[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    MOVING THE MONEY: UNDERSTANDING
                     THE IRANIAN REGIME'S ACCESS TO
                     MONEY AROUND THE WORLD AND HOW
                    THEY USE IT TO SUPPORT TERRORISM

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                           AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 26, 2023

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                           Serial No. 118-52
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                                __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
54-317 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
 
                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

               PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma             MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas                     Member
BILL POSEY, Florida                  NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri         BRAD SHERMAN, California
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                AL GREEN, Texas
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Vice          EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
    Chairman                         JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut
TOM EMMER, Minnesota                 BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia   JUAN VARGAS, California
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
JOHN ROSE, Tennessee                 VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin               SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina      AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina         STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin          RITCHIE TORRES, New York
ANDREW GARBARINO, New York           SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California                NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BYRON DONALDS, Florida               WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska                 BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MIKE LAWLER, New York
ZACH NUNN, Iowa
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas
ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee

                     Matt Hoffmann, Staff Director
              Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                   BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Chairman

PETE SESSIONS, Texas                 AL GREEN, Texas, Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia   RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JOHN ROSE, Tennessee, Vice Chairman  SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania             NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
ANDY OGLES, Tennessee
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on:
    October 26, 2023.............................................     1
Appendix:
    October 26, 2023.............................................    29

                               WITNESSES
                       Thursday, October 26, 2023

Goldberg, Richard, Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of 
  Democracies (FDD)..............................................     4
Noronha, Gabriel, Fellow, the Gemunder Center for Defense and 
  Strategy, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America 
  (JINSA)........................................................     6
Thomas, Clayton, Specialist, Middle Eastern Affairs, 
  Congressional Research Service (CRS)...........................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
    Goldberg, Richard............................................    30
    Noronha, Gabriel.............................................    37
    Thomas, Clayton..............................................    53

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Horsford, Hon. Steven:
    ``First look: Top Biden official heads to Europe in push to 
      cut off Hamas funding,'' dated October 23, 2023............    63
Goldberg, Richard:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    65
Noronha, Gabriel:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    67
Thomas, Clayton:
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Waters......................................    68
    Written responses to questions for the record from 
      Representative Nikema Williams.............................    70

 
                    MOVING THE MONEY: UNDERSTANDING
                     THE IRANIAN REGIME'S ACCESS TO
                     MONEY AROUND THE WORLD AND HOW
                    THEY USE IT TO SUPPORT TERRORISM

                              ----------                              


                       Thursday, October 26, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Oversight
                                and Investigations,
                           Committee on Financial Services,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Huizenga 
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Huizenga, Sessions, 
Wagner, Mooney, Rose, Meuser, Ogles; Green, Horsford, Garcia, 
and Williams of Georgia.
    Also present: Representatives Luetkemeyer and Steil.
    Chairman Huizenga. Good morning. The Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any time.
    Today's hearing is entitled, ``Moving the Money: 
Understanding the Iranian Regime's Access to Money Around the 
World and How They Use It to Support Terrorism.''
    I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an 
opening statement.
    Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Noronha, and Mr. Thomas, I want to say 
thank you for being here. We appreciate your time. I know for 
at least two of you, you were also part of a hearing yesterday 
with my colleague, Blaine Luetkemeyer, so you are pulling some 
double duty, and we appreciate that.
    At the end of the day, we are trying to find out how we can 
help stabilize the Middle East. That is the ultimate goal here.
    Let me be clear: Today's hearing should not be labeled as 
partisan. Members from both sides of the aisle have concerns 
about how the Iranian regime is able to support terrorism 
around the world, continue its march towards developing nuclear 
weapon capabilities, and suppress the human rights of its own 
people.
    Let's begin today by setting the stage. Since 2021, the 
Iranian regime has profited nearly $80 billion from oil sales 
around the world, which is due in part to relaxed sanctions. 
Earlier this summer, reports indicated that the United States 
and Iran had resumed diplomatic engagements after the Biden 
Administration failed to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA).
    In September, the United States and Iran finalized a swap 
involving the release of five American hostages in exchange for 
five Iranian nationals who had been charged with sanctions 
violations and Federal crimes, while agreeing to give Iran 
access to approximately $6 billion in funds previously held in 
South Korea. Similarly, the Administration waived sanctions to 
allow more than $10 billion worth of Iranian assets held in 
Iraq to be transferred to Oman and other jurisdictions.
    Three weeks ago, Hamas committed one of the most brutal 
terrorist attacks that we have ever seen on the state of 
Israel, and 30 Americans tragically lost their lives in that.
    It is important to note that Hamas receives approximately 
$350 million per year in support from Iran, roughly 93 percent 
of their total funding.
    Finally, last week this subcommittee launched an 
investigation to better understand the Administration's 
decisions regarding economic sanctions on the Iranian regime.
    So, today's hearing will focus around three central 
questions: first, how restricted Iranian funds are held around 
the world and how the Iranian regime accesses them; second, 
understanding the genesis of the $6 billion used as negotiating 
terms to release the hostages in Iran, and is that, in fact, 
what happened; and third, how the Administration helped the 
Iranian regime more easily access an additional $10 billion 
paid by Iraq for electricity.
    Here is what Congress can do. First, we can push for 
greater transparency when any Administration is choosing to 
waive sanctions that have been passed by this body, especially 
as negotiating terms and any hostage deal with the Iranian 
regime. Members of this body should not be kept in the dark; 
the consequences are too great.
    Next, we do not allow sanctions to be waived, rolled back, 
or funds transferred. Time and time again, Iran has shown that 
it is willing to starve its own people in pursuit of supporting 
terrorism or achieving a nuclear weapon. Naively believing that 
diplomatic agreements will deter the Iranian regime will be 
done at our own peril. We must cripple their economy and return 
to the previous Administration's maximum pressure campaign, in 
my opinion.
    Let me close with this. I know there are a lot of different 
opinions about what is happening in Gaza and with the 
Palestinians and with Israel. But we should all agree that 
innocent civilians should not be used as political cover. Make 
no mistake, Hamas is no friend of the Palestinian people, in my 
opinion. And the Iranian regime is no friend of ours. We must 
not waiver in our support for our ally of Israel.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I 
am going to yield back the balance of my time. I now recognize 
the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the 
witnesses for appearing as well.
    Mr. Chairman, this hearing is ostensibly being held to 
investigate how Iran accesses restricted funds around the 
world, looking at two instances where the United States has 
granted waivers for Iran to access these specific restricted 
funds.
    Some of my colleagues across the aisle, however, may try to 
link these waivers to the attacks in Israel. That would be a 
callous attempt to politicize what is already a horrific 
crisis. We cannot allow this hearing to become a distraction 
action by my colleagues across the aisle from 23 days of 
legislative inaction. We cannot allow the blame game with 
political fallacies to masquerade as proven facts.
    Let's examine some of the political fallacies refuted by 
proven facts. Political fallacy: The $6 billion transferred 
from South Korea to Qatar has been handed over to Iran. Proven 
fact: Not a scintilla of a cent. Some things bear repeating. 
Not a scintilla of a cent has been released to Iran. On October 
12, 2023, the U.S. and Qatar agreed to restrict the funds in 
response to the attack on Israel.
    Political fallacy: The $6 billion are U.S. taxpayer 
dollars. Proven fact: U.S. Presidents, including President 
Trump, have granted waivers for countries to purchase Iranian 
oil with each country's own money. No President has given 
foreign countries taxpayer dollars to purchase Iranian oil.
    Political fallacy: President Biden shouldn't allow Iraq to 
purchase electricity from Iran. Proven fact: Former President 
Trump allowed Iraq to buy electricity from Iran with the 
justification that Iraq had a fragile economy. Should former 
President Trump be denounced for allowing Iraq to buy 
electricity from Iran?
    In closing, I ask this of my Republican colleagues: Where 
were you when former President Trump allowed eight countries to 
purchase oil from Iran? Where were you when former President 
Trump allowed Iraq to purchase electricity from Iran? And why 
is there no mention of former President Trump in your 
distraction action memo?
    Now, there are some things on which the Chair and I can 
agree. What he said about Israel and what happened there, I 
think we can find common ground on. It was a horrific event. It 
is something that never should have happened and should never 
happen again. But we also have to concern ourselves with peace. 
And you have to concern yourself with peace of the genesis of 
war, else you may not know what type of war to execute. And we 
also have to concern ourselves with humanitarian aid for the 
Palestinians. There are many other things that we might not 
agree on, but I do believe we agree on some of these.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time, and I yield back.
    Chairman Huizenga. Thank you. I appreciate that. And we 
will get to a number of those issues that the ranking member 
has brought up.
    Today, we welcome the testimony of Mr. Richard Goldberg, 
the senior advisor for the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies; Mr. Gabriel Noronha, a fellow with the Gemunder 
Center for Defense and Strategy at the Jewish Institute for 
National Security of America; and Mr. Clayton Thomas, one of 
our own, is a Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the 
Congressional Research Service.
    Thank you all for being here. We thank you for your time. 
We know it is valuable, especially for those of you pulling 
double duty. You will each be recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral statements. And without objection, your written statements 
will be made a part of the record.
    Mr. Goldberg, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF RICHARD GOLDBERG, SENIOR ADVISOR, FOUNDATION FOR 
                  DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (FDD)

