[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         RETURNING TO THE MOON:
                        KEEPING ARTEMIS ON TRACK

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                             AND TECHNOLOGY

                                 OF THE

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            JANUARY 17, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-30

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


       Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
       
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
54-502PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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              COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

                  HON. FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman
BILL POSEY, Florida                  ZOE LOFGREN, California, Ranking 
RANDY WEBER, Texas                       Member
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   HALEY STEVENS, Michigan
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York
MIKE GARCIA, California              DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
JAY OBERNOLTE, California            ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee         VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California             KEVIN MULLIN, California
RICK CRAWFORD, Arkansas              JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York             EMILIA SYKES, Ohio
RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  MAXWELL FROST, Florida
SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida              YADIRA CARAVEO, Colorado
DALE STRONG, Alabama                 SUMMER LEE, Pennsylvania
MAX MILLER, Ohio                     JENNIFER McCLELLAN, Virginia
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              GABE AMO, Rhode Island
MIKE COLLINS, Georgia                SEAN CASTEN, Illinois,
BRANDON WILLIAMS, New York             Vice Ranking Member
TOM KEAN, New Jersey                 PAUL TONKO, New York
VACANCY
                                 ------                                

                 Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

                   HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chairman
BILL POSEY, Florida                  ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois, 
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida                  Ranking Member
MIKE GARCIA, California              JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California             YADIRA CARAVEO, Colorado
DALE STRONG, Alabama                 JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JENNIFER McCLELLAN, Virginia
                         
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                            January 17, 2024

                                                                   Page

Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                           Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Chairman, Committee on 
  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    18
    Written Statement............................................    19

Statement by Representative Eric Sorensen, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, 
  Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    20
    Written Statement............................................    21

Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
  Representatives................................................    21
    Written Statement............................................    22

Written statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, 
  Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    23

                               Witnesses:

Ms. Catherine Koerner, Associate Administrator, Exploration 
  Systems Development Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics 
  and Space Administration
    Oral Statement...............................................    25
    Written Statement............................................    27

Mr. William Russell, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office
    Oral Statement...............................................    31
    Written Statement............................................    33

Mr. George A. Scott, Acting Inspector General, National 
  Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Oral Statement...............................................    50
    Written Statement............................................    52

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Co-President, LogiQ, Inc
    Oral Statement...............................................    62
    Written Statement............................................    63

Discussion.......................................................    73

              Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Ms. Catherine Koerner, Associate Administrator, Exploration 
  Systems Development Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics 
  and Space Administration.......................................    94

Mr. William Russell, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............   112

Mr. George A. Scott, Acting Inspector General, National 
  Aeronautics and Space Administration...........................   118

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Co-President, LogiQ, Inc.................   128

 
                         RETURNING TO THE MOON:
                        KEEPING ARTEMIS ON TRACK

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                   Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank Lucas 
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Chairman Lucas. The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized 
to declare recess of the Subcommittee at any time.
    Welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Returning to the 
Moon: Keeping Artemis on Track.'' And before I make--offer my 
opening statement, I would like to acknowledge that I 
appreciate our witnesses being here today. Mother Nature is 
proving to be somewhat challenging this week, as you can see by 
the turnout of membership. This has been a hearing that's been 
much anticipated by the Members in a very enthusiastic way, but 
you have to physically get here. And that's a challenge we're 
working on. And Subcommittee Chairman Babin is in the air 
somewhere between here and Houston, so the moment he arrives, 
we will have a proper Chairman to preside over this process.
    With that, I want to recognize myself for five minutes for 
an opening statement.
    Good morning, and I welcome everyone to the Science 
Committee's first hearing of 2024. It's fitting that we're 
kicking off the year with a hearing on Artemis, given its 
importance to our space program and to U.S. competitiveness. My 
top priority since becoming Chairman of the Science Committee 
has been to ensure that American competitiveness and leadership 
in the fields of research and technology development. This 
includes U.S. activities in space, especially human 
exploration.
    The importance of U.S. leadership in space is why some of 
our top legislative priorities this Congress include a NASA 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) reauthorization 
bill, which we'll consider this spring, and the Commercial 
Space Act. It has been almost seven years since a comprehensive 
NASA authorization bill was signed into law, and that's simply 
too long for an agency of NASA's importance.
    Much has happened during that period, and this Committee 
should provide direction to NASA's activities for the coming 
years, especially in the areas of human exploration. How we 
address future human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is 
undoubtably a topic we'll address in the NASA authorization 
bill. Artemis is a cornerstone of that effort. I'm confident 
that I speak for everyone on this Committee when I say we all 
support Artemis. This Committee has long directed NASA to 
return humans to the Moon and eventually Mars. But this 
Committee's support of Artemis means asking detailed questions 
of NASA and providing oversight of the agency's proposals. 
Congress must have proper insight in the agency's planning and 
execution of this mission to ensure its success.
    This also means listening to inputs from external 
stakeholders and hearing differing viewpoints, which is why 
we've assembled a panel of witnesses with a variety of 
perspectives today.
    Last week, NASA announced the delay of Artemis II to 
September 2025 and Artemis III to September 2026. I look 
forward to hearing from NASA about the cause of these delays 
and potential impacts to future missions and about the steps it 
is taking to mitigate future risks. We have a responsibility to 
not only our constituents, but the international community to 
see that Artemis is executed in a timely and fiscally 
responsible manner without sacrificing safety.
    I remind my colleagues that we are not the only country 
interested in sending humans to the Moon. The Chinese Communist 
Party is actively solicitating international partners for a 
lunar mission, a lunar research station, and has stated its 
ambition to have astronauts on--human astronauts on the surface 
by 2030. The country that lands first will have the ability to 
set a precedent for whether future lunar activities are 
conducted with openness and transparency or in a more 
restricted manner.
    I'm grateful to our panel for appearing before us today to 
share their experience and expertise, and I look forward to a 
productive discussion on how we can ensure the success of 
Artemis and the best way for the U.S. to be the world leader in 
human space exploration.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Lucas follows:]

    Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to the Science 
Committee's first hearing of 2024. It's fitting that we're 
kicking off the year with a hearing on Artemis, given its 
importance to our space program and to U.S. competitiveness.
    My top priority since becoming chairman of the Science 
Committee has been to ensure American competitiveness and 
leadership in the fields of research and technology 
development. This includes U.S. activities in space, especially 
human exploration.
    The importance of U.S. leadership is space is why some of 
our top legislative priorities this Congress include a NASA 
authorization bill, which we will consider this spring, and the 
Commercial Space Act.
    It has been almost seven years since a comprehensive NASA 
authorization bill was signed into law, and that is simply too 
long for an agency of NASA's importance. Much has happened 
during that period, and this Committee should provide direction 
to NASA's activities for the coming years, especially in the 
area of human exploration.
    How we address future human exploration beyond Low Earth 
orbit is undoubtedly a topic we will address in the NASA 
authorization bill. Artemis is a cornerstone of that effort.
    I am confident that I speak for everyone on this committee 
when I say we all support Artemis. This committee has long 
directed NASA to return humans to the Moon and eventually Mars.
    But this Committee's support of Artemis means asking 
detailed questions of NASA and providing oversight of the 
agency's proposals. Congress must have proper insight into the 
agency's planning and execution of this mission to ensure its 
success.
    This also means listening to inputs from external 
stakeholders and hearing differing viewpoints, which is why we 
have assembled a panel of witnesses with a variety of 
perspectives today.
    Last week, NASA announced the delay of Artemis 2 to 
September 2025 and Artemis 3 to September 2026. I look forward 
to hearing from NASA about the cause of these delays and 
potential impacts to future missions, and about the steps it is 
taking to mitigate future risks.
    We have a responsibility to not only our constituents, but 
the international community to see that Artemis is executed in 
a timely and fiscally responsible manner without sacrificing 
safety.
    I remind my colleagues that we are not the only country 
interested in sending humans to the Moon. The Chinese Communist 
Party is actively soliciting international partners for a lunar 
research station and has stated its ambition to have astronauts 
on the human surface by 2030.
    The country that lands first will have the ability to set a 
precedent for whether future lunar activities are conducted 
with openness and transparency or in a more restricted manner.
    I am grateful to our panel for appearing before us today to 
share their experience and expertise. I look forward to a 
productive discussion on how we can ensure the success of 
Artemis and the best way for the U.S. to be the world leader in 
human space exploration.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Sorensen for his opening 
statement.

    Chairman Lucas. I now recognize Ranking Member Sorensen for 
his opening statement.
    Mr. Sorensen. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, for 
holding today's hearing ``Returning to the Moon: Keeping 
Artemis on Track.'' I want to welcome our distinguished 
witnesses. Thank you for your time and your expertise and for 
being here today.
    I was not alive, huddled around the TV for Apollo 11, but 
my parents watched that landing. I'm the son of an aerospace 
engineer and a meteorologist with a deep love of science. I 
know the profound impact it has had on our country and on our 
world. When I look up in the night sky, I wonder what's up 
there. I want us to know what's up there.
    Today, we're examining NASA's Artemis mission. The program, 
separated into several stages, is designed to bring humans step 
by step to the Moon and beyond. Artemis will inspire the next 
generation, strengthen our aerospace industry and international 
partnerships, and demonstrate capabilities needed to eventually 
send humans to Mars.
    Last year, I was proud to host NASA astronaut Dr. Kate 
Rubins in my district in western Illinois. Dr. Rubins spoke 
about her excitement for the upcoming generation. She believes 
that--and I spoke with our witnesses earlier--that the first 
humans that will set foot on Mars may be in a first grade 
classroom today. What an exciting possibility for the next 
generation, for our children.
    The Artemis I mission was an important first uncrewed test 
that sent the Orion vehicle thousands of miles beyond the Moon 
before its return to Earth. Artemis II will test additional 
systems as it brings humans around the Moon, and Artemis III 
will land humans back on the lunar surface.
    The difficulty of these missions cannot be underestimated. 
Last week, we learned that NASA's delaying the Artemis II and 
III missions by about a year. I stand behind NASA in 
prioritizing safety for Artemis, and I look forward to gaining 
further insight into the delays and any related costs.
    Artemis requires a sustained national investment. In a 2021 
report, the NASA Office of the Inspector General (IG) said, 
quote, ``NASA is projected to spend $93 billion on the Artemis 
effort from Fiscal Year 2012 to 2025,'' end quote. And that's 
even before we land our astronauts on the Moon. As authorizers 
with oversight responsibility, this Committee needs to ensure 
that those investments are made wisely.
    This hearing provides a timely opportunity to get both an 
update on the progress and an understanding of the pressing 
issues of the Artemis program, including does NASA and Congress 
have an appropriate level of understanding of the cost of key 
Artemis systems, individual Artemis missions, and a sustained 
lunar exploration effort? What is the critical path for 
returning humans to the Moon? And what is the plan for 
addressing all of the challenges? How would a fiscal 2024 
budget at enacted 2023 levels or even a cut below the 2023 
levels affect this program? How are NASA and its partners 
addressing risks? And how will risk be communicated to the 
American people?
    In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want the Artemis to be safe and 
successful. Artemis and Moon to Mars are tremendous 
opportunities and of importance to the United States and the 
rest of the world. America's international leadership and 
engagement in the Artemis program and the Artemis Accords will 
promote peaceful, safe, and sustainable exploration of the Moon 
and other celestial bodies.
    Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time, 
Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sorensen follows:]

