[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                 


 
  EXAMINING THE FISCAL YEAR 2024 STATE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS BUDGET 
                           REQUEST FOR AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             June 22, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-35

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 54-080PDF          WASHINGTON : 2024                   
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California             GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California                COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa                   SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas                       Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
                                     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey         SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             JIM COSTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida                  JASON CROW, Colorado
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illino
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas
JOHN JAMES, Michigan
KEITH SELF, Texas
                                     
                                     
                                     is

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                         Subcommittee on Africa

                           JOHN JAMES, Chair
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey        SARA JACOBS, California, Ranking 
YOUNG KIM, California                    Member
JIM BAIRD, Indiana
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey
CORY MILLS, Florida

                                     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
                                         Florida
                                     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
                                     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois

                       Joe Foltz, Staff Director
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Phee, Honorable Molly, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 
  African Affairs, U.S. Department of State......................     7
Muyangwa, Honorable Monde, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 
  Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development..............    12

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    37
Hearing Minutes..................................................    39
Hearing Attendance...............................................    40

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    41


  EXAMINING THE FISCAL YEAR 2024 STATE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS BUDGET 
                           REQUEST FOR AFRICA

                        Thursday, June 22, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                            Subcommittee on Africa,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in 
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. John James (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. James. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Africa will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Fiscal Year 
2024 State and Foreign Operations budget request for Africa. I 
now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, Assistant Administrator 
Monde Muyangwa, it is my pleasure to welcome you before the 
Subcommittee on Africa and this hearing examining the 
President's budget request for Africa.
    I'll be leading a congressional delegation to the DRC, 
Tanzania, and Nigeria this summer and I look forward to this 
morning's hearing to learn more about the Administration's 
approach to the African continent.
    The U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the role of 
the strategic competition in foreign policy. Throughout Africa 
the Chinese Communist Party uses the Belt and Road Initiative 
as a Trojan horse to curtail freedoms and erode institutions, 
while the Russian Federation and the Kremlin supported Wagner 
Group create and perpetuate instability, profiting off the 
backs of Africans.
    Despite these realities, the U.S. strategy toward sub-
Saharan Africa does not once mention strategic competition. It 
only mentions China once.
    I am concerned that this dissonance at the top is reflected 
in the lack of resolve to ensure that you have the necessary 
resources in place to strengthen and deepen our partnerships on 
the continent.
    In today's resource-constrained environment it's imperative 
that we prioritize our limited resources on Africa on programs 
that most benefit U.S. national interests and that starts with 
its people.
    U.S. embassies throughout Africa have struggled to keep 
pace with the profound transformations across the continent, 
and while I commend the Foreign Service officers serving on the 
front lines of diplomacy there are persistent and widespread 
staffing gaps that have a material impact on diplomatic 
capacity to engage compared to China's large and growing 
presence on the continent.
    I look forward to hearing how the department is looking at 
making sure personnel are more efficiently allocated in global 
Foreign Service system with the appropriate incentives to build 
the American presence on the continent.
    Switching to programs, the failed U.N. peacekeeping 
missions in Mali, Central Africa, African Republic, and the DRC 
cost the United States taxpayers $975 million dollars in the 
last Fiscal Year alone.
    Let me say that again. Nearly a billion dollars in the last 
Fiscal Year alone. The purpose of these peacekeeping missions 
is to prevent conflict and create the conditions for peace, and 
yet by comparison the Global Fragility Act, which is intended 
to be the U.S.' long-term strategy to stabilize conflict-
affected areas and prevent violence, is provided only $100 
million annually for the entire coastal West Africa region, a 
region that's at high risk of instability.
    U.S. global health programs such as PEPFAR and the 
President's malaria initiative have been unmitigated successes 
and have saved millions of lives across Africa.
    The successes of these decades-long investments in these 
initiatives can be built upon and applied to other priorities 
across the continent.
    Advancing two-way trade rather than just aid and investment 
between U.S. and African partners must be a key foreign policy 
priority, not simply $55 billion commitment made without 
followup.
    I'm currently working on legislation relating to the DRC's 
critical mineral sector specifically in creating a strategy to 
balance our national security responsibility to ensure 
continued access to key mineral commodities such as cobalt and 
lithium with the appalling working conditions present in the 
DRC mining sector and the extremely opaque business and climate 
that exists throughout the country.
    I look forward to working with you both as this legislative 
progresses--legislative effort progresses and in hearing your 
thoughts on how we can improve and get better in the U.S. 
economic relationship.
    Additionally, and if I can be frank, I'm concerned that 
these limited resources for the African continent are being 
used to force a social and climate agenda upon unwilling 
African partners, and from what I've heard from representatives 
of African nations it is further validating concerns that many 
on the continent have.
    Africans are not vassals. They are equals, and a finger 
wagging we know it all and better than you foreign policy just 
reinforces the stereotypes that are being pushed by the 
Russians, the Chinese, and those who would hurt us.
    It is perceived as highly hypocritical when we would 
lecture when the Saudis also have problems with women's rights 
and the Chinese leverage slave labor, and is perceived as 
racist when they see billions going to Ukraine when areas in 
Africa to include Sudan are worse.
    What are we doing to mitigate this perception of hypocrisy 
and racism in American foreign policy with Africa? In advance 
of this hearing Congressman Mills, the vice chair of the 
subcommittee, sent you both a letter detailing specific USAID 
and State Department programs of concern throughout Africa and 
I really look forward to hearing how you explain these programs 
to secure U.S. interests in the face of African nations, many 
of whom have complained on the methods of their employment.
    In closing, the United States is a reliable and valued 
partner to many on the African continent but more trust--excuse 
me, more must be done to ensure that our limited government 
must be more focused and funding the continent is used most 
efficiently and effective to advance U.S. national interests 
but not at the expense of our African partners.
    The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the 
Congresswoman from California, Ms. Jacobs, for any statement 
she may have.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Assistant Secretary Phee and Assistant Administrator Muyangwa, 
for testifying before this committee today on the Fiscal Year 
1924 Africa budget and U.S. policy in Africa.
    Today's hearing gives us an important opportunity to 
examine the Biden Administration's Fiscal Year 1924 budget 
request for Africa and to conduct oversight of U.S. policy in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
    The African continent plays a critical role on the world 
stage. It has the youngest population and is expected to 
outpace Asia as the fastest growing region in the world with 
six out of the 10 fastest growing economies.
    There is so much we can learn from African countries on 
many of our shared goals like prioritizing climate resiliency, 
being a leader on global health, and strengthening trade and 
investment.
    But like anywhere else the region is also facing challenges 
like addressing democratic backsliding, political instability, 
poverty, food insecurity, and the economic impacts of Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine.
    It's long overdue for the United States to truly prioritize 
Africa in its broader foreign policy and it's why I've been so 
encouraged by and focused on the Biden Administration's U.S.-
Africa Leaders Summit, the first of its kind since 2014.
    With this summit the United States committed $55 billion to 
the African continent over the next 3 years in human capital 
infrastructure, agriculture, health systems, and securing 
investments, including the Digital Transformation for Africa, 
an initiative designed to expand digital access and literacy 
across the continent that will invest over $350 million and 
facilitate $450 million in financing--a really exciting effort 
that helps bring our engagement to the 21st century; the new 
president's advisory council on African diaspora engagement in 
the United States to deepen the dialog between U.S. officials 
and the African diaspora, a long overdue initiative that 
leverages the huge African diaspora population and better 
incorporates diaspora communities into U.S. policy; new 
programs advancing democracy and good governance like the $100 
million 3-year pilot program, the 21st Century Partnership for 
African Security Initiative to support security sector reform 
efforts, and the $75 million 3-year program, the African 
Democratic Political Transitions Initiative to address 
democratic backsliding; and so many other important and long 
overdue initiatives that I hope we can hear more about today.
    I particularly want to commend President Biden's 
announcement of U.S. support for the African Union's bid to 
join the G-20 as a permanent member where they are directly 
impacted by the decisions made on the global stage.
    Earlier this week I introduced a resolution supporting the 
AU's bid to join the G-20 and this critical commitment by 
President Biden with the support of the rest of my Democratic 
colleagues on the Africa Subcommittee.
    With all of these announcements we now need to ensure that 
we're following through on our promises because the worst thing 
we can do is have this summit, make all of these announcements, 
make a big deal, and then not live up to what our commitments 
promised.
    So I'm glad we're addressing the budget today because we 
all know that reduced funding will make implementation of these 
commitments even harder.
    Earlier this month House Republicans unveiled their 
proposed international affairs budget, which cuts the budget by 
nearly 31 percent, a total of $18.3 billion compared to last 
year.
    Slashing foreign assistance undermines our shared goals and 
priorities with our African partners and undermines U.S. 
leadership on the world stage. Specifically, this cut would 
significantly impact our assistance supporting education 
elections, the bipartisan Young African Leaders Initiative, 
conflict mitigation, and trade and investment and so much more.
    If funding for Power Africa, for instance, were cut by even 
25 percent this result--would result in 2.8 million fewer 
households connected to electricity and a thousand fewer MWs of 
power supply, leaving an additional 2 million households 
without power.
    So I hope to hear today how the President's budget request 
would help fulfill all of our goals. I also hope to cover 
critical issues on the continent including the U.S. response to 
the deteriorating situation in Sudan, the ongoing pursuit of 
justice in Ethiopia, and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray, 
increasing conflict and violent extremism in Mozambique and 
coastal West Africa, and so much more.
    I once again thank the two witnesses for testifying before 
the committee and look forward to digging into all of these 
important issues.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. James. Thank you, madam. Other members of the committee 
are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the 
record.
    We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses 
before us here today. The Honorable Molly Phee is the Assistant 
Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at the Department of 
State. Madam, if you would.