    Mr. Goldberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 
Green. It is great to be back in this chamber a few hours later 
for the double duty, and this is a really important topic. I do 
hope we can find bipartisan common ground here.
    I do want to address some of the ranking member's last 
comments and questions, because I can answer them pretty 
quickly and easily. Where was I when President Trump issued oil 
waivers? Well, in 2018, I was at the FDD opposing those 
waivers. And in 2019, I was in the National Security Council 
ending them, because we ended them in May of 2019.
    So, I don't know where this talking point keeps coming from 
that Trump did this too. Maximum pressure started in May 2019, 
Congressman. We ended the oil waivers. All of that money went 
on lockdown in escrow accounts, and they have not been reopened 
until this year, until these transfers.
    Where was I when we were granting waivers under the statute 
that I wrote as a staffer in 2012, the Iran Freedom and 
Counter-Proliferation Act, when we allowed Iraq to continue 
importing electricity from Iran? First, I was at FDD, and then, 
I was at the National Security Council, and we worked for the 
Treasury Department and the State Department to ensure those 
funds were locked down. We allow, under the waiver, import of 
electricity. We don't allow Iran to access the funds. Now, we 
do.
    I don't know where all of these claims keep coming from, 
but let's stick with facts.
    If we today, in the wake of October 7th, agree that we need 
to do all we can to deny this regime in Tehran resources, that 
it is in our national security interest for the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to have less money, not more money at its 
fingertips, understanding the fungibility of money, putting 
aside whether this $6 billion you are pointing to has been 
spent yet or borrowed against yet, there's an interesting 
question that's never asked.
    What about the $10 billion, Congressman? What about that 
money that was moved out of Iraq to Oman? You have no 
information about it. We just heard yesterday that the waiver 
was introduced into the record. We just learned about it. What 
has been spent out of there? Is that money frozen? Have the 
Omanis agreed to that? Have the Iraqis agreed to that? When 
that waiver expires, will we revert to the old waiver and 
ensure that money in Baghdad gets locked down for electricity 
payments?
    We can allow Iraq to import electricity. We don't have to 
allow Iran access to the money.
    Oil sanctions. This is just new.
    This summer, we saw a massive spike as the secret nuclear 
deal that I outline in my written testimony started after Brett 
McGurk, the White House Middle East Coordinator had gone to 
Oman, and negotiated, through the Omanis, a secret nuclear 
understanding, using all kinds of interesting pretext and 
executive authorities to start releasing money and stop 
enforcing sanctions. Why? Because they knew politically they 
couldn't come to this House to submit a deal under the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act to evade the laws we have all 
passed, that you all have voted on in the past. Why did they do 
that? Because they wanted a nuclear understanding. They wanted 
to say, oh, please, just don't go across that 90-percent 
enriched uranium threshold.
    We heard yesterday in testimony that, oh, we should never 
have gotten out of the JCPOA. Look at Iran's nuclear program 
today. The vast majority of Iran's advancements in its nuclear 
activities have happened since January 2021. That is when they 
crossed to 20-percent enriched uranium, and then to 60 percent, 
and now they're just a stone's throw away from showing us their 
technical capability to get to 90 percent. Only when we went 
from maximum pressure to maximum concessions, maximum 
deference.
    The policy needs to change. Oil exports have been steadily 
rising with nonenforcement throughout 2021 and 2022. It was 
only this year that they went through the roof, with some 
reports topping 2 million barrels per day, in August, under 
this nuclear deal.
    And so, no, Congressman, I am not saying this $6 billion 
was used to fund October 7th. It is factually inaccurate, but a 
posture of appeasement for 2\1/2\ years that emboldens this 
regime. A summer negotiated secret nuclear understanding that 
allows this regime to say, well, the Americans are off the 
table. They are afraid of us. They are deterred. We have 
already cut a pact with Saudi Arabia, too, through the Chinese 
earlier in the year. Now, we can turn all of our sights on 
Israel, the only country in the Middle East operating inside of 
Iran to stop that nuclear program. Now, we can activate all of 
our terror tentacles that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) coordinates in Beirut, a cell coordinating Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and the Islamic jihad.
    This is when we need to come together to say, let's lock 
down these resources. Let's turn our posture from appeasement, 
to deterrence, to pressure. That is how we take on the terror 
tentacles of Tehran.
    I look forward to your questions today. Thank you so much 
for holding this hearing. I know that Qatar came up yesterday. 
There may be a hostage deal today involving Qatar. I think it 
is important we address that in the double game Qatar plays. 
But I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Goldberg can be found on 
page 30 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Huizenga. Our witnesses are reminded that they 
need to address their remarks to the Chair, specifically. But I 
appreciate your passion, Mr. Goldberg, and I look forward to 
exploring a few of those issues.
    Mr. Noronha, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF GABRIEL NORONHA, FELLOW, THE GEMUNDER CENTER FOR 
    DEFENSE AND STRATEGY, THE JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL 
                  SECURITY OF AMERICA (JINSA)

    Mr. Noronha. Thank you, Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member 
Green, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for 
inviting me here today.
    Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
spent more than $20 billion to support foreign terror groups in 
the Middle East. It has spent tens of billions of its own 
dollars on its own terror operations. And I think it is 
important to understand that when the Islamic Republic chants, 
``Death to Israel,'' and they chant, ``Death to America,'' they 
are really deadly serious about those chants, and we learned 
that 2 weeks ago.
    And, Mr. Chairman, you are correct that this is not a 
partisan issue. They do not distinguish between Republicans and 
Democrats when they target us, and they don't in their ongoing 
assassination plots on U.S. soil.
    Hamas' attack on Israel was only possible because of the 
increased funding from the Iranian regime over the last couple 
of years--not just in the last couple of months, but over the 
last couple of years. Historically, Iran has provided $100 
million to Hamas. In the past year, that has increased to $350 
million.
    And I think it's important to understand how they got to 
the position of being able to increase those funds. Today, Iran 
provides Hamas 93 percent of its military budget. That funding 
allowed Hamas to lay low over the last year and prepare for 
these sneak attacks. Iran also trained 500 Hamas fighters 
inside Iran as recently as September. I think that is certainly 
a contributing factor to the success of their operations.
    And the regime could afford this largesse because of the 
problems with financing that has really flooded in--as you 
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, $80 billion at least in oil sales 
since the beginning of 2021. The $10 billion from Iraq, 
facilitated by State Department waivers--which I saw that you 
submitted into the record yesterday--which are very strange, 
having written them myself, and very unprecedented. They may 
now be laundering that money through China to get rid of all 
humanitarian exemptions. And then, the $6 billion that was 
deposited into Qatari accounts in exchange for the release of 5 
Iranian-American hostages. There are also reports that Iran has 
gained access to $6.7 billion in International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Special Drawing Rights. That is very much in this 
committee's jurisdiction.
    Supreme Leader Khamenei's philosophy is to use all the 
funds it can obtain to advance its terrorism. They don't really 
care about providing for the material needs of the Iranian 
people. They will always prioritize terror. And the United 
States should not aid the regime in this effort.
    I have a few recommendations. First, Congress should force 
the Executive Branch to enforce its existing oil sanctions 
against shipping companies, tanker companies, ports, refiners, 
and insurance companies. There are over 300 tankers 
facilitating trade in Iranian oil which are not sanctioned 
today. And these sanctions seem to be mandatory, not 
discretionary. The same applies to Iran's--the United States' 
sectorial sanctions against Iran's metals and petrochemical 
exports. Those sanctions have really not been enforced in the 
past 30 months.
    Second, Congress should work to bring an end to these 
ongoing energy waivers that we provide to Iraq and make sure 
that those funds can't be laundered in China. This is a really 
serious terror financing threat. This issue has gone on for a 
long time, through multiple Administrations. And I think it is 
incumbent on Congress to find a solution in the Executive 
Branch on how we can wean Iraq off Iranian energy independence, 
but then try to bring this to an end fast.
    Third, the United States must claw back the $6 billion 
provided to the Qatari fund for Iran last month. It has not 
been disbursed yet. My concern, based on Iranian budgeting 
principles, is that they plan out their foreign currency 
payments months in advance, and they were planning to draw down 
on this. And we are in the process of moving funds around until 
just now, I think.
    The deal we made with Iran in August and September became 
irrelevant the moment they funded the slaughter of 30 Americans 
in Israel last month and took a dozen more Americans hostage. 
We should not view that deal as having any legitimacy anymore.
    And I think the other point that is important to know is 
that the regime has a long history of pilfering food and 
medicine to resell on the black market in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The proceeds, even if we gave them food and medicine, would 
likely go to terror or be stolen by the regime elite. And so, I 
believe Congress should rescind the September 11th waiver to 
formally and permanently freeze those funds and ultimately work 
to provide the funds to the victims of terror.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Noronha can be found on page 
37 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Huizenga. Thank you.
    Mr. Thomas, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral remarks.

