, the more capable it will be of planning operations, 
whether directed, guided, or inspired--as previously observed by IS 
``provinces'' in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Petter Nesser, ``Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and 
Terrorist Entrepreneurs: How the Islamic State Terror Wave Rose So High 
in Europe,'' CTC Sentinel 12, no. 3 (March 2019), https://
ctc.westpoint.edu/military-interventions-jihadi-networks-terrorist-
entrepreneurs-islamic-state-terror-wave-rose-high-europe; Aaron Y. 
Zelin, The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya, Policy Note 45 
(Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2018), https://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/others-foreign-fighters-
libya; Aaron Y. Zelin, ``ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from 
Afghanistan,'' PolicyWatch 3778, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, September 11, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More immediately, IS-M's and JNIM's success in Mali may likewise 
prompt forays into nearby regions. One possibility is that the infusion 
of resources will be reinvested into faltering operations in North 
Africa, especially Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. Such a trend would mark 
an effective reversal of the southward flow of arms, money, and 
militancy from North Africa following the 2011 revolutions. 
Alternatively, IS-M and JNIM might try to extend farther south into the 
Gulf of Guinea countries like Benin and Togo, where both have grown 
slowly in recent years, or even push into newer countries such as 
Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, or Guinea.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Sam Mednick and Virgile Ahissou, ``Jihadi Violence Hits Benin, 
Shows Spread Across West Africa,'' Associated Press, December 28, 2022, 
https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-al-qaida-politics-benin-
violence-e70ea4e0cf5211785cf1cb20c4b38487; ``Togo Extends State of 
Emergency in North,'' Agence France-Presse, April 7, 2023, https://
www.barrons.com/news/togo-extends-state-of-emergency-in-north-5c083845; 
``Ghana Sends Special Forces to Border as Sahel Violence Spreads,'' 
African Defense Forum, May 9, 2023, https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/
ghana-sends-special-forces-to-border-as-sahel-violence-spreads; Annie 
Linskey, ``Kamala Harris Pledges $100 Million to West Africa Nations to 
Fight Extremist Threat,'' Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2023, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/kamala-harris-pledges-100-million-to-west-africa-
nations-to-fight-extremist-threat-6f02504e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Internally, worsening security dynamics across Mali will continue 
to open operating space for JNIM and IS-M, particularly in light of 
recent reports of conflict between the aligned Wagner Group and Malian 
military and the formerly pro-government Coordination of Azawad 
Movements (CMA),\22\ a coalition of Tuareg militant factions.\23\ 
Various Tuareg militants may also choose to align with one of the 
jihadist factions (IS-M or JNIM), even though no evidence suggests this 
has happened yet.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Coordination of Azawad Movements, post on X (formerly 
Twitter), September 12, 2023, https://twitter.com/cicamazawad/status/
1701653679831478529.
    \23\ Andrew Lebovich, ``Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel: 
Mouvement Pour Le Salut de Azawad, Groupe D'Autodefense Tuareg Imghad 
et Allies,'' European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019, https://
ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping.
    \24\ ``Letter Dated 3 August 2023 from the Panel of Experts on 
Mali,'' https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_578.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Therefore, in Mali and the broader Sahel, security dynamics 
involving local, regional, and global actors have produced a fluid 
geopolitical situation that benefits the local Islamic State 
``province'' as well as JNIM and other non-state actors. Today's 
reality, of course, does great damage to the Sahelian population.
                            recommendations
    The current Malian preference for Wagner, which effectively blocks 
Western nations from the theater, limits U.S. options for meaningfully 
shaping dynamics on the ground. Even if the United States or its French 
or other allies were more inclined to assert themselves, broader 
geostrategic concerns could hinder their appetite for a 
counterterrorism turf war with Russia. Tenuous U.S. ties with the 
current Nigerien leadership further complicate the situation and may 
hinder the effectiveness of the local U.S. drone base, which has been 
used against both IS Sahel Province and JNIM militants over the years. 
Washington should therefore prepare for the possibility that Niger 
could ask the United States to leave, as Mali recently did with France. 
Contingency planning for a drone base could include engaging countries 
like Ghana or Senegal, allowing for a back-up plan amid the current 
trajectory.
    The U.S. Treasury Department should consider applying broader 
sanctions against IS-M and JNIM leaders and financial networks. To 
date, only 4 senior figures have been designated from JNIM and 2 from 
IS-M.\25\ With 2 of these 6 figures now dead. Furthermore, neither 
group has seen a designation against them since 2021, even as both 
groups have gotten stronger in Mali. Broader targeting could 
potentially limit IS-M's and JNIM's ability to move money across 
borders. However, clear insight into the deep bench of IS-M and JNIM 
leadership or financiers is unavailable in the open source. Therefore, 
the State and Treasury Departments should use classified information 
and draw from the intelligence community to shed light on these 
figures, in turn denying them opportunities to help IS-M and JNIM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ ``Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department 
Under E.O. 13224,'' U.S. Department of State, last updated June 20, 
2023, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/#State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Likewise, it is also worth confronting the Wagner Group and its 
logistics without hesitation. In late July, the United States 
sanctioned three Malian officials (Malian Defense Minister Colonel 
Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and 
Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko) for 
facilitating and expanding the Wagner Group's operations in the country 
since December 2021.\26\ This is a good start, though it would be 
worthwhile to target those within the Wagner Group more specifically as 
the United States has done previously with its officials' activity in 
the Ukraine war. Due to the cross-border nature of the conflict in Mali 
and its connections to the insurgencies in Burkina Faso and Niger, as 
well as the two countries also working with the Wagner Group, 
considering sanctions related to these activities in those countries is 
worth exploring as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Anthony J. Blinken, ``Imposing Sanctions on Malian Officials 
in Connection with the Wagner Group,'' U.S. Department of State, July 
24, 2023, https://ru.usembassy.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-malian-
officials-in-connection-with-the-wagner-group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, there has been a growing perception, whether it is true or 
not, in the Sahel region, as well as elsewhere in the world that the 
United States can be fickle with its allies in contrast to Russia, 
which backs them no matter what. Therefore, before the security 
situation devolves even more and spreads to other countries again it is 
imperative that Washington sticks to its allies regionally and make 
these efforts visible. Otherwise, do not be surprised if Moscow tries 
to find cracks in the foundations of relations and leverages insecurity 
to take advantage and undermine the United States' position in the 
region in the way we have already now seen in recent years in Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and Niger. Remembering that counterterrorism and great 
power competition are linked in these conflict zones will also 
alleviate tactical and strategic misunderstandings and deter Russia 
from taking advantage of a warped view by Washington that these issue-
sets are somehow not linked.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Zelin.
    I now recognize Ms. Charles for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DONNA O. CHARLES, DIRECTOR OF WEST AFRICA AND THE 
            SAHEL, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

    Ms. Charles. Good morning, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member 
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I 
thank you and your staff for the opportunity to discuss the 
rise of terrorism in Africa and the potential threat it poses 
to the homeland.
    As director for West Africa and the Sahel at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace, I lead the Institute's efforts to inform 
public policy and programs that are designed to help our 
partners counter violent extremism, prevent and stabilize 
regional conflicts, promote community-led peace-building 
initiatives, and advance good governance reforms in the region. 
During my tenure at the State Department, where I focused on 
terrorism in Africa, I witnessed how important it is for the 
United States to remain vigilant in its efforts to neutralize, 
contain, and deter threats against Americans at home and 
abroad.
    While my professional experiences will inform my testimony 
and responses today, they are wholly my own and do not reflect 
the positions or policies of the U.S. Institute of Peace or any 
other department or agency.
    My testimony focuses on three critical issues that I assess 
are foundational to addressing the complex landscape of 
terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa and how its evolution poses a 
threat to the homeland.
    The first is understanding capabilities and intent, which 
shapes our knowledge of terrorist operations and how to best 
counter them. The second is mapping out risks and 
vulnerabilities to U.S. persons and interests at home and in 
Africa, including our posture, our exposure, and our risk 
tolerance. The third issue is building partnerships and 
capacities where they matter most. These issues require a 
robust set of tools and an equally robust policy that defines 
our strategic interests and political will to apply resources 
where they are lacking.
    The evolution of terrorism in Africa has resulted in 
significant shifts in capabilities and intent. A prime example 
of this shift is al-Shabaab, the Somalia based al-Qaeda 
affiliate. The group's capabilities have advanced substantially 
over the last 15 years and almost proportionately to its 
capacity to raise money. As a result, al-Shabaab remains the 
wealthiest, largest, and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the 
world. It is only in the last 3 years, however, that U.S. 
officials have publicly concluded that al-Shabaab is a threat 
to the U.S. homeland. I refer you to my written testimony for 
details about how al-Shabaab's plot, uncovered in the 
Philippines in 2019, helped shift this assessment. In addition, 
increased access to information technology, including social 
media, as well as global transportation, trade, financial and 
communication networks, create a target-rich environment for 
terrorist groups in Africa and elsewhere.
    Mapping and mitigating risks and vulnerabilities that 
expose the homeland to terror threats must be an iterative and 
well-resourced process. Consider our air borders. As of 2019, 
at least 11 countries in Africa have a last point of departure, 
or LPD, air route to the United States. This data point 
illustrates how a terrorist in Africa could, after clearing 
several layers of screening and security protocols, board a 
flight bound for the United States and use various means to 
attack the homeland, either before landing or upon doing so.
    Our land borders present another vulnerability. Thousands 
of migrants and special-interest aliens, or SIAs, from various 
countries in Africa have made the dangerous trek to South or 
Central America onward to the Southern Border. I again refer 
you to my written testimony for countermeasures that I believe 
have improved situational awareness along our borders.
    I urge decision makers to embrace a both/and strategy 
rather than an either/or approach to ensure we are successful 
on both sides of the boom. Policy makers must take a hard look 
at how U.S. strategies for engaging in Africa are reconciled 
with the resources available. Also, we will fail if we abandon 
security cooperation with military and law enforcement partners 
on the continent.
    I am encouraged by investments in prevention, including 
through expanding civil military operations, analyzing 
financial facilitation networks, and leveraging advanced open-
source intelligence and technologies. Continuing to invest in 
these and other measures will pay dividends in protecting the 
homeland.
    I thank you for holding this hearing on this very important 
topic. I'm honored to appear before this committee, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Charles follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Donna O. Charles
                           27 September 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee--I thank you and your staff for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the rise of terrorism 
in Africa and the potential threat it poses to the homeland.