    Good morning and thank you, Chairman Lucas, for holding 
today's hearing Returning to the Moon: Keeping Artemis on 
Track.
    I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses. Thank you 
for being here.
    I was not alive during the Apollo 11 landing, but as the 
son of an aerospace engineer, and a meteorologist with a deep 
love of science, I know the profound impact it has had on our 
country and on the world. When I look up at the night sky, I 
wonder what is up there? I want us to go so I can know.
    Today, we are examining NASA's Artemis program. This 
program, separated into several stages, is designed to bring 
humans, step by step, to the moon and beyond.
    Artemis will inspire the next generation, strengthen our 
aerospace industry and international partnerships, and 
demonstrate capabilities needed to eventually send humans to 
Mars.
    Last year, I was proud to host NASA astronaut, Dr. Kate 
Rubins, in my district. Dr. Rubins spoke about her excitement 
for the upcoming generation. She believes that first graders 
are the perfect age to one day go to Mars. What an exciting 
possibility for our nation's children!
    The Artemis I mission was an important first uncrewed test 
and sent the Orion vehicle thousands of miles beyond the Moon 
before its return to Earth. Artemis II will test additional 
systems as it brings humans around the moon. And Artemis III 
will land humans back on the moon. The difficulty of these 
missions cannot be underestimated.
    Last week, we learned that NASA is delaying the Artemis II 
and Artemis III missions by about a year. I stand behind NASA 
in prioritizing safety for Artemis, and I look forward to 
gaining further insight into the delays and any related costs.
    Artemis requires a sustained national investment. In a 2021 
report, the NASA Office of Inspector General said, ``NASA is 
projected to spend $93 billion on the Artemis effort from FY 
2012 through FY 2025.'' And that's even before we land our 
astronauts on the Moon.
    As authorizers with oversight responsibility, this 
committee needs to ensure those investments are made wisely.
    This hearing provides a timely opportunity to get both an 
update on the progress and an understanding of the pressing 
issues for the Artemis program, including,
      Do NASA and Congress have an appropriate level of 
understanding of the cost of key Artemis systems, individual 
Artemis missions, and a sustained lunar exploration effort?
      What is on the critical path for returning humans 
to the Moon and what is the plan for addressing those 
challenges?
      How would an FY2024 budget at enacted FY2023 
levels, or even a cut below the FY 2023 appropriated levels, 
affect the Artemis program?
      How are NASA and its partners addressing risks 
and how will risk be communicated to the public?
    In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want Artemis to be safe and 
successful. Artemis and Moon to Mars are of tremendous 
importance to the United States and the world.
    America's international leadership and engagement in the 
Artemis program and the Artemis accords will promote peaceful, 
safe, and sustainable exploration of the Moon and other 
celestial bodies.
    Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

    Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Sorensen.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee 
for a statement.
    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. 
Chairman, for holding today's hearing. I want to welcome our 
witnesses, and thank you for being here to discuss the topic of 
``Returning to the Moon: Keeping Artemis on Track.''
    This Committee, as the Chairman has noted, has long 
maintained its bipartisan support for Artemis in the NASA's 
Moon to Mars efforts, and I don't see that changing in any way. 
I was thrilled with the success of the Artemis I test flight. 
In my own State of California, NASA's Moon to Mars campaign 
supports 11,600 jobs and created an economic impact of $2.8 
billion according to NASA's 2021 Economic Impact Report.
    So let me be clear, I support Artemis, but I want it to be 
successful, especially with China at our heels, and we need--we 
want to be helpful here in the Committee in ensuring that 
Artemis is strong and staying on track as we look to lead the 
world hand-in-hand with our partners in the human exploration 
of the Moon and beyond.
    Now, sending people into space, let alone the Moon, isn't 
easy. And NASA recently announced delays to the Artemis II and 
III missions. I have confidence in NASA's workforce and the 
decision to keep safety as a top priority. To that end, I look 
forward to understanding the details behind the recent delays 
and what's involved in addressing those issues.
    As the Artemis efforts continue, we as the authorized 
Committee must have our eyes wide open. Moon to Mars is a 
multidecadal effect--effort that will span several Congresses 
and Administrations. Full situational awareness requires that, 
one, we know how much the key Artemis systems cost, as well as 
the missions themselves; two, have a realistic understanding of 
how NASA is assessing schedule; and three, have clarity on the 
top most technical challenges and risks and how they're being 
addressed across NASA and among its diverse set of partners and 
acquisition mechanisms.
    We also know NASA has a lot on its plate. The future of low 
Earth orbit and the planned end of the International Space 
Station operations in 2030, the need for critical yet costly 
deorbit vehicle, the transition to the use of future commercial 
space stations and their readiness to come online, all this has 
to be kept in mind.
    In addition, key considerations on the Mars sample return 
are on the horizon. And as we learned last week from NASA and 
NOAA's (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's) 
annual assessment of global temperature, we must continue to 
obtain the measurements and observations needed to understand 
and mitigate the impacts of climate crisis.
    In short, NASA is a multi-mission agency, and we can't lose 
sight of the benefits and challenges of a balanced portfolio. 
But supporting balance won't be made any easier by the 
dysfunctional appropriations process that I think threatens to 
undermine what we know is best for the--for leading the world 
and growing our economy in a sustainable way, investments in 
R&D (research and development) and innovations such as those at 
NASA.
    I'm excited about Artemis and Moon to Mars, and I look 
forward to working with our Chairman, with the Administration, 
and with stakeholders on building a smart, strong, and 
sustainable path forward.
    And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]

    Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Babin, for holding 
today's hearing. I also want to welcome our witnesses. Thank 
you for being here to discuss the topic of ``Returning to the 
Moon: Keeping Artemis on Track.''
    The Committee has long maintained its bipartisan support 
for Artemis and NASA's Moon to Mars efforts, and I don't see 
that changing in any way. I was thrilled with the success of 
the Artemis I test flight. In my own state of California, 
NASA's Moon to Mars campaign supports 11,600 jobs and created 
an economic impact of 2.8 billion dollars, according to NASA's 
FY2021 Economic Impact Report.
    So let me be clear upfront. I support Artemis. I want it to 
be successful, especially with China at our heels. We want to 
be helpful in ensuring Artemis is strong and staying on track 
as we look to lead the world, hand in hand with our partners, 
in the human exploration of the Moon and beyond.
    Sending people into space, let alone to the Moon, will 
never be easy. NASA recently announced delays to the Artemis II 
and III missions. I have full confidence in NASA's workforce 
and the decision to keep safety as the top priority. To that 
end, I look forward to understanding the details behind the 
recent delays and what is involved in addressing the issues.
    As Artemis efforts continue, it's incumbent upon us, as the 
authorizing committee, to have our eyes wide open. Moon to Mars 
is a multi-decadal effort that will span several Congresses and 
Administrations.
    Full situational awareness requires that:
    1)  We know how much the key Artemis systems cost, as well 
as the missions themselves;
    2)  Have a realistic understanding of how NASA is assessing 
schedule;
    3)  Have clarity on the topmost technical challenges and 
risks and how they are being addressed across NASA and among 
its diverse set of partners and acquisition mechanisms.
    Moreover, we can't ignore that NASA has a lot on its plate. 
The future of low Earth orbit and the planned end of 
International Space Station operations in 2030, the need for a 
critical yet costly deorbit vehicle, the transition to the use 
of future commercial space stations and their readiness to come 
online must be kept in mind. In addition, key considerations on 
Mars Sample Return are on the horizon. And, as we learned last 
week from NASA and NOAA's annual assessment of global 
temperature, we must continue to obtain the measurements and 
observations needed to understand and mitigate the horrific 
impacts of the climate crisis. In short, NASA is a multi-
mission agency, and we can't lose sight of the benefits and 
challenges of a balanced portfolio.
    Supporting balance won't be made any easier by the 
dysfunctional appropriations process that threatens to 
undermine what we know is best for leading the world and 
growing our economy in a sustainable way--investments in R&D 
and innovation such as those at NASA.
    I'm excited about Artemis and Moon to Mars. I look forward 
to working with the Chairman, the Administration, and 
stakeholders on building a smart, strong, and sustainable path 
forward.
    Thank you, and I yield back.

    Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair would note that when Subcommittee Chairman Babin 
arrives, we will make his time for an opening statement, too.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]

    Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to the Science 
Committee's first hearing of 2024. It's fitting that we're 
kicking off the year with a hearing on Artemis, given its 
importance to our space program and to U.S. competitiveness.
    The nation that leads in space earns tremendous scientific 
knowledge, reaps the rewards of technological advancements, and 
sets the rules of the road for future exploration. It's 
critical that we continue to lead so that our values of 
transparency, openness, and freedom guide exploration rather 
than communist principles and dictatorial regimes. That's why 
it's so important for Artemis to succeed.
    The origins of the Artemis program stem from President 
Bush's Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January of 
2004. In 2005, this committee directed NASA to plan to return 
American astronauts to the Moon as a stepping-stone to Mars and 
beyond. This committee, and Congress as a whole, has not 
wavered in its commitment to that goal. All too often NASA 
programs have suffered from cost over-runs, under-performance, 
schedule delays, or changing political directions that have led 
to cancellations. Recognizing this history, Congress has 
provided "continuity of purpose" for Artemis through multiple 
NASA Authorization Acts, robust appropriations, and consistent 
oversight to ensure the program remained focused across several 
Administrations.
    This was no small task, and we still have our work cut out 
for us to maintain the program and ensure success. I was 
incredibly pleased to see the success of Artemis' first mission 
in November of 2022, which sent an uncrewed Orion capsule 
around the Moon and back to Earth, where it was successfully 
recovered in the Pacific Ocean. But last week, NASA announced 
delays to the Artemis 2 mission, which would send astronauts 
around the Moon, and the Artemis 3 mission, which would return 
humans to the lunar surface for the first time in more than 50 
years. Artemis 2 has been delayed until September 2025 and 
Artemis 3 has been pushed back to September 2026. This is in 
addition to proposed delays to Artemis 4 that were included in 
the President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request last year. 
While an argument could be made that those schedules were 
aggressive, it is important for Congress to monitor contract 
performance and NASA program management to gain insight into 
trends and indicators that could portend future issues.
    Every delay costs the United States time and taxpayer 
dollars and risks our preeminent role in space exploration. As 
I said at the beginning of my remarks, we cannot afford to cede 
U.S. leadership in space, so it's critical that we keep Artemis 
on track and on time.
    That is the focus of the hearing today. My goal is for this 
Committee to come away with a better understanding of the 
current challenges facing Artemis and our efforts to return to 
the Moon.
    There are plenty of topics for us to explore today ranging 
from acquisition strategies, architecture decisions, concept of 
operation choices, contractor performance, and NASA oversight. 
While we will only touch the surface of these complicated 
issues today, we will surely continue our oversight through 
additional hearings, information requests, budget reviews, and 
stakeholder engagement.
    Today, however, we have witnesses from NASA, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the NASA Inspector General, and 
the private sector, all of whom can give us more insight into 
the program and what's needed to keep it moving forward on time 
and on budget.
    I look forward to their testimony, and discussing how we 
can ensure future success. Thank you.