    STATEMENT OF CLAYTON THOMAS, SPECIALIST, MIDDLE EASTERN 
         AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS)

    Mr. Thomas. Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Green, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting the 
Congressional Research Service to testify today.
    This morning, I will summarize my written statement on 
Iran's funds abroad, starting with a brief overview of the U.S. 
sanctions authorities that underpin the funds and their use 
before focusing on the Biden Administration's decision earlier 
this year to facilitate the transfer of $6 billion of those 
Iranian funds from South Korea to Qatar. I will finish by 
suggesting some options and implications for congressional 
action.
    For background, the United States has, for decades, sought 
to limit the Iranian Government's financial resources via 
sanctions in an effort to deprive the government of the ability 
to fund its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and 
the means to deliver them, its nuclear activities, and its 
support for terrorist groups. Led by Congress, these U.S. 
efforts have included a decade's long effort to limit Iran's 
petroleum exports, a key revenue source for the regime.
    Starting in 2011, Congress authorized exceptions from U.S. 
sanctions for countries that otherwise could be subject to 
penalties for purchasing Iranian petroleum to continue such 
purchases if they gradually reduced their imports. Congress 
further mandated that excepted foreign buyers had to deposit 
payments for Iranian petroleum in financial institutions of the 
purchasing country, not in Iran. Congress explicitly permitted 
the use of those funds for humanitarian trade in multiple Iran-
specific sanctions authorities, in line with long-standing 
provisions in U.S. law that exempt humanitarian goods like food 
and medicine from U.S. sanctions programs.
    Still, restrictions on those Iranian funds abroad lead many 
to describe them as frozen, as foreign financial institutions 
have generally restricted their use in order not to run afoul 
of U.S. law and themselves become potential targets for 
secondary sanctions.
    In September 2023, in conjunction with mutual prisoner 
releases from the United States and Iran, the U.S. approved the 
transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds from South Korea to 
Qatar. These actions occurred in the context of broader 
diplomatic engagement to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions. To 
facilitate the transfer of funds, Secretary Blinken issued 
sanctions waivers to allow European financial institutions to 
participate without the risk of U.S. sanctions.
    Executive Branch officials did not provide a detailed 
description of the oversight mechanisms that would have applied 
to the funds, but said that U.S. oversight, in partnership with 
that of the Government of Qatar, would be substantial and that 
the United States would take, ``appropriate action,'' if Iran 
attempted to use the funds for purposes other than 
nonsanctionable humanitarian trade.
    The September 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and the 
resulting conflict have prompted increased scrutiny of U.S. 
policy towards Iran, a long-time backer of Hamas. That scrutiny 
includes attention to the $6-billion transfer. According to 
press reports, Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo told 
legislators that in the wake of Hamas' assault on Israel, U.S. 
and Qatari officials had agreed to prevent the use of the funds 
indefinitely. The Administration has not made any official 
statements on the status of those funds.
    Going forward, as part of its oversight responsibilities, 
Congress could consider whether or not to seek greater 
visibility into Iran's funds abroad, including via legislation 
to require regular reporting by the Administration to Congress 
on the funds and their use. Congress could also consider 
whether or not to mandate congressional review of 
Administration decisions with respect to the funds.
    Some Members of Congress are urging or seeking to compel 
the Administration to act in a demonstrable, transparent way to 
ensure the funds in Qatar are not used for transactions that 
would benefit the Iranian Government. Since September 7th, 
Members of Congress have introduced at least 18 pieces of 
legislation related to Iran. Many of those bills would rescind 
the waivers issued to facilitate the transfer and seek to 
encourage third parties to block or otherwise decline to 
conduct transactions with the funds. Other legislation would 
seek to confiscate and repurpose the funds, although the United 
States' ability to seize the funds appears to be limited, as 
the United States does not have jurisdiction over them.
    New official action to newly block the funds could provoke 
an Iranian response or have other impacts on U.S. interests, 
including with respect to Qatar, a major non-NATO ally of the 
United States that hosts major U.S. military facilities. Formal 
action to rescind the waivers or amend the authorities 
underlying them could also have implications for Iraq, which 
has long relied on U.S. sanctions waivers to import Iranian 
electricity. Congress could also revisit long-standing 
sanctions exemptions for humanitarian trade, weighing them 
against the broader goal of pressuring the Iranian Government 
and the interest some Members have expressed in supporting the 
Iranian people.
    This concludes my brief remarks. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found on page 
53 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
    We are going to now turn to Member questions, and I am 
going to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Honestly, I really do wish we could have a long-form 
podcast kind of conversation here today because there are so 
many avenues to explore in this, but I will only have 5 
minutes. We will all have 5 minutes, but I am sure we will be 
having quite a bit of follow-up on that.
    Mr. Noronha, yesterday at our National Security 
Subcommittee hearing, I entered into the record, as you had 
indicated, the report to Congress on the renewal of Iraq's 
sanctions waiver for electricity payments. This is the Biden 
Administration's sanctions waiver for the payment of 
electricity by Iraq to Iran.
    Have you seen this document?
    Mr. Noronha. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Huizenga. Okay. What are your immediate takeaways? 
I know you touched on a few of those things, but just explore 
that briefly.
    Mr. Noronha. It struck me that they were trying to use the 
2012 law which was intended to reduce imports of Iranian oil--
--
    Chairman Huizenga. And let's be clear, this is the 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)----
    Mr. Noronha. Correct.
    Chairman Huizenga. ----under the Obama Administration.
    Mr. Noronha. Correct. This was passed bipartisan from 
Congress and signed into law by President Obama. It was 
intended to get Iran's oil and electricity revenues down. And 
instead, what it appears the Administration used that law for 
is to, in my view, illegally create a channel where Iran could 
get euros.
    Congressman Huizenga. Which was specifically the Korea 
situation, correct? Korea had a reliance on Iranian oil and 
this was part of trying to wean them off of that?
    Mr. Noronha. There were eight countries that we were 
working on to wean off their imports of Iranian oil. We 
couldn't do so overnight. And we were trying to do this very 
fast. Iraq is slightly separate.
    Chairman Huizenga. Yesterday, you said you were immediately 
struck a little bit that Germany, France, and Oman were the 
three exceptions to that. Can you explore that briefly?
    Mr. Noronha. France, Germany, and Oman have never imported 
Iranian oil. They have never imported Iranian petroleum 
products. They were never given waivers by the Trump 
Administration because they didn't need them.
    Chairman Huizenga. So, why in the world would they be 
included in this now?
    Mr. Noronha. It is, in my view, legal fiction that was used 
to somehow cite this law so that they could be the mechanism to 
launder funds from Iraq into euros for an Omani channel.
    Chairman Huizenga. Mr. Goldberg, I am going to turn to you. 
The Administration obviously allowed the transfer of $10 
billion from Iraq as well. Where do you suspect this money is 
now?
    Mr. Goldberg. We don't have clarity on that. We do know 
that, if you look back, and I document this in my written 
testimony, we have multiple statements from various Iranian 
officials and Iraqi officials in that May-June-July timeframe 
that give us this dollar figure, some say $10 billion, or $11 
billion. But remember, Iraq is still importing electricity, so 
that money continues to grow. It is not one-time money like a 
frozen account in South Korea or the $3 billion that is still 
sitting in Japan or any money that is in Delhi or in Beijing 
that may have been on the docket for transfer in the future 
under this nuclear understanding.
    This $10 billion--let's use that figure--is a public 
number. Some amount of that was already paid out: $2.76 
billion. We saw that. That was an initial allowance under a 
prior waiver in June that was used to pay off various debts of 
the Iranians, including imports from Turkmenistan, according to 
public reporting. Then the rest of it, the balance at some 
point is transferred under this new waiver, sir, that you have 
just entered into the record. In July, we have the State 
Department on record saying that they are designating Oman to 
be the custodian. This waiver now provides France and Germany 
in this as well.
    Clearly, there is some movement of cash converting Iraqi 
dinar to euro in Europe and moving it into Oman. The balance in 
Oman is unknown, the balance in Iraq is unknown, and the 
balance in France or Germany is unknown. But according to the 
waiver, these are the institutions that would be involved. And, 
of course, we don't have the names of the institutions.
    Chairman Huizenga. Yes. Is Oman known as a straight-up 
player in the banking industry?
    Mr. Goldberg. Oman is viewed in some ways, in historical 
terms, as worse than Qatar as far as playing all sides. We have 
seen public reporting in the past of their ties to the IRGC, at 
times in smuggling routes through Oman and around Oman that the 
Iranians have used. They have been used--if you go back to 
2015, 2013, right after Congress had enacted the two laws that 
are really disgusting here, that secret negotiation of the now 
National Security Advisor was with the Omanis to get to that 
JCPOA originally, that is why the Omanis were used again by 
Brett McGurk for this channel.
    Chairman Huizenga. I just have a few seconds left, and so 
much more to discuss. Are any of you aware if there is a 