    In my role as the director for West Africa and the Sahel at the 
U.S. Institute of Peace, I lead the Institute's efforts to inform 
public policy and programs that are designed to help our partners 
counter terrorism and violent extremism, prevent and stabilize regional 
conflicts, promote community-led peacebuilding initiatives, and advance 
good governance reforms in the region. The U.S. Institute of Peace is 
one of the few independent organizations of its caliber to have in-
country staff in some of the most challenging and dynamic areas in the 
world. I am fortunate to have the opportunity to continue building on 
two decades of experience in foreign policy and national security from 
various corners of the U.S. interagency, which includes nearly a decade 
of service as an active-duty officer in the U.S. Air Force. I am proud 
of my service to this country and am honored for every opportunity I 
receive to continue in that service.
    During my tenure at the State Department, where I focused on U.S. 
counterterrorism objectives, operations, and programs in Africa, I 
witnessed how important it is for the United States to remain vigilant 
in its efforts to neutralize, contain, and deter threats that could 
threaten us here at home. While my professional experiences will inform 
my testimony and responses before you today, they are wholly my own and 
do not reflect the positions or policies of the U.S. Institute of Peace 
or any other department or agency.
    My testimony will focus on three critical issues that I assess are 
foundational to addressing the complex landscape of terrorism in Sub-
Saharan Africa and how its evolution poses a threat to the homeland. 
The first is understanding capabilities and intent, which shape how we 
think about how known and suspected terrorists operate at home and 
abroad and how to best counter their efforts; the second is mapping out 
risks and vulnerabilities to U.S. persons and interests at home and in 
Africa, including our posture, exposure, and risk tolerance; and the 
third and final issue is building partnerships and capacities where 
they matter most. In my experience, the issues I have identified 
require a robust set of tools and an equally robust policy that defines 
our strategic interests and political will to apply resources where 
they are lacking.
                        capabilities and intent
    When analyzing the capabilities and intent of prominent foreign 
terrorist organizations operating throughout Africa, it helps to 
understand that these groups are not cut from whole cloth. From al-
Shabaab in East Africa to ISIS in West Africa, there may be 
similarities in their distorted ideologies and perceptions of Islam, 
but their capabilities, intent, and in some cases, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures, vary for practical reasons. For instance, while most of 
these terror groups aspire to establish caliphates that extend to the 
borders of the countries in which they operate and beyond, there is not 
a single group operating in Sub-Saharan Africa that can accomplish this 
without overcoming steep hurdles, including rival factions, armed 
groups, regional forces, and vigilantes. What ISIS accomplished in 
Syria and Iraq circa 2014 \1\ reminds us that the idea of establishing 
a caliphate is possible but not durable. Understanding this landscape 
should inform how we develop policies, programs, and operations meant 
to reduce, if not eliminate, continuing and imminent threats to U.S. 
persons and interests here and abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ (Director of National Intelligence 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I am not aware of any credible evidence available publicly that 
suggests terrorist groups operating in West Africa and the Sahel pose a 
continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. homeland. In this case, it 
is important to distinguish threats to U.S. persons and interests in 
the region, including hard targets like U.S. embassies to soft targets 
like hotels and shopping centers, from threats to the homeland. 
Counterterrorism practitioners should not rule out how the evolution of 
terrorist groups in Africa, for which we have many examples, has 
resulted in significant shifts in capabilities and intent.
    A prime example of this shift in capabilities and intent is the 
Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab, a U.S.-designated foreign 
terrorist organization \2\ that is also designated by the UN \3\ and 
other countries and organizations.\4\ For almost 2 decades, analysts 
have observed al-Shabaab's capabilities and tactics in asymmetrical 
warfare advance substantially, and almost proportionately to the 
group's capacity to raise funds and collect revenues from a range of 
illicit activities and ostensibly legitimate businesses. A body of 
credible open-source reporting and publicly-available testimony from 
U.S. officials indicate that al-Shabaab remains the wealthiest, 
largest, and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the world.\5\ It is only 
in the last 3 years that U.S. officials have publicly concluded that 
al-Shabaab is a threat to the U.S. homeland as well.\6\ This conclusion 
has much to do with the details of an al-Shabaab plot uncovered by 
Filipino authorities in 2019 that involved an al-Shabaab operative who 
was in the final stages of completing a flight training program in the 
Philippines.\7\ While there have been reports of threats and plots 
hatched by al-Shabaab against the U.S. homeland over the last 
decade,\8\ this plot was one of the first indicators that al-Shabaab 
had both the capability and intent to strike targets outside of the 
East Africa region, and likely inside the United States based on 
evidence found at the crime scene and elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ (U.S. Department of State n.d.).
    \3\ (United Nations n.d.).
    \4\ (UK Home Office 2023).
    \5\ (Department of Defense 2022).
    \6\ (U.S. Department of State 2022).
    \7\ (U.S. Department of Justice 2020).
    \8\ (ABC News 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This plot, among others, should inform how the United States and 
other partners continue to reevaluate and enhance our approaches to 
countering terrorism threats. In the case of al-Shabaab, the 
preponderance of resources, including training, equipping, and 
generally building out counterterrorism capabilities of regional 
partners like Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, have been focused 
largely on neutralizing an agile and resilient threat on the ground 
using traditional and conventional tools.\9\ However, the on-going 
evolution of information technology, including social media, and the 
growing interconnectedness of our transportation, trade, financial, and 
communication networks have opened avenues of approach for terrorist 
groups targeting the United States and our partners. Even modestly-
resourced terrorist groups no longer limit themselves to launching 
asymmetrical physical attacks against local or regional targets of 
opportunity. Most terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
long used social media to radicalize, recruit, and propagandize their 
campaigns against civilians, Western-aligned regional governments, and, 
in some cases, the West itself.\10\ \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ (U.S. Department of State 2022).
    \10\ (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2022).
    \11\ (USIP, Wilson Center 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Al-Shabaab is in a league of its own in Africa when we consider its 
long history of using social media and other tools to radicalize and 
recruit youth from the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere 
who traveled to Somalia, or attempted to travel there, to fight 
alongside and work on behalf of al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda of East 
Africa.\12\ Like many other like-minded terrorist groups, al-Shabaab 
reportedly used its platform to praise the Taliban's takeover of 
Afghanistan in August 2021.\13\ Despite this outward signal of support 
for the Taliban's cause, I am not aware of any credible and public 
information indicating the Taliban and Africa-based terrorist groups 
are linked currently through finances or other means of assistance. 
However, there is a body of historical reporting that links legacy 
members of al-Shabaab and its precursor organizations (e.g., Al Ittihad 
Al Islamiya, known as AIAI, which rose to prominence in Somalia in the 
1990's) to training camps in Afghanistan.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).
    \13\ (Kaledzi 2021).
    \14\ (United Nations 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Al-Shabaab's origin story, which dates to the early and mid-2000's, 
paints a clear picture of a group that remains intent on establishing 
an Islamic caliphate in a Somalia under shari'a law and ousting 
Ethiopian and other Western-backed forces. The group's focus has been 
highly localized, allowing it to amass enough power, personnel, and 
resources to take over large swaths of territory in southern and 
central Somalia. Over the next decade, al-Shabaab established 
governance structures throughout the country, meted out justice and 
retribution through harsh and savage tactics, and expanded its 
operations to Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in East 
Africa. As African Union forces, with support from the United States 
and others, beat al-Shabaab's forces back from strongholds along the 
coast and the Juba River Valley, the group had less territory to govern 
and more time to focus on external operations.\15\ The group's 
endurance is due in large part to how pervasive al-Shabaab and its 
proxies are in Somalia and by its capacity to penetrate almost all 
aspects of Somali society, including financial services, commerce, and 
telecommunications.\16\ In my estimation, the longevity of a group like 
al-Shabaab is fundamental to its threat profile today. The fact that 
al-Shabaab had the ability to deploy operatives beyond the continent to 
obtain flight training speaks to the strategic patience of its 
leadership, planners, and operatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).
    \16\ (United Nations 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       risks and vulnerabilities
    This example demonstrates why the United States can ill afford to 
underestimate the nature of the terrorism threat in other parts of 
Africa, including West Africa and the Sahel, and leads me to the second 
critical issue the United States must factor into its analysis--mapping 
risks and vulnerabilities to the U.S. persons and interests, including 
the homeland. Most terrorist groups operating in West Africa and the 
Sahel, which include ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, appear focused on 
conducting asymmetric attacks against regional government forces and 
softer civilian targets, with many having established human smuggling, 
narco-trafficking, and kidnapping-for-ransom networks.\17\ The latter 
often target Westerners whose countries are known to pay ransoms for 
their release.\18\ Terrorist organizations based in West Africa and the 
Sahel have also used their platforms to declare jihad against the West, 
radicalize recruits, and make a gruesome display of their attacks 
through social media.\19\ However, I have not seen credible, publicly-
available evidence to indicate any West Africa-based groups have 
demonstrated the capability and intent to attack the homeland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ (United Nations 2022).
    \18\ (UK Home Office 2022).
    \19\ (USIP, Wilson Center 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Terrorist groups throughout the continent have demonstrated the 
ability to evolve and improve their tactics, techniques, procedures, 
and targets. This fact holds true for groups that have emerged in 
recent years in Central Africa (ISIS in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) and southern Africa (ISIS-Mozambique and related networks in 
South Africa, for example). As a result, the United States should 
continue to map and mitigate risks and vulnerabilities in the region 
that unnecessarily expose the homeland to terrorism threats emanating 
from the African continent. That mapping effort must include a constant 
and rigorous assessment of the risk and vulnerability profile of our 
land and air borders. As of 2019, at least 11 countries in Africa have 
a last-point-of-departure air route to the United States.\20\ This 
datapoint suggests that a terrorist actor in Africa capable and intent 
on attacking the United States could, after clearing several layers of 
screening and security protocols, board a flight bound for the United 
States and use various means to attack the homeland, either before 
landing or upon doing so. Similar scenarios include the failed attempt 
by the ``Underwear Bomber,'' a Nigerian national serving life in prison 
who had been recruited and trained by al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) to conduct the airline attack.\21\ While his flight to Michigan 
was indirect from Yemen through Europe, this example and others--recall 
al-Shabaab's failed plot to detonate an explosive-laden laptop in 2016 
\22\ and AQAP's intercepted printer bomb in 2010 \23\--remain 
illustrative of how terrorists exploit such vulnerabilities and only 
need to be lucky once to achieve their objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ (Sims 2019).
    \21\ (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2015).
    \22\ (BBC 2016).