    Chairman Lucas. Let me introduce our witnesses. Our first 
witness today is Catherine Koerner, Associate Administrator for 
the Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate of 
NASA. Her responsibilities include the development of the Moon 
to Mars infrastructure, management of systems development for 
Artemis, and planning NASA's deep space exploration approach. 
Ms. Koerner previously served as the Deputy Associate 
Administrator for the directorate and prior to that served as 
the Orion Program Manager.
    Our next witness is Mr. William Russell, Director of 
Contracting and National Security Acquisitions at GAO 
(Government Accountability Office). He manages a portfolio 
which includes issues related to NASA and DOD's (Department of 
Defense's) industrial base and supply chain integrity, among 
other topics. Mr. Russell joined GAO in 2002 and has previously 
served on GAO's Homeland Security and Justice team.
    Our third witness is Mr. George Scott, acting Inspector 
General at NASA. He assumed the role in January of this year, 
having previously served as the Deputy Inspector General. Prior 
to joining NASA, Mr. Scott served over three decades at GAO, 
which included serving as the managing director of GAO's 
Homeland Security and Justice team.
    Our final witness is Dr. Michael Griffin, Co-President of 
LogiQ, a scientific and technical consulting firm he cofounded. 
Dr. Griffin previously served as the 11th Administrator of 
NASA, leading the agency from 2005 to 2009. He has also served 
as the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 
as well as the Space Department head at the Johns Hopkins 
University Applied Physics Laboratory.
    Again, thank you all for being here today. And I now 
recognize Ms. Koerner for five minutes to present her 
testimony.


              TESTIMONY OF MS. CATHERINE KOERNER,

          ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, EXPLORATION SYSTEMS

                DEVELOPMENT MISSION DIRECTORATE,

         NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Ms. Koerner. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Sorensen, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on NASA's Artemis campaign.
    Under the Artemis campaign, the United States, along with 
our international and commercial partners, will return humans 
to the Moon to explore, conduct scientific research, and 
establish the capability for long-term human presence on and 
around the Moon. Then, using what we learn at the Moon, we will 
take the next giant leap, sending the first humans to Mars.
    In November 2022, NASA took the first major step in 
America's return to the Moon with the Artemis I mission. That 
historic launch and 25 1/2-day mission tested the Space Launch 
System (SLS) rocket, the Orion spacecraft, and the Exploration 
Ground Systems in preparation for Artemis II. On Artemis II, 
NASA astronauts Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, Christina Koch, 
and Canadian astronaut Jeremy Hansen will journey beyond low 
Earth orbit and around the Moon, the farthest humans have 
journeyed into space in more than 50 years.
    Approximately one year after Artemis II, the Artemis III 
crew will land on the lunar south pole and begin building out a 
robust long-term exploration program. With Artemis IV, 
astronauts will again visit the lunar surface and start 
assembly of the space station in lunar orbit called Gateway.
    NASA's plan for a successful and sustainable return to the 
Moon requires the development of several new space systems, 
including the SLS rocket, the Orion spacecraft, the Exploration 
Ground Systems, lunar landers, the Gateway space station, and 
new lunar spacesuits and lunar rovers. Last year, pursuant to 
the NASA Authorization Act of 2022, NASA established the Moon 
to Mars program office, which focuses on the development of 
these new systems, mission integration, and risk management 
across the portfolio. This new office also leads planning and 
analysis for long-lead technology developments to support 
humans to Mars.
    In the year since NASA's successful Artemis I flight test, 
NASA has continued to refine the schedule of the follow-on 
Artemis missions. Based on data from Artemis I and the 
readiness of the space systems needed to safely transport our 
crews from Earth to the lunar surface and back, the Artemis II 
adds several new systems to support astronauts inside of Orion. 
In addition, we are continuing to study the Orion heat shield 
from Artemis I to ensure the safety of our crew on future 
missions. Based on these factors, we're planning for Artemis II 
to launch in September 2025. Artemis III will build on the 
progress of Artemis I and II and adds a commercial lunar lander 
and advanced spacesuits for walking on the lunar surface. In 
2026, Artemis III will send humans back to the surface of the 
Moon.
    While sending humans back to the Moon will be a significant 
accomplishment, we do not intend to stop there. NASA's long-
term goal is to send humans to Mars, and the Moon will help us 
get there. Mars is a rich destination for scientific discovery 
and a driver of technologies that will enable humans to travel 
and explore far from Earth. By using what we learn on and 
around the Moon under Artemis, NASA is working to understand 
and overcome the future challenges associated with landing and 
living on Mars.
    As NASA builds a blueprint for human exploration throughout 
the solar system for the benefit of humanity, we conducted our 
first two architecture concept reviews, the culmination of a 
robust analysis process designed to align NASA's Moon to Mars 
exploration strategy and codify the supporting architecture. 
This annual review is a milestone that enables our Moon to Mars 
strategy to evolve over time as we consider lessons from 
previous missions and provide opportunities to onramp new 
technologies, as well as new industry and international 
partners.
    Through the Artemis campaign, NASA is partnering with the 
most diverse and broad exploration coalition in history, 
including multiple international and commercial partners. For 
example, NASA's Gateway program is an international 
collaboration with the Canadian Space Agency, European Space 
Agency, Japan Exploration Agency, and now the United Arab 
Emirates Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre to establish 
humanity's first space station around the Moon. Similarly, NASA 
is exploring additional international partnerships for lunar 
surface habitats, logistics, and mobility capabilities that 
will enable long-term human presence and enhanced scientific 
returns.
    Together, we will continue to develop the technology and 
the systems needed to live and work on and around the Moon in 
preparation for human missions to Mars. Because of our diverse 
astronaut corps, we will be able to fly the first woman, first 
person of color, and the first international astronaut to the 
Moon. We will align with our international partners toward a 
future of expanded economic opportunity and scientific 
discovery while investing in the next generation of STEM 
(science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) leaders as 
we support the limitless possibilities of space exploration.
    NASA is grateful for this Committee's continued support of 
the Artemis campaign, and I appreciate this opportunity to 
update you on behalf of NASA and our Artemis partners and would 
be pleased to answer your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Koerner follows:]
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    Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much.
    I now recognize Mr. Russell for five minutes to present his 
testimony.

          TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM RUSSELL, DIRECTOR,

        CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS,

             U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Russell. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Lofgren, 
Ranking Member Sorensen, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you 
for the opportunity to discuss NASA's efforts to return 
astronauts to the surface of the Moon and ultimately human 
exploration of Mars through the Artemis missions.
    NASA has requested at least $38 billion over the next five 
years to support this ambitious undertaking. The projects 
supporting Artemis are complex and specialized and often push 
the state-of-the-art in space technology. These new projects 
include a Human Landing System (HLS) to transport crew to the 
lunar surface and spacesuits for lunar operations. In addition, 
NASA plans to rely on existing programs, including the Orion 
multipurpose crew vehicle and the Space Launch System. 
Successfully executing the Artemis missions will require 
extensive coordination across programs and with a wide range of 
contractors to ensure systems operate together seamlessly and 
safely.
    Our work has highlighted NASA's progress toward its Artemis 
flight tests and lunar landing mission. Examples include the 
successful launch of Artemis I in November 2022, which 
demonstrated the initial capability of the Space Launch System, 
as well as the Exploration Ground Systems. For Artemis II, the 
first flight with crew, NASA is currently conducting 
integration and testing of the crew capsule and the launch pad. 
And for Artemis III, the first crewed lunar landing mission, 
the HLS contractor has conducted two test flights. NASA also 
continues to make progress on its integration and risk 
management plans, such as establishing mechanisms for 
identifying and tracking Artemis III risks and the 
establishment and implementation of the Moon to Mars program 
office.
    While NASA continues to develop capabilities needed to 
support Artemis efforts, the agency does face several 
challenges. These include the Artemis schedule, a lack of 
transparency into the Artemis mission and program costs, and 
other acquisition management challenges. In terms of Artemis 
III's schedule, in our November 2023 report, we found that 
there were a variety of factors that made the previous December 
2025 date unlikely. These included an ambitious schedule, 
delays to key events, and the remaining technical work. 
Specifically, we found that if the HLS development took as many 
months to complete as an average NASA project, it was likely 
Artemis III would be likely to occur in early 2027. Just last 
week, NASA adjusted the launch date to September 2026 to allow 
contractors more time to complete a significant amount of 
remaining technical work.
    In terms of Artemis III mission costs, in December 2019 we 
found that NASA didn't plan to establish an official cost 
estimate for this mission. We made a recommendation, and NASA 
concurred with it, to establish one but has not yet done so. 
While NASA requested $6.8 billion to support Artemis III 
programs in the Fiscal Year 2024 budget request, decisionmakers 
will have limited knowledge into the full scope of the Artemis 
III mission costs until an estimate is created.
    Last, in terms of acquisition management, NASA has been on 
GAO's high risk list for a number of years related to 
acquisition management and has made a lot of progress there, 
but NASA's largest, most complex projects, including those that 
support the Artemis missions, continue to shape the agency's 
entire acquisition portfolio. When these projects exceed their 
cost or schedule baselines, it can have cascading effects on 
other projects and efforts. In our '23 assessment of NASA 
projects, we found that NASA anticipated setting baselines for 
six Artemis programs, including HLS. As these projects enter 
the portfolio, they will drive the agency's acquisition 
performance over the next several years for good or ill.
    In summary, NASA's made important progress on its Artemis 
efforts, but challenges remain. NASA will need to manage 
multiple risks seamlessly. It will need to continue to find 
ways to elevate risks across programs and mitigate those. That 
includes increasing transparency on how much Artemis III and 
future Artemis missions are likely to cost. Implementing our 
past recommendations will help NASA to improve in these 
critical areas.
    Chairman Lucas, this completes my prepared remarks. I look 
forward to any questions the Subcommittee may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
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    Chairman Lucas. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Scott for 
five minutes to present his testimony.