written agreement between the Qataris and the United States? 
And the same question on the Omanis. Because when we see White 
House spokespeople saying these funds are, ``frozen,'' it does 
not appear that they really are frozen.
    Mr. Noronha. Mr. Chairman, there is a written agreement 
that outlines the hostage deal and the $6 billion payment. To 
my knowledge, I do not know of a written agreement pertaining 
to the potential freeze.
    Mr. Goldberg. The waiver, I believe, sir, does make 
reference to communications. The committee should ask for all 
communications.
    Chairman Huizenga. Okay. I appreciate that. And my time has 
expired.
    The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Horsford, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, and good morning. Thank you to the 
Chair and the ranking member for this timely hearing.
    Like so many of us, I was shocked and appalled by the 
horrific attacks on the people of Israel by Hamas terrorists. 
It is our duty to ensure that never again happens anywhere, and 
this hearing and the work of the Administration is imperative.
    I am in a unique position here--I am a member of both this 
committee and the House Armed Services Committee, so I received 
classified information and attended closed-door hearings to 
better understand the events that occurred on the ground, the 
preparation and planning leading up to these despicable attacks 
and, most importantly, the actions available to us going 
forward.
    Let me be clear: The response from the United States must 
be unequivocal and project American strength internationally. 
We stand with our ally, Israel, and are willing to use any of 
the tools available to us to support that end. But we are here 
today to discuss one of those tools, one that is undoubtedly 
important. And we must take a serious look at solutions to 
mitigate the ability of Iran and any other state sponsor of 
terrorism to finance these kinds of horrific attacks around the 
globe. So, it is imperative to deny Hamas and Russia access to 
illicit funds.
    I would like to enter into the record, Mr. Chairman, an 
article from Axios. Actually, the Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury is en route to Europe. He will be speaking to the 
Royal United Services Institute in London this Friday, and it 
is specifically around the issues on sanctions against these 
sponsors of terrorism.
    Chairman Huizenga. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. Horsford. As we have heard, it likely took multiple 
years to plan the coordinated and multifaceted attack on 
October 7th, which means that there were likely multiple years 
of funding, in spite of strict U.S. sanctions. While we know 
that Hamas isn't using U.S.-based financial institutions, they 
are able to still engage in the financial sector writ large.
    Mr. Thomas, would you please speak to the array of 
financing options available to Iran in spite of the sanctions 
regime? And what else can the United States Government do to 
stem that flow of illicit funds?
    Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Congressman. With respect to Iran's 
support for Hamas, this is a relationship that goes back many 
decades, nearly to the inception of Hamas as a group in the 
late 1980s. Traditionally, Iranian financial support for Hamas 
has been estimated at about $100 million a year. Although, as 
we have heard, there have been press reports citing Israeli 
sources indicating that support may have increased in recent 
years, and there have been numbers as high as $350 million.
    Of course, Iran's support for Hamas is not limited to 
financial support. The means by which Iran provides material 
support to Hamas vary. Clearly, the nature of these illicit 
transactions makes tracking them difficult. But from what we 
know, Iran relies on smuggling via tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt 
border. The Egyptian Government has cracked down on those in 
large part since 2013, but there are indications that trade 
continues.
    In terms of Iran's financial status abroad in general, 
which I imagine we will discuss at length today, those funds, 
pursuant to U.S. law and regulations, are limited to funds 
transactions involving non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.
    Mr. Horsford. On that point, we have heard many of my 
colleagues on the other side emphasize that money is fungible 
and that the dollars spent on humanitarian aid is $1 that is 
freed up from the Iranian Government to spend on financing 
terrorism. However, it seems that can only be true if they ever 
intended to spend money on that in the first place.
    Mr. Thomas, do you believe that without the $6 billion in 
funds, Iran would otherwise provide this same aid to its 
people? Yes or no?
    Mr. Thomas. I think given the history of Iran's support for 
these groups, and its support for these groups in spite of the 
humanitarian needs of the Iranian people, again, Iran has 
continued to provide support for terrorist groups regardless of 
the economic situation.
    Mr. Horsford. Is there any indication that links past 
increases in humanitarian aid to an increase in availability of 
Iranian funds to finance terrorism, given the numerous controls 
that are in place?
    Mr. Thomas. Not that I am aware of. Again, that support has 
remained consistent for years.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Sessions, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 
think that your opening statement by this last discussion from 
our colleagues does tell us this is a bipartisan hearing. And 
thank you very much for doing that.
    Mr. Thomas, can you give us more information about how the 
Iranian accounts work, and are they special purpose accounts?
    Mr. Thomas. These accounts really go back to 2012. We have 
discussed at length the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA). That legislation, as I mentioned in 
my remarks, permits countries to continue to import Iranian 
oil, provided that they keep it in special purpose accounts, as 
you have described. The year after the 2012 NDAA was passed, 
Congress, as part of the 2013 NDAA, included a provision 
subtitle D, IFCA, which Mr. Goldberg mentioned, the Iran 
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act. That Act tightens those 
restrictions by mandating that purchases for Iranian oil--the 
funds from those purchases must remain in the purchasing 
country, not remitted to Iran.
    The conditions that govern the restrictions on those 
accounts are prescribed in U.S. law and U.S. regulations, 
namely, that they must be used for bilateral, nonsanctioned 
humanitarian trade that does not involve the Iranian Government 
or Iranian entities. For example, funds in country X would be 
allowed to be drawn down to pay an exporter in country X to 
export humanitarian goods into Iran.
    Mr. Sessions. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, I would like for each one of you to take a whack 
at the question about the Qatar relationship with Iran, because 
it appears as though, from what I see, we do favorably count on 
Qatar and their relationship, not only with us as a host 
country, but also as an intermediary. Can you please discuss 
that?
    First, Mr. Goldberg?
    Mr. Goldberg. Congressman, it is a very important and 
timely question. I think it's important that for anybody who 
had views of Qatar's relationship with Iran, Qatar's 
relationship with Hamas before October 7th that didn't align 
with my view, I hope we can all reset assumptions at this 
point.
    Mr. Sessions. I think they reset it.
    Mr. Goldberg. Exactly, sir. They did reset it.
    And any sort of hostage negotiations that are going on, if 
there is a hostage exchange--today, I heard perhaps of a 
release of some women and children--we want to have everyone 
back that we can. We want all hostages released. But understand 
that Qatar is playing us. It is the arsonist playing 
firefighter at this point and coming to our rescue, as they 
host a summit between the Iranians and Hamas after October 7th 
so they can coordinate in Doha the day after Secretary Blinken 
goes, while they continue to have financial channels, while Al 
Jazeera is spitting out horrible anti-American hate, incitement 
to violence, and pro-Hamas propaganda. I think it is absolutely 
time for us to reassess that relationship. We have a lot of 
leverage there. Yes, they host the Combined Air Operations 
Center (CAOC), yes, they host our air operations center. And 
yes, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) could 
do it too.
    Mr. Sessions. Thank you.
    Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. Thank you. Qatar is more of a diplomatic and 
political partner to Iran than an economic partner. They don't 
do much trade. I believe that we should try to rescind some of 
the agreements we have made with Qatar regarding Hamas.
    There was an agreement made in 2012 to host the political 
leadership office in Qatar. We should make a formal ask of the 
Qataris and say we want this office gone and a formal 
extradition request for the leaders of Hamas who are currently 
in Qatar.
    Mr. Sessions. Would they not have recognized that 
themselves internally as a result of, ``this reset,'' or is 
that still part of the relationship that the United States 
needs to be out there pushing them this way?
    Mr. Noronha. It needs to be a formal ask. They are 
currently effectively the mediators for the hostage talks, so I 
think there is a different policy view of what should happen in 
the next 2 weeks versus what should happen----
    Mr. Sessions. And we want to keep working with them.
    Mr. Thomas?
    Thank you, by the way, each of you.
    Mr. Thomas. U.S. officials, as has been said, have credited 
Qatar for the role that it has played in the release of 
hostages. More broadly, again, Qatar does support some 
important U.S. interests. It does have a very multidirectional 
foreign policy in that it has relationships with Iran as well 
as with many other U.S. partners in the Middle East.
    What I would say is that Secretary Blinken has said that 
business as usual with Hamas is over. And I imagine going 
forward, it is going to be balancing this kind of new approach 
with these long-standing U.S. interests with respect to 
Afghanistan, and with respect to U.S. facilities in Qatar. And 
this, I imagine, is going to be a place where Congress can play 
a role in overseeing what the Administration's path with Qatar 
is going forward.
    Mr. Sessions. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I would encourage us, as I know you will do, 
to consider the region that we don't live in, but in which we 
have vast interests. And thank you very much.