    \23\ (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
(Rewards for Justice) 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our land borders present another vulnerability that terrorist 
groups in Africa could exploit as thousands of extracontinental 
migrants and special interest aliens (SIAs) from various countries in 
Africa have been known to make the dangerous trek to South or Central 
America onward to the Southern Border.\24\ In previous positions, I 
have reviewed several sensitive reports and handled in extremis 
situations that required extensive coordination between U.S. and 
foreign partners to identify, track, and apprehend SIAs from Somalia 
and elsewhere in Africa who were en route to or had crossed our 
Southern Border. Various U.S. administrations have taken measures to 
leverage biometrics and other technology to improve situational 
awareness along our air and land borders and reduce the threat to the 
homeland from known and suspected terrorists.\25\ \26\ \27\ Most of 
these programs require the U.S. Government to actively pursue and 
cultivate partnerships all over the world that will ensure we continue 
to close seams and gaps in the vast border network. If the United 
States determines that its tolerance for risk in this regard is and 
should remain low, then we must reckon with what lowering that risk 
requires in terms of additional personnel, fiscal resources, and 
purposeful diplomatic engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ (Yates 2019).
    \25\ (U.S. Department of State 2019).
    \26\ (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2023).
    \27\ (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           building capacities and strengthening partnerships
    Building and improving partner capacity must continue to be a 
central part of our counterterrorism and border security strategy, 
especially in many regions of Africa where borders are often porous and 
security measures are easily evaded through bribery or overcome by 
force.
    In my view, the United States has shown exemplary effort in 
developing and implementing whole-of-Government and whole-of-society 
approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism, but decision 
makers and other stakeholders need to agree that these approaches must 
use a ``both/and'' strategy rather than ``either/or'' to ensure we are 
successful left and right of the boom. While trade-offs are unavoidable 
when resources are finite, the United States cannot afford to 
compromise on a comprehensive, effective counterterrorism strategy that 
includes:
   Sustainable physical security measures, including 
        intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology;
   High-quality, strategic information sharing agreements such 
        as HSPD-6;
   Sustainable capacity-building programs that facilitate 
        technology transfers; and
   Initiatives that counter radicalization and recruitment, 
        support reconciliation and peacebuilding measures, and promote 
        political stability and reform.
            erosion of democracy and the rise of insecurity
    West Africa and the Sahel present a particularly challenging and 
acute problem set. While the region has never been immune to various 
forms of instability, the last 5 years have forced us to reckon with 
decades of failed and stagnant policies that helped precipitate the 
spate of coup d'etats we are witnessing today. The political 
convulsions throughout the region, however, should not be viewed as a 
monolith. The ostensible predicate for the coup in Guinea looks nothing 
like what transpired in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The run-
up to the recent coup d'etat in Gabon is reportedly beset by a 
complicated brew of ruling family palace intrigue \28\ and Great Power 
Competition.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ (Dougueli 2023).
    \29\ (Deutschmann 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What most of these extra-constitutional movements have in common to 
varying degrees is the role foreign adversaries aim to have in shaping 
and further stoking anti-Western sentiments, regardless of whether they 
are organic or sensationalized.\30\ The Russian Federation and its 
proxies such as Wagner and Sewa Security Services continue to make 
significant headway in exploiting critical minerals and natural 
resources in exchange for flimsy security cooperation agreements \31\ 
largely because, in my view, these impressionable juntas in Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and now Niger have created or intensified political and 
security vacuums. These natural resources are crucial for the Kremlin's 
on-going efforts to evade U.S. and Western sanctions and fund its 
illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, but the juntas who seek 
Russia's support to counter terrorism and armed groups in their 
backyards have been left with little to show for these agreements.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ (Lucas 2023).
    \31\ (Arieff 2023).
    \32\ (Sany 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The security situation in Mali and Burkina Faso, which the juntas 
in these countries used to justify their putsches, has not stabilized 
or improved. In fact, recent reports indicate that these countries have 
seen a rise in terrorist attacks since the juntas overthrew their 
democratically elected governments.\33\ While the Burkinabe, Nigerien, 
and Malian juntas enter security pacts to protect each, it appears 
these militaries--before and after their coup d'etats--can barely 
protect themselves and their people without considerable external 
support. For instance, Burkina Faso's military has experienced several 
mutinous uprisings over the last decade due to lack of pay and 
inadequate training, resources, and leadership.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ (Rogan 2023).
    \34\ (Al Jazeera 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     reassessing the u.s. approach
    This security situation unfolding throughout and beyond West Africa 
and the Sahel underscores the need for the United States and its like-
minded partners to reassess its policy, strategy, and posture on the 
continent. The situation is complicated, but with sustained political 
will and sufficient resources, the United States can help change the 
unfortunate trends in the region. Specific remedies include taking a 
hard look at how U.S. strategies for engaging in Africa are reconciled 
with the resources being applied, including U.S. embassy staffing. The 
United States must consider whether its objectives, programs, and 
overall ambitions in Africa align with the resources provided for our 
embassies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and in the Coastal West Africa 
region, where additional resources provided through the Global 
Fragility Act will be spread out over five countries.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ (National Security Council, Executive Office of the President 
2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, U.S. security cooperation throughout Africa has been 
mischaracterized in a way to suggest that training and equipping 
African forces is a recipe for coup d'etats and political instability. 
Those who watch the region closely will agree this misperception is 
dangerous, counterproductive, and fails to address issues that existed 
long before these partnerships emerged. Building core capacities to 
counter terrorism, secure borders, and develop regional solutions to 
regional problems at all levels of government and through civil society 
is the ideal approach toward balancing the three ``Ds'' of U.S. foreign 
policy--defense, development, and diplomacy.
                               conclusion
    I am encouraged by the Department of Defense's desire to continue 
developing tools that help get at the threat ``left of the boom''--
including through civil military operations, exchange programs, and 
professional development programs like International Military Education 
& Training (IMET). There is also room to improve upon critical 
capabilities such as anti-money laundering and countering the financing 
of terrorism (AML/CFT) programs funded by the Departments of Defense 
and State that are designed to detect and deter the flow of funds to 
terror groups like al-Shabaab and ISIS. The United States and its 
partners are enhancing social network analysis and open-source 
intelligence technologies as another means of identifying the front and 
back ends of radicalization and terrorist recruitment networks. 
Continuing to invest in these and other measures as part of a balanced 
and strategic counterterrorism approach will redound to the United 
States' efforts to protect U.S. persons and interests in the region and 
in the homeland.
    Thank you for holding a hearing on this important topic, as well as 
your bipartisan commitment to safeguarding the country and its 
citizens. It has been an honor and a privilege to appear before this 
committee today and I look forward to answering your questions.
                               References
ABC News. 2015. Mall of America Heightens Security After al-Shabab 
Threat. February. https://abcnews.go.com/US/mall-america-heightens-
security-al-shabab-threat/story?id=29137738.
Al Jazeera. 2023. Timeline: Burkina Faso from popular uprising to 
soldier mutinies. January 22. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/
timeline-burkina-faso-unrest.
Arieff, Blanchard, Ploch-Blanchard, and Bowen. 2023. ``Russia's Wagner 
Group in Africa: Issues for Congress.'' Congressional Research Service. 
April 26. https://crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12389/2.
BBC. 2016. Al-Shabab `carried out' Somalia plane attack. February 13. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35569535.
Council on Foreign Relations. 2022. ``Al-Shabaab.'' Backgrounder. 
December. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab.
Department of Defense. 2022. ``Statement of GEN Townsend.'' Senate 
Armed Services Committee. March. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/
AFRICOM%20FY23%20Posture%20statement%20%20ISO%20SASC%2015%20MAR- 
%20Cleared.pdf.
Deutschmann, Paul. 2023. Coup d'etat freezes China's Gabon naval base 
plan (Africa Intelligence). September 7. https://
www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/09/07/coup-d-etat-
freezes-china-s-gabon-naval-base-plan,110040506-eve.
Director of National Intelligence. 2022. ``Counterterrorism Guide: 
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND ASH-SHAM (ISIS).''
Dougueli, Georges. 2023. Fractured family: The Bongo siblings and 
Gabon's turmoil (The Africa Report).  September 1. https://
www.theafricareport.com/320739/fractured-family the-bongo-siblings-and-
gabons-turmoil/.
Kaledzi, Isaac. 2021. Taliban triumph means more worries in Africa 
(DW). August. https://www.dw.com/en/taliban-triumph-means-more-worries-
in-africa/a-58898090.
Lucas, Edward. 2023. Heart of Darkness: Russia's African Empire (CEPA). 
July 30. https://cepa.org/article/heart-of-darkness-russias-african-
empire/.
National Security Council, Executive Office of the President. 2022. 
``U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa.'' The White House. August. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-
Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2022. ``Emerging 
Technologies May Heighten Terrorist Threats.'' First Responders 
Toolbox. October. https://www.odni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/
firstresponderstoolbox/134s_First_- 
Responders_Toolbox_Emerging_Technologies_May_Heighten_Terrorist_- 
Threats.pdf.
Rogan, Ali and Zahn, Harry. 2023. Why West African nations are seeing a 
spate of military coups (PBS). August 26. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
show/why-west-african-nations-are-seeing-a-spate-of-military-coups.
Sany, Joseph, PhD. 2023. ``Great Power Competition Implications in 
Africa: The Russian Federation and its Proxies (Joseph Sany Testimony 
before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Africa).'' U.S. Institute of Peace. July 18. https://www.usip.org/
publications/2023/07/great-power-competition-implications-africa-
russian-federation-and-its-proxies.
Sims, Shannon. 2019. ``Wheels Up on More Flights to the African 
Continent.'' The New York Times, October 17. https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/17/travel/nonstop-flights-africa.html.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 2022. CBP National Targeting 
Center. January 4. https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/cbp-national-
targeting-center.
U.S. Department of Justice. 2020. ``Kenyan National Indicted for 
Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated 
Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab.'' Office of Public Affairs, 
December. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kenyan-national-indicted-
conspiring-hijack-aircraft-behalf-al-qaeda-affiliated-terror- 
ist#::text=%E2%80%9CAs%20alleged%2C%20Cholo%20Abdi%20Abdullah,Man- 
hattan%20U.S.%20Attorney%20Audrey%20Strauss.
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Rewards for 
Justice). 2023. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). https://
rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula-aqap/.
U.S. Department of State. n.d. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. https:/
/www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
----. 2019. ``FY 2020 Budget: State Department Counterterrorism Bureau 
(Statement of Nathan Sales).'' 116th Congress. July 24. https://
www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109863/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA13-
WState-SalesN-20190724.pdf.
----. 2022. ``Integrated Country Strategy: Somalia.'' March. https://
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_AF_Somalia_Public.pdf.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2023. Investigations--
Terrorism and National Security Threats: Applying the Agency's Vast 
Authorities to Protect National Security. January 25. https://
www.ice.gov/investigations/terrorism-national-security-threats#bitmap.