 STATEMENT OF MOLLY PHEE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU 
          OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Ms. Phee. Good morning, and thank you to you both for your 
opening statements. It's a pleasure to see you, Mr. Chairman 
and Ranking Member.
    I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Biden-Harris 
Administration's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request. The planned 
$55 billion investment in Africa announced by President Biden 
at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December builds on 
existing programs with a proven track record and provides 
funding for promising new initiatives.
    Our African partners ask us what the funding announced at 
the Leaders Summit means for them. Our answer is that the $8 
billion in the Fiscal Year 2024 budget request, a portion of 
our overall ALS investment, targets three categories of 
activity: first, reinforcing programs that have benefited 
African people and American interests; second, addressing 
Africa's infrastructure deficit and accelerating economic 
growth; and third, pioneering new initiatives to meet 
entrenched challenges.
    Fundamentally, the goal of the summit and its 
implementation is to solidify a strategic partnership between 
the United States and African countries, institutions, and 
people.
    In this effort, Ambassador Johnnie Carson in his role as 
special representative for summit implementation, has been an 
invaluable partner lending his expertise and insights.
    Based on consultations with African leaders he will propose 
a new architecture to ensure that the U.S. Government maintains 
predictable and sustained engagement with the continent.
    This budget request funds valued programs such as Power 
Africa, the Young Africa Leaders Initiative, and the African 
Women's Entrepreneurship Program. The request amplifies funding 
for critically needed development financing in Africa, 
especially the impactful work of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, the EXIM Bank, and the Development Finance 
Corporation.
    It will also fund new initiatives, as the ranking member 
said, the digital transformation with Africa to expand 
affordable inclusive digital connectivity and the ADAPT, or 
African Democratic and Political Transitions initiative to 
support democratic transitions.
    To elevate the voices of the more than 45 million 
American--African members of the diaspora in America we are 
also launching the President's Advisory Council on Africa 
Diaspora Engagement this month.
    The pandemic underscored the need for continued investment 
in African health systems. To that end, we are requesting more 
than $5 billion, which includes nearly $3.8 billion for the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, to end 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic by 2030.
    To achieve this goal we ask for strong bipartisan support 
for a clean PEPFAR reauthorization before it expires at the end 
of September.
    We are also committed to addressing food insecurity 
exacerbated by Russia's aggression in Ukraine. That is why we 
requested $487 million for the U.S. government's flagship food 
security program Feed the Future.
    In addition, drawing on Fiscal Year 2023's supplemental 
resources generously provided by Congress, Secretary Blinken's 
envoy for global food security, Dr. Cary Fowler, worked with 
USAID to design and launch a new initiative known as Vision for 
Adapted Crops and Soils.
    This innovative new program directs research funding to 
develop climate-resistant staple crops and improve soil.
    To promote political stability the budget request seeks 
$436 million for democracy and good governance to counter 
democratic backsliding and to secure gains made in fragile 
democracies.
    In the Sahel, we are requesting $388 million to support our 
efforts to increase disaster resilience, empower youth 
entrepreneurship, and reduce poverty. We are committed to 
countering harmful Russian and People's Republic of China--or 
PRC--activities.
    We support additional resources in this space. We remain 
heavily invested in diplomatic efforts to promote peace. 
Enlisting the AU, Kenya, and South Africa, our diplomacy 
contributed to the cessation of hostilities agreement between 
the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation 
Front.
    Our increased engagement in coastal West Africa and 
Mozambique for the strategy to promote stability and prevent 
conflict is making a difference. We are working closely with 
newly elected leaders in Kenya and Nigeria to promote economic 
development, inclusive governance, and State institutions 
capable of meeting security threats.
    We are responding to the outbreak of violence in Sudan by 
seeking to protect civilians, advance their democratic 
aspirations, and minimize threats to regional stability.
    Our ability to execute on our goals and interests relies on 
our dedicated public servants domestic and abroad. We have 
requested additional positions for critical personnel needs and 
are seeking incentives for posts that are difficult to staff.
    In closing, let me reiterate my appreciation to this 
committee. We greatly value your support in upholding our 
shared goals for a strategic partnership in Africa.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]

  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
  
    
    Mr. James. Thank you for your opening statement and for 
your work.
    The Honorable Monde Muyangwa--forgive me, Muyangwa--is the 
assistant administrator at the Bureau for Africa and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development.
    Again, forgive my mispronunciation. Your statement, please, 
ma'am?