    Thank you for your service to our country.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    With that, Ms. Garcia from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the witnesses, 
thank you for being here on such a timely and very critical 
topic.
    Like most of my colleagues, I strongly condemn the horrific 
October 7th attacks carried out by Hamas in Israel. We have all 
seen the gruesome images and heard the heartbreaking stories of 
those impacted. In the aftermath of this tragedy, it is 
critical that we stand with our ally, Israel.
    I am proud to have supported passage yesterday of the 
bipartisan resolution expressing strong support for Israel and 
its right to defend herself against Hamas and other terrorist 
groups in the region.
    Iran plays a key role in the financing of terrorist groups 
like Hamas and Hezbollah. Therefore, U.S. sanctions in Iran are 
critically important. I recently joined a bipartisan letter 
with my colleagues demanding that Iran be held accountable for 
its role in funding Hamas and for the maximum enforcement of 
all U.S. sanctions in the region.
    We have heard testimony here today that places a lot of 
focus on the Biden Administration's work this summer to free 
American prisoners in Iran. I want to inquire further about the 
history of the financial relationship between Iran and its 
proxies.
    Mr. Thomas, can you speak a little more about the financial 
ties between Iran and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah?
    Mr. Thomas. The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is 
a little bit different than the relationship between Iran and 
Hamas. When we are talking about Hezbollah, Hezbollah is really 
kind of the crown jewel of Iran's regional network of proxies. 
Iranian support to Hezbollah is thought to be about $1 billion 
a year. And I think that is a reflection of the much closer 
political and ideological ties that link Tehran to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.
    Hamas, on the other hand, has fewer of those kind of 
natural ties to Tehran. And I think that is reflected in the 
support, which is generally estimated to be $100 million in 
recent years. Again, some estimates that it may be higher.
    In terms of how Iran provides support, as I said, much of 
this is covert and evasive. But what we do know is that Hamas 
does rely on kind of international networks of both licit and 
illicit financing.
    In the past, the Department of the Treasury has designated 
networks of financiers across the region for their role in 
providing support to Hamas and its activities.
    With respect to Iran, Hamas officials have said in the past 
that a lot of this is cash. They have talked about going to 
Tehran and coming back with suitcases of cash. There is a wide 
variety of ways that Iran can support these groups. It is going 
to be a little bit harder with Hamas, given the restrictions on 
entry into and out of Gaza, as opposed to Hezbollah, which has 
a much larger presence in Lebanon.
    Ms. Garcia. So, these suitcases of cash, what currency are 
they using, and what role is cryptocurrency playing?
    Mr. Thomas. The report that I was referring to was from, I 
believe it was 2009, when Hezbollah representatives talked 
about not being able to leave with Tehran because they had so 
much cash. I don't remember if they specified the currency.
    With respect to crypto, there have been reports--and I 
would defer to the testimony that some of your colleagues heard 
yesterday from Mr. Zarazinski--that tens of millions of dollars 
in crypto funds have been interdicted by Israeli and U.S. 
authorities, and those funds were belonging to or on their way 
to Hamas.
    What I would say in context is, first, as I understand it, 
with Hamas financing, a much larger portion of that is coming 
from the funds that Hamas generates by virtue of its de facto 
control of the Gaza Strip and, second, that it received $100 
million or more from Iran. So, the crypto is, I imagine, a 
little bit less than those other sources of funding, but any 
provision of financial resources to Hamas would be a major 
concern to U.S. policymakers and likely sanctionable under U.S. 
law.
    Ms. Garcia. Did Iran actually receive any of the $6 billion 
transferred in exchange for the release of the prisoners?
    Mr. Thomas. U.S. officials said on October 8th, I believe 
for the first time, that none of the funds had been drawn down, 
and that appears to still be the case. U.S. officials maintain 
that----
    Ms. Garcia. So, none has been disbursed?
    Mr. Thomas. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Garcia. Okay. I just want to make sure that we get that 
on the record again. The U.S. Treasury Department recently 
sanctioned individuals and businesses in South America which 
are accused of financing Hezbollah.
    Mr. Thomas, can you speak to the dangers that groups like 
Hezbollah and Hamas pose beyond the Middle East?
    Mr. Thomas. Hezbollah, in particular, does have networks in 
South America largely drawing on expat populations from which 
they are able to secure funding and support. And this is an 
issue of long-standing concern going back, I would say, well 
over a decade. Congress has looked at this issue. And as you 
say, the Administration has sanctioned numerous officials for 
their participation in this trade as well.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, if the witness would provide any other 
detail on that, my last question, it really would be great. I 
think he was----
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentlewoman will submit written 
questions to the Chair, which we will then pass along.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Huizenga. If would like an expansion, you may put 
that down in writing, and we will pass that along to our 
witnesses.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you.
    Chairman Huizenga. With that, the gentlelady from Missouri, 
Mrs. Wagner, who is also the Chair of our Capital Markets 
Subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    On this very past anniversary of 9/11, the Biden 
Administration announced this reckless and extremely dangerous 
deal with Iran, a state sponsor of terror. President Biden's 
decision to release $6 billion in Iranian funds is nothing 
short of a windfall of cash and economic relief for Tehran to 
use for its military and to fund terrorist proxies like, as we 
have discussed, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. This was a 
shameful payout to a regime that is responsible for countless 
deaths, including Americans.
    Less than a month later, Hamas, an Iran-funded terrorist 
group, launched the deadliest attack on the Jewish people since 
the Holocaust. Let's be clear about Iran's role in the Middle 
East. It is the world's worst state sponsor of terror, and it 
is bent on attacking U.S. and Israeli interests with every 
resource it can muster.
    This money should never have been released in the first 
place. And now, the U.S. must claw it back to ensure that it 
cannot be used in further efforts by Iran or Hamas to target 
Israel.
    Mr. Noronha, the Biden Administration has mentioned a, 
``quiet understanding,'' with Qatar regarding the $6 billion in 
Iranian funds exchanged in the hostage deal. What does a, 
``quiet understanding,'' look like in practice?
    Mr. Noronha. It means nothing at all, because a quiet 
understanding has no legal basis. It does not legally prevent 
Qatar from distributing those funds to Iran in the future. And 
more importantly, in my mind, it does not prevent or discourage 
Iran from taking, say, Qatari or American hostages and saying, 
okay, now you really have to turn that spigot back on. We have 
made this practice now of saying you can get cash for hostages. 
And now that that practice has been exemplified to the Iranian 
regime, they will use and abuse that as long as it is a 
possibility.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
    Mr. Goldberg, the Biden Administration said that the $6 
billion in accounts in Qatar could only be used for 
humanitarian purposes. Can you explain why that is impossible 
to ensure, given the fact that we all know that money is 
fungible?
    Mr. Goldberg. Thank you for the question, ma'am. They also 
said this about the $10 billion going to Oman; the same 
language was used by Mr. Miller at the State Department. That 
is why we should take a close look at what has been spent there 
too.
    Obviously, money is fungible. Even if they say, this is all 
for non-sanctioned goods, which, by the way, is wider than what 
we traditionally think of as humanitarian, because there are 
all kinds of debts that can be paid off in that respect as 
budget support. We also know and have documented, as Mr. 
Noronha went through yesterday, so many times in history when 
Iran has filed paperwork that is fraudulent, with front 
companies and false transactions that have gone to money 
laundering, that have gone to the IRGC, and have gone to Assad 
in Syria or to Halkbank in Turkiye. Remember that massive 
scandal still being prosecuted today? It was all based on 
humanitarian transactions, billions of dollars of a scheme that 
Iran had cooked up and nobody caught it.
    Mrs. Wagner. Let me press on. Mr. Noronha, approximately 
how much money does Iran provide to Hamas each year? And would 
the terrorist attacks that Hamas perpetrated on October 7th 
have been possible without that Iranian support, including 
financial support?
    Mr. Noronha. They have historically provided $100 million. 
During maximum pressure, they had to institute an austerity 
plan; they had to lay off a bunch of fighters. They were really 
struggling on budgets. Since 2021, that funding has increased 
to as much as $350 million. And my view is that their strategic 
surprise would not have been possible without the funding.
    Mrs. Wagner. So, the sanctions were working when we forced 
them into their austerity plan so they could not, in fact, fund 
these terrorist proxies to the extent that they are currently 
doing so.
    One other question, because it just rubs me the wrong way, 
Mr. Goldberg. Why does the foreign minister of Iran have a visa 
to be in New York City right now? I was reading about it 
earlier today. It is absolutely unbelievable to me that this 
man who was working on plotting with Hamas on an attack against 
Israel has been given a visa and is currently--this foreign 
minister is in New York City.
    Sir?
    Mr. Goldberg. It's completely shameful, ma'am. There are 
Americans being held hostage, there are Americans dead, and 
Iran is complicit. This man should not be in our country.
    Mrs. Wagner. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentlelady yields back.
    The gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. Williams, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Huizenga, and 