----. 2015. `Underwear Bomber' Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab sentenced to 
life. February. https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/underwear-bomber-
umar-farouk-abdul- mutallab-sentenced-life.
UK Home Office. 2022. Foreign Travel Advice: Mali. https://www.gov.uk/
foreign-travel-advice/mali/terrorism.
----. 2023. Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations. September. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-
organisations_2/proscribed-terrorist-groups-or-organisations-
accessible-version#list-of-proscribed-international-terrorist-groups.
United Nations. 2012. Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea 
Adds One Individual to List of Individuals and Entities. February. 
https://press.un.org/en/2012/sc10545.doc.htm.
----. n.d. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) 
concerning Al-Shabaab. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/
751.
----. 2022. Stronger Regulation, Cross-Border Coordination Key to 
Stopping Terrorism across Africa Funded by Illegal Trafficking in 
Natural Resources, Speakers Tell Security Council. October. https://
press.un.org/en/2022/sc15056.doc.htm.
----. 2022. UNSC 1267 Sanctions. March. https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/
hassan-dahir-aweys.
USIP, Wilson Center. 2017. The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and 
Beyond. Analysis, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace. https://
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-
Beyond.pdf.
Yates, Caitlyn. 2019. ``As More Migrants from Africa and Asia Arrive in 
Latin America, Governments Seek Orderly and Controlled Pathways.'' 
Migration Policy Institute. October 22. https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/extracontinental-migrants-latin-
america.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Charles.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Magaziner. I ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee 
be permitted to sit with the subcommittee and question the 
witnesses.
    Chairman Pfluger. Without objection, so ordered.
    I ask the committee for something slightly out of order. I 
ask unanimous consent to offer Dr. Zelin about 2 minutes to 
provide this committee a little bit of educational background 
on the difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda. If you will give 
us about 2 minutes on that. We have heard the terms, but tell 
us about your testimony. It was very interesting and I think 
the education will be really good for us.
    Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Chairman.
    So the two groups originally were previously together. So 
the Islamic State of Iraq was part of al-Qaeda, then the group 
broke away in 2013. Part of it was over doctrinal issues. One 
was related to the issue of takfir, or saying that another 
Muslim was not a real Muslim and therefore legitimizing their 
shedding of their blood. Another was the issue of the 
caliphate. The Islamic State wanted to announce the caliphate 
and that they were the ones, and that al-Qaeda was subordinate 
to it because they were just a group. So, essentially, the 
Islamic State views itself as needing to have administrative 
control in the areas that it operates right away and it doesn't 
matter if they have the support of the local populations. Think 
of ISIS as like a totalitarian regime, whereas al-Qaeda is more 
like an authoritarian regime when it operates. Al-Qaeda, in 
turn, as a consequence of lessons learned from the Iraq war, 
believes that instead, it needs to first gain some level of 
support from the population, sort-of, you know, hearts and 
minds approach. Obviously, they're the ones who are still in 
control, but they believe if they can explain to the local 
population first their ideology, that in turn people will agree 
with them because from their perspective what they believe is 
the true Islam, even though, as we all know, it's a twisted 
version of it.
    So therefore, al-Qaeda has more of this gradualist approach 
related to working with the population, taking over territory, 
implementing Islamic law based off of their interpretation, 
whereas the Islamic State has more of a direct approach where 
they want to do it right away, and it doesn't matter who's in 
the way, essentially.
    So think of it as more of like a totalitarian versus an 
authoritarian approach to their broader agendas.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning, and an additional round of 
questioning may be called after all Members have had the chance 
to be recognized.
    I now recognize myself for the first round of questioning.
    I want to go to Ms. Charles, you said something very 
interesting. It is pertinent today, and this was not in my line 
of questioning, but you talked about the trek that people are 
making from Africa to Central and South American countries and 
the vigilance that we need to have on our Southern Border. Can 
you please expand on that and what that threat is? I have 
personally been to these regions. I have been to the Darien. I 
saw people from West Africa, from Sub-Saharan Africa that were 
in the Darien this summer. So please tell us that vigilance 
that we need to be preparing for here.
    Ms. Charles. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger. I'm happy to.
    One of the things I want to emphasize at the outset is that 
the migration crisis that we are seeing, especially as it 
pertains to African migrants leaving the continent, is one that 
should be considered from a humanitarian perspective as well. I 
think it's important to understand that the vast majority of 
people that are leaving dire conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
either because of environmental stresses, because of violent 
conflict, because they have been victimized or targeted by 
their governments, at the end of the day, people who are 
willing to make this trek to South and Central America to the 
Southern Border are clearly desperate. Now, I think it's also 
important to recognize that within that group we have seen that 
there are opportunities for threat actors to use these routes 
to get to the United States or get to regions close to the 
United States to conduct operations to facilitate other 
elements of their organizations. It's important to be clear-
eyed about the threat that this poses.
    While I will not speak for what any department or agency is 
doing today, I will say that in my professional experience I am 
aware of the routes that have been taken by certain actors who 
are associated with terrorist organizations operating in Sub-
Saharan Africa. You'll see various methodologies for that. The 
majority of people leaving Sub-Saharan Africa tend to migrate 
toward Europe, right, using either the North African routes, 
Libya----
    Chairman Pfluger. Do they pose a terrorist threat in Europe 
as well?
    Ms. Charles. My understanding is that there are elements 
within these large groups. You have to understand that these 
are thousands of people.
    Chairman Pfluger. Yes.
    Ms. Charles. There are elements within that group that have 
links and associations with terrorist organizations in Africa.
    Chairman Pfluger. I am going to keep moving. I want to pick 
up on this here in a minute.
    But Mr. Meservey had a very interesting point. You said 
that they are required, that these jihadists are required to 
fight the United States. So picking up on where Ms. Charles 
talked about, can you kind-of--and you said in your testimony 
the African terror threat has likely become more acute because 
of the Taliban's conquest of Afghanistan. You went on to talk 
about the relationship was unlikely to dissolve soon, and the 
Osama bin Laden effect, the allegiances that were sworn. It has 
been 2 years since you published that particular article. Do 
you feel that the Taliban's resurgence has impacted jihadist 
states in the Sahel?
    Mr. Meservey. I think certainly the Taliban's re-conquest 
has provided, at the very least, a moral boost to these groups. 
It's encouraging to see an organization like the Taliban defeat 
the United States, essentially. I think that is how this is 
interpreted. This is seen as a defeat of the United States. So 
I think at the very least, it has provided them motivation. We 
saw some of Afghan terrorist organizations actually celebrating 
the Taliban's re-conquest of Afghanistan.
    I have not seen any reports of direct links right now 
between the Taliban and Afghan terrorist organizations. But as 
I noted in my testimony, I think there's a very real danger 
that will happen again. There is a history of it, of Afghan 
terrorists fighting and training in Afghanistan and then going 
back to the continent, so.
    Chairman Pfluger. Ambassador Pham, while they may not have 
the capability to conduct attacks on the United States homeland 
right now, if they do, please tell us that is this headed to a 
point where these groups, whoever they may be, al-Qaeda-
affiliated, ISIS-affiliated, do they have the motivation to 
attack the U.S. homeland or U.S. interest?
    Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As Mr. Meservey pointed out, the motivation, the 
theological underpinnings are there. What they've lacked to 
date, thank God, is the capability. But they're constantly 
seeking. We've seen this, for example, with al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, where they've increasingly built sophisticated, 
increasingly sophisticated, even undetectable--the laptop bomb 
case a few years ago. So they're striving for it. To date, they 
haven't, but they will continue to do so.
    The reasons Ms. Charles pointed out earlier, I would just 
add to that we don't know what we don't know. Our databases of 
individuals, especially for African terrorists organizations, 
are not as robust because we haven't invested the resources 
that we have, for example, for screening individuals from the 
Middle East or South Asia. That's a vulnerability.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
    I recognize the Ranking Member for your line of questions.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman, and I will pick up on 
that point.
    So Ms. Charles in her written testimony noted the 2019 
incident where an al-Shabaab operative was found to be 
completing flight training in the Philippines, and we assessed 
that that was one of the first indicators that al-Shabaab had 
the capability and intent to strike targets outside of the East 
Africa region, including, potentially, the United States.
    So what more can we be doing or should we be doing to 
identify these plots and disrupt them before they occur? 
Because to the prior point, the eyes of the world have been 
focused on the Middle East and elsewhere. What do we as a 
Government need to be doing to support that intelligence 
gathering and disrupt those plots with regard to these African 
terrorist groups?
    Ms. Charles. Thank you for your question, Ranking Member 
Magaziner.
    What made the 2019 plot so significant was the fact that 
Filipino authorities were the ones that detained Cholo Abdullah 
in his hotel room, his quarters. While I cannot speak to in 
this setting the specific circumstances that led the Filipino 
authorities to Mr. Abdullah, I will say that it is critical to 
understand that those partnerships, the partnerships that the 
United States has with Filipino authorities as well as, when 
you think about it, other authorities throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa and globally, really help us extend our visibility and 
extend our awareness and understanding of the threats that are 
plotting against either their interests or U.S. interests, 
either in that region or in the homeland. So I will say that 
what organizations and departments and agencies like the 
Department of State and others have done, not just since that 
attempted attack and prior to that is increase the partnerships 
that we have in these regions from a military and a law 
enforcement perspective. That just not includes liaison 
relationships where we're exchanging information, but also 
training and equipping and building capacities. When we build 
capacities, then we are allowed to engage these organizations 
and these entities in a way that is not just beneficial to them 
when they're building out a prosecution case, but it's also 
beneficial to us as well.
    So that's my recommendation in that regard.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    Dr. Zelin, I was struck by something in your remarks just 
now where you said that at times the United States can be 
viewed as a fickle partner in the region. What do you mean by 
that?
    Mr. Zelin. Yes, thank you.
    I think part of it is not just related to specifically in 
the Sahel, but other areas on the world stage in the past, 
whether it's related to actors in the Middle East in terms of 
the United States and Iraq or the United States and Syria. We 
were just discussing what happened in Afghanistan. Obviously, 
it didn't make sense for the United States to continue to 
remain fighting against the Taliban since nothing was really 
changing on the ground. However, there's been a perception by 
many U.S. allies that the United States won't stick it out, 
even if it's very tough, even though, obviously we're there for 
20 years. As a consequence, you've increasingly seen Russia 
pushing to try and fill those vacuums by undermining the United 
States and going in there and showing that they can do what 
they do on the ground, especially in the context of Syria in 
particular. The Assad regime was toast, more or less, until the 
Russians came in. Now we've seen, as a consequence of that, 
they've then parlayed that into greater relations with other 
states in the Gulf region, in Egypt, and then, of course, what 
we're seeing in Eastern Europe now related to Ukraine.