 STATEMENT OF MONDE MUYANGWA, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU 
     FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you, Chairman James, Ranking Member 
Jacobs, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to testify about the President's Fiscal 
Year 2024 budget request and its importance for USAID's 
programming across sub-Saharan Africa.
    I would like to extend a special thanks to the committee 
whose bipartisan commitment to the people of Africa has 
provided the foundation for USAID programs and their success. 
Africa is home to some of the fastest growing markets in the 
world.
    It also has one of the world's fastest growing and youngest 
population. By 2050 one in four people will be African. This is 
a generation of young people who have the power to drive 
economic growth and build a more equitable future.
    Overall, the joint State-USAID Fiscal Year 1924 request of 
$8 billion advances these peace and security efforts to build 
more stable, inclusive economies, increases mutually beneficial 
economic growth, revitalizes democracies and champions human 
rights, and builds Africa's resilience.
    The United States remains a key partner to Africa in 
strengthening regional stability. Our support will address 
humanitarian needs and human rights and advance women's 
leadership in preventing and resolving conflict.
    Africa plays a pivotal role in the global economy and U.S. 
investments stimulate economic growth, reduce poverty and 
hunger, create jobs, and expand markets and social services.
    Looking ahead to the Fiscal Year 2024, the request of $100 
million for Prosper Africa will amplify services that increase 
two-way trade and investment between the United States and 
Africa. Since Prosper Africa's launch in 2019 the U.S. 
Government has helped close more than 1,100 deals across 49 
countries for a total estimated value of $65 billion.
    Turning to Power Africa, at its 10-year anniversary the 
initiative has closed 145 transactions and facilitated access 
to electricity for more than 179 million people.
    The $100 million request for Power Africa will accelerate 
efforts to increase electricity generation in sub-Saharan 
Africa in support of the Electrify Africa Act. The President's 
request prioritizes engagement with African partners to promote 
democratic ideals and foster legitimate, transparent, and 
inclusive political systems.
    The $436.3 million democracy request will provide critical 
resources to build on USAID's new Democracy Delivers 
initiative, which bolsters countries experiencing windows of 
democratic opportunity.
    In countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi this 
support is vital to sustain democratic transitions and 
consolidate gains.
    The President's request also includes initiatives announced 
during the December 2022 part of the U.S.-Africa Leaders 
Summit. The first, the Africa Democratic and Political 
Transitions Initiative, includes a request for $25 million to 
enable the U.S. Government to more effectively partner with 
regional bodies, governments, and civil societies to support 
successful democratic transition.
    The second, the Digital Transformation with Africa 
Initiative, is a request of $50 million to help expand 
affordable and inclusive digital connectivity, build digital 
resilience, and improve livelihoods and economic well being of 
Africans.
    The President's Fiscal Year 1924 request prioritizes the 
U.S. government's global hunger and food security initiative 
Feed the Future. The request of $487.5 million for food 
security increases funding support and aligns resources for the 
eight new Feed the Future countries in Africa.
    In addition, U.S. assistance will help African countries 
adapt to severe weather and other shocks and conserve 
biodiversity while growing their economies.
    The President's request of more than $5 billion for global 
health, including lifesaving PEPFAR programs in sub-Saharan 
Africa, will build on partnerships including with the private 
sector to strengthen health systems to provide essential 
services, prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease 
outbreaks, and promote innovation and research.
    The President's request of $20 million for the Young 
African Leaders Initiative will scale training and expand 
partner engagement.
    We will continue to provide opportunities for YALI alumni 
through transformational leadership training, networking, and 
professional development.
    In conclusion, the President's 1924 budget request 
demonstrates our renewed commitment to partnerships between the 
United States and Africa.
    Again, I appreciate your long-standing bipartisan 
commitment to the African continent and I thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Muyangwa follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    
    Mr. James. Thank you, Assistant Secretary--excuse me, 
Assistant--you got your promotion right there. How about that?
    Ms. Muyangwa. I did.
    Mr. James. Thank you, Assistant Administrator Muyangwa. I 
now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
    A few weeks ago we had Secretary of State--Secretary Antony 
Blinken here for a number of questions and I had the 
opportunity to question the Secretary myself for a few minutes 
and I asked for his commitment and support on solidifying 
American supply chains and driving out slavery and human rights 
violations, among many things.
    And I'm currently working on legislation relating to the 
DRC's critical mineral sector specifically in creating a 
strategy to balance our national security responsibility to 
ensure continued access to key mineral commodities such as 
cobalt and lithium with the appalling working conditions 
present in the DRC mining sector and the extremely opaque 
business climate that exists throughout the country.
    I look forward to working with the Secretary and with each 
of you as we move forward with this legislative effort.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, in addition to some of your 
concerns that we discussed recently I've also been closely 
following President Tshisikedi's recent visit to Beijing and 
the negotiation between his government and the CCP--linked 
mining companies.
    A couple of questions for you. What is the department's 
belief regarding the purpose and the outcome of President 
Tshisikedi's visit to Beijing, and two, what is the 
department's view regarding the current trajectory of the DRC--
China relationship?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As a leader of a large and complicated country we 
anticipate and assess that President Tshisikedi likes to have 
many options, as many leaders would, as he considers how to 
develop his country's resources.
    But we are confident that the United States is a better 
partner and that that is his view, that we are a better partner 
and one he would prefer to engage with.
    So we are looking very seriously at opportunities for 
development in the critical mineral sector. You may have seen 
that the Development Finance Corporation recently announced a 
project to build a transport corridor from Zambia through DRC 
to Angola to help move resources from the DRC to export 
markets.
    Mr. James. Madam Assistant Secretary, do you have the 
resources--do you have the heads to specifically focus on an 
effort like that specific with critical minerals in the DRC? Do 
you have that resource?
    Ms. Phee. I would say the short answer to that is no. But I 
would also like to share with you, if I might, how we got to 
this position and what we need to do to get out of this 
position.
    Mr. James. Perfect.
    Ms. Phee. So as you may be aware, in recent years there was 
a hiring freeze at the State Department and we failed to hire 
to respond to attrition.
    The Secretary has included in his budget requests immense 
requests, relatively speaking, to increase our staffing and 
that hiring and training process is underway.
    But there's a gap between where we need to go and where we 
are so we're working on some creative solutions within the 
department to identify talent to help us take advantage of 
opportunities specifically in the DRC.
    I would ask this committee to lend your support to the 
budget requests that the Administration has made for the State 
Department. Relatively speaking, in our grand national budget 
it's a reasonable request and it will provide us with the 
predictability and the stability to carry out our shared goals.
    Mr. James. And the second question with the last minute or 
so what's the Department's view regarding the current 
trajectory of the DRC-China relationship?
    Ms. Phee. Again, my understanding, based on my witness of 
President Tshisikedi's engagement with President Biden and his 
repeated engagement with Secretary Blinken, is that the United 
States remains the preferred partner and it is our 
responsibility to show up and ensure that we remain in that 
privileged position.
    Mr. James. I now recognize Ranking Member Jacobs for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again, 
both of you, for testifying.
    I want to start this conversation by talking about not just 
the Fiscal Year 1924 request but what level of funding Congress 
is likely to pass. House Republicans have proposed cuts to the 
international affairs budget of nearly 31 percent.
    Assistant Secretary Phee and Assistant Administrator 
Muyangwa, could you please provide the committee a brief 
overview of what these kinds of cuts could mean for our work in 
Africa and our ability to lead and do all the things that we 
want you to be able to do?
    Ms. Phee. Dr. Monde is a great partner to me so we never 
know which one should speak first.
    This is an exciting time to be involved in African affairs. 
Finally, the United States is, as President Biden said in 
December, all in on Africa. We have many opportunities, as we 
have discussed, and, again, we believe our values, our 
approach, our processes, our innovation, and our technologies, 
everything you can imagine, makes us the best bet for our 
African friends.
    But to capitalize on this opportunity we need those 
resources so we have sufficient funds to respond to the 
programming needs, both building on the excellent programs we 
have that are well appreciated and have a demonstrable impact 
and to invest in new efforts such as the Global Fragility Act 
to make sure that we can address what have been sort of 
entrenched challenges and problems.
    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you so much for that question.
    I'd add three other areas where we would see impact. 
Obviously, it would impact our whole development agenda on the 
African continent but let me focus on three specific areas.
    If we cut the budget Power Africa would not be able to 
deliver electricity to 2.8 million households across the 
continent, and we know what an amplifier the access to energy 
is in terms of development.