Ranking Member Green.
    I agree with you, Chairman Huizenga, I wish this could be a 
roundtable discussion, more of a dialogue so that we could have 
a much more robust discussion and conversation, because I am 
going to tell you now, I have many questions that I am going to 
need answered for the record that I will be submitting because 
we are not going to get through all of this today.
    I thank all of our witnesses for joining us today. I am 
heartbroken by the continued loss, not just on October 7th, but 
continuing today, the loss of innocent Israeli, Palestinian, 
and American lives in Gaza and in Israel. In no way, shape, or 
form is terrorism ever acceptable. Congress and our President 
have a responsibility to respond swiftly and humanely when our 
allies need us.
    But at the time of an unprecedented attack on one of our 
most critical allies, Israel, Congress was frozen and unable to 
take any action to aid Israel, and provide global leadership. 
Only yesterday, a full 2\1/2\ weeks after the attack occurred, 
did the House vote to condemn Hamas' vicious terror attack and 
affirm our support for Israel.
    I have been getting texts, calls, and emails from rabbis 
and other members of the Jewish community in my district in 
Atlanta urging Congress to take action since October 7th. But 
again, under Republican leadership, it took 2\1/2\ weeks for 
this body to officially condemn this heinous terrorist attack.
    Extreme MAGA Republicans pose a real threat to our national 
security when things happen like kicking out their own Speaker, 
and a 22-day lapse without a Speaker, and then replacing our 
Speaker with the chief legal architect of attempting to 
overturn the 2020 Presidential election results.
    I am from Georgia, so it hits a little differently for me. 
In Congress, I always center on the most-marginalized people. 
And it pains me as a mama and a leader in this country, and as 
the co-Chair of the bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Black-
Jewish Relations, that Congress was paralyzed and couldn't 
properly respond while innocent civilians and babies--babies, 
y'all--were being killed.
    It is our responsibility to ensure that our foreign policy 
not only stands up for marginalized people, but holds 
accountable those facilitating the financing of terrorism.
    Mr. Thomas, if necessary, how can the U.S. structure 
additional sanctions on Iran to maximize the impact on 
political leaders and minimize the impact on everyday Iranians?
    Mr. Thomas. This is a debate central to Iran sanctions, but 
it is much broader than Iran. Congress has long wrestled and 
successive Administrations have wrestled with the dilemma of 
how to hold regimes that the United States finds objectionable 
accountable, while not bringing harm to the populations over 
which those regimes rule.
    I think the way that Congress has tried to do that in the 
Iran space is by creating specific humanitarian exemptions for 
sanctions. Those aren't always perfect, and there are reports 
of diversion. I think at this point, Congress--basically, the 
situation in which the Biden Administration is operating is a 
sanctions architecture created by Congress, and that refers 
both to the waivers that the Administration has used and going 
back to previous Administrations, as well as the authorities 
that they have used.
    So, if Congress decides that the indirect or ancillary 
benefits to the Iranian regime of those waivers are greater 
than the benefits that the Iranian people receive, then 
Congress could perhaps take a look at revising those 
authorities.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
    I am also concerned about the continued push that I hear 
from some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to 
pull back from the United States' role in protecting democracy 
and facilitating global cooperation, especially after 
witnessing the importance of the U.S.-Israeli partnership 
firsthand just last month as I visited Israel on a 
Congressional Black Caucus delegation trip. It is clear to me 
that we need to engage with the rest of the world, not hide 
from it.
    Mr. Thomas, how did the Trump Administration's withdrawal 
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the 
Paris Climate Agreement impact our ability to work with 
European allies and conduct diplomacy in the Middle East?
    Mr. Thomas. The Trump Administration's decision in 2018 to 
cease U.S. participation in the JCPOA was welcomed by some U.S. 
partners and was strongly criticized by others. In the region, 
a number of U.S. partners welcomed the decision. But as you 
say, in Europe, many European allies saw the JCPOA as a 
critical international diplomatic achievement and sought to 
preserve the benefits. Ultimately, that was not possible. And 
while the JCPOA is still technically in effect, obviously we 
have seen Iran surpass its requirements under the JCPOA, and 
the U.S. has moved beyond even where it was in 2018 in terms of 
sanctions.
    In terms of the kind of broader impact, where the Biden 
Administration appears to be now is really engaging with 
partners, including----
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Mr. Thomas, unfortunately I am out 
of time----
    Mr. Thomas. Sorry.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. ----which I knew would happen. And 
I have many more questions to submit for the record.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Rose, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman Huizenga, for holding this 
incredibly important hearing. And thank you to our witnesses 
for being here. I know you have had a busy week.
    I would like to start off by saying how incredibly 
disappointed I have been in the Biden Administration's lax Iran 
policies. Iran is a long-time state sponsor of terror and a 
major supporter of Hamas. The unspeakable terrorist attacks 
that occurred in Israel by Hamas have left all of us sick over 
the barbarity of these atrocities committed against Israelis, 
Americans, and numerous other nationalities.
    It is crystal clear that Hamas, and Hamas' benefactor, 
Iran, have zero regard for the sanctity of human life. It 
greatly concerns me that the Biden Administration has recently 
allowed billions of dollars in Iranian funds to be transferred 
around the globe in an opaque and completely nontransparent 
manner. It is absolutely essential that Congress fully 
understand how these money transfers were allowed, and the 
current status of the these Iranian funds.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I might note, we don't need necessarily 
more sanctions; we need the ones we already have to be enforced 
by this Administration.
    Mr. Thomas, are you aware of any database or set of 
information available from Treasury that allows the public to 
understand where Iran's money is in the world?
    Mr. Thomas. I am not.
    Mr. Rose. Mr. Noronha, do you think it would be in the 
public interest for Treasury to publish data that would help to 
allow the public to understand where Iran's money is in the 
world?
    Mr. Noronha. Absolutely. And I think it would help Congress 
do its oversight job and not just rely on the Executive Branch 
to do what Congress tells it to do.
    Mr. Rose. In September, the Administration established a 
new humanitarian channel in Qatar to administer $6 billion in 
Iranian assets from South Korea. Treasury describes this 
channel as a way to, ``further facilitate the flow of 
humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran.''
    Mr. Thomas, is it unusual for Treasury to create a 
humanitarian channel? And why would Treasury need to create a 
humanitarian channel?
    Mr. Thomas. I think probably the closest analog to the 
humanitarian channel in Qatar was the Swiss Humanitarian Trade 
Arrangement which was set up by the Trump Administration in 
February of 2020. That was based on October 2019 understandings 
between the Departments of State and Treasury to basically 
create mechanisms to facilitate humanitarian trade into Iran.
    In terms of why it is necessary, I believe the intent is to 
give extra cover to private organizations, private businesses 
that want to participate in this trade but otherwise might be 
deterred for fear of U.S. sanctions. It is basically telling 
people who want to participate in this, ``You will not be 
exposed to U.S. sanctions if you participate in humanitarian 
transactions involving Iran.''
    That doesn't mean that those businesses are going to 
participate in it. You can open the door, but you can't force 
anybody to walk through it. And my understanding of the Swiss 
Humanitarian Trade Arrangement is that only a few transactions 
were processed through it.
    Mr. Rose. Is there a stark difference between a 
humanitarian channel and other escrow accounts that are 
available to Iran for humanitarian trade purposes?
    Mr. Thomas. It is difficult to say with respect to the 
humanitarian channel in Qatar. As you said, that was announced 
by the Treasury Department in mid-September, and as of early 
October, it appears that the circumstances surrounding those 
funds have changed. Although, the Administration has not made 
an official statement on the status of those funds.
    Based on the arrangements that governed the Swiss 
humanitarian channel, I would imagine that basically, it 
involves increased due diligence requirements on the financial 
institutions involved in processing those transactions.
    Mr. Rose. In your opinion, is there enough information 
publicly available on the humanitarian channels to understand 
how effective they have been in the past or how effective this 
one might be in getting the appropriate assistance to Iranian 
citizens themselves?
    Mr. Thomas. I think we already see Congress starting to 
take this up as an oversight mechanism. I will point you to 
H.R. 5826, which was marked up in the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee last week. That legislation would require biannual--
every 6 months--reports from the Administration specifically on 
the $6 billion in Qatar. But I don't think there is any reason 
why Congress couldn't broaden that reporting requirement to try 
to have more visibility, as Mr. Noronha said, into where those 
funds are and what is the status.
    Mr. Rose. Thank you.
    I see my time is about to expire, Mr. Chairman, so I yield 
back.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman yields back.
    With that, the ranking member of the subcommittee, the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    While I greatly appreciate the commentary of Mr. Goldberg, 
my questions were not directed to Mr. Goldberg. And there is a 
reason I didn't direct my questions to Mr. Goldberg. Mr. 
Goldberg is not a Member of Congress. Mr. Goldberg doesn't have 