               TESTIMONY OF MR. GEORGE A. SCOTT,

                   ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,

         NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Scott. Good morning. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member 
Lofgren, Ranking Member Sorensen, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss 
key challenges facing NASA's Artemis campaign. At the outset, I 
would like to thank the Subcommittee for your continued support 
of our oversight work.
    Also, I would like to thank Paul Martin, our former 
Inspector General, for his exceptional leadership of our office 
over the past 14 years. It was a pleasure serving as his deputy 
for the last 5 1/2 years.
    Historically, NASA has struggled to establish credible cost 
and schedule estimates, and Artemis is no exception. After more 
than a decade of preparation and delays, NASA successfully 
completed the Artemis I mission in December of 2022. Despite 
this achievement, NASA faces additional challenges to meeting 
its Artemis goals. Of utmost importance is resolving technical 
issues that could threaten astronaut safety. The agency will 
need to do this while also addressing longstanding concerns 
such as unsustainable costs, unreliable project schedules, and 
the lack of transparency into funding needs.
    In terms of technical challenges, NASA's most immediate 
issue is preparing for the Artemis II mission, the first crewed 
test flight of SLS and Orion. For example, the Artemis I flight 
revealed unexpected erosion of protective material on Orion's 
heat shield. In addition, the agency has identified other 
issues with Orion that it needs to correct before the next 
launch.
    Recognizing the challenges that lie ahead, last week, NASA 
announced delays to the next two Artemis missions. This will 
allow more time to address technical issues identified during 
the first mission, as well as support for the development and 
testing of other systems, including the Human Landing System 
and next-generation spacesuits.
    The second challenge is the campaign's enormous cost. 
Overall, we projected that total Artemis costs will reach $93 
billion between 2012 and 2025. We also estimate that SLS and 
Orion production and operating costs will total at least $4.2 
billion per launch for the first four Artemis missions. This 
figure does not include $42 billion in formulation and 
development costs spent over the past dozen years.
    Given these costs, it is imperative that NASA identify and 
effectively implement cost-saving measures. To its credit, the 
agency recognizes the need to reduce costs and is attempting to 
do so. Our work, however, has found that some key cost 
reduction efforts may fall short. This is due in part to NASA 
not capturing certain costs when developing estimates or 
relying on unrealistic assumptions. NASA also wants to make its 
Moon to Mars effort more sustainable by sharing costs with its 
international partners. However, the agency current plans--the 
agency's current plan does not include cost estimates for these 
partners beyond Artemis IV.
    Finally, the Artemis campaign lacks cost and schedule 
transparency. NASA has not developed a comprehensive estimate 
for all Artemis costs. And, unlike its other major projects and 
programs, NASA has not established lifecycle costs or made cost 
and schedule commitments for some programs supporting Artemis. 
Without the agency fully accounting for and accurately 
reporting the overall cost of current and future missions, it 
will be difficult for Congress to make informed decisions about 
NASA's long-term funding needs. Further, without credible, 
complete, and transparent costs and schedule estimates, NASA 
will be hard pressed to achieve meaningful cost savings, a key 
step to making Artemis truly sustainable over time.
    We look forward to assisting NASA in achieving its Artemis 
goals and will continue to provide independent, objective, and 
comprehensive oversight of this effort. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Scott follows:]
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    Chairman Lucas. Thank you. I now would like to recognize 
Dr. Griffin for five minutes to present his testimony.

              TESTIMONY OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN,

                   CO-PRESIDENT, LogiQ, INC.