    Similarly, with Prosper Africa if we were to cut the 
request there we would not be able to really lean into the 
plans that we have to advance two-way trade between the United 
States and Africa to unlock the business potential that resides 
on the continent and also to encourage more American businesses 
to invest in Africa.
    The third area I would focus on is on the education front. 
If we were unable to--if we did not get the request that we 
have put in the literacy rates in Africa had already taken a 
downward trajectory due to COVID and other factors and we have 
been working to build that up to try and raise those literacy 
rates.
    The implications for development, again, given education's 
impact or link to development is huge, particularly on a 
continent where one in four--in five will be African by 2050.
    Ms. Jacobs. Yes. Thank you. And I hope my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle hear how detrimental the proposed cuts 
would be for the things we all want to do on the African 
continent.
    Really quickly, in our last minute and a half I want to 
talk about the Global Fragility Act. As you both know, you 
know, Mozambique and coastal West Africa are priority countries 
and this law is really about doing things differently, which 
means coordinating across the interagency and realigning our 
funding and empowering local partners.
    And while we know that a different bureau is the lead at 
the State Department, Congress expects the regional bureaus to 
be part of this, too, and to prioritize the country strategies.
    So, Assistant Secretary Phee, I just wanted you to discuss 
how you plan to do this for Mozambique and coastal West Africa.
    Ms. Phee. Thanks very much for your support for this 
incredibly important program. I want you to know that I have 
directed all of the Ambassadors in countries that are 
benefiting from this program that this is the--should be their 
number-one priority, that we need to have this program succeed 
to demonstrate that the new authorities and resources you gave 
us and the new way of thinking and approaching will work.
    As you know, we're focused on three different types of 
activities--social inclusion, government responsiveness, and 
accountability of security forces.
    I think we're already beginning to see the impact of the 
initial funding, and the teams worked together closely and we 
worked closely with the other bureau--the CSO Bureau--and I'm 
confident you're going to see a good return on that investment.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. James. The chairman now recognizes Rep. Kim for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman James and 
Ranking Member Jacobs, for holding this hearing. I want to 
thank our witnesses for joining us today.
    The civil war in Sudan has only gotten worse since fighting 
began on April 15, and without the U.S. leadership on the Sudan 
crisis the humanitarian catastrophe will worsen and Moscow will 
emerge as the victor.
    The Wagner-backed Rapid Support Forces has already publicly 
expressed openness to a Russian naval base at Port Sudan with 
resurrecting its genocidal tactics in Darfur.
    The Sudanese Armed Forces' reliance on imprecise airpower 
and artillery has taken a very heavy civilian toll with little 
military success.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, I wanted to find out what is the 
senior level task organization and roles and responsibilities 
within the State Department for handling U.S. policy toward 
Sudan.
    And, you know, during the past periods of conflict in Sudan 
the U.S. has utilized the role of a special envoy and I was 
wondering if such an appointment would be constructive to 
advance U.S. policy in Sudan.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you very much for your question about such 
a critical crisis at a--in a critical part of the continent. 
The Secretary of State, Secretary Blinken, has been personally 
and directly involved and we focused our efforts on three 
prongs.
    The first prong has been emergency diplomacy, working with 
our partners, the Saudis, who have unique influence with both 
sets of security actors. We have worked to try and achieve 
cease-fires to reduce the level of violence and allow the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
    Those cease-fires have not been fully effective, although 
they have allowed the transmittal of important urgently needed 
humanitarian assistance.
    However, on Wednesday, yesterday, we adjourned those talks 
to--because the format is not succeeding in the way that we 
want.
    The second important prong is our support, which is our 
long-standing support for the Sudanese civilians against their 
oppressive military, whether it's the SAF--the Sudanese Armed 
Forces--or the Rapid Support Forces.
    So we are working closely with Sudanese civilians and with 
our partners in Africa, particularly at the African Union and 
the regional organization IGAD as well as other interested 
partners such as the EU, the United Nations, and the Arab 
League, to see how we can lend our collective support to 
promote Sudanese civilian leadership of Sudan.
    As the security forces have demonstrated, they have no 
right to have any role in governance.
    And the third prong is humanitarian assistance, which I 
might ask Dr. Monde to address, fulfilling our long-standing 
role as the leading donor in the world as well as the leading 
donor in Sudan.
    Mrs. Kim of California. To the question that I just posed, 
would a special envoy--would be able to carry out all of these 
three-pronged solutions that you just mentioned? Because you 
said the conversation started but it has not advanced to the 
level that we can actually carry those out.
    Ms. Phee. Yes. The Secretary is considering elevating the 
role of Ambassador John Godfrey, who knows all the players. But 
I want to emphasize that the entire U.S. Government is fully 
engaged in addressing this crisis given its impact not only for 
Sudan but for the region.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Okay. I also wanted to ask if you 
can describe the State Department's efforts to engage civilian 
groups in Sudan. What is the department's plan to achieve that 
long-term goal of a political transition toward a civilian role 
in Khartoum?
    Ms. Phee. We have been in daily contact with Sudanese 
civilians, which has been somewhat challenging given the 
collapse of the communications network and the fighting that 
they are living under.
    But there are also many Sudanese leaders outside of Sudan, 
including the former civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok.
    Just last week, I, along with colleagues from USAID, 
chaired a meeting under the support of the former Sudanese 
Ambassador to the United States with key critical leaders to 
talk to them about who should be involved in the process to 
establish a civilian government, where should that process take 
place, and when should that take place.
    So we continue to be----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Quickly, I wanted to ask--you know, 
because I serve as the chairwoman with the Indo-Pacific 
Subcommittee, too, so one of my priorities is finding ways to 
incorporate more private sector initiatives into our foreign 
policy to better equip our diplomats to compete with our PRC 
counterparts.
    So do you think our Ambassadors and the embassy staff are 
sufficiently equipped in supporting and advocating for our 
private sector throughout the African continent, especially 
the--when contrasted with the high level of diplomatic support 
afforded to the Chinese and European countries? Could you make 
that comparison?
    Ms. Phee. Sure. Well, first of all, we welcome your support 
for that initiative, and in Vice President Harris' recent trip 
to the continent she secured commitments from the private 
sector in the billions to actually undergird the Digital 
Transformation Initiative that we described to you. We also 
have partners on the continent from the Development Finance 
Corporation and from the Department of Commerce's Foreign 
Commercial Service.
    But if you ask me if we could use more the answer would be 
yes.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. James. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    I now recognize Rep. Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Last year the USAID announced the Africa Localization 
Initiative to direct more funding to local organizations in 
sub-Saharan Africa. As part of its larger localization agenda 
the Administration has not asked for additional funding to 
implement this initiative.
    My first question goes to Assistant Administrator Muyangwa. 
Sorry about the pronunciation.
    Can you elaborate on the status of the implementing--of 
implementing this initiative including potential focus 
countries?
    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you very much for that question. So 
localization is very, very important to the success of USAID's 
work on the continent and we are continuing to make progress on 
that front.
    We just issued USAID's localization report in March of this 
year, which shows where we are, and some of our missions on the 
African continent are doing quite well. But we continue to push 
and to plan and to implement so we can make even more progress 
in that end.
    To that end we have 12 countries that are now participating 
or 12 missions that are participating in the localization--
Africa Localization Initiative and we are working with them to 
develop their plans and to implement, and we will take lessons 
from those 12 missions and see what we can do to amplify our 
localization efforts across the continent.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. And how is the USAID 
viewing this program in comparison to the Central America local 
initiative?
    Ms. Muyangwa. We learned a lot from the Central American 
initiative and so we built some of those lessons learned to 
inform how we are working on the African component of it, 
obviously, contextualized to the African situation. But we work 
together to share lessons learned and to figure out how we can 
continue to amplify localization across the agency.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. To what extent are you thinking 
about lessons learned on localization from PEPFAR on the 
continent?
    Ms. Muyangwa. I would say that those lessons learned have 
been built into how we are thinking about localization. In 
fact, our health sector had the highest percentage of 
localization of all of our programming and so it is a very good 
place for us to start in terms of figuring out how we embed 
those lessons learned to our future efforts.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. And I wanted to ask specific 
questions about health. What are the Administration's 
priorities regarding PEPFAR programming in Africa as Congress 
considers the potential reauthorization of the program this 