a vote. Mr. Goldberg has an opinion, and I respect his opinion. 
But my questions were directed to the Members of Congress who 
have the opportunity to vote.
    Now, to you, Mr. Thomas. You indicated that the 
architecture for the transaction that took place, the $6 
billion, was created by Congress. Is that correct?
    Mr. Thomas. Yes, sir. I am referring specifically to 
Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, as well as 
additional restrictions added by the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act in the 2013 NDAA.
    Mr. Green. And for verification purposes, you are with what 
entity, please?
    Mr. Thomas. I am a Specialist in Middle Eastern affairs at 
the Congressional Research Service.
    Mr. Green. And that is an entity associated with what 
organization or what body, please?
    Mr. Thomas. We are part of the Library of Congress. We 
provide nonpartisan authoritative information and analysis to 
all 535 Members of Congress and their staff, and all 
committees, and we work equally on behalf of all Members of 
Congress.
    Mr. Green. The transaction that took place, the $6 billion 
in question, did that transaction take place in contravention 
of the law?
    Mr. Thomas. The Administration issued waivers on September 
11th pursuant to Section 1245 of the NDAA to facilitate the 
transfer of those funds from South Korea to Qatar.
    Mr. Green. And if those funds never get to Iran, can they 
be fungible as they relate to spending in Iran?
    Mr. Thomas. I would say that the terms governing the use of 
those funds are the same as the restrictions that govern the 
use of Iranian funds that are held anywhere in the world; 
namely, that they can only be used for nonsanctioned, 
bilateral, humanitarian trade. And that is the system that 
Congress set up, that these funds had to stay in the 
jurisdiction where they originated and not ever touch Iran.
    Mr. Green. And the same Congress that produced this 
architecture that you called to my attention is the Congress 
that can change this architecture, is that a fair statement?
    Mr. Thomas. Exactly.
    Mr. Green. They have a vote.
    Mr. Thomas. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Green. You don't have a vote, do you, Mr. Thomas? You 
work for an entity associated with Congress, but you don't have 
a vote, do you?
    Mr. Thomas. I do not, sir. I am not a Member of Congress.
    Mr. Green. Okay. I think it is pretty fair to say that we, 
the Members of Congress, may have some responsibilities, but 
what you have is an opinion, as is the case with the other 
witnesses.
    Moving on to something else, Hamas is a terrorist 
organization. What they did was a crime against humanity and 
should never happen again. But I have lived long enough now and 
have enough courage to say that we ought not to allow innocent 
people, regardless of their place of origin, to be killed.
    I care about babies in Israel, but I also care about babies 
in Palestine. Those babies have lives, too. We ought to be 
concerned about all babies. And we ought to be concerned about, 
not just winning a war, but winning the peace. You can win a 
war and lose the peace. How you execute a war has a lot to do 
with the peace you will have.
    And I will tell you that while I did not cosign the 
resolution, there is a reason: I believe that we should have 
had language in there about a two-state solution to this 
problem. Because if we do not, if Congress doesn't go on 
record, we give the impression that we may be abandoning the 
two-state solution.
    I have not abandoned it. I voted to fund these agreements 
that we have had with Israel, each and every one of them. But I 
did it because I thought we would have a two-state solution. 
And without a two-state solution, I don't see a path to peace.
    I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    And I will note that, yes, we all do have a vote up here, 
and we are responsible for those votes and explaining those 
votes to our constituents. We also have staff that we rely on 
as well, and I have appreciated those opinions from former 
staff who have helped us as Members.
    Mr. Green. And in response to your comment, Mr. Chairman, 
which you allowed yourself time for; I just ask for equal time. 
I respect the comments of staff, too. I have no problem with 
staff. It is just that----
    Chairman Huizenga. Excellent.
    Mr. Green. ----we have the votes.
    Chairman Huizenga. There we go.
    The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meuser, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meuser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this very 
important hearing.
    And certainly, thank you to our witnesses. I appreciate 
your information very, very much. It is pretty serious stuff.
    Mr. Goldberg, the Biden Administration had secretly made 
available to Iran, since May, $50 billion for nothing more than 
a promise that Iran would not provoke an immediate nuclear 
crisis by producing weapons-grade uranium. This package did 
include the $6 billion transferred to Qatar.
    I met with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
last year, and they were very clear that Iran was in all kinds 
of violations, and they were making a trip there within about a 
week to express to them that they are in complete violation of 
any sort of a--the so-called deal that was being made, the Iran 
nuke deal.
    What are your thoughts there? Why would the Administration 
continue to work with some sort of deal?
    By the way, a colleague in the hearing yesterday, if you 
remember, stated that that would go down in history as one of 
the greatest flaws ever, that the previous Administration had 
gotten out of that.
    I don't know what kind of agreement there is when one side 
just blatantly doesn't follow it, doesn't allow surprise 
inspections. You give them a month's notice to show up, and 
then, they can tell when the uranium was moved and how much was 
actually extracted from the area. Yet, this Biden 
Administration continues to try to work with this Iranian 
terrorist state.
    Why do you think that is?
    Mr. Goldberg. Congressman Meuser, as a staff member to 
people who voted many years ago when I wrote both of those 
sanctions laws we are talking about, and they passed 100-0 and 
94-0 in the Senate, and by unanimous consent here in the 
House--and I thank everybody who voted on it at the time and 
the staff who worked on it.
    Mr. Meuser. Yes.
    Mr. Goldberg. I would say that, at that time, we had a 
bipartisan consensus that more money for the Islamic Republic 
of Iran was bad and that we should continue to pressure, 
contain, and roll back that regime across all of its malign 
activities.
    Mr. Meuser. Right.
    Mr. Goldberg. That changed during the JCPOA. We have gone 
into camps. It is ideological. It is political.
    Mr. Meuser. Right.
    Mr. Goldberg. And we advised----
    Mr. Meuser. It is amazing the level of Iranian sympathizing 
that is taking place. I agree with you.
    And you wrote, I think, that we now see the results of 
policies and appeasement that enrich the world's leading state 
sponsor of terror, and then we just go on.
    And I want to talk to Mr. Noronha and Mr. Thomas as well. 
There is no debating that things such as the increase of 
exports--1.5 million barrels per day, the highest monthly rate 
since 2018--there is no getting around those facts.
    And the level of funding that is coming into Iran, the 
sponsor of terror, that is clear and known to Democrats and 
Republicans, that is happening. And yet, at the same time, they 
are selling it to China at discounts, and we know this.
    And it is also stated there is no way for Iran to boost its 
exports to this extent without the White House ordering the 
nonenforcement of U.S. sanctions and providing clear signals to 
Beijing that U.S. sanctions will not be enforced.
    What is going on here?
    Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. $150 million a day in Iranian oil revenue is 
currently what is happening. And that does not go to the 
Iranian central budget; that goes to the IRGC's budget. They 
have a special deal; they get the Iranian oil revenue.
    Respectfully, sir, that is exactly what is happening. It is 
a funneling for terror financing across the Middle East that 
reaches to Washington, D.C., because there are assassination 
attempts ongoing here in this Capitol.
    Mr. Meuser. Right.
    Mr. Thomas, allowing the missile embargo on Iran to expire; 
granted, the national legitimacy to Iran's transfer of armed 
drones to Russia, who were sending billions and billions of 
American taxpayer dollars to the Ukraine, and yet we are 
allowing this to help fund Russian drones and ballistic 
missiles. What do you think about that?
    Mr. Thomas. The sunset you are referring to that happened 
this week did draw condemnation from a number of Members of 
Congress. It also drew attention in Europe, which has been the 
focus of a number of Members who have sought to have European 
partners of the United States join U.S. efforts to continue 
those restrictions.
    Mr. Meuser. I think it is insane.
    I want to ask you a question. Do we have any documentation 
or any reason to believe, or are there any facts or connections 
to the idea that there may be a transfer of funds from Iran to 
any member of the Biden family? Does anybody have any 
information on that?
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Meuser. If you do, please let me know for the record.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman can pose that question in 
writing if he so chooses.
    With that, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Steil. Chairman Huizenga, thank you for holding today's 
hearing, and thank you for waiving me on to the subcommittee.
    It is such an important topic that we are discussing, and 
incredibly timely following the attack by terrorists from Hamas 
against defenseless Israeli citizens. And when we see Iran as 
the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, and we look at 
the Biden Administration's policy allowing Iran to have access 
to funds, I think it is imperative that we in Congress examine 
that and move this Administration in a new and different 
direction.
    I think the direction that this Administration has been 
going--providing access to funds to Iran, looking the other way 
as it relates to oil sanctions in particular, where billions of 
dollars are able to move into Iranian-controlled coffers--is 
incredibly dangerous.
    And I want to dig in a little bit, if I can. I want to 
start with you, Mr. Noronha. Walk us through a little bit of 
how these funds are flowing, because I think it is really 
imperative for the American people to understand.
    We had the Biden Administration come forward and say that 
the Iranians don't have access to these funds in Qatar. Yet, 