    Dr. Griffin. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sorensen and 
Lofgren, Members of the Committee, thanks for the invitation to 
appear here today. I will try to use less than my five minutes, 
and I will be direct.
    In my judgment, the Artemis program is excessively complex, 
unrealistically priced, compromises crew safety, poses very 
high mission risk of completion, and is highly unlikely to be 
completed in a timely manner even if successful. This matters 
because our self-declared adversary--adversaries--the Chinese 
Communist Party, together with their Russian partner, fully 
understand the role that being on the space frontier has in the 
world of global power politics. We seem no longer to understand 
that.
    For the United States and its partners not to be on the 
Moon when others are on the Moon is unacceptable. We need a 
program that is consistent with that theme. Artemis is not that 
program. We need to restart it, not keep it on track, per the 
subject of this hearing. The Congress should provide specific 
direction to the executive branch to address this issue.
    Thank you. I would request my full statement, written 
statement, be entered into the record and I'm--will stand down 
for your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
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    Chairman Lucas. Without objection, so ordered.
    I turn to myself now for five minutes for questions.
    Ms. Koerner, NASA announced last week that Artemis II is 
now targeted for launch in September 2025 and Artemis III 
targeted for launch in September 2026. Can you share the 
scheduling margin built into the updated Artemis II and III 
launches?
    Ms. Koerner. So thank you, Chairman Lucas, appreciate the 
question today. We are--have adjusted the Artemis II schedule 
based on crew safety. As you recall, from coming out of Artemis 
I we had a tremendously successful mission, and one of the 
follow-on investigations from that mission is the performance 
of the heat shield. That has taken us some time to analyze the 
data. The heat shield performed perfectly from a thermal 
perspective, but we saw some unusual characteristics, and we 
want to fully understand that before we put Reid, Victor, 
Christina, and Jeremy on Artemis II. So that has contributed to 
the delay in the mission. We have sufficient time to complete 
that investigation with a 10-month adjustment to that launch 
schedule.
    Also, with Artemis II, we have additional capabilities on 
the Orion spacecraft. The life support systems have proven to 
be more difficult and challenging to develop. And during the 
testing of some of those systems, we identified an issue with a 
digital motor controller that has impacted our ability to be 
able to continue the processing the vehicle as previously 
planned. The additional time that we have given ourselves in 
the adjusted schedule permits us the opportunity to address the 
challenges that we've seen with that digital motor controller.
    So we have a number of issues, and those issues are all 
encapsulated with this margin that we have on the schedule for 
this September 2025. There is margin built into that schedule 
for us to complete all of the necessary testing and to address 
all of the regular processing that we--lessons learned that we 
had from the Artemis I launch.
    Chairman Lucas. To the rest of the panel, based on these 
margins, do you believe that these revised schedule launches--
dates are realistic? Whoever would care to touch that first.
    Mr. Russell. Yes, Chairman Lucas, I can jump in. I think 
for Artemis II, certainly, that that provides more time to get 
through the issues and figure out the heatshield life support 
challenges that Ms. Koerner referenced. The one thing that 
jumps out with the revised Artemis III date is the span of time 
between Artemis II and III is one year. So if you consider the 
successful conclusion of Artemis I in 2022 and now it's going 
to be a few years to the '25 date to do essentially the same 
Artemis test flight the second time with the crew, Artemis III 
is more complicated, so there's not a lot of time, and as you 
saw with Artemis I, there are things that are going to happen 
that you need to learn that you need to investigate. One year 
is not a lot of time to do that learning, turn around and be 
ready for a September 2026 launch date. So that's the one 
scheduled pressure that we see with the new dates.
    Chairman Lucas. Any observations, gentlemen, that you care 
to add?
    Dr. Griffin. I would say that the Artemis circumlunar 
mission is, I think, very doable on the timescale that NASA has 
said. I don't think the Artemis III, the landing mission, is at 
all realistically scheduled.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman Lucas. I think NASA will 
continue to be challenged on the schedule front, particularly 
with the Artemis III mission. Now, historically, certain 
spaceflight missions, in terms of going from contract to 
development have taken, you know, 8 1/2 years. And with HLS, 
NASA was trying to do it in a much more condensed timeframe. So 
I think based on lessons learned from Artemis II, I think that 
the agency will be better positioned to come up with a more 
realistic launch date for Artemis III.
    Chairman Lucas. Ms. Koerner, can you share with the 
Committee what milestones NASA uses to measure contractor 
performance on the Human Landing System and spacesuit contracts 
and, along with that, what the consequences are for contractors 
if they don't meet the milestones by the assigned deadline?
    Ms. Koerner. So with regards to the contract milestones, we 
have a number of milestones that are significant for the 
Artemis III landing--ultimate crew landing. The first would be 
an uncrewed demo that has to happen prior to a crewed landing. 
We are keeping track on SpaceX, our prime contractor, for the 
Human Landing System. We're keeping track of their progress. If 
you recall, they've had a number of test flights, and they will 
actually conduct their next test flight here, likely in the 
February timeframe. And they have good scheduled margin to 
support that launch.
    We are anticipating a number of launches in calendar year 
'24 by our SpaceX industry partners to support the development 
of not only the Human Landing System capability but also their 
cryogenic fuel transfer capability, which is essential for us 
to be able to understand the process for refueling the Human 
Landing System prior to when we send our crews.
    So we have various milestones throughout their contract 
that enable us to be able to measure their performance. We also 
have recently made contract modifications that allow us to 
incentivize them to meet those milestones on the schedule that 
we need in order for us to support the launch date of the crew 
in September 2026.
    I will note that we do parallel processing of a lot of our 
missions, so it's not like we have just one year between 
Artemis II and Artemis III to get everything accomplished. We 
are right now working on the hardware for Artemis III, and in 
particular, I will note things like the European Service Module 
will be shipping here in the spring to the Kennedy Space Center 
for processing and to complete assembly of the Orion 
spacecraft. So I fully expect that before we ever launch 
Artemis II, Artemis III vehicle processing will be far enough 
along that we'll be able to take advantage of the one year 
between the two missions to be able to fully be ready for the 
Artemis III mission in September of '26.
    I will also note that if you recall the press conference 
that we did just last week when we announced the slip to those 
launch dates, we had our 11 industry partners online with us 
for that, and all of them has signed up for the launch date of 
Artemis III that we are currently showing.
    Chairman Lucas. Thank you. And before I yield to the 
Ranking Member, I would note that I've had several 
conversations with the Administrator, and he has a great deal 
of confidence in you. I just want to pass that along.
    Ms. Koerner. Thank you.
    Chairman Lucas. And with that, I yield back and turn to the 
Ranking Member, Mr. Sorensen, for five minutes.
    Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Koerner, we have heard from GAO and the NASA IG about 
the importance of cost transparency for Artemis. Artemis is not 
just one system, one mission, or even one capability. It's a 
set of increasingly complex missions and activities. NASA now 
has successfully completed Artemis I. Could you explain how 
NASA is documenting the lessons that we have learned in Artemis 
I such that we are applying those lessons to Artemis II and 
III?
    Ms. Koerner. Certainly. So we did a very extensive lessons-
learned process coming out of Artemis I that enabled us to at 
every level within the organization and within the hardware 
production, whether it's at the contractor level or NASA doing 
integration and analysis, to be able to factor that into the 
Artemis II learning, as well as future missions.
    As I indicated previously, we have--we're--we have a lot of 
missions in flow and in development simultaneously. What that 
does is it enables us to--when we learn a lesson on Artemis I, 
we can flow that into all of the development that we have 
currently ongoing. It also allows us if, for example, we've 
already built some equipment for Artemis II, we already have 
Artemis III at nearly the right level in its production to be 
able to make modifications to that hardware and then bring it 
forward to incorporate it into Artemis II, just as an example. 
So having the rich, I'll say, production cadence that we have 
established with our Artemis missions and our hardware has 
enabled us to be able to incorporate all of those lessons 
learned.
    I will also note to the comment about the cost and cost 
transparency, one of the challenges that we face in answering a 
per-mission cost is our contracts are set up to do bulk buys. 
In other words, we get--if I go buy three of something, I can 
get it less expensive than if I buy one of something three 
times. So when we have--establish our contracts and we purchase 
some of our equipment, those bulk buys give us cost savings. 
But what those do is it lumps costs together in by program and 
by purchases. It doesn't allow us--we don't, for example, get 
appropriations for Artemis missions. I don't get an Artemis I 
appropriation and an Artemis II appropriation. I get one for 
SpaceX--excuse me, for HLS, for Orion, for the Space Launch 
System.
    So aggregating those costs where we'd make bulk buys and we 
make purchases based on different contract mechanisms makes it 
very challenging for us to put together a per-mission cost. But 
we are very transparent in the cost numbers that we have with 
the contract structures that we have in place and with the way 
that we are appropriated.
    Mr. Sorensen. So you would say that it is an investment--
Artemis I is an investment in II, and then II is an 
investment----
    Ms. Koerner. All of these missions build on each other, 
yes, sir.
    Mr. Sorensen. Great. You know, humans landed on the lunar 
surface in 1969. In the year 2024, we still use some of the 
same technology that was developed, you know, some 55 years 
ago. And I like to say that we wouldn't have computers in our 
pockets if we didn't have that investment. So, Ms. Koerner, 
could you speak to what returning to the Moon and eventually 
going to Mars will mean for the science and technology of 
tomorrow?
    Ms. Koerner. Yeah, if you'll permit me an analogy, so I was 
here, by the way, and watched Apollo 11 astronauts walk on the 
Moon, so I remember that. And I remember the inspiration that 
that was to me and to those from my generation. The analogy 
that I'll use for you is, right, a car today and a car from the 
early 1900's look pretty similar in some regards. They have a 
steering wheel, they have wheels, they transport people, any 
number of people depending on the design. But when you look 
inside the engine, they're very different. They're very 
different machines.
    The technology that we're going to the Moon with this time 
is very different. And the technologies that we're developing 
are actually developing entire industries to support those 
technologies, industries, craft trades, that things of that 
nature that are helping the economic engine of the United 
States, as well as our partnering countries.
    Mr. Sorensen. I lived in east Texas, and I remember 
everything about that Saturday morning when Space Shuttle 
Columbia disintegrated. I still feel it to this day. Next week, 
we will recognize NASA's Day of Remembrance to honor the heroes 
that made that ultimate sacrifice to advance our Nation's 
spaceflight and exploration programs.
    I know my time is waning. How do we plan to communicate the 
upcoming risk as we continue to go farther? Would anyone like 
to answer that?
    Ms. Koerner. I would like to at least start out by doing 
that. So many of us lived through the tragedy of Columbia, and 
many of us witnessed the tragedy of Challenger as well. And 
those of us who are still within the agency take those lessons 
very seriously, and we make sure that when we have a day of 
remembrance, we remember not only the tremendous lives that 
these people lived and the sacrifices that they made, but we 
remember why we do what we do and why we are so focused on risk 
and on safety, which is the reason--for example, we did not 
hesitate to adjust the launch date for Artemis II when it 
became evident that safety was of utmost importance with the 
challenges we were facing.
    Mr. Sorensen. Thank you.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Posey, for five minutes.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chinese Communist Party threatens almost every 
component of our government and the lives of Americans 
obviously. And, Ms. Koerner, your written testimony, you didn't 
mention China at all. Mr. Russell, you mentioned diversity, but 
you didn't mention China. Mr. Scott didn't mentioned China. Dr. 
Griffin, your testimony does mention our adversary China, and I 
wonder if you expound upon why you went into such detail, for 
the clarification of others?
    Dr. Griffin. In my judgment, China--and I don't want to say 
China. I want to say the Chinese Communist Party, fully 
understands and frequently says that their goal is to be the 
world's great power. They regard the Western democracies as 
decadent and outmoded and ineffective and inefficient. China's 
President--he has other titles--Xi bullies neighboring 
countries, presumes to take control of international waterways, 
supervises a military establishment that has recently sunk 
other people's ships fishing in their own waters. Everything 
about the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party suggests that 
they are their adversary, and they say so.
    To allow a situation to develop where the human frontier is 
populated by our adversary and we are not there should be 
unacceptable to this Nation and to our Western and Asian 
partners. It should be unacceptable. We are not on a path to 
recognize that. The rest of the world looks and will always 
look to the nations that occupy the frontier and exploit the 
frontier and extend the frontier as leaders of the world. I 
believe that's the position that the United States should 
occupy in preference to our adversaries. Thank you.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. And you mentioned 
frontier. Add to that ultimate military high ground. Whoever 
controls space will control the destiny of this Earth.
    Dr. Griffin. As you know, I've spent considerable time in 
the national security side of our space programs as well, and I 
really consider them to be one program. But I came here today 
to discuss civil space, sir, and----
    Mr. Posey. Yes.
    Dr. Griffin [continuing]. We can discuss military space at 
another occasion.
    Mr. Posey. How should America make it our goal to ensure 
that we emerge as first among equals when it comes to setting 
standards? We've had a couple of hearings on that.
    Dr. Griffin. Well, the standards are set by the people who 