year?
    Ms. Muyangwa. So PEPFAR has been one of, if not the most, 
transformative health program in the world. Its impact on the 
continent has been absolutely transformative, starting out 20 
years ago when very few Africans had access to life-saving 
medications to today where we have 18 million Africans who are 
able to access medications.
    We have a number of countries that have really made a lot 
of progress. We have reduced maternal deaths on the continent. 
We have improved the number of children who are born HIV/AIDS 
free. We have made significant progress in terms of addressing 
the malaria.
    So a lot of achievements on the African continent but we 
still have a lot of work to do, and so as we look to 2030 when 
we are looking to get to the 95/95/95 formula that has been put 
out there for HIV/AIDS it's critically important that we 
continue to support those efforts because our inability to 
support those efforts will mean losing the gains that we have 
made over the last few years and so that's critically 
important.
    The second area in terms of the President's budget has to 
do with enhancing pandemic--sorry, pandemic support--the 
response to pandemics and so building that capacity, as we saw 
with COVID, it is critically important that we continue to 
build those capacities because it impacts not just Africa but 
the rest of the world as well.
    So there's a lot of work to do and that request is 
fundamentally important to the success of our engagement with 
the continent.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. The Fiscal Year 2024 request will 
reduce funding for water and sanitation programs by nearly 50 
percent from 2022 levels though cholera and other waterborne 
illnesses remained a threat in the region. What is the reason 
behind that proposed decrease?
    Ms. Muyangwa. I think it's--so it's looking broadly at all 
of the issues and challenges that we are facing on the 
continent and it's also looking at the opportunities that we 
have to leverage other programs to achieve work in certain 
areas.
    So it's that shift of resources to still remain committed 
to the continent, still remain committed to the health area but 
also looking at areas where we can continue to do the work that 
does not undermine our overall objectives in that sector. I 
think that's one.
    I think the second area for us, and the administrator has 
been very strong on this, is figuring out how we crowd in 
resources from other partners to enable us to continue doing 
the work that we need to do in these other areas. So those are 
two prongs that we would be pursuing.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you for your testimony. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. James. Thank you. I now recognize Rep. Baird for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our 
witnesses for being here.
    My first question deals with the fact that last week the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee--we held a hearing that the 
U.S. doing to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative--BRI.
    One of my questions pertained to the actions this 
Administration is taking to counter Chinese involvement with 
AGOA--approved countries that have duty-free access to U.S. 
markets. The Communist Party--CCP--has leveraged large-scale 
investments in many sub-Saharan AGOA countries--eligible 
countries.
    Many of these investments have tied aid approach that are 
backed by unrepayable terms and burdensome collateral 
commitments.
    My concern is that the U.S. taxpayer dollars that are being 
spent in Africa by the State Department and USAID are going 
directly into the hands of the CCP in disguise as repayments by 
those countries and Americans are footing the bill.
    So my question gets down to what is USAID and the State 
Department doing to oversee where these funds are being used 
and that Chinese are not just using these funds to funnel U.S. 
taxpayer dollars into their pocket.
    So if you can give me any kind of a sense of what you're 
doing in that area I would appreciate it either. Either one of 
you.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you very much for your question.
    Of course, Chinese predatory practices in Africa, which 
include the BRI investment that increases debt burden and also 
unsavory practices with regard to the environment and labor, 
are of major concern to the U.S. Government.
    The kind of programming we're trying to offer as an 
alternative, whether it be through Millennium Challenge 
Corporation investment in, for example, regional 
transportation, the Development Finance Corporation financing 
for major investments to build transportation pipelines for 
mineral export, or EXIM Bank financing all comes with built-in 
protections to ensure that that funding is used properly and 
transparently with accountability.
    Separately, we are working with governments such as the new 
leadership in Zambia where the previous leadership had incurred 
a great Chinese debt burden at the Paris Club and other G-20 
discussions to help reduce the debt loads. So those are two 
examples of the way in which we're safeguarding U.S. investment 
and resources and helping our African partners move away from 
those predatory practices.
    Mr. Baird. One more. To continue on with that, do you feel 
that we're being successful in competing with China? I mean, 
they fund everything in terms of ports and railroads and other 
resources. And so are those African countries accepting our 
offers?
    Ms. Phee. We do different types of funding. As you heard 
from Dr. Monde, for example, we invest in people and in 
systems. So, for example, our impact on African health has 
been, as she said, transformative.
    But part of the reason it's been transformative is that 
assistance has helped to build African health systems so that 
they're going to be better able to respond and work with us for 
pandemics whether they're COVID, Ebola, most recently, Marburg.
    So we have not traditionally invested U.S. Government in 
big infrastructure projects the way the Chinese have. Some of 
those have been helpful to the continent, particularly roads, 
but some we have concerns about and are taking actions about.
    For example, we're keeping a close eye on investments in 
ports to make sure that ports aren't developed that would 
threaten the United States. So we have different ways of 
engaging.
    Our practices, of course, also are focused on anti-
corruption, unlike the Chinese, and, again, as I mentioned, on 
labor standards and environmental standards.
    So we believe in an open competition. Our processes and 
approach, our technology, our ways of doing business will be 
most attractive to our African partners.
    Mr. Baird. Dr. Monde, we are out of time, I guess, so I 
yield back. But I would like to have your comments on that, 
too, at some point. Thank you.
    Mr. James. I now recognize Rep. Jackson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Chairman James.
    This is an open question. The AGOA--African Growth 
Opportunity Act--is up for renewal in 2025. Please share with 
us your insights on what that bill should look like, what we 
should be asking for, to give us a sustainable competitive 
advantage in Africa.
    And let me parenthetically say I am glad that there is 
renewed interest. We have had a long relationship with Africa 
that we have chose not to invest in the continent. So what 
should it look like, going forward?
    Ms. Phee. Thanks very much for your interest and your 
support.
    You've rightly identified AGOA as a key component of our 
economic partnership with Africa. One of the outcomes of the 
Leaders Summit was to amplify our engagement to promote trade 
and investment. That's our signature initiative, and first of 
all, I would welcome congressional support for its renewal.
    We're also engaged in discussions now about whether or not 
the program should be adjusted. It's had a positive impact in 
the 35 countries who have benefited from those trade privileges 
but it has not been fully optimized.
    So there's discussions underway with USTR and the State 
Department's chief economist about possible ways we might 
recommend you consider to update the bill.
    I would say that, as the chairman noted in his opening 
statement, it's a good bridge to doing more trade and less aid. 
That was one of the original elements of the design to help 
Africans climb out of poverty, help develop jobs, and help 
improve their economies through trade rather than aid.
    Ms. Muyangwa. And I would just add to that that throughout 
its existence USAID has played a critical role in supporting 
AGOA and we stand ready to continue to provide that support.
    The support that we have provided includes helping member 
countries develop national AGOA implementation plans and 
helping them navigate the rules and regulations pertaining to 
AGOA, helping them through the--meeting the standards of 
participation in AGOA.
    And so we would continue to provide that support to AGOA, 
given its critical--it's a critical part of our larger trade 
and investment infrastructure.
    Mr. Jackson. Okay. I'd like to make one comment on that 
before I ask a followup question. I find it remarkable that we 
have had a 200-plus-year relationship with Africa and we did 
not have an African trading policy officially until 2000--it's 
rather reprehensible--and that we have seen a Marshall Plan.
    We have seen the rebuilding of Japan. But we have never 
forcefully said this is how we're going to invest across the 
continent of Africa. And in the last 20 years we have seen the 
Chinese talk about communications infrastructure.
    We have seen them in 2010 talk about the Belt and Road 
Initiative. It's been concrete plans and they have been 
successful, although many African countries have not had an 
alternative. They've been--had the opportunity to go to the IMF 
and those programs did not work.
    So when we talk about onerous conditions and expensive 
funding we have not offered them many viable alternatives. So 
I'm glad to see that we're talking about reciprocal trade.
    In Sudan specifically the 2020 Congress appropriated $900 
million for the Sudanese government before the 2021 coup. What 
would you think--how much of that money was spent and is there 
anything that we could have done different?
    Ms. Phee. Thanks for that question. Although that subject 
was handled prior to my confirmation as assistant secretary I 
think there's a consensus that we did not move the money out 
quickly enough to have the desired impact and, in fact, in my 
confirmation hearing I committed to accelerating our 
disbursement of those funds.
    I started work in October and that's when the coup 
happened. So we did not have time to mobilize.
    That said, it's not uncommon in countries that have had 
such difficult histories as Sudan has--30 years of an Islamist 
dictatorship by a military leader--that the transition--we 