clearly, they issued the waiver and then a license to transfer 
those funds to Qatar.
    Last year, in the NDAA, I successfully got an amendment 
passed and signed into law that will force this Administration 
to disclose those types of licenses. Waivers previously were 
enforced under the 2012 NDAA. Now, we have access to the 
licenses, so we can actually see with transparency how this 
Administration is giving deference and giving access to Iran. 
We now know it went to Qatar.
    Do we actually have any proof that what the Administration 
is saying as it relates to these funds--that the Iranians don't 
have access, that they haven't done that--what is the proof of 
this?
    Mr. Noronha. There has been no documentation sent over to 
Congress. They did not affirmatively provide the package, the 
written agreement, to Congress.
    I think one point that is relevant here is that the laws we 
have been describing here from 2012 allowed bilateral trade in 
South Korean won to Iran; they didn't allow for euros and 
dollars. That is a permissive waiver in the granting of a 
concession to Iran to allow that money----
    Mr. Steil. I think that is really important. That is the 
actual waiver. And then, they provide the license to transfer 
that over to Qatar such that they can be dealing in a much more 
liquid currency form. Is that right?
    Mr. Noronha. That is correct. If they wanted to buy food 
and medicine from South Korea, they could have, but they chose 
not to. Again, the emphasis is not on helping the Iranian 
people.
    Mr. Steil. So, someone should suspect, why would they not 
want to buy some food or some medical supplies, and load it 
onto a boat in South Korea that would then go over to Iran. And 
maybe then, they could at least argue that they are trying to 
help people, that they are not going to pilfer these things off 
the top.
    What if, all of a sudden, they want access to euros?
    Mr. Noronha. Because euros are what Hezbollah and Hamas 
want, at the end of the day, and it is much easier to do this 
if it is in those currencies.
    Mr. Steil. So, the Administration was hoping everyone would 
look the other way on the transfer of these funds to Qatar, and 
most likely, most of the international community would have but 
for the attack by terrorists from Hamas in Israel, where the 
world's attention turned to this region once again. And the 
Administration was exposed for their poor decision to allow the 
transfer of these funds from custody in South Korea to Qatar. 
Is that accurate?
    Mr. Noronha. I believe that is, sir.
    Mr. Steil. Let's dive in one step further. I think you made 
an important point about the Administration looking the other 
way as it relates to oil sales, which from a dollar standpoint 
or from a value standpoint--dollar, euro, whatever currency 
they are operating in--is probably a more relevant discussion 
point.
    And this Administration has looked the other way while Iran 
has been able to transfer oil to China as well as Syria. Is 
that accurate?
    Mr. Noronha. They have been notified many times of all the 
tankers that are evading their sanctions. They know all of 
this, and they haven't done it.
    Mr. Steil. And why is the Administration looking the other 
way?
    Mr. Noronha. Because they want to advance their nuclear 
deal with Iran, which is a broader political objective.
    Mr. Steil. And who gets the funds?
    Mr. Noronha. Iran, at the end of the day------
    Mr. Steil. Does it go to the central bank account? Does it 
go to a food organization? Does it at least go to some warm and 
fuzzy operation in Iran so that they can at least pretend they 
are doing the right thing with it?
    Mr. Noronha. It is a complicated international financial 
network. It is not easy for them to move things under 
sanctions. Sanctions make it harder, which is the point. But it 
is sort of like a sieve; it slowly drips in and comes back into 
Iran.
    Mr. Steil. And in particular, when Iran has access to new 
funds, it is like a gift card that gives Iran the ability to 
purchase other things. And as we know, Iran is the leading 
state sponsor of terrorism around the globe. And ultimately, I 
am wildly concerned that these funds are falling into the hands 
of operations like Hezbollah and Hamas.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 
being here today.
    I want to touch on something that Mr. Meuser said, and that 
you kind of mentioned in passing, Mr. Noronha, which is the 
idea that Iran has somehow been involved in attempted 
assassinations on U.S. soil. Can you please expand on that?
    Mr. Noronha. Iran is currently trying to assassinate my 
former boss, Brian Hook, who has testified before Congress 
multiple times. They are trying to assassinate Mike Pompeo, and 
John Bolton, but also Democrats. They are trying to assassinate 
current officials of the Biden Administration: General Mark 
Milley, who served both Presidents; and Masih Alinejad, who 
testified before Congress yesterday.
    They are trying to do it, and they have made active 
attempts. And I will leave that to your imagination. They have 
been described in some Department of Justice filings as showing 
up on people's doorsteps with guns, and getting within 100 feet 
of targets.
    A lot of our public servants have to live with 24-hour 
security details, and they have been living with them for 3 
years, if not longer. That is not how Americans should have to 
live. This is not a Republican/Democrat thing; this is a 
disgrace to our public servants who have served this country, 
in both Administrations, and shouldn't be treated this way.
    Mr. Ogles. So, to emphasize, both Republicans and Democrats 
live under constant fear. It is documented, and we know it 
because of assassination attempts or plans against their lives. 
Is that fair?
    Mr. Noronha. It is, sir.
    Mr. Ogles. Is it reasonable to assume that giving Iran or 
Qatar any mechanism by which money would flow into Iran would 
somehow aid and abet the missions to kill Americans on U.S. 
soil?
    Mr. Noronha. These operations are expensive. They need the 
money to do it. They have bounties of up to a million dollars 
on the heads of each of these Americans. That money is 
absolutely subsidizing these assassination threats. They would 
probably still try to do them, but it makes their job much 
easier.
    Mr. Ogles. Would it be in the best interest of our homeland 
and the aforementioned individuals whose lives are under a 
fatwa or assassination orders that these monies be pulled back 
and blocked in perpetuity?
    Mr. Noronha. I believe it could save their lives--at least 
some of their lives, if we do so.
    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Goldberg, do you have any comments?
    Mr. Goldberg.No, sir. The leading state sponsor of 
terrorism with active plots to kill Americans should not have 
access to a nickel, if we can stop it.
    Mr. Ogles. Would you like to say that again a little 
louder?
    On that, Mr. Steil mentioned Qatar. What active role has 
Qatar played in essentially aiding Iran to get around 
sanctions, which then allows moneys to flow to these active 
terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terrorism, the 
literal active, ongoing assassination attempts against former 
and current public officials?
    Mr. Noronha?
    Mr. Noronha. My understanding is that, separate of the $6 
billion which we are debating, Qatar is not typically an 
economic partner of Iran. They are not typically the sanctions-
busting jurisdiction involved here.
    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Goldberg?
    Mr. Goldberg. Listen, in general, we should have a 
principle that there is no access to cash, there are no 
relationships, there is no safe harbor. You should not be in 
the capital of Qatar, Doha, and have a summit between the 
Iranian foreign minister and the head of Hamas, and then, by 
the way, allow that same Iranian foreign minister, who was also 
in Beirut earlier this summer before the attacks, to come to 
New York on a visa.
    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Goldberg, when we look at the $6-billion 
Iran deal, there was a prisoner swap, obviously the funds. In 
my opinion, it is appeasement. But can you give us a broader 
scope of that deal and, again, the risk associated with it as--
again, we have a minute, so I am going to give you the floor--
but the unintended consequences of this, again, appeasement of 
state terror?
    Mr. Goldberg. I think it is a very important time to zoom 
out and think about this at a strategic level. Right now, we 
have all talked about the brink of regional war. Why would we 
be on the brink of regional war? Because Iran is not deterred. 
Why has Iran not deterred? Because as much as the President 
says, I am going to send another carrier strike group--don't do 
it, don't do it, Iran--they also, at the same time, see a 
posture of saying, how much money can we make available to you 
so that we don't have to confront you if you continue to 
escalate your nuclear program?
    As long as we have $10 billion-plus in a waiver that is 
continuing to build up money available to the regime in Oman, 
$6 billion moved from South Korea, all the oil that is 
flowing--it is not possible to allow that much oil to go 
without having built-up sanctions targets that you are sitting 
on, that you are not imposing sanctions on and not talking to 
Beijing about first.
    All of that--$50 billion or more, the $80 billion since 
2021--needs to stop; otherwise, they will continue to push and 
push until this escalates further.
    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Goldberg, really quickly, is the world a 
more dangerous place because of this $6 billion?
    Chairman Huizenga. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Goldberg. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Ogles. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Chairman Huizenga. Okay.
    I would like to thank all of our witnesses for their 
testimony today and, frankly, for their current and past 
service to our country, and to the various legislative and 
executive organizations that have helped this government.
    And at some point, we are going to need to explore doing 
this in a podcast format. I believe this is something--between 
two hearings yesterday, and a hearing today, and there is a 
hearing happening in the U.S. Senate right now as well, this is 
certainly at the forefront of many of the conversations that 
are happening in Congress writ large and, I think, around the 
world.
    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in 
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
the record.
    With that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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