    Mr. Magaziner. I have heard several of you in your remarks 
allude to the need for the United States to be a good partner 
to friendly nations in terms of economic and humanitarian 
assistance as well. We are being asked to consider 
appropriations bills that in their current form contain deep 
cuts to food assistance programs and other aid through the 
State Department budget and the Department of Agriculture 
budget. I will open this up to any of you. Can any of you speak 
to the importance from a national security perspective that the 
United States be a good partner and not allow Russia or China 
to subvert our engagement with friendly nations that share our 
values?
    I will open it up to anyone.
    Mr. Pham. I'll take you up on that Ranking Member, 
Magaziner.
    I'm a firm believer that accountable foreign assistance is 
critical to American leadership and our national interests in 
many of these countries. They're the difference that has gained 
us entree with civil society, with populations, they help shore 
up friendly governments that partner with us. So in a number of 
things, they reinforce. I've had the honor of working closely 
with and advising military deployments throughout the 
continent, and I've yet to meet a commander who didn't 
emphasize the value of those other programs in creating the--
shaping the environment in a way that made his or her 
operations easier and safer.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Following the lead of Mr. Magaziner in asking about the 
risks of decreasing financial commitments, perhaps, to this 
problem abroad, let me ask something a little differently, or 
that going at it that same issue in another way maybe. I think 
many Americans, although without your level of expertise 
perhaps, believe that the $8 trillion that we spent in 
Afghanistan and Iraq didn't work out well. There are other 
examples to boot. I mean, Libya always comes to mind for me. 
There has been a consistent policy architecture behind all of 
those acts, all of those policies that continues to hold 
amazing sway. In fact, I think the premise behind Mr. 
Magaziner's question and your answer to it, Ambassador, was 
that we have got to keep doing the same thing. Am I wrong? Is 
that perception wrong that that policy didn't work out well in 
Afghanistan and Iraq? Is it that the United States just wasn't 
permitted to stay for 40 years or 50 years or 100 years, as 
opposed to some other fundamental defect there?
    Mr. Pham. Sir, if I may clarify my remarks.
    I think our foreign assistance is critical to our 
leadership, but it is foreign assistance with our partners. 
Very often what we don't have is partners. A wonderful example, 
I would say, is the leading beneficiary of PEPFAR, which is for 
renewal, and beneficiary of AGOA, which is up for renewal next 
year, is South Africa, a country I would hardly cite as a 
partner of the United States, in fact, a partner of our 
adversaries. Why they should be the leading beneficiary in 
Africa befuddles me, sir.
    Mr. Bishop. Anybody else want to comment on what I have 
asked?
    Ms. Charles.
    Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Bishop.
    One of the points that I'd like to emphasize, especially as 
a veteran and somebody who has deployed to the Middle East and 
have worked on training and equip programs, is that we learned 
important lessons from the situation in Afghanistan. I think 
that I would like to commend the entities and organizations 
that have done extensive research on those lessons that we've 
learned. One of the things that I think we learned is that 
tactically, operationally, strategically, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to I would say, prop up a government, a 
military with tools, resources, equipment that they will not 
have the capacity to use for a long period of time. I would 
make this distinction with what we're doing in Somalia. Again, 
not the best situation when it comes to where al-Shabaab is on 
the trajectory over 15 years, but we've helped build out a 
Somalian national army that did not exist in its current form 
15 years ago.
    So I would say that we have learned lessons and that those 
lessons can be applied to situations not just in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and all over the world. Yes, large mistakes were made 
when it comes to our foreign assistance and how we operated 
there, but we've learned those lessons, and I'm seeing them 
applied in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.
    Mr. Bishop. I hear you. I would like to believe we have 
learned lessons, and you just gave an example. But what it 
evokes in me is a recognition that of the resources we invested 
in the Afghanistan army and Americans saw it just collapse. I 
am sure there are expert views about why that is a distinct 
situation, but it doesn't really provide me comfort.
    Let me ask you this. How many countries in Africa are U.S. 
forces conducting operations in now?
    Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Bishop.
    From my perch, I would refer you to the Department of 
Defense to provide specifics on that.
    When we look at open-source information, it is clear that 
Somalia is one of those countries. We also have partnerships 
throughout West Africa where we're training and equipping. 
We're providing support in various ways. But I would refer you 
to Department of Defense for specifics on that.
    Mr. Bishop. OK. Let me just ask one more for whoever wants 
to take it.
    How is it that China and Russia are able to win support in 
Africa based off anti-U.S. resentment? What are the reasons 
that people there resent the United States and be inclined to 
join Russia or China and their efforts?
    Mr. Meservey. Thank you.
    I think how Africans feel about the United States varies 
widely across the continent. There actually is a lot of support 
for the United States among the general African population. 
Now, there's also growing levels of support--or not growing on 
an uninterrupted trajectory, but there is support for China, as 
you say. I think that's due to decades of very intensive 
Chinese engagement, diplomatic investments, loans, things of 
that nature. But there's also a growing wariness of Chinese 
engagement because of fears that perhaps some of these 
countries are too engaged with China.
    On the Russia side, yes, we saw Russian flags being waived 
during some of these coups and such things. I would suspect 
that some of that was Russian propaganda, frankly. I don't know 
where they would have gotten those flags other than from the 
Russians themselves. But it's also true that, yes, there is 
resentment toward former colonizers like the French, for 
instance, who have a very difficult history in that region.
    So it's very, very complex. I don't think the United States 
is out of the game, so to speak, as far as our person-to-person 
diplomacy and our ability to win influence and support in the 
general African population.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. D'Esposito [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank both our Chairman and our Ranking Member 
for holding this most important hearing. I want to thank the 
Members today, witnesses for your testimony.
    Africa: continent that is exploding in terms of importance, 
population, center of resources. Russia, China, the United 
States, everybody is trying to control, influence the area. For 
the United States, I hate to say this, but we only pay 
attention when we see smoke, and by then the fire is raging out 
of control.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to submit an article for the record 
today. It is Calgary Herald by David Beasley, former South 
Carolina Governor and ex former director of the U.N. World Food 
Program. It is entitled ``Ahead of Business Forum in Banff, 
Former Top U.N. Official Warms of Widespread Starvation Due to 
Conflict.''
    Mr. D'Esposito. Without objection.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The information was not available at the time of publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Correa. So David Beasley and I have been talking for a 
number of months. I am going to quote him, and he says, ``I 
cannot tell you how many times mothers would say to me, my son 
or husband did not want to join ISIS or al-Qaeda but we had not 
fed our little girl in 2 weeks. What were we supposed to do? 
The extremist groups used food to recruit and especially in the 
Sahel region as well as in the Horn of Africa, places such as 
Somalia where you have Al-Shabaab.'' He goes on to say, during 
the Arab Spring there were over 48 nations of unrest and 
political instability due to rising food prices. The 
international hunger crisis is much worse today than it was in 
2010. He goes on to say the cost of feeding a Syrian in Syria 
is about 50 cents a day. The cost, humanitarian, to support 
that Syrian in Germany is about $70 or more per day. Heard all 
of you very carefully, you barely mentioned starvation, food.
    So I am going to ask all of you today, the United States is 
the breadbasket of the world. Do you know how much foreign aid, 
U.S. aid, we provided Africa? Mr. Pham. Mr. Meservey. Yes, go 
ahead. I only have 2 minutes.
    Mr. Pham. Yes. The approximate U.S. aid to Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa is approximately $6-7 billion a year.
    Mr. Bishop. Is that going up or down?
    Mr. Pham. The trend has been relatively steady.
    Mr. Bishop. Is that enough?
    Mr. Pham. I would say it is enough if spent wisely.
    Mr. Pham. Mr. Meservey.
    Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with the last comment. It has 
to----
    Mr. Bishop. Mr. Zelin, Dr. Zelin.
    Mr. Zelin. I think we need to think about the continuing 
degradation of the environment and how climate change is 
affecting----
    Mr. Bishop. So hunger is only going to get worse and worse 
and hungry people do desperate things to feed their family.
    Mr. Zelin. There's also the issue of the grain crisis from 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that's affected a lot of nations 
in Africa as well, since they don't have access to it now 
because of the Russian blockade on Ukraine.
    Mr. Bishop. So, Ms. Charles, go ahead.
    Ms. Charles. I would say that the humanitarian assistance 
is an important part of it, but we also need to work on the 
opposite end, or the other side of that, which is improving the 
technology transfer and allowing the information that we have 
about agriculture to help transform lives, subsistence farmers, 
et cetera. So we do a lot in humanitarian assistance, emergency 
food assistance. For instance, we are the largest donor--
bilateral donor to Somalia.
    Mr. Bishop. Ms. Charles, I would say that all of that is 
good, but if you are starving today, by the time you get 
technology transfer and other resources on the ground, it is 
probably going to be too late. My concern as a policy maker--
and we are debating how much foreign aid we are giving 
countries today in terms of food--is trying to get attention, 
trying to understand the pragmatics, the reality where the 
rubber meets the road. That family in Africa not having enough 
to eat and how we can help possibly with food. As Governor 
Beasley said, either you feed these people or you are going to 
continue to throw gasoline on top of a fire that will 
eventually overwhelm us.
    So, you know, I would ask all of you to go back and think 
about how important is it today to feed the starving people 
like in South Africa, for our own personal interest.
    Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you very much.
    Mr. D'Esposito. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meservey, in May 2023, you wrote a paper titled 
``America's Best Choice in Sudan is the least bad option''. In 
that paper, you mentioned that a sustained conflict in Sudan 
would lead to a major humanitarian and migration crisis. How 
could a potential refugee crisis from any country experiencing 
instability in that region impact this Nation's on-going crisis 
at the Southern Border?
    Mr. Meservey. Yes, I think, as we've been discussing during 
this testimony, or during this hearing, that when you get 
increased migration flows, whether within Africa or across the 
Southern Border, for instance, it does raise the risk of 
terrorists using those flows to embed themselves. We've seen 
this during the Syria crisis. We know for a fact that some 
terrorists used that crisis and the migration flows into Europe 
to get into Europe and wage attacks. So, yes, that always 
should be a concern around these conflicts.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Ambassador, you highlighted that the 
centuries-old trade routes across the Sahara Desert are now 
being used by blind actors for human trafficking and the 
smuggling of narcotics and other contraband to Europe. Can you 
briefly describe which specific drugs are coming through that 
route?