might have expected that the transition would be bumpy.
    But I think, if that was your question, sir, we did not 
move the money fast enough.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you.
    Ms. Muyangwa. I would agree with my colleague here, and the 
only thing I would add to that that there is a request from 
USAID for close to $50 million in the 1924 budget to support 
Sudan and that is underpinned by our commitment to supporting 
the people of Sudan in their democratic aspirations but also 
our recognition that Sudan resides in a very restive region and 
our ability to be able to provide the support is critically 
important not just for Sudan but for the entire region and our 
interests in that region.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you for your participation and coming 
forward with us today. I yield my time, Chairman.
    Mr. James. Thank you, Rep. Jackson. I now yield myself 5 
minutes of questioning.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, the Manono-Kitolo mine in the DRC 
is one of the largest if not the largest in the world. 
President Biden's climate change agenda is pretty aggressive by 
all measures.
    The automotive industry has been tagged with the obligation 
to meet these greenhouse gas emissions targets lest they pay 
fees.
    According to NHTSA last year, could cost the industry $90 
billion and another $9 billion in fees for noncompliance, and 
that's not to mention any other penalties that could come from 
any other agencies in the Administration.
    Given these aggressive goals, I imagine that you support 
the President's climate agenda. Is your department also given 
metrics and are you also tracking the fact that President 
Tshisikedi was in Beijing negotiating the sale and the control 
of one of the largest lithium mines in the world--as it is 
nearly impossible to currently make electric vehicles without 
lithium--this past week in Beijing?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, again, I welcome your interest in 
the DRC and in the role that DRC critical minerals will play 
for the United States and globally.
    We are working with his government to see what might be 
possible and to----
    Mr. James. Are you being measured by anything? We say that 
there's transformational change. We say that there are 
meetings. We say that there are--are there any goals that you 
have to hit?
    Are there any metrics that you are measuring to kind of 
kind of define and be transparent with the success or not of 
the American taxpayers' efforts and money and kind of tracking 
our progress in the region?
    Ms. Phee. In terms of the DRC----
    Mr. James. The fact that the President has such aggressive 
goals----
    Ms. Phee. Yes.
    Mr. James [continuing]. With EV transformation----
    Ms. Phee. Yes.
    Mr. James [continuing]. Yet the control for the largest 
lithium mine in the world may have been negotiated to China. I 
understand that if we have these goals, if we are putting 
metrics and goals and having penalties in the automotive 
industry then we in the government should also have metrics and 
goals that we're following to facilitate the potential 
penalties that we'd be imposing on American companies. Are you 
aware and are you tracking any goals?
    Ms. Phee. Yes. The interagency is focused very much on 
critical minerals and identifying and pursuing opportunities to 
ensure U.S. investment in that sector.
    Mr. James. What are those goals? Are they--are they numbers 
or are--can you share those goals?
    Ms. Phee. Why do not I followup with you on----
    Mr. James. I would appreciate that followup. Thank you very 
much.
    Ms. Phee. Okay. Thank you. Yes.
    Mr. James. Another one. Is the Wagner Group a threat to 
Africa?
    Ms. Phee. The Wagner Group is a predatory group that 
exploits existing challenges in Africa.
    Mr. James. Is the Wagner Group a threat to the United 
States of America and its allies?
    Ms. Phee. I do not believe it's a threat to us but it's a 
threat to the interests of our partners in Africa.
    Mr. James. There are a lot of things that we're seeing in 
Africa that are reminiscent to the Afghanistan and Pakistan 
issues that we saw 20 years ago. Wagner Group is absolutely a 
terrorist threat in Africa and it can absolutely hurt us in the 
United States of America.
    That is one of the biggest reasons that Africa is 
important. I also have a question about Sudan.
    Are you familiar with GSK, a security company in Sudan?
    Ms. Phee. No, I'm not.
    Mr. James. Okay. It's a small technology and security 
company that's based in Sudan. The Tradive General Trading LLC 
is used for funding the operations of Hemeti and the RSF. 
Mohammed Edris is partnered with Ahmed Mousa, Dagalo's younger 
brother and is in partisanship--a partnership with Wagner. 
Edris moves all the money for Hemeti.
    What I've heard--what I've heard is that these are things 
that happened prior to your--to your stationing in your 
position but the war in Sudan is currently being funded by 
stealing the resources--the natural resources from the 
Sudanese.
    Are we doing anything to counteract these forces, the 
funding of the Wagner Group and the continued violence in 
Sudan?
    Ms. Phee. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Earlier this month we imposed sanctions on two sets of 
parastatals that are, respectively, affiliated with the 
Sudanese Armed Forces and with the Rapid Support Forces. GSK--
--
    Mr. James. To what effect? Are we noticing any effect at 
all?
    Ms. Phee. Well, it was--the action was just taken this 
month. So we--so I just wanted to mention to you that GSK is a 
subsidiary of Tradive, which is the--one of the RSF affiliated 
parastatals that we sanctioned.
    What we--what would be helpful, and I would welcome your 
voice, is to encourage other governments to join us in our 
sanctions.
    The U.K. is considering doing so. The EU has been rather 
slow in making a decision to pursue sanctions, and we're in 
discussions with our Arab partners as well.
    Mr. James. Thank you for your work here. I appreciate it 
and look forward to working with you.
    The chair now recognizes Rep. Kamlager-Dove for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    It's always appreciated when you invite me to these 
hearings, and Assistant Secretary Phee and Assistant 
Administrator Muyangwa, it is so great to see you both again 
after the Presidential delegation to Nigeria that I had the 
privilege of participating in earlier this month with you.
    As important as it is to bolster our programming and 
funding commitments on the continent, this will yield little 
advancement if we do not have the people to implement them.
    So, Assistant Secretary Phee, what is the Administration 
doing to address personnel gaps at U.S. diplomatic posts in the 
region and also to increase the diversity of our Foreign 
Service officers to reflect the population they are engaging 
in? And then what can we do to help make that happen?
    Ms. Phee. Thanks very much for that question, which 
highlights the personal commitment of Secretary Blinken and all 
of his key staff such as persons like myself to do both more in 
getting staff for the State Department generally and to ensure 
that we attract and retain diverse talent.
    So on the first, as you are aware we had a few years where 
there was a freeze on hiring and we failed to hire to replace 
those who departed.
    The Administration and all of its budget requests has put 
forward large requests for additional staff. We would welcome 
support for those staffing requests so we can do better but we 
have a gap between those we lost and those that are now coming 
online.
    So that's a challenge, given that our renewed emphasis and 
elevation of the Africa file. With regard to the challenge of 
diversity, I think we're facing a challenge that many in the 
private sector also face.
    But there are concerted efforts from programs to personal 
leadership, mentorship, to try and, again, address both the 
issue of attracting the right talent and retaining the right 
talent.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you for that. I mean, I hate to 
sound controversial but it is always odd when I go to the 
continent of Africa and the only folks that are representing 
the United States of America are white people. It just makes me 
a little prickly. So, please, I hope you share those remarks 
with the secretary.
    I also had the privilege of traveling to Stockholm this 
weekend as part of a congressional delegation to the 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue to discuss mutual priorities 
with counterparts in the EU, and I have to say that I was 
dismayed by their level of dismissiveness when it came to 
investing in the continent of Africa.
    I cannot tell you how many people rolled their eyes at me. 
I had to meditate. One shared interest that I believe needs to 
be elevated is increasing our partners' attention and 
investments in Africa because the United States can and should 
not do this work alone.
    So can you describe in what ways is State pressing our G-7 
partners to bolster their development, financing, and business 
investments in Africa? And if the assistant administrator would 
like to add to that I would welcome.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting the important role of 
our partners. So when we're united we can have maximum impact.
    As you know, the President has led the way in the G-7 to 
mobilize G-7 efforts to improve and increase investment in 
Africa and also to leverage capital funds globally so that we 
marry U.S. Government resources, other government resources, 
particularly from the West, and some venture capital funds that 
are available.
    We also meet routinely at every level of the U.S. 
Government with the Europeans and with G-7 partners. Africa is 
always a topic of conversation, including in the most recent G-
7 meetings in Japan, and we fully agree with you that we need 
the Europeans to do more with us in Africa.
    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you very much for that question, and 
it's good to see you again.
    So USAID approaches this from a number of--a number of 
vantage points. Let me start with the recent pledging 
conference on Sudan that just took place where the U.S.--the 
United States has been the leading contributor to humanitarian 
efforts in Sudan.
    We got other partners to contribute to those efforts. We're 
still putting in a sizable amount of money compared to the 
others but others stepped up to the plate. So I think that's 
really important.
    A second area in which we do this is what the administrator 
calls progress beyond programs where we try to crowd in 
partners to add more resources to the areas of the work that we 
already are working on.
    And then Prosper Africa on the economic end also offers 
services that really seek to demystify Africa both to our U.S. 