show up. They're not set by the people who watch what happens 
with others. So by returning to the Moon in a focused and 
expeditious manner, which we are not today, we will inevitably 
bring along--we will be required to bring along communications 
and navigation and other infrastructure systems, which we 
expect others will use as well.
    By that mechanism, we will have established the standards, 
just as we did with the ICAO (International Civil Aviation 
Organization) starting at the end of World War II for global 
air transport. But again, those are facts on the ground that 
are created by the people who are on the frontier first. They 
are not created by the people who follow.
    Mr. Posey. Now Thank you, Doctor.
    Now, Ms. Koerner, what specific steps are being taken to 
address what some consider to be the outdated gas and 
propellant pipelines and other ground systems at Kennedy Space 
Center to ensure that we have the capacity to support our 
booming commercial space sector?
    Ms. Koerner. So the infrastructure at the Kennedy Space 
Center, as well as at all of our centers, is very much aging, 
and we are aware of that within the agency. I will tell you 
from an Artemis perspective, we are investing heavily in the 
capabilities that we need to support the Artemis mission. Last 
year, we had over 70 launches from the Florida Space Coast. 
It's an exciting time for all of us in the space industry. Most 
of those were on the cape side, but we also had a number of 
them from our side on the--at the Kennedy Space Center.
    And in order--excuse me. In order to support those, we have 
poured heavily, as I said, into the infrastructure. But we also 
recognize that there's still more that is needed there. Many of 
the launches from that area are commercial in nature, and we 
have use agreements with our commercial and industry partners 
that allow them to actually invest in the infrastructure as 
well. We know as an agency that our infrastructure is older 
than I am in some cases. And our NASA leadership has 
established what's called NASA 2040, which is an internal 
effort to look at all of the agency's infrastructure and 
mission support functions to be able to set us up properly for 
what the agency's mission is going to be in the 2040 timeframe. 
Infrastructure like that at the Kennedy Space Center, which is 
critically important to us in Artemis, is part of that 
discussion.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back with a 
request that we also have a weather modification technology 
hearing again. Thank you.
    Chairman Lucas. Duly noted. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full 
Committee for five minutes.
    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Now, as I understand it, our effort to go to the Moon is 
going to rely on at least five major, distinct, multibillion 
dollar development programs that have to sync up perfectly. The 
SLS rocket, the Orion crew vehicle, the Exploration Ground 
System, the Human Landing System, as well as the spacesuit. I 
am--they're all going to be procured under different 
acquisition mechanisms. I particularly would like to know about 
the cryogenic fluid management and other new technologies. What 
happens if these five major programs don't sync up or if one 
gets slowed down? How do we proceed? Can you address that, Ms. 
Koerner?
    Ms. Koerner. Certainly. Thank you for the question. So we 
established the Moon to Mars program office just last year, 
pursuant to the NASA Authorization Act, to do just what you're 
talking about, to integrate all of those programs that are 
essential for Artemis and ensure that we are properly level-
loading the risk between those programs so that they all 
converge together for a mission. We know that it's going to be 
challenging and difficult for us to--especially as we get into 
later missions to get all of those missions to align to the 
same timeframe. And so we have put our contracts in place to 
continue to develop hardware for the subsequent missions so 
that we can be ready to execute a mission as soon as all the 
elements are available.
    We also recognize that there might be some development and 
technology challenges that come along the way, and so we are--
have a very flexible and adaptable mission structure that 
allows us to be able to make updates to our mission profiles if 
we need to in the event that one element in the Artemis 
program's cadre does not make it in time for the original 
planned mission.
    Ms. Lofgren. Well, just following up, if one of these 
elements is delayed, what happens to the whole program?
    Ms. Koerner. So we would--depending on how long the delay 
is, depending on the reason for the delay, we would potentially 
execute a slightly modified version of that mission. And I 
mention that only because we have set in place for our agency a 
process that allows us to keep our eye on the exploration 
objectives, and all of our missions contribute to those 
exploration objectives. So we can modify the mission content to 
adjust to still accomplish those objectives. Unlike, for 
example, when we flew space shuttle missions, each mission was 
very independent and different. With Artemis, we're building a 
capability, not just a launch capability, but a capability in 
cislunar orbit, capability on the surface of the Moon over 
time. And as any large-scale development activity knows, when 
you do that you can make adjustments for when something gets 
delivered late or something shows up differently, you focus 
then on another aspect or another objective that you're trying 
to achieve.
    Ms. Lofgren. Let me ask this. The IG issued a report in 
October of last year about the supply chain monitoring. What 
has NASA done to adopt those recommendations relative to the 
Artemis supply chain?
    Ms. Koerner. So we certainly do appreciate our governing 
organizations that provide us feedback and contribute to the 
benefit of the program. We have looked at our supply chain and 
supply chain management and looked at how we can better manage 
that, and I'll speak again to what I mentioned previously. The 
Moon to Mars program office, that office was deliberately 
established so that we can connect all of the what were 
previously disparate programs and look across the board and 
address some of these supply chain issues.
    Ms. Lofgren. I want to say I also saw the landing on the 
Moon. It was a stunning thing. But I'll confess at the time, I 
thought, how is this helping us here on Earth? Now, I listened 
closely to Dr. Griffin's assessment of the Chinese. I 
completely agree with him. I do think it's important to outline 
for the American public why this matters to them. And I'm 
wondering, Ms. Koerner, if you could outline efforts that NASA 
is making to explain why this matters to America. And, by the 
way, I concur in the Chairman's comment that the Administrator 
has huge confidence in you, so if you could answer that.
    Ms. Koerner. Thank you. That's a little bit embarrassing, 
I'll admit. But I'll say one of the efforts that we have done 
within our agency within the last couple of years really focus 
on the why, the why of exploration. And we identified three 
pillars associated with that why: science, national posture, 
and inspiration. Science, I think, is obvious. It's the engine 
that generates economic benefit wherever it goes, in addition 
to inspiring the next generation of STEM, as well as teachers 
and those of us who look to the scientific discovery with 
wonder and decide that is something I want to learn more about 
and want to pursue.
    Additionally, national posture, I think we've spoken to 
that a little bit already with Dr. Griffin's testimony. But 
I'll state we believe that--and our Administrator spoke about 
it just last week--that we will be on the surface of the Moon 
before China is. And it's our intent for that to happen. Now 
there are other government agencies that can provide a much 
more detailed briefing that we can do in a different 
environment than here that could give you more insight and 
information about China's progress and about our progress along 
those lines.
    Let's see. I mentioned the--two of the three pillars. The 
third one, inspiration, again, you know, it's what inspired me 
to pursue a STEM career. It's what inspired many people in my 
generation and really developed that next generation that we're 
starting to see. And we hope to do that inspiration not just 
here in the United States, but around the world.
    Ms. Lofgren. Well, I thank you very much. Just by the way 
before I yield back, we had an astronaut come and meet with 
students in Hollister, California, just a few days ago, 
inspiring those young people. It's very important.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
    And before I turn to my next colleague for questions, I 
would note since it's true confession time, yes, I was nine 
years old that summer, too. But in my part of rural Oklahoma, 
we had one television station. We only had AM radio and this 
strange concept called party lines for a phone system.
    Ms. Koerner. I remember those.
    Chairman Lucas. You know exactly how many relatives you 
have based on what you've said on the phone.
    That said, I turn to the gentleman Mr. McCormick for five 
minutes.
    Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Artemis mission is not only about returning humans to 
the Moon, but about advancing technology, fostering 
international cooperation, stimulating the economy, inspiring 
the public, and securing the United States' position as leaders 
in space exploration.
    Similarly, in the 1960's, we were again faced with the 
space race only this time with the Chinese, not just the 
Russians. The United States must be a leader in space, and we 
must lead by setting the standards we know will continue the 
incredible innovation and advancement we have fostered here. I 
have a keen understanding of the important implications of the 
Artemis program for our economy, national security, and 
advancement of technology, but do think we need to evaluate the 
real challenges of NASA we are facing to achieve their goal in 
a timely and cost-effective manner.
    I'm going to take a little tack away from our typical 
questioning and get into a little bit of medicine and human 
physiology in space as a physician. Recently, the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research have come together to look at a promising 
technology known as mitochondrial organelle transplantation to 
address the mitochondria dysfunction in the neurodegenerative 
diseases we've seen in human beings but also in astronauts for 
some reason. We don't even know why. Is NASA aware of the work 
that the VA--and this is an obscure question, so I understand 
I'm probably talking outside the normal purview. But is NASA 
aware of this study between the VA and Walter Reed addressing 
mitochondrial dysfunction? And would they be willing to work 
toward advancing technology to help these astronauts protect 
their energy cells if you will?
    Ms. Koerner. So you may or may not know this about me, but 
one of the interesting career path--parts of my career path is 
that I spent five years running the Human Health and 
Performance Directorate at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, 
Texas. As an engineer running a health and medical 
organization, I found it very fascinating, and I learned a lot 
of things about human physiology and how very little we 
actually understand about the--how the human system responds in 
a microgravity environment. And we, today, do not understand 
how the human system would respond in microgravity followed by 
partial gravity back to microgravity. The longest duration crew 
member that we have just recently returned last year, and he 
only spent 371 days in space. When we go to Mars, we're going 
to have to spend close to 1,000 days in space.
    So I recognize that the human as a system is something that 
we need to investigate and explore further. I also know that we 
have done a number of studies and a number of investigations 
with the team that we have at the Johnson Space Center on the 
exact problem that you indicated. I'm not even going to try to 
spell it or say it as you so eloquently did because I am not a 
physician. But I will say that we have made great strides in 
understanding not only what happens to the astronauts, but what 
happens to the astronauts and how that can then apply to 
similar, I'll say, subjects on the ground. And that 
transferring of that technology and that information has made 
great strides in a number of medical fields. You can find 
equipment that we use to--for treating astronauts in an 
emergency room anywhere in the United States and around the 
world.
    So we do actually partner with them and with others. And I 
would welcome further conversation on that and putting you in 
touch with some of the folks that we have that do that work on 
a regular basis.
    Mr. McCormick. I think that is amazing. As matter of fact, 
if you want to consider somebody who's a pilot and a physician 
and maybe a Congressman going on one of those missions, just 
let me know.
    Ms. Koerner. I'll keep that in mind. Thank you.
    Mr. McCormick. Dr. Griffin, it's no secret that China has a 
goal to surpass the United States by 2045. As global leaders in 
space, we can't allow this to happen. I think the leading edge 
that we have in space technology will protect the United States 
in not just the economy, but technologies that can benefit 
humankind like we just discussed.
    As the United States works to recruit additional 
international partners, how can we in the government continue 
to promote its vision in space diplomacy over China's? In other 
words, you can see countries like India putting a vehicle on 
the dark side of the Moon for about $75 million. Now, granted, 
it's not manned, so it does cut some corners and they maybe 
don't have the same bureaucracy requirements, but how can we 
partner with other countries to make this a more efficient 
process?
    Dr. Griffin. The way we effectively partner with other 
countries is to establish that we are going to do great things 
and that there is room for everybody of like mind to join us. 
We can't partner with people with an empty bag, OK? We have to 
be clearly seen to be doing things in an efficient, 
expeditious, focused, determined way. And when that happens, 
partners will appear.
    Mr. McCormick. Great, thanks. And I'll just yield with the 
statement that this investment is an investment in the future 
and has great economic and technological benefit to us as we 
continue to invest in Artemis. Thank you. I yield.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I recognize my 
colleague, Ms. Caraveo, for five minutes.
    Ms. Caraveo. Thank you, Chair Lucas and Ranking Member 
Sorensen, for holding this hearing, and thank you to the 
witnesses for joining us today.
    If there's one State that perhaps unexpectedly is 
synonymous with the Artemis mission, it's my home State of 
Colorado. Excuse me. From navigation tools associated with the 
mission to the Orion capsule itself, Colorado's advanced 
aerospace infrastructure has been pivotal in the development of 
these missions. I'm also proud to say that I represent many of 
the workers and contractors who have made Artemis possible, and 
I'm excited to continue my support for these missions.
    However, I think we have heard a lot of concerns here about 
the timeline for the Artemis missions. And I think something 
that we've kind of been beating around the bush about is 
overall funding for NASA and whether you have the money to 
carry these missions out.
    So, Associate Administrator Koerner, in particular, when we 
hear today about the pressures that you have to cut costs, to 
maintain crew safety, to keep things on time, but also, when we 
have a Congress that has been unable to pass a budget overall, 
what are the implications for Artemis if NASA is appropriated 
with flat budgets beyond not just 2024, but potentially the 
rest of the decade?
    Ms. Koerner. So as I mentioned earlier, we are in 
production on not only Artemis II, but Artemis III, Artemis IV, 
Artemis V. We have hardware and builds for all of those 