    Mr. Pham. Two in particular. Cocaine from Latin America, 
some of it moving from Colombia via Venezuela to the Sahel. The 
other one is cannabis, some of it grown on the continent, but 
those are the two primary ones, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. These same routes also have a variety 
of energy pipelines that support Europe's efforts to pivot from 
Russian oil and gas. Can you briefly discuss the threats posed 
to those pipelines and how these threats could potentially 
impact global energy?
    Mr. Pham. Europe is relying--the flurry of deals signed 
since February 2022 with African countries, one of the ones 
that most preoccupies, I think, energy analysts, is the Trans-
Sahara pipeline running through Niger, into Algeria, and then 
over to Spain. That's been now put in doubt both because of the 
coup in Niger, the petroleum minister being arrested, and now 
the increased jihadist activity in that country, and in Mali, 
in the northern part of Mali as well.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Now this is for any of you. So, the 
Homeland Threat Assessment of 2024, published this month by 
DHS, stated, and I quote: ``As of July, approximately 160 non-
U.S. persons in the TSDS attempted to enter the United States 
via the Southern Border this year, most of whom were 
encountered attempting to illegally enter between points of 
entry. This represents an increase from the approximately 100 
encounters in all of fiscal year 2022.'' Do you think the rise 
in terrorism in Africa could be contributing to the increase in 
this number?
    Ms. Charles, you hit the button first, so go ahead.
    Ms. Charles. Representative, thank you for the question.
    I think the situation, when you look at it from a sheer 
numbers perspective, can seem easier on its face to analyze. 
It's a nuanced and complex situation. I think that the numbers 
that we're looking at, especially from the TSDS, as you refer 
to that information, is fed from various databases, as I 
understand it, and the United States can do a better job at 
scrubbing this information and ensuring that it is accurate. I 
have seen in my professional experience that some of the 
information is contestable, and so it's important to sort-of 
provide that nuance and context there.
    But at the end of the day, the rise of terrorism in Africa 
does not necessarily mean that we are going to see a threat to 
the United States that's proportionate. It's important for us 
to ensure that the partnerships that we have in South America, 
in Central America, and the tools and technologies that we're 
using, like Bitmap, ATSG, PICES, et cetera, are employed in a 
way that can help us identify those potential threats well 
before they get to the Southern Border.
    So that's the point that I wanted to emphasize.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds left.
    Dr. Zelin, through your research, have you seen any threat 
indicators from jihadist groups from the region that we are 
discussing today that would present a direct threat to the U.S. 
homeland?
    Mr. Zelin. Currently, no. It's a low risk. However, if they 
continue to control territory, especially in Mali region, with 
the Islamic State, they've shown previously in cases in Syria, 
Libya, and Afghanistan, if they have the time and space, they 
will attempt to either direct an attack or try to guide people 
in the homeland that are already here or try to inspire them. 
So it's something that needs to be focused on continuously.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you very much, Doctor.
    My time has expired.
    I now recognize Ms. Titus for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Getting back to the topic of what is happening in Africa 
and what we can do there, I would ask you, Ms. Charles, to talk 
a little bit about the Global Fragility Act. That was 
established, for those who don't know, in 2019. Set aside ten 
countries where we should be focused, directing our efforts in 
those countries to try to stabilize the situation, look at what 
the threats are to growing democracy, how the United States can 
do better coordinating with locals on the ground there for 
their input. Now, that is going to be running out fairly soon, 
and it is woefully underfunded. Could you talk about how it 
works and what its contributions are to countering this 
terrorist rise?
    Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Titus.
    One of the things that I will say about the Global 
Fragility Act and its related strategies is that it is meant 
to, with the resources provided year over year, to help 
capacitate not just national governments, but also working with 
local governments, civil society, using a whole-of-society 
approach to ensure that those elements that foster fragility, 
if you will, can be addressed in a sustainable way. I 
completely agree that the resources provided, especially year 
over year, for a region like West Africa, coastal West Africa, 
where you have 5 countries where ostensibly tens of millions of 
dollars needs to be spread out over a period of time, may not 
necessarily be adequate, may not be enough.
    But at the end of the day, the idea behind the Global 
Fragility Act is one that allows us to look at the problem set 
from a balanced perspective, where we look at the three Ds, 
development, diplomacy, and defense. We're balancing out those 
elements of development and diplomacy, but we need to ensure 
that our embassies in the region are capacitated and resourced 
in a way that allows the efforts associated with the GFA to be 
effective. We cannot mete out tens of millions of dollars to 
affect any change without having the Ambassadors in place, poll 
officers in place, reporting officers in place, programs 
officers in place in countries like Niger, where my 
understanding is that embassy staffing is well below 75, even 
50 percent.
    So I will say that GFA on its face is a fantastic idea and 
concept, but in practicality, in implementation, there are 
challenges that we need to address, especially when it comes to 
presence.
    One thing I will point out when it comes to strategic 
competition is that if we aim to use this tool as part of an 
effort to compete strategically with the likes of the Russian 
Federation and the PRC, we need to ensure that we look at how 
they're manning their embassies in the region and how we're 
manning ours. If we cannot compete in that regard, then I think 
things like GFA might not be as successful as they could be.
    Ms. Titus. Well, we lost a lot of State Department folks 
during the previous administration when that was pretty much 
emasculated. We heard from the President at that time that 
everything was transactional and wasn't going to be invested or 
working with our allies in any part of the world, but certainly 
in Africa was the case. Isn't it better to look at the causes 
of this terrorism than trying to deal with them after they are 
more established? We have seen that al-Shabaab especially in 
some of these countries is seen as a stabilizing force. It has 
its own governmental structure, provides employment, and that 
is a big source of radicalization when young people are not 
employed. It is not ideological necessarily. So if we are there 
competing with these other things that we could do under the 
Fragility Act, maybe that would be a way to circumvent it as 
opposed to have to deal with it after the fact.
    Ms. Charles. Rep. Titus very quickly on those two points. I 
agree that it is important to look at the root causes, but, 
again, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the both/and 
strategy is the most I think effective, right. The United 
States is one of the most sophisticated and capable governments 
out there, especially when it comes to not just our 
intelligence, our security services, but also our ability to 
deploy what I call soft power. I think that's an important 
thing to realize is that we are head and shoulders above a lot 
of our partners in terms of what we're doing, and I think we 
can do both things. We can walk and chew gum when it comes to 
not just the securitized relationships that we have, military 
and law enforcement, but the soft power skills that we're very 
good at deploying as well. When it comes to working with 
journalists in civil society, we do that very well too.
    When it comes to the point you raise about al-Shabaab, 
which I think is a critical one, over time, yes, it has been 
shown that al-Shabaab has created structures, especially when 
they govern most of southern Somalia, that people saw them as a 
stabilizing force. However, I would argue with the idea that 
they were preferred. Yes, they could adjudicate civil cases 
right. With land reform, if you will. They were there when 
there were no other security forces there. The problem, 
however, is that al-Shabaab offered an extortion level of 
security, if you will. These are people that would exact the 
kind of justice that would make our hair stand on end. These 
are people that would bury women in the ground to the shoulders 
and stone them if there was an accusation of infidelity.
    So I would beg people to understand that while there may 
have been a level of stability, it was because there was a 
vacuum. That's an important point to make.
    Ms. Titus. I think the point is that if we are not there to 
feel that vacuum, then we can't expect to have good results.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes gentlelady from the great State of 
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, I can't thank the Chairman 
and Ranking Member enough for what I think is an enormously 
crucial hearing. This is not the Foreign Affairs Committee and 
so I know that your extending to this area is crucial and it 
just plays into my frustration.
    I thank my colleague from Nevada for going where I will try 
to go in a very short period of time, and that is the crucial 
urgency of the relationship between the United States and the 
continent. Recognize that there are more than 50 nations, but 
the continent. I guess my chastising is that Republican and 
Democratic administrations over the past 2 decades have failed 
to understand the cruciality of our relationship. In terms of 
the funding in State Department efforts, though, let me 
compliment our foreign diplomacy team that I have seen all over 
Africa who are working beyond hours with short staff. But we 
have missed the most important moment in history. I don't know 
if we can get it back, and that is why we are here talking 
about it.
    The Congressional Black Caucus, led by some of us intensely 
engaged, were the ones that pushed for AFRICOM. That was an 
approach as a first effort of really on the ground. I heard 
you, Ms. Charles, speak about soft power. I am going to have a 
question--just looking for the clock. But having gone to school 
at the University of Ghana in Accra and Kumasi, University of 
Nigeria, with campuses at Lagos and Ibadan, I know that Africa 
could have been the continent, the greatest ally to the United 
States of America.
    My first question is going to be to each of the witnesses, 
starting with you, Mr. Pham, thank you for your service. Is 
Africa a strategic and economic force that the United States 
should try to embrace with a very strong connection? I just 
need yes or no.
    Mr. Pham. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Sir, I am just going down the----
    Mr. Meservey. Yes.
    Mr. Zelin. Yes, definitely.
    Ms. Charles. Absolutely, yes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. This is Republicans and Democrats who are 
witnesses.
    In 2014, I was the first Member of Congress to lead a 
delegation in to deal with the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls, 
which was by a terrorist group. That would have also been a 
moment that we could have poured in our concern. We, as Members 
went in, only three of us, to show compassion to the family. 
The issue was in northern Nigeria, where they felt completely 
abandoned, it was being taken over by ISIS or radicals, and 
that was their way of showing the Nigerian government and 
everyone else, burning Christian churches, et cetera, how 
powerful they were.
    So let me try to pose to you, Ms. Charles, what should be 
the most targeted way that we can overcome China's presence 
that takes and does not give? Wagner, that is in the central 
African Republic. People may not think that pulls in a 
terrorist look, but it is a look that is different from America 
and argues against American values. That is what terrorism is. 
It changes people's attitudes and moves them away from 
democratic principles, being able to see the forest for the 
trees, meaning that it is better to help collaborate and work 
and build a bridge rather than be given a bridge, and then 
extract every literal blood out of the country and give nothing 
back. So what can we do? Terrorism is a multifaceted fight. It 
is the hearts and souls of the continent, and it is a strategic 
way of getting in.
    If I am going to yield just a moment more, I do want to put 
on the record, pay tribute to my predecessor, the Honorable 
Mickey Leland, who sat in this place, and as far back as 1989 
and beyond, he took up the cause of Sub-Saharan Africa by 
bringing in food. He was making friends between Eritrea, Sahara 
Desert, and Ethiopia, and he died on the side of an Ethiopian 
mountain, taking grain to the starving African. That should 
have been what we would have done. We would not be facing ISIS 
or----
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired, but 
the Chair will allow one more minute.
    Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Or al-Qaeda.
    If you can give us a schooling, please. I would appreciate 
it.
    I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.
    Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Jackson Lee, for 
your question.
    I will be brief in my response in that, focusing on the 
point that you raised about strategic competition and looking 
at how China and Russia operate in Sub-Saharan Africa.
    The United States would do very----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. And how that opens the doors for the 
terrorists.
    Ms. Charles. Well, that's one element, and I think it's 
again, a very nuanced conversation to have. But I would say 
that the United States would do well to leverage one of the 
most important things that we have that I would say that the 
Russian Federation and the PRC do not have, which is a vibrant, 
robust, and well-educated diaspora. The diaspora community has 
been very vocal in its concerns about how the United States 
appears to have a fickle way of addressing some of the issues 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. If we are more consistent in our 
engagement across the board and again use that whole-of-society 
approach, engaging civil society, engaging the grassroots 
organizations that Russia and China often ignore, I think that 
we would do well and we will pay dividends to our influence on 
the continent.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    The gentlelady's time has expired.
    I thank the witnesses and our committee for the questions 
that have been asked today. It is a busy day, and second round 
does not look like it will happen, but I do want to offer the 
Ranking Member the opportunity to make a closing statement at 
this time.
    Mr. Magaziner. Well, thank you, Chairman.
    I am very glad that we held this hearing today. I am very 
grateful to our witnesses and the experience and the insights 
that they have brought. To our colleagues, as the Chairman 
noted, this is a busy day and a busy week in Congress, but the 
fact that so many of our colleagues came prepared to engage on 
this topic, I think is a very positive sign.
    As a Government and as a Congress, we need to constantly be 
anticipating threats to the United States homeland before they 
develop and plan for them in advance and diffuse them before 
the threats become imminent. If we do not engage and continue 
to engage and increase our engagement in Africa, we will all 
regret it.
    So I want to thank all of you for your insights. I was 
particularly struck when Ms. Charles talked about the three Ds, 
defense, diplomacy, and development. I think that is a great 
framework through which to look at this work. We need to make 
sure that we have robust defense and intelligence-gathering 
capabilities in areas like the Sahel in West Africa where 
terrorist threats are on the rise, we need to continue to 
engage diplomatically with our allies in the region that share 
our values and our interests, and we need to continue to invest 
in development, not pull back, because those root causes of 
radicalization that include poverty and hunger continue to be a 
major challenge. We cannot have a foreign policy or a defense 
strategy that is based just on sticks and not carrots. It needs 
to be all of the above, not either/or.
    Russia and China are moving into this region, not out of 
altruism, not out of charity, but because they understand that 
it is in their strategic interest to have a presence and to 
have relationships in all regions, but particularly in Africa 
in the 21st Century. There is a national security imperative 
that the United States do the same, that we continue to engage 
with defense, diplomacy, and development to ensure that our 
adversaries, be they nation-states or terrorist organizations, 
do not gain the upper hand.
    So thank you, Chairman, for calling this hearing. Thank you 
again to our witnesses and our colleagues. Let this be a 
redoubling of our efforts in this area as we go forward.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. I think the Ranking Member.
    I will make a brief closing statement as well.
    I couldn't agree with my colleague, the Ranking Member, Mr. 
Magaziner, more on what he just said about anticipating. That 
is the reason that we held this hearing today, is because your 
testimony, your written testimony, the questions that you have 
answered, the colleagues on both sides of the aisle, if there 
is something that unifies this Congress, it is exactly this 
subject right here on how to anticipate and then take action 
and prevent these terrorist acts from impacting Americans, 
American interest, and our partners and allies, which, 
unfortunately, we have seen a track record and a motivation. 
Maybe the capability and capacity isn't quite there yet, as was 
mentioned, but it is going to be there. If left unchecked, it 
will certainly impact us. So I appreciate everyone 
participating in this today.
    That is why we held this hearing. I look at the threat 
environment around the world, it is growing. I think, 
personally, myself, and having been deployed all over the 
world, that we are probably in a threat environment that rivals 
that of the pre-World War II environment, if not greater, 
because of the complexity of the nature of threats and the 
domains. That it is not just the land, air, and sea domain, we 
have a cyber domain. We have got many places around the world 
that are now, for the first time, experiencing these horrors, 
as was mentioned by Ms. Charles. You know, these are graphic 
images, but we have to keep those in mind. I am worried about 
that threat environment and that landscape and the vacuum that 
we see in the regions that you have pointed out throughout the 
continent of Africa that are allowing a breeding ground for 
terrorism, which has to be checked with the partnering with not 
just these nations, but also with like-minded countries around 
the world. The great power competition has obviously spilled 
over into this threat, this extremism threat.
    So I am very, very pleased with the results of this hearing 
today. I want to continue the work here. I would implore all of 
you to please continue your work because you are informing the 
U.S. Government on those threats and the policy decisions that 
we will make and the direction that we will go is hinging upon 
your work, your research, and your expertise.
    So I thank the witnesses. The Members of the subcommittee, 
may have additional questions for you and we would ask that you 
respond to these in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

        Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for J. Peter Pham
    Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny 
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty 
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an 
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in 
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the 
region and if so, in what way?
    Answer. Indeed, the unlamented demise of Wagner boss Prighozhin and 
the ensuing confusion caused not only by the taking out of several 
senior Wagner leaders alongside Prighozhin, but also by the hitherto 
not-entirely successful efforts by Russian authorities, led by Deputy 
Defense Minister Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, to take over 
control of Wagner mercenaries and the various rackets they have 
created, have created an narrow opportunity where a concerted effort by 
the United States and its allies could result in diminishing Russia's 
malign influence in the region. I am aware of two such efforts 
currently under way and am willing to discuss them with the Members of 
the subcommittee or your staff, but it would probably not be 
appropriate for me to go into detail publicly. Suffice to say that it 
is a case-by-case question and requires diplomatic and intelligence 
resources which, as I noted in my testimony, we woefully lack in the 
region. Moreover, the current U.S. administration needs to development 
a robust strategy for the Sahel, rather than its reactive default 
setting.
    Question 2. U.S. foreign policy goals in Somalia have included 
promoting political and economic stability, preventing the country from 
becoming a terrorist safe haven, and helping reduce the humanitarian 
crisis. In fiscal year 2022 the United States provided over $818 
million in humanitarian aid to Somalia in addition to $275 million in 
other assistance, primarily military aid.\1\ Does this support these 
overarching United States policy goals effectively? What strategic or 
financial changes would you recommend for the United States to pursue 
in Somalia?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS (2023), https://
crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Answer. I regret to say that if our foreign policy goals in Somalia 
are ``promoting political and economic stability, preventing the 
country from becoming a terrorist safe haven, and helping reduce the 
humanitarian crisis,'' we have chosen a very strange way of going about 
it with an utterly inappropriate partner.
    In my opinion, the resources cited in the question, almost of all 
of which was spent in southern and central Somalia for the benefit of 
the so-called Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) have been wasted. The 
FGS is an unelected body (the last one-person-one-vote election in 
southern and central Somalia took place in 1969) which, where it is not 
deeply penetrated by Islamist extremists (e.g., the minister of 
religion, Mukhtar Robow, used to be No. 2 in the al-Shabaab terrorist 
organization and had a $5 million U.S. State Department ``Rewards for 
Justice'' bounty on his head; he has never renounced his jihadist 
ideology, but simply switched sides because he lost an internal power 
struggle), is notoriously corrupt. Moreover, this so-called government 
exercises little real authority outside of limited areas. To add insult 
on injury, despite the prodigious amounts of U.S. taxpayer money spent 
on them, the FGS almost never misses an opportunity to side with our 
rivals, including China and Russia.
    In contrast, the northern region of Somaliland (the former British 
protectorate) which was independent before the former Italian colony of 
Somalia and which declared itself independent again in 1991, has for 
more than 3 decades been peaceful, had multiple one-person-one-vote 
Presidential and legislative elections, and aligned itself with U.S. 
partners (including mutual recognition with the Republic of China on 
Taiwan). It boasts the finest deep-water harbor in Africa between Suez 
and Durban as well as the continent's longest runway (originally built 
by the United States for use in the Cold War against the southern 
Soviet Union). The port of Berbera, expanded by the Emirati company DPW 
with a significant investment from the government of the United 
Kingdom, is also a vital transit hub for the region, including 
landlocked Ethiopia.
    At the very least, as the Congress itself has legislated in fiscal 
year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, we need to carefully 
study the benefits to U.S. interests of rebalancing our engagement in 
the Somali lands, including security cooperation with Somaliland.
    Question 3. You stated in your testimony that the Sahel region of 
Africa represents nearly half of global terrorism deaths in 2022, and 
if the trend continues this year, the total percentage of deaths will 
eclipse 50 percent. What steps need to be taken to immediately reverse 
this trend?
    Answer. There are no quick fixes to a crisis that has developed 
over a long period and is, ultimately, rooted in the failure of 
governance, what I often described during my service as U.S. special 
envoy for the Sahel region as the ``crisis of state legitimacy'' 
throughout that region. As I repeatedly emphasized at the time: ``The 
heart of the crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy--a 
perception by citizens that their government is valid, equitable, and 
able and willing to meet their needs . . . Absent states' commitments 
to meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international engagement 
is likely to succeed.'' I believed that to be true then and I believe 
it to still be true today.
    While we cannot ``immediately reverse'' what decades of neglect 
have wrought, it is nevertheless in America's strategic interest to 
lead its allies and other partners in finding a solution, especially 
when geopolitical rivals like China and Russia and as well as 
malevolent forces like jihadist terrorists actively seek to exploit 
these very vulnerabilities.
    Question 4. You highlighted how Niger saw a 79 percent decrease in 
deaths due to terrorism in your testimony. On Sunday, the French 
president, Emanuel Macron, announced that he was withdrawing all French 
troops from Niger within the next couple of months in the wake of a 
coup d'etat that took place this summer. Most of these forces were 
involved in anti-terror operations within the country. Is Niger at risk 
of seeing an increase now and on the path of following the same haunted 
fate as Burkina Faso and Mali?
    Answer. We need to disentangle two separate issues, France's role 
in Niger and America's role in the country and our strategic interests. 
On the former, it is worth noting that while France has played a 
helpful role with some counterterrorism operations and training, its 
role in the lead-up to and during the July 2023 coup d'etat is far more 
ambiguous and, frankly, rather troubling. As to the U.S. role and our 
interests, including the importance of Air Base 201 not only for 
tracking violent extremists across the Sahel, but also for kinetic 
operations against those who threaten U.S. persons and interests as 
well as those of our allies and partners, this is why it is important 
to approach our engagements with the post-coup authorities 
pragmatically to ensure that malign actors do not have a chance to fill 
gaps created intentionally or unintentionally.
       Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Joshua Meservey
    Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny 
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty 
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an 
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in 
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the 
region and if so, in what way?
    Answer. Unfortunately, Wagner's Africa operations appear to have 
largely continued uninterrupted, despite Prigozhin's death, and it 
appears that Moscow has thus far successfully transitioned control of 
those operations to its preferred leaders. I believe the opportunity 
for the United States will come, however, when the counterproductive 
nature of Wagner's operations in the fight against terrorism in places 
like Mali becomes undeniable. Wagner's indiscriminate brutality cannot 
long check the insurgencies in the Sahel, and the security situation 
will continue to deteriorate. The United States should already be 
planning for the potential collapse of Mali and perhaps Burkina Faso, 
and be working with concerned partners, including regional states, on a 
plan for trying to contain the fallout from such a crisis and stabilize 
core areas within the countries.
    Question 2. The United States has provided training, equipment, 
intelligence, and other support to Somali troops, including their 
special operations unit, and the African Union forces fighting in 
Somalia against al-Shabaab. What more should the United States be doing 
in Somalia to counter al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups?\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS (2023), https://
crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Answer. Mogadishu joined what began as a local clan uprising 
against al-Shabaab's cruelty and onerous taxation to achieve 
significant gains on the ground against the group. However, the 
limitations of the model are already becoming obvious as the offensive 
has largely stalled. While certain units of the Somalian armed forces 
have fought well, the Somali National Army (SNA), despite many years of 
training and billions of dollars of support from a variety of 
countries, is still not capable of militarily suppressing al-Shabaab on 
its own. In large part that is due to the political dysfunction of the 
Somalian government, which for years has been distracted by elite power 
struggles and seeking opportunities for corruption. Without a viable, 
competent local government, the United States and other external 
partners will never be able to help Somalia achieve a decisive victory 
against al-Shabaab.
    So, Washington should put a much greater emphasis on demanding 
accountability from Mogadishu by establishing a series of measurable, 
time-bound benchmarks for it to achieve to continue receiving American 
assistance. It should also adopt a more decentralized model of 
engagement. Rather than focusing so intently on Mogadishu, it should 
recognize that only a highly decentralized governance system has any 
chance of succeeding in the Somalian context given the realities of 
Somalian society. Washington should work more with Federal member 
states that have demonstrated a baseline of competency and legitimacy, 
and it should recognize the reality that Somaliland is a de facto 
independent state and treat it as such.
    Question 3. You highlighted Wagner's presence across the continent 
and the implications to U.S. interests in the region. China also has a 
significant presence in the region. What steps can the United States 
take to guide countries away from these authoritarian countries and 
provide an alternative to what the PRC and Russian PMC groups have to 
offer?
    Answer. The United States first needs to conduct a clear-eyed 
assessment of which African countries it can reasonably expect to make 
gains in for its national interests, and which ones require engagement 
because of their strategic significance. The United States should 
ensure its engagements with those countries are sustained and 
intensive. The engagements should focus on motivating and facilitating 
U.S. private-sector investment in those countries. Most African 
governments recognize that their countries' greatest need is jobs for 
their exploding youth populations, something that American investment 
can help with. The United States also needs to be unafraid to tout, 
with appropriate sensitivity and tone, capitalism and democracy's 
unmatched record in protecting people's rights and building safe and 
prosperous societies. Congress should exercise strict oversight over 
agencies like DFC and Prosper Africa to ensure the projects they 
support advance American interests in the context of great power 
competition; Congress should also remove DFC's development component as 
the United States already has many agencies devoted to development, but 
not enough committed to incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private-
sector involvement in Africa. Washington should also avoid exporting 
its own culture wars into African countries that are inhabited by 
populations that are on average highly conservative on social matters. 
Doing so unnecessarily breeds resentment and distrust among African 
countries.
    Question 4. In your testimony, you state that there are ``vast 
spaces in places like Mali and Burkina controlled or influenced by 
terrorist organizations.'' With France announcing the withdrawal of 
French forces from Niger within the next few months, do you foresee 
Niger also quickly following the trend that we are seeing in Mali and 
Burkina Faso?
    Answer. The Nigerian junta has demonstrated a level of openness to 
retaining ties with the United States and certain European states, and 
before the coup, Niger was relatively better off in terms of security 
than many of its Sahel neighbors. That suggests that Niger will not 
descend into instability at the rate that Mali and Burkina Faso have, 
yet the dangers that its security will nonetheless deteriorate are 
real. Given the stakes and the reality that there are few other options 
for the United States in the Sahel, Washington should continue to find 
a way to have a working relationship with Niamey, as the region, 
Europe, and the United States can ill afford another country plunged 
into a Burkina Faso or Mali-style security crisis.
       Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Aaron Y. Zelin
    Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny 
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty 
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an 
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in 
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the 
region and if so, in what way?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Given how extremist groups exploit local resources, 
social grievances, and fragile governments, how can U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts better work to address these root causes in 
the Saleh region of Africa?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Salafi-jihadi activity in Burkina Faso helped create 
the conditions that led to multiple coups. We are seeing an Islamic 
State cell form in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Niger. The political and economic situations in this region paired with 
the rise of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel have created eerily 
similar conditions that we saw in Syria and Iraq in 2013. Would you 
agree that these factors are creating a new breeding ground to 
establish a caliphate in the Sahel that allows jihadist groups to 
conduct and coordinate operations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Donna O. Charles
    Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny 
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty 
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an 
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in 
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the 
region and if so, in what way?
    Answer. In the wake of Prigozhin's death in August 2023, open-
source reports indicated that Russia's Defense Ministry has been 
posturing to subsume most of Wagner's disinformation and mercenary 
operations, including those in Africa.\1\ African governments that are 
involved in security cooperation agreements with Wagner reportedly have 
expressed concerns and regrets to U.S. officials about the situation 
they are in, noting the mounting, credible reports of human rights 
abuses, exploitative concessions to extract natural resources, and the 
lack of progress on counterterrorism and other security objectives. 
While it is unclear as to whether these lamentations are legitimate or 
an attempt to gain leverage as a negotiating tactic, the United States 
and Western partners have narrow windows of opportunity to regain 
influence in parts of Africa where Wagner and the Russian Federation 
have established a foothold. To do this successfully, however, the 
United States must present serious and viable alternatives to Russian 
proxies and mercenaries who have worked to cultivate these 
relationships over years, and with alacrity.\2\ For instance, the 
Russian Federation's sweeping influence in the Central African Republic 
is, in part, the result of a multi-faceted, years-long initiative to 
prop up a vulnerable government under President Touadera. This effort 
has expanded into a thriving sociocultural propaganda campaign 
involving language training, pageants, and academic exchange programs, 
to name a few.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ (Troianovski, 2023).
    \2\ (Detsch, 2023).
    \3\ (El-Badawy, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most viable opportunity for the United States to regain 
influence in countries that appear beholden to the Russian Federation 
is to demonstrate a long-term commitment to sustainable and scalable 
security cooperation, as the United States has done through 
relationships established in parts of East Africa over the last several 
decades. Reported negotiations between U.S.-based Bancroft Global 
Development and the Central African Republic paint a picture of what a 
long-term security assistance relationship could look like, with a 
strong contrast to the transactional Russian model.\4\ Although the 
situation in Somalia today is far from perfect, Bancroft's long-
standing role in training, equipping, and mentoring Somali and African 
Union security forces under the auspices of the State Department and 
the Department of Defense \5\ could help the United States turn the 
tide against Russian influence in parts of Africa gradually. However, 
the 3Ds approach--defense, development, and diplomacy \6\--should be 
applied as part of a durable U.S. engagement strategy. Security 
cooperation through private military contractors is best fortified by a 
robust and experienced diplomatic presence. At present, a large portion 
of the U.S. embassies in countries where Russian proxies are prominent 
are understaffed, which hampers implementation of a comprehensive and 
balanced engagement strategy that goes beyond defense and security 
cooperation.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ (Peltier, 2023).
    \5\ (Naylor, 2015).
    \6\ (Syed, 2010).
    \7\ (Gramer, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Expanding the sphere of U.S. influence involves investing in soft 
power approaches that complement traditional train-and-equip models. 
The United States should also seek to expand effective exchange 
programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), and the Young 
African Leaders Initiative (YALI). Wherever legally possible,\8\ the 
United States should tap its deep well of tailored programming and 
initiatives to burnish its reputation as the security partner of choice 
in Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ In its current form (Pub. L. 117-103, Division K), Section 7008 
states that ``None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the 
government of any country whose duly elected head of government is 
deposed by military coup d'etat or decree or, after the date of 
enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military 
plays a decisive role: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such 
government if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the 
appropriate Congressional committees that subsequent to the termination 
of assistance a democratically-elected government has taken office: 
Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply 
to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation 
in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available 
pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular 
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.'' 
(Congressional Research Service, ``Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. 
Foreign Aid Appropriations,'' September 1, 2022.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               References
Detsch, J. (2023, September 25). Wagner's African Hosts Regret Letting 
Them In. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/
09/25/wagner-africa-mali-libya-car-prigozhin-putin-russia/.
El-Badawy, E.M. (2022, March 23). Security, Soft Power and Regime 
Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa. Retrieved from Tony 
Blair Institute for Global Change: https://www.institute.global/
insights/geopolitics-and-security/security-soft-power-and-regime-
support-spheres-russian-influence-africa.
Gramer, R.A. (2022, July 22). U.S. Embassies in Africa Are Chronically 
Short-Staffed. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://
foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/africa-embassies-short-staffed-us-sahel-
china-russia/.
Naylor, S. (2015, January 22). Profit and Loss in Somalia. Retrieved 
from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/22/delta-force-
somalia-terror-blackwater-bancroft/.
Peltier, E. (2023, November 26). Battle for Influence Rages in Heart of 
Wagner's Operations in Africa. Retrieved from The New York Times: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/26/world/africa/wagner-russia-central-
african-republic.html.
Syed, N.A. (2010, September 17). The 3 Ds of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 
from Harvard Political Review: https://harvardpolitics.com/the-3ds-of-
foreign-affairs/.
Troianovski, A.W. (2023, September 8). After Prigozhin's Death, a High-
Stakes Scramble for His Empire. Retrieved from The New York Times: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/08/world/europe/prigozhin-wagner-
russia-africa.html.

                                 [all]