partners and others who are working in the economic space.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California [presiding]. Thank you.
    I would like to recognize myself for questioning but I want 
to continue this conversation with you, Assistant Secretary 
Muyangwa, regarding the Prosper Africa.
    The Fiscal Year 1924 budget request for Prosper Africa is 
designed to be the one-stop shop for all two-way trade and 
investment between the United States and Africa that is 
currently $100.5 billion.
    Currently, it is housed within USAID but where does Prosper 
Africa fit into the agency's overall trade and investment 
strategy with Africa?
    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you very much for that question.
    So while USAID serves as the secretariat for Prosper 
Africa, Prosper Africa is a 17-agency initiative.
    So USAID is actually just the secretariat for that and it 
is really at the center of economic engagement with the African 
continent, offering a lot of services in terms of encouraging 
U.S.-Africa trade and investment and a lot has been done.
    We just had a great success story in terms of President 
Ruto announcing $150 million worth of investment working with 
Prosper Africa and others between the U.S. and Kenya. Prosper 
Africa does a lot in terms of connecting U.S. and African 
businesses.
    We have a virtual deal room, for example, which curates 
opportunities and facilitates U.S. companies and entrepreneurs 
being able to connect with those opportunities in Africa.
    We provide advisors to U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs 
who are interested in doing business in Africa and those have--
all of these efforts pulled together have yielded quite 
significant results, as both Assistant Secretary Phee and 
myself mentioned in our written remarks.
    Mrs. Kim of California. You know, I've noted that there is 
no Prosper Africa coordinator within the State Department, 
right?
    Ms. Muyangwa. The Prosper Africa coordinator actually 
resides at USAID----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Or at USAID. Yes.
    Ms. Muyangwa [continuing]. And I am happy to share that a 
Prosper Africa coordinator will be coming on board imminently--
--
    Mrs. Kim of California. Okay.
    Ms. Muyangwa [continuing]. And we just sent a message out 
to committee members this morning, I believe. But the 
announcement----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Given the importance I think it's 
real important to have that coordinator to effectively navigate 
and coordinate the--you know, across the interagency.
    So I really support that and I believe that coordinator 
position should be elevated and properly empowered. Wouldn't 
you agree? That's also a sentiment that is shared by many 
private sector representatives, both African and Americans.
    One more question to you. Where will the Prosper Africa 
coordinator fit into that USAID hierarchy and who would that 
person report to?
    Ms. Muyangwa. So the Prosper Africa coordinator has a line 
to the assistant administrator, myself, and that is mostly on 
coordination purposes. The Prosper Africa coordinator also has 
a strong link with our agency front office as well as our 
Administration.
    And so the Prosper Africa coordinator really works across 
all of the agencies--the 17 agencies that I talked about----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Got it.
    Ms. Muyangwa [continuing]. Coordinates with the Africa 
Bureau because it's an Africa focused position, but also get 
strategic guidance direction from the larger U.S.----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I would like to put in 
one more question in to Assistant Secretary Phee.
    Ms. Muyangwa. Sure.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Given Africa's economic potential 
it's really especially important that we have a very high-level 
commercial expertise in our embassies. Would you agree? Right.
    But I've noted also from 2016 to 2020 there were on average 
only 12 Foreign Commercial Service officers in the entirety 
throughout the sub-Saharan Africa. So would the State 
Department support more Foreign Commercial Service officers 
being placed at embassies all throughout Africa?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you for highlighting the need for more 
Foreign Commercial Service officers, which, of course, is a 
program run by the Department of Commerce.
    You know, the President has an advisory council on doing 
business in Africa and they recently completed a report which 
included a dozen or so recommendations and that is one of their 
key recommendations. So I think that's a consensus view.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Perfect. And then we talked about 
the African Leadership Summit. Since then--I think we addressed 
it a little bit but can you tell us what instructions have been 
sent to the embassies and consulates regarding that and, you 
know, in order to advance commercial diplomacy goals, and when 
were they sent?
    Ms. Phee. Thanks very much. This is the 6-month anniversary 
so we're doing--this is a great opportunity. We're doing a lot 
of public diplomacy to identify all the work that has been done 
in the past 6 months.
    Specifically regarding the economic diplomacy we had an 
Africa Business Forum day in which deals of $15.7 billion were 
announced.
    That number has now risen to $16.2 billion. One of our key 
leaders who had served at the National Security Council to help 
organize the summit is now working for the Chamber of Commerce 
specifically to followup on implementation of those deals and 
we are fully engaged with our embassies and pursuing the 
economic levers I've outlined.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you so much. We went over 
time but now I recognize Ranking Member Jacobs for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, I was glad that we have talked a 
lot about the U.S.-African Leaders Summit. I know you just 
answered questions on the commercial piece.
    I just wanted to make sure the State Department has sent 
out guidance and materials on implementation other than what's 
publicly available to the embassies and missions.
    Ms. Phee. Yes. And also just to update you, we established 
a website for the Leaders Summit in December and we're now 
going to transfer all of the programs and activities.
    We have at least 19 different departments and agencies who 
are moving in many ways and we want to have points of contact 
so we facilitate followup.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Wonderful. I'm so glad to hear that. I 
know when I was traveling on the continent some of the 
Ambassadors were still waiting for that guidance.
    I know we have also talked about Sudan a few times already. 
I'm particularly concerned by what we have seen in West Darfur, 
ethnic-based killings against the non-Arab Masalit tribes 
people by the RSF and we know that the highest risk of 
atrocities and crimes against humanity and genocide is previous 
atrocities and, obviously, unfortunately, this region has seen 
decades of these kinds of killings.
    What is the State Department doing to address these 
killings, gather evidence, and proactively try to prevent 
another genocide in the region?
    Ms. Phee. Thanks for highlighting the horrific crimes that 
are taking place in the Darfur region. We mobilized very 
quickly following the outbreak of the conflict to work with our 
colleagues in the bureau--CSO Bureau--to establish something 
known as the Sudan Conflict Observatory, which has already 
begun publishing photographs and other images and documents to 
describe what's going on including in the Darfur region.
    As you may have seen last week we issued a statement in 
reaction to the assassination of the Governor of West Darfur 
and we have spoken directly to these problems both publicly and 
in Jeddah where we have been meeting with a delegation from the 
RSF as well as through our engagement with the leadership of 
the RSF.
    So the initial attention focused on Khartoum because it was 
unusual to have that kind of fighting in the Nation capital. 
But as we feared, given the RSF base in Darfur the fighting has 
spread there.
    Ms. Jacobs. And I wanted to also ask you about U.S. policy 
on Mali and specifically MINUSMA. Now that we're likely to see 
a withdrawal of MINUSMA how is the U.S. working with the U.N. 
to ensure an orderly and responsible withdrawal of troops and 
how does this decision impact the new U.S. strategy toward 
Mali?
    Ms. Phee. This is a deeply regrettable decision, which is 
one in a pattern of regrettable decisions by the transitional 
government that will threaten the interests of the people of 
Mali.
    As you know well, once a government withdraws consent for a 
peacekeeping mission it's not possible to keep the mission on 
the ground.
    But it's one of the largest missions in Africa and we will 
need to work responsibly together with other members of the 
Security Council as well as with the transitional authorities 
to make sure that the draw down does not worsen the situation.
    The choices that the transitional government has been 
making are--have been the subject of concern and criticism by 
the United States and other partners and to their partners in 
the region who are also concerned about the impact the 
deterioration of the situation will have on their interests.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And, last, I mentioned in my opening remarks President 
Biden's support for the AU to become part of the G-20. There's 
wide range of support for that here in Congress and the 
international community.
    When do you expect this to happen?
    Ms. Phee. It's our expectation that that should take place 
this year, likely in the fall, and I'm glad you've raised that 
point because one of the important outcomes of the Leaders 
Summit was our effort to elevate Africa in the global 
conversation so not only the G-20--and thank you for your 
legislative reinforcement--also support for an African 
permanent seat on the Security Council.
    And I wanted to mention in response to an earlier question 
that Secretary Yellen is undertaking an effort to update the 
IFIs and the MDBs to make sure they're fit for purpose to meet 
the challenges that African nations face.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, I'm really glad to hear that and please 
count on us if you need anything in that regard, and we look 
forward to working with you to make sure that Africans actually 
get a say in the decisions that are often being made about 
them.
    So thank you. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, and now I recognize 
Representative Baird for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    My question focuses on the contributions for the 
international peacekeeping activities account. The U.S. 
Government requested $1.31 billion for U.S. contributions to 
international peacekeeping throughout the sub-Sahara Africa.