missions at various stages, right? So consistency and budget 
helps us be able to keep the cadence of those missions to where 
we can keep our team fresh and keep our team active and have 
them be able to actually produce the hardware in a timely 
fashion.
    We have been challenged by Congress to have an annual 
cadence of our missions, and if we get stuck in either a 
flatline or a reduced budget kind of environment, what that 
means is we will prioritize the near-term missions. Artemis II 
and Artemis III will be prioritized. And those other missions 
in the interval between those other missions will continue to 
push out to the right. It would be my hope that we wouldn't be 
faced with that kind of a situation, but that's how I would 
envision that playing out.
    I would add, though, resources is more than just budget in 
my mind. Time is also a resource, but also personnel is a 
resource. And one of the benefits of flying these Artemis 
missions is we inspire the next generation of engineers, of 
technicians, of welders, of people that can actually do the 
work, which there's a tremendous shortage of skilled labor in 
some areas that it's--I'm sure you know, if you've talked to 
your--for example, some of the contractors that are in your 
home State, they'll tell you it's sometimes challenging to find 
the right skill level for building and doing the things that 
we're trying to do with Artemis. So consistency both in in 
budget, but also the resources and the inspiration that we can 
provide to inspire that next individual who can help us build 
the generation that we're looking forward to building.
    Ms. Caraveo. Thank you so much. Those are very good points. 
And I think that consistency and budget probably has a direct 
implication on people being willing to take these jobs. So, Dr. 
Griffin, in that same kind of vein in your experience, what can 
the impact of flat budgets and budgetary uncertainty for short-
term CRs (continuing resolutions) and shutdown threats, which 
we've had many of this session, have on the NASA contractor 
workforce and its ability to meet NASA's needs.
    Dr. Griffin. Sorry. In my experience in both DOD and NASA, 
multiple occasions over the years, it's not so much a flat 
budget that is a problem. Actually, most of the time I would 
welcome a flat budget if I knew I was going to have it. It's--
it needs to be at an appropriate level to accomplish the task 
at hand. But flatness in itself is not the issue.
    The issue is that when we do not have an appropriation on 
time, year after year, we force our--the government actually 
does very little work itself. It may plan and may integrate 
work, but the work is done by American industry and in some 
cases our partner industries. And when we cannot--when we stop 
and start that funding by delaying our--or even skipping our 
appropriations cycles, as we did in 2008, that is a huge 
problem.
    Ms. Caraveo. Thank you very much. I yield back the 
remainder of my time.
    Chairman Lucas. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Issa, for five minutes.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Over a decade ago, almost two decades ago now, Elon Musk 
began telling us here on the Capitol and around the country, 
anywhere someone would listen, that the United States was 
getting ripped off, that in fact it shouldn't cost more and 
take longer to take the same basic rocket and drive the same 
number of pounds into space. Until he got through the almost 
infinite blockade by the established launch people, nothing 
happened. Today, we are launching and, in theory, we're 
launching for less.
    But I guess my question is whatever happened to fixed, 
firm, and fair? Whatever happened to that? I think the question 
primarily for the IG is, is there any reason that these 
contracts particularly to go to the Moon and circle it weren't 
done on a tell us what it'll cost half a century after you 
already did it?
    Mr. Scott. Thank you Mr. Issa. As we've previously 
reported, you know, NASA has been challenged to establish 
credible costs and schedule estimates. While certainly 
appropriate----
    Mr. Issa. And they haven't met that challenge. Is that more 
or less correct?
    Mr. Scott. Today in the way that we would say is most 
transparent, that is correct. I think while it's certainly 
appropriate to have commercial partners involved in the launch 
activities, a key challenge that we continue to remind the 
agency it's important to hold them accountable for delivering 
the promised goods and services at the promised price. You 
know, we've previously reported that, at times, even though 
contractors were behind schedule and over cost, NASA was still 
paying them overly generous performance awards. And so I think, 
again, this is less about like the ``who'' and more about just 
making sure that you hold them accountable for delivering at 
the price they promised.
    Mr. Issa. Well, a follow up to that, when you've got--I 
mean, because you're in the business of figuring out the why. 
Is it because the contractors are not living up to their 
original promise, perhaps never intended to? Or is a portion of 
the blame the shifting sands of NASA starting a project and 
then endlessly changing it even when it's to return to do what 
you did half a century ago?
    Mr. Scott. I mean, our work has identified various factors 
contributing to some of these challenges. You know, one is 
workforce challenges. It's harder--you know, while you can set 
a requirement, if you don't have the workforce available at the 
time to actually execute it, that's challenging.
    Mr. Issa. But----
    Mr. Scott. Also, NASA's changing requires----
    Mr. Issa. But workforce is a great question. If I'm any of 
these contractors, either the historic incumbents or the newer 
combinations, isn't that in the bid?
    Mr. Scott. There's always optimism that you'll be able to 
get the workforce to complete the work, right? Some of these 
contractors are actually competing for the same workers, for 
example. And again, whether it's workforce issues, whether it's 
changing requirements on NASA's part, all of those add into 
these eventual cost overruns that NASA experiences on some of 
these contracts. Again, this is about accountability for 
holding the vendors responsible for what they're promising.
    Mr. Issa. OK. Well, I'm going to go back again. When you 
look at the current cost overruns and time delays, can you pull 
your slide rule out and figure out why? Or do we have to rely 
on computers now that cost more and take longer? Sorry, but I 
can't resist the fact that we truly did go to the Moon with 
slide rules, and we now seem to be--take longer with more 
indecision when we're simply retracing the steps. Perhaps it's 
because we're not measuring with a slide rule.
    Mr. Scott. Our work previously talked about some of the 
challenges NASA faced with project management. Part of it was 
overoptimism, right? NASA can get things done. Sometimes that 
confidence in getting things done so overrules what you know 
it's going to take to actually get it done. Part of it is--and 
Cathy spoke to this earlier--the unstable funding stream, 
right, it's hard to plan in the long term if you're not sure 
about your funding stream in the near term. And finally, sort 
of making sure you continue to grow the workforce within NASA 
and within the industry to continue to support the work you're 
doing. So there are a number of challenges to NASA being able 
to get these projects done on time and at the promised amount.
    Mr. Issa. Well, if we assume for a moment that Congress 
isn't going to change, we assume for a moment that the Moon 
isn't moving differently than it did half a century ago, what 
should we demand that NASA do in order to deliver the rest of 
Artemis II and III on time and with no greater overruns than 
we've already experienced? What would be the steps that 
Congress would be required to take?
    Mr. Scott. In my view, one would be locking the agency down 
into making lifecycle cost and schedule commitments. We 
understand that the world is complex, things will change, but 
it's incredibly important for Congress to at least have an 
initial idea of what it's going to cost and when NASA can get 
it done.
    Mr. Issa. I thank you. The questions could go on again and 
again, but I probably really would have to bring a slide rule 
if I were going to calculate all the overruns. So with that, I 
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Lucas. It would be fascinating watching you use a 
slide ruler.
    Mr. Issa. I've got a whole bunch in my collection if you 
want me to bring it in.
    Chairman Lucas. Not a doubt in my mind, not a doubt at all 
in my mind.
    The Chair now recognizes the--Congresswoman Lee for five 
minutes.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for 
holding this important meeting.
    Serving in this office for over a year now has been a 
unique experience learning more about the scientific 
communities and the ways I can serve my constituents beyond the 
personal passions that drove me to serve in western 
Pennsylvania. Recent inclement weather across the country has 
affected us all in one way or another, but space science 
particularly through the use of satellites is crucial for 
meteorologists like yourself, Mr. Sorensen, to make more 
accurate and timely weather predictions, ultimately improving 
our ability to respond to and mitigate the impact of various 
weather events.
    While we continue to race to the Moon and all the 
discoveries that we may uncover there, I continue to look 
toward the research and work of countless scientists here on 
Earth and 1,000 miles above that will help innovate our 
approach toward realizing things like cleaner air and water, 
sustainable infrastructure, and more equitable transportation 
in southwest PA and across the Nation.
    Today, we've discussed what path forward entails and 
returning men and hopefully landing our first woman on the 
Moon. In this arena, just as in life, the concept of failure is 
an essential step in the pathway to success. I'm proud to 
represent Astrobotic in Pittsburgh, who, for the last 16 years, 
has worked tirelessly to make returning Americans to the Moon 
surface a reality. While last week's unfortunate anomaly with 
the Peregrine lunar landing reaffirms the unforgiving nature of 
the space environment. It also further highlights that 
success--the success that we can achieve through the pursuit of 
innovation and pushing boundaries. Between the lander's launch 
and its expected reentry to Earth's atmosphere tomorrow, the 
vehicle's flight has provided irreplaceable knowledge, 
experience, and insight that will feed forward into making 
Artemis and the U.S.'s return to the Moon a sustained success.
    Onboard flight systems like avionics, propulsion 
controllers, thermal control systems, and more have been tested 
and qualified, creating new capability in the U.S. space 
industrial base that could be utilized for other missions and 
programs in the future. So I'd say now is not the time to 
retreat. Our Nation has consistently, throughout its history, 
built upon our ability to adapt and respond to failures, and we 
must continue to support CLPS efforts so the Nation gets the 
benefit of hard-earned lessons learned from the missions--that 
mission and others like it.
    Ms. Koerner, while setbacks are often inevitable in science 
and in life, commercial space industry leaders like Astrobotic 
find a measurable value and constancy of purpose and programs 
critical to the Artemis mission. Why is it critical for the 
Nation to keep supporting missions like those on Commercial 
Lunar Payload Services (CLPS), despite the challenges?
    Ms. Koerner. So part of our charter is also to develop an 
economic engine that generates and stimulates activity in the 
space sector. And so what we've been doing with the Commercial 
Lunar Payload Services contract--and we call it CLPS. I think 
you referred to it as C-L-P-S.
    Ms. Lee. Oh, CLPS.
    Ms. Koerner. CLPS----
    Ms. Lee. I'll do that one next.
    Ms. Koerner. CLPS is the way we refer to that--is one of 
those opportunities to help spur on the development of new 
space entrants. We know that there's a lot of space industry 
and the big names that have been out there for years, and they 
do contribute tremendously to the Artemis program. But we want 
to also make the entrance bar lower so that we can more broadly 
generate economic activity across the board. Plus, we find a 
lot more innovation in some of these commercial providers.
    It was disappointing that the CLPS provider had challenges 
last week, but we did still get tremendous data. And we will 
continue to get data from CLPS missions as we launch those as 
precursors. It's really important for us to have robotic 
precursor missions because that gives us data that helps inform 
and enable, and it makes our mission safer. What we discovered 
and what they learned very, very much so last week, but what we 
have discovered over a number of tragedies is that space and 
space exploration is unforgiving.
    And what we are doing with Artemis is infinitely safer than 
what we did in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo days. In just 
recently talking to one of the first flight directors from that 
era, he told me that he didn't realize until more recently just 
how close they were to having a national tragedy during a 
number of those Apollo missions. And that's because they were 
just young, and they didn't understand what they didn't know. 
We're a lot smarter now with the missions that we've flown and 
with the sacrifices that we've made, and so every step that we 
make with Artemis makes us safer as we explore.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you. That's my time. So I will yield back 
now instead of launching into another question, but I 
appreciate you all for coming today and for sharing your 
testimony.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
    I would note to the witnesses that we're still 40 minutes 
away from noon, and after consultation with the Ranking Member, 
I believe we'll do another round, conscious of your time.
    Associate Director, let's go back for a moment to that 
measure contractor performance discussion. You talked about the 
incentives if contractors produce ahead of schedule, on time, 
and I think the carrot is always very important. Let's discuss 
for just a moment the stick. What are the consequences for 
contractors if they don't meet the milestones by the assigned 
deadline?
    Ms. Koerner. So again, it depends on the type of contract, 
right, that we have. We have performance awards that we can 
decrement associated with not meeting milestones. For firm 
fixed price contracts, it depends again on the way the 
contract's written. They have to perform, and in some cases we 
have penalties if they perform--they have to reimburse the U.S. 
Government for the cost. And by reimburse, I say it basically 
decrements the payment that they would get in that milestone 
payment. So they may not, for example, get all of a milestone 
payment if they don't meet in a timely fashion.
    So again, it depends on the contract mechanism what 
penalties that we can put in place, but we also have ways that 
we can reflect the contractor performance in a more broad scale 
to the rest of the community, so it does affect their ultimate 
bottom line.
    Chairman Lucas. So speaking of the milestones, for 
instance, have any of the milestones been divided up into 
interim milestones, or have interim milestones been created to 
allow for earlier payments? I ask because this data would be 
helpful in providing insight into program progress.
    Ms. Koerner. So I'm not entirely sure I understand the 
question. We do break certain milestones up and, for example--
and I can speak to the experience I had managing the Commercial 
Resupply Services contract for the International Space Station 
years ago. If we got to a milestone, and we felt like the 
contractor didn't do all the things or completely meet the 
milestone in a timely fashion, we would withhold a certain 
amount of that award. That's what I mean by decrement. So 