    The request for these contributions to the failing U.N. 
missions in Central Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Mali is $970 million. By contrast, the coastal West African 
region receives only $100 million and they spread that through 
the Global Fragility Act, and that's split between five 
countries.
    So my question, Assistant Secretary Phee, is in today's 
resource constrained environment why does the department still 
view these contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations in 
Africa as an effective use of resources that enhance U.S. 
national security?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you very much, Congressman, for 
highlighting the challenges that these peacekeeping missions 
face.
    As I'm sure you know well, as a permanent member of the 
Security Council dating to our--the founding of the Security 
Council the United States pays an assessed contribution to 
support peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security 
Council.
    So that accounts for that funding request, and the 
peacekeeping efforts in Africa are among if not the most 
challenging in the world, given the degraded security 
environments in which they operate, and the challenges that 
troop-contributing countries face in dealing with terrorist 
threats such as in Mali where they're dealing with threats from 
ISIS and from AQ.
    Also in the DRC they're dealing with threats from armed 
militias as well as ISIS, and in CAR there is the historic 
threat from insurgent groups there and now the presence of the 
Wagner Group.
    In both CAR and in Mali the Wagner Group has limited the 
operations of those peacekeeping missions, calling into 
question their utility, and I think it has led to the decision 
by the transitional government to ask for the mission to leave 
in Mali.
    So they're a bit of apples and oranges in terms of the 
funding as, again, assessed contributions rather than 
initiatives by Congress such as through the GFA. So those are 
questions that we need to consider collectively about what's 
the best way to invest in Africa security and development.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. And, Assistant Administrator 
Muyangwa, the Global Facility and Fragility Act sets a decade-
long time horizon on the address of political and social 
drivers of conflict, a laudable goal but one insufficient to 
address the immediacy of the security threat posed by the JNIM 
and Islamic State--Islamic State in Greater Sahara.
    So how does the department balance resourcing the long-term 
goals of the GFA with the urgent need to improve security to 
the northern areas of the coastal West Africa?
    Ms. Muyangwa. Thank you so much for that question.
    I would start by pointing out that the GFA is part of a 
larger package of security support to the African continent 
that the United States provides. Part of it resides with the 
Department of Defense, and then there are programs by the 
Department of State as well as USAID.
    For USAID on the Global Fragility Act, as you know the 
President approved those 10-year plans in March of this year 
and we have started to implement in coastal West Africa where 
we have 22 activities that are either being implemented or in 
the planning process and we are focusing on the prevention side 
of it, which speaks to the larger security environment.
    So we have programs that are looking at border security, 
programs that provide for livelihoods so that we can build 
resilience in the communities that guards against potential 
recruitment by extremist forces.
    We are also looking at each country's contacts, and so the 
10-year horizon actually gives us the certainty of being able 
to build on over the long term rather than the single-year 
funding.
    So we're really, really grateful for that, that it will 
continue to build on successes from this year going into the 
future to help minimize the vulnerabilities to violent 
extremism in the region and other sources of fragility.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, Chairwoman.
    Late last year as part of the U.S. Africa Leadership Summit 
President Biden issued an executive order directing the 
Secretary of State to establish the President's Advisory 
Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, what is the status of 
establishing this council and choosing members?
    Ms. Phee. We're so excited about this council. We're really 
thrilled to have the resources and talent of the American 
diaspora--the African diaspora in America to help us.
    Earlier this month we sent forward to the Hill the 
regulatory framework that would guide the establishment of the 
council and names have been selected through a conscientious 
and thorough process. They're being vetted right now and our 
hope is that we can announce the names this month.
    Again, this is the 6-month anniversary of the summit so we 
want to make sure that everyone sees what we're doing to act on 
the President's commitments.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. And how do you envision the 
council changing the way the U.S. engages with the diaspora 
communities and related to U.S. policy?
    Ms. Phee. I think the most important way it will change the 
way and what we do--it's not as if we have been disengaged with 
the diaspora communities but it will formalize and make 
systematic our outreach and we can then depend on leaders who 
have been tapped to support us to tap into their networks.
    So I think by elevating it to a Presidential level, by 
tapping some of the greatest leaders in America, and by working 
with them formally we'll be able to improve our engagement with 
them and their engagement with Africans.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much for your 
testimony.
    Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Kamlager-Dove for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I just want to say--I know this was discussed but Assistant 
Administrator, I think USAID is doing important work and your 
work with PEPFAR has been transformational and I certainly 
support a clean reauthorization.
    I also hope that we find ways to counter the recent policy 
in Uganda and work to make sure that it does not infect and 
affect the rest of the continent because, you know, hate kills.
    Assistant Secretary, I would ask if you could find a way to 
maybe give this committee a briefing on the status of Ethiopia. 
I talked to some constituents last night and there are some 
real concerns of a potential coup or deep unrest. And so hoping 
that--I just think that that country cannot afford that kind of 
instability.
    And, last, I just want to say that I actually do believe 
that there's a strong correlation between the countries who 
were most brutal in their colonization and the perpetual 
instability of those respective countries and I hope that we 
can find ways to lean on those European countries who are our 
allies to ask them to do better and to step up.
    So now my questions are the Digital Transformation for 
Africa Initiative, I believe, could be a game changer and I 
would love to hear from both of you what metrics or goals are 
you using to both monitor its implementation and also to track 
its success.
    Ms. Phee. She always makes me go first.
    We're so excited you have highlighted that. This has the 
potential to be impactful in a way that PEPFAR has been 
impactful.
    So we looked across the U.S. Government to find all the 
different departments and agencies who in some way contributed 
to this effort and we have identified $350 million in U.S. 
Government funded programs and have tapped an additional $450 
million in financing. So we're going to try and help expand 
digital access, digital literacy, and a good enabling 
environment.
    When the Vice President was in Zambia building on work 
she's done in Latin America she reached out to leaders in the 
private sector and asked them to match the U.S. Government 
investment. So we need to turn those commitments into reality.
    But there's a lot of opportunity and interest there. We 
talked about the work we have been doing over the past few 
months to make real the commitments at the ALS.
    So we have set up a digital policy council within the 
government to sort of guide this investment and make sure we're 
taking advantage of these resources to really make a difference 
in this critical space.
    You had an opportunity to go to Abuja. I hope you can go to 
Lagos where there's an incredible creative industry which is 
really engaged in this space. That's another area, for example, 
where the diaspora council can help us.
    So there's a lot of opportunities here. Everybody is 
focused on making good use of these resources to have the kind 
of impact that will make a difference in Africa.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Amen to the creative economy.
    Ms. Muyangwa. I have nothing more to add to that--I thought 
the assistant secretary covered that really well--except to say 
we are in lockstep with the Department of State in terms of the 
importance of Digital Transformation Africa to our future 
efforts across the development, security, and governance 
sectors.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. So you have one extra minute of my time 
so I would just like you to continue to talk about the vibrancy 
and the potential of the creative economy in Africa. You can 
talk about Lagos or you can go other places. But I think it's 
incredibly important that we understand the power of this 
industry and how we can leverage it.
    Ms. Muyangwa. I would just say that one of the things I 
particularly enjoy in my job is visiting the continent with the 
young Africans and just seeing the creativity and the solutions 
and ideas that they are bringing to many of the challenges that 
their countries are facing in the security sector, in the 
health sector, in the education sector.
    And so creating an environment in which we can harness all 
of that really not just centers African agency but also enables 
us to spend less on the humanitarian, the security issues, over 
the long term.
    And so, for me, finding ways of amplifying these creatives 
on the continent is absolutely critical to our success in terms 
of our U.S.-Africa engagement.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, and I yield back, Madam 
Chairwoman.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. And I want to thank both 
of you for your testimony and answering the questions from our 
members.
    So, members, thank you so much for your engagement today.
    The members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to respond to 
those in writing.
    And pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 
days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials 
for the record, subject to the length limitations.
    So without objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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