instead of them getting X, they would get X minus a certain 
amount. And we did that based, again, on the value judgment for 
what that milestone was worth. And then they had an opportunity 
in some cases--not in all. Some cases, that was just money that 
came back to the program. But in some cases, we would defer the 
payment until they accomplished it in the manner in which we 
needed. And there were plenty of opportunities that we got from 
them. And I'll say in-kind work and additional work and benefit 
to the U.S. Government that was performed as a result of them, 
for example, being late on some of those milestones.
    Chairman Lucas. Because I think sometimes we get questions 
from appropriators and other oversight entities that perhaps 
the milestones should be--of course, should be designed to 
accomplish the work in an efficient and effective fashion and 
accelerate if helpful, but that the milestones not be designed 
just to help the contractor move along----
    Ms. Koerner. No, they----
    Chairman Lucas [continuing]. Through the process.
    Ms. Koerner. They certainly are designed, I'd say, 
mutually. So when--a lot of times when we award these, 
especially the firm fixed price contracts, the contractor will 
propose to the U.S. Government what they would like to see in 
the milestones. And as part of the negotiation before we even 
award that contract, we will adjust those milestones, but the 
values, but the timing of them also in order to make sure that 
it meets the timeline that we need for whatever it is that that 
contractor is providing.
    Chairman Lucas. Speaking of the international element of 
all these efforts, again to you, Associate Director, NASA 
recently announced a partnership with the UAE on Gateway under 
which the Mohammed bin Rashid Space Center would provide 
Gateway's crew and science airlock module, as well as a UAE 
astronaut to fly to the lunar space station on a future Artemis 
flight. How will NASA and UAE share costs related to this 
partnership?
    Ms. Koerner. So I don't know that we--I would say we share 
costs, right? So when we negotiate with an international 
partner for a contribution to Artemis or to any activity, there 
is a--I'll say a value that we assess, that we, the U.S. 
Government, assess on the--on what they are contributing, and 
then in kind we return a value to them. So for example, the one 
that you mentioned there, the UAE will be providing the 
airlock, and in exchange, we, NASA, are going to be training a 
crew member and launching a crew member and giving that country 
an opportunity to have a crew member on the Gateway space 
station. So it's more of a value-to-value contribution as 
opposed to a cost.
    Chairman Lucas. By the way, is the UAE providing airlock on 
the Gateway a critical path, an important part----
    Ms. Koerner. Absolutely----
    Chairman Lucas [continuing]. Of the concept?
    Ms. Koerner. It absolutely is critical. So it enables us to 
have access both internal as well as now external access to 
scientific payloads that we can put on the exterior of Gateway 
and enables us to be able to do maintenance on the Gateway. 
Having an airlock provides more flexibility for how we use the 
Gateway space station in cislunar orbit for future missions. I 
spoke to it earlier when I talked about the flexibility in our 
missions. Having different elements of the Artemis program 
enables us to have that mission flexibility.
    Chairman Lucas. Ranking Member, humor me for one more 
question. The UAE is of course an example of international 
partnership. They have resources with which to work, which is 
critically important. But I ask this question in the context of 
the technology. They also have a history of partnering with 
China in lunar efforts. For instance, the same entity has an 
agreement to include a rover on the Chinese mission to the 
lunar south pole. I guess my question is how--when we are 
partnering with people who are partnering with others, how do 
we ensure that the technology shared through a partnership 
doesn't, shall we say, inadvertently contribute to someone 
else's space capacities?
    Ms. Koerner. So we have a fairly rigorous export control 
process that monitors and manages our interactions with our 
international partners at every level to ensure that exactly 
what you just said does not happen.
    Chairman Lucas. My time has expired.
    I recognize gentleman Mr. Sorensen for five more minutes.
    Mr. Sorensen. In my opening statements, I had mentioned how 
important it was to bring a NASA astronaut to my district. Dr. 
Kate Rubins has been back and forth to the International Space 
Station several times. And one of the simple problems that she 
discussed with me and with the students in my district as we 
were going to schools was that spacesuits were designed for 
men. They weren't designed for women. And that was something 
that she had to deal with in real time.
    And so that brings me to another line of questioning for 
Mr. Russell. GAO's recent report on Artemis programs noted 
challenges with developing and testing the exploration 
spacesuit. Can you discuss these challenges and what measures 
can NASA take to help address such challenges, including issues 
that we have with the supply chain?
    Mr. Russell. Certainly. Thank you for the question. I think 
the first challenge to note was, originally, NASA designed the 
spacesuit in-house, and then made the decision to contract that 
out, which is happening now. As we took a look at some of the 
current challenges, certainly one has to do with sufficient 
life support. You need to have backup as you're doing lunar 
operations, have confidence that the system can operate and 
sustain the astronaut's life as they go through the mission. So 
there are some technologies that need to be matured there, some 
refinements to the requirements that the contractor is working 
on. That's some of the key things that we pointed to in our 
recent report.
    Mr. Sorensen. Ms. Koerner, I'd like to go a little bit more 
in depth on that. Could you talk about the significant work 
that is needed to mature technologies for the exploration 
spacesuit life support systems, as Mr. Russell was talking 
about. Are the spacesuits on the critical path for Artemis III? 
Does NASA have the roadmap for how spacesuit life support 
systems will be matured and then maintained?
    Ms. Koerner. So, as was noted, NASA designed the spacesuit 
and gave this--made that design available to U.S. industry to 
be able to produce. And one of our spacesuit providers is using 
that design. We have a long history of doing space walks and 
developing spacesuits but also managing spacesuits and managing 
those systems. I think it's obvious, but I just want to make 
sure it's very--I state it very clearly. A spacesuit is like a 
personal spacecraft. And it's very complex. It has all of this 
same kinds of systems that a spacecraft would have but in a 
much smaller environment. And it has to be, as you noted, 
adaptable for both male and female of various sizes and shapes.
    So the design and the development of the hardware for that 
is something that while NASA has experience on, we're trying to 
foster that experience in our commercial industry partners and 
are helping them. One of the ways we do that is through 
government task agreements, and we are enabling their 
development and helping them with some of that testing through 
those government task agreements. So it really is a partnership 
activity. Even though it is a service contract and they are 
doing the development of the exploration suit, NASA is standing 
side by side with them and enabling that to happen.
    Mr. Sorensen. Do you--and I'll open this to anyone who 
wants to answer. Are there other opportunities for public-
private partnership that we haven't yet--done yet, for 
instance, with spacesuits, to open that up to companies to be 
able to come up with a technology to learn? Are there other 
ways as we look forward to Artemis II and Artemis III that we 
can look forward to that?
    Ms. Koerner. So I'll offer that there's plenty of 
opportunity, I would say, for partnerships and for on-ramping 
new technologies, not just in spacesuits, but in every aspect 
of what we're doing with Artemis. One of the things that we've 
done over the last couple of years is we established a process 
for our architecture, which is the entirety of our plan for 
exploration that does an annual review where our entire 
organization, all of NASA, all of our mission directorates, all 
of our technical authorities, all of our centers all get to 
weigh in on the path that NASA is moving forward on. And we get 
to share the technologies that are developed in industry and 
onramp those. We share the output from that review with 
industry, and we have a constant and regular dialog with 
industry, with our international partners, with academia, to do 
just that, to identify opportunities for partnerships, but also 
to make sure that what we're doing with our exploration 
activities aligns with the direction that our stakeholders want 
us to go.
    Mr. Sorensen. Great. So we're on the right path for 
Artemis----
    Ms. Koerner. I believe we are.
    Dr. Griffin. I would----
    Mr. Sorensen. Thank you.
    Dr. Griffin. If I might add?
    Mr. Sorensen. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Griffin. I would add that if the United States and its 
international partners have a consistent program to return to 
the Moon and stay, that there are an enormous number of 
infrastructure development opportunities available in which 
commercial industry can invest because they know that there 
will be a return. So I mentioned communications, navigation 
functions earlier, command and data handling, data storage. The 
CLPS program was brought up. There will be a need in supplying 
a human lunar base for all types of cargo ranging from small, 
high-value items to bulk cargo that industry could supply if 
they know that there is going to be a consistent market for 
such.
    Mr. Sorensen. And I think that's an important part is we're 
not just going back to the Moon. We're going back to the Moon 
to stay on the Moon.
    Mr. Russell. I would hope so, although I've been trying for 
over 30 years to promote such an activity and have so far 
failed, so I possibly should retire from the field.
    Mr. Sorensen. No, don't do that. I yield back.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. You never give 
up. Speaking of never giving up, I recognize the gentleman from 
California for five minutes.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Associate Director, you talked about reducing the mortality 
or potential mortality? We've lost 15 astronauts over the 
years. I guess my question is, what statistic or fact would 
show that we've become safer over time in space?
    Ms. Koerner. So I don't know that I can point to a single 
statistic, but what I will tell you is that we have more 
redundancy in our systems. We have more reliability in our 
systems. We have more capability in our systems. And I think 
that alone gives us a greater confidence that even though we're 
doing something that is extremely, as I said earlier, 
unforgiving, that we have more safeguards and safety in the 
system.
    Mr. Issa. I understand, but today, we're talking--we're 
looking at significant delays in doing something that we did 
before. Nobody died going to the Moon and back. As a matter of 
fact, the program that killed most of our astronauts was the 
cost-saving, redundant-use, new and improved shuttle. 
Ultimately, that program killed the majority of all astronauts 
that ever died. The early exploration had its death, including 
three on the ground. We learned from that, don't sit in a bag 
of oxygen on the ground, not able to get off the ship quickly.
    So there have been lessons. But I'm--you know, I've 
listened for quite a while to this discussion about the 
spacesuit and, you know, what we're going to do and the 
discussion as though that women were new to space. I'm sorry, 
but we've had women in space for longer than some Members of 
Congress have lived now. So I--I'll ask again. We're looking at 
overruns and delays.
    And so I think I'll go to Mr. Russell. When they're putting 
that figure out there--we've had--2.9 percent of all those who 
have gone to space have died, so it's not an insignificant 
number. But if you take away two events of a single program 
type, you suddenly go from nearly 700 flights and 19 dead to 
almost nobody in the rest of those flights.
    So when we're looking at the cost and delivery, are we in 
fact looking at Artemis--looking for new solutions to things 
which have already been solved? You know, I'm from the 
generation of the joke about the difference between our 
inverted writing instrument and the Russians, OK? And for those 
who haven't seen it, exactly, we came up with the space pen, it 
cost millions. They came up with a pencil. And for redundancy, 
they had a second one.
    So again, as we're looking at firm fixed pricing and 
predictability of time, should we in fact push NASA to 
accomplish the mission with the highest level of reuse of 
technology, or should we allow them to continue to say, but 
we're exploring all kinds of new technology, which inherently 
brings in--at least in my examination, it brings in risk 
assessment of new technology? One only needs to look at the 
Boeing MAX and ask the question, is there anything that new 
about a 737 going 34,000 feet? No. But somehow, every change is 
a variable.
    So if we're looking to deliver on time, on budget, are we 
doing all the right things, or are we doing all the things that 
have led us to this inevitable delay and cost overrun?
    Mr. Russell. Great question. I think that's the--as I see 
it, NASA is at an inflection point right now because they are 
about to set the agency baseline commitments for a number of 
these efforts. And you referred to the firm fixed price 
contracts and things. And once you settle on a number that is 
great, you can hold the contractor to that price, that 
deliverable, but it's up to the government to have stable 
requirements, right? When you change those requirements, then 
that changes the deal that you have with the contractor that 
could cost additional funds.
    So right now, what we expect to see is really----
    Mr. Issa. Contract changes are where all the profit is, 
isn't it?
    Mr. Russell. Right, that equals dollars. If it's a cost-
plus contract, you know, if there's a delay, you're paying the 
contractors cost plus whatever fee goes along with that.
    So I think as we look to these new efforts, how those 
technical and cost baselines are set and the realism of those 
are going to be very important. And we'll see in the coming 12 
to 18 months whether the projects can adhere to those 
baselines, meet the technical challenges. There's going to be 
some margin for cost and schedule reserves to deal with issues, 
but the fidelity and the realism of those baselines will be 
extremely important for what are some new and novel 
technologies. A lot of these systems, you know, it's not just a 
rocket, it has a payload. That's never been done before. 
There's a lot of firsts. The way that the HLS system will work 
with, you know, essentially a gas station in space that will, 
you know, fill up the lander and help accomplish the mission, 
all of those are new and novel things. So capturing that 
technical risk, putting it in a realistic baseline, I think, 
will be essential.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
    Seeing no additional questions, I want to thank the 
witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for your 
questions. We will have more of these hearings and expect, with 
a different attitude from Mother Nature, a really big crowd.
    The record will remain open for 10 days for additional 
comments and written questions from the Members. This hearing 
is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                               Appendix I

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                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

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